The Grecian history: From the end of the Peloponnesian War, to the death of Philip of Macedon. Containing the space of sixty-eight years. By Temple Stanyan, Esq; Volume the second, now originally publish'd.

THE GRECIAN HISTORY. BOOK I.

From the End of the Peloponnesian War, to the Battle of Mantinea. Containing the Space of 42 YEARS.

CHAP. I.

From the End of the Peloponnesian War, to the Death of Socrates. Containing the Space of 5 YEARS.

_THE Victory of Lysander was so terrible a Shock to Athens, that tho' she gather'd Strength enough to survive it, she could never perfectly recover it. From a Prospect of bringing the War ••o an happy Issue, she found herself in one Hour

reduced to the lowest ebb of Fortune, and lay at the Mercy of those whom she had so lately in|sulted: For the Terms obtain'd by the las•• Treaty, amounted to little more than surrender|ing at Discretion. So that from hence we ma•• date the Fall of the Athenian Empire, which be|gan soon after the Defeat of the Persians at My cale, and continued about seventy three Years However the Conquerors were so generous, a•• not wholly to extinguish the Name of Athen•• They said, They would not be guilty of putting ou•• one of the Eyes of Greece. And this agrees wit•• what Plutarch relates of Lysander, That when h•• sent word to Sparta, That the Athenians were ta|ken, the Magistrates wrote back to him, It is su•• ficient to have taken them. But it is certain, they imposed some further Marks of their Conque•• on them: Of which the most particular was that they obliged the People to break up th•••• Democracy, and submit to the Government o•• Thirty Men, who are commonly known by the Name of The Thirty Tyrants.* 1.1 This Change wa•• owing chiefly to Lysander, who about the same time introduced the Oligarchy into Samos, an•• other Places, which he took in as tributary t•• Athens. In most of them he establish'd a D•••• cemvirate, which was modell'd according to hi•• Directions, and made up of his own Creature•• And thus he treated not only the Enemies, bu•• the Allies of Sparta; by which means he had in manner engross'd to himself the whole Empire 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Greece.

Having settled his Conquests,* 1.2 he returned in triumph to Sparta with the Athenian and other Gallies, and fifteen hundred Talents in Mony, together with a great deal of rich Booty, besides the Crowns of Gold and other Presents which had been made him by the several Cities. He sent the Mony to Sparta in sealed Bags by Gylippus, who, ripping up the bottom of the Bags, took out as much as he thought fit, and then sew'd them up again. But there happen'd to be a Note in each Bag, specifying the Sum contain'd in it, which Gylippus not being appris'd of, the Fraud by this means was detected: And there|upon, either to avoid Punishment, or out of Shame for having been guilty of so mean an Action, he banish'd himself, and never afterwards appear'd in Sparta.

There was a further Consideration in regard to this Treasure, whether, according to the Spartan Laws, it ought to be received into the City. Many of the soberest and most discreet among them oppos'd the introducing it; and they were the more confirmed in their Opinion from this Instance of Gylippus, who, they found, had been so far influenc'd by Mony, as to give up every thing else for it, and to sully all the Glory of his past Actions: For he was otherwise a Man of great Reputation, and had acquitted himself ex|tremely well in the War of Sicily, where he had the Command of the Spartan Troops: And it was owing chiefly to him, that the Athenians did

not make themselves Masters of that Island. Hereupon the Ephori were obliged to pass a De|cree, that none but the old Iron Mony of the Country should be made current. But Lysander's Friends would not yet give it up: They resumed the Debate, and got the Decree revers'd, or at least so far qualified, that this Mony, tho' it was to be admitted into the City, was to be employ'd only on publick Occasions; and it was made capital to convert it to any private use. But this did not answer the Intent of Lycurgus, which was, by prohibiting the use of Gold and Silver, to restrain Covetousness and Luxury. Plutarch observes upon this occasion, That the ill Consequence of Riches was not so effectually prevented, by forbidding the use of Mony in pri|vate, as it was encouraged, by allowing it in pub|lick: That therefore this sort of Prohibition on|ly heighten'd their Desires; and that, if their Actions did not presently break out, at least thei•• Affections were tainted. Whatever was pretend|ed of laying in a Fund to supply the Exigencie of the State, the use of Mony had now got foot|ing among them; they began to know the Valu•• of it as well as their Neighbours, and rais'd 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by more arbitrary and oppressive Methods. Di••••dorus Siculus says, They exacted Tribute fro•••• all the Cities under their Jurisdiction, and tre•• sur'd up a thousand Talents every Year. Upo•• the whole, it is certain that the introducing th•• Treasure, was in effect a Change in the Constintion;

it soften'd their Minds so as to prepare them for Corruption; and in short, was the first great Step towards their throwing off that rugged Virtue, which distinguish'd them so much from the rest of Greece. This Change was owing in|tirely to Lysander, who sacrificed every thing to his Ostentation and Vanity, and stuck at no Ex|pence to gratify them. He erected his own, and several of the chief Commanders Statues in Brass. He was very liberal to those of his Retinue, and gave such Encouragement to the Poets, that they complimented him with Songs of Tri|umph, and employ'd all their Art in his Praises. The Grecians in general were so aw'd with his Merit, that they erected Altars to his Honour, and sacrificed to him as a God.

In the mean time while The Thirty in Athens,* 1.3 instead of compiling and publishing a more per|fect Body of Laws, which was the Pretence ••or their being chosen, began to exert their Power of Life and Death: And tho' they constituted ••a Senate and other Magistrates, they made no further use of them, than to confirm their Au|thority, and to see their Commands executed. However they at first acted cautiously, and con|demn'd only the most detested and scandalous part of the Citizens, such as lived by Eviden|••ing and Informing. But this was only to give a colour to their Proceedings; their Design was to make themselves absolute; and knowing that was not to be done without a Foreign Power,

their next Step was to desire a Guard might be sent them from Sparta, till such time as they could clear the City of all disaffected Persons, and throughly settle the Government. Lysander accordingly procured them a Guard under the Command of Callibius, whom by Bribes and Ar|tifices they work'd over to their Designs, and then acted without Controul, filling the City with the Blood of those, who, on account of their Riches, Interest, or good Qualities, were most likely to make head against them. The most violent a|mong them was Critias, who resolved to reek his Revenge on the People, by whom he had formerly been banished.* 1.4 The first who protest|ed against these Proceedings was Theramenes, one of their own Memhers: And lest he should joi•• with the Multitude against them, they investe•• three thousand of the Citizens with some part o•• the Power, and by their Assistance disarmed th•• rest. Being throughly embolden'd by such a•• Accession to their Party, they agreed to singl•• out every one his Man, to put them to death and seize their Estates for the Maintenance o•• their Garrison: Amongst whom was Nicerat•••• the Son of Nicias, a Man of the greatest Esta•••• and Interest in Athens, and of so sweet and ob••••liging a Temper, that he was universally l•••• mented. But being still jealous of Theramene•••• who was struck with Horror at their Proposal they found it necessary to remove him out of t•••• way.* 1.5 And thereupon Critias accused him to 〈◊〉〈◊〉

Senate, of endeavouring to subvert the Govern|ment. From thence he took occasion to justify their Proceedings in general; as, That it was ne|cessary to abridge the People in some measure of that Liberty with which they had so long been pamper'd; That all Changes of Government were attended with Blood, and therefore it was no wonder that they had so many Enemies: But that it was unpar|donable in one of their own Order to desert them, and to betray that Power, which, by accepting a Share of it, he had promised to maintain. Thera|menes made so full and handsom a Defence, that the Senate were inclined to favour him: Which Critias perceiving, and knowing that, as one of The Three Thousand, he had a Privilege of be|ing tried in form, he struck his Name out of the List, in order to subject him more immediate|ly to their Censure. It was justly urged by The|ramenes, That it was as easy to blot out any other Man's Name as his; and that therefore they ought to make his Case their own. But as they were un|der no present Apprehension of that kind, or rather that they were aw'd by a Guard, which Critias had placed before the Bar of the Court, they durst not oppose the Tyrants, who taking advantage of their Silence,* 1.6 immediately pass'd Sentence of Death upon him; which he suffer'd by the Juice of Hemlock. When he had drank his Dose, he threw away what was left in the Cup, and said, This to honest Critias. Socrates, whose Disciple he had been, was the only one

of the Senate, who ventur'd to appear in his De|fence; he made an Attempt to rescue him out of the Hands of the Officer of Justice; and af|ter his Execution, went about, as it were, in de|fiance of The Thirty, exhorting and animating the Senators and Citizens against them. Critias•• who had likewise been his Scholar, was so alarm'd and incens'd at his Behaviour, that he forba•• him instructing the Youth. But he went o•• with the same Intrepidity, and without any re|gard to his Authority. The Tyrants, whethe•• they were aw'd with his Merit, or his Resolu|tion, did not think fit to proceed against him•• But as he continued to use the same Freedom with the Government, it soon after cost him his Life, as in its proper Place will be more particu|larly related. As to Theramenes, the People ex|press'd a greater Concern for him, than could have been expected for one of that Society. But he was indeed the only one among them, from whom they had any thing to hope for, as a Bar|rier between them and the Tyranny. When he first engaged with them, he was upon the strict|est Terms of Friendship with Critias, and they had always acted together in concert: But when he sound what Measures the other was pursuing, he oppos'd him, and broke with him.

He had appear'd in most of the late Contests betwixt the Nobility and the Commons,* 1.7 and was active, but not violent; endeavouring rather to accommodate himself to both Parties, than to

depress eithr: From whence his Enemies gave him the Name of The Buskin, as it serves either Foot. But his shifting Sides proceeded not so much from the Unevenness of his Temper, as from his Caution and Moderation, which made him distinguish betwixt the Rule and the Ty|ranny. He had some time before shewn his In|clination to an Oligarchy, having been principal|ly concerned with Pisander and Antiphon in in|troducing the Government of The Four Hundred: And in this latter Instance, he seems to have had some Plan of that kind in his view: For he thought The Thirty too few to carry on the Ad|ministration, and propos'd the adding some competent number to them. On the other hand, he was as much against the letting in The Three Thousand, which he saw, was only arming one part of the Citizens against the rest. He was, according to the mildness of his Nature, for some middle Scheme, whereby the Power of the Multitude might be restrain'd, but not to|tally abolished. But whatever his Designs were, he had not weight enough to put them in exe|cution; and therefore sell a Sacrifice to the ho|nesty of his Intentions. The greatest Blot upon his Memory, is, his being instrumental in the Condemnation of the Admirals, after the Fight at Arginusae.

The Tyrants having remov'd this Obstacle out of their way, renew'd their Outrages with more Security, taking off all whom they thought

any way obnoxious, or in any capacity of ob••••structing their Designs. Whilst they were thu•• destroying with Sword and Rapine, the wretch|ed Remainder of the Citizens cast their Thought on Alcibiades, and were struck with Remorse for their last ill Usage of him. But as he had be|fore overlook'd their Peevishness, and reliev'd them in their Extremities; so neither were they now without hopes, that he might appear again to rescue them. And the Tyrants themselves were so apprehensive of it, that they were very solicitous to get Intelligence of all his Designs and Actions. Critias at last represented to Ly|sander, that either the Government, or Alcibiades must fall; and, after many Solicitations, so far pre|vail'd, that Orders were given to dispatch him. He resided at that time in a small Village in Phrygia, where he was making an Interest with Pharnabazus, to recommend him to his Master Artaxerxes. Lysander made it a Request to Pharnabazus, to deliver him up either alive or dead; and laid such stress upon it, that he seem'd to make it a Condition of the League between the Spartans and the Persians. He consented to it, and committed the Execution to his Brother and his Uncle; who surrounding the House, where he dwelt with his Mistress Timandra, set fire to it. Alcibiades threw in great quantities of Clothes and Furniture to choke the Flame; then with his Robe on his left Arm, and his Sword in the other hand, he made his way through it:

Which the Assassins perceiving,* 1.8 retreated, and slew him at a distance with their Darts and Ar|rows. Some ascribe this Murther to Pharnaba|zus his own private Jealousy of him; others to the Resentment of some young Noblemen whose Sister he had debauch'd. And others say, he had got into the Secret of the Levy, that Cyrus was making for the Expedition against his Brother, and was endeavouring, by the Discovery of it to Artaxerxes, to ingratiate himself with that Prince, and to procure his Assistance for re-establing the Affairs of his Country; that therefore it became necessary to take him off. But whatever Cause they assign for his Death, they are generally a|greed as to the manner of it; which indeed was suitable to that Extravagance,* 1.9 with which Fortune had all along treated him. And there|in she did but second the variety of Nature, who seems in his Composition to have work'd up the most jarring Contradictions, and to have tried how far she could go, in reconciling the Ex|tremes of Vice and Virtue. But it is to be doubted whether his Virtues ought, upon a strict Examination, to bear that Name; and whether they ought not rather to be call'd extraordinary Talents and Endowments, and Ways of recom|mending himself. They had more of Artifice and Design, of Popularity and Ostentation, than of any real Principle of Honour and justice, or Love of his Country. And therefore Valcrius Maximus makes it a question, Whether his good

or bad Qualities were most hurtful to the Pub|lick: By the former, says he, he deceived his Fel|low-Citizens, and by the latter he ruin'd them. H•• first insinuated himself into their Confidence and then put them upon fruitless and desperat•• Projects; particularly that fatal Expedition against Sicily, where their Fleets and Armies moulder'd away, when they had need enough of them a•• home; and this paved the way for their tota•• Overthrow by Lysander. His View in these En|terprises, was not only to procure Honour to himself, but also to make himself necessary, and to keep the People employ'd, so that they should not be at leisure to inquire into his Conduct. He likewise found his account in the Presents that were made him abroad, and in that respect he was both greedy and corrupt; and yet his ta|king them was not so much for the sake of the Mony, as to support his Popularity and Luxu|ry. His natural bent was certainly Pleasure; and yet as much as he lov'd it, he made it give way to his Ambition: But he was so violent, and withal so irregular and capricious in the Pursuit of it, that there was no living with him upon any equal sooting. He was any thing, and every thing, by fits and starts, and just as it suited his present purpose; one while for the Oligarchy, and then as great a Stickler for the Democracy; one while in the Spartan Interest, in order to re|venge himself of his Country, and then in the Persian, in order to be reconcil'd to it. The

People, it must be confes'd, were no less une|qual and inconstant in their behaviour to him; from whence it happen'd, that, according to the Temper they were in, or according to the occasion they had for his Service, he was look'd upon as the best or worst Member of the Com|mon-wealth, and was either caress'd and ador'd, or detested and persecuted. And yet, upon the whole, they had such an opinion of his Merit, that tho' they were never easy with him, they never thought themselves safe without him. Plu|tarch makes a Remark, That his Enemies could never get the better of him but in his Absence; which must be attributed to his Subtilty and Address, and more especially to the Amiableness of his Person, and the Force of his Eloquence, which Nepos says, No body could resist. But tho' by these means he captivated the generality of the Citizens; yet the gravest and most con|siderable among them saw further into the Dis|guise, and were more upon their guard against him. Upon this occasion the Warning that was given them by Timon the Man-hater, of what they were to expect from him, may be worth re|membring. It happen'd one Day, that Alcibia|des having succeeded well in an Oration, the whole Assembly attended to compliment him upon it; and Timon, instead of avoiding him, as he did others in the like Cases, put himself in his way, and taking him by the Hand, said, Go on boldly, my Son; may'st thou increase in Credit

with the People; for thou wilt one Day bring them Calamities enough. He was scarce above forty Years old when he died; by which time he had done enough to make himself by turns the Sup|port and Terror, not only of his own Country, but of several other Parts both in Greece and Asia. And he had been still greater, if he had been as careful to preserve the People's Love, as he was to obtain it. But the Management of Prosperi|ty was not his Talent: And therefore the fairest View of him is to be taken from his Suffer|ings; which, as they were often unjust, set off his good Qualities to a greater Advantage, and consequently made his Fall the more lamented, especially at a time when he was so much wanted. Having given a general Character of this great Man, when I first mention'd him, I have here only added such further Observations, as were necessary to illustrate it, and which have natural|ly occur'd upon a more distinct Survey of his Actions.

The Inhabitants not being able to bear the se|vere Treatment they met with from The Thirty, fled daily in great numbers out of the City, by which means all Greece was overspread with Athe|nian Exiles; till at last the Spartans published an Edict, forbidding any of their Cities to receive them; so that they were forced to betake them|selves to Thebes and Argos, and such other Places, where they could live in any tolerable Security.

The first who appear'd to stem this Torrent,* 1.10 was Thrasybulus, who had done good Service in the Peloponnesian War; insomuch that Alcibiades is said to owe most of his Success to his acting in concert with him: But his Merit being not of so glaring a kind, was in a great measure eclips'd by that General, till it broke out upon this occasion of exerting himself alone, and in such a Cause as the Subversion of Tyranny. At Thebes he fell into a Consultation with his Fel|low-Citizens; and the Result was, That some vigorous Effort, tho' it carried never so much Danger with it, ought to be made for the Re|covery of the publick Liberty: Accodingly, with a Party of Thirty Men only, as Nepos says; but, as Xenophon more probably says, of near Se|venty, he seized upon Phyle a strong Castle on the Frontiers of Attica. This Enterprise gave the Alarm to The Tyrants, who immediately march'd out of the City with The Three Thou|sand, and their Spartan Guard, and attempted the Recovery of the Place, but were repuls'd with loss. Finding they could not carry it by a sud|den Assault, they resolved upon a Siege; but be|ing not sufficiently provided for that Service, and a great Snow falling that Night, they were forced to retire the next Day into the City, leaving on|ly part of their Guard, to prevent any further Excursions into the Country.

By this first Success Thrasybulus had increas'd his Followers to the number of Seven hundred;* 1.11

with which he made a Sally upon the Guards, and dispers'd and routed them, with the Slaughter of about an hundred and twenty. The Thirty in the mean while, were under great Consternation; and for sear of Treachery from those few who were left in the City, they forced them to quit it. Then they fortified Eleusis, to serve them upon any sudden Exigency, as a Place of Retreat. And, to free themselves from any Jea|lousy the Inhabitants might give them, they caused all who were able to bear Arms, to pass One by One, as it were upon a Re|view, in order to compute the Strength of the Garrison, and murder'd them. At the same time they attempted to corrupt Thrasy|bulus, and sent under colour of treating about Prisoners, to make him a private Offer of sharing with them in the Government, toge|ther with the Liberty of restoring any Ten of the Exiles, whom he should name, upon Con|dition he would dismiss the rest, and come in|to their Measures. To which Proposal he ge|nerously answer'd, That he look'd upon his Ba|nishment to be far more honourable, than the whole Power and Dominion of The Thirty; and that be would never put up his Sword, till all the Citi|zens from every Part were receiv'd, and restor'd to the Liberties derived to them from their An|cestors.

By this time he had got together a Body of a thousand Men; with which he march'd out of

Phyle by Night, and seiz'd on the Piraeus. The Thirty coming with their whole Strength to the Relief of it, he took advantage of the Ground' made the best Disposition of his Men, then re|minded them of the Cause they were engaged in, and the Success they had hitherto met with, and offer'd the Enemy Battle; wherein he easi|ly obtain'd the Victory; which indeed was more remarkable for the Consequence of it, than the Number of the Slain, wich were about Seven|ty; but among them were Critias and Hippoma|cbus, two of the chief of the Tyrants.

A Truce being granted for delivering up the dead Bodies, both Sides came to a Parley; and Thrasybulus took that occasion to expostalate with them, asking them, Why they fled from a Con|queror, whom they ought rather to join as the As|sertor of the Publick Liberty; adding, That his Army was compos'd of Citizens, and not of Ene|mies; that he came not to rob or plunder ••than, but to restore them to their own; in short, That his Quarrel was to the Tyrants, not to the City. Then he reminded them. How they were tied to one ano|ther by all the Obligations of Religion, Laws and Consanguinity; how they had served in the same Camp, and sought under the same Colours. He conjur'd them, That, if they themselves could pa|••iently submit to the Yoke, they would at least have ••ome Pity for their Fellow-Citizens, who were ba|••••ished for no other Reason, but because they would ••ot be Slaves; concluding, That if they would re|store

him to his Country, he would restore them to•• their Liberty. It is probable this Speech may be•• consounded with another to the same effect, by some ascribed to Cleocritus; but it is certain, i•••• made such an Impression upon The Three Thou sand, especially those who had been least instru••mental in these Outrages, that, upon their Re••••turn into the City, they became throughly sensi|ble, that they ought not to let their Country b•• ruin'd, to support the Avarice and Ambition o•••• their Tyrants:* 1.12 The Issue whereof was, that Th•••• Thirty should be remov'd from the Government Accordingly, they retired to Eleusis; and te•••• others were chosen,* 1.13 one out of each Tribe, fo•••• the Administration.

But this Change was far from producing an•• good effect:* 1.14 The Ten copied exactly after The Thir|ty; so that the Tyranny being restrain'd only as t•• the Number, there were the same Jealousies Tumults and Divisions in the City, the same Act•• of Injustice, Rapine and Cruelty: And many o•• The Three Thousand were too deeply involved i•••• the Guilt of the former Administration, not t•••• pursue the same Measures. They found ther•••• was no means of Sasety or Impunity lest so•• them, but by the utter Destruction of those i•••• the Piraeus. Accordingly they held Correspon|dence with The Thirty at Eleusis, and made the•• joint Application to Sparta for fresh Succours so•• that purpose. Their Request was seconded b•••• L••sander, who represented it as a new Affront o••••

fer'd to the Spartans, in revolting from them, and dissolving the Form of Government, which they had prescribed to them; and thereupon he procured them from the State an hundred Ta|lents,* 1.15 with a Commission for himself to go Ge|neral, and his Brother Libys Admiral, in order to block up the Piraeus by Sea and Land. Ac|cordingly he march'd with a strong Body of Peloponnesians; and the Admiral suffer'd no Pro|visions to go in by Sea; by which means those in the Piraeus were distress'd on all sides.

While things were in this Posture,* 1.16 Pausanias, one of the Spartan Kings, got leave to follow Lysander with another Body, to support him. But his Design was not so much to assist, as to watch him; he could not allow him the Glory of conquering Athens a second time; and there|fore went rather to trifle, and perplex the War, than to prosecute it to any real Advantage: So that what some call his Commiseration of the poor Athenians, was in reality the Envy he bore to Lysander. It is also observable, that in ma|king his Levies for this Expedition out of the Forces in Alliance with Spar••a, the Boeotians and Corinthians, who had all along been the most ac|tive and profess'd Enemies of the Athenians, re|sused now to serve against them, alledging, that They could not salve their Oath in making War upon those, who had not broke any one Article of the League. But the truth is, they appre|hended the Power of the Spartans, concluding,

They would make an entire Conquest of Athens, and annex it to their own Dominions. This is the first Instance of that Jealousy, which soon after several other States of Greece conceived of Sparta.

Pausanias, before any Act of Hostility on his side, sent to those in the Piraeus, to depart every one to his respective home; and, upon their Refusal, having drawn up his Men, and made a slight Attack, he went to view the Ground for opening the Trenches: But the Enemy made a Sally, and gall'd him so in his Retreat, that from Skirmishing, he was forc'd to bring it to a regular Action, which was fought obsti|nately enough on both sides, till at length the Athenians were routed,* 1.17 with the loss of an hun|dred and fifty Men, and Pausanias erected a Trophy.

But instead of pushing his Victory, he sent privately to the Athenians, that they should dis|patch Ambassadors to him, and the two Ephori who attended him in the Field, to offer Terms of Accommodation. Accordingly they sent their Deputies both from the Piraeus, and the Ci|ty, and a Peace was concluded upon these Con|ditions; That every Man should return home, ex|cept The Thirty, and The Ten, and Eleven mort who had commanded in the Piraeus. And if any in the City apprehended themselves to be obnoxious, they should also be free to retire with them to Eleu|sis. After which Pausanias drew off the Spartan

Army, and those in the Piraeus march'd with their Arms into the City; where Thrasybulus having, among other things, reproach'd the Ci|tizens with their calling the Spartans in to their Assistance, told them, They had nothing further to fear, provided they would be governed by their ancient Laws;* 1.18 and so far prevail'd upon them, that they chose their Magistrates as formerly, and restored the Democracy.

But the City had no sooner began to recover Breath, when the Remainder of the Faction at Eleusis were hiring Foreign Troops, in order to make another Attempt: Whereupon the whole City went out against them; and having taken their Commanders upon a Pretence of coming to a Parley, cut them to pieces; after which the rest were easily brought to an Accommodation. And lest the Remembrance of former Trans|actions should create any new Disturbances, a General Amnesty was pass'd,* 1.19 and every Man ob|liged himself by Oath, to bury what was pass'd in Oblivion: Which being religiously observed, the City was restored to its former Tranquillity, and its Members were again united into one Body.

Thus ended this Sedition in the third after its breaking out upon the Change of the Go|vernment;* 1.20 during which time the State suffer'd such Convulsions, as proved more fatal to it than the War. There were fourteen hundred Citi|zens put to death without hearing, and those

chiefly Men of Note and Condition. There were above Five Thousand more forced to fly into the Piraeus: And Xenophon observes, that this ••••••••stine Fury had consumed as many in eight Months, as the Peloponnesian War did in Ten Years. As the Flame was kindled by the Tyranny of The Thirty, so it was all along fo|mented and kept alive by the Ambition of Ly|sander: And that it was at last extinguished, is almost intirely owing to the Conduct and Reso|lution of Thrasybulus, who, after the share he had in rescuing his Country from a Foreign Enemy, had the peculiar Glory of suppressing its in|testine Foes, and, by that means, of restoring the City to itself. And in effecting this, he shew'd the greatest Temper and Moderation; which indeed were necessary in such a Conjuncture, to appease the Minds of the People, and to reconcile them to one another. Hence it was, that this Act of Oblivion became a Pattern to succeeding Ages; and Cicero recommends it as such to the People of Rome, when the City was divided into Factions upon the Murther of Julius Caesar.

Upon this Re-establishment of Affairs in Athens, the other States enjoyed the same Tranquillity, or rather kept in a quiet Subjection to Sparta, which now held the undoubted Sovereignty of Greece. But it being a Maxim with the Spar|tans, that this Sovereignty was not to be main|tain'd but by a constant course of Action, they were still seeking fresh Occasions of War: And

part of their Forces, together with another Bo|dy of Grecians, being at this time engaged in a Quarrel between the Persian King and his Bro|ther, it will be necessary to pass over into Asia, and relate so much of the Persian Affairs, as con|cerns The Expedition of Cyrus, wherein those Forces were employ'd; especially since it is at|tended with Circumstances, which, if duly con|sider'd, will easily make it pass for one of the greatest Actions of Antiquity.

Darius the Persian upon his Death-bed,* 1.21 for his two Sons, Artaxerxes and Cyrus; the former whereof he declared his Successor,* 1.22 and the other General of a part of his Troops; and he had before appointed him Commander in chief of the Maritime Provinces. The old King being dead, Tissaphernes, who went up with Cy|rus from his Government, accused him to his Brother of Treason: But upon the Intercession of his Mother Parisatis, not only his Life was spared, but he was confirmed in his Govern|ment. And yet he was no sooner returned to it, but he studied how to revenge this Affront, and to dethrone his Brother. To this end, he practised with the Grecians and Barbarians, and made Levies of the best Soldiers of Peloponne|sus, in order to recruit his Garrisons; the Pre|tence for which was, his Distrust of Tissaphernes, from whom he had taken all the Cities of Ionia, except Miletus; and that he had block'd up by Sea and Land, under colour of restoring some

whom Tissaphernes had banished, upon a Suspi|cion of their betraying him. The King was not much concerned at his Quarrel with Tissa|phernes, so long as he thought these Levies were designed against him only; and he was the more confirmed in this Opinion, because Cyrus con|tinued to send him up the Tribute due from those Places, as before.

Cyrus in the mean while held Intelligence with Clearchus, Aristippus and other Grecians, who were either banish'd from their respective Countries,* 1.23 or disgusted in them; and by their means got together, upon several different Pre|tences, One little Army in the Chersonese of Thrace, a Second upon the Hellespont, and a Third in Thessaly. When his Designs were ripe, he drain'd his Garrisons, and assembled all these scat|ter'd Forces together at Sardis, giving out, that his Intent was to chastise the Pisidians, who infested his Province.* 1.24 But Tissaphernes judging right, that these Preparations were too great for so in|considerable an Enterprise, as the Pisidian War, ha••••en'd to inform the King of it, who accord|ingly took the Alarm, and prepared for his De|fence.

At the Rendezvous of the Forces at Sardis,* 1.25 there were Four Thousand Grecians, who had been drawn out of the Garrisons, under the Command of Xenias; Proxenus the Boeotian had brought Two Thousand more; Sophaenetus the Stymphalian, One Thousand; Socrates of Achaia,

Five hundred; and Phasion the Megarean, Seven Hundred; in all to the number of Eight Thou|sand Two Hundred Men; with which Cyrus march'd through Lydia to Colossus, a City of Phrygia, where he was join'd by Menon the Thessalian, who commanded in the room of Aristippus, with Fifteen Hundred more. His next March was to Celaene, another City of P••rygia, where Clearchus the Spartan came in to him with Two Thousand more; Sosias the Syra|cusian with One Thousand; and Socrates the Ar|cadian with Three Hundred; which made the whole Number of Grecians Thirteen Thousand, whereof Eleven Thousand were heavy-arm'd.

But when they were got as far as Tarsus, the Capital of Cilicia,* 1.26 they began to perceive Cyrus's Intent of leading them into Persia against his Brother, and refused to follow him; till by the Artifice of Clearchus (who was the only Grecian in the Secret of Cyrus's Design) they being con|vinced, it was less hazardous to proceed, than to retreat,* 1.27 began to be pacified; and upon a Promise of having their Pay augmented to a Third more, they agreed to march. At Issus, he last City of Cilicia, there came to them Thir|••y Five Peloponnesian Gallies, and Twenty Five of Cyrus's, which had been employ'd in the Blockade of Miletus; and Cherisophus the Spar|••an join'd the Army with Seven Hundred Gre|ians, which he had on board the Gallies. Four Hundred more, who were in the Pay of Abroco|mas,

deserted from him, and came in to Cyrus. This Abrocomas commanded upon the Euphrates, and march'd with Three Hundred Thousand Men to join the King's Army, but did not ar|rive till after the Battle.

When they were arrived upon the Coasts of Phaenicia,* 1.28 Xenias and Phasion deserted from them, and made their Escape on board a Merchant Ship; which Cyrus did not resent in such a man|ner as was expected. He only told the other Captains, That no body should reproach him with keeping them in his Service against their Will, or with taking from them what they had got in it; that it was in his Power to pursue and punish them, but that he was so far from doing either, that he would send to them their Wives and Children, which be had as Hostages. By this generous Pro|ceeding he fix'd the Resolution of those, who be|fore had no great Inclination to proceed.

