A treatise concerning the principles of human knowlege: Part I. Wherein the chief causes of error and difficulty in the sciences, with the grounds of scepticism, atheism, and irreligion, are inquir'd into. By George Berkeley, ...

Introduction.

§ 1. PHILOSOPHY being no|thing else but the study of Wisdom and Truth, it may with reason be expected, that those who have spent most Time and Pains in it shou'd enjoy a greater calm and serenity of Mind, a greater clearness and evidence of Knowlege, and be less disturb'd with Doubts and Diffi|culties than other Men. Yet so it is, we see the Illiterate Bulk of Mankind that walk the High-road of plain, com|mon Sense, and are govern'd by the Dictates of Nature, for the most part easy and undisturb'd. To them nothing that's familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They com|plain not of any want of Evidence in their Senses, and are out of all danger of becoming Sceptics. But no sooner do we depart from Sense and Instinct to follow the Light of a Superior Prin|ciple,

to reason, meditate and reflect on the Nature of Things, but a thou|sand Scruples spring up in our Minds, concerning those Things which before we seem'd fully to comprehend. Preju|dices and Errors of Sense do from all Parts discover themselves to our view; and endeavouring to correct these by Reason we are insensibly drawn into uncouth Paradoxes, Difficulties, and Inconsistences, which multiply and grow upon us as we advance in Specu|lation; till at length, having wander'd thro' many intricate Mazes, we find our selves just where we were, or, which is worse, sit down in a forelorn Scepticism.

§ 2. The cause of this is thought to be the Obscurity of things, or the na|tural Weakness and Imperfection of our Understandings. It is said the Fa|culties we have are few, and those de|sign'd by Nature for the Support and Pleasure of Life, and not to penetrate into the inward Essence and Constitu|tion of Things. Besides, the Mind of

Man being Finite, when it treats of Things which partake of Infinity, it's not to be wonder'd at, if it run into Ab|surdities and Contradictions, out of which it is impossible it shou'd ever ex|tricate it self, it being of the nature of Infinite not to be comprehended by that which is Finite.

§ 3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to our selves in placing the Fault originally in our Faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we make of them. It is a hard thing to suppose, that right Deductions from true Prin|ciples shou'd ever end in Consequences which cannot be maintain'd or made consistent. We shou'd believe that God has dealt more bountifully with the Sons of Men, than to give them a strong desire for that Knowlege, which he had placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable to the wont|ed, indulgent Methods of Providence, which, whatever Appetites it may have implanted in the Creatures, doth usual|ly furnish 'em with such means as, if

rightly made use of, will not fail to sa|tisfie them. Upon the whole, I am inclin'd to think that the far greater Part, if not all, of those Difficulties which have hitherto amus'd Philosophers, and block'd up the way to Knowlege, are intirely owing to our selves. That we have first rais'd a Dust, and then com|plain, we cannot see.

§ 4. My Purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those Principles are, which have introduced all that Doubtfulness and Uncertainty, those Ab|surdities and Contradictions into the se|veral Sects of Philosophy; insomuch that the Wisest Men have thought our Igno|rance incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural dulness and limitation of our Faculties. And surely it is a Work well deserving our Pains, to make a strict inquiry concerning the first Prin|ciples of Human Knowlege, to Sift and examine them on all sides, especially since there may be some Grounds to sus|pect that those Lets and Difficulties, which stay and embarrass the Mind in

it's search after Truth, do not spring from any Darkness and Intricacy in the Objects, or natural Defect in the Under|standing, so much as from false, Princi|ples which have been insisted on, and might have been avoided.

§ 5. How difficult and discouraging soever this Attempt may seem, when I consider what a number of very great and extraordinary Men have gone be|fore me in the like Designs: Yet I am not without some Hopes, upon the Con|sideration that the largest Views are not always the Clearest, and that he who is Short-sighted will be obliged to draw the Object nearer, and may, perhaps, by a close and narrow Survey discern that which had escaped far better Eyes.

