Letter addressed to the abbe Raynal on the affairs of North-America: In which the mistakes in the abbe's account of the revolution of America are corrected and cleared up. By Thomas Paine, M.A. of the University of Pennsylvania, and author of the pamphlet and other publications, entitled, "Common sense.".

POSTSCRIPT

SINCE closing the foregoing letter, some intimations, respecting a general peace, have made their way to America On what authority or foundation they stand, or how near or remote such an event may be, are circumstances I am not inquiring into But as the sub∣ject must sooner or later become a matter of serious atten∣tion, it may not be improper, even at this early period, candidly to investigate some points that are connected with it, or lead towards it.

THE independence of America is at this moment as firm∣ly established as that of any other country in a state of war. It is not length of time, but power that gives stability. Nations at war know nothing of each other on the score of antiquity. It is their present and immediate strength, together with their connections, that must support them. To which we may add, that a right which originated to∣day▪ is as much a right, as if it had the sanction of a thousand years; and therefore the independence and present governments of America are in no more danger of being subverted, because they are modern, than that of England is secure, because it is ancient.

THE polities of Britain, so far as they respected Ame∣rica, were originally conceived in idiotism, and acted in madness. There is not a step which bears the smallest trace of rationality. In her management of the war, she has laboured to be wretched, and studied to be hated; and in all her former propositions for accommodation, she has discovered a total ignorance of mankind, and of those natural and unalterable sensations by which they are so generally governed. How she may conduct her∣self in the present or future business of negociating a peace is yet to be proved.

HE is a weak politician who does not understand human nature, and penetrate into the effect which measures of government will have upon the mind. All the miscarria∣ges

of Britain have arisen from this defect. The former Ministry acted as if they supposed mankind to be without a mind; and the present Ministry, as if America was without a memory. The one must have supposed we were incapable of feeling; and the other, that we could not remember injuries.

THERE is likewise another line in which politicians mistake, which is that of not rightly calculating, or rather of misjudging▪ the consequence which any given circum∣stance will produce. Nothing is more frequent as well in common as in political life than to hear people complain, that such or such means produced an event directly con∣trary to their intentions. But the fault lies in their not judging rightly, what the event would be: for the means produced only its proper and natural consequence.

IT is very probable, that in a treaty for peace, Britain will contend for some post or other in North-America; perhaps Canada or Halifax or both: And I infer this from the known deficiency of her politics, which have e∣ver yet made use of means, whose natural event was a∣gainst both her interest and her expectation. But the question with her ought to be, whether it is worth her while to hold them, and what will be the consequence.

RESPECTING Canada, one or other of the two follow∣ing will take place, viz If Canada should people, it will revolt; and if it do not people▪ it will not be worth the expence of holding. And the same may be said of Hali∣fax, and the country round it. But Canada never will people; neither is there any occasion for contrivances on one side or the other, for nature alone will do the whole,

BRITAIN may put herself to great expences in sending settlers to Canada; but the descendants of those settlers will be Americans, as other descendants have been before them. They will look round and see the neighbouring States sovereign and free, respected abroad and trading at large with the world; and the natural love of liberty, the advantages of commerce, the blessings of independence

and of a happier climate, and a richer soil, will draw them southward, and the effect will be that Britain will sustain the expence, and America reap the advantage.

ONE would think that the experience which Britain has had of America, would entirely sicken her of all thoughts of continental colonization; and any part which she might retain, will only become to her a field of jealousy and thorns, of debate and contention, for ever struggling for privileges, and meditating revolt. She may form new settlements, but they will be for us; they will become part of the United States of America; and that against all her contrivances to prevent it, or without any endea∣vours of ours to promote it. In the first place she can∣not draw from them a revenue, until they are able to pay one, and when they are so, they will be above subjec∣tion. Men soon become attached to the soil they live upon, and incorporated with the prosperity of the place; and it signifies but little what opinions they come over with, for time, interest, and new connections will render them obsolete, and the next generation know nothing of them.

