A state of the expedition from Canada: as laid before the House of Commons, by Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, ... With a collection of authentic documents, ... Written and collected by himself, ...

APPENDIX.

* 1.1Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, dated Hertford-Street, 1st January, 1777.

MY LORD,

MY physician has pressed me to go to Bath for a short time, and I find it requi∣site to my health and spirits to follow his advice: but I think it a previous duty to assure your Lordship, that should my attendance in town become necessary, rela∣tively to information upon the affairs of Canada, I shall be ready to obey your summons upon one day's notice.

Your Lordship being out of town, I submitted the above intentions a few days ago personally to his Majesty in his closet; and I added,

"That as the arrange∣ments for the next campaign might possibly come under his royal contemplation before my return, I humbly laid myself at his Majesty's feet for such active em∣ployment as he might think me worthy of."

This was the substance of my audience, on my part. I undertook it, and I now report it to your Lordship in the hope of your patronage in this pursuit; a hope, my Lord, founded not only upon a just sense of the honour your Lordship's friend∣ship must reflect upon me, but also upon a feeling that I deserve it, in as much as a solid respect and sincere personal attachment can constitute such a claim.

I leave in the hands of Mr. D'Oyley such of the memorandums confided to me by General Carleton as require dispatch, should your Lordship think proper to carry them into execution.

I also leave in that gentleman's hands the copy of an application relative to boats for the artillery, and which I take the liberty to submit to your Lordship as well worthy of consideration, upon the supposition that the enemy should arm upon Lake George, and that any operation should be adviseable by that route.

I likewise leave the disposition of winter quarters, which I received by the last ship from Canada. I find no dispatch is come to your Lordship by that occasion, and I conceived those papers might be of use.

I have the honour to be, My Lord, &c. J. BURGOYNE.

* 2.1Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Sir Guy Carleton, dated White∣hall, 22d August, 1776.

THE rapid success of his Majesty's arms, in driving the rebels out of Canada, does great honour to your conduct, and I hope soon to hear that you have been able to pursue them across the lakes, and to possess those posts upon the frontiers which may effectually secure your province from any future insult.

His Majesty, in appointing you commander in chief of his forces in Canada, was pleased to extend your commission to the frontiers of his provinces bordering thereupon, wisely foreseeing, that it might be necessary for the compleating your plan of operations, that you should march your army beyond the limits of your own government. I trust, before this letter reaches you, that you will, by your spirit and activity, have cleared the frontiers of Canada of all the rebel forces, and will have taken the proper measures for keeping possession of the lakes. That service being performed, his Majesty commands me to acquaint you, that there still remains another part of your duty to be undertaken, which will require all your abilities and the strictest application, the restoring peace, and the establish∣ing good order and legal government in Canada. It is an object of the greatest importance to this country, the difficulties attending it are immense; but his Majesty depends upon your zeal, and upon your experience, for carrying it into execution. His Majesty, ever anxious for the happiness of his subjects, com∣mands me to inform you, that no time should be lost in beginning so important a work, and that you do therefore return to Quebec, detaching Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, or such other officer as you shall think most proper, with that part of your forces which can be spared from the immediate defence of your province, to carry on such operations as shall be most conducive to the success of the army acting on the side of New-York; and that you direct the officer so detached to commu∣nicate with and put himself, as soon as possible, under the command of General Howe, you will order such artillery as you shall judge necessary to proceed with this detachment; and as a great quantity of heavy cannon and military stores were sent, upon the supposition that Quebec might have been in the hands of the rebels, you will, upon requisition from General Howe, supply him with such cannon and stores as may not be wanted for the protection of Canada.

* 3.1Thoughts for conducting the War from the Side of Canada.

By Lieutenant-General Burgoyne.

WHEN the last ships came from Quebec, a report prevailed in Canada, said to have been founded upon positive evidence, that the rebels had laid the keels of several large vessels at Skenesborough and Ticonderoga, and were resolved to exert their utmost powers, to construct a new and formidable fleet during the winter.

I will not, however, give credit to their exertions, in such a degree as to imagine the King's troops will be prevented passing Lake Champlain early in the summer, but will suppose the operations of the army to begin from Crown Point.

But as the present means to form effectual plans is to lay down every possible difficulty, I will suppose the enemy in great force at Ticonderoga; the different works there are capable of admitting twelve thousand men.

I will suppose him also to occupy Lake George with a considerable naval strength, in order to secure his retreat, and afterwards to retard the campaign; and it is natural to expect that he will take measures to block up the roads from Ticonderoga to Albany by the way of Skenesborough, by fortifying the strong ground at different places, and thereby obliging the King's army to carry a

weight of artillery with it, and by felling trees, breaking bridges, and other obvious impediments, to delay, though he should not have power or spirit finally to resist, its progress.

The enemy thus disposed upon the side of Canada, it is to be considered what troops will be necessary, and what disposition of them will be most proper to pro∣secute the campaign with vigour and effect.

I humbly conceive the operating army (I mean exclusively of the troops left for the security of Canada) ought not to consist of less than eight thousand regulars, rank and file. The artillery required in the memorandums of General Carleton, a corps of watermen, two thousand Canadians, including hatchet-men and other workmen, and one thousand or more savages.

It is to be hoped that the reinforcement and the victualllng ships may all be ready to sail from the Channel and from Corke on the last day of March. I am per∣suaded that to sail with a fleet of transports earlier, is to subject government to loss and disappointment. It may reasonably be expected that they will reach Quebec before the 20th of May, a period in full time for opening the campaign. The roads, and the rivers and lakes, by the melting and running off of the snows, are in common years impracticable sooner.

But as the weather long before that time will probably have admitted of labour in the docks, I will take for granted that the fleet of last year, as well bateaux as armed vessels, will be found repaired, augmented, and fit for immediate service. The magazines that remain of provision, I believe them not to be abundant, will probably be formed at Montreal, Sorel and Chamblée.

I conceive the first business for those entrusted with the chief powers, should be to select and post the troops destined to remain in Canada; to throw up the military stores and provision with all possible dispatch, in which service the abovementioned troops, if properly posted, will greatly assist; and to draw the army destined for ope∣ration to cantonments, within as few days march of St. John's as conveniently may be. I should prefer cantonments at that season of the year to encampment, as the ground is very damp, and consequently very pernicious to the men, and more especially as they will have been for many months before used to lodgings, heated with stoves, or between decks in ships; all these operations may be put in motion together, but they severally require some observation.

I should wish that the troops left in Canada, supposing the number mentioned in my former memorandum to be approved, might be made as follows.

	Rank and File.
The 31st regiment, British, exclusive of their light company of grenadiers	448
Maclean's corps	300
The 29th regiment	448
The ten additional companies from Great Britain	560
Brunswic and Hesse Hanau to be taken by detachments or com∣plete corps, as Major General Reidesel shall recommend, leaving the grenadiers, light infantry and dragoons compleat	650
Detachments from the other British brigades, leaving the grena∣diers and light infantry complete and squaring the battalions equally	600
	3006

My reason for selecting the 31st regiment for this duty is, that when I saw it last it was not equally in order with the other regiments for services of activity.

I propose the 29th regiment as it is not at present brigaded.

I propose Maclean's corps, because I very much apprehend desertion from such parts of it as are composed of Americans, should they come near the enemy.

In Canada, whatsoever may be their disposition, it is not so easy to effect it.

And I propose making up the residue by detachment, because by selecting the men least calculated for fatigue or least accustomed to it, which may be equally good soldiers in more confined movements and better provided situations, the effective strength for operation is much greater and the defensive strength not impaired.

I must beg leave to state the expeditious conveyance of provision and stores from Quebec, and the several other depositaries, in order to form ample magazines at Crown Point, as one of the most important operations of the campaign, because it is upon that which most of the rest will depend. If sailing vessels up the St. Lawrence are alone to be employed, the accident of contrary winds may delay them two months before they pass the rapids of Richelieu, and afterwards St. Peter's Lake; delays to that extent are not uncommon, and they are only to be obviated by having a quantity of small craft in readiness to work with oars. From the mouth of the Sorrel to Chamblée, rowing and tacking is a sure conveyance if sufficient hands are found. From Chamblée to St. Therese (which is just above the Rapids) land-carriage must be used, and great authority will be requisite to supply the quantity necessary.

A business thus complicated in arrangement, in some parts unusual in practice, and in others perhaps difficult, can only be carried to the desired effect by the peremptory powers, warm zeal, and consonant opinion of the governor; and though the former are not to be doubted, a failure in the latter, vindicated, or seeming to be vindicated, by the plausible obstructions that will not fail to be suggested by others, will be sufficient to crush such exertions as an officer of a sanguine temper, entrusted with the future conduct of the campaign, and whose personal interest and fame therefore consequentially depend upon a timely out-set, would be led to make.

The assembly of the savages and the Canadians will also entirely depend upon the governor.

Under these considerations, it is presumed, that the general officer employed to proceed with the army will be held to be out of the reach of any possible blame till he is clear of the province of Canada, and furnished with the proposed supplies.

The navigation of Lake Champlain, secured by the superiority of our naval force, and the arrangements for forming proper magazines so established as to make the execution certain, I would not lose a day to take possession of Crown Point with Brigadier Fraser's corps, a large body of savages, a body of Canadians, both for scouts and works, and the best of our engineers and artificers well supplied with intrenching tools.

The brigade would be sufficient to prevent insult during the time necessary for collecting the stores, forming magazines, and fortifying the posts; all which should be done to a certain degree, previous to proceeding in force to Ticonde∣roga;

to such a degree I mean as may be supposed to be effected in time of trans∣porting artillery, preparing fascines, and other necessaries for artillery operations; and by keeping the rest of the army back during that period, the transport of provisions wil be lessened, and the soldiers made of use in forwarding the convoys.

But though there would be only one brigade at Crown Point at that time, it does not follow that the enemy should remain in a state of tranquility. Corps of savages, supported by detachments of light regulars, should be continually on foot to keep them in alarm, and within their works to cover the reconnoitering of general officers and engineers, and to obtain the best intelligence of their strength, position, and design.

If due exertion is made in the preparations stated above, it may be hoped that Ticonderoga will be reduced early in the summer, and it will then become a more proper place for arms than Crown Point.

The next measure must depend upon those taken by the enemy, and upon the general plan of the campaign as concerted at home. If it be determined that General Howe's whole forces should act upon Hudson's River, and to the south∣ward of it, and that the only object of the Canada army be to effect a junction with that force, the immediate possession of Lake George would be of great con∣sequence, as the most expeditious and most commodious route to Albany; and should the enemy be in force upon that lake, which is very probable, every effort should be tried, by throwing savages and light troops round it, to oblige them to quit it without waiting for naval preparations. Should those efforts fail, the route by South Bay and Skenesborough might be attempted, but considerable diffi∣culties may be expected, as the narrow parts of the river may be easily choaked up and rendered impassable, and at best there will be necessity for a great deal of of land carriage for the artillery, provision, &c. which can only be supplied from Canada. In case of success also by that route, and the enemy not removed from Lake George, it will be necessary to leave a chain of posts, as the army proceeds, for the securities of your communication, which may too much weaken so small an army.

Lest all these attempts should unavoidably fail, and it become indispensibly necessary to attack the enemy by water upon Lake George, the army at the outset should be provided with carriages, implements, and artificers, for conveying armed vessels from Ticonderoga to the lake.

These ideas are formed upon the supposition, that it be the sole purpose of the Canada army to effect a junction with General Howe, or after co-operating so far as to get possession of Albany and open the communication to New-York, to remain upon the Hudson's River, and thereby enable that general to act with his whole force to the southward.

But should the strength of the main American army be such as to admit of the corps of troops now at Rhode Island remaining there during the winter, and acting separately in the spring, it may be highly worthy consideration, whether the most important purpose to which the Canada army could be employed, supposing it in possession of Ticonderoga, would not be to gain the Connecticut River.

The extent of country from Ticonderoga to the inhabited country upon that river, opposite to Charles Town, is about sixty miles, and though to convey artil∣lery and provision so far by land would be attended with difficulties, perhaps more

than those above suggested, upon a progress to Skenesborough, should the object appear worthy, it is to be hoped resources might be found; in that case it would be adviseable to fortify with one or two strong redoubts the heights opposite to Charles Town, and establish posts of savages upon the passage from Ticonderoga to those heights, to preserve the communication, and at the same time prevent any attempt from the country above Charles Town, which is very populous, from molesting the rear or interrupting the convoys of supply, while the army proceeded down the Connecticut. Sould the junction between the Canada and Rhode Island armies be effected upon the Connecticut, it is not too sanguine an expectation that all the New England provinces will be reduced by their operations.

To avoid breaking in upon other matter, I omitted in the beginning of these papers to state the idea of an expedition at the outset of the campaign by the Lake Ontario and Oswego to the Mohawk River, which, as a diversion to facilitate every proposed operation, would be highly desirable, provided the army should be rein∣forced sufficiently to afford it.

It may at first appear, from a view of the present strength of the army, that it may bear the sort of detachment proposed by myself last year for this purpose; but it is to be considered that at that time the utmost object of the campaign, from the advanced season and unavoidable delay of preparation for the lakes, being the reduction of Crown Point and Ticonderoga, unless the success of my expedition had opened the road to Albany, no greater numbers were necessary than for those first operations. The case in the present year differs; because the season of the year affording a prospect of very extensive operation, and consequently the esta∣blishment of many posts, patroles, &c. will become necessary. The army ought to be in a state of numbers to bear those drains, and still remain sufficient to attack any thing that probably can be opposed to it.

Nor, to argue from probability, is so much force necessary for this diversion this year, as was required for the last; because we then knew that General Schuyler with a thousand men, was fortified upon the Mohawk. When the different situ∣ations of things are considered, viz. the progress of General Howe, the early invasion from Canada, the threatening of the Connecticut from Rhode Island, &c. it is not to be imagined that any detachment of such force as that of Schulyer can be supplied by the enemy for the Mohawk. I would not therefore propose it of more (and I have great diffidence whether so much can be prudently afforded) than Sir John Johnson's corps, an hundred British from the second brigade, and an hundred more from the 8th regiment, with four pieces of the lightest artillery, and a body of savages; Sir John Johnson to be with a detachment in person, and an able field officer to command it. I should wish Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger for that em∣ployment.

I particularize the second brigade, because the first is proposed to be diminished by the 31st regiment remaining in Canada, and the rest of the regiment drafted for the expedition being made also part of the Canada force, the two brigades will be exactly squared.

Should it appear, upon examination of the really effective numbers of the Canada army, that the force is not sufficient for proceeding upon the above ideas with a fair prospect of success, the alternative remains of embarking the army at Quebec, in order to effect a junction with General Howe by sea, or to be employed sepa∣rately

rately to co-operate with the main designs, by such means as should be within their strength upon other parts of the continent. And though the army, upon examina∣tion of the numbers from the returns here, and the reinforcements designed, should appear adequate, it is humbly submitted, as a security against the possibility of its remaining inactive, whether it might not be expedient to entrust the latitude of embarking the army by sea to the commander in chief, provided any accidents du∣ring the winter, and unknown here, should have diminished the numbers consider∣ably, or that the enemy, from any winter success to the southward, should have been able to draw such forces towards the frontiers of Canada, and take up their ground with such precaution, as to render the intended measure impracticable or too ha∣zardous. But in that case it must be considered that more force would be required to be left behind for the security of Canada, than is supposed to be necessary when an army is beyond the lakes; and I do not conceive any expedition from the sea can be so formidable to the enemy, or so effectual to close the war, as an invasion from Canada by Ticonderoga. This last measure ought not to be thought of, but upon positive conviction of its necessity.

J. BURGOYNE.

Hertford-Street, Feb. 28th, 1777.

* 3.2Extract of a Letter from Lord George Germain to General Carleton, dated Whitehall, 26th March, 1777.

MY letter of the 22d August, 1776, was intrusted to the care of Captain Le Maitre, one of your aid-de-camps; after having been three times in the Gulph of St. Lawrence he had the mortification to find it impossible to make his passage to Quebec, and therefore returned to England with my dispatch; which, though it was prevented by that accident from reaching your hands in due time, I nevertheless think proper to transmit to you by this earliest opportunity.

You will be informed, by the contents thereof, that as soon as you should have driven the rebel forces from the frontiers of Canada, it was his Majesty's pleasure that you should return to Quebec, and take with you such part of your army as in your judgment and discretion appeared sufficient for the defence of the province; that you should detach Lieutenant General Burgoyne, or such other officer as you should think most proper, with the remainder of the troops, and direct the officer so detached to proceed with all possible expedition to join General Howe, and to put himself under his command.

With a view of quelling the rebellion as soon as possible, it is become highly ne∣cessary that the most speedy junction of the two armies should be effected; and therefore, as the security and good government of Canada absolutely require your presence there, it is the King's determination to leave about 3000 men under your command, for the defence and duties of that province, and to employ the remainder of your army upon two expeditions, the one under the command of Lieutenant Ge∣neral Burgoyne, who is to force his way to Albany, and the other under the com∣mand of Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger, who is to make a diversion on the Mohawk River.

As this plan cannot be advantageously executed without the assistance of Cana∣dians and Indians, his Majesty strongly recommends it to your care, to furnish both

expeditions with good and sufficient bodies of those men; and I am happy in know∣ing that your influence among them is so great, that there can be no room to ap∣prehend you will find it difficult to fulfil his Majesty's expectations.

In order that no time may be lost in entering upon these important undertakings, General Burgoyne has received orders to sail forthwith for Quebec; and that the in∣tended operations may be maturely considered, and afterwards carried on in such a manner as is most likely to be followed by success, he is directed to consult with you upon the subject, and to form and adjust the plan as you both shall think most con∣ducive to his Majesty's service.

I am also to acquaint you, that as soon as you shall have fully regulated every thing relative to these expeditions (and the King relies upon your zeal, that you will be as expeditious as the nature of the business will admit) it is his Majesty's plea∣sure that you detain for the Canada service

The 8th regiment, deducting 100 for the expedition to the Mohawk	460
Battalion companies of the 29th and 31st regiments	896
Battalion companies of the 34th, deducting 100 for the expedition to the Mohawk	348
Eleven additional companies from Great Britain	616
Detachments from the two brigades	300
Detachments from the German troops	650
Royal Highland emigrants	500
	3770

You will naturally conclude that this allotment for Canada has not been made without properly weighing the several duties which are likely to be required. His Majesty has not only considered the several garrisons and posts which probably it may be necessary for you to take, viz. Quebec, Chaudiére, the disaffected parishes of Point Levi, Montreal, and posts between that town and Oswegatche, Trois Rivieres, St. John's, Sele aux Noix, La Prairie, Vergere, and some other towns upon the south shore of St. Lawrence, opposite the isle of Montreal, with posts of communi∣cation to St. John's, but he hath also reflected that the several operations which will be carrying on in different parts of America must necessarily confine the attention of the rebels to the respective scenes of action, and secure Canada from external at∣tacks, and that the internal quiet which at present prevails is not likely to be in∣terrupted, or if interrupted, will soon be restored by your influence over the inha∣bitants; he therefore trusts that 3000 men will be quite sufficient to answer every possible demand.

