The theory of moral sentiments: By Adam Smith, ...

CONTENTS.

PART I. OF the Propriety of Action.

• SECT. I. Of Sympathy Page 1
• SECT. II. Of the sentiments by which we approve or disapprove of the passions and affections of other men, as suitable or unsuitable to their objects.
  • CHAP. I. Of the pleasure of mutual sympathy 14
  • CHAP. II. Of the manner in which we judge of the pro|priety or impropriety of the affection of other men 22
  • CHAP. III. The same subject continued 30
  • ...

• ...
  • CHAP. IV. Of the amiable and respectable virtues page 41
• SECT. III. Of the degrees of the different passions which are consistent with propriety 49
  • CHAP. I. Of the passions which take their origin from the body 51
  • CHAP. II. Of those passions which take their origin from a particular turn or habit of the imagina|tion 60
  • CHAP. III. Of the unsocial passions 67
  • CHAP. IV. Of the social passions 80
• SECT. IV. Of the effects of prosperity and adversity upon the judgment of mankind with regard to the propriety of action; and why it is more easy to obtain their approbation in the one state than in the other 93

• ...
  • CHAP. I. That tho' our sympathy with sorrow is gene|rally a more lively sensation than our sym|pathy with joy, it commonly falls much more short of the violence of what is felt by the person principally concerned p. 93
  • CHAP. II. Of the origin of ambition, and of the distinc|tion of ranks 108
  • CHAP. III. Of the stoical philosophy 128

PART II. Of merit and demerit; or of the objects of reward and punishment.

• SECT. I. Of the sense of merit and demerit 141
  • CHAP. I. That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude, appears to deserve reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever

• ...
  • appears to be the proper object of resent|ment, appears to deserve punishment 143
  • CHAP. II. Of the proper objects of gratitude and resent|ment 148
  • CHAP. III. That where there is no approbation of the conduct of the person who confers the be|nefit, there is little sympathy with the gra|titude of him who receives it: and that, on the contrary, where there is no disapproba|tion of the motives of the person who does the mischief, there is no sort of sympathy with the resentment of him who suffers it p. 153
  • CHAP. IV. Recapitulation of the foregoing chapter 157
  • CHAP. V. The analysis of the sense of merit 160
• SECT. II. Of justice and beneficence.
  • CHAP. I. Comparison of those two virtues 170
  • ...

• ...
  • CHAP. II. Of the sense of justice, of remorse, and of the consciousness of merit 180
  • CHAP. III. Of the utility of this constitution of nature 188
• SECT. III. Of the influence of fortune upon the senti|ment of mankind, with regard to the me|rit or demerit of actions 207
  • CHAP. I. Of the causes of this influence of fortune 210
  • CHAP. II. Of the extent of this influence of fortune 218
  • CHAP. III. Of the final cause of this irregularity of senti|ments p. 237

PART III. Of the foundation of our judgments concerning our own sentiments and conduct, and of the sense of duty.

• SECT. I. Of the consciousness of merited praise or blame 248
• ...

• SECT. II. In what manner our own judgments refer to what ought to be the judgments of others: and of the origin of general rules 253
• SECT. III. Of the influence and authority of the general rule of morality, and that they are justly re|garded as the laws of the Deity 273
• CHAP. IV. In what cases the sense of duty ought to be the sole principle of our conduct; and in what cases it ought to concur with other motives 297

PART IV. Of the effect of utility upon the sen|timent of approbation.

• SECT. I. Of the beauty which the appearance of utility bestows upon all ••he productions of art, and of the extensive influence of this species of beauty p. 337
• SECT. II. Of the beauty which the appearance of utility upon the character and actions of men; and

• how far the perception of this beauty may be regarded as one of the original principles of approbation 356

PART V. Of the influence of custom and fashion upon the sentiments of moral approbation and disapproba|tion.

• SECT. I. Of the influence of custom and fashion upon our notion of beauty and deformity 371
• SECT. II. Of the influence of custom and fashion upon moral sentiments 386

PART VI. Of Systems of Moral Philosophy.

• SECT. I. Of the questions which ought to be examined in a theory of moral sentiments 413
• SECT. II. Of the different accounts which have been given of the nature of virtue 416

• ...
  • CHAP. I. Of those systems which make virtue consist in propriety p. 418
  • CHAP. II. Of those systems which make virtue consist in prudence 441
  • CHAP. III. Of those systems which make virtue consist in benevolence 455
  • CHAP. IV. Of licentious systems 470
• SECT. III. Of the different systems which have been formed concerning the principle of appro|bation. 490
  • CHAP. I. Of those systems which deduce the principle of approbation from self-love 492
  • CHAP. II. Of those systems which make reason the prin|ciple of approbation. 498
  • CHAP. III. Of those systems which make sentiment the principle of approbation 506
• SECT. IV. Of the manner in which different authors have treated of the practical rules of mo|rality 521