The difference, between words, esteemed synonymous: in the English language; and, the proper choice of them determined: together with, so much of Abbé Girard's Treatise, on this subject, as would agree, with our mode of expression. ... In two volumes. ... [pt.1]

THE SIGNIFICATION OF WORDS, esteemed SYNONYMOUS, IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, INVESTIGATED.

1. To Abandon, Forsake, Leave, To Relinquish, Desert, Quit.

THE words abandon and leave imply involuntary acts; the words for|sake, relinquish and desert, those that are voluntary.

To abandon, is more applicable to things; leave, to persons. He was under a necessity of abandoning his possessions, and compelled to leave his friends.

To forsake, implies leaving in resent|ment or dislike; to relinquish, quitting

any claim to; to desert, leaving meanly or treacherously.

Being treated with disrespect, we are apt to forsake even the person, whose cause we were studious to espouse. Every honest man, finding his plea not backed by justice, would readily relinquish his claim, and even make his competitor a recompence adequate to the expence and trouble he had put him to. It is an act of the greatest baseness to desert one's friend in time of distress.

To quit, implies the breaking off from, and may be either voluntary or involuntary.

When he had acquired by trade sufficient to support himself, for the remainder of his life, he, prudently, quitted his business. Being overpowered, by superior strength, he was obliged to quit his hold.

We should by no means abandon, while we can keep possession; nor leave, while we are able to stay; we should not forsake, without sufficient reason; nor are we bound to relinquish, but when our title is bad; No colour of excuse can be alledged for deserti|on; nor should we ever quit, with a view of laying hold again.

2. To Abdicate, Renounce, Resign.

To abdicate is an involuntary act; renounce and resign are voluntary.

Abdicate more particularly relates to a throne; renounce, to matters of religion; resign, to employments.

King James the second abdicated the throne of England, when he could keep possession of it no longer. Many persons, through conviction of mind, have formally renounced the errors of the church of Rome. We frequently resign our employments, through a desire of retirement.

To abdicate a crown, is ever looked upon as disgraceful; to renounce a religion, as ho|nourable, when done through the preva|lence of truth; and to resign and office, as no|ble, when generously given up in favour of another, and with the approbation of the person we serve.

3. To Abale, Diminish, To Decrease, Lessen.

These words are nearly synonymous, when they are verbs neuter; they, then, mean to grow less: as verbs active, they are very different. Even as neuters, they will carry some difference in their meaning.

To abate, implies a decrease in action; diminish, a waste in substance; decrease, a decay in moral virtue; lessen, a contraction of parts.

Want of spirits, when a man is running, will abate his ardour, and, consequently, his pace. Febrifuges, if properly applied, will abate a fever. Put sugar into water, and it will diminish visibly. An object, seemingly, diminishes, in proportion to the distance, from which, we view it.

Through a contempt of religion, men, daily, decrease in virtue, a decrease in piety, is usually accompanied with false notions of God. Draw the air from a blown-up blad|der, and it lessens, proportionably.

As verbs active; to abate, more particu|larly, implies, to lower in the price of;

diminish, to make less by abscision or des|truction, either with respect to bulk, value, quality or quantity; lessen, to a voluntary act of degradation.

Shop-keepers, generally, ask their cus|tomers an advanced price for goods, that they may be enabled to abate, if desired.

By dividing of substance, we diminish its bulk; by breaking a diamond, we diminish its value; by mixing water with spirits, we diminish the quality; and by taking one yard from ten, we diminish the quantity.

A mean action always lessens us, in the sight of good men; and whatever false no|tions vanity may inculcate, we ever seem less, when we strive to appear greater.

4. To Abhor, Hate, To Loath, Detest.

All these words imply aversion, but re|quire to be differently used, upon different occasions.

To abhor, implys an aversion to that, to which, we have a natural antipathy; hate, an aversion actuated by revenge: loath, is

more applicable to food: detest, implies a|version actuated by disapprobation.

We abhor, what we cannot endure. We are apt to hate the person, who injures us. We loath the food, by which we have been surfeited. We detest the man, who is guilty of a mean action.

The spendthrift, naturally, abhors nig|gardliness, and the niggard, profligacy. The hatred of the revengeful man, is roused, whenever the object of his revenge approa|ches. The stomach loaths the very sight of that meat, by which we have been satiated. Every, thinking, man detests the least degree of meanness, more particularly that, which is fordid or base.

5. Abject, Low, Mean, Beggarly.

As the words abject and low are indis|criminately used, when meant to signify a person's state or condition; so are the words mean and beggarly, when we would express the disposition: but the impropriety of so doing, is very evident.

By abject, is understood that forlorn situ|ation

in life, that a man brings himself in|to, by ill conduct; by low, that, in which Providence has placed him: the first, is voluntary; the latter, involuntary.

Divine Wisdom hath thought proper, for various reasons, to make distinctions be|tween men, placing some, in a higher sphere, others, in a lower; but never was he the cause of any one's abjectness. Want of merit or fortune, often, renders a man low; but it must be a villainous character, to make him abject.

With respect to the words mean and beg|garly, when meant to express the disposi|tion, the absurdity of using them, one for the other, is, equally, visible.

Mean, signifies a man's readiness to per|form a dirty or illicit action; whereas beg|garly, is, more particularly, expressive of a narrow, groveling spirit.

He who can stoop, to be guilty of a meanness, merits the contempt of all who know him. It has, ever, been accounted beggarly, to live below the rank of life we are in.

When a man is brought into a state of penury and contempt, by a long course of infamy, we, justly, call him abject; if his

narrow circumstances are, only, owing to the poverty of his parents, we, then, repute him low; when guilty of any thing, beneath the character of an honest man, or a gen|tleman, we account him mean; and when the treasures of the rich, are sullied by the nar|row notions of the poor, we call it beggarly.

6. To Abolish, Abrogate, Disannul, To Repeal, Revoke.

Abolish, is a term, rather to be used with respect to customs; abrogate and repeal, with regard to laws; disannul and revoke, to private contracts.

When old customs have been, by long experience, found to be detrimental, they have, very prudently, been abolished. New fashions, abolish old ones.

The word abrogate, is generally used with respect to ancient laws; repeal, to mo|dern: that is, when we talk of rendering old laws null, we call it abrogating; when those lately made, repealing.

Despotic power has frequently abrogated what was instituted by equity. Upon the

enaction of a new law, many inconveniences have sometimes appeared, before un|thought of; this, has occasioned a repeal.

The abrogation of a fundamental law, frequently causes the ruin of the sovereign, or of the people; and, sometimes, of both. The legislative power has often found itself obliged to repeal an act of parliament one sessions, which passed the last; merely, to appease the clamours of the people.

The difference in meaning, between the words disannul and revoke, is not very great; yet such, as to admit of a distinction.

Disannul is applied to a written contract; revoke to a verbal.

He, who gives a conditional bond to ano|ther, has a right to disannul it, if the specified conditions are not punctually observed. To revoke a promise now-a-days, is no other, than fashionable; whereas, formerly, it was considered, as a breach of friendship.

7. To Finish, Complete, To End, Conclude.

With respect to the three first words, the proper idea of finishing, is, the bringing a

thing to its last period: the completion of any thing, is, the actual arrival of that last period: and the characteristic of ending, is cessation or discontinuation.

Lazy people begin many things, without finishing any. We ever feel a secret satis|faction, in the completion of a work, we have been long about. May we not ques|tion the wisdom of those laws, which, instead of ending suits, do but serve, to prolong them?

By the word conclude, we understand, per|forming the last act of ratiocination; widely differing from complete. We complete a piece of mechanism; but conclude an oration.

A piece of clockwork is of little value, till completed. It is allowed by all Rhetori|cians, that the greatest ornament of an ha|rangue, is a well finished conclusion.

We finish what we have begun, by con|tinuing to work at it. We complete a work, by putting the last hand to it. We end it, by discontinuation. Thus, we may finish, without ending; and end, without completing.

8. On, Upon,

These two words are indiscriminately used, one for another, on all occasions; but, with great impropriety.

On, rather, signifies by; as, on my word; on my honour; &c. whereas, upon, means up, on the top of; and is applied to mat|ter; as, upon the table; upon the chair; upon the house; &c.

The absurdity of a contrary diction, is evident from the following change of words: it was his honour, upon which, he swore.

Indeed, the word upon is used with ele|gance, even detached from substance, when the sense is figurative; as for ins|tance, he relied upon the promise of his friend; intimating, that, that promise, was the staff, upon which, he leaned: but, on other occasions, the impropriety is gross.

9. Action, Act, Deed.

As custom has applied the word deed, chiefly to signify the written evidence of any legal act, it will be necessary, only, to shew the difference, between the words acti|on and act.

The word action, then, is applicable, indif|ferently, to every thing we do, whether common or extraordinary; but the word act, should signify, something done, which is remarkable.

An elegant speaker, will not say, a virtu|ous act, a good or a vitious act; but an act of virtue, or of goodness, or of iniquity: where|as, to say, a virtuous action, or a good or vi|tious action, is proper and elegant.

'Tis, generally speaking, a good action to conceal the faults of our neighbours; and it is the rarest act of charity, among mankind.

The sentiments of the heart, are not, so much, to be judged of, from words, as from actions. It is an act, of great heroism,

to pardon our enemies, when we have power, to be revenged on them.

These two words are further distinguish|able by our considering them, somewhat physically. The word action, in this light, relates, more, to the power that acts; and the word act, is, more, applicable to the effect itself, produced by that power; this makes the one, properly, the attribute of the other: so, that it may be, justly, said, we should always have a presence of mind, attendant upon our actions, to ren|der, all of them, either acts of bounty, or acts of justice.

10. To Enlarge, Increase.

The word enlarge, is, properly, used to signify an addition of extent. Increase, is critically, applicable, only, to number, height and quantity.

We enlarge a town; a field; a garden. We increase the inhabitants of a town; our expences; our revenues.

The former word, is, more, suitable to one entire and vast quantity of space; the

latter, to any gross and multiplied quantity in general: thus, it is, commonly, said, that we have enlarged our house, when we have made it more extensive, by adding buildings to the sides of it: but, we, usually, say, a house is increased with an additional story, or with several new rooms.

By enlarging our territory, we, generally, increase our riches. Princes, certainly, en|large their renown, by widening the bounds of their dominions; and they are apt to think, they, at the same time, increase their power: but, in this, they are, sometimes, mistaken; for such an enlargement, may chance to produce, only, an, increase of cares and troubles, which may end, in their utter ruin.

A king, who labours, more, after acquir|ing new subjects, than, in governing those he already has, may enlarge his fame; but will never increase his happiness.

11. Address, Air, Mien, Behaviour, Manners, Deportment, Carriage.

What is called our air, mien and carriage, seem to be born with us, and strike at first

sight: our address, manners, behaviour and deportment, are owing to education; and, gradually, disclose themselves, in our inter|course with the world.

Mien, rather, relates to our look; carriage to our frame; but, the word air to both. We, usually, judge of the mien, by the face; the carriage, by the person; and the air, by both.

How sweet is the mien, that has good humour in the countenance! A gentle|man, though in rags, is, easily, discover|ed, by his graceful carriage. An open countenance and majesty of person, give a man, the most engaging air imagina|ble.

Address, is confined to our words; de|portment, to our actions; behaviour arises from both; and the fruit of behaviour, is manners.

Our address shall often please, when our deportment shall disgust; and VICE VERSA.

When our address is engaging, and our deportment comformable, 'tis impossible our behaviour should be otherwise.

In order, to be well with the world, we should suit our behaviour, to our company; which, though in the eye of some persons,

has been considered, as deceitful, must, in the end, be looked upon, as the height of good manners.

An engaging air, which is the union of a charming mien and graceful carriage, is necessary, to make any thing please; but unless accompanied with good manners, arising from a genteel address and deport|ment, it becomes, perfectly, disgustful.

12. To Accost, Approach.

We accost those, with whom, we would speak; but, often, approach, without any intention to address.

The bold, can accost, without the least hesitation. We cannot approach the great, without some kind of ceremony.

When we have any thing to say to a person, we, naturally, accost him: when we would insinuate ourselves into his good graces, we endeavour to approach him.

Education teaches us to accost the ladies with civility; but, to approach them, re|quires some kind of assurance, seafoned with respect.

13. Ingenuity, Cleverness, Abilities, Parts,

Ingenuity, relates, more, to the invention of things; cleverness, to the manner of exe|cuting them; ability, to the actual execution of them; and parts, to the discernment. The third, then, puts in use, what the se|cond dictates, pursuant to the digested plan, of the fourth, invented by the first.

A man may be ingenious, and not clever; he may be clever, without abilities to exe|cute; and he may have great abilities, and, yet, not be a man of parts.

Admitting we are not very ingenious, still, if we are accustomed to the management of things, we may be clever; but it requires abilities, to do with them, as we would; and parts, to conduct them.

He, who discovered the powers of refraction and reflection, had he known no|thing more, would have been ingenious: he, who constructed the telescope, was clever; the finisher, was a man of abilities; and without doubt, the philosopher, he, who applies the instrument to the various pur|poses of astronomy, must be a man of parts.

14. To Add, Augment.

By adding one thing to another, we aug|ment the same. By the word adding, we understand, the joining of different things together; or, if they are things of the same kind, joining them, in such a manner, as not to confound them, but, that after such junction, each, may be distinguished from the other: whereas, the word augment, in|dicates our making a thing larger or more abundant, by such an addition, as shall cause it, afterwards, to appear one, and the same thing; or, at least, that, when the ad|dition is made, the whole, together, shall be conceived under one idea; thus, for ex|ample, we add one basket of rubbish, to another, one room to another, but we augment the heap, and the house.

There are many, who would not scruple to augment their own stock, by fraudu|lently adding to it, that of another.

To add, is a verb active only; augment, both active and neuter.

Our ambition, augments with our for|tune; and we are no sooner in possession of

one hundred pounds, than we are eager to add to it another.

15. To Study, Learn.

To study, implies a uniform application, in search of knowledge; to learn, that application, with success.

We study, to learn; and learn, by dint of study.

People of vivacity, learn easily; but are heavy at study.

We can study but one thing at a time; but we may learn many.

The more we learn, the more we know; but, oftentimes, the more we study, the less we know.

We have studied well, when we have learned to doubt.

There are many things we learn, without study; and other things we study, without learning.

Those are not the wisest, who have studied most; but, those who have learnt most.

We see some persons, studying continually, without learning any thing; and others, learning almost every thing, without the least study.

The time of our youth, is the time of study; but it is, in a more advanced age, when we, truly, can be said, to learn; it is then, only, we have capacity to digest, what we have before, laid up in the memory.

16. Buttress, Support, Prop.

The Buttress, fortifies; it is fixed close, to resist the impulsion of other bodies: the support, bears, by being placed beneath a thing, to prevent its falling under a weight: the prop, assists, and its general use is, to strengthen.

A wall is frequently made stronger, by buttresses: An arch is supported, by columns: A house, when in danger of falling, is kept up, by props.

That, which has received a violent thrust, or is much bulged, stands in need of a buttress; that, which is too heavy to

carry itself, is in want of supporters; and that, which ought to stand upright, and cannot be made to do so of itself, must be propped.

In a figurative sense, buttress relates, more, to defence; support, to credit; and prop, to friendship.

The true Christian, seeks no buttress, a|gainst the malignity of men, but that of innocence and integrity; he makes work, the most solid support of his life; and looks upon implicit obedience to the decree of heaven, as the most steady prop of his felicity.

17. Enough, Sufficient.

The object of both these words, is quan|tity; but with this difference, that enough relates, more, to the quantity, one desires to have, and sufficient, to that quantity, one, really, wants to employ.

Thus, the avaritious man never has enough; let him accumulate ever so much, he, still, desires more; and the prodigal, never sufficient; he, still, wanting to expend more than he has.

We say, we have enough, when we wish not for more; and we say, we have sufficient, when we have, just, what is necessary.

When applied to such things, as are con|sumable, the word enough, seems to denote, a much greater quantity, than the word suffi|cient; for in relation to such things, when we say we have enough, it seems, as though we should have too much, had we more: but, what we call sufficient, may be added to, without coming near that extreme: for, we may say, of a very small income or revenue, that it is sufficient; though, at the same time, we can hardly think it enough.

The word enough, has a more general and comprehensive meaning; the word sufficient, a more limited and particular one.

An hour at table, is, certainly, sufficient, for our nourishment; but, not enough, for some persons pleasure or satisfaction.

An oeconomist, can find enough, where there is very little; but the prodigal, never has sufficient, let him have ever so much.

18. To Declare, Affirm, Protest, Aver, Assert, To Maintain, Swear, Avouch, Attest.

In the first seven words, we find different degrees of declaration. To declare, signi|fies, to tell any thing simply, but seriously; to affirm, means, to say confidently; to protest, implies a solemn affirmation; to aver, signi|fies, a positive declaration; to assert, that de|claration, defended; to maintain, implies a support of such assertion; to swear, is, to ratify it, by an oath.

When we give our opinion, on being seriously asked, we are said, to declare it: when we would give that declaration, more force, we affirm it: and, to strengthen that affirmation, we protest it, solemnly; that is we affirm it, by invoking the Deity.

The other words, are, sufficiently, explained above.

If, ever, we wish, to gain credit, in the world, whatever we declare, should be back|ed by truth. True politeness, forbids our

affirming any thing, unless required by the obligations of justice. To make frequent use of protestations, betrays a suspicion, that our bare word, is not to be believed. Always to aver, hath an appearance of dogmatising; and shews us ignorant of that proper degree of diffidence, which ever accompanies wis|dom. Some persons are so ready to assert, that let the matter be right or wrong, 'tis equally the same. When our opinions are just, and well-grounded, we have an un|doubted right, to maintain them. Swearing, was first instituted in courts of judicature, as a conscientious testimony of truth.

The words avouch, and attest, tho' often usedas synonynous, with the foregoing; have a very different signification. The word, avouch, implies, an assertion, in defence of another; attest, a bearing, witness to what another has, just before, said.

When the reputation of an honest man has been, undeservedly, hurt, 'tis the part of a friend, to avouch his good character.

Too much care to attest all that is ad|vanced, renders our conversation tiresome.

There is another verb, warrant, which has some affinity to the word maintain; but, as custom has made the use of it vulgar,

it is unnecessary to take any further notice of it.