It is likewise his Majesty's pleasure that you put under the command of Lieute∣nant General Burgoyne

The grenadiers and light infantry of the army (except of the 8th regiment and the 24th regiment) as the advanced corps under the command of Brigadier General Fraser	1568
First brigade, battalion companies of the 9th, 21st, and 47th regiments, de∣ducting a detachment of 50 from each corps, to remain in Canada	1194
Second brigade, battalion companies of the 20th, 53d, and 62d regiments, de∣ducting 50 from each corps to remain as above	1194

All the German troops, except the Hanau chasseurs, and a detachment of 650	3217
The artillery, except such parts as shall be necessary for the defence of Canada.
	7173

Together with as many Canadians and Indians as may be thought necessary for this service; and after having furnished him in the fullest and compleatest manner with artillery, stores, provisions, and every other article necessary for his expedition, and secured to him every assistance which it is in your power to afford and procure, you are to give him orders to pass Lake Champlain, and from thence, by the most vigorous exertion of the force under his command, to proceed with all expedition to Albany, and put himself under the command of Sir William Howe.

From the King's knowledge of the great preparations made by you last year to secure the command of the lakes, and your attention to this part of the service du∣ring the winter, his Majesty is led to expect that every thing will be ready for Ge∣neral Burgoyne's passing the lakes by the time you and he shall have adjusted the plan of the expedition.

It is the King's further pleasure that you put under the command of Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger,

Detachment from the 8th regiment	100
Detachment from the 34th regiment	100
Sir John Johnson's regiment of New York	133
Hanau chasseurs	342
	675

Together with a sufficient number of Canadians and Indians; and after having fur∣nished him with proper artillery, stores, provisions, and every other necessary arti∣cle for his expedition, and secured to him every assistance in your power to afford and procure, you are to give him orders to proceed forthwith to and down the Mo∣hawk River to Albany, and put himself under the command of Sir William Howe.

I shall write to Sir William Howe from hence by the first packet; but you will nevertheless endeavour to give him the earliest intelligence of this measure, and also direct Lieutenant General Burgoyne, and Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger, to neglect no opportunity of doing the same, that they may receive instructions from Sir William Howe. You will at the same time inform them, that, until they shall have received orders from Sir William Howe, it is his Majesty's pleasure that they act as exigencies may require, and in such manner as they shall judge most proper for mak∣ing an impression on the rebels, and bringing them to obedience; but that in so doing, they must never lose view of their intended junctions with Sir William Howe as their principal objects.

In case Lieutenant General Burgoyne or Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger should hap∣pen to die, or be rendered, through illness, incapable of executing those great trusts, you are to nominate to their respective commands, such officer or officers as you shall think best qualified to supply the place of those whom his Majesty has in his wisdom at present appointed to conduct these expeditions.

* 4.1Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, dated Quebec, May 14, 1777.

[Private.]

MY LORD,

I TAKE the opportunity of a vessel dispatched by Sir Guy Carleton to England, to inform your Lordship of my arrival here the 6th instant. And though my present situation, as acting under a superior upon the spot, may make an official correspon∣dence unnecessary, I cannot persuade myself I shall not appear guilty of impropriety in assuming the honour of a private and confidential one, relatively to the objects of my destination.

From my present information, I have reason to expect the preparations for open∣ing the campaign to be very forward on our part. Due exertions were used in the course of the winter, and the uncommon mildness of the weather greatly favoured them, to convey provisions to Chamblé and St. John's. One large victualler ar∣rived after I left the St. Lawrence last November; all residues of other victuallers have been collected; I am in hopes of finding a sufficiency of provision to enable me to cross the Lake Champlain at least, without the arrival of the Corke fleet. I hope also to find artillery stores enough to feel the pulse of the enemy at Ticondero∣ga. Should their situation and resolution be such as to make great artillery prepa∣rations requisite. I shall certainly be under the necessity of waiting at Crown Point the arrival of the ordnance ships from England. A good body of the Indians I am assured are ready to move upon the first call, and measures are taking for bringing them forthwith to proper redezvous.

I cannot speak with so much confidence of the military assistance I am to look for from the Canadians. The only corps yet instituted, or that I am informed can at present be instituted, are three independent companies of 100 men each, officered by Seigneurs of the country, who are well chosen; but they have not been able to engage many volunteers. The men are chiefly drafted from the militia, according to a late regulation of the legislative council. Those I have yet seen afford no pro∣mise of use of arms—aukwark, ignorant, disinclined to the service, and spiritless. Various reasons are assigned for this change in the natives since the time of the French government. It may partly be owing to a disuse of arms, but I believe principally to the unpopularity of their Seigneurs, and to the poison which the emissaries of the rebels have thrown into their minds. Should I find the new com∣panies up the country better composed, or that the well affected parties can be pre∣vailed upon to turn out volunteers, though but for a short occasion, as they did last year, I shall move Sir Guy to exert further measures to augment my numbers.

The army will fall short of the strength computed in England; the want of the camp equipage, cloathing, and many other necessary articles, will cause inconve∣nience; I am nevertheless determined to put the troops destined for my command immediately in motion; and, assisted by the spirit and health in which they abound, I am confident in the prospect of overcoming difficulties and disappoint∣ments.

Having settled all measures with Sir Guy Carleton, both for this purpose and for the expeditious transport of the stores as they may arrive, and having already dis∣patched instructions to Captain Lutwidge, who commands the fleet upon Lake

Champlain, to secure the navigation, in which I clearly see he will find no trouble, I shall proceed in person this afternoon for Montreal, and from thence make my final arrangements for pursuing the King's orders.

I should think myself deficient in justice and in honour, were I close my letter without mentioning the sense I entertain of General Carleton's conduct; that he was anxiously desirous of leading the military operations out of the province, is easi∣ly to be discerned; but his deference to his Majesty's decision, and his zeal to give effect to his measures in my hands, are equally manifest, exemplary, and satisfactory. I shall take every possible means to transmit to your Lordship an account of my pro∣ceedings from time to time, and have the honour to be, with perfect respect,

Your Lordship's most obedient and most humble servant, J. BURGOYNE.

P. S. I have mentioned nothing of intelligence concerning the enemy, con∣cluding that Sir Guy Carleton will transmit the material part of it, and in a manner more full than in my power to do. I understand they have laboured hard to strengthen Ticonderoga, and threaten a vigorous resistance there, and that they have built some vessels on Lake George, as your Lordship may remember I had foreseen.

* 5.1Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, dated Montreal, May 19, 1777.

MY LORD,

I HAD the honour to write to your Lordship the day I left Quebec, having rea∣son to imagine this letter may reach that place in time to be dispatched with my former one, I cannot omit the occasion to inform your Lordship, that the hopes I expressed of being able to put the troops in motion without waiting the arrival of the fleets from England and Ireland, are confirmed.

The only delay is occasioned by the impracticability of the roads, owing to late extraordinary heavy rains, and this difficulty will be speedily removed, by exerting the services of the parishes as soon as the weather clears. In the mean time, I am employing every means that water carriage will admit for drawing the troops and stores towards their point. I trust, I shall have vessels sufficient to move the army and stores together, and in that case, will take post at once, within sight of Ticon∣deroga, and only make use of Crown Point for my hospital and magazine.

A continuation of intelligence from different spies and deserters, confirms the de∣sign of the enemy to dispute Ticonderoga vigorously. They are also building bow∣gallies at Fort George, for the defence of that Lake, &c. fortifying on the road to Skenesborough.

It is consigned to the New England colonies, to furnish supplies of men and pro∣vision to oppose the progress of my army, and they have undertaken the task, upon condition of being exempt from supplying Mr. Washington's main army.

It is my design, while advancing to Ticonderago, and during the siege of that post, for a siege I apprehend it must be, to give all possible jealousy on the side of Connecticut. If I can by manoeuvre lead the enemy to suspect, that after the reduc∣tion of Ticonderago, my views are pointed that way, the Connecticut forces will be

very cautious of leaving their own frontier, and I may gain a start that may much expedite and facilitate my progress to Albany.

Your Lordship may rest assured, that, whatever demonstration I may endeavour to impose on the enemy, I shall really make no movement that can procrastinate the great object of my orders.

I have the honour to be, &c. J. BURGOYNE.

* 6.1Substance of the Speech of Lieutenant-General Burgoyne to the Indians in Congress, at the Camp upon the River Bouquet, June 21, 1777, and their Answer, translated.

[In Lieutenant-General Burgoyne's, June 22, 1777.]

CHIEFS and WARRIORS,

THE great King, our common father, and the patron of all who seek and deserve his protection, has considered with satisfaction the general conduct of the Indian tribes from the beginning of the troubles in America. Too sagacious and too faithful to be deluded or corrupted, they have observed the violated rights of the parental power they love, and burned to vindicate them. A few individuals alone, the refuse of a small tribe, at the first were led astray, and the misrepresentations, the specious al∣lurements, the insidious promises and diversified plots, in which the rebels are exer∣cised, and all of which they employed for that effect, have served only in the end to enhance the honour of the tribes in general, by demonstrating to the world, how few and how contemptible are the apostates. It is a truth known to you all, that these pitiful examples excepted, and they probably have before this day hid their faces in shame, the collective voices and hands of the Indian tribes over this vast con∣tinent, are on the side of justice, of law, and of the King.

The restraint you have put upon your resentment in waiting the King your father's call to arms, the hardest proof, I am persuaded, to which your affection could have been put, is another manifest and affected mark of your adherence to that principle of connection to which you were always fond to allude, and which it is mutually the joy and the duty of the parent to cherish.

The clemency of your father has been abused, the offers of his mercy have been despised, and his farther patience would, in his eyes, become culpable, in as much as it would withold redress from the most grievous oppressions in the provinces thatever dis∣graced the history of mankind. It therefore remains for me, the General of one of his Majesty's armies, and in this council his representative, to release you from those bonds which your obedience imposed.—Warriors, you are free—Go forth in might of your valour and your cause; strike at the common enemies of Great-Britain and America—disturbers of public order, peace, and happiness—destroyers of commerce, parricides of the state.

The circle round you, the chiefs of his Majesty's European forces, and of the Princes his allies, esteem you as brothers in the war; emulous in glory and in friend∣ship, we will endeavour reciprocally to give and to receive examples; we know how to value, and we will strive to imitate your perseverance in enterprize, and your constancy to resist hunger, weariness, and pain. Be it our task, from the dictates of

our religion, the laws of our warefare, and the principles and interest of our policy, to regulate your passions when they overbear, to point out were it is nobler to spare than to revenge, to discriminate degrees of guilt, to suspend the up-listed stroke, to chastise, and not to destroy.

This war to you, my friends, is new; upon all former occasions in taking the field you held yourselves authorized to destroy wherever you came, because every where you found an enemy. The case is now very different.

The King has many faithful subjects dispersed in the provinces, consequently you have many brothers there; and these people are the more to be pitied, that they are persecuted, or imprisoned, wherever they are discovered, or suspected, and to di∣semble, is, to a generous mind, a yet more grievous punishment.

Persuaded that your magnanimity of character, joined to your principles of affec∣tion to the King, will give me fuller controul over your minds, than the military rank with which I am invested, I enjoin your most serious attention to the rules which I hereby proclaim for your invariable observation during the campaign.

I positively forbid bloodshed, when you are not opposed in arms.

Aged men, women, children, and prisoners, must be held sacred from the knife or hatchet, even in the time of actual conflict.

You shall receive compensation for the prisoners you take, but you shall be called to account for scalps.

In conformity and indulgence to your customs, which have affixed an idea of ho∣nour to such badges of victory, you shall be allowed to take the scalps of the dead, when killed by your fire, and in fair opposition; but on no account, or pretence, or subtlety, or prevarication, are they to be taken from the wounded, or even dying; and still less pardonable, if possible, will it be held, to kill men in that condition, on purpose, and upon a supposition, that this protection to the wounded, would be thereby evaded.

Base lurking assassins, incendiaries, ravagers, and plunderers of the country, to whatever army they may belong, shall be treated with less reserve; but the latitude must be given you by order, and I must be the judge of the occasion.

Should the enemy, on their part, dare to countenance acts of barbarity towards those who may fall into their hands, it shall be yours also to retaliate; but till severity shall be thus compelled, bear immoveable in your hearts this solid maxim, it cannot be too deeply impressed, that the great essential reward, worthy service of your alli∣ance, the sincerity of your zeal to the King your father, and never-failing protector, will be examined, and judged upon the test only of your steady and uniform adhe∣rence to the orders and counsels of those to whom his Majesty has intrusted the direc∣tion and the honour of his arms.

Answer from an old Chief of the Iroquois.

I stand up in the name of all the nations present, to assure our father, that we have attentively listened to his discourse, We receive you as our father, because when you speak, we hear the voice of our great father beyond the great lake.

We rejoice in the approbation you have expressed of our behaviour.

We have been tried and tempted by the Bostonians; but we have loved our father, and our hatchets have been sharpened upon our affections.

In proof of the sincerity of our professions, our whole villages able to go to war, are come forth. The old and infirm, our infants and wives, alone remain at home.

With one common assent we promise a constant obedience to all you have ordered, and all you shall order; and may the Father of Days give you many and success.

* 7.1Copy of a Letter from General Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, dated Skenesborough, July 11th, 1777.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that the enemy, disloged from Ti∣conderoga and Mount Independant, on the 6th instant, and were driven, on the same day, beyond Skenesborough on the right, and to Humerton on the left, with the loss of 128 pieces of cannon, all their armed vessels and bateaux, the greatest part of their baggage and ammunition, provision, and military stores, to a very large amount.

This success has been followed by events equally fortunate and rapid. I subjoin such a detail of circumstances as the time will permit; and for his Majesty's further information, I beg leave to refer your Lordship to Captain Gardner, my aid de camp, whom I thought it necessary to dispatch with news so important to the King's service and so honourable to the troops under my command.

Journal of the late principal Proceedings of the Army.

Having remained at Crown-Point three days to bring up the rear of the army, to establish the magazines and the hospital, and to obtain intelligence of the enemy, on the

* 9.1I ordered the advanced corps, consisting of the British light infantry and grenadiers, the 24th regiment, some Canadians and Savages, and ten pieces of light artillery, under the command of Brigadier General Fraser, to move from Putnam Creek, where they had been encamped some days, up the west shore of the lake to Four-Mile-Point, so called from being within that distance off the fort of Ticoderoga. The German reserve, consisting of the Brunswick chasseurs, light infantry and gre∣nadiers under Lieutenant Colonel Breyman were moved at the same time to Richard∣son's farm, on the east shore, opposite to Putnam Creek.

* 9.2The whole army made a movement forward. Brigadier Fraser's corps occupied the strong post called Three-Mile-Point, on the west shore; the German reserve the east-shore opposite: the army encamped in two lines, the right wing at the Four-Mile-Point, the left wing nearly opposite, on the east shore.

The Royal George, and Inflexible frigates, with the gun-boats, were anchored at this time just without the reach of the enemy's batteries, and covered the lake from the west to the east shores. The rest of the fleet had been some time without guns, in order to assist in carrying provisions over Lake Champlain.

The enemy appeared to be posted as follows. A brigade occupied the old French lines on the height to the north of the fort of Ticonderoga. These lines were in good repair, and had several intrenchments behind them, chiefly calculated to guard the north-west flank, and were further sustained by a block-house. They had, farther to

their left, a post at the saw-mills, which are at the foot of the carrying-place to Lake George, and a block-house upon an eminence above the mills, and a block-house and hospital at the entrance of the lake.

Upon the right of the lines, and between them and the old fort, there were two new block-houses and a considerable battery close to the water edge.

It seemed that the enemy had employed their chief industry, and were in the grea∣test force upon Mount Independence, which is high and circular, and upon the sum∣mit, which is Table Land, was a star fort, made of pickets, and well supplied with artillery, and a large square of barracks within it. The foot of the hill, on the side which projects into the lake, was intrenched and had a strong abbattis close to the water. This intrenchment was lined with heavy artillery, pointed down the lake flanking the water battery, above described, and sustained by another battery about half way up the hill. On the west side the hill runs the main river, and in its passage is joined by the water which comes down from Lake George. The enemy had here a bridge of communication, which could not at this time be reconnoitred. On the east side of the hill the water forms a small bay, into which falls a rivulet after having encirculed in its course part of the hill to the south east. The side to the south could not be seen, but was described as inaccessible.

* 9.3About nine in the morning a smoke was observed towards Lake George, and the Savages brought in a report that the enemy had set fire to the further block-house and had abandoned the saw-mills, and that a considerable body were advancing from the lines towards a bridge upon the road which led from the saw-mills towards the right of the British camp. A detachment of the advanced corps was immediately put in march, under the command of Brigadier Fraser, supported by the second brigade and some light artillery, under the command of Major General Phillips, with orders to proceed to Mount Hope, which is to the north of the lines, to reconnoitre the enemy's position, and to take advantage of any post they might abandon or be driven from. The Indians under Captain Fraser, supported by his company of marksmen, were directed to make a circuit to the left of Brigadier Fraser's line of march, and endea∣vour to cut off the retreat of the enemy to their lines; but this design miscarried through the impetuosity of the Indians, who attacked too soon, and in front; and the enemy were thereby able to retire with the loss of one officer and a few men killed, and one officer wounded. Major General Phillips took possession of the very advanta∣geous post of Mount Hope this night, and the enemy were thereby entirely cut off from all communication with Lake George.

* 9.4Mount Hope was occupied in force by General Fraser's whole corps. The first British brigade, and two entire brigades of artillery. The second brigade, British, encamped upon the left of the first, and the brigade of Gall, having been drawn from the east shore to occupy the ground where Fraser's corps had originally been; the line became compleat, extending from Three-Mile-Point to the westermost part of Mount Hope; on the same day, Major General Reidesel encamped on the east shore in a parallel line with Three-Mile-Point, having pushed the reserve forward near the rivulet which encircles Mount Independence. The enemy cannonaded the camps of Mount Hope and of the German reserve during most part of this day, but without effect.

