The works of Alexander Pope Esq. In nine volumes complete. With his last corrections, additions, and improvements; ... Together with the commentaries and notes of Mr. Warburton: [pt.1]
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- The works of Alexander Pope Esq. In nine volumes complete. With his last corrections, additions, and improvements; ... Together with the commentaries and notes of Mr. Warburton: [pt.1]
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- Pope, Alexander, 1688-1744.
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- London :: printed for J. and P. Knapton, H. Lintot, J. and R. Tonson, and S. Draper,
- 1751.
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"The works of Alexander Pope Esq. In nine volumes complete. With his last corrections, additions, and improvements; ... Together with the commentaries and notes of Mr. Warburton: [pt.1]." In the digital collection Eighteenth Century Collections Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/004809055.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 30, 2025.
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Page 135
CONTENTS OF THE ESSAY on CRITICISM.
- INtroduction. That 'tis as great a fault to judge ill, as to write ill, and a more dangerous one to the public, ℣ 1.
- That a true Taste is as rare to be found, as a true Ge|nius, ℣ 9 to 18.
- That most men are born with some Taste, but spoil'd by false Education, ℣ 19 to 25.
- The Multitude of Critics, and causes of them, ℣ 26 to 45.
- That we are to study our own Taste, and know the Li|mits of it, ℣ 46 to 67.
- Nature the best guide of Judgment, ℣ 68 to 87.
- Improv'd by Art and Rules, which are but methodis'd Nature, ℣ 88.
- Rules deriv'd from the Practice of the Ancient Poets, ℣ id. to 110.
- That therefore the Ancients are necessary to be study'd by a Critic, particularly Homer and Virgil, ℣ 120 to 138.
- Of Licenses, and the use of them by the Ancients, ℣ 140 to 180.
- Reverence due to the Ancients, and praise of them, ℣ 181, etc.
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- Causes hindering a true Judgment. 1. Pride, ℣ 208, 2. Imperfect Learning, ℣ 215. 3. Judging by parts, and not by the whole, ℣ 233 to 288. Critics in Wit, Language, Versification, only, ℣ 288. 305. 339, etc. 4. Being too hard to please, or too apt to admire, ℣ 384. 5. Partiality—too much Love to a Sect,—to the Anci|ents or Moderns, ℣ 394. 6. Prejudice or Prevention, ℣ 408. 7. Singularity, ℣ 424. 8. Inconstancy, ℣ 430. 9. Party Spirit, ℣ 452, etc. 10. Envy, ℣ 466. Against Envy, and in praise of Good-nature, ℣ 508, etc. When Severity is chiefly to be used by Critics, ℣ 526, etc.
- Rules for the Conduct of Manners in a Critic, 1. Can|dour, ℣ 563. Modesty, ℣ 566. Good-breeding, ℣ 572. Sincerity, and Freedom of advice, ℣ 578. 2. When one's Counsel is to be restrained, ℣ 584. Cha|racter of an incorrigible Poet, ℣ 600. And of an im|pertinent Critic, ℣ 610, etc. Character of a good Critic, ℣ 629. The History of Criticism, and Cha|racters of the best Critics, Aristotle, ℣ 645. Horace, ℣ 653. Dionysius, ℣ 665. Petronius, ℣ 667. Quintilian, ℣ 670. Longinus, ℣ 675. Of the De|cay of Criticism, and its Revival. Erasmus, ℣ 693. Vida, ℣ 705. Boileau, ℣ 714. Lord Roscommon, etc. ℣ 725. Conclusion.
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Jump to sectionAN ESSAY ON CRITICISM.
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COMMENTARY.
An Essay]The Poem is in one book, but divided into three principals parts or members. The first [to ℣ 201.] gives rules for the Study of the Art of Criticism: the second [from thence to ℣ 560.] exposes the Causes of wrong Judgment; and the third [from thence to the end] prescribes the Morals of the Critic.
In order to a right understanding of this poem, it will be ne|cessary to observe, that tho' it be intitled simply an Essay on Criticism, yet several of the precepts relate equally to the good writing as well as to the true judging of a poem. This is so far from violating the Unity of the Subject, that it rounds and com|pleats it: or from disordering the regularity of the Form, that it produces the highest beauty which can arise out of method, as will appear by the following considerations: 1. It was impossi|ble to give a full and exact idea of the Art of poetical Criticism, without considering, at the same time, the Art of Poetry; so far as Poetry is an Art. These therefore being closely connect|ed in nature, the Author has with much judgment reciprocally
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interwoven the precepts of both thro' his whole poem. 2. As all the rules of the ancient Critics were taken from Poets who copied nature, this is another reason why every Poet should be a Critic: Therefore, as the subject is poetical Criticism, it is fre|quently addressed to the critical Poet. And 3dly, the Art of Criticism is as necessarily, and much more usefully exercised in writing than in judging.
But Readers have been misled by the modesty of the Title: which only promises an Art of Criticism, in a treatise, and that a compleat one, of the Art both of Criticism and Poetry. This, and the not attending to the considerations offered above, per|haps was what misled a very candid writer, after having given this Piece all the praises on the side of genius and poetry which his true taste could not resuse it, to say, that the observations fol|low one another like those in Horace's Art of Poetry, without that methodical regularity which would have been requisite in a prose writer. Spec. No 235. I do not see how method can hurt any one grace of Poetry; or what prerogative there is in verse to to dispense with regularity. The remark is false in every part of it. Mr. Pope's Essay on Criticism, the Reader will soon see, is a regular piece: And a very learned Critic has lately shewn, that Horace had the same attention to method in his Art of Poetry.
VER. 1.
'Tis hard to say, etc.]The Poem opens [from ℣ 1 to 9.] with shewing the use and seasonableness of the subject. Its use, from the greater mischief in wrong Criticism than in ill Poetry, this only tiring that misleading the reader: Its season|ableness, from the growing number of false Critics, which now vastly exceeds that of bad Poets.