§ 6. In order to prepare the Mind of the Reader for the easier conceiving what follows, I thought it proper to premise somewhat, by way of Introduc|tion, concerning the Nature and Abuse of Language. But the unraveling this Matter leads me in some measure to

anticipate my Design, by taking notice of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering Speculation intricate and perplex'd, and to have occasion'd innu|merable Errors and Difficulties in almost all parts of Knowlege. And that is the opinion that the Mind hath a pow|er of framing Abstract Ideas or Noti|ons of Things. He who is not a per|fect Stranger to the Writings and Dis|putes of Philosophers, must needs ac|knowlege that no small part of them are spent about abstract Ideas. These are, in a more especial manner, thought to be the Object of those Sciences which go by the name of Logic and Metaphy|sics, and of all that which passes under the Notion of the most abstracted and sublime Learning, in all which one shall scarce find any Question handled in such a manner, as does not suppose their Ex|istence in the Mind, and that it is well acquainted with them.

§ 7. It is agreed on all hands, that the Qualities or Modes of things do ne|ver really exist each of them apart by

it self, and separated from all others, but are mix'd, as it were, and blended together, several in the same Object. But we are told, the Mind being able to consider each Quality singly, or ab|stracted from those other Qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to it self abstract Ideas. For ex|ample, there is perceiv'd by Sight an Object extended, coloured, and moved: This mix'd or compound Idea the mind resolving into it's Simple, constituent Parts, and viewing each by it self, ex|clusive of the rest, does frame the ab|stract Ideas of Extension, Colour & Mo|tion. Not that it is possible for Colour or Motion to exist without Extension, but only that the Mind can frame to it self by Abstraction the Idea of Colour exclusive of Extension, and of Motion exclusive of both Colour and Extension.

§ 8. Again, the Mind having ob|serv'd that in the particular Extensions perceiv'd by Sense, there is something common and alike in all, and some o|ther things peculiar, as this or that Fi|gure

or Magnitude, which distinguish them one from another; it considers a|part or singles out by it self that which is common, making thereof a most ab|stract Idea of Extension, which is neither Line, Surface nor Solid, nor has any Figure or Magnitude but is an Idea in|tirely prescinded from all these. So like|wise the Mind by leaving out of the par|ticular Colours perceiv'd by Sense, that which distinguishes them one from ano|ther, and retaining that only which is common to all, makes an Idea of Colour in abstract which is neither Red, nor Blue, nor White, &c. And in like man|ner by considering Motion abstractedly not only from the Body moved, but like|wise from the Figure it describes, and all particular Directions and Velocities, the abstract Idea of Motion is framed; which equally corresponds to all particular Motions whatsoever that may be per|ceiv'd by Sense.

§ 9. And as the Mind frames to it self abstract Ideas of Qualities or Modes, so does it, by the same precision or

mental Separation, attain abstract Ideas of the more compounded Beings, which include several coexistent Qualities. For example, the Mind having observ'd that Peter, James and John, &c. resemble each other, in certain common Agree|ments of Shape and other Qualities, leaves out of the complex or compound|ed Idea it has of Peter, James, &c. that which is peculiar to each, retaining on|ly what is common to all; and so makes an abstract Idea wherein all the particulars equally partake, abstracting intirely from and cutting off all those Circumstances and Differences, which might determine it to any particular Existence. And after this manner it is said we come by the abstract Idea of Man or, if you please, Humanity or Humane Nature. wherein 'tis true, there's included Colour, because there is no Man but has some Colour, but then it can be neither White, nor Black, nor any particular Colour; because there is no one particular Colour wherein all Men partake. So likewise there is in|cluded Stature, but then 'tis neither Tall

