To us, therefore, that action must ap|pear to deserve reward, which appears to be the proper and approved object of gra|titude; as, on the other hand, that action must appear to deserve punishment, which appears to be the proper and approved ob|ject of resentment.
To reward, is to recompense, to remu|nerate, to return good for good received. To punish, too, is to recompense, to re|munerate, though in a different manner; it is to return evil for evil that has been done.
There are some other passions, besides gratitude and resentment, which interest us in the happiness or misery of others; but there are none which so directly ex|cite us to be the instruments of either. The love and esteem which grow upon acquaintance and habitual approbation, necessarily lead us to be pleased with the good fortune of the man who is the ob|ject of such agreeable emotions, and con|sequently, to be willing to lend a hand to promote it. Our love, however, is fully satisfied, though his good fortune should be brought about without our assistance. All that this passion desires is to see him