VER. 9.
'Tis with our judgments, etc.]The author having
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shewn us the expediency of his subject, the Art of Criticism, next inquires [from ℣ 8 to 15] into the necessary Qualities of a true Critic: And observes first, that JUDGMENT, simply and alone, is not sufficient to constitute this character, because Judg|ment, like the artificial measures of Time, goes different, and yet each relies upon his own. The reason is conclusive; and the similitude extremely just. For Judgment, when alone, is always regulated, or at least much inflenced by custom, fashion, and habit; and never certain and constant but when sounded upon TASTE: which is the same in the Critic, as GENIUS in the Poet: both are derived from Heaven, and like the Sun (the natural measure of Time) always constant and equal.
Nor need we wonder that Judgment alone will not make a Critic in poetry, when we see that it will not make a Poet. And on examination we shall find, that Genius and Taste are but one and the same faculty, differently exerting itself under different names, in the two prosessions of Poet and Critic. For the Art of Poetry consists in selecting, out of all those images which present themselves to the fancy, such of them as are truly poetical: And the Art of Criticism in judiciously discerning, and fully relishing what it finds so selected. 'Tis the same opera|tion of the mind in both cases, and consequently, exerted by the same faculty. All the difference is, that in the Poet this fa|culty is eminently joined with a bright imagination, and exten|sive comprehension, which provide stores for the selection, and can form that selection, by proportioned parts, into a regular whole: In the Critic, with a solid judgment and accurate discern|ment; which penetrate into the causes of an excellence, and can shew that excellence in all its variety of lights. Longinus had taste in an eminent degree; so this, which is indeed common to all true Critics, our Author makes his distinguishing character,
Thee, bold Longinus! all the Nine inspire, And bless their Critic with a Poet's fire.
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VER. 15.
Let such teach others, etc.]But it is not enough that the Critic hath these natural endowments to entitle him to the exercise of his Art, he ought, as our Author shews us [from ℣ 14 to 19] to give a further test of his qualification, by some acquired talents: And this on two accounts: 1. Because the of|fice of a Critic is an exercise of Authority. 2. Because he being naturally as partial to his Judgment as the Poet is to his Wit, his partiality would have nothing to correct it, as that of the per|son judged hath. Therefore some test is reasonable; and the best and most unexceptionable is his having written well himself, an approved remedy against Critical partiality; and the surest means of so maturing the Judgment, as to reap with glory what Longinus calls the last and most perfect fruits of much study and experience. Η ΓΑΡ ΤΩΝ ΛΟΓΩΝ ΚΡΙΣΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΗΣ ΕΣΤΙ ΠΕΙΡΑΣ ΤΕΛΕΥΤΑΙΟΝ ΕΠΙΓΕΝΝΗΜΑ.
VER. 19.
Yet if we look, etc.]But having been so free with this fundamental quality of Criticism, Judgment, as to charge it with inconstancy and partiality, and as often warped by custom and affection; that this may not be mistaken, he next explains [from ℣ 18 to 36.) the nature of Judgment, and the accidents
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occasioning those disorders before objected to it. He owns, that the seeds of Judgment are indeed sown in the minds of most men, but by ill culture, as it springs up, it generally runs wild: either on the one hand, by false knowledge which pedants call Philo|logy; or by false reasoning which Philosophers call School-learn|ing: Or on the other, by false wit which is not regulated by sense; or by false politeness which is solely regulated by the fa|shion. Both these sorts, who have their Judgments thus doubly
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depraved, the poet observes, are naturally turned to censure and reprehension; only with this difference, that the Dunce always affects to be on the reasoning, and the Fool on the laughing side.—And thus, at the same time, our author proves the truth of his introductory observation, that the number of bad Critics is vastly superior to that of bad Poets.
VER. 36.
Some have at first for Wits, etc.]The poet having enumerated, in this account of the nature of Judgment and its
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various depravations, the several sorts of bad Critics, and ranked them into two general Classes; as the first sort, namely the men spoiled by false learning, are but few in comparison of the other, and likewise come less within his main view (which is poetical Criticism) but keep groveling at the bottom amongst words and letters, he thought it here sufficient just to have mentioned them, proposing to do them right elsewhere. But the men spoiled by false taste are innumerable; and These are his proper concern: He therefore, from ℣ 35 to 46. sub-divides them again into the two classes of the volatile and heavy: He describes in few words the quick progress of the One thro' Criticism, from false wit to plain solly, where they end; and the fixed station of the Other between the confines of both; who under the name of Wit|••ings, have neither end nor measure. A kind of half formed creature from the equivocal generation of vivacity and dulness, like those on the banks of Nile, from heat and mud.
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VER. 46.
But you who seek, etc.]Our author having thus far, by way of INTRODUCTION, explained the nature, use, and abuse of Criticism, in a figurative description of the qua|lities and characters of Critics, proceeds now to deliver the pre|cepts of the Art. The first of which, from ℣ 47 to 68. is, that he who sets up for a Critic should previously examine his own strength, and see how far he is qualified for the exercise of his profession. He puts him in a way to make this discovery, in that admirable direction given ℣ 51.
AND MARK THAT POINT WHERE SENSE AND DULNESS MEET.He had shewn above, that Judgment, without Taste or Genius, is equally incapable of making a Critic or a Poet: In whatsoever subject then the Critic's Taste no longer accompanies his Judg|ment, there he may be assured he is going out of his depth. This our author finely calls,
that point where sense and dulness meet.And immediately adds the REASON of his precept; the Author of Nature having so constituted the mental faculties, that one of them can never excel but at the expence of another.
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From this state and ordination of the mental faculties, and the influence and effects they have one on another, our Poet draws this CONSEQUENCE, that no one genius can excell in more than one Art or Science. The consequence shews the necessity of the precept, just as the premisses, from which it is drawn, shew the reasonableness of it.