* 9.5The army worked hard at their communications and got up the artillery, tents, baggage and provisions, the enemy at intervals continued the cannonade upon the camps, which was not in any instance returned.

The Thunderer Radeau, carrying the battering train and stores, having been warped up from Crown Point, arrived this day, and immediately began to land the artillery.

* 9.6Lieutenant Twiss, the commanding engineer, was ordered to reconnoitre Sugar Hill, on the south side of the ••ommunion from Lake George into Lake Champlain, which had been possessed in the night by a party of light infantry. It appeared at first to be a very advantageous post, and it is now known that the enemy had a coun∣cil some time ago upon the expediency of possessing it; but the idea was rejected, upon the supposition that it was impossible for a corps to be established there in force. Lieutenant Twiss reported this hill to have the entire command of the works and buildings both of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, at the d stance of about 1400 yards from the former, and 1500 from the latter; that the ground might be levelled so as to receive cannon, and that the road to convey them, though difficult, might be made practicable in twenty-four hours. This hill also commanded, in reverse, the bridge of communication; saw the exact situ∣ation of their vessels; nor could the enemy, during the day, make any material movement or preparation, without being discovered, and even having their num∣bers counted,

It was determined that a battery should be raised on Sugar Hill for light twenty∣four pounders, medium twelves, and eight-inch howitzers. This very arduous work was carried on so rapidly that the battery would have been ready the next day.

It is a duty in this place to do some justice to the zeal and activity of Major General Phillips, who had the direction of the operation, and having mentioned that most valuable officer, I trust it cannot be thought a digression to add, that it is to his judicious arrangements and indefatigable pains, during the general super∣intendency of preparation which Sir Guy Carleton entrusted to him in the winter and spring, that the service is indebted for its present forwardness. The preva∣lence of contrary winds and other accidents having rendered it impossible for any necessaries prepared in England for the opening of the campaign, yet to reach the camp.

* 9.7Soon after day-light an officer arrived express, on board the Royal George, where in the night I took up my quarters, as the most centrical situation, with information from Brigadier Fraser that the enemy were retiring, and that he was advancing with his picquets, leaving orders for the brigade to follow as soon as they could accoutre, with intention to pursue by land. This movement was very discernible, as were the British colours, which the Brigadier had fixed upon the fort of Ticonderoga. Knowing how safely I could trust to that officer's conduct. I turned my chief attention to the pursuit by water, by which route I understood one column were retiring in two hundred and twenty bateaux, covered by five armed gallies.

The great bridge of communication, through which a way was to be opened, was supported by twenty-two sunken piers of large timber, at nearly equal di∣stances; the space between were made of separate floats, each about fifty feet long, and twelve feet wide, strongly fastened together by chains and rivets, and also fastened to the sunken piers. Before this bridge was a boom, made of very

large pieces of timber, fastened together by rivetted bolts and double chains, made of iron an inch and an half square.

The gun-boats were instantly moved forward, and the boom and one of the intermediate floats were cut with great dexterity and dispatch, and Commodore Lutwidge, with the officers and seamen in his department, partaking the general animation, a passage was formed in half an hour for the frigates also, through im∣pediments which the enemy had been labouring to construct since last autumn.

During this operation Major General Reidesel had passed to Mount Indepen∣dence, with the corps, Breyman, and part of the left wing. He was directed to proceed by land, to sustain Brigadier Fraser, or to act more to the left, if he saw it expedient so to do.

The 62d regiment British, and the Brunswick regiment of Prince Frederick, were stationed at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, in the place of the parties of Fraser's brigade, which had been left in possession of the artillery and stores, and the rest of the army was ordered to follow up the river as they could be col∣lected, without regard to the place in the line.

About three in the afternoon I arrived with the Royal George and Inflexible; and the best sailing gun-boats at South Bay, within three miles of Skenesborough, at which latter place the enemy were posted in a stockaded fort, and their armed gallies in the falls below.

The foremost regiments, viz. the 9th, 20th, and 21st, were immediately dis∣embarked, and ascended the mountains with the intention of getting behind the fort, and cutting off the retreat of the enemy; but their precipitate flight rendered this manoeuvre ineffectual. The gun-boats and frigates continued their course to Skenesborough Falls, where the armed vessels were posted. Captain Carter, with part of his brigade of gun-boats, immediately attacked, and with so much spirit, that two of the vessels very soon struck; the other three were blown up, and the enemy having previously prepared combustible materials, set fire to the fort, mills, storehouses, bateaux, &c. and retired with the detachment left for that purpose, the main body having gone off when the troops were ascending the mountain. A great quantity of provisions and some arms were here consumed, and most of their officers' baggage was burnt, sunk, or taken. Their loss is not known; about 30 prisoners were made, among which were two wounded officers.

During these operations upon the right, Brigadier General Fraser continued his pursuit to Castletown till one o'clock, having marched in a very hot day from four o'clock in the morning till that time. Some stragglers of the enemy were picked up, from whom the Brigadier learned that their rear guard was composed of chosen men, and commanded by Colonel Francis, one of their best officers. During the time that the men were refreshing, Major General Reidesel came up, and arrange∣ments for continuing the pursuit having been concerted, Brigadier Fraser moved forward again, and during the night lay upon his arms, in an advantageous situ∣ation, three miles nearer the enemy.

* 9.8At three in the morning he renewed his march, and about five his advanced scouts discovered the enemy's centries, who fired their pieces and joined the main body. The Brigadier observing a commanding ground to the left of his light infantry, immediately ordered it to be possessed by that corps; and a considerable body of the enemy attempting the same, they met. The enemy were driven back

to their original post; the advanced guard under Major Grant was by this time engaged, and the grenadiers were advanced to sustain them, and to prevent the right flank from being turned. The Brigadier remained on the left, where the enemy long defended themselves by the aid of logs and trees, and after being repulsed, and prevented getting to the Castletown road by the grenadiers, they rallied, and renewed the action; and upon a second repulse, attempted their retreat by Pitsford Mountain. The grenadiers scrambled up a part of that ascent, appearing almost inaccessible, and gained the summit before them, which threw them into confusion; they were still greatly superior in numbers, and consequently in extent, and the brigadier, in momentary expectation of the Brunswickers, had latterally drawn from his left to support his right. At this critical moment General Reidesel, who had pressed on, upon hearing the firing, arrived with the foremost of his columns, viz. the chasseurs company and eighty grenadiers and light infantry. His judgment immediately pointed to him the course to take; he extended upon Brigadier Fraser's left flank. The chasseurs got into action with great gallantry, under Major Barner. They fled on all sides, leaving dead upon the field Colonel Francis and many other officers, with upwards of 200 men; above 600 were wounded, most of whom perished in the woods, attempting to get off, and one colonel, seven captains, ten subalterns, and 210 men were made prisoners; above 200 stand of arms were also taken.

The number of the enemy before the engagement amounted to 2000 men. The British detachment under Brigadier General Fraser (the parties left the day before at Ticonderoga not having been able to join) consisted only of 850 fighting men.

The bare relation of so signal an action is sufficient for its praise. Should the attack against such inequality of numbers, before the German brigade came up, seem to require explanation, it is to be considered that the enemy might have escaped by delay; that the advanced guard on a sudden found themselves too near the enemy to avoid action without retreating; and that Brigadier Fraser had supposed the German troops to be very near. The difference of time in their arrival was merely accidental. The Germans pushed for a share in the glory, and they arrived in time to obtain it. I have only to add, that the exertions of Briga∣dier Fraser on this day were but a continuance of that uniform intelligence, activity and bravery, which distinguish his character upon all occasions, and entitle him to be recommended, in the most particular manner, to his Majesty's favour.

The officers and soldiers of this brigade have prevented any distinctions of indi∣viduals by a general and equal display of spirit.

The country people about Skenesborough having reported that part of the enemy were still retreating, the 9th regiment was detached, with orders to take post near Fort Anne, and observe the enemy's motions. This was effected, but with great difficulty, as the roads were almost impracticable, and the bridges broken. The other troops were employed all that day and night in dragging fifty bateaux over the carrying place at Wood Creek, to facilitate the movement of the rest of the first brigade to Fort Anne, to dislodge the enemy.

* 9.9A report was received from Lieutenant Colonel Hill (9th regiment) that the enemy had been reinforced in the night by a considerable body of fresh men; that he could not retire with his regiment before them, but he would maintain his ground. The two remaining regiments of the first brigade were ordered to quicken

their march, and upon second intelligence of the enemy, and firing being heard, the 20th regiment was ordered forward with two pieces of artillery, and Major General Phillips was sent to take the command. A violent storm of rain, which lasted the whole day, prevented the troops from getting to Fort Anne so soon as was intended; but the delay gave the 9th regiment an opportunity of distinguish∣ing themselves, by standing and repulsing an attack of six times their number. The enemy finding the position not to be forced in front, endeavoured to turn it; and from the superiority of their numbers that inconvenience was to be appre∣hended; and Lieutenant Colonel Hill found it necessary to change his position in the height of action: so critical an order was executed by the regiment with the utmost steadiness and bravery. The enemy, after an attack of three hours, were totally repulsed, and fled towards Fort Edward, setting fire to Fort Anne, but leaving a saw-mill and a block-house in good repair, which were afterwards pos∣sessed by the king's troops.

The 9th regiment acquired, during their expedition, about thirty prisoners, some stores and baggage, and colours of the 2d Hampshire regiment.

One unlucky accident happened, to counterbalance, in some degree, this suc∣cess. Captain Montgomery, an officer of great merit, was wounded early in the action, and was in the act of being dressed by the surgeon when the regiment changed ground; being unable to help himself, he and the surgeon were taken prisoners. I since hear he has been well treated, and is in a fair way of recovery at Albany.

* 9.10The army very much fatigued (many parts of it having wanted their provisions for two days, almost the whole their tents and baggage) assembled in their present position. The right wing occupies the heights of Skenesborough in two lines; the right flank to the mountains, covered by the regiment of Reidesel's dragoons, en potence; the left to the Wood Creek.

The Brunswick troops under Major General Reidesel upon Castletown River, with Breyman's corps upon the communication of roads leading to Putney and Rutland; the regiment of Hesse Hanau are posted at the head of East Creek, to preserve the communication with the camp at Castletown River, and secure the bateaux.

Brigadier Fraser's corps is in the centre, ready to move on either wing of the army.

The scattered remains of the enemy are at Fort Edward, on the Hudson's River, where they have been joined, as I am informed, by General Putnam, with a considerable corps of fresh troops.

Roads are opening for the army to march to them by Fort Anne, and the Wood Creek is clearing of fallen trees, sunken stones, and other obstacles, to give passage to bateaux for carrying artillery, stores, provisions and camp equipage. These are laborious works; but the spirit and zeal of the troops are sufficient to surmount them. Some little time must also be allowed for the supplies of provisions to overtake us. In the mean time all possible diligence is using at Ticonderoga to get the gun-boats, provision vessels, and a proper quantity of bateaux into Lake George. A corps of the army will be ordered to penetrate by that route, which will afterwards be the route for the magazines; and a junction of the whole is in∣tended at Fort Edward.

I transmit to your Lordship herewith returns of the killed and wounded, and lists of such parts of provisions and stores, taken from the enemy, as could be collected in so short a time.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect, Your Lordships, &c.

* 9.11Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, dated Skenesborough, July 11, 1777.

[Private.]

MY LORD,

HAVING given your Lordship a detail, in my public letter of this date, of the late transactions, I now do myself the honour to state to your Lordship, such circum∣stances as appear to me more proper for a private communication.

Mr. Peters and Mr. Jessup, who came over to Canada last autumn, and proposed to raise battalions, one from the neighbourhood of Albany, the other from Charlotte county, are confident of success as the army advances. Their battalions are now in embryo, but very promising; they have fought, and with spirit. Sir Guy Carleton has given me blank commissions for the officers, to fill up occasionally, and the agree∣ment with them is, that the commissions are not to be so effective, till two thirds of the battalions are raised. Some hundreds of men, a third part of them with arms, have joined me since I have penerated this place, professing themselves loyalists, and wishing to serve, some to the end of the war, some for the campaign. Though I am without instructions upon this subject, I have not hesitated to receive them, and as fast as companies can be formed, I shall post the officers till a decision can be made upon the measure by my superiors. I mean to employ them particularly upon detach∣ments, for keeping the country in awe, and procuring cattle; their real use I expect will be great in the preservation of the national troops: but the impression which will be caused upon public opinion, should provincials be seen acting vigorously in the cause of the King, will be yet more advantageous, and, I trust, fully justify the ex∣pence.

The manifesto, of which I enclosed your Lordship a copy in my last dispatches, and herewith send a duplicate, has great effect where the country is not in the power of the rebels; where it is, the committees turn all their efforts to counteract it. They watch or imprison all suspected persons, compel the people in general to take arms, and to drive the cattle, and to burn the corn, under penalty of immediate death. Great numbers have been hanged. Should these wretches succeed to make a desert of the country, by fire and massacre, it will at least be a pleasing reflection, that while advantages are reaped from the clement part of the manifesto, they, and not the King's troops, are the executioners of its threats.

Your Lordship will have observed, I have made no mention of the Indians, in the pursuit from Ticonderoga. It is not possible to draw them in many respects from the plunder of that place, and I confidentially acknowledge this is not the only instance in which I have found little more than a name. If, under the management of their conductors, they are indulged, for interested reasons, in all the caprices and humours of spoiled children, like them they grow more unreasonable and importunate upon

every new favour; were they left to themselves, enormities too horrid to think of would ensue, guilty and innocent, women and infants, would be a common prey.

This is the character of the lower Canadian Indians, who alone have been with the army hitherto. I am informed the Outawas, and other remote nations, who are within two days march of joining me, are more brave and more tractable; that they profess war, not pillage. They are under the directions of a M. St. Luc, a Canadian gentleman of honour and parts, and one of the best partizans the French had last war, and of one Langlade, the very man who projected and executed with these very na∣tions the defeat of General Braddock. My first intention was to turn this whole corps to the Connecticut immediately, to force a supply of provisions, to intercept reinforcements, and to confirm the jealousy I have in many ways endeavoured to ex∣cite in the New England provinces; but finding that the enemy are labouring to re∣move their magazines from Forts George and Edward, and every where destroying the roads, and preparing to drive and burn the country towards Albany, I have de∣termined to employ them, to prevent, if possible, by their terror, the continuance of those operations. And after arriving at Albany, they may be employed to renew the alarm towards Connecticut and Boston.

Your Lordship will pardon me if I a little lament that my orders do not give me the latitude I ventured to propose in my original project for the campaign, to make a real effort instead of a feint upon New England. As things have turned out, were I at liberty to march in force immediately by my left, instead of my right, I should have little doubt of subduing before winter the provinces where the rebellion origi∣ginated.

If my late letters reach Mr. Howe, I still hope this plan may be adopted from Al∣bany; in the mean while my utmost exertions shall continue, according to my in∣structions, to force a junction.

I have sent some Indians through the woods, in the hope of their reaching St. Leger, with the account of my progress; now is the critical time for his push upon the Mohawk. I have certain intelligence that all the country round Fort Stanwix is in alarm: but I imagine it proceeds from the appearance of some Savages detached by Colonel Butler, not apprehending St. Leger can be got quite so forward.

* 11.1To Lord George Germaine.

Camp near Saratoga, August 20, 1777.

MY LORD,

IN my last dispatch (a duplicate of which will be inclosed herewith) I had the honour to inform your Lordship of the proceedings of the army under my command to the 30th of July.

From that period to the 15th of August every possible measure was employed to bring forward bateaux, provisions, and ammunition from Fort George to the first navigable part of Hudson's River, a distance of eighteen miles, the roads in some parts steep, and in others wanting great repair. Of the horses furnished by contra••t in Canada not more than a third part was yet arrived. The delay was not imputable

to neglect, but to the natural accidents attending so long and intricate a combination of land and water carriage. Fifty team of oxen, which had been collected in the country through which I had marched, were added to assist the transport; but these resources together were found far inadequate to the purposes of feeding the army, and forming a magazine at the same time. Exceeding heavy rains augmented the impediments. It was often necessary to employ ten or twelve oxen upon a single bateau; and after the utmost exertions for the fifteen days above stated, there were not above four days provision before hand, nor above ten bateaux in the river.

Intelligence had reached me that Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger was before Fort Stanwix, which was defended. The main army of the enemy opposed to me was at Stillwater, a place between Saratoga and the mouth of the Mohawk.

A rapid movement forward appeared to be of the utmost consequence at this period. The enemy could not have proceeded up the Mohawk without putting themselves between two fires, in case Colonel St. Leger should have succeeded; and at best being cut off by my army from Albany. They must either therefore have stood an action, have fallen back towards Albany, or have passed the Hudson's River, in order to secure a retreat to New England, higher up. Which ever of these measures they had taken, so that the King's army had been enabled to advance, Colo∣nel St. Leger's operations would have been assisted, a junction with him probably secured, and the whole country of the Mohawk opened. To maintain the commu∣nication with Fort George during such a movement, so as to be supplied by daily degrees at a distance, continually increasing, was an obvious impossibility. The army was much too weak to have afforded a chain of posts. Escorts for every sepa∣rate transport would have been a still greater drain; nor could any have been made so strong as to force their way through such positions as the enemy might take in one night's march from the White Creek, where they had a numerous militia. Had the enemy remained supine, through fear or want of comprehending so palpable an ad∣vantage, the physical impossibility of being supplied by degrees from Fort George was still in force, because a new necessity of land carriage for nine miles arises at Still∣water; and in the proportion that carriages had been brought forward to that place, the transport must have ceased behind.

The alternative therefore was short; either to relinquish the favourable opportuni∣ty of advancing upon the enemy, or to attempt other resources of supply.

It was well known that the enemy's supplies in live cattle, from a large tract of country, passed by the route of Manchester, Arlington, and other parts of the Hampshire Grants, to Bennington, in order to be occasionally conveyed from thence to the main army. A large deposit of corn and of wheel carriages was also formed at the same place, and the usual guard was militia, though it varied in numbers from day to day. A scheme was formed to surprise Bennington. The possession of the cattle and carriages would certainly have enabled the army to leave their distant ma∣gazines, and to have acted with energy and dispatch: success would also have answer∣ed many secondary purposes.