19. Arms, Weapons.

By arms, we understand those instru|ments of offence, generally, made use of in war; such as, fire-arms, swords, &c. By weapons, we, more particularly, mean instru|ments of other kinds, (exclusive of fire arms,) made use of as offensive, on especial occasions.

In the state of Switzerland, all men are obliged to learn the use of arms, in their youth, that, in cases of extremity, they may be capable of defending themselves against the attacks of their enemies.

In times of insurrection, people make use of such weapons as they can get.

20. Attractions, Allurements, Charms.

Besides the general idea, which makes these three words appear synonymous, it is, likewise, their common fate, scarce ever to be used in the singular number; at least, in those senses, in which, they are here con|sidered; that is, whenever they are used to signify the power of beauty, of agreeable|ness, or, of any thing which pleases.

With respect to their different mean|ings, it appears to me, that attractions mean, something natural; allurements, some|what, rather, artificial; and charms, some|what stronger and more uncommon than either.

Attractions, may be said, to engage us; allurements, to entice us; charms, to seduce us.

The heart of man can scarce stand against the attractions of a pretty woman: It is with difficulty he can defend, himself against the allurements of a coquette; but,

to resist the charms of a sweet-tempered beauty, is impossible.

Ladies, always, owe their attractions and their charms, to a happy formation of their features and persons; but they, sometimes, procure their allurements, at their toilettes.

I know not whether I may fall in with the taste of mankind; but in my opinion, attractions rise from those ordinary graces, which nature has bestowed upon the wo|men with more or less liberality, and which are the common appendages of the sex; allurements, from those cultivated graces, which form a faithful mirrour of the natu|ral, and are studied, merely, with a desire to please; charms, from those singular graces, which nature, sometimes, bestows as a most valuable gift, and which are more particu|lar and personal.

Defects not seen at first, but afterwards observed, lessen attractions greatly. Allure|ments vanish, as soon as the artifice appears. Charms lose their force, when time and custom hath rendered them familiar.

These words are not in use only, with regard to beauty, and the graces of the sex; but, with respect to every thing that pleases. In this case, attractions and charms,

are applied, only, to such things, as are amiable in themselves; whereas, the word allurements, is, sometimes, applied to such things, as are even in themselves odious; but, which we love nevertheless.

Virtue has attractions, which the most vicious of men cannot avoid being sensible of. The riches of the world are allure|ments, which never fail to captivate, in spite of their ill tendency. Pleasure has such charms, that it is hunted after by every one, as well by the philosopher, as the li|bertine.

We say, great attractions; powerful al|lurements; and, invincible charms.

Honour attracts; fortune allures; but, the charms of glory, are invincible.

21. Miserly, Niggardly, Covetous, Avaritious.

The word miserly, signifies, rather, a par|cimonious disposition, or a depriving our|selves of the necessaries of life, merely to hoard the riches we possess. By niggardly,

we understand, that sordid temper, that does things by halves. Covetous, implies, an eager craving for the possessions of another. By avaritious, we mean, that inordinate thirst of gain, that makes a man grasp at-every thing he sees. Taking the words in these fenses, which are undoubtedly the proper ones, we may be covetous and not avariti|ous, niggardly and not miserly.

He, who never gives any thing away, is justly, called miserly; he, who fails to bestow when necessary, or, when he bestows, gives too little, draws on himself the epithet of niggardly; he, who longs for the goods of another, is covetous; and he, who grasps at wealth by all means whatever, avaritious.

Of all extraordinary beings, there is no greater one than the miser, who punishes himself, and starves in the midst of plenty.

The miser is laughed at, but the niggard is despised.

The contented man is at quiet within himself; but the covetous is ever on the rack: he eagerly wishes for what another possesses, and his inability of obtaining it, is his continual torment.

It is necessary to be ever watchful of an avaritious man, for his disposition leads him to take every opportunity of defrauding you.

22. Acknowledgment, Confession.

Acknowledgment, supposes a question ask|ed; whereas, confession, favours a little of accusation.

We acknowledge what we had an inclina|tion to conceal: We confess that which we were blameable in doing.

It is interrogation, which causes acknow|ledgment; repentance, confession.

It is better to make a sincere acknow|ledgment, than a bad excuse.

We should not confess to all sorts of people.

An acknowledgment unasked, is either noble or foolish, according to the circum|stances, and effect it produces.

Confession, unaccompanied with repent|ance, is an insult to the Deity.

It would be want of spirit, to acknowledge a fault, without a certainty that such ac|knowledgment would be satisfactory; and it would be foolish, to make confession, without hopes of pardon; for why should we de|clare ourselves culpable to those, who breathe nothing but vengeance.

23. Admonition, Advice, Counsel.

The end of admonition, is gentle reproof. Advice and counsel, are to convey instruction; but with this difference, that advice, implies no superiority with respect either to rank or parts, in the person who gives it; where|as, counsel, generally, carries with it one, if not both.

Admonition, in a master, frequently has a greater effect than correction.

People are readier to give advice, than to take it.

Parents should take care to counsel their children, before they turn them out into the world.

Admonition should be given with temper. Advice, with sincerity, and counsel, with art and modesty.

Admonish a friend in private, but reward him openly.

Nothing is more salutary than good ad|vice, and yet, nothing is more nauseous to take.

When counsel is given with an air of im|pertinence, it is sure to make the counsel despised, and the counsellor odious.

24. To Have, Possess.

In order to have a thing, it is not neces|sary to have the power of disposal of it, or to have it actually in our hands; it is suf|ficient that it belongs to us: but to possess it, it must be in our hands, and, we have the liberty of disposing of it, whenever we think proper.

Thus, we have, an estate, notwithstand|ing it is mortgaged for the benefit of our creditors; but, as to riches, we possess, them.

We are not always masters, of what we have; we are, of what we possess.

A married man has continual torment, when the Demon of Jealousy possesses him.

We have often but the half of things, partaking them with others; we possess them, when they are entirely our own.

Those, who have only the knowledge of arts, follow their rules; but those, who possess them, lay down their rules to fol|low.

25. Battle, Combat, Fight.

Battle, is an action, more general, and commonly, preceded by some preparation. Combat, seems to be an action, more parti|cular, and often unexpected. Fight may be either, one or the other, and is seldom used in the plural.

Thus, the fight, between the Carthaginians and the Romans, and that, at Pharsalia, be|tween Caesar and Pompey, were battles: but those, in which the Horatii and the Curatii, decided the fate of Rome, were combats.

26. Handsome, Pretty, Beautiful.

It is the fate of these words, when ap|plied to the female sex, to be used indis|criminately one for the other, and yet, at the same time, no three words can be more different.

By a handsome woman, we understand one, that is graceful and well shaped, with a regu|lar disposition of features: by a pretty, we mean one, that is delicately made, and whose features are so formed, as to please: by a beautiful, a union of both.

A lady may be handsome and not pretty, pretty and not handsome; but, to be beautiful, she must be both pretty and handsome.

Many a handsome woman has a forbidding countenance.

It has been the misfortune of many a pretty woman, to be crooked.

A beautiful woman, is, now-a-days, very rare to be met with.

Prettiness, carries an idea of simplicity; handsomeness, of nobility; beauty, of ma|jesty.

The ladies, in romances, are described, as, either beautiful or handsome; the shep|herdesses, by the poets, are represented as pretty; so, in other things, we say, a beau|tiful palace; a handsome house; a pretty cot|tage.

A beautiful woman, is an object of curio|sity; a handsome woman, of admiration; and a pretty one, of love.

When applied to other things, beautiful, relates to something more serious and en|gaging; pretty, to somewhat more gay and diverting: this is the reason why we say a beautiful tragedy; but, a pretty comedy.

27. Benignity, Benevolence, Kindness, Tenderness, Humanity.

Benignity, is a sort of kind condescen|tion, and an attribute of princes only. Be|nevolence, a wishing well to mankind, and seems relative to those, who have, more parti|cularly, the power of doing good. Kindness, is the same disposition among equals. Ten|derness, is a susceptibility of impression, and more applicable, to persons nearly connect|ed. Humanity, denotes a fellow feeling, for the distresses, even, of a stranger.

Benegnity, benevolence, and kindness, spring from the will; tenderness, and humanity, from the heart.

The benignity of a prince, makes him universally beloved by his subjects.

Benevolence, is a shining character, and is more conspicuous, for the charitable actions it produces.

Kindness, is what one man naturally ex|pects from another, and what we are reci|procally bound to impart.

The tenderness of a parent, has, often, been the ruin of a child.

The distresses of individuals, will, often, draw tears from a person, truly humane.

From the very instant of our birth, we experience the benignity of heaven, and malignity of corrupt nature.

The realized benevolence, of some good men, have, almost, made them worshiped by their fellow creatures.

Kindnesses, are in the power of every one to shew; therefore, he, that withholds them, fa|vours more of the brute, than of the man.

The great tenderness of animals, to their young, is a standing reproof to the many unfeeling mothers.

True humanity consists, in not treating with rigour, but excusing the weaknesses, supplying the defects, assuaging the pains, and comforting the afflictions, of our neighbour.

28. Poverty, Indigence, Want, Need, Necessity.

Poverty, is that situation of fortune, op|posed to riches, in which, we are deprived of the conveniences of life.

Indigence, is a degree lower; we there want the necessaries; and is opposed to su|perfluity.

Want, seems rather to arrive by accident, implies, a scarcity of provisions, rather than a lack of money, and is opposed to abundance.

Need and necessity relate less to the situa|tion of life, than the other three words, but more to the relief we expect, or the remedy we seek; with this difference be|tween the two, that need, seems less pressing than necessity.

Merit, or a fortunate circumstance, in life, frequently extricates us from a state of poverty, in which we were born; and in which, prodigality often plunges the rich.

Diligence is the best remedy against in|digence, which is, generally, the just pu|nishment of idleness.

Wise precautions prevent want, which is often brought on, by extravagance.

When we are in need, we should seek assistance from our friends, but be careful not to importune too much.

The means of obtaining relief, in ex|treme necessity, is to implore the succour of the truly charitable.

A state of poverty, is most conducive to the health of the soul; we being there, out of the way of temptations.

The man, who opens his hand to the cravings of the indigent, feels within his breast a secret satisfaction, which the un|charitable man, is an entire stranger to.

He that will waste, will want.

A friend in need, is a friend indeed.

Necessity, is the mother of invention.

29. Good-fortune, Prosperity.

What we call good-fortune, is the effect of chance; it comes unexpected. Prosperity, is the success of conduct; and comes by degrees.

Fools have, sometimes, good fortune: wise men do not, always, prosper.

The Capital, that was saved by the cack|ling of geese, and not by the vigilance of the centinels, is a piece of history, more proper, to shew the good-fortune, of the Ro|mans, than their military government on that occasion; though, on all others, their wise conduct, has contributed as much to their prosperity, as the valour of their soldiers.

30. Good-nature, Good-humour.

These terms, though very expressive of their respective meanings, are too often

for want of proper discernment, con|founded.

We may be good-humoured, and not good|natured; good-natured, and yet not, always, good-humoured.

To make this properly appear, it is ne|cessary to give a full definition of each.

By good-nature, is meant, that disposition, which partakes the felicity of all mankind; that promotes the satisfaction of every in|dividual, within the reach of its ability; that relieves the distressed, comforts the afflicted, diffuses blessings, and communi|cates happiness, as far as its sphere of ac|tion can extend; whereas, good-humour is nothing more, than a chearful, pleasing de|portment, arising, either from a natural gaiety of mind, or, an affectation of popu|larity, joined to an affability of behaviour, which is the result of good-breeding, and a compliance with the taste of every com|pany.—This kind of good-humour, is by far, the most striking quality; 'tis frequently mistaken for, and complimented with, the superior name of real good-nature. A man, by this specious appearance, has often ac|quired that appellation, who, in all the ac|tions of his private life, has been a morose,

cruel, revengeful, sullen, haughty tyrant. On the contrary, a man of a true benevo|lent disposition, and formed, to promote the happiness of all around him, may sometimes, perhaps, from an ill habit of body, an accidental vexation, or a com|mendable openness of heart, above the meanness of disguise, be guilty of little sal|lies of peevishness or ill-humour, that may carry the appearance of, and be, unjustly, thought to proceed from, ill-nature, by per|sons who are not acquainted with his true character; and, who take them for synony|mous terms, tho', in reality, they have not the least analogy to each other.

31. Happiness, Felicity, Bliss.

These three words denote, equally, an ad|vantageous state, and agreeable situation; but that of happiness, marks, properly, the state of fortune, capable of dispensing plea|sures, and placing them within our reach; that of felicity, expresses, particularly, the state of

the heart; disposed to ta••••e pleasure, which it finds, in whatsoever it possesses; that of bliss, which conveys a mys•••••••• idea, paints a state of imagination, which we anticipate, as it were, from a thorough conviction that we shall inherit it hereafter.

Our happiness glares in the eyes of the world, and exposes us, often, to envy. Our felicity is known only to ourselves, and gives us continual satisfaction. The idea of bliss, extends itself beyond a life temporal.

We are sometimes in a state of happiness, without being in a state of felicity. Happi|ness consists in the possession of wealth, ho|nours, friends and health; but 'tis the satisfaction of the mind, and the enjoyment of those things, that constitutes felicity. As to bliss, it is the portion of the godly, and depends in each religion, on the per|suasion of the mind.

Satisfaction without, forms the happiness of man; satisfaction within, his felicity: bliss must be asked of God. The first, is within the reach of riches, the second, of wisdom, but, the third, is reserved for those, whom the scripture calls, the poor in spirit.

32. Confines, Limits, Bounds.

Confines, are where we are at liberty to go. Limits, are what we ought, not to pass. Bounds, are what we can, not pass.

We approach, or, get farther from the confines; we contract, or, extend the limits; we advance, or, remove the bounds.

By confines, we rather understand, the edge or border: the confines of a country, not surrounded by the sea, are generally distin|guished by rivers or hills.

He, who continually exceeds the limits, which temperance hath set, will soon find himself, on the confines of the grave.

They say, with more eloquence than truth, that the limits of the Roman empire, were those of the world.

The Sea, the Alps, and the Pirenean mountains, are the natural bounds of France.

Ambition knows no bounds; and we are never happy, but when the bounds of our fortune, are those of our desire.

33. Extremity, End.

Each, of these words, signifies, the least of those parts which constitutes a thing; but with this difference, that extremity, supposes a situation and an arrangement, intimating the greatest distance; whereas, end, supposes a length only, and denotes, that place where the length ceases.

Extremity, answers to the centre; end, to the beginning; thus, we say, the extremity of a kingdom; the end of life.

34. Aim, View, Design.

The aim, is more fixed, we take every method to pursue it; the view, more vague, we make use of means to accomplish it; the design, more close, we leave nothing undone to complete it.

A good prince has no other design in his government, than to render his state flou|rishing,

because, he has the happiness of his people, in view, and true glory, is his aim.

The true Christian has no other aim, than heaven; no other view, than to please God; nor any other design to complete, than his own salvation.

We are said, to lay an aim; to have views; to form a design.

Reason forbids our laying any aim, that is impossible to attain; to have any chimerical views, or to form any design we are unable to execute.

If my views are just, I have a design in my head, that will bring me to my aim.

35. Burden, Load.

By the word, burden, we understand, a weight, possible to be born; by load, a weight, more than we are able to bear.

A light burthen, is no inelegant expressi|on; but, a light load, certainly is.

In the heat of summer, our very cloaths, are a burthen.

Many a poor animal is so inhumanly laden, as to sink under the load.

Taken now in a figurative sense, they are, equally, different.

How unhappy is the man, who feels the burthen of an evil conscience!

We have, sometimes, thro' a bad habit of body, such a load upon our spirits, as not to be able to support ourselves.

36. Charm, Enchantment, Spell.

The word charm, carries an idea of force, which puts a stop to ordinary effects and natural causes. The word enchantment, is used, properly, for that which regards the illusion of the senses. The word spell, bears particularly an idea of something, which disturbs the reason. All the three, in the literal sense, mark the effect of a magical operation, condemned by religion, and laughed at by philosophy.

Antiquated tales, say there is a charm to destroy the effect of arms, and make them

invulnerable. We read, in old romances, of the surprising power of enchantments, that have, suddenly, changed the manners, and reversed the fortune. Weak people have thought, and do still believe, that by means of a spell, the health has been destroyed, and the person so bewitched, made raving mad; but, persons, of good sense, see no charm in the world, but the caprice of pas|sions, with respect to reason, which often suspends reflexion, and stops the effects, which that would naturally and necessarily produce: they are acquainted with no other enchantment, than, that seduction arising from a depraved taste, and disordered ima|gination: they know also, that, which is foolishly attributed to the power of a spell, maliciously laid, is no other, than the effect of a bad constitution, which is frequently remedied, by an application of proper medicines.

37. To Chastise, Punish, To Correct, Discipline,

We chastise, him, who has committed a fault, to prevent his doing the same again: we punish, the person guilty of a crime, by way of expiation, and, as an example to others. To correct, signifies, to amend, by means of chastisement; to discipline, means, to regulate and instruct.

We chastise a child, in order to correct his manners: officers are, frequently, oblig|ed to punish a soldier with death, to keep up good discipline in the regiment.

It is necessary, for good correction, that the chastisement, be not the effect of anger: justice demands, that the punishment, be ri|gorous, when the crime, is enormous; other|wise, there can be no good discipline in the state.

God, like a tender father, chastises us in this life, that we may not be punished in the life to come.

As the words chastise, and, punish, are thought to have the nearest affinity to each

other; it may not be unnecessary, to shew a, yet further, difference between them.

Chastise, then, carries, always, with it an idea of subordination; denoting, an autho|rity or superiority in him, who chastises, over the person, chastised; but the word, punishment, carries no such idea, in its signi|fication; for we are sometimes punished, by our equals, by ourselves, by our inferiors, by the mere event of things, or, by the effects of the fault, we have committed.

Parents, who, thro' tenderness to their children, forbear to chastise them, are often punished for their folly, by their future in|gratitude and ill conduct.

38. Prudence, Discretion, Care, Caution,

Prudence, is here the mother virtue, and signifies, wisdom applied to practise: discre|tion, is the effect of prudence, and means, a knowledge to govern or direct one's self: By care, we understand, heed, in order to

preservation. Caution, implies, a greater de|gree of wariness.

A proper attention to prudence, would make us so discreet, as to be careful, in every thing we do; and cause us to act, with the greatest caution.