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VER. 68.
First follow Nature, etc]The Critic observing the directions here given, and finding himself qualified for his office, is shewn next how to exercise it. And as he was to attend to Nature for a Call, so he is first and principally to follow her when called. And here again in this, as in the foregoing pre|cept, the poet [from ℣ 67 to 88.] shews both the fitness and the necessity of it. It's fitness, 1. Because Nature is the source of poetic Art; that Art being only a representation of Nature, who is its great exemplar and original. 2. Because Nature is the end of Art; the design of poetry being to convey the knowledge of
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Nature in the most agreeable manner. 3. Because Nature is the test of Art, as she is unerring, constant, and still the same. Hence the poet observes, that as Nature is the source, she con|veys life to Art: As she is the end, she conveys force to it, for the force of any thing arises from its being directed to its end: And, as she is the test, she conveys beauty to it, for every thing acquires beauty by its being reduced to its true standard. Such is the sense of those two important lines,
Life, force, and beauty must to all impart, At once the source, and end, and test of Art.We now come to the necessity of the Precept. The two great constituent qualities of a Composition, as such, are Art and Wit: But neither of these attains perfection, 'till the first be hid, and the other judiciously restrained; which is only then when Na|ture is exactly followed; for then Art never makes a parade, nor can Wit commit an extravagance. Art, while it adheres to Nature, and has so large a fund in the resources which Nature supplies, disposes every thing with so much ease and simplicity, that we see nothing but those natural images it works with, while itself stands unobserv'd behind: But when Art leaves Na|ture, deluded either by the bold extravagance of Fancy, or the quaint odnesses of Fashion, she is then obliged at every step to come forward, in a painful or pompous ostentation, in order to cover, to soften, or to regulate the shocking disproportion of unnatural images. In the first case, the poet compares Art to the Soul within, informing a beauteous Body; but we general|ly find it, in the last, only like the outward Habit, bolstering up, by the Taylor's skill, the defects of a mis-shapen one.—As to
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Wit, it might perhaps be imagined that this needed only Judg|ment to govern it: But, as he well observes,
Wit and Judgment often are at strife, Tho' meant each other's aid, like Man and Wife.They want therefore some friendly Mediator or Reconciler, which is Nature: And in attending to her, the Judgment will learn where to comply with the charms of Wit, and the Wit how to obey the sage directions of Judgment.
VER. 88.
Those Rules of old etc.]Having thus, in his first precept, to follow Nature, settled Criticism on its true bottom; he proceeds to shew what assistance may be had from Art. But
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lest this should be thought to draw the Critic from the founda|tion where he had before fixed him, he previously observes [from ℣ 87 to 92] that those Rules of Art, which he is now about to recommend to his study, were not invented by the Imagina|tion, but discovered in the book of Nature: And that, there|fore, tho' they may seem to restrain Nature by Laws, yet, as they are laws of her own making, the Critic is still properly in the very liberty of Nature. Those Rules the ancient Critics borrowed from the Poets, who received them immediately from Nature,
Just Precepts thus srom great Examples giv'n, These drew from them what they deriv'd from Heav'n;and are both therefore to be well studied.
VER. 92.
Hear how learn'd Greece, etc.]He speaks of the ancient Critics first, and with great judgment, as the previous knowledge of them is necessary for reading the Poets, with that fruit which the intent here proposed requires. But having, in the previous observation, sufficiently explained the nature of ancient Criticism, he enters on the subject [treated of from ℣ 91 to 118] with a sublime description of its End; which was to
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illustrate the beauties of the best Writers, in order to excite others to an emulation of their excellence. From the admiration which these Ideas raise in him, the poet is naturally brought back to reflect on the degeneracy of modern Criticism: And as the restoring the Art to its original integrity and splendor is the great purpose of his poem, he first takes notice of those, who seem not to understand that Nature is exhaustless, that new mo|dels of good writing may be produced in every age, and con|sequently new rules may be formed from these models in the same manner as the old Critics formed theirs, from the writings of the ancient Poets: but these men wanting art and ability to form these new rules, are content to receive, and file up for use, the old ones of Aristotle, Quintilian, Longinus, Horace, etc. with the same vanity and boldness that Apothecaries practise with their Doctors bills: And thus rashly applying them to new Originals (cases which they did not hit) it was no more in their power than their inclination to imitate the candid practice of the An|cients, when
The gen'rous Critic fann'd the Poet's fire, And taught the world with reason to admire.
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For, as Ignorance, when joined with Humility produces stu|pid admiration, on which account it is so commonly observed to be the mother of Devotion and blind homage; so when joined with Vanity (as it always is in bad Critics) it gives birth to every iniquity of impudent abuse and slander. See an example (for want of a better) in a late worthless and now forgotten thing, called the Life of Socrates. Where the head of the Author (as a man of wit observed, on reading the book) has just made a shift to do the office of a Camera obscura, and represent things in an inverted order; himself above, and Sprat, Rollin, Voltaire, and every other Author of reputation, below.
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VER. 118.
You then whose judgment etc.]He comes next to the ancient Poets, the other and more intimate commentators of Nature. And shews [from ℣ 117 to 141.] that the study of These must indispensably follow that of the ancient Critics, as they furnish us with what the Critics, who only give us general rules, cannot supply: while the study of a great original Poet, in
His Fable, Subject, scope in ev'ry page; Religion, Country, genius of his Age;will help us to those particular rules, which only can conduct us
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safely through every considerable work we undertake to exa|mine; and, without which, we may cavil indeed, as the poet truly observes, but can never criticize. We might as well sup|pose that Vitruvius's book alone would make a perfect Judge of Architecture, without the knowledge of some great master-piece of science, such as the Rotonda at Rome, or the Temple of Mi|nerva at Athens; as that Aristotle's should make a perfect Judge of wit, without the study of Homer and Virgil. These there|fore he principally recommends to complete the Critic in his Art. But as the latter of these Poets has, by superficial judges, been considered rather as a copyer of Homer, than an original, our Author obviates that common error, and shews it to have arisen (as often error does) from a truth, viz. that Homer and Nature were the same; and how that the ambitious young Poet, though he scorned to stoop at any thing short of Nature, when he came to understand this great truth, had the prudence to contemplate Nature in the place where she was seen to most ad|vantage, collected in all her charms in the clear mirror of Ho|mer. Hence it would follow, that, though Virgil studied Na|ture,
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yet the vulgar reader would believe him to be a copier of Homer; and though he copied Homer, yet the judicious reader would see him to be an imitator of Nature: the finest praise which any one, who came after Homer, could receive.