Lieut. Col. Baume, an officer well qualified for the undertaking, was fixed upon to command. He had under him 200 dismounted dragoons of the regiment of Riede∣sel, Captain Fraser's marksmen, which were the only British, all the Canadian volun∣teers, a party of the Provincials who perfectly knew the country, 100 Indians, and two light pieces of cannon; the whole detachment amounted to abo ut 500 men. The instructions were positive to keep the regular corps posted while thel ight troops felt

their way, and not to incur the danger of being surrounded, or having a retreat cut off.

In order to facilitate this operation, and to be ready to take advantage of its suc∣cess, the army moved up the east shore of Hudson's River. On the 14th, a bridge was formed of rafts, over which the advanced corps passed and encamped at Saratoga. Lieutenant Colonel Breyman's corps were posted near Batten Kill, and upon intelli∣gence from Colonel Baume, that the enemy were stronger at Bennington than ex∣pected, and were aware of his attack, that corps, consisting of the Brunswick gre∣nadiers, light infantry and chasseurs, were sent forward to sustain him.

It since appears that Lieutenant Colonel Baume, not having been able to complete his march undiscovered, was joined at a place called Sancoix Mills, about four miles short of Bennington, by many people professing themselves to be Loyalists. A pro∣vincial gentleman of confidence who had been sent with the detachment, as knowing the country and the character of the inhabitants, was so incautious as to leave at liber∣ty such as took the oath of allegiance.

His credulity and their profligacy caused the first misfortune. Colonel Baume was induced to proceed without sufficient knowledge of the ground. His design was be∣trayed; the men who had taken the oaths were the first to fire upon him; he was attacked on all sides. He shewed great personal courage, but was overpowered by numbers.

During this time Lieutenant Colonel Breyman was upon the march through a hea∣vy rain; and such were the other impediments stated in that officer's report, of bad roads, tired horses, difficulties in passing artillery, carriages, &c. that he was from eight in the morning of the 15th to four in the afternoon of the following day making about twenty-four miles.

He engaged, fought gallantly, and drove the enemy from three several heights; but was too late to succour Colonel Baume, who was made prisoner, and a considera∣ble part of his dragoons were killed or taken. The failure of ammunition, from the accidental breaking to pieces of a tumbril, unfortunately obliged Lieutenant Colonel Breyman to retire conquering troops, and to leave behind two pieces of cannon, be∣sides two which had been lost by Lieutenant Colonel Baume. The Indians made good their retreat from the first affair, as did Captain Fraser, with part of his compa∣ny, and many of the Provincials and Canadians.

The loss, as at present appears, amounts to about 400 men, killed and taken in both actions, and twenty-six officers, mostly prisoners; but men who were dispersed in the woods drop in daily. A correct return shall be transmitted to your Lordship the first opportunity.

This, my Lord, is a true state of the event. I have not dwelt upon errors, be∣cause in many instances they were counterbalanced by spirit. The enemy will of course find matter of parade in the acquisition of four pieces of cannon: but that apart, they have small cause of exultation; their loss in killed and wounded being more than double to ours, by the confession of their prisoners and deserters, and of many inhabitants who were witnesses to the burial of their dead.

The chief subject of regret on our side, after that which any loss of gallant men naturally occasions, is the disappointment of not obtaining live cattle, and the loss of time in bringing forward the magazines.

This heavy work is now nearly completed, and a new bridge of boats is thrown over the Hudson's River, opposite to Saratoga, the former one of rafts having been carried away by the swell of water after the late continual rains. When enabled to move, nothing within my scale of talent shall be left unattempted to fulfil his Maje∣sty's orders, and I hope circumstances will be such, that my endeavours may be in some degree assisted by a co-operation of the army under Sir William Howe.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, Your Lordship's most obedient and most humble servant, (Signed.) J. BURGOYNE.* 11.2

* 11.3Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, dated Camp, near Saratoga, August 20, 1777.

[Private.]

MY LORD,

I NEED not enlarge upon the concern I have in communicating any sinister events. I am persuaded your Lordship will give me credit for partaking every sentiment that your Lordship, or any other man warmed with principle and zeal in this contest, can feel.

In regard to the affair of Saintcoick, I have only to add to the public account, that if ever there was a situation to justify enterprize and exertion, out of the beaten track of military service, it was that in which I found myself. Had I succeeded, I should have effected a junction with St. Leger, and been now before Albany. And I flatter myself, I need only mention those views, to shew that in hazarding this expedition I had the soundest principles of military reasoning on my side, viz. that the advantages to be expected from success were in a great degree superior to the evils that could at∣tend miscarriage. The secondary purposes, to which I alluded in the public letter, were to try the affections of the country; to complete the Provincial corps, many re∣cruits for which were unable to escape from their villages without a force to encou∣rage and protect them; and to distract the councils of the enemy, by continuing their jealousy towards New England.

Major General Reidesel has pressed upon me repeatedly the mounting his dragoons, the men were animated with the same desire, and I conceived it a most favourable oc∣casion to give into their ideas and solicitations, because in exerting their zeal to fulfil their favourite purpose, they necessarily would effect the greater purpose of my own. The rest of the troops were selected from such as would least weaken the solid strength of the army, in case of ill success; and I thought it expedient to take a little trial of the Provincials and Canadians before I might have occasion for them in more impor∣tant actions.

The original detachment could not have been made larger without opening roads, and other preparations of time, nor should I have thought it justifiable to expose the best troops to loss upon a collateral action. Had my instructions been followed, or could Mr. Breyman have marked at the rate of two miles an hour any given twelve hours out of the two and thirty, success would probably have ensued, misfortune would certainly have been avoided. I did not think it prudent, in the present crisis, to mark these circumstances to the public so strongly as I do in confidence to your

Lordship; but I rely, and I will venture to say I expect, because I think justice will warrant the expectation, that while, for the sake of public harmony, that necessary prin∣ciple for conducting nice and laborious service, I colour the faults of the execution, your Lordship will, in your goodness, be my advocate to the King, and to the world, in vindication of the plan.

The consequences of this affair, my Lord, have little effect upon the strength or spirits of the army; but the prospect of the campaign in other respects, is far less prosperous than when I wrote last. In spire of St. Leger's victory, Fort Stanwix holds out obstinately. I am afraid the expectations of Sir J. Johnson greatly fail in the rising of the country. On this side I find daily reason to doubt the sincerity of the re∣solution of the professing loyalists. I have about 400, but not half of them armed, who may be depended upon; the rest are trimmers, merely actuated by interest. The great bulk of the country is undoubtedly with the Congress, in principle and in zeal; and their measures are executed with a secrecy and dispatch that are not to be equalled. Wherever the King's forces point, militia, to the amount of three or four thousand assemble in twenty-four hours; they bring with them their subsistence, &c. and, the alarm over, they return to their farms. The Hampshire Grants in particular, a country unpeopled and almost unknown in the last war, now abounds in the most active and most re∣bellious race of the continent, and hangs like a gathering storm upon my left. In all parts the industry and managment in driving cattle, and removing corn, are indefati∣gable and certain; and it becomes impracticable to move without portable maga∣zines. Another most embarrassing circumstance, is the want of communication with Sir William Howe; of the messengers I have sent, I know of two being hanged, and am ignorant whether any of the rest arrived. The same fate has pro∣bably attended those dispatched by Sir William Howe; for only one letter is come to hand, informing me that his intention is for Pensylvania; that Washington has de∣tached Sullivan•• with 2500 men to Albany; that Putnam is in the Highlands, with 4000 men. That after my arrival at Albany, the movements of the enemy must guide mine; but that he wished the enemy might be driven out of the province be∣fore any operation took place against the Connecticut; that Sir Henry Clinton remain∣ed in the command in the neighbourhood of New-York, and would act as occurrences might direct.

No operation, my Lord, has yet been undertaken in my favour: the highlands have not even been threatened. The consequence is, that Putnam has detached two brigades to Mr. Gates, who is now strongly posted near the mouth of the Mohawk-River, with an army superior to mine in troops of the Congress, and as many militia as he pleases. He is likewise far from being deficient in artillery, having received all the pieces that were landed from the French ships which got into Boston.

Had I a latitude in my orders, I should think it my duty to wait in this position, or perhaps as far back as Fort Edward, where my communication with Lake George would be perfectly secure, till some event happened to assist my movement forward; but my orders being positive to

"force a junction with Sir William Howe,"

I appre∣hend I am not at liberty to remain inactive longer than shall be necessary to collect twenty-five days provision, and to receive the reinforcement of the additional com∣panies, the German drafts and recruits now (and unfortunately only now) on Lake Champlain. The waiting the arrival of this reinforcement is of indispensible necessity, because from the hour I pass the Hudson's River and proceed towards Albany, all

safety of communication ceases. I must expect a large body of the enemy from my left will take post behind me. I have put out of the question the waiting longer than the time necessary for the foregoing purposes, because the attempt, then critical, de∣pending on adventure and the fortune that often accompanies it, and hardly justifiable but by orders from the state, would afterwards be consummately desperate. I mean my Lord, that by moving soon, though I should meet with insurmountable difficul∣ties to my progress, I shall at least have the chance of fighting my way back to Ticon∣deroga, but the season a little further advanced, the distance encreased, and the march unavoidably tardy, because surrounded by enemies, a retreat might be shut by im∣penetrable bars or the elements, and at the same time no possible means of existence remain in the country.

When I wrote more confidently, I little foresaw that I was to be left to pursue my way through such a tract of country, and hosts of foes, without any co-operation from New-York; nor did I then think the garrison of Ticonderoga would fall to my share alone, a dangerous experiment would it be to leave that post in weakness, and too heavy a drain it is upon the life-blood of my force to give it due strength.

I yet do not despond.—Should I succeed in forcing my way to Albany, and find that country in a state to subsist my army, I shall think no more of a retreat, but at the worst fortify there and await Sir W. Howe's operations.

Whatever may be my fate, my Lord, I submit my actions to the breast of the King, and to the candid judgment of my profession, when all the motives become public; and I rest in the confidence, that whatever decision may be passed upon my conduct, my good intent will not be questioned.

I cannot close so serious a letter without expressing my fullest satisfaction in the be∣haviour and countenance of the troops, and my compleat confidence that in all trials they will do whatever can be expected from men devoted to their King and country.

I have the honour to be, &c. J. BURGOYNE.

P. S. Upon re-perusing this letter, I am apprehensive that the manner in which I have expressed myself, respecting the reinforcement being only upon Lake Cham∣plain, may seem ambiguous.—I do not mean to impute the delay to any thing but accidents, nor do I mean to contest Sir Guy Carleton's reasoning upon not complying with my requisitions to garrison Ticonderoga, I only lament it.

* 12.1Copy of a Letter from Sir William Howe to Lieutenant General Burgoyne, dated New-York, July the 17th, 1777.

DEAR SIR,

I have received yours of the second instant on the 15th, have fince heard from the rebel army of your being in possession of Ticonderoga, which is a great event, carried without loss. I have received your two letters, viz. from Plymouth and Quebec, your last of the 14th May, and shall observe the contents. There is a report of a messenger of yours to me having been taken, and the letter discovered in a double wooden canteen, you will know if it was of any consequence; nothing of it has tran∣spired to us. I will observe the same rules in writing to you, as you propose, in your

letters to me. Washington is waiting our motions here, and has detached Sullivan with about 2500 men, as I learn, to Albany. My intention is for Pensylvania, where I expect to meet Washington, but if he goes to the northward contrary to my expectations, and you can keep him at bay, be assured I shall soon be after him to relieve you.

After your arrival at Albany, the movements of the enemy will guide yours; but my wishes are, that the enemy be drove out of this province before any operation takes place in Connecticut. Sir Henry Clinton remains in the command here, and will act as occurences my direct. Putnam is in the highlands with about 4000 men. Success be ever with you.

Yours, &c. WILLIAM HOWE.

* 13.1Sir Guy Carleton's Letter.* 13.2

Quebeck, November 12, 1777.

SIR,

I received your letter of the 20th of October, with your public dispatches by Captain Craig, the 5th instant, and heartily condole with you upon the very disa∣greeable accounts they contain, all which I sincerely lamented, both on the public account and your own.

This unfortunate event, it is to be hoped, will in future prevent ministers from pretending to direct operations of war, in a country at three thousand miles di∣stance, of which they have so little knowledge as not to be able to distinguish between good, bad, or interested advices, or to give positive orders in matters, which from their nature, are ever upon the change; so that the expedience or propriety of a mea∣sure at one moment, may be totally inexpedient or improper in the next.

Having given over all hopes of being relieved this fall. I determined upon sending home Captain Foy, to furnish his Majesty's confidential servants, and my successor, with the best information in my power, of the state of affairs in this province, that they may form the better judgment of what they have to do.

I am, &c.

* 14.1Army from Canada under Lieutenant General Burgoyne.

Total Rank and File, 1st of July, 1777. [Sick included.]

British.
9th regiment	542
20th	528
21st	538
24th	528
47th	524
53d	537
62d	541
Grenadiers and light infantry com∣panies from 29th, 31st, and 34th regiments	329

Left in Canada out of the above	343
British. Total	3,724
Germans, 1st July	3727
Left in Canada	711
For the campaign, Germans	30,16
Regular troops, total	6,740
Garrison left out of the above at Ticonderoga.
British rank and file	462
German rank and file	448
	910
To force a passage to Albany	5,830
1st July, British artillery	257
German artillery	100
Bat men, servants, &c. in the above.
Recruits under Lieut. Nutt	154
Canadians	148
Indians never more than	500
Before Septemb. fell off to	90
Provincials at most	682
1st October, no more than	456
In September the additional com∣panies joined near Fort Miller, in all	300
Regulars killed, wounded, and prisoners in the campaign,	1777.

		Killed.	Wounded.	Prisoners.	Total
British.
	Officers	26	47	19
	Serjeants	15	33	14
	Drummers	3	5	6
	R. & File	207	549	449	1285
Germans.
	Officers	10	16	29
	Serjeants	12	28	59
	Drummers	1	8	18
	R. & File	141	225	575	941

* 16.1First Application from Major General Phillips relative to Horses. Dated Montreal, June 4, 1777.

SIR,

I TAKE the liberty of informing your Excellency, that there has yet been no arrange∣ment made for marching the field artillery by land, should the corps of troops upon an expedition under your command in the course of the campaign quit the lakes Champlain and George, and the rivers.

I have, upon the strictest information which could be procured, reason to believe, that neither carriages nor horses will be to be had nearer than Albany, should the route of your army be that way, and even in that country, it will necessarily require a con∣siderable time before any can be got; all which must necessarily delay the operations of the campaign, after the reduction of Ticonderoga. I therefore submit to your Excellency's consideration whether horses and such ammunition-carriages as may be wanted should not be procured for the service of the campaign, for the field artillery attached to the corps of troops your Excellency is to command this campaign?

I have the honour to be Sir, With the greatest respect, Your Excellency's most obedient and most humble servant, M. PHILLIPS, Major General, commanding the royal artillery in Canada.

His Excellency Lieutenant General Burgoyne.

Copy of a Letter to Major General Phillips, respecting Horses. Dated Montreal, June 4, 1777.

SIR,

I have the honour of your letter of this day's date, informing me that no arrangement has yet been made for moving the field artillery by land; and that upon the best infor∣mation you can obtain, neither carriages nor horses can be procured on the other side Lake Champlain nearer than Albany.

In consequence of this representation, I have to request you, to give in your opinion upon the mode of procuring horses and carriages from this country, combining the considerations of dispatch, sufficiency, oeconomy towards government, and I wish to know the opinion as soon as possible.

I am with truest regard, Sir, Your obedient humble servant, J. BURGOYNE, Lieutenant-General.

Major-General Phillips.

Extracts of Letters from Major General Phillips, &c.

Extract of a Letter from Major General Phillips to Lieutenant General Burgoyne.

Montreal, June 5, 1777.

I HAVE the honour of your Excellency's letter to me of yesterday, in answer to one I wrote on the subject of the field-artillery being supplied with horses, &c. &c.

You are pleased, Sir, to order me to give an opinion upon the mode of procuring horses and carriages from this country, combining the consideration of dispatch, sufficiency, and oeconomy towards government.

There are but two modes of procuring horses for the service, supposing the country is not to furnish them upon Corvées, the one is by purchasing of horses upon the account of government, the other by contract.

The first of these modes has always appeared to me difficult, uncertain, and full of openings for every species of imposition, and the expence uncertain.—Government must trust various people to buy horses, and in this country it will not be possible to procure any persons who will not immediately pursue the views of gaining money to themselves with a consideration for the King's service. Add to this, that it will be∣come such a charge, that many commissaries must be appointed, and various other officers of that sort, &c, which being a mixture of inspectors into the purchases of horses, and necessarily also at times the being purchasers, it will be difficult ever to ascertain the price, and seldom that the goodness of horses can be depended on.

I have seen in my service this mode attempted, but it has to my knowledge failed. I must allow, that could it be carried into execution complete, it would be the cheapest for government: but taking into consideration the various impositions which will arise, and that the setting out on a plan of this nature will require a very large sum of mo∣ney,

perhaps from 20,000l. to 30,000l. to be intrusted into various hands, I freely give it as my opinion that it is not a perfect plan. The contracting for a certain num∣ber of horses at a fixed price for the hire by day reduces the whole to a very simple, and therefore generally a certain plan. It depends in the setting out, by making as cheap, as fair, and just a bargain on the part of government as can be. And being so made, that the military and civil officers do their duty, by attending to the receiving of horses only as they are fitting for service. The contractor has his interest so di∣rectly connected with fulfilling his contract, as upon failure it ceases, that he will exert all means to do it, and the care of government will be that it be done honestly and compleatly.

I have thus obeyed your Excellency's orders, and given an opinion which I submit entirely to your consideration.

Extract of a Letter to Nathaniel Day, Esq. Commissary General, &c. dated Montreal, June 4th, 1777.

I BEG the favour of you to calculate what number of horses and carriages (suppo∣sing them such as are in common use in Canada) will be sufficient for conveying by land thirty days provision for 10,000 men, together with about 1000 gallons of rum, and you will please to make me your report as soon as possible.

Extract of a Letter to Sir Guy Carleton.

Montreal, June 7, 1777.