WERE Britain truly wise, she would lay hold of the present opportunity to disentangle herself from all conti∣nental embarrassments in North-America, and that not on∣ly to avoid future broils and troubles, but to save expen∣ces. For to speak explicitly on the matter, I would not, were I an European power, have Canada, under the con∣ditions that Britain must retain it▪ could it be given to me. It is one of those kind of dominions that is▪ and ever will be, a constant charge upon any foreign holder.

AS to Halifax, it will become useless to England after the present war, and the loss of the United States. A harbour, when the dominion is gone, for the purpose of which only it was wanted, can be attended only with ex∣pence. There are, I doubt not, thousands of people in England, who suppose, that those places are a profit to the nation whereas they are directly the contrary and instead of producing any revenue, a considerable part of

the revenue of England is annually drawn off, to support the expence of holding them.

GIBRALTAR is another instance of national ill policy. A post which in time of peace is not wanted, and in time of war is of no use, must at all times be useless. Instead of affording protection to a navy, it requires the aid of one to maintain it. And to suppose that Gibraltar commands the Mediterranean, or the pass into it, or the trade of it, is to suppose a detected falshood; because though Britain holds the post she has lost the other three, and every be∣nefit she expected from it. And to say that all this hap∣pens because it is besieged by land and water, is to say nothing▪ for this will always be the case in time of war, while France and Spain keep up superior fleets, and Bri∣tain holds the place.—So that, though as an impenetra∣ble inaccessible rock it may be held by the one, it is al∣ways in the power of the other to render it useless and excessively chargeable.

I SHOULD suppose that on e of the principal objects of Spain in besieging it, is to shew to Britain, that though she may not take it, she can command it, that is, she can shut it up, and prevent its being used as a harbour, tho' not a garrison.—But the short way to reduce Gibraltar, is, to attack the British fleet; for Gibraltar is as depen∣dent on a fleet for support, as a bird is on its wing for food, and when wounded there it starves.

THERE is another circumstance which the people of England have not only not attended to, but seem to be utterly ignorant of, and that is, the difference between permanent power, and accidental power, considered in a national sense.

BY permanent power, I mean, a natural inherent and perpetual ability in a nation, which though always in being, may not be always in action, or not always advan∣tageously directed; and by accidental power, I mean, a fortunate or accidental disposition or exercise of national strength, in whole or in part.

THERE undoubtedly was a time when any one Euro∣pean nation, with only eight or ten ships of war, equal to the present ships of the line, could have carried terror to all others, who had not began to build a navy, however great their natural ability might be for that purpose: But this can be considered only as accidental, and not as a stand to compare permanent power by, and could last no longer than until those powers built as many or more ships than the former. After this a larger fleet was necessary in order to be superior; and a still larger would again supersede it. And thus mankind have gone on building fleet upon fleet, as occasion or situation dictated. And this reduces it to an original question, which is: Which power can build and man the largest number of ships? The natural answer to which is, That power which has the largest revenue and the greatest number of inhabi∣tants, provided its situation of coast affords sufficient con∣veniencies.

FRANCE being a nation on the continent of Europe, and Britain an island in its neighbourhood, each of them derived different ideas from their different situations. The inhabitants of Britain could earry on no foreign trade, nor stir from the spot they dwelt upon, without the assist∣ance of shipping; but this was not the case with France. The idea therefore of a navy did not arise to France from the same original and immediate necessity which produced it to England. But the question is, that when both of them turn their attention, and employ their reve∣nues the same way, which can be superior?

THE annual revenue of France is nearly double that of England, and her number of inhabitants more than twice as many. Each of them has the same length of coast on the channel, besides which. France has several hundred miles extent on the bay of Biscay, and an open∣ing on the Mediterranean: And every day proves that practice and exercise make sailors as well as soldiers in one country as well as another.

IT then Britain can maintain an hundred ships of the

line, France can as well support an hundred and fifty, because her revenues and her population are as equal to the one, as those of England are to the other. And the only reason why she has not done it, is because she has not till very lately attended to it. But when she sees, as she now sees, that a navy is the first engine of power, she can easily accomplish it.