When they came to Thapsacus a City upon the Euphrates, Cyrus told them plainly his De|sign of marching against the King; at which the Soldiers murmur'd,* 1.29 and reproach'd their Offi|cers with having kept it so long secret, refusing at the same time to march any further, till Cy|rus promis'd them a further Reward upon their Arrival at Babylon,* 1.30 together with their full Pay to their Return into Ionia. Menon was also very instrumental in persuading them; for which Cyrus made him Presents to a considerable value.

From thence they march'd through Mesopota|mia, and at last advanc'd into the Province of Bablyon; where Cyrus, upon the Return of those who had been sent to reconnoitre the Enemy, advis'd with the Grecian Captains, and then spoke to them to this effect. It is not, my Friends,* 1.31 for want of Troops, that I have made choice of you, but because I have thought you were better to me than a great Number of Barbarians. Don't let me be deceived in my Opinion of you; but shew your selves worthy of that Liberty which you enjoy, and which I think preferable to all other Possessions. Consider only who you have to do with, and no|thing can happen in the Engagement to dishearten you. The Enemy indeed is very numerous, and will rush upon you with great Shouts and Acclamations; but if you can stand this first Eclat, you your selves will be ashamed for them afterwards. If you behave upon this Occasion like your selves, and any one shall afterwards desire to return home, his Countrymen shall have cause to look upon him with Admira|tion and Envy. But many of you, I believe, will rather choose to stay with me, and accept the Of|fers that shall be made you. There was a certain Samian, who took the Liberty of telling the Prince, That his promises were very large, in pro|portion to the Danger of his Enterprise; but that, after the Battle, he would forget them; or that, if he did not, he would not have it in his Power to perform them. To which Cyrus replied, This Kingdom of my Father's is so extensive, that one

part of it is not habitable by reason of the Heat, nor the other by reason of the Cold. All that lies between these Two Extremes, it will be in my Power, if I am victorious, to bestow on my Friends. Neither am I so much afraid of not having enough to give, as of not having Men enough to give it to. And as for you, Grecians, I promise to give every Man of you a Crown of Gold. Upon which As|surances, they went away very well satisfied, Clearchus afterwards ask'd him, if he thought the King would give him Battle. Yes, undoubt|edly, said he; If he be the Son of Darius and Pa|risatis, and my Brother, he will not let me take pos|session of all this, without striking a Stroke for it.

Upon a general Review of his Army,* 1.32 he found it composed of Ten Thousand and Four Hundred heavy-arm'd Grecians, Two Thousand Five Hundred others; and an Hundred Thou|sand of other Nations; and the Enemy, by the Accounts they had from Deserters, amounted to Twelve Hundred Thousand Men, besides a se|lect Body of Six Thousand Horse. He then form'd his Army,* 1.33 giving to Clearchus the Com|mand of the right Wing of Grecians, and Me|non the lest, and march'd in order of Battle, expecting every Hour to engage. But the Ene|my having left a Pass open to him, which he thought they would have disputed, he pursued his March with more Security, and less Order, till at last being arrived at the Place where he intended to encamp, he discover'd the King's

Army by a thick Cloud of Dust, and prepar'd to receive them. He order'd Clearchus to charge directly into the Center, where the King was; for that thereupon depended the whole Success of the Battle: But the Enemy being so numerous, that one of their Wings would cover the whole Front of Cyrus's Army, he thought it not ad|viseable to abandon the River, for sear of being surrounded by them; which Plutarch blames him for, as having left that Service to Cyrus, and thereby occasion'd his Death. When he had let the Enemy advance within four or five hundred Paces of him, the Grecians began the Hymn to Battle,* 1.34 and march'd up to them with great Ac|clamations. But before they were got within reach of their Javelins, the Barbarians fled, and the Grecians after them, calling out to one ano|ther, not to break their Ranks in the Pursuit. Cyrus perceiv'd the Grecians were victorious, yet was not transported with it, tho' he was alrea|dy saluted King by those about him. At length he discover'd the King his brother in the midst of the Battle; and for fear he should fall upon the Grecians in their Pursuit, and cut them off, he made up directly to him with Six Hundred Horse, and with his own Hand kill'd Artagerses, who commanded the King's Six Thousand Horse But when he had broke their Squadrons, all his own People abandon'd him, except a few of his Domesticks, with whom he charg'd on to the King, and crying out, I see him, threw a Ja|velin

at him, and wounded him in the Stomach; but at the same time receiv'd a Wound himself under his Eye,* 1.35 and was kill'd upon the Spot, with eight of his principal Attendants. The King order's his Head and right Hand to be cut off; and then push'd on to Cyrus's Camp, in pur|suit of Ariaeus, who commanded his Horse, and had fled as soon as he had heard of his Master's Death. The Grecians at the same time were in pursuit of one part of the King's Army, whils•• the other part of it were plundering their Camp; so that both sides thought themselves victorious. The King return'd upon them in the same Or|der of Battle as at first; but the Barbarians fled again on all sides upon the Approach of the Grecians, who being very much fatigued, and Night drawing on, returned to their Camp, not knowing what was become of Cyrus, but expect|ing his Orders the next Day to compleat their Victory. When the News arrived to them the next Morning of Cyrus's Death, it occasion'd a•• general Consternation; and they were now to de|liberate, not so much to annoy the Enemy, a•• to provide for their own Safety.

This was the Success of the Battle, which wa•• fought at Cunaxa in Assyria, on the Banks o•• the River Euphrates, about an hundred League from Babylon. And thus sell Cyrus in the pur••suit of his Ambition; which yet was attende•• with so many good Qualities, that he deserved better Fate; and it is very probable, from th••

Circumstances of the Action, that if he had been more cautious in exposing himself, he had carried his Point. The Character of this Prince is finely drawn by Xenophon. But not to enter further into the Persian Affairs, than is necessary to my present Purpose, I will only observe of him in general from that Historian, that no bo|dy of his time, whether Grecian or Barbarian, was so universally beloved. He describes him further, as a Prince born for Empire, and the most worthy Successor of Cyrus the Great.

Amidst the Confusion the Grecians were in af|ter the Battle, they sent to Ari••••us as Conqueror, and Commander in chief upon Cyrus's Death, to offer him the Persian Crown. In the mean time the King, as Conqueror also on his side, sent to them to surrender their Arms,* 1.36 and implore his Mercy; representing to them at the same time, That as they were in the Heart of his Dominions, surrounded with vast Rivers, and numberless Nations, it would be impossible for them to escape his Vengeance, and therefore they had nothing to do, but to submit to the present Necessity. Upon debating among themselves what Answer they should return, Proxenus de|sired to know of the Heralds,* 1.37 upon what Terms the King demanded their Arms. If as Conque|ror, it was in his Power to take them; if upon any other foot, what would be give them in return? He was seconded by Xenophon, who said, They had nothing left but their Arms, and their Liberty;

and that they could not preserve the one without the other. Clearchus said to the same effect, That if the King was disposed to be their Friend, they should be in a better Capacity of serving him with Arms, than without; if their Enemy, they should have need of them for their Defence. Some indeed spoke in Terms more complying, That as they had served Cyrus faithfully, they would also serve Artaxerxes, if he would employ them, and provided he would at the same time put them in possession of Aegypt. At last it was agreed, that they should remain in the Place where they were, and that if they advanced further, or retreated back, it should be look'd upon as a Declaration of War; so that by the Issue of the Debate, it appear'd to have been managed so, as to avoid giving a di|rect Answer, but only to amuse the King, and gain time.

Whilst this Treaty was on foot, they received Ariaeus's Answer, That there were too many powerful Men in P••rsia, to let him possess the Throne; wheresore he intended to set out early the next Morning in his Return towards Greece; and that if they had a mind to accompany him•• they should join him that Night in his Camp•• Which accordingly they all did,* 1.38 except Milithocy••tus a Thracian, who went with a Party of Thre•• Hundred Men, and Forty Horse to the King The rest, in conjunction with Ariaeus's Forces decamp'd by break of Day, and continu'd then March till Sun-set, when they discovered from

the neighbouring Villages the King was in pur|suit of them: But this Alarm was over the next Day, when he sent to treat with them. Clear|chus return'd Answer, That his Men were strait|en'd for want of Provisions; and that his Affairs required him rather to fight, than to enter upon a Treaty. Wherefore the King, to prevent their being desperate, sent to conduct them to several Villages, where they found plenty of every thing; and after Three Days Stay there, Tissa|phernes came, and insinuated to them the good Offices he had employ'd with the King, to give him leave to conduct them safe into their Coun|try; that in return, they ought to acknowledge this Favour, and not shew themselves averse to such Terms, as he could obtain for them. Cle|archus urg'd in their Defence, That they had been engag'd in this Expedition by Cyrus, with|out their Knowledge or Intention; that upon his Death, they were now free'd from that En|gagement, and had no Design upon Artaxerxes, or his Country, provided he did not oppose them in their Return. Which Tissaphernes agree'd to on the King's part, that he should not, and promis'd further, That they should be furnish'd with all necessary Provisions in their March, and that he himself would return with them to his Government.

Accordingly, in a few Days after, they set out ander his Conduct: But in their March, the Barbarians encamping at about a League's dis|tance

from the Grecians, created some little Dis|trusts and Jealousies on both sides. In about fifty Days, being got to the Banks of the River Zabatus, Clearchus, to prevent things coming to an open Rupture, had a Conference with Tissaphernes; wherein, among other things, he assur'd him of their Fidelity, in regard to the Truce between them, as likewise of their future Service, whenever he should have occasion to employ them, and that they would always look upon him as the Author of their Safety and De|liverance.* 1.39 To which Tissaphernes answer'd, That he was glad of this occasion of coming to a right Understanding with him; That indeed it was in their Power to have destroy'd the Grecia•••• whenever they had pleas'd, but that he himself had prevented it, out of a Desire to oblige them by his good Offices, as Cyrus had done by hi•• Mony. The Result of their Discourse was That they had been misrepresented to each other by some of Clearchus his Officers, and that h•••• should bring them all to Tissaphernes, in order to•• detect those who were guilty. He particularly suspected Menon of a Design to supplant him 〈◊〉〈◊〉 his Command; and accordingly brought hi•• the next Day, with three other General Office•••• Proxenus, Agias and Socrates, attended with 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Guard of Twenty Captains, and about Two Hundred Soldiers, upon a Pretence of buying Provisions in the Persian Camp. The Five G••neral Officers, upon a Signal given, were imm••••

diately admited into Tissaphernes's Tent, and put in Arrest; the others, who were without, were at the same time cut in pieces, and some Persian Horse scouring the Plain, kill'd all the Grecians they met. Amidst this Scene of Slaughter and Confusion, the Persians sent to them a second time, in the King's Name, to lay down their Arms, pretending that Clearchus was executed, as having been accused by Proxenus and Menon of perfidiously designing to break the Truce; and that his Accusers were sent for to be reward|ed by the King for their Discovery. But Xeno|phon suspecting the Treachery, demanded, that Proxenus and Menon, as being innocent, and com|mon Friends to both, might be restored to them, as the properest Persons to advise them in this Exigency. To which the Persians, not knowing what to reply, went away. Immedi|ately after, Nicarchus, one of the Captains who had attended the Generals, came, wounded in the Belly, and holding up his Entrails with his Hand, to the Grecian Camp, and told them all the Particulars of what had happen'd.* 1.40 The five Generals were sent back to the King, who caus'd them all to be beheaded, except Menon, who suffer'd some other way after a Year's Torture. It does not appear, why he was distinguished in this manner from the rest; tho' indeed there was some Justice in it in regard to his Character, which was as extraordinary as his Treatment.

He was by Birth a Thessalian,* 1.41 covetous and ambitious; but who made his Ambition all along subservient to his Avarice, and had no other View in his Pursuit of Honour, but to get by it. He sought the Friendship of Men in Power, on|ly to screen him from Punishment. He con|cluded the readiest way to obtain his Ends, was by Perjury, Lying and Fraud; and took Can|dor and Openness for Stupidity. He loved no body; and wherever he profess'd a Freindship, it was in order to ensnare. He did not laugh at his Enemies, but always made a Jest of his Friends. So neither did he attempt to defraud his Enemies of their Property, as knowing they were too much upon their Guard against him: But his Friends, who were not so, he fleec'd and plunder'd. And he valued himself as much up|on his Injustice and Falshood, as others did upon their Religion and Virtue: For he thought none but Cheats were to be look'd upon as Men of Address. He made his way to Great Men by traducing their Favourites. His manner of sup|porting his Authority among the Troops, was by committing the same Crimes with them. He endeavour'd to make himself fear'd by the Mis|chief he could do you; and you were to take it as an Obligation, that he did not do it, when it was in his Power. He gain'd the Favour of Ariaeus in his Youth, by abandoning himself to his unnatural Passion; and he prevail'd the same way with Aristippus for his Command in the

Army. Some have imagin'd that he was par|don'd by Artaxerxes; and conclude from thence, that he was engag'd in a Design of betraying the Grecians to him; which, according to his Prin|ciples, might easily be supposed: But however, this Account of him does not appear to be well founded.

Clearchus was a Spartan,* 1.42 and esteem'd one of the greatest Captains of his Time. He had done good Servie to his Country in the Peloponnesian War, and was intirely devoted to the Love of Arms; insomuch that he laid out all his Mony in War, and with the same Gust and Appetite, with which others laid it out upon their Plea|sures. Hence it was, that upon the Peace, he desir'd leave to go and chastise the Thracians, who had committed some Insults upon the Cher|sonese. Soon after he was gone, the Ephori changed their Minds, and recall'd him; and tho' they pas'd Sentence of Death upon him for disobeying their Orders, he proceeded on his March, beat the Thracians in a pitch'd Battle, ravaged their Country, and continued the War, till he enter'd into Cyrus's Service; where he was pitch'd upon as the properest Man to command the Grecians in this Expedition: And he had Ta|lents suitable to so hardy an Undertaking. He was severe in his Looks, and harsh in his Speech; he always punish'd sharply, and sometimes in Anger, but generally with Discretion. He was very strict in his Discipline; and it was a Saying

of his, That a Soldier ought to be more afraid of his Officer, than of his Enemy. Upon Action, his Men desir'd no other General; for he then appear'd mild to them, and reserv'd all his Fierceness for the Enemy: But when the Danger was over, he resumed his Natural Roughness, and many of them, as they found opportunity, left him. None of them follow'd him out of Inclination; but lived with him, as Boys do with their School-masters. However, he did every thing with them by dint of Punishment; and the Sum of his Character is, that he was more fit to command, than to obey.

Proxenus was a Boeotian,* 1.43 and of an aspiring Temper, which had engaged him in this Ser|vice; tho' he did nothing in the Pursuit of his Ambition, but what was consistent with Honour and Virtue. He was capable enough of Com|mand, but was too much the Reverse of Clear|chus. He had not the way of making himself fear'd, where it was necessary: For he was more afraid of being ill with the Soldiery, than the Soldiery with him. He thought it sufficient to commend good Actions, without punishing the bad: For which reason he was beloved by those who acted upon Principles of Honour; but bad Men took advantage of his Easiness.

Agias was an Arcadian,* 1.44 and Socrates and Achaean; they had both lived without Reproach, either as to their Military, or their Civil Conduct.

The Grecians had, ever since the Battle of Cy|rus, been so upon their guard, and were withal so bold and resolute, that the Persians despair'd of subduing them by open Force, and therefore had recourse to this treacherous Stratagem, which had so far succeeded, that the Loss of the Gene|rals was very near breaking and dispersing the whole Body. The News of it struck them with the utmost Consternation: They expected every Moment when they should be attacked in their Camp: They consider'd that they were at the very Gates of the King; surrounded with great Rivers; in the midst of many Nations their Enemies; six or seven hundred Leagues from Greece; without Officers to lead them; in want of all manner of Provisions, and of Means to get any; besides that they had no Cavalry; and therefore if they were victorious, could not pur|sue their Enemies; and if they should happen to be defeated, must every Man of them be cut off. In these perplexing Thoughts they pass'd the Night without Sleep, despairing ever to see their Native Country more.

It was upon this Occasion,* 1.45 that Xenophon sig|nalized himself. He was an intimate Friend of Proxenus, who had invited him into Asia, and presented him to Cyrus, who had also express'd a particular Esteem for him; but hitherto he had served only as a Voluntier in the Army. The next Morning he assembled the Officers, and re|presented to them the Misery of their Condition;

That they could expect no Mercy from the King, if they fell into his Hands; to prevent which, they had nothing to depend upon, but their own Personal Bravery; and that no time ought to be lost in providing for their Defence. He there|fore advised to choose new Officers in the Place of those who were murther'd, and to resolve to make their way home in the best manner they could. Accordingly, they chose Timasion in the room of Clearchus, Xanthicles in that of Socra|tes, Cleanor in that of Agias, Philesius in that of Menon, and Xenophon in that of his Friend Proxe|nus. He having encourag'd the Army with a long Harangue in praise of their Ancestors, pro|pos'd to them, for the Safety and Expedition of their Return, to burn their Tents, Carriages, and all unnecessary Baggage, and to march in the form of a hollow Square, that, in case they should be attack'd, they might be prepar'd to receive the Enemy with a Front either way. All which being approv'd of, Cherisophus the Spart••n led the Van, and Timasion and Xenophon brought up the Rear.

They bent their March towards the Heads of the great Rivers,* 1.46 in order to pass them where they were fordable: But they had made very lit|tle way before they were follow'd by a Party of the Enemies Archers and Slingers, commanded by Mithridates, which gall'd their Rear, and wounded several of them, who being heavy|arm'd, and without Cavalry, could make no

Resistance. To prevent the like Inconvenience, Xenophon furnish'd two hundred Rhodians with Slings, and mounted fifty more of his Men up|on Baggage-Horses; so that when Mithridates came up with them a second time, and with a much greater Body,* 1.47 he repuls'd them with this Handful of Men, till he arrived near to the City Larissa on the Banks of the Tigris. From thence they march'd to another desolate City call'd Mepsila; and about four Leagues from that Place, Tissaphernes came up to them with his whole Army in Order of Battle; but, ••fter several Skirmishes, was forc'd to retire. In a few Days after, he secured an Eminence, over which the Grecians were obliged to make their way: Which Xenophon perceiving, took a De|••achment of the Army, and with great Dili|gence gain'd the Top of a Mountain which commanded that Eminence, from whence he ea|sily dislodg'd the Enemy, and made good a Pas|sage for the rest of hsi Troops into the Plain, where they found Plenty of Provisions, tho' Tis|••aphernes had done what he could before, to ••urn and destroy the Country.

But still they were under as great Difficulties as ever, being bounded on the one hand by the Tigris, and on the other by inaccessible Moun|tains, inhabited by the Carduchi, a sierce and warlike People, and who, Xenophon says, had cut off an Army of Six Score Thousand Persians to

a Man, by reason of the Difficulty of the Ways. However, having no Boats to cross the River, and the Passage through the Mountains opening into the rich Plains of Armenia, they resolv'd to pur|sue their March that way. These Barbarians soon took the Alarm; but not being prepar'd to meet them in a Body, they possess'd themselves of the Tops of the Rocks and Mountains, and from thence annoy'd them with Darts and great Stones,* 1.48 which they threw down into the Defiles thro' which they pass'd; in which they were al|so attack'd by several other Parties; and thoug•• their Loss was not considerable, yet, what with Storms and Famine, besides seven tedious Days March, and being continually forc'd to fight their way, they underwent more Fatigue and Hardship, than they had suffer'd from the Per|sians during the whole Expedition.

They were now got to the Banks of the Cen|trites, which divides the Mountains from Arme|nia: And whilst the Carduchi were still in View of them, and pouring down upon their Backs, they had this deep River before them, with 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Body of Troops on the other side to dispute their Passage. Notwithstanding which, they forded it with all their Baggage, and fought their way into Armenia;* 1.49 where Tyribazus the Go|vernor offer'd them free Passage and Provisions upon condition they did not ravage the Coun|try. But his Design was to cut them off in the Mountains; which they being appriz'd of, fell

upon him first, defeated him, and took his Tent.* 1.50 Soon after they arrived at the Euphrates, which they pass'd near the Source; and continued their March through the Desart part of Arme|nia; where several of them were lost in the deep Snows, and the rest suffer'd extremely by Cold and Hunger. After a Stay of seven Days to refresh themselves in the Villages, they pro|ceeded thro' the Countries of the Phasiani, Ta|choi, and Chalybes; which latter were reckon'd the stoutest People of the Barbarians. But the Grecians again forc'd the Passes they held in the Mountains, and made good their Descent into the Plain. After which they arriv'd at the River Harpasus; and from thence at a rich populous City call'd Gymnias. They were very well re|ceiv'd by the Governour of the Province, who dismiss'd them with a Guide, that brought them in five Days within Sight of the Sea;* 1.51 at which they burst out into Tears and Exclamations of Joy, and embrac'd their Officers for having brought them within reach of several Grecian Co|lonies, by which they might hope to be protected the rest of their March. And of this they had an Instance in the next Province belonging to the Macrones, who at first appear'd in Arms against them; but finding them to be their Countrymen, brought them Provisions, and gave them free Passage. From thence they advanc'd to the Mountains of Colchis, where they met with some Opposition, but got the better, and, in two Days

more,* 1.52 arriv'd at Trapezus, a Grecian Colony of the Sinopeans, situate in the Country of Colchis, upon the Euxine Sea.

Here being almost beat out with the Fatigues of their long March, they resolv'd to make the rest of their Way by Sea, and deputed Cherisophus to the Spartan Admiral for Ships for that Pur|pose. Whilst the Army waited his Return, they subsisted themselves by their Incursions upon the Barbarians; till at last, after thirty Days Stay, hearing nothing of him, and the Country being quite exhausted, they put their Women, old and sick Men, and Part of their Baggage, on board some Vessels which they had stopt at Trapezus, whilst the rest renew'd their March by Land, and in three Days reach'd Cerasus, another Greacian Colony;* 1.53 where, upon a review of their Forces, they were found to amount to Eight Thousand Six Hundred, the rest of the Ten Thousand be|ing dead either of the Fatigue, Sickness, or their Wounds.

Upon their Arrival on the Frontiers of the Mosynaeci,* 1.54 they were vigorously oppos'd, and re|puls'd with Loss; but being encourag'd by Xe|nophon,* 1.55 they rally'd, took the Metropolis, and by that Means became Masters of the whole Country, from thence they continu'd their March along the Coast,* 1.56 till they arriv'd at Cotyora. The Distance from the Field of Battle to this Place is computed at about Six Hundred and Twenty Leagues; which from the Day of the Battle took

them up Eight Months Time; of which they march'd an Hundred and Twenty-two Days. They had hitherto preserv'd themselves in an in|tire Body; but being a••terwards broken and di|minish'd by their Divisions, and other Accidents, Xenophon, for that Reason, seems to finish their Retreat at this Place. But as he still prosecutes his Account of them, it may be proper to see, what further Difficulties they meet with, till they arriv'd nearer home, and pass'd again into the Service of their Country.

The Inhabitants of this Place at first refusing them Admittance, they ravag'd the Country, and liv'd at Discretion, till, by the Interposition of the Sinopeans, to whom Cotyora was tributary, they were supply'd from the Town. During their Stay here of Forty-five Days, there was a general Enquiry made, in the Nature of a Court-Martial, into all the Abuses and Offences that had been committed in the Army, whether by Officers or others, since the Death of Cyrus, and Punish|ments allotted accordingly. Among others, Xe|nophon was accus'd of having treated several of the Soldiers ill;* 1.57 but he made it appear, he had done nothing but what was necessary to preserve the Discipline, and was acquitted with a general Ap|plause.* 1.58 He had also form'd a Project of settling them in these Parts, and sounding a Grecian Co|lony; which was approv'd by some; but his Enemies representing it to the Army, only as a more honourable way of abandoning them, and

to the Inhabitants, as a Design to subdue and en|slave the Country, he was forc'd to give over that Enterprize. However, the Noise of it had this good Effect, that the Natives did what they could, in a friendly Manner, to procure their Departure, advising them to go by Sea, as the safest Way, and furnish'd them with a sufficient Number of Transports for that Purpose.

Accordingly they embark'd with a fair Wind, and the next Day got into the Harbour of Sinope, where Cherisophus met them with some Gallies; but, instead of the Money they had also expected from him, he only told them, they should be paid their Arrears, assoon as they got out of the Euxine Sea. But this Answer occasion'd a great deal of murmuring and Discontent among them;* 1.59 so that they resolved to put themselves under one single General, desiring Xenophon in the most pressing and affectionate Terms, to accept of that Command; which he modestly declined, and procur'd the Choice to fall upon Cherisophus. But he enjoy'd it not above six or seven Days; for no sooner were they arriv'd at Heraclea, than the Army depos'd him for refusing to extort a Sum of Money from the Inhabitants of that City; which being a Grecian Colony, Xenophon likewise refus'd to concern himself in that Affair; so that the Army being disappointed in their Hopes of Plunder,* 1.60 fell into a Mutiny, and divided into three Bodies; of which the Achoeans and Arca|dians were the principal, consisting of Four

Thousand Five Hundred Foot, and commanded by ten of their own Officers. Cherisophus retain'd another, of Two Thousand One Hundred; and Xenophon the third, of about the same Number, forty whereof were Horse; which indeed was all the Cavalry they had.

The first Body having obtain'd Ships of the Heracleotae, sail'd to Calpe, a Port of Bithynia. Cherisophus led his Troops by Land, leaving what Ships he had to Xenophon; who set sail, and landing on the Confines of Bithynia, march'd into the Country. The Arcadians landing in the Night, had plunder'd the Villages; upon which the Inhabitants appear'd in Arms, and almost entirely cut off two Regiments, and surrounded a Hill where the rest were encamp'd. Xenophon in the mean time receiving Advice of their Con|dition, march'd to their Relief, setting on Fire every thing in his Way that was combustible; which struck such a Terror into the Enemy, that they decamp'd by Night:* 1.61 Upon which the Gre|cians were happily reunited, and encamp'd at the Port of Calpe; where they settled the Command as before, substituting Neon in the Room of Che|risophus, who died here; and making it Death for any Man henceforward, to propose the di|viding of the Army. But being straiten'd for Provisions, they were forc'd to spread themselves in the Villages; where Pharnabazus's Horse being join'd by the Inhabitants, cut in Pieces Five Hundred of them. The rest escaping to an Hill,

were rescu'd and brought off by Xenophon; who after this led them thro' a large Forest, where Pharnabazus had posted his Troops to oppose their Passage;* 1.62 but they entirely defeated him, and pursu'd their March to Chrysopolis of Chalce|don, having got a great deal of Booty in their Way,* 1.63 and from thence to Byzantium.

Pharnabazus, who fear'd they would be strong enough to dispossess him of his Government, had been practising with Cleander, the Governor of Byzantium, and Anaxibius, the Spartan Admiral, to use all possible Means to hasten their Depar|ture. Accordingly Anaxibius got them out of the City Gate, under a pretence of reviewing them, and told them, They would meet with Plenty of Provisions in the Thracian Villages, and that they should proceed to the Chersonese, where he would take care they should be paid their Arrears. But they were so ill satisfied with these Promises, that they re-enter'd the Gates in a tumultuous Manner, and put the City into the utmost Con|fusion. They address'd themselves to Xenopho•• telling him,* 1.64 That now was the Time to make himself great, and them rich, and that they ought not to slip this Opportunity of furnishing them|selves with every thing they wanted. To appease them, he seem'd at first to comply with their Demands; then having drawn them up in a large Square of the City,* 1.65 he represented to them the ill Consequence of plundering the City, and thereby incensing the Spartans, who held the

Sovereignty of Greece, and had Athens in their Alliance: That this would involve their Country in a dangerous War, and themselves in inevitable Ruin, since it was equally impracticable for them to make their Retreat to the Persian, or any of the Countries thro' which they had forc'd their Passage, or to return home; to which he added, how much it would sully the Glory of their Re|treat, That after having spared so many of the Barbarian Cities, they had plunder'd the first they came to in their own Country, and murder'd so many of their Friends and Relations. This Ha|rangue had so good an effect, that they imme|diately chang'd their Resolution, and march'd out of the City without committing the least Dis|order; which was intirely owing to Xenophon, who to the Courage and Conduct he had shewn in every Circumstance of the Retreat, had added this extraordinary Instance of his Mildness and Humanity, and the Force of his Eloquence. And this was testified of him at large in a Letter from Chio, a Philosopher then in the Town, to a Friend of his, wherein he tells him, He had been an Eye|witness of the Skill and Temper, with which Xeno|phon had allay'd the Fury of the Soldiers; that he could not forbear going to thank him as the Author of his Deliverance, and was struck with the Sight of a Man, who had nothing terrible or severe in his Looks, but entertain'd him in the most meek and agreeable Manner on several Subjects, and who knew so well how to reduce Philosophy to Practice.

The Troops being thus appeas'd,* 1.66 Xenophon took his Leave of them, and retir'd into the City, with a Design to embark for Athens: But as they proceeded to the neighbouring Villages, they were divided in their Opinion as to what Course they should take.* 1.67 In these Uncertainties, he was prevail'd upon to return to the Army, and was receiv'd with all imaginable Demonstrations of Joy. At the same time there was an Overture made to him from Seuthes,* 1.68 King of the Odrysians in Thrace, with a Promise of great Rewards both to the Officers and Soldiers, in case they would enter into his Service. He accepted the Offer, and led them into the Service of that Prince; who, by their Assistance, gain'd great Advan|tages over his Enemies; insomuch that the whole Country submitted to him.

They had no sooner re-establish'd him in his Dominions, but Thimbron the Spartan General sent them Word, he was order'd by the State to declare War against Tissaphernes; and that they should receive all fitting Encouragement, if they would assist him. Seuthes not being able to pay them their Arrears, and having no further Occa|sion for them, did what he could to encourage the Proposal; tho' they were of themselves desirous enough to serve again in the Cause of their Coun|try; besides that they were glad of such an Occa|sion of revenging the Treachery of Tissaphernes to them in their Retreat: So that they easily gave into it, and were so warm upon it, that an Arca|dian

accused Xenophon of having detain'd them so long out of that Service,* 1.69 only to enrich himself at the Expence of their Lives and Labours; and added, That as to his part, what little he had, he would freely give to see him stoned to death. Another stood up, and seconded this Motion; and a third spoke to the same Purpose. He made it appear in his Answer to this Charge, that he had acted in every thing for the Good and Safety of the Army; that, as to his own particular, he had not receiv'd the Rewards which were pro|mised him, nor even so much as several of the other Captains; and appeal'd to Seuthes himself for the Truth of it. He modestly hinted to them his past Services, which they had promised never to forget, when, in their Dangers and Fatigues, they gave him no other Name, than that of Fa|ther, Saviour and Deliverer; and in the end re|proach'd them with the rankest Malice and In|gratitude. They were so well satisfied with his Defence, that several spoke in his Favour, and nothing more of a Complaint was urg'd against him:* 1.70 So that they prepar'd for their new Expe|dition, and he embark'd with them, and sail'd to Lampsacus in Mysia. From thence they march'd to Troas, and crossing Mount Ida, ar|riv'd at Antandros; whence coasting along, they gain'd the Plain of Thebe,* 1.71 and arriv'd at Perga|mus in Lydia; where Xenophon, with a Detach|ment of Three Hundred Men, took a Persian Lord with all his Equipage, and a great Sum of

Mony.* 1.72 The next Day Thimbron arriving there, took them under his Command, and join'd them to his own Troops, in order to carry on the War in Asia.

