Resentment would prompt us to desire, not only that he should be punished, but that he should be punished by our means, and upon account of that particular injury which he had done to us. Resentment can|not be fully gratified, unless the offender is not only made to grieve in his turn, but to grieve for that particular wrong which we have suffered from him. He must be made to repent and be sorry for this very action, that others, thro' fear of the like punish|ment, may be terrified from being guilty of the like offence. The natural gratifi|cation of this passion tends, of its own ac|cord, to produce all the political ends of punishment; the correction of the crimi|nal, and the example to the public.
Gratitude and resentment, therefore, are ••he sentiments which most immediately and directly prompt to reward and to pu|nish. To us, therefore, he must appear to deserve reward, who appears to be the pro|per and approved object of gratitude; and he to deserve punishment, who appears to be that of resentment.