Stature nor Low Stature, nor yet Mid|dle Stature, but something abstracted from all these; and so of the rest. More|over, there being a great variety of o|ther Creatures that partake in some Parts, but not all, of the complex Idea of Man, the Mind leaving out those Parts which are peculiar to Men, and retaining those only which are common to all the li|ving Creatures, frames the Idea of Ani|mal, which abstracts not only from all particular Men, but also all Birds, Beasts, Fishes and Insects. The constituent Parts of the abstract Idea of Animal are Body, Life, Sense and Spontaneous Mo|tion. By Body is meant, Body with|out any particular Shape or Figure, there being no one Shape or Figure common to all Animals, without Covering, either of Hair, or Feathers, or Scales, &c. nor yet Naked: Hair, Feathers, Scales, and Nakedness being the distinguishing Pro|perties of particular Animals, and for that reason left out of the Abstract Idea. Upon the same account the spontaneous Motion must be neither Walking, nor Flying, nor Creeping, it is

nevertheless a Motion, but what that Motion is, it is not easy to conceive.

§ 10. Whether others have this wonderful Faculty of Abstracting their Ideas, they best can tell: for my self I dare be confident I have it not. I have indeed a Faculty of imagining, or re|presenting to my self the Ideas of those particular things I have perceiv'd and of variously compounding and divid|ing them. I can imagine a Man with Two Heads or the upper parts of a Man joyn'd to the Body of a Horse. I can consider the Hand, the Eye, the Nose each by it self abstracted or sepa|rated from the rest of the Body. But then whatever Hand or Eye I imagine, it must have some particular Shape and Colour. Likewise the Idea of Man that I frame to my self, must be either of a White, or a Black, or a Tawny, a Streight, or a Crooked, a Tall, or a Low, or a Middle-sized Man. I can|not by any effort of Thought conceive the abstract Idea above described. And it is equally impossible for me to form

the abstract Idea of Motion distinct from the Body moving, and which is neither Swift nor Slow, Curvilinear nor Rectili|near; and the like may be said of all other abstract general Ideas whatsoever. And there's Grounds to think most Men will acknowledge themselves to be in my Case. The generality of Men which are Simple and Illiterate never pretend to abstract Notions. It's said they are difficult and not to be attain'd without Pains and Study; we may therefore reasonably conclude that, if such there be, they are confin'd only to the Learned.

§ 11. I proceed to examine what can be alleg'd in defence of the Doctrine of Abstraction, and try if I can discover what it is that inclines the Men of Spe|culation to embrace an Opinion, so re|mote from common Sense as that seems to be. There has been a late excellent and deservedly Esteem'd Philosopher, who, no doubt, has given it very much Coun|tenance by seeming to think the having abstract general Ideas is what puts the

widest difference in point of Understand|ing betwixt Man and Beast.

The ha|ving of general Ideas (saith he) is that which puts a perfect distinction be|twixt Man and Brutes, and is an Ex|cellency which the Faculties of Brutes do by no means attain unto. For it is evident, we observe no Foot-steps in them of making use of general Signs for universal Ideas; from which we have reason to imagine that they have not the Faculty of abstracting or making general Ideas, since they have no use of Words or any other general Signs. And a little after. Therefore, I think, we may suppose that 'tis in this that the Species of Brutes are discriminated from Men, and 'tis that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so wide a Distance. For if they have any Ideas at all, and are not bare Machines (as some wou'd have 'em) we cannot deny 'em to have some Reason. It seems as e|vident to me that they do some of 'em in certain Instances Reason as that

they have Sense, but it is only in par|ticular Ideas, just as they receive them from their Senses. They are the best of 'em tied up within those narrow Bounds, and have not (as I think) the Faculty to enlarge 'em by any kind of Abstraction.

Essay on Hum. Vnderst. B. 2. C. 11. § 10 and 11. I readily agree with this Learned Author, that the Faculties of Brutes can by no means attain to Abstraction. But then if this be made the distinguishing pro|perty of that sort of Animals, I fear a great many of those that pass for Men must be reckon'd into their number. The reason that is here assign'd why we have no Grounds to think Brutes have Abstract general Ideas, is that we ob|serve in 'em no use of Words or any o|ther general Signs; which is built on this Supposition, viz. that the making use of Words, implys the having gene|ral Ideas. From which it follows, that Men who use Language are able to Ab|stract or Generalize their Ideas. That this is the Sense and Arguing of the Author will further appear by his an|swering

the Question he in another place puts.

