CHAP. I. That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude, appears to deserve reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever appears to be the proper ob|ject of resentment, appears to deserve punishment.
TO us, therefore, that action must appear to deserve reward, which ap|pears to be the proper and approved ob|••ect of that sentiment, which most imme|diately and directly prompts us to reward, or to do good to another. And in the same manner, that action must appear to ••eserve punishment, which appears to be ••he proper and approved object of that ••entiment which most immediately and ••irectly prompts us to punish, or to inflict ••vil upon another.
The sentiment which most immediate|••y and directly prompts us to reward, is gratitude; that which most immediately ••nd directly prompts us to punish, is re|••entment.