Thus in the first Year of the Ninety-fifth O|lympiad,* 1.73 ended this memorable Expedition of this Body of Grecians; who, notwithstanding the many Adventures and Impediments they met with, and which took up so much of their Time, perform'd the whole Journey of between Four and Five Thousand English Miles forwards and backwards, in the Space of about Nineteen Months, from their first setting out, till their Ar|rival at Pergamus. It is true indeed, that, upon a Review of the Forces at Cerasus, there ap|pear'd to be but Eight Thousand Six Hundred Men; and after their Service under Seuthes, there is Mention made but of Six Thousand; which last Diminution of them was owing to their Di|visions, and going in separate Bodies in Search of Plunder, as they came nearer home. But yet, that any such Number of them should escape, as did actually reach the Confines of Greece, seems almost incredible. That, after the Death of Cyrus, which struck such a Damp into the rest of his Forces, they alone should have Courage enough to continue the War, to oblige the Per|sian to sue to them for Peace, and furnish them with Provisions; That, after the treacherous Murder of their Officers, they should be still hardy enough to make their Way in Defiance

of a numberless Army, that could neither take them by Force, nor circumvent them by Strata|gem; That they should traverse the Body of that vast Empire, with so many barbarous Nations on all Sides, to dispute their Passage over Rocks and Mountains almost inaccessible, and such Rivers as the Tigris and Euphrates; and all this with the Countenance rather of Conquerors, than of de|spairing successless Adventurers, exposed to the Fury of a powerful incensed Monarch with a victorious Army: these are Circumstances, which would not easily gain Credit, if they had not been describ'd and attested by Xenophon, who has done it with such Exactness and Fidelity, and at the same time with such Modesty in regard to him|self, that the only Doubt remaining, is, whether he gain'd more Honour by the Share he had in the Expedition, or by the Account he has given of it.

But it is time now to return to Greece, which we left chiefly under the Direction of the Spar|tans, who contenting themselves with the Sub|mission of the several States to them at home, were meditating other great Designs, and resolv'd to push their Conquests abroad. The first Occa|sion that offer'd, was from the Ionians: They were afraid of the Power of Tissaphernes, who, as a Reward for the Service he had done Artaxerxes in the late War with his Brother Cyrus, had the Government of all the Cities he had possessed in those Parts, conferr'd on him; and therefore

they begg'd Assistance from Sparta to support them in their Liberties. Their Request was easily granted; and a Body of Five Thousand Men, with Three Hundred Athenian Horse, were sent to them, under the Command of Thimbron, who appear'd among them, but would not venture to take the Field, till he was join'd by the Re|mainder of the Ten Thousand at Pergamus; with which Forces he took that, and several other ill-fortified Towns, and then laid Siege to Larissa. But before he could take it, he was recall'd by the Ephori,* 1.74 and banish'd, for having suffer'd the Soldiers to pillage the Countries of their Allies; and was succeeded in the Command by Dercyl|lidas.

Athens, during the Time of the Expedition of the Ten Thousand, and the breaking out of this fresh War in Asia, was very quiet with its Neigh|bours, and endeavouring to recover itself from its late Confusions in the Government at home. But there were still some Seeds of Rancour and Ma|lice left among the Citizens, which, two Years after the Expulsion of the Thirty, broke out upon Socrates, and occasion'd his Death. The chief Instrument in it was Anytus, who engag'd Melitus and Lycon to join with him in accusing him to the State. Accordingly Melitus drew up his Accusa|tion,* 1.75 containining in Substance, That he did not ac|knowledge the Gods of the Republick, but introduced new Deities in their room; and further, That he corrupted the Youth. He urg'd in his Defence,

That he had assisted,* 1.76 as others did, at the Sacri|fices and solemn Festivals, and appeal'd to Me|litus himself for the Truth of it. He denied his endeavouring to establish any new Worship: He own'd indeed, he had receiv'd frequent Admo|nitions from a Divine Voice, which he call'd his Daemon, that constantly attended him, and dis|cover'd to him Things to come; that he had of|ten made use of this Divine Assistance for the Ser|vice of himself and his Friends: But that if he had been thus particularly favour'd from Heaven, it was owing chiefly to the Regularity of his Life and Conduct; and that the Approbation of the Gods, which was given him as the Reward of his Virtue, ought not to be objected to him as his Crime. Then as to the other Article, wherein he was branded with a criminal Passion for young Men, he said, He had no other View in his Con|versation with them, than to regulate their Mo|rals; that as he could not do this with any pub|lick Authority, he was therefore forc'd to insi|nuate himself into their Company, and to use in a manner the same Methods to reclaim, that o|thers did to corrupt them.

How far the whole Charge affected him, is not easy to determine. It is certain, that amidst so much Zeal and Superstition as then reign'd in Athens, he never durst openly oppose the receiv'd Religion, and was therefore forc'd to preserve an outward Shew of it: But it is very probable, from the Discourses he frequently held with his

Friends, that in his Heart he despis'd and laugh'd at their monstrous Opinions, and ridiculous Mys|teries, as having no other Foundation, than the Fables of the Poets; and that he had attain'd to a Notion of the One, Only, True God; inso|much that, upon the account both of his Belief of the Deity, and the Exemplariness of his Life, some have thought fit to rank him with the Christian Philosophers. And indeed his Behaviour upon his Trial, was more like that of a Christian Martyr, than of an Impious Pagan; where he appear'd with such a compos'd Confidence, as naturally results from Innocence, and rather, as Cicero observes, as if he were to determine upon his Judges, than to supplicate them as a Cri|minal.

But how slight soever the Proofs were against him, the Faction was powerful enough to find him guilty. There was the Form of a Process against him, and his Irreligion was the Pretence upon which it was grounded; but his Death was certainly a concerted thing. His steady uninter|rupted Course of obstinate Virtue, which had made him in many Cases appear singular, and oppose whatever he thought illegal or unjust, without any Regard to Times, or Persons, had procur'd him a great deal of Envy and Ill-will: Insomuch that he had, several Years before, been publickly attack'd upon the Stage in the Play, call'd The Clouds, where he is introduc'd as the Author of many gross Impieties; which some

say, Aristophanes wrote out of a personal Pique to him; others, that he did it only according to the Liberty then indulg'd to the Stage, and intended, in the Person of Socrates, to expose and ridicule the Philosophers in general. But most are of Opinion, that it was at the Instigation of Anytus, who look'd upon him as a dangerous Man, and took that Method of preparing the People for his Condemnation, whenever an Opportunity should offer. This agrees with the Terms proposed to him, even after the Accusation was given in, when perhaps he was not sure of carrying his Point a|gainst him: He hinted to him, that if he would talk less freely, and not take upon him to censure and arraign the Administration, he would yet en|deavour to stifle the Affair, and save him. It was upon the same Account, that he was forbid conversing with the young Men: Those at the Helm were jealous of his tampering with them in relation to the Government; and this seems to be the Grounds of that Part of his Accusation. But he was not to be bought by Bribes, or deter'd by Menaces; in short, he had more Plainness and Integrity than the Times would bear; and there|fore fell a Sacrifice to the Corruption of those, whom his Honesty had made his Enemies.

It was a Privilege in Athens, after Conviction, to demand a Mitigation of the Punishment: But that, he said, would be owning himself guilty; and he chose rather to defy and incense his Judges; so that they unanimously pass'd Sentence

of Death upon him,* 1.77 by drinking the Juice of Hemlock, which was not put in execution till thirty Days after;* 1.78 during which Time, he con|versed with his Friends with the same Evenness and Serenity of Mind he had ever done: And tho' they had bribed the Jailor for his Escape, he refus'd it, as an ungenerous Violation of the Laws. He was about seventy Years old when he suffer'd; which made him say, he thought him|self happy to quit Life at a Time when it begin to be troublesome; and that his Death was ra|ther a Deliverance, than a Punishment. This agrees with his last Words to his Friend Crit•• just before he expir'd; We owe a Cock, said he, to Aesculapius, don't fail to pay it him; thereby intimating, that he should sacrifice for him 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that God, as if he had recover'd from a Diseas•• His Innocence soon after appear'd in such live•• Colours, that the Athenians imputed all the Mi••••fortunes of the Republick to his unjust Condem|nation; and to avert the Vengeance of Heaven thought themselves oblig'd to make suitable Ex|pressions of Repentance; which they did by re|voking his Sentence with a publick solemn La|mentation, and by condemning his Accusers From thence their Love and Respect to his Me••mory rose even to Veneration; insomuch tha•• they erected his Statue, and dedicated a Chap•• to him.

He was born in the fourth Year of the seventy seventh Olympiad,* 1.79 of indifferent Parentage, an

••as bred to his Father's Business of a Statuary; ••ut soon quitted it for the Study of Natural Phi|••osophy, wherein he made a good Proficiency. But finding it so defective and unsatisfactory, that ••e could ground no certain Principles upon such 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Diversity of Opinions, he turn'd his Thoughts wholly to the Nature of Man; and by diving ••eep into the Passions and Affections, endeavour'd ••ather to cultivate the Heart, than the Reason, ••nd rather to regulate the Manners, than refine ••••e Wit. It is said of him, that he had natu|rally a Disposition to Vice; but he so far got the ••etter of himself, as to make Virtue habitual to ••im, and was therefore the better prepar'd to ••••plant it in others: So that he was the first, who settled the standing Rules of Good and Ill, ••nd is to be look'd upon as the Founder of Moral Philosophy. His Life and Doctrine were one con|••nu'd Lesson of Virtue; which he inculcated ••ith Candour and Modesty, Easiness and Affa|••ility, and temper'd the Dryness of his Maxims with an Air of Humour and Pleasantry, as know|••••g that, to please, was the surest Method to ••ersuade; and by this Means he took off that ••gged and unsociable Dress that Philosophy then ••ore. If he sometimes went out of his Cha|••acter, it was in Opposition to the Sophists; he ••ould not bear their deluding all the Youth of ••hat Time with a superficial Tincture of the Sci|••nces; and therefore took all Occasions of con|••••ting their false Reasonings, and of mortifying

their Arrogance. As to his own way of reason|ing, it was very just, and yet uncommon. He began with doubting, enquiring, and asking of Questions, as if he sought rather to receive In|struction, than to give it; and from the An|swers which must be naturally made, his Infe|rences were undeniable. He had a way of lead|ing People insensibly from one Absurdity to an|other, till they came to the Point he aim'd at▪ and, by the most familiar Comparisons, mad•• the Truth so plain, as to become in a manner th•• Object of their Senses: By which Means he ••••voided the Odium of dictating, and left to ever•• one the Pleasure of convincing himself. H•• Studies did not so wholly employ his Time, as 〈◊〉〈◊〉 make him, in other Respects, an idle Member 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Common-wealth. He made several Ca••••paigns in the Peloponnesian War; where being 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Actions at Potidaea, Delium and Amphipol•• he had the good Fortune to save Alcibiades 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Xenophon from falling into the Enemies Hands•• and he gave such further Proofs of his Courag•• that when his Party was at last forc'd to retre•• 'tis said of him, He did not fly as others, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 measur'd back the Field by Inches. Some Part 〈◊〉〈◊〉 his Time he devoted to his Love of Musick an•• Rhetorick. He had also the Reputation of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 good Poet; insomuch that he is said to have 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a Hand in several of Euripides's Plays. But 〈◊〉〈◊〉 had used these kinds of Study rather as Amu••••ments, than his Business, and in Subs••rviency 〈◊〉〈◊〉

••is other great Designs. It was upon these oc|••asions, that the Oracle stiled him the Wisest Man: It was by these Methods, that he kept up ••he Reputation of the City, and, by his nume|••ous Followers, establish'd in it the Glory of Phi|••osophy, and that at a Time, when it had lost ••he Power of Empire.

CHAP. II.

From the Death of Socrates, to the Peace of Antalcidas. Containing the Space of 12 Years.

DERCYLLIDAS had now taken Thimbron's Army under his Command;* 1.80 and finding ••e had both Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus to deal with at the same Time, took Occasion, from a ••ique between them, to practise secretly with the ••••rst, who was the most active, and had the ••reatest Interest in the Soldiery, and struck up a ••eace with him, in order to attack the other with more Vigour and Security.* 1.81 Accordingly ••e invaded his Province; and several of the Aeolian Cities, assoon as he appear'd before 'em, ••pen'd their Gates to him; some, after a little ••hew of Resistance, submitted, and others he gain'd by Stratagem; so that in eight Days he

took Possession of nine Cities. After which, he made a Truce with Pharnabazus, and retir'd to Bithynia, where he spent the Winter in destroy|ing and ravaging the Country for Provisions.

Being continu'd another Year in his Command,* 1.82 he renew'd the Truce with Pharnabazus; and going into Thrace, shut up the Isthmus of the Chersonese with a Wall, to protect the neighbour|ing Cities from the Incursions of the Barbarians. From thence repassing into Asia, he took Atarna, a strong Place in Ionia, in Possession of the Ex|iles from Chios; but this was a Work of above seven Months. Afterwards, understanding that Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus had joined their Forces against him, he march'd with a Design to give them Battle; but first, in an Interview with them, demanded the Liberty of the Grecian Cities. Tissaphernes demanded on his Side, that the Spartan Army should withdraw out of the Country; on which Condition a Truce was con|cluded, till such time as they could receive fur|ther Instructions from their respective Masters.

Whilst these things were doing in Asia,* 1.83 the Spartans began a Quarrel with the Eleans, for having in their former Alliances constantly sided with Athens, Argos, and other States at War with them; and for not having admitted them, as well as the rest of Greece, to the Olympick Games. Upon these, and such like other frivolous Pretences, they sent Ambassadors to demand of them, That they should restore the Cities under

••heir Jurisdiction to their ancient Rights and Pri|••ileges; and, in case of a Refusal, to make a ••ormal Declaration of War. The Eleans urg'd 〈◊〉〈◊〉 their Defence, That as they had gain'd those Cities by the Sword, they had the sole right of ••sing and disposing of them, as they thought ••roper. Whereupon Agis, one of the Spartan Kings, was sent to harass the Country with Fire 〈…〉〈…〉; who, by appearing in that manner ••mong them, encourag'd Leptis, and several o|••er Towns, to revolt from them; so that meet|••••g with little Opposition, he march'd to Elis; ••d as he was upon the Point of taking and ••undering it, the Inhabitants capitulated, and ••greed to the Terms insisted on, of dismantling ••heir own City, and of making Cyllene, and all ••he other Towns, free and independent of them: ••nd thus the Eleans were taken into the Alliance 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Sparta. The Grounds of this Rupture were 〈◊〉〈◊〉 slight and trifling, that it plainly appear'd, how ••dustriously the Spartans had promoted it, and ••ow greedily they laid hold of every thing that ••ok'd like a Handle for exerting their Power, ••st they should lose that Spirit and Discipline, ••y which they had arriv'd to it, and not be able 〈◊〉〈◊〉 maintain the Title they then enjoy'd of The ••rotectors and Arbitrators of Greece. But this ••otion carry'd them so far, as to make them ••uilty of the same Injuries and Abuses they pre|••ended to redress; and in the end prov'd de|••••ructive both to themselves, and their Neighbours.

Agis had made two Campaigns of this Expe|dition;* 1.84 after which he return'd home and died, and had a Monument erected for him more sumptuous and magnificent than any of his Pre|decessors. He left 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Son, call'd Leotychides, but his Legitimacy being suspected, his Uncle Age|silaus disputed the Succession with him,* 1.85 and being supported by Lysander, carry'd it. His Reign was usher'd in with a Conspiracy against him•• an Account whereof being given in to the Eph••n they apprehended one Cinadon as the Principal▪ and being ask'd, how he came to be concern'd in this Treason, he could give no other Reason for it, than that he could not bear any Man 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the City greater than himself; upon which 〈◊〉〈◊〉 was executed, with several of his Accomplices.

The Phaenicians were at this time fitting out 〈◊〉〈◊〉 great Fleet, for the Service of the Persian•• which so alarm'd the Spartans, that they resolv'd to send a fresh Army into Asia, upon the old Pretence of freeing the Grecian Cities. The Matter was propos'd by Lysander, who also de|sired the Command of these Forces, having 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Design to re-establish in those Cities the Decen|virate, which was the Form of Government 〈◊〉〈◊〉 was always most fond of. But Agesilaus inclining to go himself, the other desisted; tho' it cam•• to be a long Debate, Whether they should tru•• him with that Post, on account of an Advic•• the Oracle of Delphi had given them, That 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Republick should go near to be destroy'd, when 〈◊〉〈◊〉

Regal Government halted; for Agesilaus was lame of one Leg. This had also been made use of as an Objection to him in his Pretensions to the Succession: But at last they salved the Matter, with this Resolution, That it was better for the King to halt, than the Kingdom; and accordingly he was sent with Eight Thousand Men, and Pro|visions for six Months.* 1.86

Being arriv'd at Ephesus,* 1.87 Tissaphernes amus'd him for some Time, under a Pretence of waiting for Dispatches from the King his Master; and having in the mean time got together a great Army,* 1.88 let Agesilaus know he would declare War against him, if he did not retire out of Asia. But he was so incensed at his tricking him in this manner, that he immediately enter'd Phrygia, where he took several Towns, and met Pharna|bazus's Forces; but, for want of Cavalry, did not venture a Battle.

But having soon after procured a great num|ber of Horse, which he had demanded of the Cities there, by way of Contribution, he en|gaged TissapherneS's Army, and gain'd a signal Victory near the River Pactolus, where he forced the Enemy's Camp, and found in it a great deal of Mony, and other rich Booty. Tissaphernes himself not being in the Action, the King suspected his Fidelity, and looking up|on him as the Author of this, and several other Miscarriages, caused him to be beheaded.

The next Year he sent Tithraustes in his room;* 1.89 who endeavour'd to gain upon Agesilaus by Treaty. He sent to let him know, that his Predecessor had deservedly been punished with Death, as being the Author of this War; that, as to his own part, he would pursue other Mea|sures, and would allow the Asiatick Cities their Liberty, provided they would pay the customary Tribute, and that the Army withdrew. To which the other answer'd, he could do nothing in it, till he received Orders from Sparta. How|ever, Tithraustes prevail'd with him in the mean time, to draw his Forces towards Phrygia, and gave him Thirty Talents for their Subsistence. Upon his March, he received Dispatches from Sparta, to let him know, the State approved of his Proceedings, and gave him a Power of ap|pointing an Admiral, to act in concert with him by Sea. Accordingly he procured from the Isles, and Maritime Towns, an Hundred and Twenty Gallies, and gave the Command of them to Pisander,* 1.90 his Wife's Brother, a Man of Fire and Ambition enough, but in other re|spects not equal to that Charge, especially con|sidering he had so experienc'd and vigilant 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Commander as Conon, to deal with.

However these great Preparations from Spar|ta, gave a fresh Alarm to the Persians; who•• finding they could not prevail upon Agesilaus, ei|ther by Menaces, or Persuasions, to quit As•••• resolved upon a more effectual Expedient, by

making a Diversion, and removing the Seat of the War. They knew how ill affected most of the Grecian States were to that of Sparta, on ac|count of her late absolute and tyrannical Treat|ment of them, and thought this the most pro|per time to stir them up against her, and to rouse in them a Sense of recovering their Li|berty.* 1.91 To which purpose Tithraustes sent over Timocrates to practise with the Orators, and other leading Men of the principal Cities; and, to make his Commission more effectual, gave him Fifty Talents to dispose of among them, as he saw proper. It was upon this Occasion, that Agesilaus afterwards, upon his Return Home, said, He had been drove out of Asia by Thirty Thousand Archers; by which he meant so many Pieces of the Persian Coin, which was stamp'd with the Figure of an Archer. Conon is by some thought to have been the Author of this Advice. He had, during his Retreat in Asia, after the Defeat of the Athenians at Aegos-pota|mos, made it his Business to ingratiate himself with the Persians, in hopes, by them, to gain an Opportunity of retrieving the Misfortunes of his Country. With that View, he took all Oc|casions to incense them against the Spartans, and to traverse their Designs; insomuch that Nepos ascribes it to him, that Agesilaus did not pene|trate further into Asia, and carry his Conquests as far as Mount Taurus. And Justin makes him signalize himself by many great Exploits

against that King personally. But the Accounts of both these Historians, in that Respect, are too confused and inconsistent, to be reconciled with others, or even with themselves: Neither can we, with any Certainty, affirm that he appear'd in Action, till after Agesilaus had quitted Asia. We may however conclude, that he was before that, making use of his Credit at the Persian Court, to procure an Armament at Sea, and that he was at least very instrumental, if not principally concerned, in forming a Confederacy of the other States of Greece against Sparta.

The first whom Timocrates treated with upon this Subject, were the Thebans, who easily heark|en'd to the Proposal, and received the Presents. He met with the like Success at Argos, and Co|rinth; and these States work'd up several others to accuse and murmur against the Spartans, in order to their uniting against them. It is ob|servable, this is the first notorious Instance o•• the Grecians being corrupted with the Persian Gold. So much did they now begin to sin•• from that zealous Spirit of Honour and Integri|ty, Concord and Unanimity, by which they were animated in the first Persian Wars. I does not indeed appear, that the Persians ha•• before made them any such gross Overtures, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 betray and sell their Country: But it might pro|bably be, because they thought it in vain. The•• knew they were not Enemies to be tamper•• with in such a manner; they sound them ever••

where in earnest, when they moved against them as one Soul and Body, when they laid aside all domestick Dissensions, to pursue the com|mon Enemy; and, in short, acted upon no other Principle than the Love of Liberty, and the Defence of their Country. This was the plain, hardy and untainted Age of Greece, which might have been of a much longer Du|ration, if its Inhabitants had contented them|selves with the Glory they had acquired at home. But these Successes soon fired them with an Am|bition of making themselves more formidable, by enlarging their Bounds, and extending their Conquests: So that by throwing themselves out in Colonies, and carrying their Arms abroad, they had a freer Converse with other Nations: And as by this means they arrived to quicker degrees of Knowledge and Politeness; so on the other hand, they became more luxurious and ef|feminate, and more open to the Charms and Temptations of Riches. They received the first Impressions of this kind from the Footing they got in Asia, where they were struck and dazzled with the Pomp, Wealth and Magnificence of the Persian Governors: And tho' in all the Ac|tions they had there, they still behaved like Gre|cians, and with a Sense of Glory; yet they ex|press'd too great an Eagerness to enrich them|selves with Plunder. In short, the Love of Mony was now rooted in their Affections; and it soon after visibly appeared in the Effects it

produced. For as the Grecians had been bribed to quit their Pretensions in Asia; so others af|terwards made use of the same Methods to in|vade Greece: And this will appear in the Sequel of the Story, to be one of the principal Causes of its total Subversion. As the Spartans kept up longest to the Rigour of their Discipline, and the Force of their Laws, they were a great while proof against Corruption and Bribery; but the Contagion still spreading, they at last yielded to the Example of their Neighbours. It was then Greece became so divided and irre|solute, as to admit of no means for its Preserva|tion; when not only each State, but also the leading Men in that State, had separate Views of their own, without any regard to the Good of the Whole.

The Thebans,* 1.92 as they were the first gain'd over to the Persian Interest, so they were the most active in promoting it. To strengthen their Alliance, they sent Ambassadors to the Athe|nians, with a long Representation of the pre|sent Posture of Affairs; wherein they artfully insinuated their Zeal and Affection to their State; from thence they took occasion to in|veigh against the Tyranny of Sparta, and con|cluded with telling them, That now was the Time to throw off the Yoke, and to recover their former Splendor and Authority. The Athe|nians, tho' they had no Share of the Persian Mony, needed not many Arguments to engage

them in a Rupture of this kind, for which they had been so long waiting a fit Opportunity.

The first Act of Hostility broke out between the Locri Opuntii,* 1.93 and the Phocians, upon a Dispute about a piece of Ground; and both Sides appeal'd to their respective Confederates for Justice and Protection. The Locri were the Aggressors, at the Instigation of the Thebans; and the Spartans espoused the latter, upon a particular Pique they had to Thebes, which they thought it necessary to resent at this time, when they found several other States arming against them. Accordingly, they ordered Pausanias to march with the Peloponnesian Forces, and sent Lysander before to engage other Cities in Boeo|tia; where having got together a considerable Army, he invested Haliartus. The Thebans im|mediately marched with their whole Strength; and taking the Advantage of attacking him, before Pausanias could come up to his Assis|tance, defeated his Army,* 1.94 and he himself was kill'd on the Spot.

Thus fell this great Man,* 1.95 after so many sig|nal Services to his Country, in giving Athens the most fatal Blow she had ever received; and in raising Sparta upon her Ruins, to a higher Pitch of Power and Grandeur than she ever attain'd, either before or after him. As it was by his means, that Sparta did at this time, in a man|ner, give Law both to Greece and Asia; so he himself became no less absolute in Sparta, than

she was among her Enemies and Allies. The Authority of her Kings was sufficiently abridged by the Constitution: but by his working Ge|nius, and the Interest he had in the State upon the Reputation of his Services, he made them appear still less, and that in the Field too, where they were least subject to be controuled. An In|stance of which we have in his going with Age|silaus into Asia, where all the Court and Applica|tion was made to him; and in every thing that pass'd of moment, he had either the first hand, or the finishing Stroke: Insomuch that the King found himself obliged to take notice of it; and that he might no longer appear a Cypher, sent him upon other Service to the Hellespont. Nei|ther was it enough for him to eclipse the Power of the Kings, and to impose his own Govern|ment of Ten Men upon all the Spartan Con|quests; but he was further endeavouring to al|ter the Succession of the Heraclidae, in order to obtain the Sovereignty for himself. As a Con|firmation of this, there was found among his Papers after his Death, A Discourse concerning the Government, which Lacratidas generously sup|press'd, saying, It would be inhumane to dig Ly|sander out of his Grave. He was undoubtedly a brave experienc'd Commander: But his Dissi|mulation, Craft and Treachery, his Ambition, Arrogance and Ostentation, make up the great|est part of his Character; and therefore it may seem pretty extraordinary, that he should support

himself so long under so jealous and austere a Government, as that of Sparta. But he had a great deal of Artifice and Address; and notwith|standing the Imperiousness of his Temper, he knew how to curb it upon occasion, and to suit it to his Circumstances: So that where he found it necessary to make his Court, he was, con|trary to the Manners of his Country, very mild and tractable, patient and submissive, and had all the little Arts of Flattery and Insinuation. It was with regard to these supple Qualities, as well as to the Badness of his Morals in general, that the Character of his Countryman Callicrati|das, has been set up in opposition to his; and indeed it was quite the Reverse of it, except in the Military Part; and in that he was no way in|ferior to him: But he was otherwise open, can|did and generous, modest, temperate, sincere and just, and was above making use of any Trick ••or Subterfuge. Lysander was so jealous of his Merit, that when he was order'd to give up the Command of the Fleet to him, he did what he could to lessen and distress him: He went so far as to withold from him the Pay of the Seamen that was remaining in his Hands; which, besides the Meanness of the Action, was betraying the Interest of his Country, and hazarding the Safety of it in a very critical Conjuncture. Upon the whole, notwithstanding his great Atchievements, he is not to be look'd upon as a true Patriot. For it seems chiefly owing to him, that the

Spartans transgress'd the just Bounds of Power he had put into their Hands. It was his Pride and Insolence, his cruel and tyrannical Deportment, and that under the Pretence of restoring Liberty, which gave their Neighbours the first Impressions of Rancour and Resentment against them. It was this that made them conceive an ill Opinion of their Government in general, and laid the Seeds of those Alliances, which were form'd a|gainst them, and which at last prov'd fatal to them. But they were not yet so sensible of the Consequences; and therefore paid all due Respect to his Memory. They went so far as to fine some who were under a Contract of Marriage to his Daughters, but finding, that their Father died so poor as to leave them no Fortune, had de|serted them. It is certain, he had reserv'd no|thing to himself out of the Spoils of the Atti•• War; which to the Spartans was a sufficient Ar|gument of his Merit. A stronger Instance of the Sense they had of his Loss, was, that they could pitch upon nobody but Agesilaus to succeed him; who, notwithstanding that he was carrying on the War in Asia with good Success, was immediately recall'd to the Defence of his Country.

After the Action Pausanias came up, but durst not make another Attempt. He only demanded the Bodies of the slain; and yet could not obtain them upon any other Terms than quitting the Country.* 1.96 The Spartans judg'd his Proceedings very dishonourable, and condemn'd him to Death••

upon which he made his Escape to Tegea, and died there.

Towards the end of the Year Agesilaus ra|vag'd the Government of Pharnabazus, and at Dascyllum, his Winter Quarters, took and plun|der'd his Tent. But that Governor some time after manag'd an Interview with him, wherein he remonstrated, That however he might be oblig'd to act for his Master's Honour, and Safety, he had not shew'd himself an Enemy to the Spartans, but on the contrary had done them many good Offices in their War against the A|thenians; and that he was now inclin'd to act no otherwise against them, than as he should be ne|cessitated to it, in order to support himself in his Command; by which Means he prevail'd with Agesilaus to withdraw his Forces out of the Pro|vince. Thereupon he descended into the Plain of Thebes; and as he was preparing to march further into the Country, receiv'd News of the War broke out in Greece, with Orders at the same time for him to return home; with which he readily comply'd.* 1.97 And the Regard he therein paid to the Laws of his Country, is particularly taken notice of, that when he was prosecuting the War with great Increase of Honour and Ad|vantage, and had set his Heart upon the entire Conquest of the Persian Empire, he had so much Command of himself, as to stop in his full Ca|reer, and abandon all, out of a Deference to the Ephori, who had recall'd him. However, he

left Four Thousand Men in Asia, to maintain the Footing he had got there, till such time as the Affairs of Greece would permit him to return, and pursue his Conquests.