A hasty conduct, can never be called prudent: want of attention, in affairs of moment, is the greatest height of indiscre|tion; for without that necessary qualifica|tion, 'tis impossible any thing we do, can be attended with success: He who expects to do any thing well, must act with care; and he, who is desirous of avoiding diffi|culties, with caution.

To weigh matters well, before we put them into execution, is a mark of prudence.

A discreet man, in the company of dan|gerous persons, such as would take advan|tage of his words, would be careful, how he opened his mouth, and, would utter no|thing, but with the greatest caution.

39. Circumspection, Consideration, Regard.

A proper attention, to the manner of act|ing, and, conducting ourselves, in our com|merce with the world, with respect to others; contributing rather to their satis|faction, than our own, is the common and general idea, which these three words pre|sent, at first sight: notwithstanding which, it appears to me, that their application should be different.

Circumspection, principally, takes place in discourse; it prevents our letting any thing escape us, that may do hurt, or give offence; and, is the effect of prudence, which risks nothing. Consideration, is more per|sonal, and relates, particularly, to our man|ner of treating other people, making a proper distinction, as different opportuni|ties may offer; and, is the consequence of esteem and duty. Regard, relates more to the state, or, situation of persons; being, particularly, careful to omit nothing, which

good sense and politeness requires; and, is the fruit of a good education.

To be well with the world, requires cir|cumspection, when we are speaking before those, with whom, we are not acquainted; consideration, for people of rank and qua|lity; and, regard, towards those, with whom, we are interested.

We ought to have a great deal of cir|cumspection, in conversations of religion and government; because, they are public mat|ters, and, subjects, on which particulars are not, at liberty, to say, what they think, especially, if their thoughts are in opposi|tion to those established in the country, where they are. It is not adviseable, for our interests, to omit shewing marks of con|sideration, to such persons, whose assistance we may stand in need of, and, from whom, we hope to receive any service. We can|not have too great a regard for the ladies; it is what they expect, and, are displeased if we neglect.

40. Cunning, Finesse, Device, Artifice, Trick, Stratagem.

Cunning, is the art of conducting de|signs, in a manner proper to succeed. Fi|nesse, is a French word, lately adopted by the English, and means, an acting secretly and under cover. Device, is rather a pretty thought or contrivance. Artifice, is unna|tural, and a far-fetched mean, of execut|ing designs. Trick, which eludes the senses, implies, a juggle: and stratagem, denotes, a disguised way of obtaining our ends.

The first three of these words, are oftner understood in a good sense, than the other.

Cunning, is employed in using means; finesse, insinuates insensibly, and, must be accompanied by penetration; device, sur|prises, and, gives satisfaction; artifice, gene|rally, makes use of studied dissimulation; a trick, is, commonly, looked on as a fraud, and a stratagem, is oftener illicit, than otherwise.

Without some degree of cunning, it will be impossible to deal with, or, guard against, the generality of mankind.

Finesse, is so essential to the courtier, that, without it, he is seen through presently.

Pretty devices, declare the authors of them, persons of ingenuity.

We ought particularly to guard against a man, who makes use of a great deal of artifice.

Jugglers perform tricks, to divert, and consequently, if clever, deserve applause; but he, who tricks his neighbour, in order to serve himself, is a rogue.

All stratagems, in war, are lawful; but, in other cases, they are ever considered, as de|rogatory to the character of an honest man.

41. Moment, Instant,

A moment, is not long; but, an instant, is still shorter. The word moment, has a sig|nification, more extended; it is taken some|times, for time, in general; and, is used in

a figurative sense: that, of instant, is more contracted; it marks the shortest duration or time, and, is never used, but in the lite|ral sense.

All depends upon knowing the favour|able moment; sometimes, an instant, too soon, or, too late, is all, that makes the dif|ference between success and misfortune.

Let us banish thought, as much as in our power, still, now and then, a reflective moment will intrude. The face of things, which we have thought established, have been, frequently, changed in an instant.

Every moment is dear to one, who knows the value of time. Every instant of our life, is a step nearer the grave.

42. Customs, Manners, Fashions.

Customs, relate to the general practice of the people; manners, to their way of life; and, fashions, to their dress.

There cannot be a more ridiculous custom, than that, of persons compliment|ing

each other, in time of divine service; it being supposed, they have there, more material things to engross their attention.

An increase, or, decrease of luxury, has been found to have, more or less, influence on the manners of the people.

It has been observed, that there is a con|tinual round of fashions; when the new are worn out, they, then, have recourse to the old, and those old ones, become new.

43. To Be, Exist, Subsist.

Be, agrees with all sorts of subjects, sub|stances or modes; with all manner of be|ings, real or ideal: Exist, is used, only, with respect to substances, and those, real: Subsist, is applied, equally, to substances or modes, but with reference to the duration of their being, which is not expressed by the other two words.

We say, of qualities, forms, actions, mo|tions, and, of all their different relations, that, they are; we say, of matter, spirit,

bodies, and, all real beings, that, they exist: We say, of states, works, affairs, laws, and, all establishments, which are neither destroyed or changed, that, they subsist.

The verb, be, is commonly, used to mark the event of any modification or quality, in the subject: that, of exist, is in use, only, to express the end of simple existence: and we employ subsist, to point out the dura|tion of that existence or modification. Thus, we say, that man is inconstant; that the phoenix exists not; that all human establishments subsist, but for a time.

44. Famous, Illustrious, Celebrated, Renowned.

Each of these qualities, distinguishes the reputation; but that, which the word fa|mous, expresses, means, no more than a simple distinction of one country or age, above another, let that distinction be taken either in good part or bad. That, which the word, illustrious expresses, is found|ed upon a merit, supported by dignity and glory; which makes the object, not only

known, but admired, and ranked among the great. That, which we understand, by the word, celebrated, expresses, a superior degree of talents, with respect either to abilities or knowledge; tho' it raises not the object, to an equal degree of grandeur, with the illustrious, it is, nevertheless, ho|nourable. That, which the word, renown|ed, denotes, is founded, only, upon fashion or public taste; which, without casting much honour on the subject, draws it sim|ply from oblivion, and makes its name known to the world.

The maid of Orleans, cried down by the English, but, esteemed by the French, was, equally, famous, in both nations. Princes shine, during their life; but, they are only illustrious, in future ages, by the monu|ments of grandeur, wisdom and greatness, which they leave behind them. There are celebrated authors, whose works, we cannot find fault with; and, those, which we can|not even commend; without risking our own reputation. A man's fortune is half made, when once he becomes renowned in his profession.

Famous, celebrated, and, renowned, are equally, applicable to persons or things;

but illustrious, to persons only; at least, when we would be nice in our choice of words.

Erostratus, among the Greeks, set sire to the temple of Diana, to make himself famous: he was rendered more so, by an order of the state, that his name should never after be mentioned, on pain of pu|nishment. The greatest part of our libels, are of the same kind; they raise a dust and become famous, by being burnt by the hangman. The Duke of Marlborough be|came illustrious, by the many victories he obtained; his glorious actions are cele|brated in history; so, are the many court|intrigues of the Dutchess. The Gobelins were so renowned, that their names live in the place, were they worked, and, in those works, in which, others imitate them. It is a question, whether the Phalernian wine was more renowned, than those are, of Champaigne and Burgundy.

45. Excuse, Pardon, Forgiveness.

We make excuse, for an apparent fault, or, slight offence: we ask pardon, for a real fault, or, when the offence is greater. We implore forgiveness of our sins. The first, is an apology, in order to justify ourselves, and, is founded on politeness; the second, is the mark of a good disposition, and, is done, in hopes of extenuation; the last, to avert the vengeance, and, declares repentance.

The good mind, excuses, easily. The good heart, pardons, readily. God delights more in forgiveness, than in revenge.

Excuse, is more used, when we address ourselves to equals; pardon, to superiors; and, forgiveness, to heaven.

Good manners demand an excuse for that, which turns out wrong, let the intention be never so good. It can never be a degra|dation, to ask pardon of that person, whom we have offended; besides, the superior rank of some persons, makes it an absolute duty in the offender. How great is the

presumption of that wretch, who fancies himself not in need of the forgiveness of the Almighty!

46. Duty, Obligation.

Duty, means, something conscientious, and, springs from a law; obligation, some|thing absolute in practice, and, springs from custom.

We are said, to fail, in our duty; and, to dispense, with an obligation.

It is the duty of a clergyman, to carry himself modestly; and he is obliged, to wear dark coloured cloaths.

Policy finds less disadvantage, in neg|lecting her duty, than in forgetting the least of her obligations.

47. To Live, Dwell.

These two words are synonymous, in that sense, in which they signify residence;

but live, relates to the particular place where, we inhabit; dwell, to the building, in which, we reside.

We live, in London; in Middlesex; in the country; we dwell, in a large house; a cottage; or, a furnished lodging.

When persons of distinction, live in Lon|don; they dwell in hovels, comparatively speaking, with their houses in the country.

We say, with great propriety, I live, all the summer, in the country; and, have one of the prettiest dwellings imaginable.

48. To Stay, Remain.

The common idea of these two words, is a cessation of progression; and their difference consists in this; that, to stay, seems to have less duration, than to remain.

A good servant, when sent on a message, stays, as short a time as possible.

When we have given offence, we should endeavour to make such an attonement, that the offended party may not remain dissatisfied.

The duration of time, expressed by the word, stay, seems less determinate, than that, by the word, remain.

Thus, we say, he remained at his country house a month; he stay'd longer, than we expected.

49. Event, Incident.

Event, is a word, most agreeable to states and governments; incident, to casualties in private life.

The revolutions of the state, are events, that determine the happiness of the people.

Our life is full of incidents, which, the eye of prudence cannot foresee.

50. To Awake, Awaken.

The first, of these words, is, more fre|quently, used in a literal sense; the last, in a figurative.

The least noise awakes those, who sleep indifferently. It requires but little, to awaken a passion, which is not, entirely, rooted out from the heart.

50. Heavy, Weighty.

The word heavy, is more applicable to that, which loads the body; weighty, to that, which burdens the mind. It requires strength, to carry the one; parts, to sup|port the other.

A weak man finds that, heavy, which, the strong find, light. The administration of state affairs, is too weighty a concern, for one person to undertake.

51. To Conquer, Subdue, Overcome.

Each of these words, implies, resistance; but, that of conquer, refers to victory over ene|mies;

and is, generally, used in the literal sense: that of subdue, is more applicable to our passions; being, oftener, used in a fi|gurative; and means, a bringing under subjection: that of overcome, supposes ef|forts, against any obstacle that opposes; meaning, rather, to surmount.

We have conquered our enemies, when we have beat them, in such a manner, as to put it out of their power, to do us any further hurt. We may be said, to have subdued our lusts, when we are able to withstand every temptation. We over|come our adversaries, when we obtain our end, in spite of every opposition.

It requires courage and valour, to con|quer; endeavour and resolution, to subdue; patience and perseverance, to overcome.

Alexander gloried more in his conquests, than in any other thing upon earth. Of all passions, avarice is the most difficult to sub|due; as neither age, or, weakness of consti|tution, is able to rebate its edge. We should strive to overcome evil, with good.

53. To no purpose, Ineffectually, In vain.

We work, to no purpose, when we meet not with the reward, we expected to re|ceive; Ineffectually, when that, which we have done, answers not the end proposed; In vain, when our work, is of no kind of use whatever.

I shall have worked to no purpose, if these sheets meet not with the approbation of the public; Ineffectually, if, after all my trouble, I have not been able to shew the true difference between words, reputed sy|nonymous; and, in vain, if the book is found to be, neither amusing or instructive.

54. Wave, Surge, Billow.

Waves, are the natural effect of the flui|dity of a running water; they are as ap|plicable to rivers, as the sea; and, leave

the idea of a calm. Surges, are appli|ed, properly, to the sea, only; imply swol'n waves, and, mark a small degree of agitation. Billows, proceed from a more violent motion, consequently, denote a greater agitation; they break into white foam, and, are attended with no little roar.

We cut through the waves; are lift|ed, by the surges; tossed and dashed, by the billows.

The life of some men, may be, aptly, compared to the sharp-keeled vessel, cutting through the waves, leaving no noise or track behind it: while that of others, may be represented, as tossed up and down, on the wind-swoln surges of a boisterous fortune; or, dashed in pieces, by the foaming billows of ad|versity.

55. Uproar, Tumult, Riot.

Uproar, conveys an idea of some great noise; tumult, and, riot, of some great dis|order.

The diference between the words tu|mult, and, riot, is, that tumult, implies, the rising of many people; riot, the disturbance of a few; whereas, an up|roar, may be occasioned, by one single person.

Tumults, and, riots are, always, attend|ed with such uproars, as give umbrage to a peaceable neighbourhood.

Houses of debauchery, are subject to riots: a tumult often happens, in ill-policed cities.

56. Inclination, Propension, Bias.

These three words rise gradually; inclination, implying some thing less strong,

than propension; propension, than bias: the first, leads us to an object; the se|cond, draws us, the third, drags us.

Inclination, is, greatly, owing to education; propension, to custom; bias, to constitu|tion.

Choice of company, is essential to the education of youth, because, at that age, they imbibe easily the inclinations of those, whose company they keep. It is a dan|gerous thing, to give a loose to any one vice, as frequent commission, is apt to create strong propension. Persons of warm constitutions, have a natural bias to venery.

Inclination, is, generally, applied to good objects; propension, to bad. Thus, we say, the charitable man is ever inclined to assist his neighbour. So deprayed is hu|man nature, that we have, always, a pro|pension to vice.

Of two persons to be served, a fo|reigner, and, a countryman; we are, ge|nerally, biassed in favour of the last.

57. Should, Ought, Is necessary.

The first of these expressions, implys, more precisely, an obligation of complai|sance, custom, or, personal interest: thus, we should not offend the company, we are in; we should follow the fashion; we should know a man, before we trust him. The second, denotes, more particularly, an obli|gation of reason and good sense; thus, we ought in every thing, to give up to those, who know better than ourselves; we ought to serve them, who have served us. The third, is more used to ex|press an essential and indispensable obliga|tion; thus, it is necessary, to love God, in order to be saved: It is necessary, to be com|plaisant, to please.

58. Furthermore, Moreover, Besides.

Furthermore, is, properly, used, when there is need only to add one more reason, to those, before-mentioned; its intent, is to multiply, and, it has no relation, but to number. Moreover, is in its right place, when used, to add a reason of a different kind, to those, that went before; its chief office is, to add, with a particular respect, to diversity. Besides, is used with pro|priety, when we would strengthen by a new reason, the force of those, that were sufficient of themselves, its principal office is, to enhance by abundance.

For a state to support itself, those, who govern, should be moderate; those who ought to obey, governable; furthermore, the laws should be judicious. There will always be war among men, because, they are naturally ambitious, and are governed by interest; moreover, zeal for religion, makes them rigid. Holy Scripture teaches us the unity of the Godhead, and, reason

points it out to us: besides, all nature makes us perceive it.

59. To Manifest, Publish, Proclaim.

These three words, imply, open decla|ration; but that of manifest, seems to con|vey, a proof of what is made known; meaning, to shew incontestably: Publish, de|notes, only, a simple declaration, but ge|neral: to proclaim, is, to make known by a formal and legal publication.

When once a man has lost his name, let him manifest his good character, as much as possible, he will find it difficult, to recover the good opinion of mankind, for prejudice is blind, even, to the most visible truths. He who publishes to the world, the failings of another, betrays in himself, a want of humanity, and, is sure to meet with the contempt of every think|ing man. A famous Sultan of Egypt left to posterity, a most remarkable testimony of the vanity of earthly grandeur; for, on his

death-bed, he commanded, that his wind|ing sheet should be carried at the end of a lance, by a herald; who was to proclaim, here is all, that this great prince will carry out of the world with him, of his wealth, dignity, and dominion, that he enjoyed upon earth.

Manifestos of a state, are, usually, publish|ed, by formal proclamation.

60. To Tell, Disclose, Reveal, To Divulge, Discover.

To make known that which is un|known, is the common signification of those words: but, to tell, is to declare things purposely, with a design to inform those, we would not have remain ignorant. To disclose, is to shew, either by design or inadvertency, that which was before con|cealed. To reveal, is to lay open a secret: to divulge, is to do the same abroad. To dis|cover, is the declaring a person to have done a thing, which he would not have been thought the author of.

So great an itch, have some persons for prattling, that they tell every individual thing they hear. Confidents too often dis|close the intrigues, they are entrusted with. Confessors reveal, sometimes, by their im|prudence, the confession of penitents. The divulging of a secret, has, often, done more harm, than any other one thing whatever; as it is impossible to smother, what once has been blazed abroad. If we would not be discovered, we should be careful to have no witness of our actions.

61. Equivocation, Ambiguity, Double-entendre.

Equivocation, has two senses; the one, natural, in which, we would have what we say understood, and, in which, the hearer does, absolutely, understand us; the other, perverted, understood only, by the person speaking. Ambiguity, has one general sense, susceptible of different interpretations; it, always, creates a difficulty in getting at the true sense of the author, and, some|times,

an impossibility. The double-enten|dre, a french word lately naturalized, has two natural and apt significations, one of which presents itself to the common under|standing of all the world; and, by the other is made, a fine allusion, understood, but by certain persons.

These three ways of speaking, are, upon occasion, ingenious methods of concealing one's true meaning: but we make use of an equivocation, to deceive; of an ambi|guity, to keep in the dark, from all; and of a double-entendre, to conceal, from some.

It is beneath the character of an honest man, to make frequent use of equivocati|ons; he that does, being sure to meet with the contempt of mankind. Ambiguities, are perhaps, oftener the effect of a confusion of ideas, than a studied design of keeping people in the dark: we ought never to use them, but when an elucidation would be dangerous. Malice and politeness have introduced the double-entendre, but it should never, be used, at the expence of our neighbours reputation.

62. Great, Big, Large.

The word great, is a general term, sig|nifying any thing considerable either in bulk, extent, quality, number, &c. thus we say, a great house; a great road; a great weight; a great many; a great fa|mine; a great happiness. The words big, and, large, are more circumscribed; big, implies, greatness of bulk; large, greatness of extent. Thus, we say, a big man; a big stone; but, a large room; a large field.

A large man, is as great an impropriety, as a big field; and we need, only, mention a big or large pleasure, to shew the ab|surdity.

63. Grave, Serious, Staid.

We are staid, through discretion and custom; grave, thro' humour and consti|tution; serious, thro' taste and affectation.

Levity is the reverse, of being staid; vi|vacity, of gravity; wantonness, of seriousness.