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VER. 141.
Some beauties yet no Precepts can declare, etc.]Our Author, in these two general precepts for studying Nature and her Commentators, having considered Poetry as it is, or may be reduced to Rule; lest this should be mistaken as sufficient to attain PERFECTION either in writing or judging, he proceeds [from ℣ 140 to 201.] to point up to those sublimer beauties which Rules will never reach, that is, enable us either to exe|cute or taste: and which rise so high above all precept as not even to be described by it; but being entirely the gift of Heaven, Art and Reason have no further share in their production than just to moderate their operations. These Sublimities of Poetry, like the Mysteries of Religion (some of which are above Rea|son, and some contrary to it) may be divided into two sorts, such as are above Rules, and such as are contrary to them.
VER. 146.
If, where the rules etc.]The first sort our author
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describes [from ℣ 145 to 158.] and shews, that where a great beauty is in the Poet's view which no stated Rules will direct him how to reach, there, as the purpose of rules is only to pro|mote an end like this, a lucky Licence will supply the want of them: nor can the Critic fairly object to it, since this Li|cence, for the reason given above, has the proper sorce and au|thority of a Rule.
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VER. 159.
Great Wits sometimes may gloriously offend, etc.]He describes next the second sort, the beauties against rule. And even here, as he observes [from ℣ 158 to 169] the of|fense is so glorious, and the fault so sublime, that the true Critic will not dare either to censure or reform them. Yet still the Poet is never to abandon himself to his Imagination: the rules our author lays down for his conduct in this respect, are these: 1. That though he transgress the letter of some one particular precept, yet that he still adhere to the end or spirit of them all; which end is the creation of one uniform perfect Whole. And 2. That he have, in each instance, the authority of the dispens|ing power of the Ancients to plead for him. These rules observ|ed, this licence will be seldom used, and only when he is com|pelled by need: which will disarm the Critic, and screen the trans|gressor from his laws.
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VER. 169.
I know there are, etc.]But as some modern Critics have had the presumption to say, that this last rule is only justi|fying one fault by another, our author goes on [from ℣ 168 to 181] to vindicate the Ancients; and to shew that this cen|sure proceeds from rank Ignorance. As where their partial Judgment cannot see that this licence is sometimes necessary for the symmetry and proportion of a perfect whole, from the point, and in the light wherein it must be viewed: or, where their hasty Judgment will not give them time to discover, that a deviation from rule is for the sake of attaining some great and admirable purpose.—These observations are further useful as they tend to give modern Critics an humbler opinion of their own abilities, and an higher of the Authors they undertake to criticize. On which account He concludes with a fine reproof of that common proverb perpetually in the mouths of Critics, quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus; misunderstanding the sense of Horace, and taking quandoque for aliquando:
Those oft are stratagems which errors seem, Nor is it Homer nods, but we that dream.
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VER. 181.
Still green with bays, etc.]But now fired with the name of Homer, and transported with the contemplation of those beauties which a cold Critic can neither see nor conceive, the Poet [from ℣ 180 to 201.] breaks into a rapturous exclama|tion on the rare felicity of those few Ancients who have risen superior over time and accidents: And, as it were disdaining any longer to reason with his Critics, offers this to them as the surest confutation of their censures. Then with the humility of a supplicant at the shrine of Immortals, and the Sublimity of a Poet participating of their fire, he turns again to these ancient worthies, and apostrophises their Manes:
Hail, Bards triumphant! etc.
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VER. 200.
T' admire superior sense, and doubt their own.]This line concludes the first division of the Poem; in which we
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see the subject of the first and second part, and likewise the con|nexion they have with one another. It serves likewise to in|troduce the second. The effect of studying the Ancients, as hi|therto recommended, would be the admiration of their superior sense; which, if it will not of itself dispose Moderns to a diffi|dence of their own (one of the great uses, as well as natural fruits of that study) the poet, to help forward their modesty, in his second part shews them (in a regular deduction of the causes and effects of wrong Judgment) their own image and amiable turn of mind.
VER. 201.
Of all the Causes, etc.]Having, in the first part, delivered Rules for perfecting the Art of Criticism, the second is employ'd in explaining the Impediments to it. The order of the two parts is judicious. For the causes of wrong Judgment be|ing Pride, superficial Learning, a bounded Capacity, and Partia|lity; Those to whom this part is principally addressed, would not readily be brought either to see the malignity of the causes, or to own themselves concerned in the effects, had not the Author previously both enlightened and convicted them, by the fore|going observations, on the vastness of Art, and narrowness of Wit; the extensive study of human Nature and Antiquity; and the Characters of ancient Poetry and Criticism; the natural reme|dies to the four epidemic disorders he is now endeavouring to redress.
Ibid.