Since all things that ex|ist are only Particulars, how come we by general Terms? His Answer is, Words become general by being made the Signs of general Ideas. Essay on Hum. Vnderst. B. 3. C. 3. § 6.

To this I cannot assent being of opinion that a Word becomes general by being made the Sign, not of an abstract general Idea but, of several particular Ideas, any one of which it indifferently sug|gests to the Mind. For Example, When it is said the change of Motion is propor|tional to the impressed force, or that what|ever has Extension is divisible; these Propo|sitions are to be understood of Motion and Extension in general, and nevertheless it will not follow that they suggest to my Thoughts an Idea of Motion without a Body mov'd, or any determinate Dire|ction, Velocitie, &c. or that I must con|ceive an abstract general Idea of Ex|tension, which is neither Line, Surface nor Solid, neither Great nor Small, Black, White, nor Red, &c. 'Tis on|ly implied that whatever Motion I con|sider,

whether it be Swift or Slow, Perpendicular, Horizontal or Oblique, or in whatever Object, the Axiom con|cerning it holds equally true. As does the other of every particular Extension, it matters not whether Line, Surface or Solid, whether of this or that Mag|nitude or Figure, &c.

§ 12. By observing how Ideas be|come general, we may the better judge how Words are made so. And here it is to be noted that I do not de|ny absolutely there are general Ideas, but only that there are any abstract general Ideas: For in the Passages we have Quoted wherein there is mention of general Ideas, it is always supposed that they are formed by Abstraction, af|ter the manner set forth in Sect. VIII and IX. Now if we will annex a meaning to our Words, and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall ac|knowledge, that an Idea, which consi|der'd in it self is particular, becomes general, by being made to represent or stand for all other particular Ideas of

the same sort. To make this plain by an Example, suppose a Geometrician is demonstrating the Method, of cut|ting a Line in two equal Parts. He draws, for instance, a Black Line of an Inch in Length, this which in it self is a particular Line is nevertheless with re|gard to it's signification General, since as it is there used, it represents all particular Lines whatsoever; so that what is de|monstrated of it, is demonstrated of all Lines or, in other Words, of a Line in General. And as that particular Line becomes General, by being made a Sign, so the name Line which taken absolutely is particular, by being a Sign is made General. And as the former owes its Generality, not to its being the Sign of an abstract or general Line, but of all particular right Lines that may possibly exist, so the latter must be thought to derive its Generality from the same Cause, namely, the various, particular Lines which it indifferently denotes.

§ 13. To give the Reader a yet clearer View of the Nature of abstract Ideas, and the Uses they are thought necessary to, I shall add one more Pas|sage out of the Essay on Human Vnder|standing, which is as follows.

Ab|stract Ideas are not so obvious or easy to Children or the yet unexercis|ed Mind as particular ones. If they seem so to grown Men 'tis only be|cause by constant and familiar Use they are made so. For when we nice|ly reflect upon them, we shall find that general Ideas are Fictions and Contrivances of the Mind, that carry Difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves, as we are apt to imagine. For Example, Does it not require some Pains and Skill to form the general Idea of a Triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract com|prehensive and difficult) for it must be neither Oblique nor Rectangle, nei|ther Equilateral, Equicrural, nor Sca|lenon, but all and none of these at once. In effect it is something imper|fect

that cannot exist, an Idea where|in some Parts of several different and inconsistent Ideas are put together: 'Tis true the Mind in this imperfect State has need of such Ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the con|veniency of Communication and En|largement of Knowledge, to both which it is naturally very much in|clin'd. But yet one has reason to su|spect such Ideas are Marks of our Im|perfection. At least this is enough to shew that the most abstract and ge|neral Ideas are not those that the Mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest Know|lege is conversant about.