Aconstant round of business and continual transaction of affairs, make us staid; reflecti|ons on our latter end, give gravity; the desire of being thought grave, seriousness.

64. Genius, Talent.

These are both born with us, and are a happy disposition of nature, by which, we are qualified for some peculiar employ|ment: but genius, seems to be more inter|nal, and possessed of the powers of inven|tion; talent, more external, and capable of execution.

Thus, we have a genius, for poetry and painting; but, a talent, for speaking and writing.

Such as have a genius for mechanics, may have no talent for watch-making.

65. People, Persons.

The word people, is so very general, that it cannot be connected with a determinate number; as, for instance, four, five, or, six people; but that of persons, may.

To be pleasant at table, none should be admitted but people of good humour; neither, should there be more, than seven or eight persons.

In order to describe a company, we should know the quality of the people, and the number of persons, present.

In all governments, we find ill-affected people: and there are, always, among a number, some discontented persons.

66. To Regard, Concern, Touch.

We say, very indifferently, without much choice, that a thing regards us, con|cerns us, or, touches us, to mark the part we bear in it. There, nevertheless, appears to me, to be a delicate distinction between these three expressions, each rising, gra|dually, above the other, according to the rank, in which, I have placed them. Tho' we have the least part, imaginable, in a thing, it may be said, to regard us; to concern us, we must have a greater; but, when we are sensibly affected by it, it may be said, to touch us. It seems also, that the word regard, is more applicable, when our interest is in question; that of concern, when speaking of things, committed to our care and conduct; that of touch, when it respects our honour of fortune.

The ill-behaviour of a servant, to a customer, regards the master; as it affects his interest. The least disturbance in Eu|rope, in some measure, regards every state;

it being difficult, for any of them, to keep a perfect neutrality, for any length of time, while the others are at war. All the operations of government, concern the first minister. It concerns a man, to be punctual, in the discharge of his duty: The conduct of a wife, touches the hus|band, so close, that he ought to have an eye over all she does. The behaviour of an ambassador, touches, always, more or less, the honour of the prince the represents.

Many people make themselves uneasy at that, which does not, in the least, regard them; meddle with what no ways con|cerns them; and, at the same time, are indifferent to those things, which touch them nearly.

67. Tranquillity, Peace, Quiet.

These words, let them be applied either to the soul, to a republic, or any particu|lar society; express, equally, a situation exempt from trouble and molestation;

but tranquillity, relates to that, within one|self, and in the time present, independent of any other relation: peace, to the situa|tion, with regard to enemies, in whose power it is, to make an alteration: quiet, with respect to time past or future, as succeeding or preceding a situation trou|bled.

Uneasy people have no tranquillity in their families. Litigious persons are hardly ever at peace with their neighbours. After a troublesome time, we enjoy a quiet state, with greater satisfaction.

What a state of tranquillity, does the re|ligious man enjoy; no outward things having the power to rufflle or discompose him! To preserve peace, we should keep ourselves, always, in a state of defence. It is indulgence, only, that will establish quiet in a mutinous people.

68. Temple, Church.

Both these words signify, an edifice, set apart for the public service of religion;

but that of temple, is a more pompous ex|pression, and less in use, than church: with respect to the Pagan religion, we, fre|quently use the word temple: as the temple of Apollo; the temple of Janus; but with relation to our own, seldom: St. Paul's church; St. Saviour's church.

Temple, seems to express something, more august, and signifies, properly, and edifice, dedicated to the deity. Church something, more common, signifying, par|ticularly, an edifice, erected for the con|gregation of the faithful.

The grandeur of Solomon's temple, was beyond description. Nothing profane ought to enter the temple of the Lord. The pre|sent thinness of our churches, is a manifest sign of a decrease in religion. Nothing ought to be permitted in church, that does not contributed to the edification of christi|ans.

69. Huge, Vast, Enormous, Immense.

The common idea of these words, is something, greatly, beyond the usual mea|sure; but those, of huge, and, vast, relate, more, to such things, as are material; those, of enormous, and, immense, to such, as are ideal; with this difference, between them; that huge, implies, greatness in bulk; vast, greatness in extent; enormous, greatness in size, even to deformity and dreadful|ness; immense, unlimited extent, even be|yond expression. Thus, we say, a huge giant; a vast tract of land; an enormous crime; the immense expanse.

There are some promontories, so huge, as to shock the eye that views them. The desarts of Arabia, are so vast, that unless travellers carried their lodging and provi|sion with them, they would perish, before they reached their journey's end. The sins of the presumptuous wretch, are so enormous, that he can have little hopes of salvation, but, in the infinite mercies of an all-gracious God. So great is the immen|sity

of the Godhead, as to exceed the ut|most stretch of human thought.

70. Way, Road.

Way, is much more extensive and gene|ral, than road; and implies the passage from place to place, whether through the high road, or not: road, is much more li|mited, and particular, and means the beaten way of travellers, from one town or city to another. Which, says the travel|ler, is our best way to Hampton; the Hounslow road, or Kingston? either road, says his guide, is good; but when we come to Twittenham, the shortest way, is across the fields; tho' the pleasantest way, would be, to go by water.

As the word, way, is, often, used to sig|nify, means; which, when considered as the intermediate step to attainment, is not, widely, different from that, of road; when we would adopt the figure of travelling, not to confuse our ideas, we, generally, make use of the word road: thus, dili|gence

with perseverance, is the high road to preferment; yet, notwithstanding, way is a much more elegant expression: a strict adherence to the principles of christianity, is the direct way to heaven.

71. Ways, Means.

We go, the ways; we use, the means.

Ways, are the methods, we take, means, what, we put in execution, to succeed. The first word, enfolds in its idea, honour and probity; the last, pays little or no regard, but, to the end aimed at. Thus, good ways, are those, which are just; good means, those, which are sure.

Simoniacal practices, are very bad ways; but, very good means, of obtaining bene|fices.

I cannot avoid here, taking notice of the ingrammatical impropriety, of annexing the singular number, to the word means; the fault, almost, of every speaker and writer; liberality, say they, is, a sure means, of becoming popular: there is, no better

means, of keeping in with the world, than that, of passing by affronts, with compo|sure:—Glaring absurdity! since, the word, means, is evidently, plural, and it would be, much more, elegant, was the false concord avoided.

72. Often, Frequently.

One, relates to the repetition of the same acts; the other, to a plurality of objects. We, often, disguise our thoughts: by doing the same thing, often, it becomes habitual. We, frequently, meet with traitors; we, frequently, do those things, which we re|pent of, afterwards.

There are two other words, bearing an equal signification with often, viz. oft, and, oftentimes, but they being, no more, than the same word, abbreviated and lengthened; it is needless, to take any further notice of them.

73. Cannot, Impossible.

One of these words, more properly, re|lates to inability; the other, to impossibi|lity.

We cannot serve two masters. It is im|possible to execute two opposite orders, at the same time.

We cannot love one, by whom we have been injured. It is impossible, to love one, to whom, we have a natural aversion.

74. Glory, Honour.

Glory, expresses something, more singu|lar, than honour. The one, makes us un|dertake, voluntarily, the most difficult things; the other, leads us, willingly, to the execution of the most rigorous exac|tions.

Quest of glory, sometimes, stimulates the soldier's courage, even to rashness; and no|tions

of honour, in spite of fear, keep him, often, to his duty.

An indifference to glory, may pass unno|ticed; but not so, with respect to honour.

It is customary, in conversation, to place interest, in opposition to glory; and incli|nation, to honour: thus, we say, an author, who labours after glory, takes more pains in the completion of his piece; than he, who works, merely for interest: and, when an avaritious man lays out his money, it is more through honour, than inclination.

75. World, Universe.

World, conveys only an idea, of one sin|gle being, though general; that which ex|ists: Universe, an idea, of many beings, or, rather that, of all parts of the world; all that exists: the first, of these words, is, sometimes, used in the literal sense, as when, we say, the old and new world; and sometimes in a figurative, as, when we say, in this world, and in the o|ther; the wicked world; the polite world: the second, is, always, used according to

the letter; and in a sense that excepts no one thing: it is, for this reason, when we would express the universe, by the term, world, that, we are obliged to put the word, all, before it, which, we have no occasion to do, by universe; for example, we should say, the sun warms all the world, and, is the heat of the universe.

76. Answer, Reply.

The answer, is made to a demand or a question, asked; the reply, to an answer or a remonstrance.

Academics are taught first, to start diffi|culties, and then, to answer them. It is nobler, to hear a wise remonstrance, and, profit by it; than make any reply.

The word, answer, is more extensive in its signification, than reply; we answer the questions of those, who ask us; the de|mands, of such, as expect our services; the examination of counsel; the arguments of disputants; the letters we receive; and,

for all our conduct. The word, reply, is far more limited; it supposes a dispute, com|menced from difference of sentiment; we reply, to the answer, of an author whose works we have criticised; to the reprimands of those, whose correction, we are unwilling to submit to; to pleaders; to an answer in chancery.

An answer, should be clear, true, and dictated by reason, and good sense; a reply, strong and convincing, armed by truth, and strengthened by experience.

We should teach children, as much as possible, to give nice and judicious ans|wers; and convince them, that there is more honour, in listning, than in making replies to those, who have the goodness to instruct them.

77. Danger, Hazard, Risk, Venture,

All these words, imply, chance of harm; but that, of danger, relates to the evil, that may happen; those, of hazard, risk, and, venture, to the good, we may lose; with

this difference, that, hazard, expresses some|thing, near; risk, something, at a distance; venture, something, farther off, relating only to the possibility of events. Hence those expressions, in danger, of death; in hazard, of our life; by giving a loose to debau|chery, we risk our health; nothing venture, nothing have.

Danger, creates fear; hazard, alarm; risk, caution; but we, often venture, with the greatest satisfaction.

The avaritious man, spurred on by in|terest, fears no danger; hazards his health and happiness; runs every risk that attends his profession; and, gladly, ventures his all, in search of that, which, if obtained, he would not have the spirit, to enjoy.

78. Against, In spite of.

Both these, denote opposition; but, the expression, in spite of, implies, more resolu|tion and greater force, than the word, against; against, supposing little, or no re|sistance,

in the object opposed; but, in spite of, a considerable struggle.

We act against the will, or, against rule, and, in spite of oppositions.

The good man, does nothing, against the dictates of his conscience. The wicked man, commits sin, in spite of the punish|ment, annexed to it.

Rashness, will attempt things, against all appearance of success; and resolution, will pursue the attempt, in spite of all the obstacles it meets with.

79. Boldness, Audaciousness, Impudence, Effrontery,

There is a commendable holdness, that proceeds from a self-consciousness of worth; but the holdness, which is here meant, springs from ignorance; is brazen and presuming. Audaciousness, is a greater degree of boldness; such, as is steeled a|gainst reproof; is rude and noisy. Impu|dence consists, in being an utter stranger, to all kind of modesty; is scurrilous and abu|sive. Effrontery, proceeds from pride, and

self-sufficiency; is overbearing and inso|lent.

The bold, are unawed by diffidence; they speak, with great assurance; neither the quality or rank of those, they address, being able to disconcert them. The more you reprove the audacious man, the more it hardens him; he, wilfully, forgets the respect, due to his superiors, and, idly, imagines his boisterous behaviour, a dis|tinguishing mark of manhood. The wea|pons of the impudent, are sauciness and abuse; which, they take up at every turn; and, with which, they lay about them, in a most unmerciful manner. As great a cause of effrontery, as any, is the want of education; he, whom it possesses, is ar|rogant and insolent, a stranger to good|sense, and unacquainted with the rules of good-breeding.

80. Profitable, Advantageous, Beneficial.

Profitable, is more applicable to gain; Advantageous, to honour, or any kind of convenience; beneficial, to health.

Some kinds of merchandise, are far more profitable, than others. A good name is very advantageous, as, it serves to push us forward in the world. Loss of blood, to a feverish person, is very beneficial.

Light profits, make a heavy purse. A seasonable word, spoke in favour, is, fre|uently, of more advantage, than the great|est services. The greatest benefit to the soul, is, a sincere repentance.

81. To See, Look at, To Behold, View.

We see, whatever strikes the sight: we look at an object, when we designedly cast our eye upon it: we behold it, when we look with attention: we view it, when we survey it.

We see, all objects before our eyes: we look at, those, which excite our curiosity: we behold, such, as cause our admiration: we view, those, we are desirous to ex|amine.

We see, distinctly or confusedly. We look at, near, or at a distance. We be|hold, with wonder and attention. We view, with care and exactness.

The eyes, open, to see; turn, to look at; fix themselves, to behold; and move all ways, to view.

The connoisseur, in painting, looks at the first picture, he sees; if it be the work of a celebrated artist, he beholds it, with pleasure, and views every part of it, with the greatest minuteness.

82. To Stare, Gaze.

Though the common meaning of these words is, to fix both the eyes upon an ob|ject, and look at it with wonder, intently and earnestly; yet, there is a great diffe|rence between them: staring, implies, looking, with wonder and impudence; gazing, with wonder and respect.

The impudence of some fellows, is so great, that, they will stare, a modest woman, out of countenance.

A man in love, will, sometimes, gaze upon the object of his affections, till he, almost, loses his sight.

When our Saviour first appeared to his disciples, after his resurrection; they gazed on him, with astonishment and rapture.

To stare another, in the face, has, al|ways, been considered, as a breach of good manners.

83. Useful, Serviceable.

As nearly synonymous, as these words may appear to be, there is, yet, a mani|fest difference between them, but the dis|tinction is so delicate, as to require some attention to discover it. Useful, in my opi|nion, is more applicable to things, in use; to those we have often recourse to; and what, cannot be well done without: Ser|viceable, to things, of service, such, as we, oftener, do without, than with: and such, as we little expect to have. Thus, furni|ture is useful; memorandum books, to per|sons engaged in a multiplicity of Business, are useful. Friends and good connections, are serviceable.

The plummet, is so useful to the carpen|ter; that, to fix a perpendicular, without it, would give him a great deal of trouble. Of all animals, a horse, is the most service|able.

To those, who take snuff, a box, is ex|tremely useful; but its contents, very far, from serviceable.

84. Gulph, Abyss.

What these words should express, is ra|ther imaginary, than real: they are, ge|nerally, used therefore in a figurative sense: we are supposed to be swallowed up, by a gulph; and lost, in an abyss. The first, car|ries with it, an idea of insatiable voracity, which drags in and consumes all, that ap|proaches; the second, of an unmeasurable depth, to whose bottom, we can never get; and in which, we lose, at the same time, the sight of the place, from whence, we came, and of that, where, we are going.

A gulph, is supposed to have, many turns and windings; of which, when we have once set a step in, we cannot possibly get out, but are carried on, in spite of all our endeavours to the contrary. An abyss, is supposed to have, many uncertain and obscure roads, without end; in which, tho' we may, sometimes, stoop, in hopes of find|ing a way out; yet, being deceived, we become disheartened, bewildered with doubts, and overwhelmed with despair.

A loose woman, is a gulph of woe, all perishes there; virtue, riches, and health. Philosophy, teaches us, that man is, con|tinually, wandering, in an abyss of dark|ness.

85. Determination, Resolution.

Determination, is an act of judgment, and supposes examination; resolution, an act of the will, and supposes deliberation: the first shuts out suspence; the last, wa|vering.

Our determinations, should be just, to avoid repentance; our resolutions, fixed, to exclude variation.

Nothing is more disagreeable, both to ourselves and others; than to be, always, undetermined, in our affairs, and irresolute, in our proceedings.

It is more difficult, to determine on points of precedence; than, on solid and real in|terests.

There are, no weaker resolutions than those, made at confession, or, on a sick-bed; the first return of health, carry|ing us again, into the same course of life.

We may be determined, and yet not re|solved; that is, we may come to some de|cision, and still, not be so far resolved, as to put that decision, into execution; fear, timidity, or, some other motive, may pre|vent us.

The determinations of women, are seldom better grounded, than on whimsey or ca|price: Men, are, so often, led by taste and custom: that, their resolutions are, gene|rally, vain.

In science, we say, the determination of a point; the resolution of a difficulty.

The more, we determine, the less, we prove. Though, in the schools, we answer every difficulty, we resolve but few.

86. Old, Ancient, Antique.

These words rise one upon the other; antique, upon ancient, and that, of ancient, upon old.

A fashion is old, when it ceases to be in use; ancient, when its use, has been, some|time, past; antique, when it has been, a long time, ancient.

That, which is recent, is not old; that, which is new, is not ancient; that, which is modern, is not antique.

Oldness agrees best with age; ancientness, with the origin of families; antiquity, with what existed in former times.

As we grow old, we decrease in strength; but gain more experience.

Ancientness, makes fashions disagreeable; but adds splendour to nobility.

Antiquity, destroys the proofs of history, and weakens credit; but renders monu|ments of greater value.

87. General, Universal.

General, implies, a great number of par|ticulars; universal, every particular.

The government of princes, has no ob|ject in view, but, the general good. The providence of God, is universal.

An orator speaks, in general, when he makes no particular application. Know|ledge is universal, when it knows every thing.

Christianity is, generally, known and be|lieved; but, not universally.

88. Word, Term, Expression,

Nothing is more common, than an in|discriminate use of these words; and yet none differ more among themselves. A word, is a single part of speech; is gene|ral, and determined by use: Term, is a

particular cast of language; owes its for|mation to the subject, and its excellence, to its suitableness. Expression, is a certain mode of speech; rises from thought, and is, more or less, beautiful, according to its particular turn.

The purity of language, depends upon its words; the precision, upon its terms; and brilliancy, upon its expressions.

Elaborate discourses, require the words, to be, truly, English; the terms, proper; and the expressions noble.

A word, which has escaped us, unde|signedly, sometimes, has been attended with fatal consequences. Terms of art, are now, pretty generally, known; however, they appear with little grace, except, in the mouths of the professors of those arts. Starched or far-fetched expressions, carry with them, an air of pedantry.

89. Pile, Heap,

These words, equally, signify a quantity of things together, one upon another;

with this difference, that pile, rather means, things put up, regularly; whereas, heap, implies no other order in the arrangement, than what rises from chance. As, a pile of wood; a heap of rubbish.

We say, a pile of bricks; when they are, the materials, prepared for building; and a heap of bricks, when they are, the remains of a fallen edifice.