But the Spartans could not wait his Arrival; they found the War thicken on their Hands, and were ready to be attack'd on all Sides. Timolous a Corinthian propos'd the advancing immediately into their Territories, in order to crush them singly, before they could be join'd by their Auxi|liaries. They set out, said he, by themselves only; but in their March they gather Forces as they go, till they grow too numerous to be withstood: Like Rivers, which are small at their Source, and easily to be forded; but as they continue their Course, the Accession of other Waters makes the Stream too rapid. This Advice was judg'd reasonable, and a Resolution was taken to pursue it. But there being too much Time spent in debating the Command, and Order of the Battle, gave the Spartans an Opportunity of being join'd by the Eleans, Sicyonians, Epidaurians, Trezaenians and others, to the Number of about Fourteen Thou|sand Men, and Thirteen Hundred Horse, under the Command of Aristodemus, who was also ap|pointed Tutor to Agesipolis, the other Sparta•• King, during his Minority. On the other Side were the Athenians, Argives, Boeotians, Corin|thians and Euboeans, who made up about Two and twenty Thousand Men, and Two Thousand Horse. Both Sides encamp'd near Sicyon, and

••t so small a Distance from each other, that it ••oon came to a regular Battle,* 1.98 wherein the Spar|••tan Allies were almost entirely routed; but they themselves maintain'd their Ground, and bore so hard upon the Athenians, who were in the left Wing, opposite to their right, that they recover'd the Day, and gain'd the Victory by their own single Valour, and with the Loss of not above eight of their own Men, which bore no Proportion to that of their Enemies, or Allies.

The News of this Victory reaching Agesilaus at Amphipolis, he sent back Dercyllidas with it into Asia, to confirm the associated Cities there, and pursu'd his March with all possible Diligence, but not without some Opposition, particularly from the Thralli in Thrace, who having formerly sold the Passage thro' their Country to Xerxes, de|manded of him an hundred Talents, and as many Women. He ask'd them, by way of Derision, Why they did not come to receive their Demands? And proceeding on his Journey, made great Slaughter of them. Then demanding a Passage thro' Macedonia, the King sent him Word, He would consider of it. So let him, said Agesilaus; and I'll go on in the mean time. The Macedonians did not much relish this Laconick Answer; but they were not as yet in a Condition to resent it, and therefore gave him no Disturbance. Having afterwards defeated a Body of Thessalian Horse, which attack'd his Rear, he arriv'd in Boeotia, where

he receiv'd Intelligence of a great Engagement at Sea.

Conon had prevail'd with Artaxerxes to fit out a Fleet,* 1.99 and to give the Command of it to him jointly with Pharnabazus. They lay in the Cher|sonese with about ninety Sail; where they had Notice, that the Spartan Fleet, consisting of an hundred and twenty Ships of their own and their Allies, lay about Cnidus; from whence Pisander, who commanded it, weigh'd Anchor, and bore down directly upon the Persians. In the first Attack he had the better of it; but one Part of the Persian Gallies came up so seasonably to the Relief of the other, that they turn'd the Fortune of the Day; insomuch that the Spartan Confede|rates began to secure their Retreat. The Ad|miral, tho' he was so ill supported, charg'd with his Ship in the Front of the Enemy, where he did a good deal of Execution, but at length was over-power'd, and kill'd. After which the Spar|tans retiring towards the Continent, Conon pur|su'd them, and took fifty of their Ships, the res•• having recover'd their Port at Cnidus.

Agesilaus having privately receiv'd this Ac+count, thought fit to stifle or disguise it for th•• present, and used his utmost Endeavours to bring the Enemy to a speedy Battle, before his Army could be more particularly inform'd, and whil•• they were flush'd with their last Victory. Ac+cordingly he join'd the Spartan Allies, and me•• the Athenians, with their Allies, on the Plain 〈◊〉〈◊〉

Coronea.* 1.100 The Thebans began the Attack with great Vigour, but were repuls'd by the extraor|dinary Courage of Agesilaus, who, notwithsand|ing that he was dangerously wounded, push'd the Enemy, till he gain'd a compleat and signal Victory, but not decisive enough to put an End to the Hostilities, which were still continu'd by Incursions into each other's Territories.

The Corinthians complain'd,* 1.101 that the chief Seat of the War being among them, they were in|fested on all Sides, being equally distress'd by their Enemies, and burden'd by their Allies; for which Reason they were inclinable to a Peace. This was oppos'd by the Magistrates and other Citizens, who had been corrupted with the Persian Mony. And these Debates occasion'd a great Dissension and Massacre in their City;* 1.102 which the Spartans easily improv'd to their Advantage, making use of one of the discontented Parties to attack the other: By which Means a Body of their Troops, under the Command of Praxitas, got within the Walls. He defeated a great Num|ber of the Argives, who came up to the Relief of their Friends in the City, and put to the Sword the Boeotians, who had got Possession of the Port call'd Lechoeus. He broke down a great Part of the Walls, which were afterwards repair'd by the Atbenians; and the whilst he was pursuing his Victory, Agesilaus ravag'd the Country of the Argives; and his Brother Teleutias, the Admiral,

scour'd the Gulf of Corinth, taking their Ships and demolishing their Arsenals.

The Athenians,* 1.103 to put a Stop to these Successes sent a fresh Supply to their Army, under th•• Command of Iphicrates, whose Conduct was in finitely above his Age, having, at twenty Year old, arriv'd to such a Degree of Perfection in Mi••…litary Affairs, that no Athenian Captain ever se•• out with greater Expectation.

About the Time of his Arrival with a Rein+forcement, Deputations were sent from Boeotia•• and other Parts, to sound Agesilaus in relation t•••• Peace; but he rejected their Proposals with Di••••…dain, till hearing soon after, that the Forces h•••• left at Lechaeus had been defeated by Iphicrates he was more inclinable to treat:* 1.104 But the•• the Deputies stood off, and insulted him in thei•• turn, demanding leave of him, by way of De••••…rision, to go to Corinth. Whereupon he di••…miss'd them; and after he had reinforc'd th•• Garrison of Lechaeus, return'd to Sparta, having by this last Action, lost all the Honour of thi•• Expedition. Iphicrates, upon his Departure, wen•• on successfully, and recover'd all the Places th•• had been taken by him, and Praxitas.

The War was continu'd by little Skirmishe•• and Incursions, which chiefly affected the Ach••…ans, as Confederates of Sparta. They were ver•• much infested by the Acarnanians, who were sup+ported by the Athenian Allies: But Agesilaus en••…••er'd

their Country with Fire and Sword, and put ••n end to this Quarrel.

In this manner the Spartans maintain'd them|selves and their Allies for some time without any considerable Increase or Diminution of Power. But their Affairs at Sea were in a more declining Condition; and the Effects of their Defeat at Cnidus began more visibly to appear. The Cities in Asia, over which they claim'd a Jurisdiction, finding them so disabled in their Shipping, and that they had Work enough upon their Hands at home, readily hearken'd to Pharnabazus, who encourag'd them to revolt from the Spartans,* 1.105 and expel their Governors; which they consented to, upon Condition they might enjoy their own Laws. He was assisted in this Work by Conon, who sug|gested to him, that the leaving them in the free Enjoyment of their Liberty, would be the surest Means to keep them in his Interest. The like Attempts were made at Sestos and Abydus; but Dercyllidas lying there, secur'd those Parts.

The next Year Pharnabazus and Conon pur|••••ing their late Victory,* 1.106 procur'd another Fleet ••rom the Towns upon the Hellespont, with which ••hey made a Descent upon the Maritime Parts of Laconia, and ravag'd the Country. After which Conon desir'd Leave to sail with the Fleet to A|••hens, with an Intent to repair the Haven of Pi|••aeus,* 1.107 and rebuild the Walls; which he repre|••••nted as a very important Pi••ce of Service against ••parta. Pharnabazus not only comply'd with

his Request, but gave him fifty Talents to be employ'd in that Work, which was accordingly effected.

The Spartans finding the War brought home to their own Doors,* 1.108 and that the Athenians reap|ing the Advantage of it, might soon wrest the Sovereignty of Greece out of their Hands, sent Antalcidas to treat with the Persians about a Peace. He applied himself to Teribazus the Governor of Sardis, and offer'd to give up the Grecian•• Cities in Asia, provided the Islands, and the o|ther Parts of Greece might remain free. An Overture of this Kind was easily hearken'd to: But the Athenians and their Allies taking the Alarm, sent Ambassadors on their Part likewise, to join in the Negotiations, and to support the Interests of their respective Principals. But there were so many different Pretensions started, th•••• they could not come to any Agreement among themselves; and Teribazus did not think himsel•• sufficiently authoriz'd by his present Instructions to conclude with the Spartans separately. How|ever, he was so well affected to them, that, tho•• the Treaty was at a stand, he supply'd them it the mean time privately with Mony to maintai•• a Fleet at Sea; wherein he had a further View•• that they might by that Means awe the othe•• States into a Compliance with the Terms offer'd by them. The Spartans likewise gain'd anothe•• Point with Teribazus in relation to Conon. ••…latcidas had it in his Instructions to render hi••••

suspected, and to inveigh against him as the chief Incendiary of the War, and as having promoted it with no other View, than to aggrandize the Athenians at the Expence of the Persians. The Charge in fact was true, and it was urg'd so strongly against him, that as he was then at Sar|dis waiting the Event of the Negotiations, Teri|bazus thought it proper to seize him, and keep him in Custody, till he should receive Orders from his Master, how to dispose of him. Some say, he sent him to Artaxerxes, who put him to death; others, that he escap'd out of Prison, with the Consent or Connivance of Teribazus; the latter whereof does not seem very probable, be|cause we find no further Mention made of him, either in Greece or Persia. So that we may con|clude he died about this Time, and that he fell a Sacrifice to his own ill-tim'd Zeal for the Ser|vice of his Country;* 1.109 which certainly carried him further than was suitable to the Circumstances he was under. He had lived as a voluntary Exile among the Persians, who had given him their Protection and Assistance; he had been favour'd and trusted by them; he had, by interesting' em in his Quarrel, broke the Power of Sparta at Sea, and repair'd the Ruins of his own City, and both at their Charge and Hazard. But not content with this, he was at the same time practising a|gainst them, and endeavouring under-hand to withdraw from them several Cities, and the whole Provinces of Ionia and Aeolia, in order to annex

them to the Dominions of Athens; and all this under a Pretence of rescuing them from the Ty|ranny of Sparta, and securing them to the Per|sians. They could not, when they were let into a Discovery of these Artifices, think he had made a suitable Return for what he ow'd them; nor indeed can this Part of his Character be otherwise justified, than by that false Principle, which had generally obtain'd among the Grecians, to give up every thing that interfered with what they call'd the Honour, or Advantage of their Coun|try. This was carried so far, as, in some Cases, to destroy the common Distinctions of Right and Wrong; and the Spartans themselves, notwith|standing their severe Justice in other Respects, were so loose in this particular, that nothing was esteem'd base, that was beneficial. Another Motive for his exerting himself in so extraordi|nary a manner, might be in order to redeem his own Honour, which does not seem to stand quite clear in the Affair of Aegos-potamos. Nepos in|deed says, he was absent from his Command at the Time of that Engagement; and assigns that as the Cause of the Defeat. But the most na|tural and authentick Account is, that he was present in the Action, but that being over|power'd by ••••sander, and seeing no Probability of Success on his Side, made his Escape with eight or nine Ships, and retir'd to Cyprus. This agrees with what is further said of him, that he was afraid and asham'd to return to Athens;

which it is plain he did not attempt till several Years after, when he had done enough to wipe off that Stain. The latter Part of his Life was certainly without Reproach, either as to his Courage, or Capacity; of both which he had given sufficient Proofs, and had made himself so formidable to the Spartans, that they were glad upon any Terms to get rid of him; and it was by the most abject Submission to the Persians, that they compass'd it. The Dread they had conceiv'd of him, seems to have been the Grounds of that scandalous Peace, which they soon after|wards concluded: And as they began from that Day forward to decline in their Reputation and Power, we may look upon Conon as having more remotely occasion'd their DownfaI.

Upon the Offers of Peace made to Teribazus, he went up to Artaxerxes, to give an Account of his Proceedings, and to receive fresh Instru|ctions. In the mean time Struthas was sent to command in the Lower Asia, and to take care of the Sea-Coasts. He was not so well inclin'd to the Spartans as his Predecessor, being more exasperated at what had been done by Agesilaus. Whereupon they sent Thimbron with a good Body of Troops to keep him in Action; which he did at first with good Success; but ranging about with a separate Party in quest of Booty, was surpriz'd by Struthas, and kill'd. He was suc|ceeded by Diphridas,* 1.110 who was a Man of better Conduct, at least of more Caution; and he having

gather'd up the Remains of the Army, main|tain'd his Ground in the P••aces which had sub|mitted to Thimbron.

There were at this Time two contending Par|ties at Rhodes,* 1.111 concerning the Form of Govern|ment there; and they were supported by their respective Patrons, those for the Democracy by the Athenians, and the others for the Oligarchy by the Spartans. The latter being over-power'd, and forc'd off the Island, made their Complaints at Sparta; and Ecdicus was dispatch'd with eight Ships to their Relief. But finding himself too weak to do any thing to the Purpose, Teleutias the Admiral was sent with twenty-seven Sail, with which he restor'd the Exiles, and the Oli|garchy. This was a Matter of too much Conse|quence to the Athenians to be given up. They were sensible how much their Sovereignty in the Island (which was truly the Point in Question) depended on the Form of Government, which should prevail in it; and therefore sent out Thra|sybulus to put Things upon the former footing. Before he durst attempt any thing at Rhodes, he went into Thrace, where he gain'd over two Persian Princes to the Athenian Interest; he then took in Byzantium, Chalcis, and several other Cities upon the Hellespont; and from thence he went to chastise the Lesbians, who were all of them, except those of Mitylene, in the Spartan Interest. Having succeeded thus far, he sail'd towards Rhodes. He had in his Way levied a

Sum of Mony for Contribution upon the Inha|bitants of Aspendus: But they being afterwards ill treated by his Soldiers, rose in a great Fury, and murder'd him in his Tent.* 1.112

Such was the End of this great Patriot, to whom Athens ow'd as signal a Deliverance, as any she had receiv'd in the Persian Wars. We need only consider her Condition under the Ty|ranny of The Thirty; when of those who had escap'd the Fate of a long War, some had been murder'd, others banish'd, and their Estates con|fiscated; when the City was one continu'd Scene of Outrage and Violence; and when those few good Men who still remain'd, and express'd a Sense of recovering the publick Liberty, yet chose rather to content themselves with talking of it, than really to attempt it: Yet even then did Thrasybulus rise in a manner singly against the united Power of the Oppressors. It having been already related with what Prudence, Zeal and Intrepidity he conducted that Affair, I will here only add an Observation which has been made, that the Success of this Enterprize was chiefly owing to its desperateness. For the Con|tempt, with which The Thirty treated it in the Beginning, made them neglect the proper Means of providing for their Sa••fety. Thrasybulus in the mean time went on with his Design, and en|creas'd his Followers: And when they sound him in a Condition to make head against them, they thought fit to make him an Offer of sharing

in the Tyranny with them, upon Condition he would desist. But it was not to be suppos'd, that one who had the Courage to project such an En|terprize, and who had advanc'd it so far, would hearken to any other Terms, than the entirely restoring the Freedom of his Country. His pub|lick-spiritedness, together with his Fidelity, Con|stancy and Magnanimity, made him at least equal to the greatest Men of his Time. There were several indeed, whose Atchievements hap|pen'd to make a greater Noise in the World: But none of them had a more real Foundation of Merit. And therefore Nepos says of him, That if Virtue were to be consider'd abstractedly from Fortune, he should be inclin'd to give Thra|sybulus the first Place in his Catalogue of War|thies.

The Spartans at this Time sent Anaxibius with a small Supply of Mony and Shipping, to re|trieve their Affairs in the Hellespont. And there|upon the Athenians, to secure the Places recover'd by Thrasybulus, order'd out Iphicrates, with eight Gallies, and twelve hundred Men, being chiefly those who serv'd under him in his Corinthian Ex|pedition. Before any considerable Action hap|pen'd on either Side, Iphicrates intercepted Anaxibius in his Way to Abydus by an Ambus|cade, and rushing out upon him, Here, said the Spartan General to his Men, must I die; take care of yourselves. And accordingly he was kill'd, with a good Number of those about him.

About the Time of these Transactions abroad,* 1.113 the Coast of Attica was infested by the People of Eegina. The Athenians made a Descent upon them, and had in some measure block'd them up by Sea and Land; but they were soon after repuls'd by them and the Spartans, who assisted them, and who had fomented the Quarrel. Thereupon the Islanders renew'd their Insults, till at length they were humbled by a Victory obtain'd against them by Chabrias,* 1.114 an Athenian of good Reputation; and those Seas were clear'd for the present.

But Chabrias being soon after sent to the As|sistance of Evagoras, King of Cyprus, and a Friend to Athens, the Spartans took Advantage of his Absence, and form'd a Design of surpri|sing the Athenians Ships in their Harbour. Ac|cordingly Teleutias enter'd the Piraeus by Night, where most of the Men being on Shore, he took several Merchant Ships, with three or four Gallies, and sunk or disabled as many more as the Time would allow; and having put the City under a general Consternation, he return'd, and prey'd upon the Coast, seizing the FishingVessels, with such other Booty as sell in his Way.

In this manner did these States for some time carry on a kind of a pyratical War, with|out any regular Engagement, and without bring|ing things to any general Issue. But the Athe|••ians being so ha••fass'd on all Sides, the Spartans

having more Garrisons than they could maintain and their Confederates revolting from them, and the other States being drain'd and tir'd out, began by mutual Consent to think of a Peace with the Persians; which Teribazus, being now re|turn'd from his Master, had full Power to con|clude.* 1.115 The Conditions were, That all the Cities in Asia, with the Island••s of Clazomenae, should be under the Jurisdiction of Persia; That the Islands of Lemnus, Imbrus and Scirus, as having from Time imm••morial been subject to Athens, should still continue so; and, That all the other Cities of Greece should be left entirely free. Which Terms were submitted to by all but the Thebans, who refus'd to give up their Jurisdiction over the Towns in Boeotia: But they were afterwards over-aw'd, and forc'd into it.

This Peace was concluded,* 1.116 according to the most general Account, in the second Year of the ninety-eighth Olympiad, and was call'd, The Peac•• of Antalcidas; if, as Plutarch says, that may be call'd a Peace, which was The Reproach and Rui•• of Greece. It was not only giving up at once all the Footing Agesilaus had got in Asia, bu•• undoing all that had been done there by th•••• Grecians in general, ever since they were a Nation. It was what the Persians themselves could not have ask'd, or even hop'd for, if the Spar+tans had not, to their eternal Infamy, made 'e•• the first Overture; the Grounds of which Over|ture was, their Dread and Jealousy of the A••••

••ans, lest they shoulD recover the Power they ••ad wrested from them. The Colonies planted 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Asia had for many Ages been consider'd as a Part of Greece; and the supporting and protect|••ng them as such, was the chief Pretence upon which the last War against Persia was founded. Wherefore this Proceeding of the Spartans, in ••elation to the Peace, was betraying and sacrificing ••ne Part of their Country, in order to maintain their Tyranny over the other. This was plainly their Drift; and Antalcidas was a very proper In|strument for the Purpose.* 1.117 When he went up to ••the Persian Court to sollicit this Affair, he took ••are to conform himself to their Softness and Ef|••eminacy; he could join in a Ball upon Occasion, and went so far as to play the Buffoon, and in a wanton Dance to mimick Leonidas and Callicrati|••as, whose Names were rever'd at Sparta, as hav|••ng been the Terror and Scourge of the Barba|••ians. However, by thus prostituting his Cha|••acter, and sacrificing even the Customs and Manners, as well as the Liberty of his Country, ••e gain'd so far upon Artaxerxes, that he shew'd him very uncommon Marks of Favour and Di|stinction; which was the more remarkable, be|cause he naturally hated the Persons of the Spar|tans, and look'd upon them as the most impu|dent of Mankind. But notwithstanding that he was so highly honour'd and caress'd upon this Negotiation, he afterwards met with the common ••ate of that Sort of Agents. For the Spartans

being reduc'd to an Extremity, and sending him again to Artaxerxes, to press for Supplies, he was treated by the King with great Coldness and Con|tempt; and returning without Success, he found the same Reception at home; insomuch that fear|ing the Power and Severity of the Ephori, he starv'd himself to death.

CHAP. III.

From the Peace of Antalcidas, to the Battle of Leuctra. Containing the Space of 17 Years.

THE Treaty, tho' it was principally between Greece and Persia, was made to extend like|wise to the Grecians among themselves; and i•• was provided by it, That whatever States should refuse to accede to it, the other contracting Powers, together with the Persian King, should compel th•••• to it by Force of Arms. The Spartans affecting still the Sovereignty of Greece,* 1.118 dismember'd as i•• was, took upon them the Execution of this Par•• of the Treaty, and, under the Notion of Gua|rantees, explain'd it as they thought fit, and ac|cording as they were sway'd by their Passion, o•• their Interest.

They began with the Mantineans, and, the Year after the Peace, sent their King Agesipoli•• to throw down their Walls; which he effected

by turning against them the Course of the River ••hat ran thro' the City; by which Means the Foundation being sapp'd and weaken'd, the In|habitants despair'd of making any Defence, and ••apitulated. This was the same Stratagem that Cimon formerly made use of, when he took Eion, situate upon the River Strymon. They were oblig'd, by the Terms of their Surrender, to ••anton themselves into Villages. This Proceed|ing of the Spartans, was in Revenge for their having taken Part against them in the late Wars; and with a View to reduce them so, as that they should not be in a Condition to unite against 'em. Some other little States they treated less rigo|rously, but yet with such an Air of Superiority and Controul, as plainly shew'd, they expected to be obey'd. In order to keep them under their Dependence, and at the same time to make them a little sanguine in their Interest, they would, in some Cases, redress their Grievances, restore their Exiles, compose their Differences, and do such other popular Acts of Justice, as to make them think, they were executing the Treaty to their Advantage, and that they were the Authors of their Liberty. And among the greater States, they had oblig'd the Corinthians to withdraw their Garrison from Argos; which, with their freeing the Boeotian Cities, and some other In|stances of that kind, had rais'd their Reputation for the present, and taken off a good deal of the

Odium, which they had contracted by the Treaty in other Respects.

The People who gave them most Disturbance at this time,* 1.119 were the Olynthians, who were started up on a sudden, and grown so powerful, that they not only held the neighbouring Places in Subjection, but had over-run a great Part of Macedonia, and taken many Towns, with Pell•• the Metropolis; wherein they copied after the Example of Sparta, and under a Pretence of de|livering those Places from the Tyranny of A|myntas their King, had in a manner drove him out of his Dominions. the Inhabitants of A|canthus and Apollonia Finding themselves under a Necessity of submitting to them, if they were not supported against them, represented their Case to the Spartans, who looking upon the O|lynthians with a jealous Eye, made no Difficulty of granting their Protection to those Cities, and immediately dispatch'd Two Thousand Men, under the Command of Eudamidas, who recover'd Potidaea, and fortify'd several Parts of Thrace. In the mean time his Brother Phaebidas was sent to join him with a greater Body of Troops.

But an Incident happen'd in his March,* 1.120 which prov'd to be of more Consequence to the Affairs of Greece, than was at first apprehended. When he arriv'd at Thebes, he found the City divided into Factions, one Party being headed by Is••••|nias, and the other by Leontiades. They were

two of the Polemarchs, or Governors of the City; and the latter being in the Spartan Inte|rest, and finding, that he could not otherwise get the better of his Colleague, betray'd the Citadel, call'd Cadmea, to Phaebidas; then seiz'd Ismenias, and forc'd his Party, to the Number of Four Hundred, to fly to Athens for Refuge. This made a great Noise there, and in the other Parts of Greece; and even at Sparta they were so asham'd of it, that they pretended to resent it; for they were sensible the Thebans had done no|thing in Violation of the Treaty, since they had submitted to it; that their domestick Dissensions did not concern the Publick; and that Phaebidas had no Authority to intermeddle in them. But this Action was excus'd by Agesilaus, who was suppos'd to be at the Bottom of the Design. He consider'd it in no other Light, than as it was of Advantage to the Common-wealth; and de|clar'd his Opinion, That if it answer'd in that Re|spect, it matter'd not by what Authority it was done. He added further, in Behalf of Phaebidas, That in an Enterprize of that Nature, Orders were not to be expected. This way of reasoning so far prevail'd with the Spartan Government, that they avow'd and justify'd the Action, tho' at the same time they punish'd the Actor; for they impos'd a Fine of ten thousand Drachmas on Ph••••bidas, and depriv'd him of his Command: Which Plutarch takes notice of as a ridiculous Incon|sistency. And Polybius, in condem••ing the Ae|tolians,

for a Procedure of the like Kind, com|pares them to the Spartans, who, when Phaebidas had, contrary to all Faith and Treaties, seiz'd the Cadmea, punish'd the Author of the Treachery, but did not withdraw their Garrison; as if, says he, that Punishment could wipe out the Injustice of the Action, and give full Satisfaction to the Thebans. He makes a further Remark applica|ble to the present Occasion, that, upon the Peace they proclaim'd publickly, they would restore all the Cities to their Liberties, and yet did not re|call any of the Governors, whom they had plac'd in them. He then adds, That 'tis the Heighth of Madness, join'd to the most consummate Wickedness, to pretend, that a Man needs only shut his ow•• Eyes, to hinder others from seeing him.

However the Spartans kept Possession of the Citadel, and confirm'd Leontiades in the Govern|ment, to whom Archias was join'd in Commis|sion, as having been an Accomplice with him in the Treachery. In the next Place they pro|cur'd Articles to be exhibited against Ismenias, for having taken Mony of the Persians, and held Intelligence with them, and for having been a principal Promoter of these intestine Broils.* 1.121 Upon which he underwent a formal Trial before three Commissioners deputed from Sparta, and one from each of the other great Cities of Greece, and was condemn'd to Death.

The Spartans having in this manner secured Thebes,* 1.122 prosecuted the War against the Olynthi|ans. The Command was given to Teleutias, who, with the Assistance of Anupetas, defeated them under the Walls of the City; after which he ravag'd the Country, and went into Winter Quarters. The next Campaign prov'd more suc|cessful to the Olynthians, who having defeated a Party of the Spartan Army, Teleutias march'd with the main Body to their Relief, and charg|ing furiously within Bow-shot of the City, his Men were very much gall'd, and himself kill'd.* 1.123 He is charg'd with more Passion and Rashness in this Enterprise, than was suitable to his Post. But however he might expose himself upon this Occasion,* 1.124 he had in the main behaved well in the Service of his Country, and acquitted himself with Honour in both his Capacities, of General and Admiral. He was also rich and liberal, and had endear'd himself so much to those who serv'd under him, that upon his Return home in a for|mer Expedition, they flock'd about him, to crown him with Wreaths and Garlands. And Xenophon says, His manner of engaging the Affections of the Sol|diers, deserv'd more to be taken notice of, than the Wealth he possess'd, or the Dangers he underwent. But whatever his personal Merit was, he ow'd a great deal to Agesilaus, who was his half Bro|ther, and was chieFly instrumental in the raising and supporting him.

The Spartans,* 1.125, as soon as they heard of his Death, sent their King Agesipolis in his room. He having collected the Forces, which were much shatter'd and dispers'd by the last Action, took Torone a Town in Alliance with the Olynthians, and harass'd the Country; but the Fatigue and extreme Heats of the Season threw him into a Fever,* 1.126 of which he died. Agesilaus, who had lived in good Friendship with him, lamented his Loss. There had indeed, at his first setting out, been a secret Emulation between them; which A|gesilaus perceiving, easily got the better of, and moulded him to his Purpose. For being natu|rally modest and tractable, but indolent withal, and averse to Business, his Colleague took care to cultivate in him this mild Disposition; and in or|der to take off the Edge of his Ambition, enter|tain'd him with Dogs and Horses, and Love-af|fairs, and went so far as to recommend Boys to him, and assist him in his Amours.

He was succeeded in the Command by Poly|biades,* 1.127 who besieged Olynthus, and reduced it by Famine. The Conditions imposed on the Inha|bitants, were, That they shou'd have the same Friends and Foes with the Spartans; and that they should join with them, as Confederates, in all their Wars.

This War continued near three Years;* 1.128 and it was no sooner ended, but the Spartans were call'd upon to chastise the Phliasians for having ill treat|ed the Exiles, who had lately been restored by

their Interposition. They made their Complaints at Sparta, and were fin'd for so doing: But upon their repeated Instances for Protection, the Ephori declared War; and Agesilaus was sent to do them Justice. He required of them to deliver up their Castle; which they refusing to do, he laid Siege to the City. They made a very obstinate De|••ence, even to the imprisoning such as did but mention any thing of a Surrender; 'till at length, their Provisions failing them,* 1.129 they were reduced to the last Extremity, and sent to Sparta to obtain the best Terms they could. In the mean time, Agesilaus leFt a Garrison in the Town, and re|••urned home, after he had spent above a Year and an half in this Expedition.

The Spartans had by this time, under colour of putting things upon that equal footing, which was required by the Treaty, gain'd such an In|••rease of Power and Authority to themselves, that there was no State in a Condition to make ••ead against them. But in the midst of this ••ecurity, they were alarmed from a Quarter, where they least expected it. The Thebans had ••or four Years, since the seizing of the Citadel, ••ubmitted to the Spartan Yoke;* 1.130 but they now ••ook occasion, by a very desperate Attempt, to ••hrow it off. For which purpose, there was a se|••ret Correspondence carried on between the most ••onsiderable of the Exiles at Athens, and those ••ho were well affected to them in Thebes; and Measures were concerted between them by Phylli|das

Secretary to the Theban Governors; by whose Contrivan••e a competent Number of the Exiles were to get into the City; and Charon, a Man of the first Rank there, offer'd his House for their Reception. The Day being fix'd, they set out from Athens; and Twelve of the most active and resolute among them, were detached to en|ter the City, the rest remaining at a proper Di|stance, to wait the Event. The first who offer'd himself, was Pelopidas, who was young and da|ring, and had been very zealous in encouraging the Design; and by the Share he had in it, gave a sufficient earnest of what might be further expected from him in the Service of his Coun|try. The next Man of Consequence, was M••••+lon, who by some is said to have first projected the Affair with Phyllidas. These two, with their ten Associates, dress'd themselves like Peasan•••• and beat about the Fields with Dogs and Hunt|ing-poles, as in search of Game. By which means having pass'd unsuspected, and convey'd them+selves into the City, they met at Charon's House as the general Rendezvous, where they were so•••• after join'd by Thirty six more of their Confe+derates. It was concerted, that Phyllidas sho•••• on that Day give a great Entertainment to •• chias and Philip, the two Governors, who we appointed by the Spartans; and, to make it 〈◊〉〈◊〉 more compleat, he had engaged to provide so•••• of the finest Women in the Town to give th•••• a Meeting. Matters being thus prepar'd, 〈◊〉〈◊〉

Associates divided themselves into two Bands; one of which, led by Charon and Mellon, were to attack Archias, and his Company. And hav|ing put on Womens Cloaths over their Armour, with Pine and Poplar over their Heads, to shade their Faces, they took their Opportunity, when the Guests were well heated with Wine, to enter the Room, and immediately stabb'd Archias and Philip, with such others of the Company, as were pointed out to them by Phyllidas. A little before this Execution, Ar|chias received an Express from Athens, with all the Particulars of the Conspiracy; and the Courier conjured him in the Name of the Per|son who wrote the Letters, that he should read them forthwith; for that they contain'd Matter of great Importance. But he laid them by un|open'd, and with a Smile said, Business to mor|row; which Words upon that Occasion grew into a Proverb.