B. 4. C. 7. § 9. If any Man has the Faculty of framing in his Mind such an Idea of a Triangle as is here describ'd, it's in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor wou'd I go about it. All I desire is, that the Reader wou'd fully and and cer|tainly inform himself whether he has such an Idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard Task for any one to per|form. What more easy than for any one

to look a little into his own Thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can at|tain to have, an Idea that shall corre|spond with the description that is here given of the General Idea of a Triangle, which is, neither Oblique nor Rectangle, Equilateral, Equicrural nor Scalenon, but all and none of these at once?

§ 14. Much is here said of the Diffi|culty that abstract Ideas carry with them, and the Pains and Skill requisite to the forming them. And it is on all Hands agreed that there is need of great Toil and Labour of the Mind, to Eman|cipate our Thoughts from paticular Ob|jects, and raise them to those Sublime Speculations that are conversant about abstract Ideas. From all which the na|tural Consequence shou'd seem to be, that so Difficult a thing as the forming abstract Ideas was not necessary for Com|munication, which is so easy and fami|liar to all sorts of Men. But we are told if they seem obvious and easy to Grown Men, 'Tis only because by constant and fa|miliar use they are made so. Now I wou'd

fain know at what time it is, Men are imploy'd in surmounting that Difficul|ty, and furnishing themselves with those necessary helps for Discourse. It can|not be when they are grown up, for then it seems they are not conscious of any such Pains-taking; it remains therefore to be the business of their Childhood. And surely, the great and multiply'd La|bour of framing abstract Notions will be found a hard Task for that tender Age. Is it not a hard thing to imagine that a couple of Children can't Prate together, of their Sugar-plumbs and Rat|tles and the rest of their little Trinkets, till they have first Tack'd together num|berless Inconsistencies, and so framed in their Minds abstract general Ideas, and annexed them to every common Name they make use of?

§ 15. Nor do I think them a whit more needful for the Enlargement of Knowlege than for Communication. It is I know a Point much insisted on, that all Knowlege and Demonstration are a|bout universal Notions, to which I ful|ly

agree: But then it does not appear to me that those Notions are form'd by Abstraction in the manner premised, Vni|versality, so far as I can comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, positive Na|ture or Conception of any thing, but in the relation it bears to the Particu|lars signified or represented by it: By vertue whereof it is that things, Names or Notions, being in their own Nature, Particular are render'd Vniversal. Thus when I demonstrate any Proposition con|cerning Triangles, it is to be supposed that I have in view the universal Idea of a Triangle; which ought not to be understood as if I cou'd frame an Idea of a Triangle which was neither Equi|lateral nor Scalenon, &c. But only that the particular Triangle I consider, whether of this or that sort it matters not, does equally stand for and repre|sent all Rectilinear Triangles whatso|ever, and is in that sense Vniversal. All which seems very Plain and not to in|clude any Difficulty in it.

§ 16. But here it will be demand|ed, how we can know any Proposition to be true of all particular Triangles, except we have first seen it demonstrat|ed of the abstract Idea of a Triangle which equally agrees to all? For be|cause a Property may be demonstrated to agree to some one particular Trian|gle, it will not thence follow that it e|qually belongs to any other Triangle, which in all respects is not the same with it. For Example, Having demon|strated that the three Angles of an Iso|sceles, Rectangular Triangle are equal to two right Ones, I cannot therefore con|clude this Affection agrees to all other Triangles, which have neither a right An|gle, nor two equal Sides. It seems there|fore that, to be certain this Proposition is universally true, we must either make a particular Demonstration for every particular Triangle, which is impossible, or once for all demonstrate it of the ab|stract Idea of a Triangle, in which all the Particulars do indifferently partake, and by which they are all equally represent|ed.