Of all the causes, etc.]The first cause of wrong Judg|ment is PRIDE. He judiciously begins with it, [from ℣ 200 to 215] as on other accounts, so on this, that it is the very thing which gives modern Criticism its character; whose com|plexion is abuse and censure. He calls it the vice of Fools; by whom are not meant those to whom Nature has given no Judg|ment (for he is here speaking of what misleads the Judgment) but those in whom education and study has made no improve|ment; as appears from the happy similitude of an ill-nourish'd
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body; where the same words which express the cause, expres. likewise the nature of pride:
For as in bodies, thus in souls, we find, What wants in blood and spirits, swell'd with wind.'Tis the business of reason, he tells us, to dispel the cloud which pride throws over the mind: But the mischief is, that the rays of reason, diverted by self-love, sometimes gild this cloud, instead of dissipating it. So that the Judgment, by false lights reflected back upon itself, is still apt to be a little dazzled, and to mis|take its object. He therefore advises to call in still more helps:
Trust not yourself; but your defects to know, Make use of ev'ry Friend—and ev'ry Foe.Both the beginning and conclusion of this precept are remarkable. The question is of the means to subdue Pride: He directs the Critic to begin with a distrust of himself; and this is Modesty, the first mortification of Pride: And then to seek the assistance of others, and make use even of an Enemy; and this is Humility, the last mortification of Pride: For when a man can once bring himself to submit to profit by an enemy, he has either already quite subdued his Vanity, or is in a fair way of so doing.
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VER. 215.
A little learning, etc.]We must here remark the Poet's skill in his disposition of the causes obstructing true Judg|ment. Each general cause which is laid down first, has its own particular cause in that which follows. Thus, the second cause of wrong Judgment, SUPERFICIAL LEARNING, is what gives birth to that critical Pride, which he mentioned first.
VER. 216.
Drink deep, etc.]Nature and Learning are the pole stars of all true Criticism: But Pride hinders the sight of Nature; and a smattering of letters takes away all sense of the want of Learning. To avoid this ridiculous situation, the poet [from ℣ 214 to 233] advises, either to drink deep, or not to taste at all; for the least sip is enough to make a bad Critic, while even a moderate draught can never make a good one. And yet the labours and difficulties of drinking deep are so great that a young author,
"Fir'd with ideas of fair Italy,"and am|bitious to snatch a palm from Rome, engages in an undertak|ing as arduous almost as that of Hannibal: Finely illustrated by the similitude of an unexperienced traveller penetrating thro' the Alps.
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VER. 233.
A perfect Judge, etc.]The third cause of wrong Judgment is a NARROW CAPACITY; the natural and certain cause of the foregoing defect, acquiescence in superficial learning. This bounded Capacity the poet shews [from 232 to 384.] be|trays itself two ways; in the matter, and in the manner of the
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work criticised. In the matter by judging by parts; or by having one favorite part to a neglect of all the rest: In the manner, by confining the regard only to conceit, or language, or numbers. This is our Poet's order; and we shall follow him as it leads us; only just observing one great beauty which runs thro' this part of the poem; it is, that under each of these heads of wrong Judgment, he has intermixed excellent precepts for right. We shall take notice of them as they occur.
He exposes the folly of judging by parts very artfully, not by a direct description of that sort of Critic, but of his opposite, a perfect Judge, etc. Nor is the elegance of this conversion in|ferior to the art of it; for as, in poetic style, one word or figure is still put for another, in order to catch new lights from dif|ferent images, and to reflect them back upon the subject in hand; so, in poetic matter, one person or thing may be advan|tageously employed for another, with the same elegance of re|presentation. It is observable that our Author makes it almost the necessary consequence of judging by parts, to find fault: And this not without much discernment: For the several parts of a compleat Whole, when seen only singly, and known only indepen|dently,
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must always have the appearance of irregularity; often, of deformity: Because the Poet's design being to create a result|ive beauty from the artful assemblage of several various parts into one natural whole; those parts must be fashioned with re|gard to their mutual relations in the stations they occupy in that whole, from whence, the beauty required is to arise: But that regard will occasion so unreducible a form in each part, when considered singly, as to present a very mis-shapen appearance.
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VER. 253.
Whoever thinks a faultless piece to see,]He shews next [from ℣ 252 to 263] that to fix our censure on single parts tho' they happen to want an exactness consistent enough with their relation to the rest, is even then very unjust: And for these reasons, 1. Because it implies an expectation of a faultless piece, which is a vain imagination: 2. Because no more is to be expected of any work than that it fairly attains its end: But the end may be attained, and yet these trivial faults committed: Therefore, in spight of such faults, the work will merit the praise due to that which attains its end. 3. Because sometimes a great beauty is not to be procured, nor a notorious blemish to be avoided, but by suffering one of these minute and trivial errors. 4. And laftly, because the generous neglect of them is a praise; as it is the indication of a Genius, busied about greater matters.
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VER. 263.
Most Critics, fond of some subservient art, etc.]II. The second way in which a narrow capacity, as it relates to the matter, shews itself, is judging by a favorite Part. The au|thor has placed this [from ℣ 262 to 285] after the other of judging by parts, with great propriety, it being indeed a natural consequence of it. For when men have once left the whole to turn their attention to the separate parts, that regard and reverence due only to a whole is fondly transferred to one or other of its parts. And thus we see that Heroes themselves as well as Heromakers, even Kings as well as Poets and Critics, when they chance never to have had, or long to have lost the idea of that which is the only legitimate object of their office, the care and conservation of the whole, are wont to devote themselves to the service of some favorite part, whether it be love of money, mi|litary glory, despotic power, etc. And all, as our Author says on this occasion,
to one lov'd Folly sacrifice.
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This general misconduct much recommends that maxim in good Poetry and Politics, to give a principal attention to the whole; a maxim which our author has elswhere shewn to be equally true likewise in Morals and Religion; as being founded in the order of things: For, if we examine, we shall find it arise from this imbecillity of our nature, that the mind must always have some|thing to rest upon, to which the passions and affections may be interestingly directed. Nature prompts us to seek it in the most worthy object; and common sense points out to a Whole or System: But Ignorance, and the false lights of the Passions, confound and dazzle us; we stop short, and before we get to a Whole, take up with some Part; which from thence becomes our Fa|vourite.