HAVING had the honor to represent to your Excellency the necessity of being provided with a certain number of horses and carriages for the artillery, victual, and other indispensible purposes of the army, when it shall be obliged to quit the borders of the lakes and rivers; and having understood from your Excellency that such pro∣vision could not be made by the ordinary methods of covée, and that if proposed without compulsion upon the country the effect would be precarious, dilatory, and expensive; I have the honour now to lay before your Excellency proposals for con∣tracts for an expeditious supply of horses for the artillery, and 500 carts, with two horses each, for the other purposes.

I am too ignorant of the prices of the country to offer any judgment upon the reasonableness of these proposals; nor have I any long acquaintance with Mr. Jordan, or other motive for wishing him the preference, if other persons can be found equally capable, responsible, and expeditious. I have only thus far interfered, upon a con∣viction, after considering the route the King's orders direct, and taking all possible methods of information upon the supply to be expected as we proceed, that to de∣pend upon the country altogether would be to hazard the expedition.

Your Excellency will observe, that in order to save the public expence as much as possible, I have reduced this requisition much below what would be adequate to the service, and I mean to trust to the resources of the expedition for the rest; 500 carts will barely carry fourteen days provisions at a time, and Major General Phillips means

to demand as few horses as possible, subject to whatever future augmentations future services may require; the present number wanted will be about 400; there will then remain unprovided for (for expeditious movement) the transport of bateaux from Lake George to Hudson's River, and the carriage of the tents of the army, and many other contingencies that I need not trouble your Excellency to point out to you.

Extract of a Letter to General Harvey.

Montreal, May 19, 1777.

YOU have permitted me, as formerly, to write to you confidentially. I take the first conveyance to renew a correspondence so pleasing and honourable to myself, and that may, in some cases, become beneficial to the public service. It shall never be employed but to convey truths, to do justice to facts and persons, and to secure myself in the continuance of an esteem so valuable to me as yours against appearances and misrepresentations.

I have reason to be exceedingly satisfied with all that has been done, and with most things that are doing: exertions have been made during the winter, which was remark∣ably favourable, in all the departments, and preparations are very forward; those that have been committed to the directions of General Phillips have been executed with a diligence, precision, and foresight, that entitle him to the fullest praise. The troops are in a state of health almost unprecedented, and their spirits and general improvement are equally objects of great pleasure and promise. To this agreeable representation I have the happiness to add, that Sir Guy Carleton has received me and the orders I brought in a manner that, in my opinion, does infinite honour to his public and private character.

That he should have wished for the lead in active and important military operations, is very natural. That he thinks he has some cause of resentment for the general tenor of treatment he has received from some of the ministers is discernible; but neither his disappointment nor his personal feelings operate against his duty; and I am convinced he means to forward the King's measures, entrusted to my hands, with all the zeal he could have employed had they rested in his own.

My intention is, during my advance to Ticonderoga, and siege of that post, for a siege I apprehend it must be, to give all possible jealousy on the side of Connecticut. If I can by manoeuvre make them suspect that after the reduction of Ticonderoga my views are pointed that way, it may make the Connecticut forces very cautious of leaving their own frontiers, and much facilitate my progress to Albany. I mention this intention only to Lord George and yourself, and I do it lest from any intelligence of my motions that may reach England indirectly, it should be supposed I have suffer∣ed myself to be diverted from the main object of my orders. The King and his Majesty's ministers may rest assured that whatever demonstrations I may endeavour to impose upon the enemy, I shall really make no movement that can procrastinate my progress to Albany.

One thing more occurs. I had the surprise and mortification to find a paper handed about at Montreal, publishing the whole design of the campaign, almost as accurately as if it had been copied from the Secretary of State's letter. My own cau∣tion

has been such that not a man in my own family has been let into the secret. Sir Guy Carleton's, I am confident, has been equal; I am therefore led to doubt whether imprudence has not been committed from private letters from England, and wish you would ask my friend D'Oyley, to whom my very affectionate compliments, whether there is any person within the line of ministerial communication that he can suspect to be so unguarded? It is not of great consequence here, except as far as regards St. Leger's expedition; but such a trick may be of most prejudicial consequence in other cases, and should be guarded against.

Extract of a Letter to General Harvey.

Camp on the River Bouquet, near Lake Champlain, June 22, 1777.

I HAVE had to contend against wet weather that rendered the roads almost im∣practicable at the carrying places, and consequently the passage of the bateaux and exceedingly dilatory, besides a great deal of contrary wind. Indeed the combination of land and water movement, bad roads, inactivity and sometimes disobedience in the country, and a thousand other difficulties and accidents, unknown in other services, disconcert all arrangements. I do not mention this upon my own account, as I do not hold myself responsible for delays within the province of Canada; but I mention it to do justice to others, who, I really think, have infinite merit in overcoming the obstructions we have met with, and who ought to be justified against some acquain∣tances of yours and mine, who travel across a map very fast, and are very free in their comments, when others, who have ten times their knowledge and resources, do not answer their predictions and expectations.

I have been exceedingly distressed in regard to the brigadiers of this army. Sir Guy Carleton, the day I took leave of him, put into my hands an extract of a letter from the Secretary at War, approving the appointment of those gentlemen, but observing, that whenever any of them should lead their brigades out of the province of Canada, in order to join the troops under General Howe, there would be a necessity for their command ceasing as brigadiers, &c.

Were this to be put in execution, according to the letter of the order, and the geo∣graphical limits of Canada, and supposing Major General Phillips at the same time to be employed solely in the artillery, I should find myself at the head of an army to undertake a siege, and afterwards pursue objects of importance, and possibly of time, without a single intermediate British officer between the Lieutenant General, com∣manding pro tempore in chief, and a Lieutenant Colonel. It would be preposterous and impertinent in me to say one word more to you as an officer, upon the impossibi∣lity of methodizing or conducting such an army with such a total deficiency of staff. Had Lord Barrington condescended to have communicated his intentions to me in London, I think I could have convinced him of the impropriety. As it is, I must conclude that the spirit of the order goes only to prevent those gentlemen bearing a higher rank and pay than senior lieutenant colonels serving in the same army; and that therefore there can be no fault in keeping it dormant till the junction takes place. In other words, I look upon mine to be the Canada army till such time as I am in communication with General Howe, so as to make part of his force, and consequently

without measuring degrees north and south, that the arrangements made in Canada, and approved of by the King, remain in force till that time.

I am persuaded, my dear General, you will support me in this liberty, if such it is to be called, not only as the absolute order and method of the service depends upon it, but also to avoid to these gentlemen, who have really great merit, the vexation and the ridicule of being deprived of their rank and pay in the hour of that very service, with a view to which their appointment was originally made. I think I can answer, that the junction made, and the reasons for reverting to their former ranks, become obvious, they will submit to his Majesty's pleasure without a murmur.

Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne to General Harvey.

Head Quarters, Skenesborough, July 11, 1777.

THE mere compliment of service I have given to the troops in orders, and in the relation designed for the Gazette, is not doing them sufficient justice. It is a duty in me further, through you, and I know I shall impose a pleasing task on you, to assure the King that their behaviour is as uniformly good in the camp as in action.

After what I have publicly mentioned of Fraser I am sure I need not press you in his favour. I cannot but feel confident in the hope that his Majesty's grace will find its way through all obstacles to prevent so discouraging a circumstance as the return of this gallant officer to the mere duty of lieutenant colonel, at the head of one batta∣lion, after having given ascendancy to the King's troops, and done honour to his profession, by the most spirited actions in critical periods of two successive cam∣paigns.

You will observe, Sir, both in the public letter and in the order of battle, which Captain Gardner will put into your hands, that Major General Phillips is occasionally employed separately from the strict line of his department. This does not proceed from inattention to the explanation of his Majesty's pleasure two years ago; but from absolute necessity. The staff being composed without any British major general, Bri∣gadier Fraser being posted where he is of infinite use, at the head of the advanced corps, the service would suffer in the most material degree if the talents of General Phillips were not suffered to extend beyond the limits of the artillery, and I hold myself fully justified in continuing the great use of his assistance under this extension, by what I understand to be the signification of the King's pleasure to Sir Guy Carleton, viz. That this measure must not be made a precedent, but not forbidding it during the present exigency.

I flatter myself the King will be satisfied with the diligence used in taking the field, as well as with the subsequent operations; if not, my disappointment can only proceed from my own deficiency in stating the embarrassments I found, notwithstanding pre∣vious preparations and cordial assistances. Remote situations of the troops, currents, winds, roads, want of materials for caulking the vessels, inactivity and desertion of the Canadian corvées, were all against me. A great difficulty lay in providing horses and carriages for the bare transport of provisions and tents, when we should arrive at Fort George, or any other place where the army should have no resource of water carriage. I found an active, and I think a reasonable contractor, who supplied this necessity at a much cheaper rate than it could have been done any other way.

I inclose a copy of the contract to the treasury, to which I refer you. You will ob∣serve that I have limited the number to the mere indispensible purposes of provisions and tents, trusting to the country for the further assistance of officers baggage and the other attirail of an army. Experience already shews me that I judged right in not trusting to the country for more; for had this precaution been omitted, I should be bound fast to the spot where I am, or obliged to return by water to Ticonderoga.

I avow also to you my advice to General Carleton to grant commissions to two pro∣vincial battalions, to be raised from Albany and Charlotte County, by a Mr. Jessup and a Mr. Peters, upon condition that the commissions should not take place till two thirds of the corps should be effective, provincial corps, acting zealously in the King's cause, must have great impression upon public opinion, and will, besides, in fact be of singular use to the ease and preservation of the regular troops.

Upon this principle, therefore, I have not hesitated further to receive and to pay such loyalists as have come in with their arms since the success of Ticonderoga, and wish to be employed. Though I have not power to grant commissions, I post the officers, and form them into companies till the measure can be decided by those who have more authority.

I hope all these articles of expence will meet with the support of your opinion; and have only to add, that as no job shall be done myself, so will I use all efforts to pre∣vent such being done by others.

I am indispensibly obliged to wait some time on this position, to clear roads and make bridges, which is great labour in this country, and to bring up a stock of provision, and also to give time to the gun-boats, bateaux, and provision vessels to be put into Lake George to scour that lake, and secure the future route of the maga∣zines. I propose to possess Fort Edward at the same time that the force is ready to move down the lake, by which means, if the enemy do not evacuate Fort George, the garrison must inevitably be caught. In the mean while I have ordered Reidesel to make roads, reconnoitre the country, and make all other possible feints of a march to the Connecticut, and by some other measures I hope to give alarms that way.

INSTRUCTIONS for Lieutenant Colonel Baume, on a secret expedition to the Con∣necticut River.	Amendments made by Gen. Burgoyne.
[The erasures were made by Gen. Burgoyne.* 23.1]
THE object of your expedition is to try the affections of the country, to disconcert the councils of the enemy, to mount the Reidesel's dragoons, to com∣pleat Peters's corps, and to obtain large supplies of cattle, horses, and carriages.
The several corps, of which the in∣closed is a list, are to be under your command.

The troops must take no tents, and what little baggage is carried by officers must be on their own bat horses.
You are to proceed by the route from Batten Kill to Arlington, and take post there, so as to secure the pass from Man∣chester. You are to remain at Arlington till the detachment of the Provincials, under the command of Captain Sher∣wood, shall join you from the south∣ward.
You are then to proceed to Manche∣ster, where you will take post so as to secure the pass of the mountains on the road from Manchester to Rockingham; from hence you will detach the Indians and light troops to the northward, to∣ward Otter Creek. On their return, and also receiving intelligence that no enemy is in force in the neighbourhood of Rocking∣ham (1) you will proceed by the road over the mountains to Rockingham, where you will take post. This will be the most distant part on the expedition. (2)	(1) upon the Connecticut River, (2) And must be proceeded upon with caution, as you will have the defile of the mountains behind you, which might make a retreat difficult; you must therefore en∣deavour to be well informed of the force of the enemy's militia in the neighbouring coun∣try. Should you find it may with prudence be effected.
You are to remain there as long as ne∣cessary to fulfil the intention of the expediti∣on from thence (3) and you are afterwards to descend by the Connecticut River to Brattlebury, and from that place, by the quickest march, you are to return by the great road to Albany.	(3) while the Indians and light troops are detached up the river.
During your whole progress your de∣tachments are to have orders to bring in to you all horses fit to mount the dra∣goons under your command, or to serve as bat horses to the troops, they are like∣wise to bring in (4) saddles and bridles as can be found. (5)	(4) together with as many. (5) The number of horses requisite, be∣sides those necessary for mounting the regi∣ment of dragoons, ought to be 1300. If you can bring more for the use of the army it will be so much the better.
Your parties are likewise to bring in waggons and other convenient carriages, with as many draft oxen as will be neces∣sary to draw them and all cattle sit for slaughter (milch cows excepted) which are to be left for the use of the inhabi∣tants.

Regular receipts, in the form hereto subjoined, are to be given in all places where any of the abovementioned articles are taken, to such persons as have remained in their habitations, and other∣wise complied with the terms of General Burgoyne's manifesto; but no receipts to be given to such as are known to be acting in the service of the rebels. (6).

(6.) As you will have with you persons perfectly acquainted with the abilities of the country, it may perhaps be adviseable to tax the several districts with the portions of the several articles, and limit the hours for their delivery; and should you find it neces∣cessary to move before such delivery can be made, hostages of the most respectable people should be taken, to secure their following you the ensuing day. All possible means are to be used to prevent plundering. As it is probable that Captain Sher∣wood, who is already detached to the south∣ward, and will join you at Arlington, will drive in a considerable quantity of cattle and horses to you, you will therefore send in this cattle to the army, with a proper detachment from Peters's corps, to cover them, in order to disencumber yourself; but you must always keep the regiments of dra∣goons compact. The dragoons themselves must ride, and take care of the horses of the regiment. Those horses which are destined for the use of the army must be tied together by strings of ten each, in order that one man may lead ten horses. You will give the unarmed men of Peters's corps to conduct them, and inha∣hitants whom you can trust. You must al∣ways take your camps in good position; but at the same time where there is pasture, and you must have a chain of centinels round your cattle and horses when grazing. Colonel Skeene will be with you as much as possible, in order to assist you with his advice, to help you to distinguish the good subjects from the bad, to procure you the best intelligence of the enemy, and to chuse those people who are to bring me the accounts of your progress and success. When you find it necessary to halt for a day or two, you must always entrench the camp of the regiment of dragoons, in order never to risk an attack or affront from the enemy. As you will return with the regiment of dragoons mounted, you must always have a detachment of Captain Fraser's or Peters's corps in front of the column, and the same in the rear, in order to prevent your falling into an ambuscade when you march through the woods.

You will use all possible means to make the country believe that the troops under your command are the advanced corps of the army, and that it is intend∣ed to pass the Connecticut on the road to Boston. You will likewise have it insinuated (7) that the main army from Albany is to be joined at Springfield by a corps of troops from Rhode Island.	(7) insinuate
You will send off occasionally cattle or carriages, to prevent being too much incum∣bered; and will give me as frequent intelli∣gence of your situation as possible.
It is highly probable that the corps under Mr. Warner, now supposed to be at Manchester, will retreat before you; but should they, contrary to expecta∣tion, be able to collect in great force, and post themselves advantageously, it is left to your discretion to attack them or not, always bearing in mind that your corps is too valuable to let any conside∣rable loss be hazarded on this occasion.
Should any corps be moved from Mr. Arnold's main army, in order to inter∣cept your retreat, you are to take as strong a post as the country will afford, and send the quickest intelligence to me, and you may depend on my making such a movement as shall put the enemy be∣tween two fires, or otherwise effectually sustain you.
It is imagined the progress of the whole of this expedition may be effected in about a fortnight, but every move∣ment of it must depend upon your success in obtaining such supply of provisions as will enable you to subsist for your return to the army, in case you can get no more. (8)	(8) And should not the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be able to reach Albany before your expedition should be compleated, I will find means to send you notice of it, and give your route another di∣rection.
All persons acting in committees, or any officers acting under the directions of Congress, either civil or military, are to be made prisoners.

Batten Kill, 12th August, 1777.

SIR,

I HAD the honour of acquainting your Excellency, by a man sent yesterday evening by Colonel Skeene to head-quarters, of the several corps under my com∣mand being encamped at Saratoga, as well as of my intention to proceed the next morning at five o'clock; the corps moved at that time, and marched a mile, when I received a letter from Brigadier General Fraser, signifying your Excellency's order to post the corps advantageously on Batten Kill, till I should receive fresh instructions from your Excellency; the corps is now encamped at that place, and wait your Excellency's orders. I will not trouble you, Sir, with the various re∣ports which spread, as they seem rather to be founded on the different interests and feelings of the people who occasion them.

I have the honour to be, most respectfully, Your Excellency's most obedient and humble servant, F. BAUME.

The reinforcement of fifty chasseurs, which your Excellency was pleased to order, joined me last night at eleven o'clock.

General Burgoyne.

Cambridge, 13th August, 1777.

SIR,

IN consequence of your Excellency's orders I moved this morning at four o'clock, with the corps under my command; and after a march of sixteen miles arrived at Cambridge at four in the evening. On the road I received intelligence of forty or fifty of the rebels being left to guard some cattle. I immediately ordered thirty of the provincials and fifty savages to quicken their march, in hopes to sur∣prize them. They took five prisoners in arms, who declared themselves to be in the service of the Congress; yet the enemy received advice of our approach, and abandoned the house they were posted in. The provincials and savages continued their march about a mile, when they fell in with a party of fifteen men, who fired upon our people, and immediately took to the woods with the greatest precipita∣tion. The fire was quick on our side, but I cannot learn if the enemy sustained any loss. A private of Captain Sherwood's company was the only one who was slightly wounded in the thigh. From the many people who came from Benning∣ton they agree that the number of the enemy amounted to 1800. I will be particu∣larly careful, on my approach at that place, to be fully informed of their strength and situation, and take the precautions necessary to fulfil both the orders and instructions of your Excellency.

I cannot ascertain the number of cattle, carts, and waggons taken here, as they have not been as yet collected. A few horses have been also brought in, but am sorry to acquaint your Excellency that the savages either destroy or drive away what is not paid for with ready money. If your Excellency would allow me to purchase the horses from the savages, stipulating the price, I think they might be procured cheap, otherwise they ruin all they meet with, their officers and interpre∣ters not having it in their power to controul them. Your Excellency may depend

on hearing how I proceed at Bennington, and of my success there: praying my •…•…ctful compliments to General Reidesel,

I am, most respectfully, Sir, Your most obedient and humble servant, F. BAUME.

P. S. The names of the men taken in arms are as follows.

• George Duncan,
• David Slarrow,
• Samuel Bell,
• John Bell,
• Matt. Bell.