90. Departure, Death, Decease.

Departure, is a stile, more refined, and carries with it, an idea of the passage, from one life, to another; death, more com|mon, and signifies, precisely, extinction of life; decease, more studied, is a term somewhat bordering upon the law, and im|plies, the refuge of mortality. The se|cond, of these words, is made use of, with respect to all sorts of animals; the other two, to man only.

A glorious departure, is preferable to a shameful life. Death, is the common lot

of all things living. Succession, does not take place, 'till the moment of decease.

Departure presents nothing horrid to the imagination, it indicates something agree|able, in eternity: decease, conveys, only, an idea of trouble, in being separated from things, we are much attached to: but death, presents something dreadful and affrighting.

91. Value, Worth.

Value, rises from the intrinsic good|ness of things; worth from the estimation, of them.

Of two things, the best, is the most valuable; and that worth most, that bears the greatest price.

92. Valley, Bottom, Vale, Dale.

Of these four words, valley, implies, a narrow space, situated between two hills; bottom, a like space, but, quaggy and disa|greeable.

Vale, signifies, a space, more extended: whereas, dale, means, rather, low lands.

The words, dale and vale, are, oftener, found in poetry; valley and bottom, in prose.

Valleys are, for the most part, winding, and, as they receive water from the hills on each side, are, generally, converted into meads. He, whose house stands in a bot|tom, cannot live on a more unhealthy spot. A fine vale, with beautiful enclosures, bounded by rising woods, is a delightful prospect. Dales, are much easier to be ploughed, than hilly lands.

93. Head, Chief.

The word head, is reckoned synonymous only, to chief, when used in a figurative sense; but, even then, it requires a diffe|rent application. Head, agrees best, with respect to arrangement: chief, with regard to subordination. Thus, we say, the head

of a batallion, or, a ship; the chief of a party, or, an undertaking.

A commander in chief, is generally, at the head of his troops.

94. Impediment, Obstacle, Obstruction.

There seems to be a gradation in these words. The impediment, stays; the obsta|cle resists; the obstruction, puts an entire stop to.

We say, remove the impediment; sur|mount the obstacle; take away or vanquish the obstruction.

Even small impediments, sometimes, prove such obstacles, as obstruct our best endeavours.

The word, impediment, seems to express something, rising from the nature and proper circumstances of what we are about; that, of obstacle, something, from a foreign cause; that of obstruction, some|thing, proceeding from a superior force.

Every temptation, may be said, to im|pede

our resolutions to virtue. The elo|quence of Demosthenes, was the greatest obstacle, that Philip of Macedon found, in all his political undertakings, and which he could never surmount, but by force of arms. Nearness of kin, is an obstruction to marriage, which the laws have made, and which, those laws, only, can take away.

95. Learning, Literature, Erudition.

Of all order of words, there does not appear a more regular climax than in the above three; which seems to be compleat|ed, by the word, KNOWLEDGE; but as that, has never been accounted synonymous with these, I shall take no notice of it, here.

Learning, implies, simply, that know|ledge, which we acquire, by our common study at school. Literature, denotes, po|lite learning, or, an acquaintance with the BELLES LETTRES, and is rather, practical:

but erudition, signifies, great depth of knowledge, with a particular relation to that, which is speculative.

Without some degree of learning, 'tis impossible to pass well, through the world. There was a time, when the nobility piqued themselves, on being men of literature. A taste for erudition, will furnish infinite amusement, for a tranquil and retired life.

96. To Inquire, Interrogate, Ask.

We inquire, we interrogate, we ask, in or|der to know; but the verb, inquire, im|plies, curiosity; that, of interrogate, au|thority; that of ask, something, more, civil and respectful.

The words inquire, and interrogate, make sense, by themselves; but, to use the word ask, with propriety, we must add the mat|ter to it; that is, to make the sense per|fect, we must mention the thing we ask.

'Tis the business of a spy, to make en|quiries. Criminals are interrogated by the judge. The soldier asks orders from the commanding officer.

97. To Shun, Avoid, Fly.

We shun, those persons, whom we would not see, or by whom, we would not be seen. We avoid, doing things, that are disagree|able to us. We fly, both persons and things, which we fear and dread.

In the words, shun and avoid, which seem to have the nearest affinity to each other; there is this standing difference, that, the word, shun, is generally, ap|plied to persons; that, of avoid, to things.

In order to fly, we turn to the opposite side, and get quick away, to prevent be|ing taken; in order to shun, we take ano|ther road, getting slily away, to avoid be|ing seen, or to escape a trap; in order to avoid, we use some extraordinary means.

We shun troublesome company. We avoid running into excess. We fly those, who pursue us.

Knowlege of the world, makes us shun. Prudence makes us avoid. Fear, makes us fly.

The best remedy against the plague, is to fly far from the place where it is. The surest method of preserving our innocence, is to shun bad company. It is an act of the greatest weakness, not to avoid doing those things, which are detrimental to our in|terest.

98. Severity, Rigour.

Severity, shews itself, chiefly, in the manner of thinking and judging; it con|demns readily and admits of no excuse. Ri|gour, is seen, particularly, in the manner of punishing; it pardons nothing, nor lightens the stroke.

False-devotees are severe, only, to others, whom, they are ever eager to condemn; and are always, applauding their own ac|tions. Rigour, can never be justifiable,

but, at those times, when example is of the utmost consequence; yet, even then, some sort of allowance should be made for human frailty.

99. To Succour, Help, To Assist, Relieve.

We make use of the word, succour, in danger; help, in labour; assist, in want; relieve, in distress. The first, springs from a motive of generosity; the second, from good nature; the third, from humanity; the fourth, from compassion.

We give succour, in battle; we help, when we carry part of another's burden; we assist, the poor; and relieve, the af|flicted.

The policy of states has found it neces|sary to succour each other, when the pow|er of any one of them, is gaining too great a head. Very extraordinary things have been done, by the joint help of num|bers. Many a parent, has beggar'd him|self, in advancing the fortune of his child, tis therefore, the indispensable duty of that child, to assist his father, to the utmost

of his power. The truly compassionate man, receives, as much inward satisfaction in relieving the distressed, as he commu|nicates.

100. Always, Continually, Perpetually.

That which we do, always, we do, at all times, and on all occasions; that, which is done, continually, is done, without inter|ruption, or intermission, but, for a time limited; whereas, what is done, perpetu|ally, is done, also, without intermission, and, without any regard to time.

We should, always, prefer our duty to our pleasure. It is impossible to be, conti|nually, at work. The heavenly bodies are, perpetually, in motion.

To please in company, we should, always, talk well, but not, continually. The longi|tude may be discovered by perpetual motion.

101. Diversity, Variety.

Diversity, supposes a change, which taste is always in search of; in order to dis|cover some novelty that may enliven and delight it: variety, supposes a plurality of things, differing from each other in like|ness, which cheers the imagination, apt to be cloyed with too great a uniformity.

Without some diversity, life would be, altogether, insipid. Nature has thrown infi|nite variety among the smallest objects; which, if we cannot perceive, is owing to a defect of light.

An agreeable diversity of colours, will give as much pleasure to the eye, as har|monious sounds to the ear. Variety of amusements, insensibly, lead us into a dis|sipation.

102. Difference, Dispute, Quarrel,

Opposition of interests, causes differences. Contrariety of opinions, produces disputes.

Harshness of dispositions, is the source of quarrels.

We make up, the difference. We end, the dispute. We appease, the quarrel.

Envy and covetousness, make, some|times, great differences for trifles. Prejudice and want of attention to what is said, commonly, prolong disputes. Quarrels, for the most part, proceed more from dis|position, than animosity.

103. Ill, Sick.

These two words, are considered, only, as synonymous, when they imply, afflicted with disease; but, as indiscriminately, as they may be used, even in that sense, still, they convey different ideas, marking diffe|rent degrees of illness. The word ill, in my opinion, is used, with most propriety, when health is the least impaired; that of sick, when the body is greatly diseased. Thus we say, when we find a heaviness upon the spirits, or, a want of appetite:

that we are ill; but when the whole frame of any one is disordered, we, naturally, say, he is sick.

When we apply either of these words to ourselves, they carry very different mean|ings; thus, I am ill, is general, and implies, disordered, in any part of the body; whereas, I am sick, is particular, and means, disordered, in the stomach.

There is, yet, a further distinction be|tween them; Ill, is most applicable, when in pain only; sick, when diseased; thus, we say, he is ill of the gout; but, sick, of a fever.

104. Disease, Distemper, Sickness.

Disease and distemper, imply, particular disorders, with this difference, that, disease is more applicable to man; distemper, to brutes; whereas, sickness, is more general, and may be applied to either.

Diseases, such as the plague, fevers, &c. are, sometimes, so epidemical, as to

lay waste more, than the sword. Distempers, among cattle, are, generally, infectious. Divine displeasure hath, often, shewn it|self, by a general sickness, among men and beasts.

Both diseases and distempers, when, be|come universal, are sicknesses, so severe, as draw the joint prayers of a people, in hopes, to avert them.

105. Weary, Tired, Fatigued.

It is the continuation of the same thing, that either, wearies, or tires, with this dif|ference, that, weary, implies, a less de|gree; tired, a greater; but it is labour that fatigues. We grow weary, or tired with standing. We are fatigued with work.

When we are weary of a thing, to com|plete it, we lack spirits; when, tired, we are, totally, unable; when fatigued, we want strength to go through it, as we would.

Weariness, proceeds, sometimes, from an unwillingness, in what we undertake; we are, frequently, tired, through disposition of body, and slow circulation of blood; but, fatigue, is, always, the consequence of much action; it supposes excess of work, with respect, either to difficulty or length of time.

In a figurative sense, a petitioner grows weary, through his impatience; tired, thro' his perseverance; and fatigued, through his importunities.

We are weary, with waiting; tired, with ill-success; and fatigued with pursuing.

Thus, may we be weary, and not tired; tired, yet, not fatigued.

106. Light, Brightness, Splendor.

Light, is, the origin or commencement of brightness; splendor, is, brightness in per|fection.

The intention of light, is, only, to make objects visible, that, of brightness, to make them, clearly, distinguishable and known: splendor, shews them, to the greatest de|gree of perfection.

It is light at day-break; bright, in the morning; splendid, at noon.

We attribute light, to the stars; bright|ness, to the moon; and splendor, to the sun.

107. Lustre, Brilliancy, Radiancy.

These three words, as the last, rise, gra|dually, one upon another, and mark the different degrees of the effect of light.

Lustre, seems to be possessed of polish, only; brilliancy, of light; but, radiancy, of fire.

Lustre, shines, only; brilliancy, dazzles; but, radiancy, glares.

We, seldom, make use of the word lustre, but, in the literal sense; whereas, we, frequently, use that, of radiancy, and,

much more often, that, of brilliancy, in the figurative. Considered then, in this sense, it appears to me, that, it is the force of truth, the energy of language, and the newness of the thoughts, that give radiancy, to a discourse; whereas, brilliancy, rises from the beautiful turns and lively touches of expression: and that, it is the choice of words, the agreement of terms, and the ar|rangement of phrases, that give a lustre, to what is said.

108. Wisdom, Prudence.

Wisdom, makes us act and speak, pro|perly; prudence, prevents our speaking, or acting, improperly. The first, in order to attain its ends, searches out the best paths to follow: the second, that it may not miss its aim, tries, to discover the bad ways, in order to avoid them.

Wisdom, is more knowing; prudence, more wary.

The wise man, makes use of those means, that are most proper for his purpose; he conducts himself, by the light of reason. The prudent, man, takes those ways, he thinks most sure; he does not venture, in|to places unknown.

An ancient writer, has said, that, it is a mark of wisdom, not to talk on any sub|ject, but what, we are thorough masters of, especially, if we would be esteemed: we, may add to this maxim, that, it is a piece of prudence, not to bring a disagreeable sub|ject on the tapis, particularly, if we are de|sirous of being beloved.

109. To Find, Meet with.

We find, things, unknown, or, which we sought after. We meet with, things, that are in our way, or, which present them|selves to us, unsought for.

The unfortunate, find, always, some re|source, in their misfortunes. People, who

readily unite themselves with all the world, are liable to meet with bad company.

110. Union, Joining.

Union, relates, particularly, to two dif|ferent things, which agree together. Join|ing, respects properly two distant things, which draw near together, one after the other.

The word, union, carrys with it an idea of agreement, and fitness: that, of joining, seems to suppose, some kind of motion.

We say, the union, of colours; and the joining, of armies: the union, of two neigh|bours; and the joining, of two rivers.

That, which is not united, is divided: that which is not joined, is separated.

We unite, in order to form a society. We join, for the sake of company.

Union, is, often, used, in a figurative sense; but joining, only, in the literal.

Union, is the support of families, and the power of states. The joining of many streams, forms great rivers.

111. Situation, Condition, State.

The words, situation and condition, imply, something accidental, and transitory; with this difference, that situation, respects out|ward circumstances; condition, those, within the matter referred to; whereas, that of state, implies, something, more habitual, and lasting.

We, generally, use the word, situation, as relative, to affairs, rank or fortune; condition, with respect, to the nature, qua|lity or property of a thing; and that, of state, applying it to health, or, our well or ill-being.

We say, our situation is bad; when we are surrounded with difficulties: that a building is in bad condition; when out

of repair; and, that some persons en|joy but an indifferent state of health.

An ill-state of health, added to a bad situation of affairs, is a condition, into which, every man must, naturally, dread the fal|ling.

Such is the condition, and vicissitude of human life, that, the most prudent men, have, often, found themselves in perplex|ing situations; and from a state of happiness, have, as it were, through the perverseness of fortune, fallen into one most wretched and deplorable.

112. Of Fashion, Of Quality.

As synonymous, as these expressions may be, in the mouths of those, who use them; they, still, imply particular characters, in their right signification, when we are ob|liged, on certain occasions, to express our|selves properly. The last of these expres|sions, rises upon the first, and signifies the nobility; whereas, by the other, is, only, understood the gentry.

The pride and folly of the world is grown to so great a pitch, that persons in trade, are, continually, apeing people of of-fashion; and those, of-fashion, people of|quality.

113. Notes, Remarks, Observations.

Notes, imply, a shortness and precision: remarks, a choice and distinction: obser|vations, something critical and far-fetched.

Notes, are, often, necessary: remarks, are, sometimes, useful: observations, should be, always, learned.

Change of manners and customs, for the most part, render authors in want of notes. There are as good remarks, perhaps, to be made upon the moderns, as upon the ancients. Historical observations, make antiquity more known.

114. To Take, Receive, Accept.

We take, what, is given us. We receive, what, is sent us. We accept, what, is offered us.

We take, money; we receive, favours; we accept, services.

To accept, implys, always, consent and approbation; to receive, does not; to take, excludes, only, refusal.

No man should ever take more, than his due. We should, always, acknowledge those civilities we have received. What, we have once accepted, should, never afterwards be rejected.

115. Sentiment, Opinion, Thought.

These words are all in use, when the bare expression, only, of ideas, is in ques|tion. In this fense, sentiment, is more certain; it is a belief, raised by solid or apparent reasons; opinion, is more doubt|ful; it is a judgement, built on some foun|dation: Thought, is still less certain; spring|ing, only, from conjecture.

The word sentiment, is used, with more propriety, when the subject, is on taste. That, Homer is an excellent poet, is the sentiment, of every man of learning. The word opinion, agrees best, when talking of science. It is the general opinion, that the sun, is the centre of the world. The word thought, is, more particularly, in use, when we are judging of the event of things or, the actions of men. Politicians have long thought, that, the Moscovians would find a greater advantage from Asia, than from Europe.

Sentiments, are, in some measure, guided, by the influence of the heart; we, often, find them in favour of those persons we love. Opinions, are frequently, owing to prejudice; it is common for scholars, to have good ones for their masters. Thoughts, rise, greatly, from imagination; they are, often, chimerical.

116. Resolution, Courage, Valour, Bravery, Intrepidity.

Resolution, either banishes fear or sur|mounts it; it will not admit a falling back, but is staunch on all occasions. Courage, is impatient to attack; it undertakes boldly, and is not lessened by difficulty. Valour, acts with vigour; it gives no way to resist|ance, but, pursues its enterprize, in spite of opposition. Bravery, knows no fear; it runs nobly into danger, and prefers ho|nour to life itself. Intrepidity, encounters the greatest perils with the utmost cool|ness; and dares, even present, death.

The three first of these words, seem more relative to action, than the two last; and the two last, seem to imply, a greater fearfulness of danger, than the three first.

Resolution, supports us in action. Courage, makes us advance. Valour, makes us exe|cute. Through bravery, we expose our|selves to danger. We would sacrifice our|selves through intrepidity.

Resolution, should never desert us: cou|rage, should, always, determine us to do right: valour, would never make us des|pise the enemy: bravery, should not pride itself in opposition: nor, should intrepidity, shew itself, but, in cases of duty or neces|sity.

117. Angry, In a Passion, Passionate.

An impatient agitation, or, rising of the blood, against any one, who has offended us, is the common import of the two first, of these terms: The word, angry, implies, a passion more internal and lasting; where|as the expression, in a passion, carries in its idea, a sudden, external gust of anger; short, but violent.

Anger, shall, sometimes, brood in the breast, for years; till at last it becomes, as it were, fixed and settled; sometimes, it will dissemble, for a long while together; but, often, finds it extremely difficult to pardon: On the contrary, it is the gene|ral characteristic of those, who are in a passion, to forgive, as soon as it subsides; which may, perhaps, be the next quarter of an hour; besides, the man, in a passion, cannot dissemble; his violence of anger, must have vent; when that's obtained, he is as cool as before: indeed, his passion, will now and then, settle into confirmed

anger, but when that is the case, it is, ge|nerally, owing to repeated offences.

With respect to the word, passionate, there is a wide difference, between the man in a passion, and the passionate man; the one, being extraordinary, the other, ordinary.

Few men, for example, can avoid being in a passion, when, they are, greatly, of|fended; but passionate people, are heated, on the most trifling occasions.

118. Hasty, Passionate.

According to my conception, it appears, that hasty, relates, more, to action or blows; and that, passionate, goes seldom farther, than words.

A hasty man, is apt to lift his hand; it is, generally, with him, a word and a blow. A passionate man, will vent his anger in words, only.

We should be upon our guard, when, with hasty people; and have patience, with the passionate.

119. Strong, Robust, Stout, Sturdy.

Strength, is, chiefly, owing to the con|struction of the muscles. A little man is, often, stronger, than a greater. Robustness, carries with it, an idea of lustiness, is less subject to infirmities, and, much owing to constitution. A short man, may be robust. By stout, we understand tall and strong|made. A little man, tho' never so strong, cannot be called, stout. By sturdy, we mean stout, with a degree of hardiness.