The other Band, headed by Pelopidas and Damoclides, went to attack Leontiades, who was at home, and in Bed. They rush'd into his House by Surprise; but he soon taking the A|larm, leap'd up, and, with his Sword in his Hand, received them at his Chamber-door, and stabb'd Cephisodorus, who was the first Man that attempted to enter. Pelopidas was the next who encounter'd him, and after a long and difficult Dispute, kill'd him. From thence they went in pursuit of Hypates his Friend and Neigh|bour,

and dispatch'd him likewise. After which they join'd the other Band, and sent to hasten the Exiles they had left in Attica.

The whole City was by this time fill'd with Terror and Confusion; the Houses full of Lights, and the Inhabitants running to and fro in the Streets in a wild distracted manner, and wait|ing impatiently for Day-light, that they might distinguish their Friends from their Foes, and determine what course to take. Early in the Morning the Exiles came in arm'd; and Pe|lopidas appear'd with his Party in a General Assembly of the People, encompass'd by the Priests carrying Garlands in their Hands, pro|claiming Liberty to the Thebans in general, and exhorting them to fight for their Gods and their Country. For tho' they had made such a prosperous Beginning, the most difficult Part still remain'd, whilst the Citadel was in the Possessi|on of the Spartans, with a Garrison of fifteen hundred Men, besides a great Number of Citi|zens and others, who had fled to them for Pro|tection, and declared themselves on their Side.

Plutarch, who is very particular in the first Part of this Transaction, which has been related chiefly from him, passes over the taking the Citadel too slightly. He only says, that Pelopidas, with Charon and Mellon, block'd it up, attack'd it, and got possession of it, before any Succours could arrive from Sparta. But it is not probable, that should be the Work of a Day, or that it

should have been effected with so small a Force: And therefore this Part is to be supplied from Diodorus Siculus, who says, that the Athenians early the next Morning after, sent five thousand Foot, and two thousand Horse to Pelopidas's Assistance, and that several other Bodies of Troops came in from all the Cities of Boeotia, to the Number of seven thousand; that the Castle being besieged by this Army held out for several Days, but surrender'd at last for want of Provisions. Others say, they capitulated more out of Fear than Necessity, and that the Com|mander, at his Return to Sparta, was put to death for it. However the Citadel, upon which the whole depended, was recovered; and as the gaining that restored the Thebans to their for|mer Liberty, so it was the Foundation of their future Greatness.

This Action bore so near a Resemblance to that of Thrasybulus, whether we consider the Courage of the Actors, the Hazards and Diffi|culties of the Undertaking, the Manner in which it was conducted, or the Success and Consequen|ces with which it was attended, that it was called Its Sister. And Pelopidas proposed that Enterprise as a Pattern to the Exiles, when he exhorted them not to content themselves with living in a lazy Dependence on the Athenians, and to fawn for fear upon every smooth|tongu'd Orator, but to exert themselves like Thrasybulus; and that, as he had advanced from

Thebes, to break the Power of the Tyrants at Athens, they should in like manner march from Athens, to set Thebes at Liberty.

The Spartans were so enraged, and so far from giving up their usurped Dominion, that they sent their King Cleombrotus in the Depth of Winter to make War upon the Thebans.* 1.131 But after he had deseated some small straggling Par|ties, he left the Prosecution of his Designs to Sphodrias, who commanded in Thespiae. The Athenians were afraid, by entering into this Quarrel, to draw the Spartans upon them; and therefore withdrew their Protection and Assistance from the Thebans. The Thebans, on the other hand,* 1.132 not thinking themselves able singly to cope with the Spartans, contrived to create a Misunderstanding between these two States, in order to bring over the Athenians to them. Ac|cordingly they practis'd under-hand with Spho|drias, and put him upon a Project of attacking the Piraeus, as a thing that would redound to his Honour, and be very advantageous and agreea|ble to his Principals. He was brave and ambi|tious, but rash withal, and indiscreet; and he was work'd up to it, partly by flattering his Vanity, and partly by Presents. It was concer|ted,* 1.133 that he should march in the dead of Night, so as to be able to make his Attack upon the Place by break of Day: But he fail'd in his Time; and when he was got as far as Ele••sis, the Design took Air, and miscarried. How|ever

he had done enough to alarm and incense the Athenians, who thereupon imprison'd the Spartan Ambassadors. But the State disavow'd this Proceeding of their Officer, and call'd him to an Account for it. Agesilaus urg'd in his Behalf, That he was an honest Man, and that the Common-wealth stood in need of such Soldiers, and got him acquitted; which he is said to have done at the Intercession of his Son Archidamus, who had a Love-Affair with Cleonymus the Son of Sphodrias. This Attempt made in a profound Peace, and without the least Provocation given, was of the same kind with that of the Cad|m••a, tho' it had not the same Success; and it was Matter of great Surprise, that the Author of it should go unpunished. It is therefore to be look'd upon as one of those glaring Instan|ces of the Partiality of the Spartan Government, in Cases wherein their Interest was concerned: And the Athenians resented it accordingly. For they immediately declared themselves on the Side of the Thebans, and joining heartily with them, drew to their Confederacy several of the Cities, which were grown weary of the Spartan Ty|ranny.

The Spartans,* 1.134 in order to retain those Places which had not yet revolted, abated of their usual Severity to them;* 1.135 and sent Agesilaus and Cleom|brotus by turns, with a good Body of Troops, into Boeotia; where they made several Cam|paigns, but did little more than shew them|selves,

and harass the Country, with the Loss of many of their Men; among whom was Phae|bidas, who, since the Affair of the Cadmea, com|manded in the Garrison at Thespioe, and after|wards in the Army, upon the Absence of the Spartan Kings.

The Man who signaliz'd himself most against the Spartans,* 1.136 was Chabrias the Athenian, who had serv'd well at Sea and Land, and was now pitch'd upon as the best Officer of his Time to oppose to Agesilaus, who had enter'd Boeotia with eighteen thousand Foot, and fifteen hundred Horse; and whose Name struck such a Terror into the Thebans, that they propos'd nothing more than standing upon their Defence; and to that end, possess'd themselves of an Hill near the City. Agesilaus detach'd a Party of light-arm'd Men to provoke them to come down, and give him Battle; which they declining, he drew out his whole Forces, in order to attack them. Cha|brias,* 1.137 who commanded the Mercenaries on the Part of the Thebans, order'd his Men to present themselves, and keep their Ranks in close Order, with their Shields laid down at their Feet, and their Spears advanc'd, and with one Leg put forward, and the Knee upon the half-bent. Age|silaus finding them prepar'd in this manner to re|ceive him, and that they stood, as it were, in De••iance of him, thought fit to withdraw his Army, and contented himself with ravaging the Country. This was look'd upon as an extraor|dinary

Stratagem; and Chabrias valu'd himself so much upon it, that he procur'd his Statue to be erected in that Posture.

The Spartans having done nothing consider|able enough to answer the Losses and Expence of these Expeditions, resolv'd to try their Fortune at Sea; and fitted out a Fleet of seventy Sail, under the Command of Pollis, who endeavour'd to intercept a great Quantity of Corn design'd for Athens, and had in a manner block'd up the City. But Chabrias having Notice of this Design, came up with the Spartan Fleet, and having defeated it, convoy'd the Transport Ships safe into the Piraeus.

Chabrias acting offensively in his turn,* 1.138 sail'd with the Fleet to Naxus, and laid Siege to it; and Pollis coming up to the Relief of the Island, a very sharp Engagement ensu'd, wherein the Athenians dispers'd the whole Spartan Fleet, hav|ing destroy'd twenty-four of their Gallies, and taken eight, with the Loss of eighteen of their own. Chabrias return'd with his Spoils to Athens, and was highly honour'd, this being the first Victory at Sea, that had been obtain'd by the Athenians singly, without the Assistance of the Persian, since the Peloponnesian War: And this had put them upon asserting their former Domi|nion at Sea.

For this purpose they order'd their Fleet to sail round Peloponnesus,* 1.139 under the Conduct of Timo|theus, who was the Son of Conon, and inherited

his Father's Virtues.* 1.140 He drew several Towns and Places on the Coast, some by Force, and others by Management and mild Treatment, into the Alliance with Athens: Whereupon the Spar|tans sent out Nicolochus, with the Command of their Fleet, to put a Stop to these Encroach|ments. He was hot and daring, and immedi|ately fell in with the Athenians, before his whole Number of Ships could join him. But he was defeated, and Timotheus erected a Trophy. This Action happen'd near Leucas.

The Thebans taking Advantage of these Diver|sions at Sea, recover'd all the Cities of Boeotia, and invaded Phocis. The Spartans grew every Day less terrible to them; so that they began now to act offensively against them, and had frequent Encounters with them. And though they were not regular and decisive Battles, they were such as serv'd to raise their Courage, and gain them Experience, and were introductory to those greater Actions which happen'd afterwards. The Success of these little Engagements was ge|nerally on their Side, and was chiefly owing to Pelopidas,* 1.141 who signaliz'd himself in most of 'em. In one of them, at a Place call'd Ta••agra, he slew the Spartan Commander with his own Hand. But that which happen'd about the same Time at Tegyra, was more remarkable.

He had form'd a Design of surprising Or••d••|menus,* 1.142 which was garrison'd by the Spartans, and march'd against it with three hundred Foot, and

••ome Horse: But receiving Intelligence, that a great Body of Spartans were upon their March ••o reinforce the Garrison, he thought it adviseable ••o retire. In his Retreat, he met this Reinforce|ment near Tegyra, and being oppos'd by them, he order'd his Horse, who were in the Rear, to advance and engage them, relying on his Foot for the main Stress of the Battle. The Attack was very furious on both Sides: But Gorgoleon and Theopompus, who commanded the Spartans, soon sell; and all who were near them, were ei|ther kill'd, or put to Flight; which struck such a Terror into the rest of their Troops, that they open'd a Passage for the Thebans to pursue their March. But Pelopidas would not quit the Field, till he had made a further Slaughter among 'em, and thoroughly routed and dispers'd them. He acquir'd more Reputation by this Retreat, than he could have got by succeeding in his original Design against Orchomenus: And it was a more signal Disgrace to the Spartans, than they had hitherto met with; for they had at least three times as many Men in the Field. And it was never known before, that in all their Wars, whe|ther against Grecians or Barbarians, they had been beat by fewer Troops than their own, or even by an equal Number. It must indeed be allow'd, that these three hundred Foot were the Flower of the Theban Army; and they were di|stinguish'd by the Name of The Sacred Battalion.* 1.143 They were as remarkable for their Fidelity and

Affection to one another, as they were for their Courage, and in that respect were likewise call'd, The Band of Lovers. There are several fabulous Accounts concerning them: But all that can be reasonably collected from them, is, that they were a brave determin'd Set of young Men, who had vow'd perpetual Friendship, and sworn to stand by one another to the last Drop of their Blood. They were said to have been first rais'd by Gorgidas, who was one of the Governors of Boeotia, in Conjunction with Pelopidas, and had a considerable Share in the Transactions of that Time. He us'd them chiefly as a Guard to the Citadel, but employ'd them occasionally in other Services of the War; and upon an Engagement, he chose to divide and mix them in the Ranks with the other Troops, in order to animate them by their Example. But Pelopidas found a better Effect in keeping them in one entire Body; and after the Proofs they had given him of their Be|haviour in this Action, he constantly charg'd at the Head of them, in the same manner, without breaking and dispersing them. They are said to have remain'd invincible till the Battle of Che|ronea, which happen'd some Years after, when they were every Man of them cut down by the Macedonian Phalanx: And the next Day Philip taking a View of the Field of Battle, look'd on them with Surprise, as they lay all together a|mong the Slain, and extolling their Virtue, ••••p over them.

It was this Battle of Tegyra, says Plutarch, which first convinc'd the Grecians, that the Breed of martial Spirits is not confin'd to the Banks of the Eurotas; but that true Courage and Bravery are the Growth of every Country, where the In|habitants are brought up with a Sense of Honour and Justice, and are more afraid of the least Dis|grace, than of the greatest Danger.

These Successes of the Thebans made the Athe|nians begin to think they gain'd Ground a little too fast; and whatever Cause of Resentment they had against Sparta, they did not care to carry it so far, as to raise the Power of one State upon the Destruction of the other: Which Consideration inclin'd them towards an Accomodation. It hap|pen'd at the same time, that Artaxerxes wanting a Supply of Grecian Troops to assist him in his Aegyptian War, and which could not easily be spar'd, without putting an end to these intestine Broils, sent his Ambassadors into Greece to renew the Peace of Antalcidas,* 1.144 which in the present Conjuncture met with very little Difficulty, ex|cept from the Thebans, who would not give up their Jurisdiction over the Cities of Boeotia. The general Tenor of the Treaty was as before, That all the Cities for the future should be govern'd by their own Laws; with an additional Provision, That all the Garrisons should be withdrawn; which was accordingly executed by Commissioners ap|pointed for that Purpose.

During the short Respite that was by this Means given to the Grecians,* 1.145 Artaxerxes engag'd twenty thousand of them in his Service against Aegypt. Pharnabazus, who had the Charge of the War, and had been two Years in making Preparations for it, had got together an Army of two hun|dred thousand Men, besides this Body of Grecians, with a proportionable Number of Shipping, to act in concert with the Land Forces. He sent to Athens to demand that Chabrias, who then serv'd as a Voluntier with the Aegyptians, might be recall'd home,* 1.146 and that Iphicrates might be sent to command the Grecians; both which Point•• were readily complied with. The general Ren|dezvous was at Ace, afterwards call'd Ptolemai••; where it was resolv'd to attack Pelusium, one o•• the Seven Mouths of the Nile, as the most con|venient Passage into the Country: But the Ae|gyptians had so long Notice given them to pro|vide for their Defence, that they had made that Place inaccessible both by Sea and Land. Where, upon Pharnabazus order'd the Fleet to Mende|sium, another Mouth of the Nile, and made a Descent with three thousand Men, who, after a vigorous Resistance, took the Place. Iphicrates took the Fort likewise, with those who had retir'd into it; and being flush'd with this Success, pro|pos'd to go, without Loss of Time, to a••••ack Memphis, the capital City of Aegypt. But P••ar|nabazus chose rather to stay till his whole Forces could come up, in order to make sure Work of

it. The other urg'd the Necessity of marching immediately against it, and, in order to cut off all further Pretences, offer'd to do it with only his own Troops; which being likewise refus'd, it was plainly seen,* 1.147 that Pharnabazus was jealous of his having too great a Share in the Honour of the Expedition. Whilst this Matter was in Debate between them, the Aegyptians put a strong Gar|rison into Memphis; and drawing down the rest of their Forces against the Persians, maintain'd their Ground, and harass'd them, till at length the Inundation of the Nile oblig'd them to quit the Country. By these Means they lost the Pro|spect of taking Memphis, the Consequence where|of must have been the Reduction of the whole Kingdom. Such was the Fate of most of the Persian Expeditions, which were generally ill concerted, and worse conducted, and were al|ways attended with Delays, which were chiefly occasion'd by their Generals Hands being tied up, so that, upon any sudden Emergency, they often waited for Instructions from their Court, till the Occasion was over. And this was alledg'd by Pharnabazus in his Excuse to Iphicrates, who expostulating with him upon the Operations of the War, ask'd him, How it came to pass, that he who was so quick in proposing his Measures, was so slow in the Execution? Because, said he, I am Master of my Words; but the King is Master of my Actions. But this was not so much the Case of the present Miscarriage, which was chiefly

owing to the Misunderstanding between the two Generals. However Pharnabazus, upon his Re••turn into Asia, threw the whole Blame of it upo•• Iphicrates, who did not think it proper there to justify himself. He took warning from wha•• had lately happen'd to Conon under the like Circumstances; and therefore withdrew himself privately to Athens. Pharnabazus sent his Com|plaint after him; and the Athenians promis'd to punish him, according as they should find he had deserv'd it. But they found reason to be very well satisfied with his Behaviour, and were so far from censuring it, that soon after, as a Mark of their Approbation, they appointed him Admiral.

In the mean time the several Cities of Greece, especially those in Peloponnesus, were no sooner put into a Condition of enjoying that Liberty, which was now more fully restor'd to them, but they fell into Tumults and Seditions among themselves, with such Resentment of former In|juries upon those who had acted under the Spar|tan Administration, that they banish'd their Per|sons, and confiscated their Estates, and created such further Disorders, that the two States of Athens and Sparta sound themselves oblig'd to in|terpose in Behalf of those who were best affected towards'em, and whose Quarrels they had formerly espoused:* 1.148 And this occasion'd another Rupture the Year after the Peace was concluded; tho' it was not so general a one as before, nor of so long Continuance.

The first Contests were concerning Zacynthus and Corcyra;* 1.149 which were occasion'd chiefly by the Spartan Faction. In the former of these Places, the People had expell'd their Magistrates; who flying to Timotheus for Protection, he re|ceiv'd them on board his Fleet, and transported them back to the Island; where, by his further Assistance, they got Possession of a strong Castle, and maintain'd themselves against the Inhabitants. The like Divisions subsisting in Corcyra, the Spartans sent out Mnasippus with a Fleet, under colour of assisting their Friends there. But they knew of what Importance that Island was to the Recovery of their Dominion at Sea; and their true Design was to secure it to themselves. The Fraud being detected, the Inhabitants in general united against them as their common Enemy, and put themselves under the Protection of Athens. But before they could receive any Relief from thence, the Spartans had landed upon them, and besieged them. And when they found them|selves straiten'd for want of Provisions, they made a desperate sally, wherein they kill'd Mnasippus, with a good Number of his Men. At length Iphicrates and Timotheus coming up with the A|thenian Fleet, took nine of the Spartan Gallies, and put an end to these Commotions.

About the same time the Inhabitants of Plataêa applying to their old Friends the Athenians, for their Protection and Alliance, the Thebans took Offence at it, and demolish'd the Town; and

soon after did the same by Thespiae.* 1.150 The A••he|nians were so highly incens'd at the Treatment of those two Cities, which had deserv'd so well of the common Cause in the Persian War, that they would act no longer in Conjunction with them; and upon their breaking with them, the Affairs of Greece took a new and unexpected Turn.

Athens and Sparta began now to think in earnest of enjoying some Repose themselves,* 1.151 and of giving it to the lesser States, whose Quarrels had been promoted chiefly by them, and made subservient to their Views of obtaining the Sove|reignty of Greece. This was undoubtedly the true Grounds of their Enmity, tho' several other pretended Causes were asign'd; of which the most plausible was, the settling the other Cities and Republicks in a State of Freedom and Inde|pendency. This was now in some measure ef|fected; and the Spartans having been forc'd to give up a great Part of the Power they had un|justly obtain'd, the Athenians contented themselves with this Mark of their Submission, especially since they had recover'd a great Part of what they had lost at Sea; which had brought things to a pretty equal Balance. The Truth is, they had been at almost all the Charge and Hazard of the War, exclusive of their Allies; so that not|withstanding they had been successful in the main, they had been sufficiently drain'd and harass'd, and were therefore glad of so ••avourable a Con|juncture, to renew the former Treaty. There

being at the same time nothing to apprehend on the Side of Asia, where Artaxerxes was deeply engag'd in his Aegyptian War, there was a ge|neral Disposition for Peace, and the Negotiations were carried on successfully by the Athenians; but it was rejected by the Thebans,* 1.152 and in such a manner, as plainly shew'd they were now setting up for themselves, and would no longer be con|sider'd as a subordinate State.

They were naturally an hardy and robust Peo|ple, but had the Character of being heavy and stupid, even to a Proverb: And yet such Gene|rals as Epaminondas and Pelopides, and such Wri|ters as Pindar and Plutarch, one would think, should have vindicated them from that Reproach. However it is certain, they had not hitherto ex|erted themselves in any Degree suitable to the Fame of their Heroes and Founders, who by their Exploits, partly Fabulous, and partly His|torical, had given a Promise of what might be expected from their Descendants, especially in a City of so great Antiquity and Renown, as to have maintain'd a Siege, even before that of Troy. But they were far from answering these Expectations. The Thebans were divided in In|terest from the Boeotians during the Persian Wars; which is assign'd as one Reason, why they were so long kept under: They basely deserted the common Cause of Greece at that Time, to join with the Barbarians: And when, contrary to all human Probability, that numerous Army was

defeated, they apprehended the Power and Re|sentment of the Athenians, who, as being their Neighbours, might, under a Pretence of punish|ing their Treachery, possess themselves of their Country. This Necessity threw them under the Protection of the Spartans, who chose rather to forgive the Friends of Persia, than sacrifice the Enemies of Athens; and accordingly enter'd into a League with them. The Thebans were not un|grateful; they did them very great Service in the Peloponnesian War, and continu'd, during the whole Course of it, their good and faithful Allies. Upon what Occasion they afterwards broke with them, and were thereupon oblig'd to have Recourse to the Athenians, has already been related. It was a constant Maxim with them, as they were deserted by one of those two States, to fall in with the other; and which Side soever they inclin'd to, they were generally of Weight enough to turn the Balance: However they had hitherto made no further use of that Weight, than to secure themselves. But they had been so constantly engag'd of late Years on one Side or the other, according to the Exigencies of their Affairs, that it had brought them into Discipline, and fir'd their Ambition; and the Spartans had principally contributed to it, by their late srequent Expeditions against them. It was an establish'd Point of Policy in the Spartan Government, to avoid engaging too often with the same Enemy, for fear of instructing them in

the Art of War: And Lycurgus had, for the same Reason, expresly forbid it by his Laws. But the Resentment of Agesilaus against the The|bans carried him on beyond any Consideration of that kind; insomuch that finding his Colleague Cleombrotus averse to the Theban War, he lead the Army himself, notwithstanding that he had before claim'd the Privilege of his Age to excuse his Attendance: And an Action happening, wherein he was wounded, Antalcidas reproach'd him, That he was well requited by the Thebans, for having taught them to fight. In short, they began now to look about them, and enlarge their Views; and finding themselves too much cramp'd up within their ancient Limits, they laid hold of the present Conjuncture, to extend their Domi|nion, beginning, as the other States had done, by little Encroachments on their Neighbours.

The Spirit which now appear'd among them,* 1.153 had been rais'd by Pelopidas, their late Deliverer from the Spartan Yoke, and was seconded and supported by Epaminondas, who, tho' he had all the Qualities necessary for the Service of the Publick, yet chose to lead a private Life, in a constant Course of Virtue, and the Study of Philosophy. He had seldom appear'd in publick, but in order to get himself excus'd from those Employments, which were so eagerly courted by others. But his extraordinary Merit no longer suffering him to enjoy his Retirement, he was forc'd out of it, and plac'd at the Head of the Theban Army.

He had before this contracted an Intimacy with Pelopidas, which was daily improv'd by the Cor|respondence of their Tempers and Principles, and the ardent Zeal, which they both express'd, for the Good of their Country. And they had upon some Occasions before this Time appear'd toge|ther in Action: But Pelopidas having made a more early Figure in the Army, the Success, which the Thebans had hitherto met with, was generally ascrib'd to him: However Epaminondas had done enough to distinguish himself; and they both now came to be consider'd in the same Light, as Generals abroad, and as Governors at home.

When the Treaty propos'd by the Athenians was upon the Point of being executed, the The|bans demanded to be comprehended in it, under the Name of the Boeotians, and to be expresly stiled so. But the other contracting Powers would not agree to it: Agesilaus particularly in|sisted upon their leaving Boeotia free and inde|pendent. He was answer'd by Epaminondas, who was there as Ambassador on the Part of the Thebans, That they, the Spartans would do well to shew them the Example, by setting free the Country of Laconia; for that the Pretensions of the City of Thebes to the one, were as well founded, as those of the City of Sparta, to the other. He urg'd farther, not only in Behalf of the Thebans, but of Greece in general, That Sparta had aggran|diz'd herself by War, at the Expence of her Neigh|bours;

That Peace might be obtain'd, and such a ••ne as might be solid and lasting; but that it could not be otherwise so, than by reducing all to an E|quality. These Remonstrances, however just they were, yet so incens'd Agesilaus, that he struck the Name of the Thebans out of the Treaty,* 1.154 and declar'd War against them.

The entering into a War in this manner, was thought, both by the Spartans and their Allies, too hasty a Step; and when it was at last, and with some Difficulty, decreed by the Ephori, it was censur'd, as an Act more of Passion than Judgment, and as owing to the particular Pique Agesilaus had to the Thebans, on whose Account he had been call'd out of Asia; and thereupon he laid hold of all Opportunities of being re|yeng'd on them. However he took care at the same time to conclude a Peace with the rest of the Grecians; tho' it was couch'd in so loose and general Terms, as if it were intended only to serve the present Occasion, lest any of them should ••oin against him, and that he might afterwards either observe, or break it, according as he should find it most for his Purpose. This agrees with what he said to the other Ambassadors upon his dismissing them, That what could be amicably ad|usted, should; and that what was not otherwise to be remedied, must be determin'd by the Sword, it being too dissicult a Task to provide for every thing by ••reaty.

The Thebans were by this means left to them ••elves; and Cleombrotus lying then in Phocis wit ten thousand Foot, and a thousand Horse, th•• Ephori sent him Orders to march immediate•• into Boeotia; and at the same time they order' fresh Levies to be made in Laconia, and amon•• their Allies. The Thebans, tho' they were unde•• the utmost Consternation, and that all Greece•••• general look'd upon them as lost, prepar'd 〈◊〉〈◊〉 stand upon their Defence. Epaminondas was at•• pointed Commander in Chief; but there we•••• join'd with him, at his own Request, six other•• as his Council, or Assistants.

Cleombrotus in the mean time pursued h•••• March with great Diligence, and went on 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to a certain Victory. However, when he a•••••• riv'd upon the Frontiers of Boeotia, he sent un••••der colour of justifying his Proceedings, to d••••mand of the Thebans, That they should restore if•••• Boeotian Cities to their Liberty; That they shou•••• rebuild Plataea and Thespiae, which they had don••lish'd in the last War; and that they should make g•••• all the Losses the Inhabitants had sustain'd. E••••minendas return'd an Answer suitable to the D••••mand, That the Spartans had nothing to do wi•••• Boeotia, and that the Thebans were not accom•• table to them for their Conduct.

There now remain'd nothing further to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 done on either Side, but to prepare for Actio•••• But just as the Thebans march'd out of the C•••• they were terrified by Omens and Prodiga••••

which they interpreted to portend ill Success to ••hem. Epaminodas, by way of Encourage|ment, repeated to them a Verse of Homer, which implied,* 1.155 That there was one sure good ••men to those who fought for their Country. One of these unlucky Auguries, was a sudden ••reat Clap of Thunder, which they look'd up|••n as a Warning from Heav'n, and address'd ••hemselves to their General, to know his Senti|Ments upon it. But he being more attentive 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Incampment of the Spartan Army, than 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Thunder, gave them no other Answer, ••han That be wonder'd to see the Enemy bad ••••tch'd upon so bad a Piece of Ground, when they ••••ight have posted themselves so much more advan|••••ageously. However, to prevent any further Ef|fets of this Superstition, or Fear, which was ••mong the Troops, he found it necessary to hu|••our them a little, and to take them in their own ••ay. Accordingly he invented other Counter|••••mens and Auguries, and made use of old ••rophecies and Predictions, which he applied 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the present Occasion, and took care to have ••hem explain'd in so favourable a manner, that he Soldiers went on in full Confidence of Suc|••ess, and were eager to engage. The next ••oint in Debate, was among the Generals, ••hether they should act defensively, or march ••p to the Spartans Camp, and offer them ••attle. The Council of War upon this Occa|sion,

consisted of Epaminondas, and five of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Colleagues; and they were equally divided Opinion. But Pelopidas, as some say, came afterwards, and by his Vote it was determin to give the Enemy Battle. Accordingly 〈◊〉〈◊〉 two Armies met in the Plain of Leuctra, Town in Boeotia.

Archidamus the Son of Agesilaus, having join the Spartans with the new Levies, had increas their Number to four and twenty Thousan•• whereas the Thebans had at the most but 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Thousand. There was also a great Disproporti•••• in their Horse: But the Thebans had vastly 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Advantage, both in the Quality of their Horse and in their Management of them.

Epaminondas endeavour'd to supply his W•••••• of Troops by his Disposition,* 1.156 and by the V••••gour of his Attack. And taking to himself 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Command of the Left Wing, opposite to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Right of the Enemy, commanded by Cleomio••••tus, he put the main Stress of the Battle the•• concluding, that is he could break that Body 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Spartans, the rest would easily be put to the Ro•••• With this View, he strengthen'd his Wing w•••• his heavy-arm'd Infantry, and the best of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 other Troops; by which Additions, it was 〈◊〉〈◊〉 M••n deep, whereas that of the Spartans was b•• twelve. He closed it with the Sacred Band 〈◊〉〈◊〉 der the Command of Pelopidas; and his Ho•• he placed in the Front of it, after the Exam|ple of Cleombrotus. Having drawn off so ma••••

from his other Wing, he order'd those who re|main'd in it, to fall back in a slanting Line, as if they declin'd fighting, and were making their Retreat; which he did, that they might not be left too much expos'd, and that they might cover his Flank on the Right, and be a Body of Reserve to him in case of need.

He then advanc'd with his Wing, extending ••••t obliquely, in order to draw off the Right Wing of the Spartans from their main Body. The Enemy perceiving his Design, chang'd their Order of Battle, and began to extend their Wing likewise, with an Intent to surround Epa|••••nondas. But before they could open and close their Divisions, he took advantage of their form|ing themselves, and began the Attack with the Horse: And Pelopidas charging with him at the same time, with incredible Speed and Bra|very at the Head of his Battalion, they follow'd she Horse, and press'd so hard upon the Spar|••ans, that tho' they were of all the Grecians, the most expert in recovering any Surprise or Disorder of that Kind, their Skill was now quite passed. Their Horse being not able to stand the Shock, were forc'd back upon their Infan|try, which, by this means, was broke, and thrown into a good deal of Confusion. The Thebans having made this Impression with their Horse, push'd on to Cleombrotus, and open'd their Way to him with great Slaughter; not|withstanding that the Spartans fought with their

wonted Bravery, and held the Victory som•• Time in Suspence. At length Cleombrotus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with Dinon, Sphodrias, his Son Cleonyme and other Officers of Note, who came up 〈◊〉〈◊〉 defend the Person of their King. And 〈◊〉〈◊〉 he was kill'd, the Fight was renew'd with great|er Rage and Obstinacy, both to revenge 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Death, and to recover his Body. This la•••• was a point of Honour with the Spartan•• which they could not for shame give up; and Epaminondas chose rather to gratify them in it than to hazard the further Success of the Battle Wherefore he left them in possession of their dead King, and went on to their other Wing which was commanded by Archidamus, and con|sisted chiefly of the Allies, who had not willing|ly been engaged in this Quarrel, but were the more easily persuaded to it from the Weak|ness of the Thebans; so that they thought they had little more to do, than to take the Field, and that they were to conquer without fight|ing, or, as Diodorus expresses it,* 1.157 without Dust. But they were so dishearten'd at the Death of Cleombrotus, and the Defeat of his Wing, that they soon betook themselves to Flight, and were follow'd by the rest of the Army. Ep••|minondas pursued them with great Slaughter, 'till having compleated his Victory, he remain'd Master of the Field, and erected a Trophy. There fell in the Battle four Thousand on the Side of Sparta, whereof one Thousand were Laceda|monians,

and the Flower of their Army; and four Hundred of them were Citizens of Sparta. The Thebans lost in the whole but three Hun|dred Men.