Hugh More, a noted rebel surrendered himself yesterday evening.

The express left Cambridge at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 14th of August.

Sancoick, 14th August, 1777, 9 o'clock.

SIR,

I have the honour to inform your excellency, that I arrived here at eight in the morning, having had intelligence of a party of the enemy being in possession of a mill, which they abandoned at our approach, but in their usual way fired from the bushes, and took their road to Bennington; a savage was slightly wounded; they broke down the bridge which has retarded our march above an hour, they left in the mill about seventy-eight barrels of very fine flour, 1000 bushels of wheat, 20 barrels of salt, and about 1000l. worth pearl and pot ash. I have ordered thirty pro∣vincials and an officer to guard the provision and the pass of the bridge. By five pri∣soners taken here, they agree that 1500 to 1800 men are in Bennington, but are sup∣posed to leave it on our approach; I will proceed so far to-day as to fall on the the enemy to-morrow early, and make such disposition as I think necessary from the intelligence I may receive. People are flocking in hourly, but want to be armed; the savages cannot be controuled, they ruin and take every thing they please.

I am, Your excellency's most obedient, humble servant, F. BAUME.

Beg your excellency to pardon the hurry of this letter, it is wrote on the head of a barrel.

General Burgoyne.

Instructions to Colonel Skeene, upon the expedition to Bennington.

SIR,

I request the favour of you to proceed with Lieutenant Colonel Baume, upon an expedition of which he has the command, and which will march this evening, or to-morrow morning.

The objects of his orders are to try the affections of the country; to disconcert the councils of the enemy; to mount the regiment of Reidesel dragoons; to compleat Lieutenant Colonel Peters's corps, and to procure a large supply of horses for the use of the troops, together with cattle and carriages.

The route marked for this expedition is to Arlington and Manchester, and in case it should be found that the enemy is not in too great force upon the Connecticut riv•…•… it is intended to pass the mountains to Rockingham, and descend the river from thence to Brattlebury. Some hours before the corps marches for Arlington, Colonel Peters with all his men are to set forward for Bennington, and afterwards are to join at Arlington.

Receipts are ordered to be given for all horses and cattle taken from the country.

Lieutenant Colonel Baume is directed to communicate to you the rest of his in∣structions, and to consult with you upon all matters of intelligence, negotiation with the inhabitants, roads, and other means depending upon a knowledge of the country for carrying his instructions into execution.

I rely upon your zeal and activity for the fullest assistance, particularly in having it understood in all the country through which you pass, that the corps of Lieutenant Colonel Baume is the first detachment of the advanced guard, and that the whole army is proceeding to Boston, expecting to be joined upon the route by the army from Rhode Island.

I need not recommend to you to continue the requisites of the service with every principle of humanity in the mode of obtaining them; and it may be proper to in∣form the country that the means to prevent their cattle and horses being taken for the future, will be to resist the enemy when they shall presume to force them, and drive them voluntarily to my camp.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c. J. BURGOYNE.

CALCULATIONS of the Number of Carts that will carry Provisions for the following Number of Men.

Number of Men for		1 Day.	2 Days.	3 Days.	4 Days.	5 Days.	6 Days.	7 Days.	8 Days.	9 Days.	10 Days.	11 Days.	12 Days.	13 Days.	14 Days.	15 Days.	16 Days.	17 Days.	18 Days.	19 Days.	20 Days.	30 Days.	60 Days.	90 Days.
10,000 Men	Carts	38	75	113	150	188	226	263	300	338	375	413	452	490	526	564	600	638	678	716	750	1125	2250	3375
5000 Men	Carts	19	38	57	75	94	113	132	150	169	188	207	226	245	263	282	300	319	339	358	375	563	1125	1688
4000 Men	Carts	15	30	45	60	76	90	105	120	135	150	165	180	195	210	225	240	255	270	285	300	450	900	1350
3000 Men	Carts	12	23	34	45	57	68	79	90	102	113	124	135	147	158	169	180	192	203	214	225	338	676	1014
2000 Men	Carts	8	15	23	30	38	45	53	61	68	75	83	90	98	105	113	120	128	135	143	150	225	450	675
1000 Men	Carts	4	8	12	15	19	23	27	31	35	39	42	45	49	53	57	60	64	68	72	75	113	226	339
500 Men	Carts	2	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	21	23	25	27	29	30	32	34	36	38	57	113	171

The above Table made, allowing 3 pounds weight to the Ration and 800 pounds to the Cart Load.

NATHANIEL DAY, Commissary General.

Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne, to Sir Guy Carleton, dated Head-Quarters, at Skenesborough House, 11th July, 1777.

I REQUEST your Excellency to take into consideration the expediency of supply∣ing from Canada, a garrison for Ticonderoga.

My communication will widen so much as I proceed, the drain upon the army for posts will be so considerable, not to speak of detachments and safe-guards to protect and to awe the country, that if that first diminution is not replaced, my effective strength may become inadequate to the services intended. My present intelligence is that Putnam is collecting an army to oppose me at Saratoga. Fort Edward is also talked of to sustain a siege.

Your excellency will, I am sure, agree with me that Ticonderoga, or some other fortified post on the South part of Lake Champlain, ought to be considered on the frontiers of the province of Canada. I am aware of the difficulties that arise from the manner in which the Secretary of State's orders are penned; but I submit to your Excellency, whether, under the principle laid down in the beginning of the order, and afterwards repeated, that 3000 men were held sufficient for the defence of that province, you would not be justified in sparing for the purpose of this garrison, the overplus of the 3000 that may remain after compleating my army.

And notwithstanding the corps for the Canada service are precisely named by the Secretary of State, I would further submit whether, upon my pressing requisition, the garrison might not justifiably be furnished by detachment, even though there was no overplus, under the following words of the order; after haviug secured to him, (Lieutenant General Burgoyne) every assistance which it is in your power to afford and procure. Your Excellency's zeal for the service and favour towards me, will be better interpreters for the latitude I propose, than any thing I can further suggest; my present purpose, Sir, is to get a sufficient number of gun-boats upon the Lake George to scour that lake as expeditiously as possible, to support them with a proper force to attack Fort George on that side, while with the main of the army as soon as re∣freshed and supplied, I attack Fort Edward from hence, and therebycut off the com∣munication from Albany to Fort George, and consequently prevent the succour or retreat of that garrison.

Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne, to Sir Guy Carleton, Head-Quarters, near Fort Anne, July 29th 1777.

THE construction your excellency puts upon the orders of the Secretary of State, is too full and decisive for me to presume to trouble you further upon the subject of a garrison for Ticonderoga from Canada, I must do as well as I can, but I am sure your Excellency, as a soldier, will think my situation a little difficult. A breach into my communication must either ruin my army entirely, or oblige me to return in force to restore, which might be the loss of the campaign. To prevent a breach, Ticonderoga and Fort George must be in very respectable strength, and I must besides have posts at Fort Edward and other carrying-places. These drains added to common accidents and losses of service, will necessarily render me very inferior in

point of numbers to the enemy, whom I must expect always to find strongly posted. I ask pardon for dwelling so much upon this subject, and have only to add my re∣quest to your Excellency to forward the additional companies as expeditiously as may be.

Copy of Lieutenant-General Burgoyne's Letter to Colonel Baume.

Near Saratoga, August 14, 1777. Seven at Night.

SIR,

THE accounts you have sent me are very satisfactory, and I have no doubt of every part of your proceeding continuing to be the same.

I beg the favour of you to report whether the road you have passed is practicable, and if so, if it is convenient for a considerable corps with cannon.

Should you find the enemy too strongly posted at Bennington, and maintaining such a countenance as may make an attack imprudent, I wish you to take a post where you can maintain yourself till you receive an answer from me, and I will either support you in force, or withdraw you.

You will please to send off to my camp, as soon as you can, waggons, and draft cattle, and likewise such other cattle as are not necessary for your subsistence.

Let the waggons and carts bring off all the flour and wheat they can that you do not retain for the same purpose. This transport must be under the charge of a com∣mission officer.

I will write you at full to-morrow in regard to getting horses out of the hands of the savages.

In the mean time any you can collect from them, fit to mount the regiments, at a low price, shall be allowed.

I am with great esteem, Sir, Your most obedient humble servant. J. BURGOYNE.

* 32.1Colonel St. Leger's Account of Occurrences at Fort Stanwix.

A MINUTE detail of every operation since my leaving La Chine, with the de∣tachment entrusted to my care, your Excellency will permit me to reserve to a time of less hurry and mortification than the present, while I enter into the interesting scene before Fort Stanwix, which I invested the 3d of August, having previously pushed forward Lieutenant Bird of the King's reigment, with thirty of the King's troops and two hundred Indians, under the direction of Captains Hare and Wilson, and the chiefs Joseph and Bull, to seize fast hold of the lower landing-place, and there∣by cut off the enemy's communication with the lower country.—This was done with great address by the lieutenant, though not attended with the effect I had promised myself, occasioned by the slackness of the Messasagoes. The brigade of provision and ammunition boats I had intelligence of, being arrived and disembarked before this party had taken post.

The fourth and fifth were employed in making arrangements for opening Wood Creek (which the enemy, with the indefatigable labour of one hundred and fifty men, for fourteen days, had most effectually choaked up) and the making a tempo∣rary road from Pine Ridges upon Fish Creek, sixteen miles from the fort, for a present supply of provision and the transport of our artillery: the first was effected by the diligence and zeal of Captain Bouville, assisted by Captain Harkimer of the Indian department, with one hundred and ten men, in nine days; while Lieutenant Lundy, acting as assistant quarter-master general, had rendered the road in the worst of weather, sufficiently practicable to pass the whole artillery and stores, with seven days provision, in two days.

On the 5th, in the evening, intelligence arrived by my discovering parties on the Mohawk River, that a reinforcement of eight hundred militia, conducted by General Herkimer, were on their march to relieve the garrison, and were actually at that in∣stant at Oriska, an Indian settlement, twelve miles from the fort. The garrison be∣ing apprised of their march by four men, who were seen enter the fort in the mor∣ning, through what was thought an impenetrable swamp, I did not think it pru∣dent to wait for them, and thereby subject myself to be attacked by a sally from the garrison in the rear, while the reinforcement employed me in front. I therefore de∣termined to attack them on the march, either openly or covertly, as circumstances should offer. At this time, I had not two hundred and fifty of the King's troops in camp; the various and extensive operations I was under an absolute necessity of entering into, having employed the rest; and therefore, could not send above eighty white men, rangers and troops included, with the whole corps of Indians. Sir John Johnson put himself at the head of this party, and began his march that evening at five o'clock, and met the rebel corps at the same hour the next morning. The im∣petuosity of the Indians is not to be described on the sight of the enemy (forgetting the judicious disposition formed by Sir John, and agreed to by themselves, which was, to suffer the attack to begin with the troops in front, while they should be on both flanks and rear) they rushed in, hatchet in hand, and thereby gave the enemy's rear an op∣portunity to escape. In relation to the victory, it was equally complete, as if the whole had fallen; nay more so, as the two hundred who escaped only served to spread the panic wider; but it was not so with the Indians; their loss was great (I must be understood Indian computation, being only about thirty killed, and the like number wounded, and in that number some of their favourite chiefs and confidential warriors were slain.) On the enemy's side, almost all their principal leaders were slain. Ge∣neral Herkimer has since died of his wounds. It is proper to mention, that the four men detached with intelligence of the march of the reinforcement, set out the evening before the action, and consequently the enemy could have no account of the defeat, and were in possession only, of the time appointed for their arrival; at which, as I suspected, they made a sally with two hundred and fifty men towards Lieutenant Bird's post, to facilitate the entrance of the relieving corps, or bring on a general en∣gagement, with every advantage they could wish.

Captain Hoyes was immediately detached to cut in upon their rear, while they engaged the lieutenant. Immediately upon the departure of Captain Hoyes, having learned that Lieutenant Bird, misled by the information of a cowardly Indian, that Sir John was pressed, had quitted his post to march to his assistance, I marched

the detachment of the King's regiment, in support of Captain Hoyes, by a road in sight of the garrison, which, with executive fire from his party, immediately drove the enemy into the fort, without any further advantage than frightening some squaws and pilfering the packs of the warriors which they left behind them. After this affair was over, orders were immediately given to compleat a two-gun battery, and mortar beds, with three strong redoubts in their rear, to enable me, in case of another attempt, to relieve the garrison by their regimented troops, to march out a larger body of the King's troops.

Captain Lernoult was sent with 110 men to the lower landing place, where he established himself with great judgment and strength, having an enclosed battery of a three-pounder opposed to any sally from the fort, and another to the side of the country, where a relief must approach; and the body of his camp deeply en∣trenched and abbatised.

When by the unabating labour of officers and men (the smallness of our num∣bers never admitting of a relief, or above three hours cessation for sleep or cooking) the batteries and redoubts were finished, and new cheeks and axle-trees made for the six-pounders, those that were sent being reported rotten and unserviceable.

It was found that our cannon had not the least effect upon the sod-work of the fort, and that our royals had only the power of teizing, as a six-inch plank was a sufficient security for their powder magazine, as we learnt from the deserters. At this time Lieutenant Glenie of the artillery, whom I had appointed to act as assistant engineer, proposed a conversion of the royals (if I may use the expression) into howitzers. The ingenuity and feasability of this measure striking me very strongly, the business was set about immediately, and soon executed, when it was found that nothing prevented their operating with the desired effect but the distance, their chambers being too small to hold a sufficiency of powder. There was nothing now to be done but to approach the town by sap to such a distance that the ram∣part might be brought within their portice, at the same time all materials were preparing to run a mine under their most formidable bastion.

In the midst of these operations intelligence was brought in by our scouts, of a second corps of 1000 men being on their march. The same zeal no longer animated the Indians; they complained of our thinness of troops and their former losses. I immediately called a council of the chiefs; encouraged them as much as I could; promised to lead them on myself, and bring into the field 300 of the best troops. They listened to this, and promised to follow me, and agreed that I should recon∣noitre the ground properest for the field of battle the next morning, accompanied by some of their chief warriors, to settle the plan of operations. When upon the ground appointed for the field of battle, scouts came in with the account of the first number swelled to 2000; immediately after a third, that General Burgoyne's army was cut to pieces, and that Arnold was advancing, by rapid and forced marches, with 3000 men. It was at this moment I began to suspect cowardice in some, and treason in others; however I returned to camp, not without hopes, with the as∣sistance of my gallant coadjutor, Sir John Johnson, and the influence of the super∣intending colonels, Claus and Butler, of inducing them to meet the enemy. A council, according to their custom, was called, to know their resolutions, before the breaking up of which I learned that 200 were already decamped. In about an hour

they insisted that I should retreat, or they would be obliged to abandon me. I had no other party to take, and a hard party it was to troops who could do nothing without them, to yield to their resolves; and therefore proposed to retire at night, sending on before my sick, wounded, artillery, &c. down the Wood Creek, co∣vering them by our line of march.

This did not fall in with their views, which were no less than treacherously com∣mitting ravage upon their friends, as they had lost the opportunity of doing it upon their enemies. To effect this they artfully caused messengers to come in, one after the other, with accounts of the nearer approaches of the rebels; one and the last affirmed that they were within two miles of Captain Lernoult's post. Not giving entire credit to this, and keeping to my resolution of retiring by night, they grew furious and abandoned; seized upon the officers' liquor and cloaths, in spite of the efforts of their servants; and became more formidable than the enemy we had to expect. I now thought it time to call in Captain Lernoult's post, retiring with the troops in camp to the ruined fort called William, in the front of the garrison, not only to wait the enemy, if they thought proper to sally, but to pro∣tect the boats from the fury of the savages, having sent forward Captain Hoyes, with his detachment, with one piece of cannon, to the place where Bull Fort stood, to receive the troops who waited the arrival of Captain Lernoult. Most of the boats were escorted that night beyond Canada Creek, where no danger was to be apprehended from the enemy. The creek at this place bending from the road, has a deep cedar swamp between. Every attention was now turned to the mouth of the creek, which the enemy might have possessed themselves of by a rapid march by the Oneyda Castle. At this place the whole of the little army arrived by twelve o'clock at night, and took post in such a manner as to have no fears of any thing the enemy could do. Here we remained till three o'clock next morning, when the boats which could come up the Creek arrived, or rather that the rascally part of all nations of the Indians would suffer to come up; and proceeded across Lake Oneyda to the ruined fort of Brereton, where I learnt that some boats were still labouring down the creek, after being lightened of the best part of their freight by the Messasagoes. Captain Lernoult proposed, with a boat full of armed men, to repass the lake that night, to relieve them from their labour, and supply them with provision. This transaction does as much honour to the humanity as to the gallantry of this valuable officer.

On my arrival at the Onondago Falls I received an answer to my letter from your Excellency, which shewed, in the clearest light, the scenes of treachery that had been practised upon me. The messenger had heard indeed on his way that they were collecting the same kind of rabble as before, but that there was not an enemy within forty miles of Fort Stanwix.

Soon after my arrival here I was joined by Captain Lernoult, with the men and boats he had been in search of. I mean immediately to send off, for the use of the upper garrison, all the overplus provision I shall have, after keeping a sufficiency to carry my detachment down, which I mean to do with every expedition in my power the moment this business is effected, for which purpose I have ordered here the snow. The sloop is already gone from this with her full lading.

Officers from each corps are sent to Montreal to procure necessaries for the men, who are in a most deplorable situation from the plunder of the savages, that no time may be lost to join your army.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect, Sir, your Excellency's most obedient, and most faithful servant, BARRY ST. LEGER.

Oswego, Aug. 27, 1777.

His Excellency General Burgoyne.

* 32.2Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-General Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, dated at Albany, 20th October, 1777.

MY LORD,

NO possibility of communication with your Lordship having existed since the beginning of September, at which time my last dispatch was sent away, I have to re∣port to your Lordship the proceedings of the army under my command from that period: a series of hard toil, incessant effort, stubborn action; till disabled in the collateral branches of the army by the total defection of the Indians; the desertion or timidity of the Canadians and Provincials, some individuals excepted; disappointed in the last hope of any timely co-operation from other armies; the regular troops re∣duced by losses from the best part to 3500 fighting men, not 2000 of which were British; only three days provisions upon short allowance in store; invested by an army of 16,000 men, and no apparent means of retreat remaining, I called into council all the generals, field officers, and captains commanding corps, and by their unanimous concurrence and advice, I was induced to open a treaty with Major General Gates.