Strength, gives a man an advantage over his enemies; robustness, lends him, an air of dignity and authority; stoutness, makes him, admired; sturdiness, is accompanied, with an air of meanness.

120. Complaisant, Polite, Well-bred.

Complaisance, rises from the respect we shew those, whom we meet; is, sometimes, sincere, sometimes, not; politeness, from the flattering methods, we make use of in our behaviour and conversation; and is, gene|rally, insincere; but, to be well-bred, is to shew the same honours, always, with sin|cerity.

Complaisance, is the characteristic of the lover; politeness, of the courtier; but, to be well-bred, denotes, the gentleman.

We should be complaisant, without im|portunity; and polite, without insipidity. The distinguishing mark of a well-bred man, is, the constant care he takes, never to disgust or offend.

121. Hump-backed, Crocked, Deformed.

The true meaning of the word, hump|backed, is, having a rising, upon the back, owing either to crookedness, or some other cause, and may be either natural or acci|dental: tho' the words, crooked and deform|ed, convey other ideas, still nothing is more common, than to find them, fre|quently, in use to express the same as hump-backed. By crookedness, is understood, any deviation from natural straitness. De|formity, implies, any part of the body being imperfect or unnatural. Thus, a man is crooked, if any ways, twisted or bent from the natural shape; and deformed, if he has an eye, a finger, or, a toe, too little, or, too much. We may be hump-backed, or, crook|ed, by a fall, or, some other accident; but deformed, we cannot be, otherwise, than by a defect or exuberance in nature.

A man may be deformed, and not crook|ed; crooked, yet, not hump backed.

122. Perfect, Finished, Complete.

Perfection, regards, properly, the beauty, which rises from the design and construction of the work; finishing, from the workman|ship and hand, of the workman. Completion, depends upon the want of nothing; but, on the work's having every thing, it should have. The first, excludes all sorts of de|fect. The second, shews a particular care and attention, to the minutest article. The third, respects more, the totality of parts.

We may, easily, make a thing com|plete; and with much pains, finish it; but, after all, it may not be perfect.

123. Misfortune, Disaster, Calamity.

Each, of these words, denotes, a sad event; but, that, of misfortune, is applied to

casualties, and, outward circumstances, things detached from us. Disaster, respects, properly, personal accidents. Calamity, im|plies, something, more general.

It is a misfortune, to lose our money or our friend. It is a disaster, to fall or be wounded. It is a calamity, to find our|selves, suddenly, disgraced and ruined in the world.

We say, a great misfortune; a shocking disaster; and a dreadful calamity.

Misfortunes, will happen to the best of men. We bring disasters, frequently, upon ourselves, thro' want of proper care. Ca|lamities, are, often, sent by heaven, upon the wicked, to rouse them, from their sin|ful lethargy.

124. To Consent, Acquiesce, Agree.

We consent, to the will of others, by permitting. We acquiesce, in what is pro|posed, by conforming. We agree, to what is said, by approving.

We, naturally, oppose, what, we do not consent to; discourage, what, we will not acquiesce in; and, dispute, what, we cannot agree to.

It appears to me, that, the word, con|sent, supposes some authority, in the per|son consenting; that, of acquiesce, some sub|mission, in the person acquiescing; and that, the word agree, denotes, some aversion to dispute.

Parents, consent, to the marriage of their children. Parties, acquiesce, in the decree of a judge. Well-bred persons, agree, al|most, to every thing.

125. Management, Direction, Administration, Conduct, Government.

Management, respects, only, private things, trusted to the care of some one, to employ for the profit of another, and, to whom, he is to render an account; as that of a clerk, to his master. Direction, relates to certain affairs, where, there is a distribu|tion, either of money, office or whatever

else, is committed to the care of another, to preserve necessary order. Administration, refers to objects of greater consequence, such, as those of justice, or, the finances of a state; it supposes a pre-eminence of employ, which gives power, credit, and, a kind of liberty, in the department, the person is engaged in. Conduct, points out some knowledge and ability, with respect to things; and, a subordination, with re|gard to persons. Government, results from authority and dependance; it indicates a superiority of office, with a particular rela|tion, to policy.

Whosoever has the management of any one's concerns in trust; should be as at|tentive and as careful, as if they were his own. He, who undertakes the direction of public charities; should divest himself of all prejudice and partiality. A judge ought to be wisely circumspect in the ad|ministration of justice; and, a prime mi|nister intently wary, in the administration of public affairs. No one thing should be committed to the conduct of another, un|less, we are well perswaded, he has abili|ties, adequate to the task; and will act in conformity, to the intentions of him, whose

business he undertakes. The man, who, thro' favour of his prince, is offered the helm of government; should, seriously, re|flect on the arduous office; and not suffer his ambition, to get the better of his dis|cretion.

126. Affront, Insult, Abuse,

Affront, is an arrow of reproach and con|tempt, shot in public; it piques and mor|tifies those, who have any sense of honour. Insult, is an attack, made with insolence; it is, usually, repelled with spirit. Both affronts and insults, may be given without words; but, abuse results, chiefly, from scurrilous language.

Affronts, are, often, given through the childish itch of revenge. Insults, are, too frequently the offspring of pride. We seldom, if ever, hear abuse, in the mouth of a well-bred man.

Happy is that person, that can put up affronts, with composure; bear insults, with calmness; and, turn a deaf ear, to a|buse.

127. To, In order, to.

These terms are synonymous in that sense, where, they signify, doing one thing, in view of another; but the word, to, de|notes, a nearer view; the expression, In order, to, one, farther off.

We get introduced to a prince, to make our court: we make our court to him, in order, to obtain his favours.

The word, to, seems to agree best, when what we do, in view of some other thing, is, almost, certain to take effect. The expression, in order, to, appears to be used, with most propriety, when the thing we have in view, may not be the immedi|ate consequence.

We fire cannon, against a besieged place, to make a breach, and in order, to

take it, by assault, or, oblige the enemy to surrender.

To, respects, more particularly, an effect, which ought to be produced. In order, to, regards, properly, an aim, which we would obtain.

Young women, at a certain age, do all they can to please, in order, to procure them|selves, husbands.

128. Outside, Appearance.

In the literal sense; it is, the walls, the ditches, the courts, the gardens, the ave|nues that forms the outside of a castle; but it is, the figures, the grandeur, the situation, and, the architecture, that determines the ap|pearance: the outside, being the external part of a thing; the appearance, the effect, which a view of that thing produces, or the idea, we form of it, by that view.

In the figurative sense; outside, is, oft|ner, applied to our manners, and, our way of living: appearance, seems to be more in

use, with respect to our actions and our conduct.

A brilliant outside, is no certain proof, of a good fortune. Going, frequently, to church, is an appearance, that can deter|mine little, with regard to virtue.

129. Vision, Apparition.

A vision, passes, inwardly, in the mind; and, is supposed to be, only, an action of the imagination. An apparition, strikes the senses, outwardly, and, is supposed to be, an object from without.

Joseph was warned by a vision, to fly into Egypt, with his family. Mary Mag|delen was informed of the resurrection of our Saviour, by an apparition.

Feverish persons, often, think they see visions. Timid and credulous people, sometimes, take trees or posts, for appa|ritions; and, frequently, objects of their own imagination.

130. To See, Perceive.

Objects, that have some duration, or, that shew themselves, are seen; those, that pass by quickly, or, are hid, in some measure, from the eye, are, only, perceived.

We see the face, and, by that, perceive the disposition of the heart.

In a crowded court, those, who stand forward, are seen, by the prince; while others, behind, are scarcely perceived.

131. To Fear, be Apprehensive, To Dread, be Afraid.

We fear, an ill; through a natural a|version to it, and, from a sense, that it may happen to us: we are apprehensive, of losing a benefit; through an eager desire to obtain it, and, from a conviction that we never may: we dread, our adversary; through sentiments of esteem, when we

know him our superior: we are afraid of danger; through a timid disposition.

Want of courage, makes us fear: Doubt of success, makes us apprehensive. Distrust of strength, makes us dread. Imagination itself, will, often, make us afraid.

Common people fear death, more than any thing: the Epicureans were, much more, in fear of pain; but gentlemen, are of opinion, they ought to fear nothing, so much as infamy. The more, ardently, we wish for a thing, the more we apprehend the losing of it. Whatever merit, an au|thor may flatter himself that he has, he should always dread the judgment of the public. Women, who are afraid of nothing, but losing their reputation; do honour to their sex.

132. To Teach, Learn, Instruct.

To teach, is, only, to give lessons: to learn, is, to give lessons, with success: both which words, relate more to those

things, that are proper to cultivate the mind, and, form a good education; for, which reason, we use them with propriety, when the arts and sciences, are in question. To instruct, has a greater relation, to that, which is useful, in the conduct of life and success of affairs; it is, therefore, in its proper place, when speaking of any thing, that concerns either our duty, or, our in|terest.

Professors teach, in public schools, those, who come to hear them. The historian learns, posterity, the events of his times. A father instructs, his children, how they ought to live in the world.

It requires great knowledge, to teach method and plainness, to learn others; ex|perience and abilities, to instruct.

Many persons attempt to teach, what, they have occasion to study themselves. Some will undertake to learn others, what, they, themselves, are, almost ignorant of. Very few, are capable of instructing.

133. Gentle, Tame.

Gentle animals, are, naturally so; tame ones, are so, partly by the art and indus|try of man.

The dog, the ox, and, the horse, are gentle animals; the bear, and, the lion, are some|times, tame.

134. To Bind, Tie.

We bind, to prevent the limbs moving, or, the parts of a thing separating; we tie, to stop a thing, or, prevent its going any farther.

We bind the feet and hands of a crimi|nal; and, we tie him to a stake.

In the figurative sense, a man is bound, when he is not at liberty to act; and, he is tied, when he cannot change his party, or, quit it.

Authority and power bind: interest and love tie.

We do not think ourselves bound, when we see not our bonds; and, we do not ima|gine ourselves tied, when we have no occa|sion to use our liberty.

135. To Hope. Expect.

The first of these words has, for its ob|ject, success in itself, and denotes, a trust, born up by some encouragement. The se|cond, regards, particularly, the happy mo|ment of event, and intimates, a certainty of its arriving; we hope, to obtain things: we expect, their coming.

We should always hope, for the indul|gence of heaven; and, expect, without mur|muring, the hour of Providence.

What we hope for, seems to be more a favour or a kindness; what we expect, more a duty or obligation. Thus, we hope, for favourable answers to our demands; and, we expect, such as are agreeable to our propo|sitions.

I hope, my work will meet with the taste of the public; and, I expect, an equitable sentence.

136. Weight, Influence, Sway.

Taking these words in the sense, of hav|ing power over the minds of others; weight, implies, prevalence, tho' small; influence, seems to have more force; sway, is more absolute.

Superiority of rank and reason, gives weight; it is commonly by persuasion, that it acts. Attachment to persons contri|butes much to the influence, they have over us; it is by sollicitation, it prevails. The art of finding out and taking advan|tage of the weakness of men, forms the sway, we bear over them; 'tis by watch|ing their motion, that we succeed.

The weight we have with others, pro|ceeds, always, from some worth, in our|selves, either of mind, birth or fortune. Influence is owing to some tye, either of

heart or interest. Sway, rises from an as|cendency, arrogated by art, or, ceded to us, thro' weakness.

A person of weight, has succeeded, some|times, when arguments would have no force. Influence, on some occasions, hath wrought, almost, miracles, effecting that, which money could not bring to bear. Sway, is a wonderful operator on weak minds: procuring that, through art, which no other thing can, possibly, ob|tain.

What perverseness then, can possibly withstand a man of some weight in himself; whose influence is great, and, who knows how to bear a proper sway.

137. Authority, Power, Dominion,

We find in the word, authority, suffici|ent energy to make us perceive a right, either of civil or politic administration. There is in the word, power, a particular relation to the subordinate execution of

superior orders. The word, dominion, carries with it, an idea of empire.

It is the law, which gives authority; it deriving all its might, from thence. Power, is invested in delegates, those, to whom the execution of the laws is entrusted, and is, consequently, in subordination to au|thority. Dominion, springs from the joint consent of the people, or, from the force of arms, and, is either lawful or tyran|nical.

We are happy, in living under the autho|rity of a Prince, who prides himself in justice; whose ministers assume no power, beyond what is legal; and, who makes the welfare of his subjects, the basis of his dominion.

Authority, if weak, is exposed to con|tempt; it is, equally, as dangerous, not to make use of it on proper occasions, as, even, to abuse it. A blind power, which acts in opposition to justice, becomes odious, and paves the way to its own ruin. A jealous dominion, that admits of no sharer, makes itself formidable; awakens, on that ao|count, the ardor of its enemies, and, thus, ushers in its own fall.

There appears to me, particularly, in the idea of authority, something just and re|spectable; in the idea of power, something strong and active; and, in the idea of domi|uion, something great and elevated.

As there is none but God, that has an unlimited authority; so, there is none else, who has infinite power; neither is there any absolute, sovereign, and independent domini|on, than his.

Nature has established no authority among men, but that of fathers, over their children; all other, proceeds from positive right. The power of the passions, is the true spring of action, and, determines us, with respect, either to good or evil. It is not only by the disposition of human laws, that marriage places the woman under the dominion of the man; but, it is, also, so set|tled by the divine.

138. Volume, Book.

A volume, may contain many books: A book, may make many volumes. The

binding, properly, distinguishes the vo|lumes; and, the division of the work, the books.

We must not, always, judge of the knowledge of an author, by the largeness of the volume. Works are, sometimes, spread out into many books, which would be more valuable, were they reduced to one.

139. To have a Mind, for, Long for, Wish for, To Hanker after, Lust after.

The last, of these expressions, is more used in theology, and supposes, always, an illicit object, forbid by the laws of God; thus, we lust after a woman; or, the goods of another. The others, are all, in common use, and, express our inclination to a thing, be it what it will; with the following diffe|rence between them. We, have a mind, for, or, long for, a present object; but, have a mind, seems attended with more knowledge and reflection; long for, more opinion and more taste: we wish for things, farther

distant: we hanker after things, that more affect us.

Princes, sometimes, have a mind, to gra|tify their ambition, at the expence of their future welfare. Women with child, fre|quently, long for most things they see: Lazy people, often, sit down and content themselves, with wishing for those things, they would, presently, obtain, if diligent and assiduous. Some children will hanker, a long time, after their nurses, and, it is with the greatest difficulty, they can be brought to forget them.

140. Gain, Profit, Lucre, Emolument.

Gain, seems to arise from something ve|ry casual; and implies, risk and hazard; it is for this reason, the word, is in great use among gamesters and tradesmen. Pro|fit, appears to be more sure; proceeding either from lands or industry. Thus, we say, the profits of the earth; or, the profits of our labour. The characteristic of lu|cre, consists in a simple relation, to the passion of interest; 'tis on this account,

we say, with the greatest propriety, that man is fond of lucre. Emolument relates to commissions and employments; intimating, not only the salaries, but, all other per|quisites.

Some persons are so particularly rigid, as to condemn all gain, arising from play. Many will, idly, call that profit, which has accrued by illicit means. It is low and sordid, to be ever led by lucre. We do not, always, find the greatest honour, in of|fices, where there is the greatest emolu|ment.

141. Very, Extremely.

We are apt to use these words indiffe|rently, one as well as the other, to express a great degree of any thing. Thus, for example, we say, in the same sense, very wise; extremely wise; notwithstanding this, there appears to me some difference be|tween them: The word, very, marks an extraordinary degree; but extremely, a de|gree to admiration. Thus, we say, men

are, very, wicked: Providence is, extremely, kind.

Besides this distinction, there is one more delicate, which is, that very, does not suit well, but in the literal and natural sense; for when we say, a man is very wise; we would be understod, as saying; truly wise, whereas extremely, may be used with ele|gance, in an ironical sense. We say, then, in raillery, he is, extremely, wise, in ceasing to pursue that, he knows not how to get at; and, extremely, patient, in taking a blow calmly, he has not the spirit to return.

242. Fantastical, Whimsical, Maggotty, Fanciful,

Of these words, that of fantistical, implies, a rambling from true taste, thro excess of delicacy, or, an unseasonable search after something better. That of whimsical, means, an affectation of singula|rity. By maggotty, is understood, a great inconstancy, or, sudden change of taste. Fanciful, implies, a certain revolu|tion of humour, or, a particular way of thinking.

There cannot be a more despicable crea|ture, than the fantastical fop; he tricks out his charming self, in hopes of attract|ing the respect of mankind; but, on the contrary, meets, only, with scorn and con|tempt. The whimsical man, if his invention be fertile, is, sometimes, an object of present admiration; but, on serious reflection, is, too frequently, the subject of ridicule. A maggotty person, is, equally, tireforne to himself and to others; as what pleases him, one minute, shall, often, displease him, the next. He, who is fanciful, is far more troublesome to himself, than to others; for being led away by his wild imagination, he, fondly, believes many things to be real, which, in fact are, only, ideal.

141. Capacity, Ability.

Capacity, has more relation to the know|ledge of things; ability, to their applicati|on. The one, is acquired, by study; the other, by practice.

He, who has capacity for a thing, is pro|per

to undertake; he, who has ability, to execute.

144. Little, Small.

The word, little, sometimes, signifies, on|ly, want of bigness; and, at other times, want of greatness, in every sense; whereas that of small, is the opposite, only, to bigness, and, supposes some kind of length. Thus, we say, a little house; a little man; a little cup; a little globe: but, a small thread; a small line; a small twig.

145. To Remark, Observe.

To remark, implies, taking notice, with attention, in order, to remember: to observe, means, rather, to watch, with examination, by way of passing our judgement.

The traveller remarks, that, which strikes him most; the spy, observes those proceed|ings, which he thinks of consequence.

It is the part of a general to remark those, of his men, who distinguish them|selves in battle; and, observe the motions, of the enemy.

We may observe, in order, to remark; but custom will not admit of an inversion of the phrase.

Those, who observe the conduct of others, in order, to remark their faults; do it, rather, through a delight in censuring, than, a desire of correcting their own errors.

146. To go Back, Return.

We go back, from a place, where we have, some considerable time, been. We return, to a place, we had, just before left. Thus, we say, he is gone back into his own coun|try. He is returned home. We say, also, he is gone back from virtue; he has returned to his fault.

