The theory of moral sentiments: By Adam Smith, ...

INTRODUCTION.

THE propriety of every passion ex|cited by objects peculiarly related to ourselves, the pitch which the spectator can go along with, must lye, it is evident, in a certain mediocrity. If the passion is too high, or if it is too low, he cannot enter into it. Grief and resentment for private misfortunes and injuries may easi|ly, for example, be too high, and in the greater part of mankind they are so. They may likewise, though this more rarely happens, be too low. We denominate the excess, weakness, and fury: and we call the defect stupidity, insensibility, and want of spirit. We can enter into neither of them, but are astonished and confound|ed to see them.

This mediocrity, however, in which the point of propriety consists, is different

in different passions. It is high in some, and low in others. There are some pas|sions which it is indecent to express very strongly, even upon those occasions, in which it is acknowledged we cannot avoid feeling them in the highest degree. And there are others of which the strongest expressions are upon many occasions ex|tremely graceful, even though the passions themselves do not, perhaps, arise so neces|sarily. The first are those passions with which, for certain reasons, there is little or no sympathy: the second are those with which, for other reasons, there is the greatest. And if we consider all the different passions of human nature, we shall find that they are regarded as de|cent, or indecent, just in proportion as mankind are more or less disposed to sympathise with them.