To which I answer, that tho' the Idea I have in view whilst I make the Demonstration be, for instance, that of an Isosceles, Rectangular Triangle whose Sides are of a determinate Length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends to all other Rectilinear Triangles, of what Sort or Bigness soever. And that, because neither the right Angle, nor the equality, nor determinate Length of the Sides are at all concern'd in the Demon|stration. 'Tis true, the Diagram I have in view includes all these Particulars, but then there's not the least mention made of 'em in the Proof of the Proposition. It is not said the three Angles are equal to two right Ones, because one of them is a right Angle, or because the Sides com|prehending it are of the same Length. Which sufficiently shews that the right Angle might have been Oblique, and the Sides unequal, and for all that the Demonstration have held good. And for this reason it is, that I conclude that to be true of any Obliquangular or Scalenon, which I had demonstrated of a particular Right-angled, Equicrural

Triangle; and not because I demon|strated the Proposition of the abstract Idea of a Triangle.

§ 17. It were an endless, as well as an useless Thing, to trace the Schoolmen, those great Masters of abstraction, thrô all the manifold inextricable Labyrinths of Error and Dispute, which their Do|ctrine of abstract Natures and Notions seems to have led 'em into. What Bicker|ings and Controversies, and what a learn|ed Dust have been raised about those Matters, and what mighty Advantage has been from thence deriv'd to Mankind are things at this Day too clearly known to need being insisted on. And it had been well if the ill effects of that Doctrine were confin'd to those only who make the most avow'd Profession of it. When Men consider the great Pains, Industry and Parts, that have for so many Ages been laid out on the Cultivation and Advancement of the Sciences, and that notwithstanding all this the far greater Part of them remain full of Darkness and Uncertainty, and Disputes, that

are like never to have an end, and even those that are thought to be supported by the most clear and cogent Demon|strations, contain in them Paradoxes which are perfectly irreconcilable to the Understandings of Men, and that taking altogether, a very small Portion of them does supply any real Benefit to Man|kind, otherwise than by being an inno|cent Diversion and Amusement. I say, the Consideration of all this is apt to throw them into a Despondency, and perfect Contempt of all Study. But this may perhaps cease, upon a view of the false Principles that have obtain'd in the World, amongst all which there is none, methinks, hath a more wide and extended Sway over the Thoughts of Speculative Men, than that we have been endeavouring to overthrow.

§ 18. I come now to consider the Source of this prevailing Notion, and that seems to me to be Language. And surely nothing of less extent than Rea|son it self cou'd have been the Source of an Opinion so universally receiv'd.

The truth of this appears as from other Reasons, so also from the plain Confes|sion of the ablest Patrons of abstract Ideas, who acknowlege that they are made in order to naming, from which it is a clear Consequence that if there had been no such thing as Speech or Universal Signs, there never had been any thought of Abstraction. See B. 3. C. 6. § 39. and elsewhere of the Essay on Human Vnderstanding. But let us examine the manner wherein Words have contributed to the Origine of that Mistake. First then, 'Tis thought that every Name has, or ought to have, one only precise and settled Signification, which inclines Men to think there are certain abstract, determinate Ideas that constitute the true and only immediate Signification of each general Name. And that it is by the mediation of these abstract Ideas, that a general Name comes to signifie any particular Thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one precise and definite Signification annexed to any general Name, they all signifying indifferently a great number

of particular Ideas. All which does e|vidently follow from what has been already said, and will clearly appear to any one by a little Reflexion. To this, I doubt not, it will be objected that every Name that has a Definition is is thereby restrain'd to one certain Sig|nification. e. g. a Triangle is defin'd to be a plain Surface comprehended by three right Lines; by which that Name is li|mited to denote one certain Idea and no other. To which I answer, that in the Definition it is not said whether the Surface be Great or Small, Black or White, &c. nor whether the Sides are Long or Short, Equal ot Unequal, nor with what Angles they are inclin'd to each other, in all which there may be great variety, and consequently there is no one settled Idea which limits the Signification of the word Triangle. 'Tis one thing for to keep a Name constant|ly to the same Definition, and another to make it stand every where for the same Idea, the one is necessary, the o|ther useless and impracticable.