147. Idea, Thought. Imagination, Notion.

The idea, represents the object; thought, considers it; imagination, forms it; thus worked up, it becomes a notion. The first, only, points; the second, examines; the third, seduces; but, the last, draws.

When in conversation, our ideas are just; our thoughts, fine; and, our imaginati|ons, brilliant; we shall be sure to please: and, our notions, tho' singular, will, al|ways, be respectable.

148. Business, Affairs.

Business, implies, an object of industry; affairs, an object of concern. The first, employs the hands; the second, the mind. The word, business, by its having no plu|ral number, intimates a particular employ; by the singular of affairs, being seldom in use, in the sense before us, that word is

understood to mean, a variety of transac|tions.

The man of much business, ought to have a strong constitution. He, who has many affairs to settle, tho' he may have a clear head, will find it difficult, to adjust them all, to his satisfaction.

He, who, continually, interferes with the business of others, neglecting his own af|fairs, makes himself an object of ridi|cule; and, merits the contempt of man|kind.

149. To Take, Choose.

When we would take a thing, we de|termine upon one, because, we cannot have all. We choose, by comparing things, be|cause, we would have the best. The one, supposes a simple determination of the will; the other, a discernment of the mind.

Between two things, exactly alike, we may determine, which to take, when at the same time, there is no choice.

We are sometimes constrained to take one thing, out of many, when we are not obliged to choose.

We cannot use the word take, but, with respect to ourselves; but we choose, some|times, for others.

It is a point of good-manners, when of|fered fruit or any other thing, where there is choice; to take, that, which comes first to hand: but, when we would present any thing of the like sort, to a stranger, it is a mark of politeness, to choose for him the best.

When things are at our option, that is, when we may take, which we please; we should try to make a good choice.

Between a good course of life and a bad, there is no medium; we must either take the one or the other. Nothing appears more difficult to me, than the choice of a friend.

If, in a journey, there were, only, two roads, to take; the one, short, but, bad; the other, long, but, good; I should, cer|tainly, choose the last.

150. To Choose, Make choice of

The word, choose, is most, in its place, with respect to things, we would make use of. The expression, make choice of, is, more proper, when it relates to persons, we would appoint to any dignity or em|ploy.

George, the third, chose, the Queen's palace, as his place of residence in town; and, made choice of Caesar Hawkins, to in|oculate his children.

To choose, indicates, more particularly, a comparison made between things, in or|der, to know, which is best to take; to make choice of, marks with greater precisi|on, the simple determination of one per|son preferable to another.

Princes do not, always, choose their minis|ters; neither, do they, always, make choice of a Talbot, for a chancellor; nor, a Marlbo|rough, for a general.

151. To Choose, Prefer.

We do not, always, choose, what, we pre|fer: but, we ever prefer, that, which we choose.

To choose, is, to determine in favour of a thing, either on account of its merit, or, its value. To prefer, is, to determine in its favour, by any motive whatsoever; whether it be merit, affection, good-man|ners, policy, or, what not.

'Tis the judgment, that makes the choice; the heart, that gives the preference. 'Tis for this reason, that we, commonly, choose, what, we are acquainted with; and, prefer, what, we love.

Prudence, sometimes, forbids our choosing that, which strikes the eye most. Jus|tice will not, often, permit us to prefer our friends, to other people.

In choosing a state of life, I think there can be no harm in preferring that, which is most agreeable to our inclinations; as, in

so doing, we should, naturally, find more satisfaction in our duty.

Choice, is either good or bad, according to our taste, or, the knowledge we have in things. Preference, is, either just or unjust, as reason dictates, or, passion in|spires.

Partial preference, is, sometimes, allow|ed to princes in the distribution of their honours; but, they should, always, make choice of the ablest men, in their appoint|ments to public offices.

152. Meat, Flesh.

By the word, Meat, is understood, any kind of food; but flesh, signifies, only, the natural composition of an animal. Thus, we say, that fish and vegetables are proper meats for Lent; and, that the flesh of a partridge, is very white and tender.

Grain is the meat of birds; flesh, the food of beasts.

153. Reformation, Reform.

Reformation, signifies, often, the action of reforming; reform, seldom any other than, the effect.

A general reformation of manners, among the people, will ever be found a very diffi|cult and laborious task. When we have not been able to complete a thing to our satisfaction, by any sort of amendment, we have, often, brought it to bear, by a thorough reform.

154. Smooth, Level.

That, which is not rough, is smooth. That, which is free from either hollows or risings, is level.

The smoothest marble is the best. A country, where there is neither hills nor valleys, is level.

155. To Fade, Wither.

Of these two words, wither, rises up|that of fade. A flower, which is faded, may recover; but that, whichis withered, can not.

Beauty, like a flower, fades through length of time; and may wither, sudden|ly, by an accident.

156. Prerogative, Privilege.

Prerogative, relates to honour, and per|sonal preference; it rises principally, from subordination, or, from the relation, persons bear among themselves: whereas, privilege, implies, some advantage from interest or office, proceeding from the grant of a prince, or, the laws of a society.

Birth, gives prerogatives. Offices, give privileges.

157. Knowing, Discerning.

The knowing man, acts surely, he sel|dom deceives himself; yet, knowledge of life, only, is his fort. The discerning man, is clear-sighted and judicious, sees thro' the artifices of mankind, with half an eye, and, will not suffer himself to be deceived; his great abilities consist, in dis|tinguishing.

The study of man, will make a person knowing; but, it requires great experience, and, a long attention, both to men and books, to render him discerning.

An artful, ingenious rogue, will, some|times, take in the knowing, by a novel de|ceit; through the fallacy of which, the discerning man, shall, readily, penetrate.

158. Order, Regularity.

Each, of these words, implies, a prudent disposition of things; but, that, of order, relates, more, to the effect, which results from such a disposition; that, of regularity, more, to the power, and, to the model, that conducts that disposition.

We observe order, in conformance to regularity. The first, is the effect, of the second.

159. Traffic, Trade, Commerce,

Traffic, relates, more, to the exchange of merchandise; trade, and, commerce, to that, of buying and selling; with this difference, that trade, seems to imply the manufactur|ing and vending of merchandise within ourselves; commerce, negociating with other countries.

We traffic, with nations, that have not the use of money; by bartering one kind of merchandise, for another. Trade, is looked upon by the wisest of men, to be the support of every state; as the prosperity of a kingdom depends, in a great mea|sure, upon its riches; and, riches, is the immediate effect of trade. The great and extensive commerce, that England holds with other nations, makes us, the glory and admiration of the world.

160. Exchange, Truck, Barter.

The word, exchange, means, simply, in a general sense, the act of exchanging one thing for another, be it, what it may: the other two, are in use to denominate the particular kinds or methods of exchange; of which, this is the difference, that, the word, truck, is used, with most propriety, when speaking of serviceable things, such as are moveable; as the trucking of horses, trinkets, utensils, &c. Whereas,

barter, is a more mercantile expression, and intimates the exchange of different commo|dities, by way of traffic. Thus, so little are the natives of Guinea acquainted, with the value of gold, that, they hold commerce with other nations, by bartering it away for glass, and, other trifling ornaments.

161. Regard, Esteem, Veneration, Respect.

When we entertain a good opinion of a man, we are said, to regard him; when that regard increases, we call it esteem; we testify that esteem, by veneration; and prove it, by submission, through respect.

We have a natural regard for a quiet neighbour; we esteem him if he studies the good of the neighbourhood; if we per|ceive in him any eminent qualities, we hold him in veneration; and, in proportion, to the rank he is in above us, either by birth or fortune, we treat him, with less or greater respect.

Being born in the same country, claims regard. Civility creates esteem. Age and

merit, render venerable; rank and dignity, respectable.

162. Retinue, Train.

Retinue, implies, a number of followers; train, the same, with order. Thus, his coach was attended, with so great a retinue, that, there was no seeing the carriage, for dust. It was customary, in a Roman tri|umph, to have, always, a number of cap|tive slaves, in the train.

163. Occasion, Occurrence, Conjuncture, Case, Circumstance.

Occasion, is used, for the arrival of some|thing new, whether it be that, which pre|sents itself, or what, we seek; and, in a sense, as indeterminate with respect to time, as the object. Occurrence, is, only, in use, to express that, which happens un|expectedly,

and with relation to the time present. We make use of the word, con|juncture, to mark a situation proceeding from a concurrence of events, whether of business or interest. Case, is employed to signify, the main point, with a special re|ference to the sort and singularity of the thing in question. Circumstance, carries with it no other idea, than that of some|thing additional, accompanying another, which is principal.

We know people on particular occasions. We should demean ourselves, according to the occurrence of the times. It is, com|monly, the conjunctures, that determines us, which side to take. It has been pretended, that there are cases, in which, reason would condemn, even an attention to virtue. Di|versity of circumstances, will make the same man, think differently, upon the same subject.

164. Uncertainty, Doubt, Suspence.

In that sense, in which, these words are accounted synonymous, they, all three, im|ply indetermination; but, uncertainty rises, when the event of things is unknown. Doubt, when the mind knows not how to choose. By suspence, is understood, an inde|termined state, when the mind is held in expectation.

We are in uncertainty, with respect to the success of our proceedings; in doubt, what step to take; in suspence, when we are held from acting, by a delay of certainty.

Uncertainty, requires caution; doubt, con|sideration; suspence, patience.

A wise man is seldom uncertain, as to what shall happen; he foresees future events, and prepares himself for them. When we are in doubt, and at a loss to de|termine; we should leave the matter to the decision of others. Of all states of indetermination, that of suspence, is the most

vexatious, and the only remedy, is a quiet resignation.

165. Right, Justice.

Right, is the object of justice; and that, which is due to every one. Justice, is the conformity of our actions, with right; it is to render and secure to every one that which is his due. The first, is dictated by nature, or, established by authority, either divine or human; and is, according to cir|cumstances, sometimes, liable to change. The second, is the rule, we should, always, follow, and, is, ever, invariable.

It is consistent with the laws of justice, to use the same means, in support and de|fence of our rights, as are, often, employed to attack them.

166. Dejected, Melancholy, Low-spirited, Dull.

Dejection, is, commonly, caused by great affliction, and is, too often, a mark of de|spair. Melancholy, is, generally, the effect of constitution; its cloudy ideas overpower and banish all that are chearful. Low|spiritedness, is involuntary, and, often, pro|ceeds from a weakness of nerves: excess of joy, fatigue, bad digestion, will occa|sion it. Dullness, on the contrary, is vo|luntary; it arises, frequently, from discon|tent, disappointment, and from any other circumstance that may displease the mind.

The mind, in dejection, is unhappy, not having sufficient strength and reason to get the better of it. Melancholy, will, sometimes, wear away, by frequent diversion and dissi|pation. A person, subject to low-spirits, should pursue a regular course of life, and a uniform method of living. Dullness is encreased by giving way to it; it is in our power to banish it, whenever we please, and the damp it throws on every company,

one would imagine, should be our greatest inducement, to do it.

The reverse of dejection, is joy; the re|verse of melancholy, chearfulness; gaiety is the opposite, to low-spiritedness; and spright|liness, to dullness.

167. Piercing, Penetrating.

The word, piercing, implies, great strength of light, and, a stroke of the eye; that, of penetrating, great force of atten|tion, and, reflexion.

A piercing mind, sees things, even, through the veils, that cover them; it is difficult, to conceal truth from it; it will not suffer itself, to be deceived. A mind that penetrates, reaches to the bot|tom of things, without stopping at the surface; it is not easy to deceive it, neither will it suffer itself, to be amused.

Besides the above distinction, piercing, seems to be executed, by a sudden glance; penetrating, by making way gradually.

168. To Put, Place.

Put, seems to have a general sense; place, one more limited, meaning to put, orderly, and, in a proper place.

We put columns, to support an edifice: we place them, with symmetry.

169. Discernment, Judgment.

Discernment, relates, not only, to a thing itself, but, also, to its appearances; and, is a distinguishing knowledge, that prevents the confounding of one thing, with ano|ther. Judgment, relates to a thing consi|dered in itself, only in order, to investigate the truth; and, is a knowledge that deter|mines. The first, is limited to things pre|sent; its office is to discern truth from falsehood, perfections from defects, mo|tives from pretexts: the second, prys, even, into futurity; discovers the relation, and,

consequence of things, foreseeing their ef|fects. In short, we may say, of discern|meut, that, it is knowing; that, it renders our ideas, just; and, of judgment, that, it is wise; that, it makes our conduct, dis|creet.

When choice, or, determination, with respect to the goodness, or, beauty of ob|jects, is in question, we should have re|course to those, who have discernment. When we would take any step of conse|quence, we should take the advice of such persons, as have judgment.

Arts and sciences require discernment; which is, more or less nice, according to the delicacy of the understanding, or, the extent of knowledge. Government, and, the policy of states demand judgment; which is, more or less, sure, according to the force of reason, and, the length of expe|rience.

170. Satisfied, Contented.

We are satisfied, when, we have obtained, what we wished for: We are contented, when, we wish not for any more.

It happens, often, that, when, well satis|fied, we are not the more content.

Possession will, always, prove satisfactory; but it is the true enjoyment, only, of what we possess, that can make us content.

171. Tale, Novel, Romance, Story.

Each, of these words, implies, a small history, or, an entertaining relation of ad|ventures: the three first, are supposed to be fabulous, and, made public; whereas, the last, may be either true, or, feigned, and told either in print, or, by word of mouth; but, as they carry ideas peculiar to them|selves, it is my business, to point them out: by the word, tale, then, is meant, a

short, but dressed-up narrative of some sin|gle adventure; that, of novel, signifies, an amusing history, made up of many adven|tures, and, carried on through one, or, more volumes. By romance, is understood, a collection of wild adventures, in love and war.

Tales, ought to be well related; novels, well invented; romances, well carried on; stories, well told.

Tales, if attended with good morals, are not, only, amusing, but, instructive. No|vels, are of no other use, than to entertain; they waste the time, without making the least improvement. Romances spoil the taste of young people, who, by an attention to them, are apt to prefer the marvellous, to the natural and simple truth. A droll story, told with humour, is a great enli|vener of company.

172. Continuance, Continuation,

Continuance, relates to duration; continu|ation, to extent.

We should study a conscientious dis|charge of our duty, during our continuance in any office. The several books, contained in the volume of Paradise Lost, are conti|nuations, of the same subject.

173. Continual, Continued.

There may be an interruption in that, which is continual; but that, which is con|tinued, will not admit of it. So that the first of these words, denotes properly, the length of duration, although, there may be intervals, and, different renewals; and, the second, marks simply, the unity of that duration, independent either of length, or,

shortness of the time; it is, for this reason, we say, a continual noise; continual rains; but, a continued stream; and, in music, a continued base.

Continual interruptions will make us weary of the best undertakings. In coun|tries, situated near the poles, there is, for the space of five or six months together, one continued darkness, insomuch, that the inhabitants, during that time, are obliged to leave the place.

174. To Bid, Order.

The first, of these, is extremely general, the other more limited. To bid, intimates, direction to perform, whether the person directing, has any authority for so doing, or, not. To order, implies, the exercise of authority.

Some people are so very officious, that they are, always, ready to do, what they are bid, whether the thing be right or wrong,

or, the person bidding, be impowered, to order them, or, not.

175. Yet, In the mean while, However, Nevertheless.

Yet, seems, to have more force and energy; it assures, with firmness, in spite of every opposition. In the mean while, is less absolute, it affirms, only, against con|trary appearances. However, distinguishes two things, which seem opposite; support|ing one without hurting the other. Never|theless, affirms a thing, by exception; giv|ing us to understand, that it does not oc|cur, but, at the time, we are speak|ing.

Though the whole earth is in arms against truth, yet, it does not prevent its triumphing. Some parents are very strict, with respect to the morals of their chil|dren; in the mean while, will indulge them|selves, in every thing, their own heart can wish. Addison was a wretched speaker, however, he was an excellent author.

Churchill, every one knows, was a bad liver; nevertheless, he was of some service to his country, by ridiculing vice, and lashing venality.

176. Excellency, Excellence.

Notwithstanding these words are, evi|dently, the same, excellence, being no other than excellencie, contracted, or, the re|dundant syllable, general in old writing, taken away; yet, custom seems to have ap|plied excellency, to express the title of a go|venour, or, that of an ambassador, from one prince, to another, whereas, by excel|lence, is understood, the state of abounding in any good quality.

177. Pride, Arrogance, Vanity, Presumption, Haughtiness.

Pride, is, unreasonable or inordinate self-esteem. Arrogance, implies, taking much upon ourselves, and, is pride attend|ed with insolence and contempt. Vanity, is accompanied with affectation, and, means, pride, exerted, on slight grounds. By pre|sumption, is understood, a blind, and, ad|venturous confidence; with respect to haugh|tiness, it is a mixture of softness and inso|lence, the immediate effect of pride.

The haughtiness of the proud man, is in|sufferable. Pride makes us value ourselves; arrogance, despise others; Through vanity, we covet the attention of our acquaintance. Presumption flatters us, with having a vain power.

The proud, consider themselves, in their own mind; full, and, self-swoln, they are taken up, with their own person. The arrogant, claim to themselves, what they have not the least pretentions to, are ready

to insult those, who will not allow them, what they claim; and look down, on the rest of the world, with contempt. The vain, value themselves, upon the opinion of others; greedy of esteem, they are ea|ger, to engross the attention of all man|kind. The presumptious, carry their audaci|ous hopes, even to chimeras; bold, to un|dertake, they, fondly, imagine they have power to do every thing.

The greatest pain, we can, possibly, give the proud man, is, by laying his defects, before his eyes. We cannot hurt the arro|gant, so much, as by silent contempt. We cannot mortify a vain man more, than by paying no attention, to those qualifica|tions or qualities, he prides himself in. In order to confound the presumptuous, we need, only, desire him, to put his vain designs in execution.

178. Cure, Remedy.

We perform a cure. We procure a re|medy. The first, relates more to the mala|dy, and, to the action of him, who heals it; the second, has more relation to health, and, the state of the malady, we heal. We say, of a cure, that, it is fine; when its success, does honour to the person, who formed it; and, we say, of a remedy, that, it is certain, or, sure; when its operations are efficacious; that is, when it produces those consequences, we intended; and, we say of both, that, they are, either, easy, or, difficult.

Cure, seems to have no other object, than stubborn disorders, and those, which proceed from constitution; whereas, re|medy, has a view to slight complaints, and, such, as are of short duration.

