or agreeable either to the person himself or to others; and no qualities are disapproved of as vitious but such as have a contrary tendency. And, nature, indeed, seems to have so hap|pily adjusted our sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, to the conveniency both of the individual and of the society, that af|ter the strictest examination it will be found, I believe, that this is universally the case. But still I affirm, that it is not the view of this utility or hurtfulness which is either the first or principal source of our approbation and disapprobation. These sentiments are no doubt enhanced and enlivened by the perception of the beauty or deformity which results from this utility or hurtfulness. But still, I say, they are originally and essentially different from this perception.
For first of all it seems impossible that the approbation of virtue should be a senti|ment of the same kind with that by which we approve of a convenient and well contrived building; or that we should have no other reason for praising a man than that for which we commend a chest of drawers.
And secondly it will be found, upon exa|mination, that the usefulness of any disposi|tion of mind is seldom the first ground of