Epaminondas had succeeded in every Part of this Action, according to his Wish, and ac|cording to the manner in which he had pro|jected it. His Skill and Conduct in this Battle, and in that which succeeded it at Manitinea, are look'd upon as Master-pieces in their kind: And they who are curious that way, may see the exact Plans of them, as they are describ'd by a* 1.158 late Author in his Comments upon Poly|bius.

This Battle was fought within twenty Days after the Conclusion of the Peace. And as it was the sharpest of any that had happen'd du|ring the Wars of the Grecians among them|selves, so it was more remarkable for the Num|ber of the ••slain; there having seldom been above four or five hundred kill'd on the Side of the vanquish'd, even in the Height of the Rivalship between Athens and Sparta, when they fought with the most Rancour and Inveteracy. The Thebans acquir'd more Glory by it, than any of the Republicks had ever gain'd by any single Victory in those Wars: And Epaminondas felt such a sudden Excess of Joy upon it, that he went out of his usual Character, and was hard|ly able to contain himself. But the next Day, upon cooler Thoughts, he resum'd the Philo|sopher;

and appear'd so pensive and melancho|ly, that his Friends were very inquisitive to know the Cause of it. He told them, He had suffered himself to be too much transported upon his Victory, and that he was now undergoing a proper Chastisement for it. But his Command of himself upon this Occasion, did not come up to that of the Spartans, whose Behaviour after the Battle, was so remarkably great, that I que|stion whether it can be parallel'd in the History of any Age, or Country.

If happen'd, that when the News of the Defeat came to Sparta, they were celebrating a Publick Festival in the City, where there was a great Con|course of Strangers from several Parts of Greece.* 1.159 The Ephori, who from the Accounts they had al|ready received of the Battle, could not but be sensible of the terrible Consequences of it, yet gave Orders, that the Solemnity of the Day should not be interrupted; but privately sending the Names of the slain to each Family, out of which they were lost, they went on with the Sports and Ceremonies, as if nothing had happen'd. The next Morning, when they were more fully in|formed of the Particulars, the Fathers and Re|lations of the slain came out rejoicing in the Market-place, and saluting each other with a kind of Exultation: On the contrary, the Fa|thers of those who survived the Battle, conceal'd themselves in their Houses; and if any of them were, upon any necessary Occasion, obliged to

go abroad, it was easily discover'd by their Looks, that they were asham'd to own their Children. The Women carried it still further, the Mothers of the slain openly rejoicing, chear|fully making Visits to each other, and assemb|ling in a triumphant manner in the Temples; whilst they who expected their Children home, sat silent and dejected.

But the Generality of the People were a|waken'd by this Misfortune, and consider'd it as a Blow, that they should never be able to recover. They began to despair, when they found themselves without Troops, deserted by their Allies, and, in a manner, at the Mercy of the Conqueror; especially when they were further informed, that he design'd to invade Pe|loponnesus. This occasion'd a general Murmu|ring and Repining: It brought to their Re|membrance the former Predictions of the Oracle, That they should suffer under a lame King. They consider'd further, that they had given the Crown to this lame King, in prejudice to the Right of Leotychidas his Nephew. But notwith|standing these Reflections, and that he had un|doubtedly been the sole Author of their present Calamity, he had still so much Credit with them, that they renew'd the Confidence they they had formerly placed in him, and submitted their Affairs entirely to his Determination, ei|ther as to Peace or War.

One great Point under their immediate Con|sideration, was concerning those who had fled out of the Battle. They were by the Law in that cafe, to be degraded from all Honours, and render'd infamous, insomuch that it was a Disgrace to intermarry with them: They were to appear publickly in mean and dirty Habits, with patch'd and party-colour'd Garments, and to go half-shav'd; and whoever met them in the Streets, might insult and beat them, and they were not to make any Resistance. This was so severe a Law, and such Numbers had incurr'd the Penalties of it, many of whom were of great Families and Interest, that they apprehended the Execution of it might occasion some publick Commotions; besides that these Citizens, such as they were, could very ill be spared at this time, when they wanted to re|cruit the Army. Under this Difficulty, they gave Agesilaus a Power even over the Laws, to dispense with them, or to abrogate them, or to enact such new ones, as the present Exi|gency required. He would not abolish, or make any Variation in the Law itself, but made a publick Declarntion, That it should lie dormant for that single Day, but revive and be in full Force again on the morrow; and by that Ex|pedient he saved the Citizens from Infamy.

CHAP. IV.

From the Battle of Leuctra, to the Battle of Mantinea. Containing the Space of 8 years.

THE Fugitives being thus re-instated in the Army, Agesilaus made an Inroad into Ar|cadia, where he took a small Town belonging to the Mantineans, and wasted the Territory, but avoided engaging in any hazardous Enter|prise, doing no more at present, than what was barely necessary to keep his Men in Action, and to revive their Spirits, and at the same time to shew, that the Fortune of Sparta was not quite desperate.

The Thebans in the mean time were endea|vouring to improve their Victory; and sent an Herald crown'd with a Garland, to communi|cate it in Form to the Athenians, and to de|mand their Assistance. But they did not think this a Time to break with Sparta; they found it a fit Opportunity to make themselves more ab|solutely Masters at Sea; and if they could not carry it further, so as to obtain the Sovereign|ty of Greece; at least they thought it better to share in it with Sparta, than to endanger the letting the 'Thebans into the whole: Upon

which Considerations they dismiss'd the Herald without giving him Audience.

With these Views,* 1.160 they gave the Spartans to understand, That, as they had lost their Power, it was expected, they should lay aside their Haughtiness and Severity. At the same time they took upon themselves to maintain the Peace, which, by the Deputies of the several Cities as|sembled at Athens, they caused to be renew'd and retified, in the Name of them, and their Con|federates. The Thebans stood out as before; and the Eleans now followed their Example, object|ing against the Freedom of several Towns, which they pretended to be immediately under their Jurisdiction. And several other States afterwards fell in with the Thebans,* 1.161 some by Compulsion, and more out of Inclination and Policy, as they found they were most likely to be protected by them. Thebes was now become the common Asylum for those who apprehended the Power of their Neighbours, and more particularly of the Spartans.

The Mantineans about this time took occasi|on to rebuild their City,* 1.162 which, with the As|sistance of the Eleans, and some Part of the Arcadians, they perfected, and wall'd in, as before. And, according to Pausanias, the Ar|cadians in general, by the Persuasion of Epami|nondas, out of several small Towns, built one common City by the Name of Megalopolis; tho' Diodorus places it two years lower, upon

their great Overthrow by the Spartans. Thus far the Arcadians had made a right and reasona|ble use of Sparta's being humbled: But they, and some other States, when they found them|selves restored, according to the Treaty, to the free Enjoyment of their own Laws, and Forms of Government, grew wanton and ca|pricious, and fell into such Dissensions among themselves, as prov'd of worse Consequence to them, than the Dominion of Sparta.

This was the Case of the Tegeans, who had form'd a Scheme of uniting themselves, with all the rest of the Arcadians,* 1.163 into one Body of a Common-wealth, with a General Council, consisting of ten Thousand; in whom there was to be lodg'd an absolute Power, to deter|mine all Matters relating to Peace and War. But this Project occasion'd such Factions and Tumults among them, that great Numbers were kill'd, and above fourteen Hundred ba|nish'd; and it ended in bringing the Spartans again upon them, under the old Pretence of restoring Exiles, and in making their Country a Seat of War.

Agesilaus immediately took occasion from these intestine Divisions, to send a Body of fifteen Hundred Men among them under the Com|mand of Polytropus. He possess'd himself of * 1.164 Orchomenus,* 1.165 which was well affected to Sparta, and garrison'd it. Lycomedes the Arcadian Ge|neral

being about three to one stronger, march'd up to him, and offer'd him Battle under the Walls. Polytropus accepted it, and was kill'd, with two hundred of his Men; and the rest were forc'd back into the City. However Ly|comedes, not doubting but the Spartans would come with a greater FoRce to revenge them|selves, did not think it adviseable to pursue his Victory without some further Assistance. Accordingly he applied to the Athenians; but they refus'd to join with him, concluding, as they had done before, with regard to the The|bans, that Sparta was low enough already, and that it would be wrong Policy in them at this time to support any other State against her. Hereupon the Arcadians had recourse to the Thebans, who receiv'd them with open Arms; and this was a great Addition to the Confe|deracy, that was forming against Sparta.

About the Time of the civil Discord among the Arcadians concerning their new Form of Government, there happen'd a more grievous Instance of the same kind at Argos;* 1.166 where the Government being in the People, the Orators, or Demagogues, (as they were more properly call'd) ftirt'd them up against the Nobility, who, to secure themselves against the Insults and Outrages to which they were expos'd, en|ter'd into Conspiracy to destroy the Democra|cy. Which being suspected by the Commons, they put several to the Rack, and extorted

from them a Confession of the whole Design. Whereupon they murther'd Thirty of those who were principally concern'd, without any Form of Trial: And many false Accusations against others, were dress'd up and aggravated by these Orators; insomuch that there were above sixteen hundred of the greatest and rich|est Men of the City executed, and their Estates confiscated. At length the Orators, whether they were struck with Remorse for the Cruel|ties they had oceasion'd, or that they were a|fraid of being at last involv'd in the general Ruin, began to slacken in their Prosecutions; and the People from thence concluding, that they had deserted their Cause, murther'd such of them as they could find remaining in the City. This was the greatest Massacre that had hap|pen'd in any City of Greece; and it was di|stinguished by the Name of The Seytalism, from the manner in which it was executed, by the knocking on the Head with Clubs. And this Sedition was a very unlucky Conjuncture for that City, which was so rich and powerful, that she was in a Condition to dispute the Sovereignty of Greece. This Opinion was con|firm'd by Jason, who putting in his Claim to it in behalf of the Thessalians, made use of it as an Argument to them, that the Ar|gives were too much weaken'd with their in|testine Broils, to appear as Competitors.

This Jason had a little Principality at Pherae;* 1.167 and having ambitious Views, and extraordinary Skill in Military Affairs, got himself to be de|claR'd General of Thessaly; with which Authority he had gain'd many of the neighbouring Coun|tries into his Alliance; and the Thebans courted him for his Assistance, when they found them|selves disappointed of it at Athens. He appear'd ready to join them with a good Body of Troops; but when it came to the Point, he diverted them from pursuing their Victory, advising them to use it with Moderation, and not to make the Spartans desperate. The Spartans, on the other hand, he persuaded to lie by a little, till they had recover'd Breath, and could fight upon more advantageous Temrs: So that he acted rather as a Mediator, than an Ally; and there is Mention made of a Truce concluded between them by his Means; but the Account of it is so differently related, that it does not appear, whether it were before, or after the Battle of Leuctra. Jason's Business was to manage so between those States, that neither of them might grow too powerful, and that he might make his Advantage of it in bringing about his own Designs; which, by his Mony, Art and Eloquence, he had in some mea|sure effected. But notwithstanding that he was eager in the Pursuit of his Ambition, he endea|vour'd to save Appearances, and to preserve a good Character; so that when he had injur'd or molested any of his Neighbours, he would say,

by way of Excuse, There is a Necessity for those to be unjust in small Matters, who will act justly in great Ones. He was at the Head of an Army of ten thousand Horse, and twenty thousand heavy|arm'd Foot, without reckoning the light-arm'd Soldiers: And with this Force, he might soon have been capable of giving Law to the rest of Greece. But before he could make any Attempt towards it, he was suddenly assassinated at the Instigation of his Brothers Polydore and Polyphron, who jointly succeeded him: But the latter kill'd the other, and was soon after kill'd himself by his* 1.168 Nephew Alexander, under the Pretence of revenging the Death of his Father Polydore. By this Means Alexander possess'd himself of Pherae, and became very oppressive and tyrannical. But as I shall have occasion to mention him more par|ticularly, I would here only observe, that from the Time of Jason's Death, the Thessalians lost the Influence they had in the Affairs of Greece, and the Prospect of obtaining the Sovereignty of it in their turn.

The Thebans in the mean time having, besides the late Accession of the Arcadians, got the Pho|cians, Locrians, Acarnanians, Euboeans, and other neighbouring States, under their Dependence, were preparing to act offensively against the Spartans;* 1.169 and, under a Notion of assisting the Arcadians against them, enter'd Peloponnesus; where, having join'd the Arcadians, and the rest

of the Confederates, they made up an Army 〈◊〉〈◊〉 forty, some say, fifty thousand Men, besides grea•••• Numbers who follow'd the Camp for Plunde•••• amounting, in the whole, to seventy thousand Epaminondas and Pelopidas having the Command of the Army, divided it into four Bodies, who broke into Laconia at four several Parts of it a•• the same Time; then made a general Rendezvou•••• at Sellasia, and pursu'd their March with Fire an•••• Sword towards Sparta. Agesilous was at this time in pursuit of the Arcadians, after the Defeat of Polytropus: But upon this Approach of the•••• Thebans, he immediately return'd to Sparta,•••• where he found the Inhabitants under the utmost Terror and Consternation; and the more so, be|cause no Enemy had appear'd there in the Course of near six hundred Years, since the Dorians, as Descendants of Hercules, first got Possession of the Country. Hence it was, that Plato said, The City of Sparta was like the Temple of the Furies, which Nobody bad Courage enough to approach. And it was a frequent Saying of Agesilaus him|self, That the Women of Sparta had never seen the Smoke of the Enemies Fire; which was now re|torted upon him. There was another Saying of Antalicidas to the same Purpose, who being in Dispute with an Athenian about the Valour of the two nations, the Athenian bragg'd, That his Countrymen bad often drove the Spartans from the River Cephisus. Yes, said Antalcidas; but we never had Occasion to drive you from the Euro••••s.

But this was not the Case at present: For Epa|minondas, at the Head of his Infantry, pass'd that River, tho' it was then swell'd to an unusual Heighth, and tho' the Spartans taking that Op|portunity to fall upon him, cut off a good Num|ber of his Men. However he made good his Passage, and march'd up to the Suburbs of the City; where the Inhabitants were, with great Difficulty, restrain'd from rushing out in a con|fus'd and desperate manner upon the Enemy. But Agesilaus upon this Occasion shew'd more Temper than ordinary; he found it necessary to lay aside his Pride and Obstinacy, and to play a saving Game. He endeavour'd to quiet the Minds of the People, so as to keep them within their Bounds, and made the best Disposition he could of them, for the Defence of the City. It was thought proper in this Extrernity to pro|claim, That as many of the Helots, as would en|lift, and form themselves into Companies, should receive their Freedom; and a thousand of them accepted the Offer; Xenophon says, six thousand; which is not very improbable from the Circum|stance he adds, that when they were arm'd in a Body, they made so formidable an Appearance, that the Spartans themselves durst not trust them, without placing a good Number of Mercenaries and other Troops, as a Guard upon them.

The Thebans being thus far advanc'd, made a sort of Encampment near the City, and endea|vour'd to draw the Spartans out of it, in order to a

pitch'd Battle: But Agesilaus had retir'd to an E•• minence in the Heart of the Town, and intended nothing more than the Defence of it. Hereupon they resolv'd to attack it, and endeavour'd to tak•••• it by Storm;* 1.170 but they found the Avenues so wel secured, that they met with more Difficulty that they expected. When at length they made at Irruption with their Horse, the Spartan Horse oppos'd them; and a Party of three hundred Foot, who lay in Ambuscade, sallying out upo•• them at the same time,* 1.171 they were repuls'd with considerable Loss, and discourag'd from making a second Attempt. They contented themselves with encamping again without the City, where they bid Defiance to the Spartans, and challeng'd them to come out, and give them Battle; to which they return'd a very cool Answer, That they would not decline it, when they saw a prop•••• Occasion. Then they reproach'd Agesilaus by Name, as the Incendiary of the War, and the Author of all the Mischief done to his Country. But he resolv'd not to be provok'd; he over|look'd all these personal Insults and Reflections, as the Effects of Rage and Disappointment, and would not suffer himself to be diverted from the only Point he had then in view, which was the Security of the City; and the Preservation of it at this Time, was no less owing to this Com|mand of himself, than to his good Conduct in other Respects.

The Behaviour of Ischolas the Spartan upon this Occasion,* 1.172 deserves particular Notice. He commanded one of the Detachments which were order'd out to secure the most important Passes; but finding it too weak to stand the Attack of the Enemy, he pick'd out the youngest of the Men, and sent them back as a Reserve for the future Service of their Country; and with the rest, devoting himself, after the Example of Leo|nidas, to the publick Good, he made a long and obstinate Defence, and fought till they were all kill'd to a Man. The Thebans proposing nothing further to themselves there, decamp'd; and, after having plunder'd and laid waste all the Country, return'd into Arcadia.

This Expedition had not answer'd the great Preparations that were made for it:* 1.173 But Epami|nondas, to make it the more memorable, pro|pos'd the restoring the Posterity of the old Mes|seniens, who had near three hundred Years be|fore been driven out by the Spartans, and were settled in Sicily, Italy, and other Parts; where they retain'd their ancient Customs and Man|ners, and the Dorick Dialect. By a general Con|sent of his Allies, he invited them home to their native Country; and their City was immediately rebuilt and peopled; so that in a few Months it recover'd its former State and Grandeur; and a strong Garrison was lest for its Defence. The Territory was likewise divided by Lot among the new Inhabitants. The re-settling a People

who had made so considerable a Figure in to early Times of Greece, did highly redound to th•• Honour of Epaminondas, and was a fresh Di••••grace to the Spartans, for having tamely suffer•••• the Loss of a Country of as large Extent as the own, and the most fertile of any in Greece; besides that they had been so long in Possession of it, and held it as a Barrier against any Inv••••sion on that Side: And Agesilaus was so piqu'd•• it, that he made it the Grounds of continuing the War with the Thebans, when they offer'd him Peace; and the Consequence of his Refusal was that it very near occasion'd the Loss of Spark itself.

The Thebans, in their Return home, met with some Opposition from Iphicrates, who had been sent with twelve thousand Athenians, to assist the Spartans in their Extremity; but having loiter'd at Corinth, he did not come up till the Business was over: And afterwards he omitted to secure an important Pass call'd Cenchreae, which would have given them a great deal of Disturbance in their Retreat. His Conduct throughout in this Affair was blam'd; which was the more re|markable in him, because he never misbehav'd upon any other Occasion.

Epaminondas and Pelopidas,* 1.174 at their Return to Thebes, instead of receiving the Acknowledge|ments due to their Services, were clap'd up as State Prisoners, for having continu'd in their Command four Months longer than the Time

••dimited by Law, which took in almost the Whole of this Expedition, from their first Entrance into Peloponnesus: And as the Crime was Capital, they were tried for it. They had nothing to alledge in their Excuse for so manifest a Violation of the Law, but the Advantages they had obtain'd for their Country; so that they confess'd the Charge, and submitted themselves to their Judges. Their Enemies had used great Art and Industry to in|••cense the People against them: Which Epami|nondas perceiving, and that they were ready to pass Sentence of Death against him, reminded them of the Battle of Leuctra, and his other Ex|ploits, by which he had saved his Country, and restor'd the Liberty of Greece: And he made it his Request to have it inscrib'd upon his Tomb|••stone, That for those Services he was punish'd with Death. This manner of reproaching them had so good an Effect, that they were asham'd to proceed any further against him,* 1.175 and he was ho|nourably acquitted; as was likewise Pelopidas, who being of a warmer Temper, and spirited up by his Friends, express'd his Resentment of this Usage, and reveng'd himself upon Meneclides, who was at the Bottom of this Prosecution, and was a very able Speaker, but loose in his Man|ners, ill-natur'd, perverse and envious. he was one of those who met at Charon's House upon the affair of the Cadmea; and not thinking himself consider'd enough for his Share in that

Enterprize, made it his Business, upon all Occa|sions, to accuse and calumniate his Superiors. Even after the Trial, he prevail'd so far, as to get Epaminondas excluded for a Year from the Government of Boeotia: But Pelopidas being more a Favourite with the People, he went another way to work, and endeavour'd to supplant him, by setting up Charon against him; which he contriv'd in the following manner. There was a famous Painter of Cyzicus employ'd at Thebes in drawing a Battle, but was forc'd away by the Revolt there, before he had put the last Hand to it. However the Picture remaining in the City, Meneclides propos'd the hanging it up in some publick Place, with an Inscription to per|petuate the Memory of a Victory obtain'd by Charon at Plataea, tho' it was in reality no more than a Skirmish, wherein forty Spartan; were kill'd. This Action happen'd a little be|fore the Battle of Leuctra; and the magnifying it in this manner, was plainly with a Design to eclipse the Glory of that Day, and to throw a Slurupon the two Generals who commanded. Pele|pidas therefore oppos'd the Motion; which yet he did with great Art and Decency with regard to Charon, to whom he gave all due Praise; but at the same time he expos'd the Absurdity of the Proposal, and the Malice and Impertinence of the Author of it; which the People being sen|sible of, laid so heavy a Fine upon him, that

he was not able to pay it; and from thence|forward he grew a common Disturber of the Government.

But to return to the Spartans, they had unex|pectedly got rid of a very formidable Enemy: But the Terror and Confusion they had been in, the Sense of the Losses they had sustain'd, and their Apprehensions of what further might hap|pen,* 1.176 had created a great deal of ill Blood a|mong them, and raised such a Spirit of mur|muring, and caballing against the Government, that Agesilaus found it almost as difficult a Task to manage the People in the City, as to keep the Enemy out of it.* 1.177 There was an Instance of this kind, wherein he shew'd extraordinary Address, and Presence of Mind. Two hundred Malecontents had got into a strong Part of the Town, call'd Issorion, where they had seized the Temple of Diana. Agesilaus would not employ Force against them, not knowing how deep the Plot might be laid, and how far it might spread; but went muffled up in his Cloak, with only one Servant; and be|ing come near the Rebels, call'd out, and told them, You have mistaken my Orders; my Direc|tions were not that you should all go in a Body to that Station, but some of you should plant yourselves there, and others there; at the same time pointing out to them different Parts of the City. They went off accordingly, without the least Suspicion, to the Places which he mark'd

out to them; and immediately, upon their be|ing thus dispers'd, he order'd some of the Troops to possess themselves of that Post, and caused about fifteen of the Conspirators to be apprehended; and they were put to death the Night following. This Conspiracy was fol|low'd by another of more dangerous Conse|quence, wherein a great Number of the Citi|zens were engaged, and had private Consulta|tions every Night, how to introduce a Change in the Government. They were so strong a Party, that it was neither safe to prosecute them publickly according to Law, nor to let them go on, and connive at them. Wherefore Age|silaus took another course, and, with the Con|sent of the Ephori, put them to death private|ly without Process; which had never before been practised in Sparta. But the present Exigency of Affairs seem'd to make it necessary; for these Seditions happen'd about the Time of the The|ban Expedition. And to add to the Conster|nation the City was then under, many of the Helots and Mercenaries at the same time deserted to the Enemy.

But the Spartans having got over these do|mestick Difficulties, and repuls'd the Thebans, began now to look abroad, and provide for their future Security. They had got together a good Body of Auxiliaries from Corinth, and other Parts of Peloponnesus: But their chief De|pendence was on the Athenians, to whom they

had formally given up the Command at Sea, in order to fix them in their Interest; but they were not so sanguine in it, as was expected; so that what they did, was rather to keep the Thebans under,* 1.178 than to assist the Spartans. They now insisted on being upon the same Foot|ing with them both at Sea and Land, which they call'd, Treating upon equal Terms: And since nothing less would content them, it was ac|cordingly agreed, that each State should com|mand five Days alternately.

This Agreement was no sooner made,* 1.179 but the Arcadians renew'd the War. They took Pallene in Laconia by Storm, where they put above three hundred Spartans in Garrison to the Sword,* 1.180 and ravag'd the Country. After which they were join'd by the Argives and Eleans; and the The|bans sent Epaminodas again to them, with seven thousand Foot, and five hundred Horse. The Athenians being now in earnest, sent Chabrias to oppose his Passage. He join'd the Spartans, with their Allies, at Corinth, where they made up an Army of twenty thousand Men; to which there was afterwards an Addition of two thou|sand from Sicily, who did good Service. Epa|minondas came up to force his Passage, as he had done before, into Peloponnesus; but finding it shut up with a Wall, and a deep Interechment a-cross the Isthmus, as at the Time of the Inva|sion by Xerxes, he endeavour'd to draw the Enemy out into the Field, which they declin'd,

altho' they were near three times his number. Whereupon he survey'd the Works, and finding one Part, where the Spartans were posted, weaker than the rest, he chose to make his main At|tack there;* 1.181 which he did with such Resolution and Bravery, that, after a very hot Dispute on both Sides, he open'd the Passage, and harass'd the Country. Sicyon, and some other Places having submitted to him,* 1.182 he pursu'd his March to Co|rinth; where, after some skirmishing, he came up with his whole Strength, and made so vigo|rous an Assault, that the Inhabitants were in the utmost Despair.* 1.183 But Chabrias came out, and stood the Shock, and by the Advantage of the Ground, and the constant fresh Supplies which he receiv'd from the City, repuls'd the Enemy with great Loss; whereupon they not only re|treated from Corinth, but quitted Peloponnesus: And the Honour of this Defence was almost en|tirely owing to Chabrias.

Epaminodas, by one Part of his Conduct in this Expedition, incurr'd the Displeasure of the State. For notwithstanding his Bravery in forcing the Pass, that was defended by the Spartans, he was suspected of Partiality towards them, for not having pursu'd and slaughter'd them, when they were judg'd to be in his Power. His Enemies aggravating the Matter, and making it a Charge of Treachery, got him turn'd out of the Go|vernment of Boeotia, and reduc'd to the Condi|tion of a private Man. This Accusation was not

thought to be well founded enough for so severe a Censure: However an Occasion offer'd soon after, wherein his Service was so seasonable, and so important, that he easily wip'd off the Asper|sion.

It does not appear, what Effect the dividing the Command between Athens and Sparta had upon this Invasion; however it produc'd one good Consequence, as it serv'd to weaken the Confederacy against them. For it was now made use of as a Precedent by the Arcadians, who were grown so elated with their Successes, and put such a Value upon their Services against Sparta, that they disdain'd to act any longer in Subordination to the Thebans. This Spirit was rais'd in them by Lycomedes of Mantinea,* 1.184 who had been their General in most of their late Expeditions. He was of great Birth and Fortune, and being am|bitious withal, represented to them, That the whole Country of Peloponnesus belong'd properly to them, as the first ancient Inhabitants; That they were the most numerous of any People in Greece, and so stout and powerful, that they had always been consider'd in the first Rank of Auxi|liaries; insomuch that the Spartans had never done any thing against Athens without them, nor had the Thebans now appear'd against Sparta, if they had not supported them: That as they had formerly advanc'd the Affairs of the Spartans, they were now doing the same for the Thebans; and that in short, if they did not insist upon

commanding in their Turn with them, they might in the End find them Spartans too. He had so inflam'd them with these Remonstrances, and gain'd such an entire Credit with them, that they easily agreed to every thing he propos'd; and there was nothing so difficult that they were not ready to undertake. This created a great Coldness and Jealousy on the Part of the Thebans: And the Eleans at the same time were inclin'd to break with the Arcadians, for refusing to de|liver up to them some of their Towns, which had been taken by the Spartans.

Whilst these Disputes were on foot,* 1.185 the King of Persia sent to manage the Renewal of the Peace among the Grecians, that they might be able to spare him such Succours as he had occa|sion for. The chief Point in debate, was, the restoring Messene to the Spartans; which the Thebans not agreeing to, the Negotiations broke off; and Philiscus of Abydus, who was employ'd on the Part of the Persians, return'd into Asia, having left behind him two thousand Merce|naries, with Mony to pay them, for the Service of the Spartans. At the same time they receiv'd a second Supply of two thousand Men from Sicily.

Agesilaus, on account of his Age, got the Com|mand of the Army transferr'd to his Son Archi|damus, who march'd against the Arcadians; and, in Return for what they had done the last Year in Laconia, strom'd a Town call'd Caryae, and

put the Garrison to the Sword; from whence he proceeded to Parrhasia, and destroy'd the Coun|try about it. The Sicilian Troops being now upon their Return home, were intercepted by the Messenians; and Archidamus coming up to their Relief, was oppos'd by the Arcadians and Argives;* 1.186 but he charge'd them so furiously, that he broke them at once, and gain'd a Victory not easily to be accounted for. It is said there fell above ten thousand of the Enemy, without the Loss of one single Man on the Side of the Spartans; and hence it was distinguish'd by the Name of The Tearless Battle. The Joy upon the Arrival of the News at Sparta was so great, that the People were not able to contain themselves. This was the first remarkable Success they had met with since their Defeat at Leuctra, which had made such an Impression on them, that it is said, The Men were ever since asham'd to look their Wives in the Face. But this had given 'em new Life; they went in Crouds to the Banks of the Eurotas, full of Praise and Thanksgiving to the Gods, as having wash'd off the Stain of that Action, and restor'd their City to its ancient Splendor. Plutarch remarks, That this Excess of Joy too plainly discover'd the present Weakness of Sparta; for that Victory was formerly so common to them, that it was look'd upon as a thing of course: The Soldiers did not boast of it, nor were the Citizens exalted upon it; so that in the most extraordinary Case, they seldom sa|crificed

any thing more than a Cock; and the Messenger who brought them the News of a sig|nal Victory at Mantinea in the time of the Pel••|ponnesian War, had no other Reward than a Piece of Salt Meat. But this was re〈◊〉〈◊〉 an the•• manner; insomuch that the old King himself went out in Procession, to meet and embr••ce his Son, and was attended by the Epheri, and the whole Senate, and all with Tears of Joy in their Eyes.

The Thebans and Eleans were far from being displea••'d at this Disaster, which the Arcadians had brought upon themselves by their is••-tim'd Vanity and Arrogance: And this Defeat of them was follow'd by a further Train of Mis|fortunes.

The Thebens in the mean time were daily in|creasing in Power,* 1.187 which gave them great Credit and Influence among their Neighbours; and Pe|lopidas was chiesly instrumental in it. They were become Modeators of the Quarrels about the Succession in Macedonia, where they had com|pos'd the Differences in the Royal Family, and taken as Hostages at one time thirty, and after|wards fifty young Men of the chief Families, and with the former, the King's Brother, who was afterwards known by the Name of Philip of Macedon, and Father of Alexander the Great.