The more inveterate the disorder, the more difficult the cure; in many cases, re|gular living, is the best remedy.

The word cure, is, often, considered, as the effect of remedy. Some remedies, will complete a cure, much sooner than others.

Incurable disorders, are not, only, those, where the cure is absolutely impossible; bu, such, as, for which, no remedy can be found.

179. Haughtiness, Disdain.

Both these words, denote, a disposition, that prevents affability, and keeps us at a distance from those, whom we think be|neath us, either in birth, fortune, or, abi|lities, with this difference, that, haughti|ness is founded upon the esteem, a man has for himself; and, disdain, upon the dis|esteem, he has for others.

Haughtiness, is seldom met with, but in persons of weak understanding, and those, who have had a bad education. There are, a sort of vain people, who look upon dis|dain, as a personal accomplishment; and, who use it on all occasions, as, a test of the merit, they pretend to.

180. Sloth, Laziness, Sluggishness.

Sloth and laziness, are voluntary, with this difference, that sloth, implies, utter in|activity, an absolute aversion to work; laziness, an inclination, but, a fear of trou|ble and fatigue: whereas, sluggishness, is, often, involuntary; proceeding, sometimes, from constitution, and, is discovered, by its dull, heavy method of acting.

The slothful man, will not work, at all. The lazy man, is drawn to it, with diffi|culty. The sluggish man is slow, through the whole operation.

Industry, is the reverse of sloth; acti|vity, of laziness; expedition, of sluggish|ness.

He, who is slothful, is a murderer of time. Laziness, is its own punishment. A sluggish person, is fit for no kind of em|ployment, seldom doing any thing well, he undertakes.

181. Harm, Hurt, Injury, Detriment, Mischief.

These words, imply, some kind of ill, happening to a man's person, character, or, property. Those of harm, and, hurt, relate more to the person, or, character; with this difference, that harm, seems to denote, a small degree of hurt; hurt, a great degree of harm. Mischief, implies, ill, to the per|son, or, property, and appears, ever, to be done, with an evil intent. Injury, intimates, a degree of hurt, without justice; and re|lates to the character, or, property. De|triment, carries an idea of loss, and, is sel|dom used, but, with, regard to property.

By wounding a man, more or less, we harm, or, hurt, his person. By speaking ill of him, deservedly or not, we harm, or, hurt, his character: by breaking his head, or, setting fire to his house, we are said to do him a mischief. By taking away his good name, we injure his character: by defrauding him of his goods, we injure him

in his property. By breaking a hedge, or, treading down of corn, we do a great deal of detriment.

182. Quickly, Soon, Speedily.

The word quickly, seems, more proper, to express the motion, with which, we act; its reverse, is, slowly. The word, soon, respects the time, when the action is per|formed; its reverse, is, late. The word, speedily, has a greater relation to the time, we employ about a thing; its reverse, is, long-time.

We advance the more by going quick; but, we go surely, by going slowly. Wick|edness is always, punished, either, sooner, or later. It is necessary, to be a long-time deliberating; but, we should execute spee|dily.

He, who begins soon, and, works quick; will speedily, have done.

183. Assiduous, Expeditious, Quick.

When we are assiduous, at work, we lose no time; when expeditious, we defer not, but finish immediately: when quick, we work with activity. Idleness, delay, and slowness, are the three defects, opposite to these three good qualities.

An assiduous man, thinks nothing of the trouble of what he takes in hand. An expeditious man, will not quit his work. One that is quick, will presently, have done.

We should be assiduous, in what we un|dertake; expeditious, in affairs, that re|quire to be soon ended; and quick, in the ex|ecution of orders.

184. Now, Instantly, Immediately, Presently.

The doing a thing now, expresses the taking it in hand, at that very instant; the other three words, as they are here placed, express a time farther and farther off. In|stantly, implies, without any perceptible intervention of time. Immediately, means, without delay. By presently, is understood, soon after.

185. Fashion, Custom.

These two words, like many others, I have taken notice of, tho' they may not strike the reader, at first sight, as words, reputed synonymous; have, nevertheless, been used as such, by some of our best writers, and, are, at present: it is therefore necessary, to point out the diffe|rence between them. Fashion, then, seems,

more universal; custom, more antient: that, which the greater part of the people practice, is, a fashion; that, which has been practised a long time, is, a cus|tom.

Fasion, introduces itself, and, extends daily; custom, establishes itself, and, gains authority; the first, forms the mode; the second, a usage: each, is a kind of law, independent on reason, with respect to that, which relates to our outward actions.

There is, sometimes, more policy in conforming to a bad fashion; than being singular in some good things. Many per|sons follow custom, even in their way of thinking; imbibing the notions of their mothers and nurses.

186. Variation, Change.

Variation, consists in being, as much of one sort, as another: Change, consists, on|ly, in ceasing to be the same.

We vary in our sentiments, when, we give them up, and, embrace them again. We change our opinions, when, we re|ject one, in order, to embrace another.

He, who has no certain principles, is li|able to vary. He, who is more attached to fortune, than truth, will find no diffi|culty in changing his doctrine.

187. Variation, Variety.

Successive changes, in the same subject, make variation: A multitude of different objects, forms variety. Thus, we say, the the variation of time; variety of colours.

There is no government, but, is subject to variation. There is no species in nature, in which, we may not observe great variety.

188. Track, Footstep.

Track, is more general; meaning, any mark left on the way, of whatever passed.

Footstep, is more limited; implying, the print of the feet. Thus, we say, the track of a horse, or, a carriage; but, the footsteps, of a man.

189. Fickle, Inconstancy, Unsteady, Changeable.

The attachments, of the fickle man, are slight; those, of the inconstant, of short durati|on. As to the words, unsteady, and, changea|ble, they imply, an aversion in adhering to the same thing; with this difference, that the unsteady man, is, eager to enjoy many things; the changeable man, is, in constant search of different ones.

Men, are, commonly, more sickle and inconstant, than women; but women, more unsteady and changeable, than men. The first, err thro' indifference; the se|cond, thro' a love of novelty. Conse|quently, it is a merit, in men, to persevere; and in women, to resist.

190. Rogue, Sharper, Thief.

These are all persons, who steal what does not belong to them; with this diffe|rence, that the rogue, steals in secret; he pilfers. The sharper, steals, by finesse; he over-reaches. The thief, steals, by all manner of means, robbing by force and violence.

The rogue, fears to be discovered; the sharper, to be known again; and the thief, to be taken.

191. Intention, Design.

Intention, is, a disposition or inclination of the mind, to something at a distance; its characteristic, is to aim. Design, seems to suppose, something studied and methodi|cal;

it is employed, in searching out the means of execution.

Intentions, are more secret and vague; designs, more extensive, and, more rational.

Intention, is the soul of action, and, the spring of true worth. Design, is, the ef|fect of reflection.

As, no one cares to be balked in his intentions, or, crossed in his designs; we should have no other intention, than, to do our duty; nor, any other design, than, to conform to the will of Providence.

Nothing is less followed, than, the ori|ginal intention of charitable foundations. Nothing has been found more difficult to accomplish, than, the design of bringing about a thorough reformation of man|ners.

That man is, truly, great, who is right in his intentions, and, reasonable, in his de|signs.

192. Unpolite, Clownish.

It is a much greater defect, to be clown|nish, than, to be, barely, unpolite.

Unpoliteness, is, a want of good-man|ners: it does not please. Clownishness, is, a mixture of ill-manners: it displeases.

Clownishness, proceeds, from an entire want of education: unpoliteness, is owing to a bad one.

193. To Tolerate, Suffer, Permit.

We tolerate a thing, when, knowing it, and, having sufficient power, we do not hinder it. We suffer it, by making no opposition, but, seeming, either, not to know it, or, not to have the power of pre|venting

it. We permit it, when we autho|rise it, by formal consent.

The words, tolerate and suffer, are never used, but, with respect to bad things, or, such, as we believe so; whereas, the word permit, relates, either, to good or bad.

The legislative power is, sometimes, obliged to tolerate certain evils, in order, to prevent worse. It is, sometimes, pru|dence, to suffer, even, abuse in the discipline of the church, rather, than de|stroy its unity. Human laws never will permit, what the divine law forbids; but, sometimes, forbids, what the other will permit.

194. Gay, Merry, Diverting.

We are gay, by disposition; merry, through turn of mind; diverting, by our way of acting. Sad, serious, and, tiresome, are, exactly, their opposites.

Our gaiety turns almost, entirely, to our own advantage: our merriment, at the same time, that it is agreeable to others, it is no less so, to ourselves; but, our being diverting, is enjoyed, only, by the com|pany.

A gay man, will laugh himself; a merry man, is good company; a diverting man, will make us laugh.

We should, if possible, suppress our gai|ety, when, in the house of affliction. We should cease to be merry, when, others are sad. We should take care not to be divert|ing, at the expence of our character, or, good-sense.

195. Enmity, Rancour.

Enmity, is more declared; it seems, al|ways, open. Rancour, is more concealed; it, generally, dissembles.

Bad services, and, rude language, create enmity; which never ceases, 'till tired out

with punishing; or, a reconciliation is brought about, by the intercession of friends. Remembrance of injuries, or, af|fronts received, keeps rancour alive in the breast; which never subsides, while there is the least thirst of vengeance; or, 'till we pardon, sincerely.

Enmity, does not, always, destroy our esteem for an enemy, nor, prevent our do|ing him the justice, he is entitled to; but, it will not admit of our caressing him, or, doing him any good, otherwise, than through a sense of honour, or, greatness of soul; to which, we, sometimes, sacrifice our vengeance. Rancour, makes us embrace, with pleasure, every opportunity of re|venging ourselves; but, can hide itself, with the cloak of friendship, 'till the very moment it begins to act.

Enmity is, sometimes, noble, and it would be mean not to conceive it, against certain persons; but, rancour is, always, low.

A settled enmity in families, sometimes, runs through many generations; and will not cease, 'till time shall obliterate it. Per|fect reconciliations are very rare; there re|maining,

often, a great deal of rancour, in the breasts of those, who seem most sin|cere.

A philosopher should have no object of enmity, but, the disturbers of public tranquillity. If rancour can, in any case, be excusable, it must be, with respect to traitors; their crime, being too black, to be thought of, without indignation.

196. To Insinuate, Suggest.

We insinuate, by cunning, and, address; we suggest, by credit, and, artifice.

In order, to insinuate, we must consult both time and opportunity; in order, to suggest, it is necessary, to have ascendancy over the minds of persons.

Insinuate, implies, something delicate: suggest, frequently, something fraudu|lent.

We cover, artfully, what we would insi|nuate: and, what we would suggest, we make of some consequence.

We, often, imagine that, what, others insinuate, was first thought of, by ourselves. He, who suggests evil to another, is much more culpable, than he, who commits it.

197. Ordinary, Common.

These words, have been reputed syno|nymous, in two senses; as implying, fre|quent use; and, meaning, of little or no value: but, they are different in both. In the first sense, the word, ordinary, seems to me, to be best applied, when the repe|tition of actions, is in question; common, when a multitude of objects. Thus, no|thing is more ordinary at court, than dis|simulation. Monsters are common in Africa.

In the second, that, which is ordinary, has nothing, to distinguish it; that, which is common, has nothing, to make it sought after.

198. To Hear, Hearken.

To hear, implies, having the ear struck with any sound. To hearken, means, to lend an ear, in order, to hear. Sometimes, we hear, without hearkening; and, we, of|ten, hearken, without hearing.

199. To Understand, Comprehend, Conceive.

To have just and proper ideas of every thing, that occurs, is the common signifi|cation of these words: but, to under|stand, implies, a conformity of ideas, which has a peculiar relation to the value of the terms, we use; to comprehend, de|notes, such a conformity, as answers direct|ly, to the nature of the things, we explain; and that, which is expressed by the word,

conceive, relates, more especially, to the order and design, of what, we propose. The first, is used, with propriety, when, applied to the particulars, of what, we say; the tone, with which, we speak; the turn of our phrases; and, the delicacy of our expressions. The second, seems to agree best, with a relation to principles, lessons, precepts, and, speculative knowledge. The third, appears with greater elegance, when, it relates to forms, arrangement, projects, and, plans; in short, all that depends on the imagination.

We understand languages. We compre|hend sciences. We conceive, whatever has relation to arts.

It is difficult to understand that, which is enigmatical; to comprehend that, which is abstruse; and, to conceive that, which is confused.

Readiness of understanding, is a mark of acuteness; that, of comprehension, is, a proof of penetration; that, of conception, denotes, a clear head.

A lover, understands the language of the passions. A learned man, comprehends the metaphysical questions of the schools. An

architect, conceives the plan and oeconomy of buildings.

200. Fashion, Figure, Form.

Fashion, rises from labour, and, results from the workmanship; the workman, enriching it, more or less, according to his taste. Figure, springs from design, and, results from the out-lines of the thing; the author of the plan, making it, either more or less, regular, according to his abilities. Form, rises from construction, and, results, from the arrangement of parts; the conductor of the work, making it, more or less, natural, as his imagination di|rects him.

The fashion of a work, frequently, ex|ceeds in value, the price of the materials. We seldom give in architecture a round figure to any thing, except, to single pieces, and, such as stand by themselves. Paganism pictures the Deity, under all kinds

of forms; whereas, Christianity confines it to those, of a man, and, of a dove.

We say of fashion, that it is, either pret|ty, or, ugly; of figure, that it is, either, agreeable, or, disagreeable; of form, that, it is, either, common, or, uncommon.

201. Fault, Defect, Imperfection.

Fault, includes in its idea, a relation to the maker; so that, while it implies, some real want, in the finishing of the work, it denotes, also, that, it was owing to the workman. Defect, expresses something imperfect, in the thing, without any relation to the maker of it. Imperfection, intimates, something of less consequence, than is un|derstood by the preceding words, and, is used, with more propriety, in morality, than, either, in physics, or, mechanics.

The smoaking of chimneys, is a great fault in houses; as, a little attention in the builder, may easily prevent it. When the beauty of a building is spoiled, for want of

room, or, proper materials, it is a defect, which the builder could not prevent. Im|perfections, are considered by the bigotted religionist, as real sins; but, reasonable christians, look upon them, only, as the natural consequents of frail humanity.

202. Fault, Crime.

Faults, result from human weakness; be|ing transgressions of the rules of duty. Crimes, proceed from the wickedness of the heart; being actions, against the rules of nature.

The effects of anger, and, the intrigues of gallantry, are faults. Calumnies, and, assassinations, are crimes.

It is our indispensable duty, to pardon faults; but, punish crimes.

203. To Oblige, Constrain, To Compel, Force.

The last of these words, rises upon the third, as the third does, upon the second,

and, the second, upon the first; each of them, implying, an opposition to liberty. The word, oblige, relates more to duty, or, necessity; intimating, a power acting on us, in conformity to our inclinations: constrain, refers to those troublesome oppositions, that make us determine, against our incli|nations; compel, alludes to power and au|thority, which makes us act, in express contrariety to our will, which, we lament the not being master of: the word, force, implies, contrary efforts of a vigorous ac|tion, which, we try to resist, but, in vain.

The duty of a child, to its parents, ob|liges it, to assist him, in his old-age. The weaker and softer sex, is that, which can least brook constraint. There are, some, occa|sions, on which we should not be sorry, to be compelled, even to that, we are most un|willing to do. Ancient politeness of the table, went so far, as, to force guests to eat and drink.

204. Heaviness, Weight.

In the figurative sense, the difference of these words, is so extremely great, as to need no pointing out; in the literal, in|deed, they are, often, confounded; con|sidered then, in this last sense, heaviness, is that quality in a body, which we feel, and, distinguish by itself: weight, is the mea|sure and degree of that quality, which we cannot ascertain, but, by comparison.

We say, absolutely, and, in an undeter|mined sense, that a thing is heavy; but re|latively, and, in a manner determined, that, it is of such a weight, for example, of two, three, or, four pounds.

A thousand circumstances, prove the heaviness of the air; and, the mercury, de|termines its exact weight.

205. To Return, Surrender, Restore.

We are said, to return, what has been lent or given us: to surrender, what we have in pledge or charge: to restore, what we have taken or stolen.

We ought to return, punctually; to surrender, faithfully; and, to restore, wholly.

We borrow, with an intent to return; we take a thing in charge, with a view of surrendering it again; but, we seldom take, with a design to restore.

Custom makes use of these words, on the following occasions; the first, with res|pect to civility, favours, presents, or, testi|monies of kindness: the second, with respect to what, we are entrusted with; honours, employs, or, offices, with which we are in|vested: the third, with relation to things taken away, that have been our due. Thus, we return money, that has been lent us; presents, we have received; and, let|ters, to a deserted sweet-heart: we surrender

a child, to its parents; the ribbon of an order, the staff of command, seals, and, dig|nities to a prince; we restore, an accused person, when found innocent, to his estates and honours; and, a minor, to the posses|sion of his effects, which have been held from him.

206. Sincerity, Frankness, Plainness, Ingenuousness.

Sincerity, prevents our speaking, other|wise, than we think; and, is a virtue. Frank|ness, makes us speak, as we think; and, is a natural effect. Plainness, is, speaking, freely, what we think; and, springs, some|times, from want of reflection. Ingenuous|ness, makes us declare what we know; and, is, often, a folly.

A sincere man, will not deceive; a frank man, will not dissemble; a plain man, is not apt to flatter; an ingenuous man, knows not how to conceal any thing.

Sincerity, is of great value, in the inter|course of the heart. Frankness, facilitates

the commerce of the world. Plainness, is, often, considered, as a want of politeness. Ingenuousness, is, frequently, found to err, against prudence.

The sincere, are, always, esteemed. The frank, please all the world. The plain, sometimes, offend. The ingenuous, often, betray themselves.

207. Experiment, Trial, Proof.

Experiment, relates, properly, to the truth of things; it determines, whether a thing is, or, is not; clearing up of doubt, and, dissipating ignorance. Trial, concerns, particularly, the use of things; judging, whether they are proper, or, not; it settles the matter, and, determines the will. Proof, has a greater relation to the quality of things; teaching us, whether they are good, or, bad, distinguishing the best, and, taking away any fear of being deceived.

We make experiments, in order, to know; trials, to choose; and, proofs, to be, tho|roughly, acquainted with.

Experiments, confirm our opinions; be|ing the root of knowledge. Trial, con|ducts our taste; being the road to satisfac|tion. Proof, removes our fears; and, is a remedy against error and imposture.

End of the FIRST VOLUME.