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VER. 285.
Thus Critics of less judgment than caprice, Curious not knowing, not exact but nice,Form short Ideas, etc.]2. He concludes his observations on those two sorts of judges by parts, with this general reflexion.—The curious not knowing are the first sort, who judge by parts, and with a microscopic sight (as he says elsewhere) examine bit by bit: The not exact but nice, are the second, who judge by a favourite part, and talk of a whole to cover their sondness for a part; as Philosophers do of principles, in order to obtrude their notions or opinions for them.
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But the fate common to both is, to be governed by caprice and not by Judgment, and consequently, to form short ideas, or to have ideas short of truth: Tho' the latter sort, thro' a fondness to their favorite part, imagine that they comprehend the whole in epitome: As the famous Hero of La Mancha, mentioned just before, used to maintain, that Knight Errantry comprised with|in itself the quintessence of all Science, civil and military.
VER. 289.
Some to Conceit alone, etc.]We come now to that second sort of bounded capacity, which betrays itself in the man|ner of the work criticised. And this our Author prosecutes from ℣ 288 to 384. These are again subdivided into divers classes.
Ibid.
Some to Conceit alone, etc.]The first from ℣ 288 to 305.] are those who confine their attention solely to Conceit or Wit. And here again the Critic by parts, offends doubly in the manner, just as he did in the matter: For he not only confines his atten|tion
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to a part, when it should be extended to the whole; but he likewise judges salsely of that part. And this, like the other, is unavoidable, as the parts in the manner, bear the same close relation to the whole, that the parts in the matter do; to which whole the ideas of this Critic have never yet extended. Hence it is, that our author, speaking here of those who confine their attention solely to Conceit or Wit, describes the two species of true and false Wit; because they not only mistake a wrong dis|position of true Wit for a right, but likewise false Wit for true: He describes false Wit first, from ℣ 288 to 297.
Some to Conceit alone, etc.Where the reader may observe our Author's skill in representing, in a description of salse Wit, the false disposition of the true, as the Critic by parts is apt to fall into both these errors.
He next describes true Wit, from 296 to 305.
True Wit is Nature to advantage dress'd, etc.And here again the reader may observe the same beauty, not on|ly an explanation of true Wit, but likewise of the right disposition of it; which the poet illustrates, as he did the wrong, by ideas taken from the art of Painting.
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VER. 305.
Others for Language, etc.]He proceeds secondly to those narrow-minded Critics, whose whole concern turns upon Language, and shews [from ℣ 304 to 337.] that this qua|lity, where it holds the principal place, deserves no commenda|tion; 1. Because it excludes qualities more essential. And when the abounding Verbiage has excluded the sense, the writer has nothing to do but to gild over the defect, by giving his words all the false colouring in his power.
2. He shews, that the Critic who busies himself with this quality alone, is altogether unable to make a right Judgment of it; because true Expression is only the dress of Thought; and so must be perpetually varied according to the subject, and man|ner
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of thinking. But those who never concern themselves with the Sense, can form no judgment of the correspondence between that and the Language:
Expression is the dress of thought, and still Appears more decent as more suitable, etc.Now as these Critics are ignorant of this correspondence, their whole judgment in Language is reduced to the examination of single words; of which, such as are to his taste, are so only in proportion as they smack of Antiquity: On which our author has therefore bestowed a little raillery; concluding with a short and proper direction concerning the use of words, so far as re|gards their novelty and ancientry.
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VER. 337.
But most by Numbers judge, etc.]The last sort are those [from ℣ 336 to 384.] whose ears are attached only to the Harmony of a poem. Of which they judge as ignorantly and as perversely as the other sort did of Eloquence; and for the very same reason. He first describes that false Harmony with which they are so much captivated; and shews, that it is wretchedly flat and unvaried: For
Smooth or rough with them is right or wrong.He then describes the true. 1. As it is in itself, constant; with a happy mixture of strength and sweetness, in contradiction to the roughness and flatness of false Harmony: And 2. as it is
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varied, in compliance to the subject, where the sound becomes an who to the sense, so far as is consistent with the preservation of numbers; in contradiction to the monotony of false Harmony: Of this he gives us, in the delivery of his precepts, four fine ex|amples of smoothness, roughness, slowness, and rapidity. The first use of this correspondence of the sound to the sense, is to aid the fancy in acquiring a perfecter and more lively image of the thing represented. A second and nobler, is to calm and sub|due the turbulent and selfish passions, and to raise and warm the beneficent: Which he illustrates in the famous adventure of Timotheus and Alexander: where, in referring to Mr. Dryden's Ode on that subject, he turns it to a high compliment on that great poet.
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VER. 384.
Avoid Extremes, etc.]Our Author is now come to the last cause of wrong judgment, PARTIALITY; the pa|rent of the immediately preceding cause, a bounded capacity: Nothing so much narrowing and contracting the mind as pre|judices entertained for or against things or persons. This, therefore, as the main root of all the foregoing, he prosecutes at large from ℣ 383 to 473.
First, to ℣ 394. he previously exposes that capricious turn of mind, which, by running men into Extremes, either of praise or dispraise, lays the foundation of an habitual partiality. He cautions therefore both against one and the other; and shews that excess of Praise is the mark of a bad taste; and excess of Cen|sure, of a bad digestion.
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VER. 394.
Some foreign writers, etc.]Having explained the disposition of mind which produces an habitual partiality, be preceeds to expose this partiality in all the shapes in which it ap|peats both amongst the unlearned and the learned.