They were likewise applied to by the Thessa|lians for Protection against the Tyranny of Alex|ander the Pherean; whereupon Pelopidas was sent

as Ambassador to expostulate with him, and bring him to Reason. Upon his Return from Macedonia, he went to Pharsalus in Thessaly, in order to revenge the Treachery of some Merce|nary Troops, who had deserted him in that Expedition. He was no sooner arriv'd there, but Alexander appear'd before the Place with a great Army. Pelopidas had but a few Thessalian Troops with him; and imagining that Alexander came thither to justify himself, and answer the Complaints that were made against him, he and Is••menias, who was join'd in Commission with him, went alone, and unarm'd to him, not doubting, but the Power and Authority of Thebes, with their own personal Reputation, and the publick Character with which they were invested, would protect them against any Violence. But the Tyrant finding them in his Power,* 1.188 seiz'd 'em, and sent them Prisoners to Pherae. Polybius calls ••it an unpardonable Act of Imprudence and Rash|ness in Pelopidas, to trust himself so far to one whom he knew to be so wicked and perfidious. Alexander at first permitted every Body to see him, with an Intent, by making him a publick Spectacle, to break his Spirit, and humble him. But it had a different Effect: He sent to tell him in Defiance, That it was absurd in him, daily to terment and put to Death so many innocent worthy Citizens, and to spare him, who, he knew, if ever he escaped out of his Hands, would certainly make him suffer the Punishment due to his Crimes.

The Tyrant, surpris'd at his Intrepidity, answer'd, Why is Pelopidas in so much baste to die? Which being reported to him, he sent him this Reply, It is, that thou may'st perish so much the sooner, by becoming still more hateful to Gods and Men. From that time Alexander allow'd nobody to see or discourse with him but Thebe his Wife, whose Curiosity was rais'd by the Account his Keepers had given her of his Behaviour. Assoon as she was admitted to him, she fell a weeping, and said, I pity your Wife. And I you, said he, who can bear with Alexander, when you are not his Prisoner. This Reply affected her nearly, and rous'd in her such a Sense of her Husband's ill Usge of her, that she repeated her Visits to Pelopidas, and complain'd freely to him of the many Outrages she had receiv'd. He was not wanting, on his Part, to incense her still more against him, till by Degrees he had work'd her up to the highest pitch of Hatred and Resentment. These frequent Interviews had very much the Appearance of a Love Affair, which she had chiefly promoted: But there is no real Foun|dation to say, that she went any further, than to compassionate his Sufferings, and to commu|nicate her own, in order to revenge them; which accordingly she some time after accom|plish'd.

The Thebans resenting this Insult upon the Person of their Ambassador,* 1.189 immediately sent an Army into Thessaly; but the Generals, through

••ill Fortune, or ill Conduct, being not able to effect any thing, were forc'd to retire. Alexander pursuing them, great Numbers of their Men were kill'd; and it was owing to Epaminondas, that the rest of them were not totally defeated. He was at this time in Disgrace with the Govern|ment, the Reason whereof has before been re|lated; and therefore he had no Command in this Expedition, but serv'd as a common Soldier. However when the Troops found themselves un|der these Difficulties, which they attributed to the Incapacity of their Officers, they oblig'd him to take upon him the Command. He took the Horse, and light-arm'd Foot, and posting himself in the Rear, repell'd and charg'd the Enemy by turns, till he made good the Retreat. The Thebans, upon the Return of the Generals, fin'd each of them ten thousand Drachmas; and soon after sent Epaminondas in their room, to repair this Dishonour, and prosecute their Re|venge. Alexander was very much terrified at his second Arrival: But he preserring the Safety of Pelopidas to all other Considerations, avoided pushing things to an Extremity, for fear of making him desperate, so as turn all his Fury against his Prisoner; and therefore lay hovering about with his Army, so as to keep him in awe, and yet give him an Opportunity of offering Sa|tisfaction; which had the Effect he propos'd. He thought it too dishonourable a Part to enter into a Treaty of Alliance with one, who was

look'd upon as a Monster of Mankind: But! granted a Truce of thirty Days; in which tin having recover'd Pelopidas and Ismenias out his Hands,* 1.190 he withdrew his Forces. He co••••ducted the whole of this Affair with so muc•• Courage and Capacity on the one hand, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 much Prudence and Temper on the other, th•••• it intirely restor'd him to the Favour and goo Opinion of his Fellow-Citizens; and his generon•• Behaviour, in over-looking their unjust Resent••ment against him, was not the least Part of hi•• Praise in it.

Pelopidas, notwithstanding this Accident, ha•• in the main been very successful in these Foreign Transactions; and he had rais'd such an Opini|on of the Justice and Integrity of the Thebans, as well as of their Valour, that they were ea|sily tempted to pursue their Design of obtain|ing the Sovereignty of Greece.* 1.191 But finding they could not compass it by their Confede|rates at home, they had recourse to Persia. And they had now a good Pretence for it; for the Spartans had before sent one thither to treat on their purt. Whereupon the Thebans propo|sed it to their Confederates as expedient, that each of them should depute some proper Per|son to assist there likewise, in order to support their respective Interests. Accordingly the Ar|cadians, Eleans and Argives consented to it; and Pelopidas was named on behalf of the The|bans; which the Athenians being inform'd of,

appointed Two on their part also. But this was a Proof how much they were degenerated from the Virtue of their Ancestors: For what|ever mean Applications had before been made to the Persians by particular Persons or States, there had been no Instance of a of a Congress of this kind, where, by a general Consent, all the leading States of Greece were, by their Repre|sentatives, assembled in Form, to discuss and settle their Demands on each other, at the Court of Persia. But this was the Case at present; and the Spartans had chiefly contribu|ted to it by the Peace of Antalcidas, which had prepared the Grecians in general to receive the Yoke, and to govern themselves according to the Edicts of that King, whose Predecessors had been so shamefully bafled in their At|tempts against them, and who himself was so lately distress'd by those very Spartans, when Agesilaus was ravaging in the Heart of his Em|pire.

Pelopidas being arrived with the other Am|bassadors in Persia,* 1.192 so far ingratiated himself by his Address, and the Fame of his Exploits, that he was particularly distinguish'd from the rest of them, and the King received him with most extraordinary Marks of Honour and E|steem. He represented to him at his Audience, That the Thebans had constantly, from the Bat|t••e of Plataea to this present time, adhered to the Crown of Persia, and that the Spartans had

broke with them, purely because they refused to join with them against him. From thence he took occasion to mention their success at Leuctra, with their invading Laconia; and in|timated, that the late Overthrow of the Ar|cadians and Argives was owing to their not having been assisted by them. The King was so well pleased with his Person and Discourse, and was so well affected to the Thebans, as the People on whom he could best depend, that he readily granted his Demands: The Sub|stance whereof was, That the Liberty formerly granted to all the Towns, should be confirmed; That Messene in particular should remain free from the Jurisdiction of the Spartans; That the Athenians should lay up their Fleet; and that the Thebans should be look'd upon as the ancient heredilary Friends and Allies of Persia.

Pelopidas gain'd great Credit by this Nego|tiation: And the Thebans upon his return ex|pecting to receive the Benefit of it, caus'd the Deputies of all the Towns to be assembled at Thebes, in order to their ratifying the Treaty. But when the Oath for confirming it was ten|der'd to them, they said, They came to hear the Articles read, not to swear to them; which they could not do without consulting their Prin|cipals. And Lycomedes objected, in behalf of the Arcadians, to the Place of their Meeting, which, he said, ought to be where the Seat of the War was. This Method not taking

effect, the Cities were applied to separtely, in hopes by that means to awe them into a Compliance. But the Corinthians said plainly, They did not see any Occasion there was for the Treaty; and others following their Example, nothing further was done in it; so that the Thebans were all at once disappointed in their Views; and Artaxerxes left them as he found them, without engaging himself any further in their behalf; which indeed he could not do at this time, without arming the rest of Greece against him. For his Partiality to the Thebans, was now no less visible, than the Designs of the Thebans themselves, who had rais'd so much Jealousy by what they had already done, that there was a general Disposition to unite against them, and to make it a Common Cause. The Athenians were particularly disgusted by that Article of the Treaty, which was to restrain their Power at Sea; and they shew'd their Resentment by putting to death Timagoras one of their Ambassadors, upon his Return from Persia. He was charged with having taken part with Pelopidas, and not having act|ed in concert with his Colleague: And as he was next to Pelopidas in favour with the King, and had received rich Presents from him, it was taken for granted, that he had betray'd the Interests of his Country.

The Thebans would not yet give over their Designs; but finding they could not manage

the Arcadians,* 1.193 and the other Pelopannesian A lies to their Purpose, endeavor'd to reduce ther•• by means of their Neighbours the Achaean who had not yet taken any Part in the Qua••••rel. Epaminondas appearing as an Enemy among these latter, they easily submitted to him and enter'd into an Engagement to act in Al••liance with him. By which means the Arca••dians being distress'd on one Side by the Acha|ans, and on the other by the Spartans, made their Complaints of this Usage at Thebes; and from hence arose fresh Commotions and Ani|mosities in several Parts of Peloponnesus, but not considerable enough to be particularly rela|ted. The most remarkable Effects of them were at Sicyon;* 1.194 where Euphron a Man of great Power took this Occasion to erect a Tyranny, under colour of placing the Government in the People. He had a natural Interest among the Spartans, and cultivated the same with their Enemies, and manag'd so on all Sides, by be|traying and sacrificing one Party to the other, and by murthering and banishing the chief of the Magistrates and Nobility, that he obtain'd his Ends, and supported himself for some time, 'till the People were afterwards divided against him, and he was murther'd at Thebes by a Par|ty of those whom he had banished.

They who suffer'd most by these Disturbances, were the Phliasians, who were very much ex|posed by their Situation among the Theban

Allies. Euphron not only attack'd them him|self, but drew the whole Body of Arcadians and Argives upon them, by whom they must have been swallow'd up, if they had not been timely relieved by the Athenians under the Con|duct of Chares. But they had first undergone a Siege, and made a vigorous Defence, far beyond what could have been expected from a small City, surrounded with so powerful Ene|mies. The chief Quarrel against them was their steady Adherence to the Spartans, for whose Sakes they had often been reduced to the greatest Streights and Necessities, and yet never could be prevail'd upon, from their first engaging with them, to abandon their Inte|rests; insomuch that their Honour and Fide|lity, in this respect, is said to be without Pre|cedent.

The Athenians had drawn a good deal of Work upon their Hands, in supporting this little State; and being dissatisfied, that none of their Allies had assisted them in it, the Ar|cadians took this Opportunity to propose an Al|liance with them.* 1.195 It was debated among them, whether the accepting it were consistent with their Engagements to Sparta: But it being consider'd as of equal Advantage to both States, that the Arcadians should be drawn off from the Thebans, the Treaty was concluded; how|ever it was so qualified, that the Athenians were to assist the Arcadians with a Body of Horse,

in case they were invaded, without being obli|ged to join in the Invasion of Laconia. This Treaty was set on foot and negotiated by Ly|comedes,* 1.196 who soon after, upon his Return from Athens, was murther'd by a Party of Exiles. He was a Man of great Designs, and good Execution; but had engaged his Countrymen in perpetual Quarrels, to support his own Am|bition, and was undoubtedly the Author of all their late Misfortunes.

The Athenians, upon this new Accession, act|ed a treacherous Part against Corinth, which they were endeavouring to possess themselves of, even whilst they had garrison'd it with their own Troops, as Protectors and Allies. But the Corinthians having notice of their Design, im|mediately drew all the Athenians out of their Garrisons, and discharg'd them. Chares at the same time came up with his Fleet, under co|lour of assisting them to compose Matters in the City: They thank'd him for the Offer of his Service, but would not trust him so far as to admit him into their Harbour. These Pro|ceedings dissolved the Alliance between the two States,* 1.197 and were a kind of Declaration of War on both Sides. Whereupon the Corinthians thought it necessary to secure themselves by a Peace with the Thebans, and requested of the Spartans to give their Consent to it; which they readily granted not only to them, but to all such others of their Consederates, as de|sir'd it; but declared at the same time, that, for

their own Part, they would never lay down their Arms, 'till Messenia should be restored to them, in the Condition they received it from their Ancestors. However the Corinthians, with the Phliasians and some others, concluded a Peace with the Thebans, upon Condition, That every one should enjoy their own. Artaxerxes at the same time sent, as a Mediator, to settle once more the Tranquillity of Greece and pre|vail'd so far, that all Parties, and even the Spartans themselves were quiet for the present: And this was call'd putting an end to the La|conick or Boeotian War,* 1.198 after it had continued above five Years from the Battle of Leuctra. There is a Disagreement among the Histori|ans of this time, concerning the Date of some of the principal Events betwen the Battle of Leuctra, and this Peace; but all the Occurren|ces, which have been here related, are general|ly allow'd to have happen'd within the Com|pass of these five Years.

This last Treaty had no more than the Name and Appearance of a Peace; which, according to the present Situation of Affairs, was not like|ly to be sincere, or of any long Continuance. The growing Power of Thebes could not but necessarily keep up the other Great States in Arms against her; and the Lesser ones were so involv'd,* 1.199 either as Accessaries in their Quar|rels, or as Principals in their own, that the very next Year fresh Disturbances broke out.

The Flame was first kindled between the Ar|cadians and Eleans, who had long contested their Right to Triphylia, which belong'd pro|perly to the latter; and both Sides, according to the Fortune of their Arms, held possession of it by turns. The Eleans being worsted up|on this Occasion, call'd upon the Spartans for Assistance; and the Arcadians being supported by the Athenians, harass'd the Country of Elis, and took several Towns.

In the Year following,* 1.200 they encourag'd the Pisaeans, upon some old fabulous pretence, to claim a right of presiding at the Olympick Games; and they accordingly took upon them to manage the Solemnity. The Eleans, to whom this Honour did undoubtedly belong, resolved not to give it up.* 1.201 In the midst of the Exercises they fell upon the Arcadians with their whole Strength, and with such Fury and Intrepidity, that they soon routed them, and then deseated a Body of two thousand Argives; but being at length overpower'd, retreated back to their City, tho' with great Honour and Applause from the People, who were conven'd from all parts of Greece to the Festival, and, during this Action, stood as Spectators with their Crowns on their Heads. The Behaviour of the Eleans upon this Occasion was the more remarkable, because they had a very low Re|putation for Arms, and had done nothing like it before. However the Pisaeans remaining

Conquerors, went on with the Sports: But the Eleans would not allow this Olympiad to have been duly celebrated, or to be register'd in their Annals.

Epaminodas, during these Transactions, was wholly intent upon advancing the Honour of his Countrymen;* 1.202 and proposed to them to try for the Dominion at Sea, which he told them, they might easily obtain, as they were Sove|reigns at Land: And as a Proof of it, he in|stanced in the Case of the Spartans, who, in the War with Xerxes, had but ten Ships at Sea, and yet had the Command over the A|thenians, who had two hundred. The People came into his Proposal; and having immediate|ly order'd Preparations to be made for fitting out an hundred Gallies, sent him to Rhodes, Chios and Byzantium, to solicite the Assistance of those Places, and to fix them further in their Interest: Which he easily effected, not|withstanding that the Athenians had sent out a strong Squadron under the Command of La|ches, to oppose him. But whatever Schemes of this kind they had formed, they were di|verted from pursuing them, by the Part they took in the Quarrels among their Neighbours; And the Death of Epaminondas happening soon after, they lost the only Opportunity they ever had of becoming powerful at Sea.

Whilst he was negotiating these Matters abroad, some of the Theban Fugitives join'd

with the Orchomenians,* 1.203 in a Design to change the Government of Thebes into an Aristocracy; which being discover'd, three hundred Orcho|menian Horsemen, who were to have put it in Execution, were seized by Order of the Theban Magistrates, and condemn'd to death. They then sent a sufficient Force against Orchomenus, where the Men were all put to the Sword, the Women and Children sold for Slaves, and the City razed to the Ground. This was look'd upon as an Act of Cruelty not common among the Grecians, and such as would not have hap|pen'd, if either Epaminondas, or Pelopidas had been present. They had always shewn great Humanity to those who were in their Power, having never spilt the Blood of any Man they had conquer'd, or deprived any City of its Liberty, after they had taken it.

The Thessalians still groaning under the Ty|ranny and Oppression of Alexander the Pherean, took up Arms against him; but being worsted in several Battles, they begg'd Assistance of the Thebans, who order'd seven thousand Men, un|••er the Command of Pelopidas,* 1.204 to their Re|lief. But just as he was ready to march, there happen'd a great Eclipse of the Sun, from which the People, according to the Ignorance and Superstition of the Times, apprehended such strange Effects, that Pelopidas thought it not adviseable to proceed with so great a Num|ber of his Countrymen, against the general

Opinion, that the Expedition would prove fa|tal. As to himself, he was not at all moved at this Phaenomenon, altho' he was supposed to be principally affected by it: For the Augurs had made it portend his Death, considering him as the Sun of Thebes, that was to be eclip|sed. However he resolv'd to go on, and march'd out with only three hundred Horsemen, who attended him as Voluntiers; and having join'd the Thessalians, he encamp'd in the Face of the Enemy, who was far superior to him in Num|bers, having an Army of above twenty thou|sand Men.* 1.205 Near a Place call'd Cynos-cephalae, there were two Hills opposite to each other in the midst of the Plain; and both Sides endeavour'd to get possession of them with their Foot. Pelopidas at the same time order'd his Cavalry to charge that of the Enemy, which he soon routed, and pursued over the Plain. But Alexander having gain'd the Hills, and do|ing great Execution upon the Thessalians, who attempted to force those Ascents, Pelopidas was obliged to give over his Pursuit, and march up to their Relief; which so animated them, that, after two or three Charges, the Enemy began to fall into Disorder, and give way; which Pelopidas perceiving, cast his Eyes about in search of Alexander, and having at length discover'd him in the right Wing, rallying and encouraging his Men, he was so inflamed at the Sight, that he advanced before his Soldiers,

crying out, and challenging the Tyrant, who retreated, and shelter'd himself in the Ranks. Pelopidas there upon grew desperate, and charg'd the Enemy a••r••••h, great Numbers whereof, as they advanc'd forwards, he cut down with his own Hand: But others at a distance shot through his Armour, and wounded him, and then they stabb'd him in the Breast with their Spears.* 1.206 The Thessalians seeing him in this Danger, hasten'd down from the H••lls to his Assistance, but came too late to save him. However, to revenge his Death, they attack'd the Enemy so vigorously, both with their Horse and Foot, that they intirely routed them, and kill'd above three thousand in the Pursuit: And yet did they not look upon it as a Vi|ctory, or think that any Success could compensate the Loss of their General. The Thebans, who were then present, lamented over him in the tenderest and most affectionate manner, calling him Their Father, Saviour, and Instructor in every thing that was great and excellent. The Thessalians, and other Allies not only sympa|thiz'd, but vy'd with them in expressing their Concern, and doing Honour to his Memory: And the whole Army was so affected, that they neither put off their Armour, nor un|bridled their Horses, nor even dress'd their Wounds; but ran to him, and heap'd up the Spo••ls of the Enemy about his dead Body; they cut off their Horses Manes, and their

own Hair; and such as retired to their Tents, neither kindled a Fire, nor took any kind of Refreshment. In all the Cities through which the Body pass'd, it was attended by the Ma|gistrates, with the Priests and Inhabitants, car|••ying Trophies, Crowns and golden Armour. After which the Thessalians begg'd it as a sin|gular Favour of the Thebans, that they might bury him, and, in the most pathetick Terms, urg'd it as a sort of Right due to them, as the greatest Sufferers. You indeed, said they, have lost a great General; and in that we share in common with you: But we have likewise lost in him all the Hopes of recovering our Liberty; and under this heavy Misfortune, our paying the last Ho|nours to him, may be some small Alleviation of our Sorrow. The Thebans granted their Re|quest, and they buried him with great Pomp and Splendor. His Death, as to the Manner of it, was rather to be pitied than commend|ed: For he certainly expos'd himself more than he ought to have done. But besides the natu|ral Heat of his Temper, which was not easily to be restrain'd, he was animated with a more than ordinary Zeal in the Cause of Liber|ty, especially at this Juncture, when i•• was, in a manner, deserted by the other Great States. For the Spartans, instead of exerting themselves, as formerly, in behalf of those who were injured, were making a servile Court to Dionysius the Tyrant of Sicily, and supplying him with Officers. The A••enian••

were at the same time kept in Pay by this very Alexander, and, in Honour to him, had erected his Statue. This therefore Pelopidas thought the fairest Occasion of advancing his own and his Country's Honour, and of making it appear to the rest of Greece, that the Thebans were the only People, who waged War t•• succour the distress'd, and to destroy all arbi••trary and unjust Government: And this wa•• the principal Motive of his entering upon this Expedition. But besides these Considerations he was fired with Resentment against the Per|son of Alexander, by whom he had been s•• injuriously treated, and could not forego such an Opportunity of endeavouring as well to re••venge himself of the Tyrant, as to extirpa•••• the Tyranny.

He was of one of the best Families in Thebes, and came early to the Possession of a large For|tune,* 1.207 which he employ'd chiefly in the Relief o•• such as wanted, and deserved his Assistance. Among the rest, he pitch'd upon Epaminondas as: proper Object of his Bounty, but could neve•• prevail with him to accept a Present from him Which had such an Effect upon him, that h•• chose to conform himself, after his Example, t•• a plain, frugal and laborious way of living; an•• there was in his Apparel, and at his Table, a•• open unaffected Simplicity, which he ever after wards maintain'd in the highest Posts of th•• Government. But notwithstanding this Regula|rity,

and Appearance of Oeconomy, his constant Attention to the Business of the Publick made him neglect his private Affairs, and very much impair'd his Estate; insomuch that having a great Number of Children to provide for, his Friends took Occasion one Day to tell him, That Mony was a very necessary thing. It is so indeed, said he; but it is for that Man yonder, pointing to one Nicodemus, who was lame and blind. There was a great Conformity of Manners be|tween him and Epaminondas, except that he de|lighted most in the Exercises of the Body, and the other in those of the Mind. But they had the same general Disposition to Virtue, and the Love of their Country; and this begat the strict|est Friendship between them. Plutarch dates the Beginning of it from the Siege of Mantinea, soon after the Peace of Antalcidas. The Thebans acting then in Alliance with Sparta, Epaminondas and Pelopidas were engag'd together, and their Wing giving way, they kept their Ground, and stood singly in each others Defence, till Pelopidas being very much wounded, fell among the Slain. Epaminondas concluded him dead, yet would not leave his Body in the Power of the Enemy, but, tho' he was wounded himself likewise, maintain'd the Conflict, till at length Agesipolis the Spartan King came up from the other Wing of the Army, and rescu'd them both, when to all Ap|pearance they were lost. This was an Ac|tion that must, in all Probability, have happen'd

before the Town was besieg'd; and there is room to collect from Pausanias, that it did so: But it is not generally taken notice of, nor any where particularly describ'd; neither does it elsewhere appear, that either of these two Generals had distinguish'd themselves so early in any En|gagement. However this Circumstance of their Lives, in the manner it is attested, may have its Weight, and it is too remarkable a one to be omitted. But however their Friend|ship began, it was very sincere and lasting; and the Success of their Atchievements was almost in|tirely owing to that perfect Union and good Correspondence, that was always between them, without any Jealousy of Command abroad, or Rivalship in the Administration at home. This good Agreement between them, has been ta|ken notice of, in opposition to that Spirit of Dis|sension, Envy and Rancour, which formerly reign'd in Athens between Aristides and The|mistocles, Cimon and Pericles, Nicias and Alcibi|ades, who, great as they were in other respects, were always endeavouring to supplant and ruin one another; and their personal Enmity was said to exceed that which they bore to the Enemies of their Country. But yet it has been shewn, that some of them knew how to sti••••le their Jealousies upon Occasion, and to curb and moderate their Resentment, when the Affairs of the Publick requir'd it. But there was no need of any Management of this kind, between

the two Great Men we are now speaking of. They had no private Views of their own; they were above all Considerations of Mony; and they had no Ambitions but for the Pub|lick; so that provided That were well served, their Intention was answer'd; and each of them look'd upon the others Success in it, as his own. As to what relates further to Pelopidas singly, he was very strong and active, and of indesa|tigable Industry; he was bold and enterprising, and so successful withal, that he never lost one Battle. He had so throughly established him|self in the Favour and Affections of the Peo|ple, that he was chose thirteen times Governor of Boeotia, or (as Diodorus says) without Inter|uption, from the Time of the recovering the Cadmêa. Upon the whole, he was at least the second Man of Thebes, and in some respects may be consider'd as the First, particularly with regard to the Affair of the Cadmêa, which was certainly the Foundation of the Theban Greatness. He would indeed have persuaded Epaminondas to bear a part with him in that Undertaking; but he declin'd it, as an Action of too much Blood and Outrage. He told him, That if the rest who were concern'd in it, were as moderate as their Chief, he should make no Scruple of joining with them; but that some of them he foresaw, would carry their Passion and Revenge too far, and must ne|cessarily involve the Innocent with the Guilty.

However, in the main he approv'd the De|sign, as the Cause of Liberty, and in some measure contributed towards the Success, tho' he did not care to be engaged in the despe|rate Part of it.

The Thebans, as well to revenge the Death of Pelopidas, as to improve the Victory of the Thessalians, which they were not able to do of themselves, forthwith sent to their Assistance seven thousand Foot, and seven hundred Horse, who soon defeated, and broke to pieces the Remainder of Alexander's Army.* 1.208 Whereupon he was compell'd to restore the Towns he ha•••• taken from the Thessalians, and to withdraw his Garrisons out of all the other Places h•• had unjustly seized; and he was further obli••ged by Oath, to take part with the Theban•••• in their Wars, whenever they should requir•••• it. Upon these Conditions, they permitted him to return in peace to his own Domini••ons, where he continued about seven Year longer, till he was grown so insupportable t•••• every Body about him, that he was murther'd it•• his Bed by his Wife and his Brothers.* 1.209 H•••• dead Body was dragg'd about the Streets, an•• trodden under Foot, and left as a Prey so the Dogs. Nor were any Indignities of thi•• kind though too much for him,* 1.210 who had been wont to bury some alive, and to dress up other in Bears and Boars Skins, to be baited an•• shot at for his Diversion; and who had surprise••

••nd massacred the Inhabitants of whole Cities, which were in Friendship and Alliance with him. But amidst these Cruelties, there is one Instance recorded of him, wherein he discover'd some little Sparks of Humanity and Remorse, which yet he was far from valuing himself up|on. For seeing a famous Tragoedian act in the Troades of Euripides, he went abruptly out of the Theatre, but sent to bid the Actor go on with his Part; for that he did not go out of any Dislike of his Performance, but be|cause he was asham'd, that he, who had never shewn any Concern for those he had mur|ther'd, should be seen to weep for the Suffer|ings of Hecuba and Andromache.

But to return to the Thebans, they were still restlcss in their Pursuit of Power, and sought all Opportunities of advancing themselves upon the Weakness, or Divisions of the other States. They who furnish'd them with the most plau|sible Pretence for stirring at this time,* 1.211 were the Arcadians, who were quarrelling among themselves about some consecrated Mony, which they had taken out of the Temple of Olympia during their Disputes with the Eleans, and ap|plied to the Payment of a select Body of their Troops, call'd the Epariti. The Mantineans protested against it as Sacrilege, and brought over several of The Council of Ten Thousand, who had at first consented to it, to retract their Opinion, and to agree with them, that

it was a wicked thing, which would sor ever brand them with Infamy, and entail a Curs•• upon their Posterity. The debating this Mat|ter was principally between the Tegeans and Mantineans; and it wrought such Confusion be|tween them, and the rest of the Arca••ians, that they thought it necessary, for the Peace of the Community, to make it up as well a•• they could, both with the Eleans, and among themselves. But the leading Men, who had touch'd the Mony, apprehending they might be call'd to an Account for it, thought the best way of preventing such an Enquity, would be to embroil Matters still more; and there|sore sent to the Thebans to let them know, the Arcadians were upon the point of revolting to the Spartans, if they did not speedily come in, and put a Stop to it. At the same time they sent Directions to a Theban Officer in Tegea, to seize some of their own People, as Distur|bers of the Peace: And accordingly great Numbers were apprehended, and consin'd as Pri|soners of the State. But this occasion'd such a ge|neral Clamour, that they were soon after discharg'd•• and Complaint was made of it at Thebes, as a Matter of Impeachment against the Officer, for intermeddling in their Affairs, and attempt|ing to interrupt the good Correspondence be|tween the Two States. The more moderate among them, who saw the Consequence of cal|ling in a foreign Power to decide their Dif|ferences,

protested against the Thebans marching their Troops into their Territories, and did what they could to prevent it.* 1.212 But the The|••ans could not be prevail'd upon to let slip such an Opportunity of getting once more a footing in Peloponnesus, which was their real Design; and Epaminondas made no great Se|cret of it; but he told them at the same time, by way of Justification, That the Thebans ••had been drawn into the War on their Account; that therefore they had acted treacherously with them, in making Peace with Athens without their Consent; however, that when he should march his Army into Peloponnesus, to assist his Friends there, he should see what Proofs they the Arca|dians would then give of their Fidelity. This was deliver'd in so magisterial and menacing a Stile, that they who were best afsected to the Thebans, did not like it; and the Manti|neans, with such others, as were concerned for the good of the Community, and the general Safcty of Peloponnesus, concluded there was no time to be lost, in providing against the worst that could happen.

Accordingly they sent to the Athenians and Spartans to apprise them of the Danger,* 1.213 and to ask their Assistance. They immediately took the Alarm, and enter'd into a strict Consede|racy sor their common Defence. And to pre|vent all Disputes about the Command in the Army, it was agreed to divide it in such man|net,

that each State was to have it within their own Territories. This was a point the Arca|dians had very much at heart: But the Spar|tans being now so easily persuaded to give that up to them, which they had so long contcst|ed with the Athenians, even till they were re|duced to the greatest Extremity, was a plain Proof, how much they were terrified with the Apprechensions of another Descent into Pe|loponnesus.

Epaminondas in the mean time began his March with all the Boeotians, some Euboean••, and a Body of Thessalian Horse, expecting to be join'd by the Argives, Messenions and many others, upon his appearing among them. Up|on his first Arrival in Peloponnesus, he lay for some time at Nemea, a Town in the Te••••i|tory of Argos, where he might reasonably hope to intercept the Athenians in their March to join their Consederates; but receiving Intelli|gence, that they were to pass by Sea, he re|moved to 〈◊〉〈◊〉; which City, with the great|est Part of Areadia, immediately declared for him. The Spartans, with their Consederates, had their general Rendezvous at Mant••••, which they naturally imagin'd would be first attack'd, as being the chief Seat of those who had revolted from the Thebans.

