sympathize with, and beat time to, the gra|titude of the person who has been benefited by his actions. If in the conduct of the benefactor there appears to have been no propriety, how beneficial soever its effects, it does not seem to demand, or necessarily to require, any proportionable recom|pence.
But when to the beneficent tendency of the action is joined the propriety of the affection from which it proceeds, when we intirely sympathize and go along with the motives of the agent, the love which we conceive for him upon his own account enhances and enlivens our fellow-feeling with the gratitude of those who owe their prosperity to his good conduct. His ac|tions seem then to demand, and, if I may say so, to call aloud for a proportionable recompense. We then intirely enter into that gratitude which prompts to bestow it. The benefactor seems then to be the proper object of reward, when we thus intirely sympathize with, and approve of, that sen|timent which prompts to reward him. When we approve of, and go along with, the affection from which the action pro|ceeds, we must necessarily approve of the