I. In the unlearned, it is seen, first, In an unreasonable fond|ness for, or aversion to our own or foreign, to ancient or modern writers. And as it is the mob of unlearned readers he is here speaking of, he exposes their solly in a very apposite similitude:
Thus Wit, like Faith, by each Man is apply'd To one small sect, and all are damn'd beside.But he shews [from ℣ 397 to 408] that these Critics have as wrong a notion of Reason as those Bigots have of God: For that Genius is not confined to times or climates; but, as the common gist of Nature, is extended throughout all ages and countries: That indeed this intellectual light, like the material light of the Sun itself, may not shine at all times, in every place, with equal splendor; but be sometimes clouded with popular ig|norance; and sometimes again eclipsed by the discountenance of Princes; yet it shall still recover itself; and, by breaking thro' the strongest of these impediments, manifest the eternity of its nature.
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VER. 408.
Some ne'er advance a Judgment of their own]A second instance of unlearned partiality, he shews [from ℣ 407 to 424.] is mens going always along with the cry, as having no fixed or well grounded principles whereon to raise any judgment of their own. A third is reverence for names; of which sort, as he well observes, the worst and vilest are the idolizers of names of quality; whom therefore he stigmatizes as they deserve. Our
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author's temper as well as judgment is here very observable, in throwing this species of partiality amongst the unlearned Critics: His affection for letters would not suffer him to conceive, that any learned Critic could ever fall to so low a prostitution.
VER. 424.—
The Vulgar thus—As oft the Learn'd—]II. He comes, in the second place [from ℣ 423 to 452] to consider the instances of partiality in the learned. 1. The first is Singula|rity. For, as want of principles, in the unlearned, necessitates them to rest on the general judgment as always right; so adhe|rence to false principles (that is, to notions of their own) mis|leads the learned into the other extreme, of supposing the gene|ral
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judgment always wrong. And as, before, the Poet com|pared those to Bigots, who made true faith to consist in believ|ing after others; so he compares these to Schismaticks, who make it to consist in believing as no one ever believed before. Which folly he marks with a lively stroke of humour in the turn of the thought:
So Schismatics the plain believers quit, And are but damn'd for having too much Wit.2. The second is Novelty. And as this proceeds sometimes from fondness, sometimes from vanity; he compares the one to the passion for a mistress; and the other, to the pride of being in fa|shion: But the excuse common to both is, the daily improvement of their Judgment.
Ask them the cause, they're wiser still they say.Now as this is a plausible pretence for their inconstancy; and our author has himself afterwards laid down the like thought, in a precept for a remedy against obstinacy and pride, where he says, ℣ 570.
But you with pleasure own your errors past, And make each day a critic on the last,he has been careful, by the turn of the expression in this place, to shew the difference. For Time, considered only as duration, vitiates as frequently as it improves: Therefore to expect wis|dom as the necessary attendant of length of years, unrelated to long experience, is vain and delusive. This he illustrates by a remarkable example; where we see Time, instead of becoming wiser, destroying good letters, to substitute school divinity in their place.—The genius of which kind of learning; the character of its professors; and the sate, which, sooner or later, always at|tends whatsoever is wrong or false, the poet sums up in those four lines;
Faith, Gospel, all seem'd made to be disputed, etc.
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And in conclusion, he observes, that perhaps this mischief, from love of novelty, might not be so great, did it not, with the Critic, infect Writers likewise; who, when they find their rea|ders disposed to take ready Wit on the standard of current Folly, never trouble themselves to make better payment.
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VER. 452.
Some valuing those of their own side or mind, etc.]3. The third and last instance of partiality in the learned, is Party and Faction. Which is consider'd from ℣ 451 to 474. where he shews how men of this turn deceive themselves when they load a writer of their own side with commendation. They fancy they are paying tribute to merit, when they are only sa|crificing to self-love. But this is not the worst. He further shews, that this party spirit has often very ill effects on Science
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itself; while, in support of Faction, it labours to depress some rising Genius, that was, perhaps, raised by nature, to enlighten his age and country. By which he would insinuate, that all the base and viler passions seek refuge, and find support in party madness.
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VER. 474.
Be thou the first, etc.]The poet having now gone thro' the last cause of wrong Judgment, and root of all the rest, PARTIALITY; and ended it with the highest instances of it, in party-rage and envy; this affords him an opportunity [from ℣ 473 to 560.] of closing his second division in the most graceful manner, by concluding from the premisses, and calling upon the TRUE CRITIC to be careful of his charge, which is the protec|tion and support of Wit. For, the defence of it from malevo|lent censure is its true protection; and the illustration of its beauties, its true support.
He first shews, the Critic ought to do this service without delay: And on these motives. 1. Out of regard to himself: For there is some merit in giving the world notice of an excellence; but none at all in pointing, like an Idiot, to that which has been long in the admiration of men. 2. Out of regard to the Poem: For the short duration of modern works requires they should begin
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to enjoy their existence early. He compares the life of modern Wit, and of the ancient, which survives in an universal language, to the difference between the Patriarchal age and our own: And observes, that while the ancient writings live for ever, as it were in brass and marble, the modern are but like Paintings, which, of how masterly a hand soever, have no sooner gained their requisite perfection by the incorporating, softening, and ripening of their tints, which they do in a very few years, but they begin to fade and die away. 3. Lastly, our author shews, that the Critic ought to do this service out of regard to the Poet; when he considers the slender dowry the Muse brings along with her: In youth 'tis only a short lived vanity; and in maturer years an accession of care and labour, in proportion to the weight of Re|putation to be sustained, and of the increase of Envy to be oppo|sed: And concludes his reasoning therefore on this head, with that pathetic and insinuating address to the Critic, from 508 to 524.
Ah! let not learning, etc.
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VER 527.