Your Lordship will see, by the papers transmitted herewith, the disagreeable pro∣spect which attended the first overtures; and when the terms concluded are compared, I trust that the spirit of the councils I have mentioned, which under such circum∣stances dictated instead of submitting, will not be refused a share of credit.

Before I enter upon the detail of these events, I think it a duty of justice, my Lord, to take upon myself the measure of having passed the Hudson's River, in order to force a passage to Albany. I did not think myself authorised to call any men into council, when the peremptory tenor of my orders and the season of the year admitted no alternative.

Provisions for about thirty days having been brought forward, the other necessary stores prepared, and the bridge of boats completed, the army passed the Hudson's River on the 13th and 14th of September, and incamped on the heights, and in the plain of Saratoga, the enemy being then in the neighbourhood of Stillwater.

* 33.1The whole army made a movement forward, and incamped in a good position in a place called Dovacote.

* 33.2It being found that there were several bridges to repair, that work was begun under cover of strong detachments, and the same opportunity was taken to reconnoitre the country.

* 33.3The army renewed their march, repaired other bridges, and encamped upon ad∣vantageous ground about four miles from the enemy.

* 33.4The enemy appeared in considerable force to obstruct the further repair of bridges, and with a view, as it was conceived, to draw on an action where artillery could not

be employed. A small loss was sustained in skirmishing, but the work of the bridges was effected.

* 33.5The passages of a great ravine, and other roads towards the enemy, having been reconnoitred, the army advanced in the following order.

Brigadier General Fraser's corps, sustained by Lieutenant Colonel Breyman's corps, made a circuit, in order to pass the ravine commodiously, without quitting the heights, and afterwards to cover the march of the line to the right. These corps moved in three columns, and had the Indians, Canadians, and Provincials upon their fronts and flanks. The British line led by me in person passed the ravine in a direct line south, and formed in order of battle as fast as they gained the summit, where they waited to give time to Fraser's corps to make the circuit, and to enable the left wing and artillery, which, under the commands of Major General Phillips, and Major General Reidesel, kept the great road and meadows near the river in two columns, and had bridges to repair, to be equally ready to proceed. The 47th regiment guarded the bateaux.

The signal guns, which had been previously settled to give notice of all the columns being ready to advance, having been fired between one and two o'clock, the march continued. The scouts and flankers of the column of the British line were soon fired upon from small parties but with no effect. After about an hour's march, the picquets, which made the advanced guard of that column, were attacked in force, and obliged to give ground, but they soon rallied and were sustained.

On the first opening of the wood I formed the troops. A few cannon-shot dis∣lodged the enemy at a house from whence the picquets had been attacked, and Brigadier General Fraser's corps had arrived with such precision in point of time, as to be found upon a very advantageous height on the right of the British.

In the mean time the enemy, not acquainted with the combination of the march, had moved in great force out of their intrenchments, with a view of turning the line upon the right, and being checked by the disposition of Brigadier General Fraser, counter∣marched, in order to direct their great effort to the left of the British.

From the nature of the country, movements of this sort, however near, may be effected without a possibility of their being discovered.

About three o'clock the action began by a very vigorous attack on the British line, and continued with great obstinacy till after sunset. The enemy being continually supplied with fresh troops, the stress lay upon the 20th, 21st, and ••2d regiments, most parts of which were engaged near four hours without intermission; the 9th had been ordered early in the day to form in reserve.

The grenadiers and 24th regiment were some part of the time brought into action, as were part of the light infantry, and all these corps charged with their usual spirit.

The riflemen, and other parts of Breyman's corps, were also of service; but it was not thought advisable to evacuate the heights where Brigadier General Fraser was posted otherwise than partially and occasionally.

Major General Phillips upon first hearing the firing found his way through a diffi∣cult part of the wood to the scene of action, and brought up with him Major Williams and four pieces of artillery, and from that moment I stood indebted to that gallant and judicious second, for incessant and most material services, particularly for restoring the action in a point which was critically pressed by a great superiority of fire, and to which he led up the 20th regiment at the utmost personal hazard.

Major-General Riedesel exerted himself to bring up a part of the left wing, and arrived in time to charge the enemy with regularity and bravery.

Just as the light closed, the enemy gave ground on all sides, and left us com∣pletely masters of the field of battle, with the loss of about five hundred men on their side, and, as supposed, thrice that number wounded.

The darkness preventing a pursuit, the prisoners were few.

The behaviour of the officers and men in general was exemplary. Brigadier-General Fraser took his position in the beginning of the day with great judgment, and sustained the action with constant presence of mind and vigour. Brigadier-General Hamilton was the whole time engaged and acquitted himself with great honour, ac∣tivity and good conduct.

The artillery in general was distinguished, and the brigade under Captain Jones, who was killed in the action, was conspicuously so.

The army lay upon their arms the night of the 19th, and the next day took a position nearly within cannon shot of the enemy, fortifying their right, and exten∣ding their left to the brow of the heights, so as to cover the meadows through which the great river runs, and where their bateaux and hospitals were placed. The 47th regiment, the regiment of Hesse Hanau, and a corps of Provincials in∣camped in the meadows as a further security.

It was soon found that no fruits, honour excepted, were attained by the preceding victory, the enemy working with redoubled ardor to strengthen their left: their right was already unattackable.

On our side it became expedient to erect strong redoubts for the protection of the magazines and hospital, not only against a sudden attack, but also for their security in case of a march to turn the enemy's flank.

* 33.6A messenger arrived from Sir Harry Clinton with a letter in cypher, informing me of his intention to attack Fort Montgomery in about ten days from the date of his letter, which was the 12th instant. This was the only messenger of many that I apprehend were dispatched by Sir William Howe, and him that had reached my camp since the beginning of August. He was sent back the same night to in∣form Sir Harry of my situation, and of the necessity of a diversion to oblige General Gates to detach from his army, and my intention to wait favourable events in that position, if possible, to the 12th of October.

In the course of the two following days, two officers in disguise, and other confi∣dential persons, were dispatched by different routes with verbal messages to the same effect, and I continued fortifying my camp and watching the enemy, whose numbers increased every day.

I thought it advisable on the 3d of October to diminish the soldiers' ration in order to lengthen out the provisions, to which measure the army submitted with the utmost chearfulness. The difficulties of a retreat to Canada were clearly foreseen, as was the dilemma, should the retreat be effected, of leaving at liberty such an army as General Gates's to operate against Sir William Howe.

This consideration operated forcibly to determine me to abide events as long as possible, and I reasoned thus. The expedition I commanded was evidently meant at first to be hazarded. Circumstances might require it should be devoted. A critical junction of Mr. Gates's force with Mr. Washington might possibly decide the fate

of the war; the failure of my junction with Sir Harry Clinton, or the loss of my retreat to Canada could only be a partial misfortune.

In this situation things continued till the seventh, when no intelligence having been received of the expected co-operation, and four or five days for our limited stay in the camp only remained, it was judged advisable to make a movement to the enemy's left, not only to discover whether there were any possible means of forcing a passage should it be necessary to advance, or of dislodging him for the convenience of a retreat, but also to cover a forage of the army which was in the greatest distress on accouut of the scarcity.

A detachment of fifteen hundred regular troops with two twelve pounders, two howitzers, and six six-pounders, were ordered to move, and were commanded by myself, having with me Major-General Phillips, Major-General Reidesel, and Brigadier-General Fraser.

The guard of the camp upon the heights was left to Brigadier-General Hamilton and Specht, the redoubts and the plain to Brigadier General Gall; and as the force of the enemy immediately in their front consisted of more than double their num∣bers, it was not possible to augment the corps that marched, beyond the numbers above stated.

I formed the troops within three-quarters of a mile of the enemy's left, and Captain Fraser's rangers, with Indians and Provincials, had orders to go by secret paths in the woods to gain the enemy's rear, and by shewing themselves there to keep them in a check.

The further operations intended, were prevented by a very sudden and rapid attack of the enemy on our left, where the British grenadiers were posted to support the left wing of the line. Major Acland at the head of them sustained the attack with great resolution; but the enemy's great numbers enabling them in a few minutes to extend the attack along the front of the Germans, which were immediately on the right of the grenadiers, no part of that body could be removed to make a second line to the flank, where the stress of the fire lay. The right was at this time en∣gaged, but it was soon observed that the enemy were marching a large corps round their flank to endeavour cutting off their retreat. The light infantry and part of the 24th regiment which were at that post were therefore ordered to form a second line, and to secure the return of the troops into camp. While this movement was pro∣ceeding the enemy pushed a fresh and strong reinforcement to renew the action upon the left, which, overpowered by a great superiority, gave way, and the light in∣fantry and 24th regiment were obliged to make a quick movement to save that point from being entirely carried, in doing which, Brigadier-General Fraser was mortally wounded.

The danger to which the lines were exposed becoming at this moment of the most serious nature, orders were given to Major-General Phillips and Reidesel to cover the retreat, while such troops as were most ready for the purpose, returned for the defence of them. The troops retreated hard pressed, but in good order; they were obliged to leave six pieces of cannon, all the horses having been killed, and most of the artillery-men, who had behaved as usual with the utmost bravery under the command of Major Williams, being either killed or wounded.

The troops had scarcely entered the camp when it was stormed with great fury, the enemy rushing to the lines under a severe fire of grape-shot and small arms.

The post of the light infantry under Lord Balcarras assisted by some of the line, which threw themselves by order into the intrenchments, was defended with great spirit, and the enemy led on by General Arnold was finally repulsed, and the General wounded; but unhappily the intrenchments of the German reserve, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Breymann, who was killed, were carried, and although ordered to be recovered, they never were so, and the enemy by that misfortune gained an opening on our right and rear. The night put an end to the action.

Under the disadvantages thus apparent in our situation, the army was ordered to quit the present position during the night and take post upon the heights above the hospital.

Thus by an entire change of front, to reduce the enemy to form a new disposition. This movement was effected in great order and without loss, though all the artillery and camp were removed at the same time. The army continued offering battle to the enemy in their new position the whole day of the 8th.

Intelligence was now received that the enemy were marching to turn the right, and no means could prevent that measure but retiring towards Saratoga. The army began to move at nine o'clock at night, Major-General Reidesel commanding the van-guard, and Major-General Phillips the rear.

This retreat, though within musquet-shot of the enemy, and encumbered with all the baggage of the army, was made without loss, but a very heavy rain and the difficulties of guarding the bateaux which contained all the provisions, occasioned delays which prevented the army reaching Saratoga till the night of the 9th, and the artillery could not pass the fords of the Fish-kill till the morning of the 10th.

At our arrival near Saratoga, a corps of the enemy, between five and six hundred, were discovered throwing up intrenchments on the heights, but retired over a ford of the Hudson's River at our approach, and joined a body posted to oppose our passage there.

It was judged proper to send a detachment of artificers under a strong escort to re∣pair the bridges and open a road to Fort-Edward on the west side of the river. The 47th regiment, Captain Fraser's marksmen, and Mackoy's Provincials, were ordered for that service, but the enemy appearing on the heights of the Fish-kill in great force, and making a disposition to pass and give us battle: the 47th regiment and Fraser's marksmen were recalled; the Provincials left to cover the workmen at the first bridge run away upon a very slight attack of a small party of the enemy, and left the artificers to escape as they could, without a possibility of their performing any work.

During these different movements the bateaux with provisions were frequently fired upon from the opposite side of the river, and some of them were lost, and several men were killed and wounded in those which remained.

* 33.7The attacks upon the bateaux were continued, several were taken and retaken, but their situation being much nearer to the main force of the enemy than to ours, it was found impossible to secure the provisions any otherwise than by landing them and carrying them upon the hill: this was effected under fire, and with great difficulty.

The possible means of further retreat were now considered in councils of war, composed of the general officers, minutes of which will be transmitted to your Lordship.

The only one that seemed at all practicable was, by a night march to gain Fort-Edward with the troops carrying their provision upon their backs; the impossibility of repairing bridges, putting a conveyance of artillery and carriages out of the question, it was proposed to force the ford at Fort-Edward, or the ford above it. Before this attempt could be made, scouts returned with intelligence that the enemy were intrenched opposite these fords, and possessed a camp in force on the high ground between Fort-Edward and Fort-George with cannon. They had also parties down the whole shore to watch our motions, and posts so near to us, upon our own side of the water as must prevent the army moving a single mile undiscovered.

The bulk of the enemy's army was hourly joined by new corps of militia and vo∣lunteers, and their numbers together amounted to upwards of 16,000 men. Their position, which extended three parts in four of a circle round us, was from the nature of the ground unattackable in all parts.

In this situation the army took the best position possible and fortified, waiting till the 13th at night, in the anxious hope of succours from our friends, or the next desirable expectation, an attack from our enemy.

During this time the men lay continually upon their arms, and were cannonaded in every part, even rifle-shot and grape-shot came into all parts of the line, though with∣out any considerable effect.

At this period an exact account of the provisions was taken, and the circumstances stated in the opening of this letter became compleat.

The council of war was extended to all the field officers and captains commanding corps of the army, and the event ensued which I am sure was inevitable, and which, I trust, in that situation was honourable, but which it would be superfluous and melan∣choly to repeat.

After the execution of the treaty, General Gates drew together the force that had surrounded my position, and I had the consolation to have as many witnesses as I have men under my command, of its amounting to the numbers mentioned above.

During the events stated above, an attempt was made against Ticonderoga by an army assembled under Major General Lincoln, who found means to march with a con∣siderable corps from Huberton undiscovered, while another column of his force passed the mountains between Skenesborough and Lake George, and on the morning of the 18th of September a sudden and general attack was made upon the carrying place at Lake George, Sugar Hill, Ticonderoga, and Mount Independence. The sea officers commanding the armed sloop stationed to defend the carrying place, as also some of the officers commanding at the posts of Sugar Hill and at the Portage were surprised, and a considerable part of four companies of the 53d regiment were made prisoners; a block-house, commanded by Lieutenant Lord of the 53d, was the only post on that side that had time to make use of their arms, and they made a brave defence till cannon taken from the surprised vessel was brought against them.

After stating and lamenting so fatal a want of vigilance, I have to inform your Lordship of the satisfactory events which followed.

The enemy having twice summoned Brigadier General Powell, and received such answer as became a gallant officer entrusted with so important a post, and having tried during the course of four days several attacks, and being repulsed in all, retreated without having done any considerable damage.

Brigadier General Powell, from whose report to me I extract this relation, gives great commendations to the regiment of Prince Frederick, and the other troops sta∣tioned

at Mount Independence. The Brigadier also mentions with great applause the behaviour of Captain Taylor of the 21st regiment, who was accidentally there on his route to the army from the hospital, and Lieutenant Beecroft of the 24th regiment, who with the artificers in arms defended an important battery.

On the 24th instant, the enemy, enabled by the capture of the gun-boats and ba∣teaux which they had made after the surprise of the sloop, to embark upon Lake George, attacked Diamond Island in two divisions.

Captain Aubrey and two companies of the 47th regiment, had been posted at that island from the time the army passed the Hudson's River, as a better situation for the security of the stores at the south end of Lake George than Fort George, which is on the continent, and not tenable against artillery and numbers, The enemy were re∣pulsed by Captain Aubrey with great loss, and pursued by the gun-boats under his command to the east shore, where two of their principal vessels were retaken, together with all the cannon. They had just time to set fire to the other bateaux, and retreated over the mountains.

I beg leave to refer your Lordship for further particulars to my aid-de-camp, Lord Petersham, and I humbly take occasion to recommend to his Majesty's notice that no∣bleman, as one endued with qualities to do important services to his country in every station to which his birth may lead. In this late campaign in particular, his beha∣viour has been such as to entitle him to the fullest applause, and I am confident his merit will be thought a sufficient ground for preferment, though deprived of the eclat and sort of claim which generally attends the delivery of fortunate dispatches.

I have only to add, my Lord, a general report of the killed and wounded; I do not give it correct, the hurry of the time and the separation of the corps having ren∣dered it impossible to make it so. The British officers have bled profusely and most honourably; those who remain unwounded have been equally forward, and the gene∣ral officers from the mode of fighting have been more exposed than in other services. Among the rest of this station, I have had my escapes. It depends upon the sentence his Majesty shall pass upon my conduct; upon the judgment of my profession, and of the impartial and respectable parts of my country, whether I am to esteem them bles∣sings or misfortunes.

I have the honour to be, (Signed.) J. BURGOYNE.

* 33.8Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-General Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, dated Albany, 20th October, 1777.

[Private, by Lord Petersham.]

MY LORD,

I HAVE little to add to my public letter respecting the course of unsuccessful events, therein detailed. I rest my confidence in the justice of the King and his councils, to support the General they thought proper to appoint to as arduous an un∣dertaking, and under as positive a direction, as perhaps a cabinet ever framed. It will, I am sure, be remembered, my Lord, that a preference of exertions was the only latitude given me, and that to force a junction with Sir William Howe, or at least a passage to Albany, was the principle, the letter, and the spirit of my orders.

Indeed the appearances at the time I passed the Hudson's-River, though subject to doubt in some instances, as I then wrote your Lordship, were upon a general view, such as I am persuaded would have rendered inaction censurable, had my orders, instead of being peremptory, been discretionary. Promises of the professing loyalists were not then brought to the test; the spirit of the enemy, in combat against regular British troops, had only been tried at Ticonderago, at Huberton, at Skenesborough, and Fort Anne; in all which places it had failed; the total disappointment of effectual co-operation, could not be foreseen or supposed; and sure I am, had I then made suppo∣sition that any thing like what has happened, might have happened, and remained cautiously posted, no exertion attempted, my conduct would have been held indefen∣sible by every class and distinction of men in government, in the army, and in the public.

The expediency of advancing being admitted, the consequences have been honou∣rable misfortunes. The British have persevered in a strenuous and bloody pro∣gress. Had the force been all British, perhaps the perseverance had been longer; but as it was, will it be said, my Lord, that in the exhausted situation described, and in the jaws of famine, and invested by quadruple numbers, a treaty which saves the army to the state, for the next campaign, was not more than could have been expected? I I call it saving the army, because if sent home, the state is thereby enabled to send forth the troops now destined for her internal defence; if exchanged, they become a force to Sir William Howe, as effectually, as if any other junction had been made.