But whilst they were securing themselves on this Side, Epaininondas considering, that the City of Spar••a was in a manner drain'd for

this Expedition, broke up privately,* 1.214 and march'd all Night, in order to surprise it. But the De|sign being discover'd to Agesilaus as he was upon his March to Mantinea, he sent imme|diate Notice of it to Sparta, with Orders to put the Town in a Posture of Defence, 'till he could come in to its Relief; which he did with such Expedition, that Epaminondas found him in the City ready to receive him. That which is here related of Agesilaus, is by Diodo|••us Siculus ascribed to Agis the other Spartan King. However that be, it is certain, that Agesilaus had a principal Part in the Defence of the City. The few Forces in it were post|ed to the best Advantage, that the Time and other Circumstances would admit of; and the old Men and Boys were placed on the Tops of the Houses, to annoy the Enemy with Darts and Stones. Epaminondas, tho' he found by this Disposition, that his Design was discover'd, yet made an Assault at several Parts of the City, but met with the most vigorous Opposition. Ages••ans saw there was now no room for that Caution or Cunning,* 1.215 which had served him upon other Occasions: Wherefore putting all upon a desperate Push, he exerted himself far beyond what could be expected from his Years, and, by dint of Valour, repuls'd the Enemy. But great Part of the Glory of this Action was due to his Son Archidamus,* 1.216 who having les•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 hundred Men with him, was at all the

dangerous Passes, where the Enemy press'd har|dest. He pass'd the River in open Defiance of the Thebans; then march'd up an Eminence charg'd and routed those Soldiers, who (a•• Xenophon expresses it)* 1.217 breath'd Fire, and who so lately beat the Spartans, when they had the Advantage both of the Ground, and the Num|bers. He who signaliz'd himself most as a pri|vate Man,* 1.218 was Isadas the Son of Phabidas. He was a very beautiful, large and well-pro|portion'd Youth, scarce arrived at the Age of•• Manhood. He had just anointed himself at Home, when the Alarm being given, he rush'd out without any Arms, and almost naked; then snatching a Spear in one Hand, and a Sword in the other, he broke into the thickest of his Enemies, and bore down all before him. The Ephori, after the Action was over, gave him a Garland as the Reward of his Gallantry; but then, to keep up the Rigour of their Disci|pline, fined him a thousand Drachmas, for go|ing into the Battle unarmed.

The Spartan Forces were now come up from Mantinca, and were follow'd by most of the Confederates;* 1.219 so that Epaminondas finding no|thing more to be done on that Side, drew of his Army, and turn'd towards Mantinea, which he judged to be now quite desenceless. For besides that the Troops were drawn out of it, the Inhabitants were scatter'd about in the Fi••••, having taken that Opportunity, whilst the War

was removed into another Quarter, to get in their Harvest. Wheresore he resolved to attack the Town; and first order'd the Horse thither, who found the People dispers'd in the manner they had been informed, and all things to Ap|pearance, as they expected. But it happen'd, that six thousand Athenian Auxiliaries, who coming by Sea, knew nothing of what had pass'd at Sparta, and having pass'd the Isthmus, in order to join the Confederates, as they sup|posed, in Mantinea, were just got into the Town; and without staying to refresh themselves, or their Horses, march'd out, and gave the The|bans Battle. After an obstinate Dispute, with some Loss on both Sides, the Athenians got the better,* 1.220 and took those, who were without the Walls, under their Protection. This Action was a very sharp one, but not decisive; and is to be consider'd rather as a Skirmish, and a Prelude to what happen'd afterwards, than as a Victory. However it was of more im|mediate Consequence to the Mantineans, who, without such a seasonable and miraculous Re|lies, must have been lost. And Hegelochus, who commanded this Body of Athenians, ob|tain'd great Honour by making such a Stand against the Thebans, who were much superior in Numbers, and were also supported by the Thessalian Horse.

Epaminondas was very much piqu'd at the ill Success of these two last Enterprises, which he

was asraid would lessen him in the Opinion of his Allies, and sully the Glory of his former A••chievements; and therefore thought himself obliged to attempt something further, to sup|port his own and his Country's Honour, and to keep up the Spirits of those, whom he had taken under his Protection. And as the Time allotted him for this Expedition was very near expiring, he had no time to lose. Besides he was got so far into the Enemies Country, and they were so well prepared sor him, and watch'd his Motions so narrowly, that he thought he could not easily secure his Retreat without fight|ing; or that if he did, it would be abandoning and sacrificing his Allies. These Considerati|ons determin'd him to proceed immediately to Action, and, by one decisive Battle, either to make himself Master of Peloponnesus, or to fall honourably in the Attempt.

Accordingly,* 1.221 upon the Spartans coming to the Relies of the Mantincans, he prepar'd to attack them; and this drew on a general Engagement of both the Armies, with their respective Con|sederates. That of the Thebans consisted of thirty thousand Foot, and three thousand Horse; which was more by a third Part, both of Horse and Foot, than the Spartans had, with the Athe|nians, and all the rest of their Associates. The Mantineans, as the War was in their Territori••••, were in the right Wing, with the Spartans next to them; the Athenians in the lest, and the A|chaans,

Eleans, and others of less Note, made up the main Body. The Thebans, with the Ar|cadians, chose the Left of their Army to oppose the Right of the Enemy; the Argives were in the right; and their main Body consisted of the Euboeans, Locrians, Sicyonians, Messenians, Thes|salians and others: And both the Armies were flank'd with their Horse.

But after this Disposition, Epaminondas took a Compass, as if he declin'd fighting; and then made his Troops halt, and lay down their Arms, with a shew of encamping at a small Distance from the Enemy, hoping, by this Feint, to allay their Heat, and take off the first Impression of their Fury, and then to fall upon them by Sur|prise; wich happen'd in a great measure as he expected. For when he afterwards advanc'd to|wards them, they had quitted their Arms, and their Horses, and were so dispers'd about, that they had much ado to form themselves in time. However they recover'd the Surprise, and stood the Charge with great Resolution. Epaminondas put the Issue of the Battle upon his left Wing, as he did at Leuctra; and his Scheme of breaking in upon the Enemy was much after the same manner, by placing the best of his Men in Front, then drawing them up close, and narrowing them to a Point, so as to penetrate like the Beak of a Gally, as Xenophon expresses it. The Engage|ment began with the Horse; and it was very hot and obstinate, till at length the Athenians, who

bore the Brunt of it, were so gall'd with the Darts and Slings of the Thessalians, and so over-power'd with the Numbers of the Thebans, that they were forc'd to give Way, and to leave their Foot ex|pos'd; but yet they kept themselves in a Body, so as not to break in upon them. And in their Retreat, meeting with a Detachment of the Eu|boeans, and other Mercenaries, whom Epaminondes had sent round to attack their Rear, they fell in among them, and cut them entirely to pieces. The rest of the Athenians in that Wing, were hard press'd by the Argives, and the Theben Horse; but some Elean Horse, who had been posted in the Rear as a Body of Reserve, coming up to their Relief, they maintain'd their Ground. Their Horse in the other Wing made the same vigorous Resistance, but were forc'd at last to throw themselves in among their Foot for Pro|tection.

Upon this the Foot join'd Battle, and sought with incredible Fury, especially the Spartans and the Thebans, who were more immediately con|cern'd in the Event of the Action, and were never more in Earnest. Their Lances being broke with the Violence of the Charge, they clos'd in with their Swords, and stood Foot to Foot, neither Side abating of their Rage, or giving back one Inch of Ground. Which Epa|minondas perceiving, form'd a Troop of the most determin'd Men about him, and putting himself at the Head of them, made a very vigorous

Charge upon the Lacedaemonian Phalanx, and wounded their General with the first Javelin he threw. And his Troop pushing on with the same Ardour, he soon broke the Enemy to pieces; and then made such Havock among them, that the Ground about him was cover'd with the Bodies of the Slain. But advancing still forwards, in order to make a thorough Rout of it, the Spartans rallied, and collected them|selves into a Body, pointing their whole Fury at him, and throwing an infinite Number of Darts at him,* 1.222 many of which he drew out of his Body, and retorted at them; till at last he was mor|tally wounded by a Javelin, which was said to be thrown by Gryllus, the Son of Xenophon, who was afterwards kill'd himself in the same Battle. But the Death of Epaminondas is by some ascrib'd to Anticrates a Spartan, who, as a Reward for so ••minent a Piece of Service, was exempted from all publick Offices and Taxes; and Plutarch says, there was one of his Descendants remaining in ••his Time, who enjoy'd the same Immunities. The Thebans, upon their General's falling, re|new'd the Attack, in order to rescue his Body, and, after a very sharp Resistance on the Part of the Spartans, carried it off. This Missortune put an End to the Action; and both Sides parted, as it were, by Consent. Xenophon makes it en|tirely a drawn Battle, and says, that each Party ••rected Trophies, and ask'd leave to bury their Dead; that neither of them took any Town,

nor gain'd any Accession of Territory, or any En|crease of Power, and that Things remain'd just in the same Situation after the Battle, as they were before. But however exact and faithful he may be in the other Parts of his History, he is thought upon this Occasion to have been a little pre|judic'd, and to have industriously avoided saying too much to the Advantage of the Thebans, who had manifestly the Victory, though they were in too much Concern and Confusion to pursue it; and the only Grounds upon which the Enemy disputed it with them, was on account of the Euboeans and others, whom the Athenians, in their Retreat, had cut to pieces.

Epaminondas was carried alive into his Tent, where, assoon as he recover'd his Speech, he ask'd his Friends about him, Whether the Enemy had taken his Shield from him: They told him, It was safe; and it being brought to him, he kiss'd it. He then ask'd, Which Side had the Victory: They told him, The Thebans. All then, said he, is well. And soon after, upon the drawing the Head of the Javelin out of his Body, he sell, as it were, in the Arms of Victory, and, congra|mlating the good Fortune of his Country, ex|pired.

There was something very great and solemn in these Circumstances of his Death,* 1.223 and suitable to that just and deliberate Firmness and Composure of Mind, which he had shewn in all the Actions of his Life. To consider him in all Respects, as

a Soldier, Statesman and Philosopher, he was not only, as Cicero esteems him, the first Man of Greece, but the greatest perhaps that any Age or Country has produc'd. For all the several Vir|tues, which others posses'd singly, were united in him, and in so perfect a Degree, as to be without an Allay of any one Vice, or Failing. Besides his natural good Disposition, he had all the Advantages of Education, and was furnish'd with the best Masters, not only for Eloquence and Philosophy, but also for his Exercises, and all the other lighter Accomplishments. Hence it was, that Polymnis his Father's House was at that time one of the best Schools in Greece, and open to all the learned World. He was indeed more liberal upon this Head of Expence, than his Circumstancees would allow; for tho' he was of one of the best Families in Thebes, he died so poor, as to leave his Son no other Fortune, than what he had bestow'd on him in this manner. It happen'd however, that he neither wanted, nor desired one: For he had such a thorough Contempt of Riches, that he did not leave enough to bury him. He was in this, as in many other Respects, a Philosoper in Practice and Reality, and was poor upon Choice; and yet without any Affectation, he View of being applauded for it. Jusian says, he was no more desirous of Fame, than he was of Riches. He did not indeed af|fc•• Popularity, or Applause; he was so modest, that all his great Offices were in a manner forc'd

upon him; and his first Motive in all his Under|takings, was the Honour of his Country: But yet he had not an Insensibility of Glory with re|gard to himself, as may appear from the Answer he made to his Friends about him when he was dying. Among other Expressions of their Grief for the Loss of him, they lamented his leaving no Children behind him: Yes, said he, I leave two fair Daughters, the Victories of Leuctra and Mantinea, to perpetuate my Memory. Upon another Occasion, being ask'd, Whether he thought himseif, or Chabrias, or Iphicrates, the better Ge|neral? 'Tis hard, said he, to judge while we live. There are other Instances to prove, that he knew what was due to his Merit, and that he did not decline Praise, tho' he did not covet it. He was covetous of nothing but his Time, which he em|ploy'd wholly in the Improvement of his Mind, or in what he thought might be useful to the Publick; and he made even his Diversions sub|servient to that End. His Running, Wrestling, and other Exercises of that Kind, were not used by him, as they generally were by others, barely for Amusement, or the Glory of excelling in them, but as Lessons of Instruction in the Art of War. For which Reason he had an Aversion to sat Men in the Army, and disbanded one, who, he said, would require three or four Shields to cover his Belly. He had an extraordinary Genius for War, and had thoroughly studied the Theory of it, before he enter'd upon Action. It has ap|pear'd

from his Disposition, and his Manner of attacking, both at Leuctra and Mantinea, that he was particularly well skill'd in the Tacticks. That which has set him in a Light above most of the Grecian Generals, is the Difficulties and Dis|couragements, which he met with upon his first Appearance in the World. He had to do with a People, who were sunk into a State of Sloth and Idleness, and disposed to Slavery. They were very low at that time in their Reputation for Arms: And tho' they had taken some Part in the late Wars, it was occasionally only, and ra|ther in order to support themselves by their At|tachment to those who were best able to protect them, than with a Sense of gaining Honour, or asserting their Freedom. They had but few Troops, and those were without Spirit, or Dis|cipline, and without Officers to conduct them. This was not the Case of the great Captains who went before him, especially those of Athens and Sparta, who had Troops ready form'd and dis|ciplin'd, inur'd to Dangers and Fatigue, sir'd with Ambition, and the Love of their Country, supported by their Fellow-Citizens, and flush'd with Victory: So that their Commanders had nothing more to do, than to pursue the Track of Glory they were in, and to carry on the Service in the Way they found it. Epaminondas had none of these Advantages: But by his Courage and Zeal, and the Force of his Genius, he sup|ply'd the want of them, and, in effect, created

an Army; which being train'd up by his In|structions, and animated by his Example, soon shew'd the Thebans, that they were capable of acting for themselves, and fighting their own Battles. From hence it was, that from Auxill|aries and Dependents, they became Principals, and put in for their Turn of Superiority in Grecce. It must be allow'd, that Pelopidas had pav'd the Way for him in effecting this Change, and that he had been assisting to him in most of his great Enterprizes. But without Epimanondas, the Work had been left very imperfect. It was his bold Defiance of the Spartans, that brought on the Battle of Leuctra: And he afterwards went fur|ther towards the reducing them, than any one Man, or than all the States of Greece together. And tho' he did not throughly succeed in it, he had so disabled and dispirited them, that they never recover'd their former Reputation and Au|thority. Among other Marks of their being humbled, he had brought them to lengthen their Monosyllables, as he himself express'd it, in rally|ing them upon that assected and* 1.224 despotick Bre|vity, with which they were wont to expres•••• m|selves in their Answers to those who o••••er'd to treat, or expostulate with them. His Military Virtues were still inferior to those which regarded either the Society, or himself. His Dis••••|edness was visible in every Circumstance of his

Life: And nothing could ever shake his Inte|grity, or slacken his Zeal sor the Publick. The Persians knowing of what Consequence it was to fix him in their Interest, sent Diomedon of Cy|zicus to tempt him with a large Sum of Mony. He first gain'd Micythus, a particular Favourite of his, and gave him five Talents to sound him upon it. But Epaminondas rejected the Offer with Disdain and Indignation, declaring, That he would not put the Riches of the Universe in Compe|tition with the Good of his Country. You, Dio|medon, said he, don't know me; and I am not surprized, that you should form a Judgment of me from yourself; for which Reason I forgive you; but withal advise you to make the best of your Way home, that you may not have an Opportunity of corrupting others. As for you, said he, addressing himself to Micythus, if you don't immediately re|store him his Mony, I'll deliver you up to the Ma|gistracy. His Generosity and Friendship have sufficiently appear'd in his Behaviour to Pelopidas. He was judicious and grave, but yet afsable; he was continent, patient of Injuries, and very com|passionate; and, to crown all, he was strictly just, and so sincere a Lover of Truth, that he would not tell a Lye even in Jest. He was also a very able Speaker, and had gone further in his Search after Knowledge of all Kinds, than most of the Pailosophers of his Time, who were so by Pro|fession: And yet he did not value himself upon it, or make any Shew of it; and it was said of

him in this Respect, That Nobody knew more than he, and spoke less. Study was indeed his darling Passion; and he was so devoted to it, that he may be consider'd almost as a single Instance of one, who acquitted himself so well to the Pub|lick against the natural Bent of his Inclination. It was look'd upon as Matter of Astonishment, that a Man who was so much hid from the World, and buried, as it were, in Books, should break out at once into so great, and so tumultuous a Scene of Action; that he should negotiate the Interests of his Country abroad, manage the Government at home, and lead an Army with such Success against the united Powers of Greece. But he had a Capacity for every thing, and applied himself to every thing; and when he was once roused by a Sense of what the Publick expected from him, he gave up his belov'd Retirement, and was from thenceforwards in such continual Mo|tion, that Nobody every did so much in so short a Time. When the Thebans were once brought into Action, he resolv'd to keep them up to it: If I am your General, said he, you must be Sol|diers. Boeotia, as being an open flat Country, he told them, was the Stage of War; and that they could keep it no longer than they had their Hands upon their Shields. It was by these Maxims, and this Conduct, that he became the Support of his Country, and a Pattern to the greatest Captains of the present, and succeeding Times. Philopae|men, who is call'd the last of the Grecians, made

it his Study to imitate him; and is said to have come very little short of him in his Valour and Con|duct, and his Integrity. But he was more rough and cholerick, and had too much of the Soldier in his common Deportment; whereas Epami|nondas was cool and gentle, and had nothing of Fierceness, but in the Field. Upon the whole, he rais'd the Glory of Thebes to an Heighth beyond any of her Neighbours at that Time, and that so suddenly, that it was said to be born with him: And it will appear by the Sequel of the Story, how far it may be likewise said to have expir'd with him.

Notes

• * 1.1

  The Thirty Tyrants. A. M. 3601. Olymp. 94. 1.
• * 1.2

  Lysander returns in triumph to Sparta.
• * 1.3

  The Pro|ceedings of The Thir|ty
• * 1.4

  Therame|nes protests against them.
• * 1.5

  Is accused by Critias.
• * 1.6

  Is con|demn'd and executed.
• * 1.7

  His Character.
• * 1.8

  Alcibiades murther'd.
• * 1.9

  His Cha|racter.
• * 1.10

  Thrasybu|lus opposes The Thir|ty.
• * 1.11

  His Suc|cess.
• * 1.12

  The Thir|ty re|inov'd.
• * 1.13

  Ten subsit|tuted in their room. Olym. 94. 2.
• * 1.14

  They fol|low the Example of The Thirty.
• * 1.15

  Lysander sent to sup|port them.
• * 1.16

  Pausanias sent after him.
• * 1.17

  Routs the Athenians
• * 1.18

  The De|mocracy restored.
• * 1.19

  A general Amnesly.
• * 1.20

  Olymp. 94. 3.
• * 1.21

  Olymp. 94. 4.
• * 1.22

  Grounds of the Expe|dition of Cyrus.
• * 1.23

  His mak|ing Levies.
• * 1.24

  His Pre|tence for it.
• * 1.25

  The Ren|de•••••••• of his For•••• at Sa••ci
• * 1.26

  The Gre|cians re|fuse to fol|low him.
• * 1.27

  But are prevailed upon by Clearchus.
• * 1.28

  Xenias and ••••••sion de|〈◊〉〈◊〉
• * 1.29

  The Gre|ciansagain refuse to march.
• * 1.30

  But are a|gain pre|vail'd up|on.
• * 1.31

  Cyrus's Speech to the Gre|cian Cap|tains.
• * 1.32

  He re|views his Army.
• * 1.33

  And forms it.
• * 1.34

  The Battle.
• * 1.35

  Cyrus kill'd.
• * 1.36

  The Gre|cians sum|mon'd to surrender their Arms
• * 1.37

  But they refuse.
• * 1.38

  Milthocy|tus goes in to the Per|sian King with 340 Horse. The rest decamp the next Day.
• * 1.39

  The Trea|chery of Tissapher|nes.
• * 1.40

  The Five Grecian Generals executed.
• * 1.41

  The Cha|racter of Menon.
• * 1.42

  Of Clear|chu••.
• * 1.43

  Of Proxe|nus.
• * 1.44

  Of Agias and So|crates.
• * 1.45

  Xenophon and others succeed in the Com|mand.
• * 1.46

  The Gre|chians pur|sue their March.
• * 1.47

  The Barba|rians re|puls'd by them.
• * 1.48

  They are attack'd by the Cardu|chi.
• * 1.49

  They fight their way 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Ar|menia.
• * 1.50

  Arrive at the Eu|phrates.
• * 1.51

  They are within Sight of the Sea.
• * 1.52

  Arrive at Trapezus, a Grecian Colony.
• * 1.53

  They re|view their Forces at Cerasus.
• * 1.54

  Oppos'd by the Mosy|naeci, and repuls'd.
• * 1.55

  But rally, and are victorious.
• * 1.56

  Arrive at Cotyora.
• * 1.57

  Xenophon accus'd,
• * 1.58

  but ac|quitted.
• * 1.59

  The Army mutiny,
• * 1.60

  and divide
• * 1.61

  Are re|united.
• * 1.62

  Defeat Pharnaba|zus.
• * 1.63

  Arrive at Byzanti|um.
• * 1.64

  Propose to plunder the City,
• * 1.65

  but are re|strain'd by Xenophon
• * 1.66

  Xenophon leaves the Army,
• * 1.67

  but is pre|vail'd upon to return to it.
• * 1.68

  He assists Seuthes in Thrace.
• * 1.69

  He is again accused by the Army,
• * 1.70

  but is ac|quitted.
• * 1.71

  His Success at Perga|mus.
• * 1.72

  Thimbron takes the Army un|der his Command.
• * 1.73

  A. M. 3625. Olym. 95. ••.
• * 1.74

  Thimbron recall'd, and ba|nish'd.
• * 1.75

  Socrates accus'd
• * 1.76

  His De|fence.
• * 1.77

  He is con|demn'd,
• * 1.78

  and exe|cuted.
• * 1.79

  His Cha|acter.
• * 1.80

  A. M. 3606. Olymp. 95. 2.
• * 1.81

  Dercylli|das his Successes.
• * 1.82

  Olymp. 95. 3.
• * 1.83

  The Spar|tans quar|with the Eleans.
• * 1.84

  Agis the Spartan King dies.
• * 1.85

  Is succeed|ed by Age|silaus.
• * 1.86

  Who is sent into Asia.
• * 1.87

  A. M. 3609. Olymp. 96. 1.
• * 1.88

  His Suc|cesses there.
• * 1.89

  Olym. 96. 2.
• * 1.90

  He ap|points Pi|sander Ad|miral.
• * 1.91

  The Per|sians in|cense the Thebans, and other States, a|gainst Sparta.
• * 1.92

  The The|bans en|gage the Athenians in the Quarrel.
• * 1.93

  Hostilities begun.
• * 1.94

  Lysander kill'd.
• * 1.95

  His Cha|racter.
• * 1.96

  Pausanias condemn'd
• * 1.97

  Agesilaus recall'd from Asia. Olymp. 96. 3.
• * 1.98

  The Spar|tans gain a Victory near Sicy|on.
• * 1.99

  Conon's Victory at Cnidus.
• * 1.100

  Agesilaus his Victory at Corone••
• * 1.101

  Olymp. 96. 4.
• * 1.102

  A Massacre at Corinth.
• * 1.103

  Iphicrates sent with Recruits from A|thens.
• * 1.104

  His Sac|cess••s.
• * 1.105

  The Asia|tick Cities revolt from Sparta.
• * 1.106

  Olymp. 97. 1.
• * 1.107

  Conon re|builds the Walls of Athens.
• * 1.108

  Overtures of Peace. Olymp. 97. 2.
• * 1.109

  Conon's Death, and Character.
• * 1.110

  Thimbron kill'd. Succeeded by Diphri|das.
• * 1.111

  Commoti|ons at Rhodes. Olymp. 97. 3.
• * 1.112

  Thrasybu|lus mur|der'd. His Cha|racter.
• * 1.113

  The Aegi|netans in|fest the Coast of Attica. Olymp. 97. 4.
• * 1.114

  But are repuls'd by Chab••ias.
• * 1.115

  The Peace of Antal|cidas.
• * 1.116

  A. M. 3618. Olymp. 98. 2.
• * 1.117

  His Cha|racter.
• * 1.118

  The insolent Behaviour of the Spar|tans after the Peace.
• * 1.119

  They quar|rel with the Olyn|thians.
• * 1.120

  Phaebidas seizes the Cadmea at Thebes. Olymp. 99. 3.
• * 1.121

  Isine••••••s condemn'd.
• * 1.122

  The War carried on against the Olynthi|ans.
• * 1.123

  Teleutias kill'd.
• * 1.124

  His Cha|racter.
• * 1.125

  Succeeded By Agesi|••olis
• * 1.126

  his Death.
• * 1.127

  Polybiades takes O|lynthus. Olym. 100. 1.
• * 1.128

  The Spar|tans quar|rel with the P••siasi|ans.
• * 1.129

  Who are reduc'd by Agesilaus.
• * 1.130

  The The|bans reco|ver the Cadm••a. Olymp. 100. 2.
• * 1.131

  Whereupon the Spar|tans de|clare War against them.
• * 1.132

  The The|bans create a Quarrel bet••••en Athens and Spar|••a.
• * 1.133

  Ol••mp. 100. 4.
• * 1.134

  Olymp. 101. 1.
• * 1.135

  The Spar|tans in|vade Boeo|tia.
• * 1.136

  Are op|posed by Chabrias. Olymp. 101. 2.
• * 1.137

  His Suc|cesses.
• * 1.138

  The Victory at Naxus.
• * 1.139

  Olymp. 101. 3.
• * 1.140

  The Suc|cesses of Timotheus
• * 1.141

  and of Pe|lopidas.
• * 1.142

  The Battle ••t Tegyra.
• * 1.143

  The Sacred Battali••••.
• * 1.144

  The Peace of Antalci|das re|new'd. Olymp. 102. 1.
• * 1.145

  A Body of Grecians employ'd by the Persi|ans against Aegypt.
• * 1.146

  Iphicrates commands them.
• * 1.147

  Pharnaba|zus is jea|lous of him.
• * 1.148

  The Peace broke again in G••rerce.
• * 1.149

  Commotions at Zacyn|thus and Corcyra.
• * 1.150

  The The|bans de|molish Pla|taea and Thespiae.
• * 1.151

  Athens and Sparta incline to Peace.
• * 1.152

  The The|bans aver se to it.
• * 1.153

  They are encourag'd by Pelopi|das and E|paminon|das.
• * 1.154

  Agesilaus declares War a|gainst the Thebans.
• * 1.155

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.156

  A. M. 3634. Olymp. 102. 2. The Batt•• of Leuctra
• * 1.157

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
• * 1.158

  Le Chevalier de Folard.
• * 1.159

  The Beha|viour of the Spar|tans after their De|feat.
• * 1.160

  Olymp. 102. 3. The Athe|nians take advanta a of this O|verthrow of the Spartans.
• * 1.161

  Several States side with the Thebans.
• * 1.162

  The Man|tineans re|build their City.
• * 1.163

  Commoti|ons in Ar|cadia.
• * 1.164

  There was another City of this Name in Boeotia.
• * 1.165

  A Battle at Orcho|menus.
• * 1.166

  Sedition at Argos.
• * 1.167

  Account of Jason of Thessaly.
• * 1.168

  Some make him his Brother.
• * 1.169

  Olymp. 102. 4. The Thebans act off••nsiverly against Sparta.
• * 1.170

  And attempt to take the City by Storm.
• * 1.171

  But are repuls'd.
• * 1.172

  Behaviour of Ischolas.
• * 1.173

  Epami|nondas re|soures the Messenians
• * 1.174

  Epami|nondas and Pelopidas imprison'd at their Return.
• * 1.175

  They are tried and acquitted.
• * 1.176

  Cabals and Con|spiracies in Sparta.
• * 1.177

  The Means by which Agesilaus suppress'd them.
• * 1.178

  The Com|mand di|vided e|qually be|tween A|thens and Sparta.
• * 1.179

  The Arca|dians re|new the War.
• * 1.180

  Olymp. 103. 1.
• * 1.181

  Epami|nondas a|gain in|vades Pe|loponnesus
• * 1.182

  and as|saults Co|rinth.
• * 1.183

  But is re|pulsed by Chabrias.
• * 1.184

  The Arca|dians spi|rited up by Lycome|des.
• * 1.185

  Fresh Overtures of Peace.
• * 1.186

  A signal Victory of the Spar|tans.
• * 1.187

  The The|bans in|crease in Power.
• * 1.188

  P••lopidas and I sme|ni•• impri|s••n'd by Alexander of Pherae.
• * 1.189

  The The|••ans resent it.
• * 1.190

  Pelopidas and Isme|nias re|leas'd by Epami|nondas.
• * 1.191

  The The|bans pursue their De|sign of ob|taining the Sovereigu|ty of Greece.
• * 1.192

  Negotiati ous in Persia.
• * 1.193

  Olymp. 103. 2. the The|ban ••create fresh Di|sturbances in Pelo|ponnesus.
• * 1.194

  Account of E••••ph••••n of S••cyon.
• * 1.195

  A League between the Athe|nians and Arcadians.
• * 1.196

  Lycome|des ••vr|ther'd.
• * 1.197

  The Alli|ance dis|solv'd be|tween A|thens and Corinth.
• * 1.198

  Olymp. 103. 3. A general Peace.
• * 1.199

  Olymp. 103. 4. But is brole the next Year.
• * 1.200

  Olymp. 104. 1.
• * 1.201

  The Eleans defeat the Arcadians and Ar|gives.
• * 1.202

  Attempt of Epami|nondas to gain the Dominion at Sea for the The|bans.
• * 1.203

  A Design to change the Govern|ment of Thebes.
• * 1.204

  Pelopidas sent a|gainst A|lexander of Pherae.
• * 1.205

  The Battle at Cynos|cephalae.
• * 1.206

  Pelopidas kill'd.
• * 1.207

  His Cha|racter.
• * 1.208

  Alexander defeated, and redu|ced to Terms.
• * 1.209

  Is mur|ther'd.
• * 1.210

  Account of his Cruel|t••••••.
• * 1.211

  Olymp. 104. 2. Divisions among the Arcadians.
• * 1.212

  Which the Thebans take ad|vantage of.
• * 1.213

  Athens and Sparta 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to assist the Mantine|••••.
• * 1.214

  Epami|nondas en|deavours to surprise Sparta.
• * 1.215

  But is 〈…〉〈…〉 Agehlau••.
• * 1.216

  The 〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.217

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
• * 1.218

  and of Isa|das.
• * 1.219

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.220

  Mantinea reliev'd by the A|theniens.
• * 1.221

  A. M. 〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.222

  Epami|nondas kill'd.
• * 1.223

  His Cha|racter.
• * 1.224

  I don't 〈…〉〈…〉 I may be allow'd 〈…〉〈…〉 But it seeme to be justified by the 〈…〉〈…〉 which Taci•••• 〈…〉〈…〉