§ 19. But to give a farther Account how Words came to produce the Do|ctrine of abstract Ideas, it must be ob|serv'd that it's a receiv'd Opinion, that Language has no other End but the communicating our Ideas, and that every significant Name stands for an I|dea. This being so, and it being with|all certain, that Names, which yet are not thought altogether Insignificant, do not always mark out particular con|ceivable Ideas, it is straightway conclud|ed that they stand for abstract Notions. That there are many Names in use a|mongst Speculative Men, which do not always suggest to others determinate, particular Ideas, or in truth any thing at all, is what no Body will deny. And a little Attention will discover, that it is not necessary (even in the strictest Rea|sonings) significant Names which stand for Ideas shou'd, every time they are us'd, excite in the Understanding the I|deas they are made to stand for: In Reading and Discoursing Names being for the most part used as Letters are in

Algebra, in which thô a particular quan|tity be mark'd by each Letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each Letter suggest to your Thoughts, that particular quantity it was appointed to stand for.

§ 20. Besides, the communicating of Ideas marked by Words is not the chief and only end of Language, as is common|ly suppos'd. There are other Ends, as the raising of some Passion, the exciting to, or deterring from an Action, the putting the Mind in some particular Disposition; to which the former is in many Cases barely subservient, and sometimes in|tirely omitted, when these can be ob|tain'd without it, as I think does not infrequently happen in the familiar use of Language. I intreat the Reader to reflect with himself, and see if it does not oft happen either in Hearing or Reading a Discourse, that the Passions of Fear, Love, Hatred, Admiration, Disdain, &c. arise immediately in his Mind upon the perception of certain Words, without any Ideas coming be|tween.

At first, indeed, the Words might have ocasion'd Ideas that were fitting to produce those Emotions; but, if I mistake not, it will be found that when Language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the Sounds or Sight of the Characters is oft immediately attended with those Passions, which at first were wont to be produced by the interven|tion of Ideas, that are now quite omit|ted. May we not, for Example, be af|fected with the promise of a Good thing, thô we have not an Idea of what it is? Or is not the being threaten'd with Danger sufficient to excite a Dread, thô we think not of any particular Evil like|ly to befall us, nor yet frame to our selves an Idea of Danger in Abstract? If any one shall join ever so little Re|flection of his own to what has been said, I believe it will evidently appear to him, that general Names are often used in the propriety of Language with|out the Speakers designing them for marks of Ideas in his own, which he wou'd have 'em raise in the Mind of the Hearer. Even proper Names them|selves

do not seem always spoken, with a design to bring into our view the I|deas of those Individuals that are sup|posed to be marked by them. For Ex|ample, when a Schoolman tells me Aristotle hath said it, all I conceive he means by it, is to dispose me to em|brace his Opinion with the Deference and Submission which Custom has an|nex'd to that Name. And this effect is oft so instantly produced in the Minds of those who are accustom'd to resign their Judgment to the Authority of that Philosopher, as it is impossible any Idea either of his Person, Writings, or Re|putation shou'd go before. So close and immediate a Connexion may Custom establish, betwixt the very word Aristotle and the Motions of Assent and Reve|rence in the Minds of some Men. In|numerable Examples of this kind may be given, but why shou'd I insist on those things, which every one's Experi|ence, will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto him?

§ 21. We have, I think, shewn the Im|possibility of abstract Ideas. We have consider'd what has been said for them by their ablest Patrons; and endeavor'd to shew they are of no Use for those Ends, to which they are thought neces|sary. And lastly, we have traced them to the Source from whence they flow, which appears evidently to be Language. It cannot be deny'd that Words are of excellent Use, in that by their means all that Stock of Knowlege which has been purchas'd by the joint Labours of Inquisitive Men in all Ages and Nations, may be drawn into the view and made the possession of one single Person. But most parts of Knowlege have been so strangely perplex'd and darken'd by the abuse of Words, and general ways of Speech wherein they are deliver'd, that it may almost be made a Question whe|ther Language, has contributed more to the hindrance or advancement of the Sciences. Since therefore Words are so apt to impose on the Understanding, I

am resolv'd in my Inquiries to make as little use of them as possibly I can. What|ever Ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take them bare and naked into my View, keeping out of my Thoughts, so far as I am able, those Names which long and constant Use hath so strictly united with them; from which I may expect to derive the following Advan|tages.