ENGLAND very falsely, and ruinously for herself, infer, that because she had the advantage of France, while France had the smaller navy, that for that reason it is al∣ways to be so. Whereas it may be clearly seen, that the strength of France has never yet been tried on a navy, and that she is able to be as superior to England in the extent of navy, as she is in the extent of her revenues and her population. And England may lament the day, when, by her insolence and injustice, she provoked in France a maritime disposition.

IT is in the power of the combined fleets to conquer every island in the West Indies, and reduce all the British navy in those places. For were France and Spain to send their whole naval force in Europe to those islands, it would not be in the power of Britain to follow them with an equal force. She would still be twenty or thirty ships inferior, were she to send every vessel she had, and in the mean time all the foreign trade of England would lay exposed to the Dutch.

IT is a maxim, which, I am persuaded, will ever hold good, and more especially in naval operations, that a great power ought never to move in detachments, if it can possibly be avoided But to go with its whole force to some important object, the reduction of which shall have a decisive effect upon the war. Had the whole of the French and Spanish fleets in Europe come last spring to the West-Indies, every island had been their own, Rod∣ney their prisoner, and his fleet their prize. From the United States the combined fleets can be supplied with provisions, without the necessity of drawing them from Europe, which is not the case with England.

ACCIDENT has thrown some advantages in the way of England, which, from the inferiority of her navy, she had not a right to expect For though she has been obli∣ged to fly before the combined fleets, yet Rodney has twice had the fortune to fall in with detached squadrons, to which he was superior in numbers: The first off Cape St Vincent, where he had nearly two to one, and the other in the West Indies, where he had a majority of six ships. Victories of this kind almost produce themselves. They are won without honor, and suffered without dis∣grace: And are ascribable to the chance of meeting not to the superiority of fighting. For the same Admiral, under whom they were obtained, was unable, in three former engagements, to make the least impression on a fleet consisting of an equal number of ships with his own, and compounded for the events by declining the actions.* 1.1

To conclude, if it may be said that Britain has nume∣rous enemies, it likewise proves that she has given nume∣rous offences. Insolence is sure to provoke hatred, whe∣ther in a nation or an individual. The want of manners in the British Court may be seen even in its birth days and new years Odes, which are calculated to infatuate the vulgar, and disgust the man of refinement: And her for∣mer overbearing rudeness, and insufferable injustice on the seas, have made every commercial nation her foe. Her fleets were employed as engines of prey; and acted on the surface of the deep the character which the shark does beneath it.—On the other hand, the Combined Powers are taking a popular part, and will render their reputa∣tion immortal, by establishing the perfect freedom of the ocean, to which all countries have a right, and are inte∣rested in accomplishing. The sea is the world's high∣way; and he who arrogates a prerogative over it, trans∣gresses the right, and justly brings on himself the chastise∣ment of nations.

PERHAPS it might be of some service to the future tranquility of mankind, were an article introduced into the next general peace, that no one nation should, in time of peace, exceed a certain number of ships of war. some∣thing of this kind seems necessary; for according to the prefent fashion, half the world will get upon the water, and there appears no end to the extent to which navies may be carried. Another reason is, that navies add no∣thing to the manners or morals of a people. The seques∣tered life which attends the service, prevents the oppor∣tunities of society, and is too apt to occasion a coarseness of ideas and language, and that more in ships of war than in commercial employ; because in the latter they mir more with the world, and are nearer related to it. I men∣tion this remark as a general one; and not applied to any one country more than to another.

BRITAIN has now had the trial of above seven years, with an expence of nearly an hundred million pounds sterling; and every month in which she delays to conclude a peace, costs her another million sterling, over and above her ordinary expences of government, which are a million more; so that her total monthly expence is two million pounds sterling, which is equal to the whole yearly expence of America, all charges included. Judge then who is best able to continue it.

SHE has likewise many atonements to make to an in∣jured world as well in one quarter as another. And in∣stead of pursuing that temper of arrogance, which serves only to sink her in the esteem, and entail on her the dis∣like, of all nations, she would do well to reform her man∣ners retrench her expences, live peaceably with her neigh∣bours, and think of war no more.

Philadelphia, August 21, 1782.

Notes

• * 1.1

  See the accounte, either English or French of three actions in the West Indies, between Count de Guichen and Admiral Rodney, in 1780.