I should now hold myself unjustifiable if I did not confide to your Lordship, my opinion, upon a near inspection, of the rebel troops. The standing corps which I have seen, are disciplined. I do not hazard the term, but apply it to the great funda∣mental points of military institution, sobriety, subordination, regularity and courage. The militia are inferior in method and movement, but not a jot less serviceable in woods. My conjectures were very different after the affair of Ticonderago, but I am convinced they were delusive; and it is a duty to the state to confess it.

The panic of the rebel troops is confined, and of short duration; the enthusiasim is extensive and permanent.

It is a justice to Major General Phillips, to inform your Lordship, that when the crisis of our situation at Saratoga arrived, he very handsomely offered to hazard his person by making a circuit through the woods, and attempt to throw himself into Ticondera∣go, to defend that place, should it be the object of the enemy to endeavour the re∣taking it.

In regard to myself, I am sunk in mind and body; but while I have a faculty of either, it shall be exerted for the King's service. I shall wait in the neighbourhood of Boston, the orders of Sir William Howe.

I have the honour to be, &c. J. BURGOYNE.

* 34.1Minutes of a Council of War, held on the Heights of Saratoga, Oct. 12.

PRESENT.

• Lieutenant General BURGOYNE,
• Major General REIDESEL,
• Major General PHILIPS,
• Brigadier General HAMILTON.

THE Lieutenant General states to the council the present situation of affairs.

The enemy in force, according to the best intelligence he can obtain, to the amount of upwards of 14,000 men, and a considerable quantity of artillery, are on this side the Fish-kill, and threaten an attack. On the other side the Hudson's River, between this army and Fort Edward, is another army of the enemy, the numbers unknown; but one corps, which there has been an opportunity of observing, is reported to be about 1500 men. They have likewise cannon on the other side the Hudson's River, and they have a bridge below Saratoga church, by which the two armies can communi∣cate.

The bateaux of the army have been destroyed, and no means appear of making a bridge over the Hudson's River, were it even practicable from the position of the enemy.

The only means of retreat, therefore, are by the ford at Fort Edward, or taking the mountains in order to pass the river higher up by rafts, or by any other ford which is reported to be practicable with difficulty, or by keeping the mountains, to pass the head of Hudson's River, and continue to the westward of Lake George all the way to Ticonderoga; it is true, this last passage was never made but by Indians, or very small bodies of men.

In order to pass cannon or any wheel carriages from hence to Fort Edward, some bridges must be repaired under fire of the enemy from the opposite side of the river, and the principal bridge will be a work of fourteen or fifteen hours; there is no good position for the army to take to sustain that work, and if there were, the time stated as necessary, would give the enemy on the other side the Hudson's River an opportunity to take post on the strong ground above Fort Edward, or to dispute the ford while General Gates's army followed in the rear.

The intelligence from the lower part of Hudson's River is founded upon the con∣current reports of prisoners and deserters, who say it was the news in the enemy's camp, that Fort Montgomery was taken; and one man, a friend to government, who ar∣rived yesterday, mentions some particulars of the manner in which it was taken.

The provisions of the army may hold out to the 20th; there is neither rum nor spruce beer.

Having committed this state of facts to the consideration of the council, the Gene∣ral requests their sentiments on the following propositions.

1st. To wait in the present position an attack from the enemy, or the chance of fa∣vourable events.

2d. To attack the enemy.

3d. To retreat repairing the bridges as the army moves for the artillery, in order to force the passage of the ford.

4th. To retreat by night, leaving the artillery and the baggage; and should it be found impracticable to force the passage with musquetry, to attempt the upper ford, or the passage round Lake George.

In case the enemy, by extending to their left, leave their rear open, to march rapidly for Albany.

Upon the first proposition resolved, that the situation would grow worse by de∣lay, that the provision now in store not more than sufficient for the retreat, should impediments intervene, or a circuit of country become necessary; and as the enemy did not attack when the ground was unfortified, it is not probable they will do it now, as they have a better game to play.

The second unadvisable and desperate, there being no possibility of reconnoi∣tering the enemy's position, and his great superiority of numbers known.

The third impracticable.

The fifth thought worthy of consideration by the Lieutenant-General, Major-General Phillips, and Brigadier-General Hamilton; but the position of the enemy yet gives no opening for it.

Resolved, that the fourth proposition is the only resource, and that to effect it, the utmost secrecy and silence is to be observed; and the troops are to be put in motion from the right in the still part of the night, without any change in the disposition.

N. B. It depended upon the delivery of six days provision in due time, and upon the return of scouts, who had been sent forward to examine by what route the army could probably move the first four miles undiscovered, whether the plan should take place on that day, or on the morrow.

The scouts on their return reported, that the enemy's position on the right was such, and they had so many small parties out, that it would be impossible to move without our march being immediately discovered.

Minutes and Proceedings of a Council of War, consisting of all the general Officers and Field Officers, and Captains commanding Corps, on the Heights of Saratoga, October 13.

THE Lieutenant-General having explained the situation of affairs, as in the pre∣ceding council, with the additional intelligence, that the enemy was intrenched at the fords of Fort Edward, and likewise occupied the strong position on the Pine∣plains between Fort George and Fort Edward, expressed his readiness to undertake at their head any enterprise of difficulty or hazard that should appear to them within the compass of their strength of spirit. He added, that he had reason to believe a capitulation had been in the contemplation of some, perhaps of all, who knew the real situation of things; that upon a circumstance of such consequence to national and personal honour, he thought it a duty to his country, and to himself, to extend his council beyond the usual limits; that the assembly present might justly be esteemed a full representation of the army; and that he should think himself unjusti∣fiable in taking any step in so serious a matter, without such a concurrence of senti∣ments as should make a treaty the act of the army, as well as that of the general.

The first question therefore he desired them to decide was, Whether an army of 3500 fighting men, and well provided with artillery, were justifiable, upon the principles of national dignity and military honour, in capitulating in any possible situation?

Resolved, nem. con. in the affirmative.

Question 2. Is the present situation of that nature?

Resolved, nem. con. That the present situation justifies a capitulation upon ho∣nourable terms.

The Lieutenant-General then drew up the message, marked No. 2, and laid it before the council. It was unanimously approved, and upon that foundation the treaty opened.

October 14. Major Kingston having delivered the message marked No. 2. return∣ed with the proposals marked No. 3, and the council of war being assembled again, the Lieutenant-General laid the proposals before them, when it was resolved unani∣mously to reject the 6th article, and not to admit of it in any extremity whatever.

The Lieutenant-General then laid before the council the answers to Major-General Gates's proposals, as marked in the same paper, together with his own preliminary proposals, which were unanimously approved of.

October 15. The council being assembled again, Major-General Gates's answers to Lieutenant-General Burgoyne's proposals were laid before them, whereupon it was resolved, that they were satisfactory, and a sufficient ground for proceeding to a definitive treaty.

No. 2. Major Kingston delivered the following Message to Major-General Gates, October 14.

AFTER having fought you twice, Lieutenant-General Burgoyne has waited some days, in his present position, determined to try a third conflict against any force you could bring to attack him.

He is apprised of the superiority of your numbers, and the disposition of your troops to impede his supplies, and render his retreat a scene of carnage on both sides. In this situation he is impelled by humanity, and thinks himself justifiable by established principles and precedents of state, and of war, to spare the lives of brave men upon honourable terms. Should Major-General Gates be inclined to treat upon that idea, General Burgoyne would propose a cessation of arms during the time necessary to communicate the preliminary terms by which, in any extre∣mity, he and his army mean to abide.

No. 3. Major-General Gates's Proposals; together with Lieutenant-General Burgoyne's Answers.

I. General Burgoyne's army being exceedingly reduced by repeated defeats, by desertion, sickness, &c. their provisions exhausted, their military horses, tents, and baggage, taken or destroyed, their retreat cut off, and their camp invested, they can only be allowed to surrender prisoners of war.

Answer. Lieutenant-General Burgoyne's army, however reduced, will never admit that their retreat is cut off, while they have arms in their hands.

II. The officers and soldiers may keep the baggage belonging to them. The generals of the United States never permit individuals to be pillaged.

III. The troops under his Excellency General Burgoyne will be conducted by the most convenient route to New England, marching by easy marches, and suf∣ficiently provided for by the way.

Answer. This article is answered by General Burgoyne's first proposal, which is here annexed.

IV. The officers will be admitted on parole; may wear their side-arms, and will be treated with the liberality customary in Europe, so long as they, by proper behaviour, continue to deserve it; but those who are apprehended having broke their parole, as some British officers have done, must expect to be close confined.

Answer. There being no officer in this army under, or capable of being under the description of breaking parole, this article needs no answer.

V. All public stores, artillery, arms, ammunition, carriages, horses, &c. &c. must be delivered to commissaries appointed to receive them.

Answer. All public stores may be delivered, arms excepted.

VI. These terms being agreed to and signed, the troops under his Excellency General Burgoyne's command may be drawn up in their encampments, where they will be ordered to ground their arms, and may thereupon be marched to the river side, to be passed over in their way towards Bennington.

Answer. This article inadmissible in any extremity. Sooner than this army will consent to ground their arms in their encampment, they will rush on the enemy, determined to take no quarter.

VII. A cessation of arms to continue till sun-set, to receive General Burgoyne's answer.

(Signed) HORATIO GATES.

Camp at Saratoga, Oct. 14.

Major Kingston met the Adjutant-General of Major-General Gates's army, Octo∣ber 14th, at sun-set, and delivered the following message:

If General Gates does not mean to recede from the 6th article, the treaty ends at once.

The army will to a man proceed to any act of desperation, rather than submit to that article.

The cessation of arms ends this evening.

* 35.1RETURN of the Army of the United States, commanded by Major General Gates, Camp at Saratoga, October 16, 1777.

	Officers present.	Rank and File.
	Commissioned.	Staff.	Non-com∣missioned.
Brigade.	Brigadiers.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Chaplains.	Adjutants.	Quarter Masters.	Pay Masters.	Surgeons.	Mates.	Serjeants.	Drums and Fifes.	Present fit for Duty.	Sick present.	Sick absent.	On Command.	On Furlough.	Total.
Brigadier General Nixon's	1	3	4	3	27	25	28	24	1	4	4	2	4	3	104	52	1257	55	87	73	9	1481
Poor's	1	2	5	4	24	23	26	28	1	3	3	4	3	5	110	50	1132	48	64	61	11	1316
Learned's	1	4	3	4	26	21	23	30	1	4	3	3	2	4	121	54	1498	57	51	44	8	1658
Glover's	1	3	5	4	30	26	23	27	1	3	4	4	4	3	120	58	1776	69	94	86	23	2048
Paterson's	1	4	3	4	28	22	24	26	0	3	3	2	3	4	108	49	1255	61	77	53	12	1458
Warner's	1	5	4	3	24	27	22	26	0	4	2	3	2	3	96	40	1572	95	83	68	32	1850
Stark's	1	3	3	4	27	30	24	22	0	3	4	2	4	2	101	48	220	25	32	1919	7	1303
Bailey's	1	4	4	2	28	26	22	24	0	2	2	1	2	3	93	37	897	30	23	148	13	1011
Whipple's	1	3	2	4	24	27	23	25	1	4	3	2	3	2	104	49	112	18	21	897	27	1075
Brickett's	1	2	4	3	26	23	27	30	0	2	2	1	1	2	83	37	776	21	37	31	4	869
Fellows's	1	4	2	4	22	26	24	28	0	3	4	2	3	4	113	51	132	40	31	884	10	1097
Woolcut's	1	3	2	3	20	23	21	25	0	2	3	1	2	1	96	47	843	27	34	38	7	949
Ten Brock's	0	4	2	3	24	22	27	30	0	2	4	2	1	3	105	44	987	54	65	553	14	1673
Artillerists	0	0	1	1	6	5	5	0	0	1	1	1	3	2	22	12	438	17	25	8	2	490
Cavalry	0	0	1	3	8	6	7	0	0	2	2	0	0	2	16	8	321	5	7	12	1	346
Total	12	44	45	49	344	332	326	345	5	42	44	30	37	43	1392	636	13216	622	731	3875	180	18624

N. B. Exclusive of the numbers in the above Return, there are, the upper staff of the army, the bateau-men, the artificers, and followers of the camp.

Colonel Morgan's corps of rifle-men, and the light-infantry, are included in the brigades.

(Signed.) HORATIO GATES, Major General.

* 36.1Extracts from the Minutes of the last Council of War, excepting the names of the officers, and the notes they gave.

QUESTION.

General Gates having, in answer to General Burgoyne's message, given a solemn affirmation on his honour, that no detachment has been made from his army during the negociation of the treaty, is the treaty, in its present situation, binding on this army, or is the general's honour engaged for the signing it?

[Here follow the names of the officers as they voted.]

The lieutenant general's opinion being clear, that he is not bound by what has passed, he would not execute the treaty upon the sole consideration of the point of honour, notwithstanding the respectable majority against him.

He is likewise far from being convinced that this army, by great exertions and by great enduring in point of provisions, might not yet be relieved; but he is com∣pelled to yield on the following considerations.

The treaty was generally thought a most advantageous one before the intelligence arrived. That intelligence is refuted, and ocular demonstration of its falsity pledged as far as relates to General Gates's force; the other parts are only founded on hearsay, and not to be depended upon.

Should General Clinton be where reported, yet the distance is such as to render any relief from him improbable during the time our provisions could be made to last.

—declares his post untenable, and says, if this convention is not signed, he apprehends there will be considerable desertion.

—says he thinks the 47th regiment not to be depended on.

—is of the same opinion.

—thinks the 62d regiment is disheartened by the situation of their post, and not equal to their former exertions.

Several officers think the men in general seem to have got the convention in their heads as desirable.

Many of the best officers are absent by sickness and wounds from all the corps.

Though the other officers at the head of the British corps think they can answer for the spirit of their men, if attacked on their present ground, it is evident the most sanguine do not think any part of the army in that elevation and alacrity of spirit ne∣cessary for undertaking desperate enterprizes.

To break off the treaty now renders a future renewal of it hopeless, as our condi∣tion must every hour grow worse.

A defeat is fatal to the army. A victory does not save it, as they have neither provisions to advance nor retreat against an enemy who by experience we know are capable of rallying at every advantageous post.

And that the life and property of every provincial and dependant of this army depends upon the execution of this treaty.

POSTSCRIPT to the APPENDIX.

[Though the following Letters are not referred to in any Part of the Defence, it is hoped they will not be deemed superfluous.]

Extract of a Letter from Major General Phillips, to Lieutenant General Burgoyne, dated Cambridge, September 29, 1778.

My Dear Sir,

THE Boston news papers, have given extracts from English and New York papers, wherein you are mentioned; your arrival, your speeches in parliament; and a variety of other matters concerning you. I do not always give credit to news papers, and therefore, the publishers at Boston will excuse me, if in the in∣stance of news I do not give them, in my opinion, more veracity than I allow the news compilers at London.

I will not plague you about our situation, as you will know it, by my assuring you it is almost exactly as you left us; so no more about it. The troops here de∣pend upon you their chief, in whatever may relate to them; their interest; their honour. It is not doubted but you will exert yourself, that the officers may gain preferment in common, with other parts of the army. That you will have the goodness to exert yourself in behalf of their situation, respecting the very great expence of living, and endeavour to procure the allowance of forage money. And in short, that you will use all your powers of persuasion and interest for these troops, which have served under you with zeal, and with honour; and endeavour, by serving their situation and promoting their honour, to alleviate misfortunes which nor fortitude nor valour could prevent, and which they suffer, however, with resignation and patience. I am most perfectly convinced of your affectionate, I will say your grateful regard for us all; and I leave myself and the troops to your friendly care; to your humanity; to your honour.

You cannot expect a letter of entertainment; I have not even a power of making it one of intelligence. It shall be however, a letter of perfect sincerity, and in the fullest sense of it I profess to be,

My dear Sir,

Your very sincere Friend, and faithful Servant, (Signed) W. PHILLIPS.

P. S. I enclose you the Copy of a Memorial to the Secretary at War, I am sure you will assist it.

Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne to Lord Amherst, inclosing the Memorial referred to in the above, dated November 6, 1778.

MY LORD,

THE heavy misfortune I sustain in being precluded the King's presence, touches me in no point more nearly, than in the prevention of doing justice to the various and extensive merits of the army I had the honour to command. That the con∣sequences of my supposed, or real errors, should involve pretensions and interests of so many gallant officers is a painful reflection; and it can only be alleviated by the truest sense of the trust to be reposed in your Lordship, for the general protec∣tion of the service. The inclosed memorial was accompanied with expressions of reliance, in the name of the whole army, upon my efforts to support it. The officers in New England little conceive my present situation: I take the first oppor∣tunity to transmit their cause to your Lordship's happier auspices, with this solemn declaration, which I have mentioned upon different public occasions, and which I can omit no occasion to repeat, that there is not a British officer who served under me during the campaign of 1777, to whom I can impute blame; that the instances are very numerous wherein particular distinction is due; and as a body, they have a claim to my sincerest respect for their zeal in the King's service, and to my utmost gratitude for their attention to me personally.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c. J. BURGOYNE.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  No. I.
• * 2.1

  No. II.
• * 3.1

  No. III.
• * 3.2

  No. IV.
• * 4.1

  No. V.
• * 5.1

  Second No. V.
• * 6.1

  No. VI.
• * 7.1

  No. VII.
• * 9.1

  30th June.
• * 9.2

  1st July.
• * 9.3

  July 2.
• * 9.4

  July 3.
• * 9.5

  July 4.
• * 9.6

  5th July.
• * 9.7

  6th July.
• * 9.8

  7th July.
• * 9.9

  8th July.
• * 9.10

  9th and 10th July.
• * 9.11

  No. VIII.
• * 11.1

  Second No. VIII.
• * 11.2

  The letter that follows, No. 9, is also materially referrable to No. 8.
• * 11.3

  No. IX.
• * 12.1

  X.
• * 13.1

  Second No. X.
• * 13.2

  This letter, which was never printed before, only regards the view of the evidence, page 96.
• * 14.1

  No. XI.
• * 16.1

  No. XII.
• * 23.1

  The erasures are printed in Italics, and the amendments in the opposite column.
• * 32.1

  No. XIII.
• * 32.2

  No. XIV.
• * 33.1

  15th.
• * 33.2

  16th.
• * 33.3

  17th.
• * 33.4

  18th.
• * 33.5

  Sept. 19.
• * 33.6

  September 21.
• * 33.7

  October 11.
• * 33.8

  Second No. XIV.
• * 34.1

  No. XV.
• * 35.1

  No. XVI.
• * 36.1

  No. XVII.