§ 22. First, I shall be sure to get clear of all Controversies purely Verbal; the springing up of which weeds in al|most all the Sciences has been a main Hindrance to the Growth of true and sound Knowlege. Secondly, this seems to be a sure way to extricate my self, out of that fine and subtile Net of ab|stract Ideas, which has so miserably perplex'd and entangled the Minds of Men, and that with this peculiar Cir|cumstance, that by how much the finer and more curious was the Wit of any Man, by so much the deeper was he like to be ensnar'd, and faster held there|in.

Thirdly, so long as I confine my Thoughts to my own Ideas divested of Words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The Objects I consider, I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceiv'd in thinking I have an Idea which I have not. It is not possible for me to imagine, that any of my own I|deas are alike or unlike, that are not tru|ly so. To discern the Agreements or Disagreements there are between my I|deas, to see what Ideas are included in any compound Idea, and what not, there is nothing more requisite, than an attentive Perception of what passes in my own Understanding.

§ 23. But the attainment of all these Advantages does presuppose an intire de|liverance from the Deception of Words, which I dare hardly promise my self; so difficult a thing it is to dissolve an U|nion so early begun, and confirm'd by so long a Habit as that betwixt Words and Ideas. Which Difficulty seems to have been very much increas'd by the Do|ctrine

of Abstraction. For so long as Men thought abstract Ideas were annexed to their Words, it does not seem strange that they shou'd use Words for Ideas: It be|ing found an impracticable thing to lay aside the Word, and retain the abstract Idea in the Mind, which in it self was perfectly inconceivable. This seems to me the principal Cause, why those Men who have so emphatically recommend|ed to others, the laying aside all use of Words in their Meditations, and Con|templating their bare Ideas, have yet fail'd to perform it themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of the ab|surd Opinions and insignificant Disputes, which grow out of the abuse of Words. And in order to remedy these Evils they advise well, that we attend to the Ideas signified, and draw off our Attention, from the Words which signifie them. But how good soever this Advice may be, they have given others, it is plain they cou'd not have a due regard to it themselves, so long as they thought the only immediate use of Words was to

signifie Ideas, and that the immediate signification of every general Name was a determinate, abstract Idea.

§ 24. But these being known to be Mistakes, a Man may with greater Ease prevent his being impos'd on by Words. He that knows he has no other than particular Ideas, will not puzzle him|self in vain to find out and conceive the abstract Idea, annexed to any Name. And he that knows Names do not always stand for Ideas, will spare himself the labour of looking for Ideas, where there are none to be had. It were, therefore, to be wish'd that every one wou'd use his utmost Endeavors, to obtain a clear view of the Ideas he'd consider, separating from them all that dress and incumbrance of Words which so much contribute to blind the Judgment and divide the Attention. In vain do we extend our View into the Heavens, and pry into the Entrails of the Earth, in vain do we consult the Writings of Learned

Men, and trace the dark Foot-steps of Antiquity, we need only draw the Cur|tain of Words, to behold the fairest Tree of Knowlege, whose Fruit is ex|cellent, and within the reach of our Hand.

§ 25. Unless we take care to clear the first Principles of Knowlege, from the embarras and delusion of Words, we may make infinite Reasonings upon them to no purpose; we may draw Con|sequences from Consequences, and be never the Wiser. The farther we go we shall only lose our selves the more irre|coverably, and be the deeper entangled in Difficulties and Mistakes. Whoever therefore designs to Read the follow|ing Sheets, I do Intreat him that he wou'd make my Words the Occasion of his own Thinking, and endeavour to attain the same Train of Thoughts in Reading, that I had in Writing them. By this means, it will be easy for him to discover the Truth or Falsity of what I say. He will be out of all danger

of being deceiv'd by my Words, and I do not see how he can be led into an Error by considering his own Na|ked, undisguised Ideas.