But if in noble minds some dregs remain, etc.]So far as to what ought to be the true Critic's principal study and employment. But if the four critical humour must needs have vent, he points to its right object; and shews [from ℣ 526 to 556.] how it may be usefully and innocently diverted. This is very observable; for our author makes spleen and disdain the characteristic of the false Critic, and yet here supposes them inherent in the true. But it is done with judgment, and a knowledge of nature. For as bitterness and acerbity in un|ripe fruits of the best kind are the foundation and capacity of that high spirit, race, and flavour which we find in them, when perfectly concocted by the heat and influence of the Sun; and which, without those qualities, would often gain no more by that influence than only a mellow insipidity: so spleen and disdain in the true Critic, improved by long study and experience, ripen into an exactness of Judgment and an elegance of Taste: But, lying in the false Critic remote from
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the influence of good letters, continue in all their first offensive harshness and astringency. The Poet therefore shews how, af|ter the exaltation of these qualities into their state of perfection, the very Dregs (which, tho' precipitated, may possibly, on some occasions, rise and ferment even in a noble mind) may be use|fully employed in branding OBSCENITY and IMPIETY. Of these he explains the rise and progress, in a beautiful picture of the different genius's of the reigns of Charles II. and William III. the former of which gave course to the most profligate luxury; the latter to a licentious impiety. These are the criminals the poet assigns over to the caustic hand of the Critic, but concludes however, from ℣ 556 to 561. with this necessary admonition, to take care not to be misled into unjust censure; either on the one hand, by a pharisaical niceness, or on the other by a con|sciousness of guilt. And thus the second division of his Essay ends: The judicious conduct of which is worthy our observa|tion. The subject of it are the causes of wrong Judgment: These he derives upwards from cause to cause, till he brings them to their source, an immoral partiality: For as he had, in the first part,
trac'd the Muses upward to their spring,and shewn them to be derived from Heaven, and the Offspring of virtue; so hath he here pursued this enemy of the Muses, the bad Critic, to his low original, in the arms of his nursing mother Immorality. This order naturally introduces, and at the same time shews the necessity of, the subject of the third and last division, which is, on the Morals of the Critic.
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VER. 561.
Learn then, etc.]We enter now on the third part, the MORALS of the Critic; included in CANDOUR, MO|DESTY, and GOOD-BREEDING. This third and last part is in two divisions. In the first of which [from ℣ 560 to 632.] he inculcates these morals by precept: In the second [from ℣ 631 to the end] by example. His first precept [from ℣ 562 to 567.] recommends CANDOUR, for its use to the Critic, and to the writer criticised.
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2. The second [from ℣ 566 to 573.] recommends MODESTY, which manifests itself by these four signs: 1. Silence where it doubts,
Be silent always when you doubt your sense;2. A seeming diffidence where it knows,
And speak, tho' sure, with seeming diffidence:3. A free confession of error where wrong,
But you with pleasure own your errors past,4. And a constant review and scrutiny even of those opinions which it still thinks right:
And make each day a Critic on the last.
3. The third [from ℣ 572 to 585.] recommends GOOD BREEDING, which will not force truth dogmatically upon men, as ignorant of it, but gently insinuates it into them, as not suf|ficiently attentive to it. But as men of breeding are apt to fall in|to two extremes, he prudently cautions against them. The one is a backwardness in communicating their knowledge, out of a false delicacy, and fear of being thought Pedants: The other, and much more common extreme in men of breeding, is a mean com|placence, which such as are worthy of your advice do not want to make it acceptable; for those can best bear reproof in par|ticular points, who best deserve commendation in general.
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VER. 585.
'Twere well might Critics, etc.]The poet having thus recommended, in these general rules of Conduct for the Judgment, the three critical Virtues to the heart; shews next [from ℣ 584 to 632.] on what three sort of Writers these Vir|tues, together with the advice conveyed under them, would be thrown away; and, which is worse, be repaid with obloquy and slander. These are the false Critic, the dull Man of Qua|lity, and the bad Poet; each of which incorrigible writers he hath very justly and exactly characterized.
But having drawn the last of them at large, and being always attentive to his main subject, which is, of writing and judging well, he re-assumes the character of the bad Critic (whom he had but touched upon before) to contrast him with the other; and makes the Characteristic common to both, to be a never|ceasing Repetition of their own impertinence.
The Poet,—still runs on in a raging vein, etc. ℣ 607, etc.
The Critic—with his own tongue still edifies his ears, ℣ 615, etc.
Page 201
VER. 631.
But where's the man, etc.]II. The second division of this last part, which we now come to, is of the Morals of Critics by example. For, having there drawn a picture of the false Critic, at large, he breaks out into an apostrophe, con|taining an exact and finished character of the true, which, at the same time, serves for an easy and proper introduction to this second division. For, having asked [from ℣ 631 to 644.] Where's the
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man, etc. he answers [from ℣ 643 to 682.] That he was to be found in the happier ages of Greece and Rome; in the persons of Aristotle and Horace, Dionysius and Petronius, Quintilian and Longinus. Whose features he has not only exactly delineated, but contrasted with a peculiar elegance; the profound science and logical method of Aristotle being opposed to the plain common sense of Horace, conveyed in a natural and familiar negligence; the study and refinement of Dionysius, to the gay and courtly ease of Petronius; and the gravity and minuteness of Quintilian, to the vivacity and general topics of Longinus. Nor has the Poet been less careful, in these examples, to point out their eminence in the several critical Virtues he so carefully inculcated in his precepts. Thus in Horace he particularizes his Candour, in Pe|tronius his Good Breeding, in Quintilian his free and copious In|struction, and in Longinus his noble Spirit.
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VER. 682.
Thus long succeeding Critics, etc.]The next pe|riod in which the true Critic (he tells us) appear'd, was at the revival and restoration of letters in the West. This occasions his giving a short history [from ℣ 683 to 710.] of the decline
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and re-establishment of arts and sciences in Italy. He shews that they both fell under the same enemy, despotic power; and that when both had made some little efforts to restore themselves, they were soon quite overwhelmed by a second deluge of another kind, Superstition; and a calm of Dulness finish'd upon Rome and Letters what the rage of Barbarism had begun:
A second deluge learning thus o'er-run, And the Monk finish'd what the Goth begun.When things had been long in this condition, and all recovery now appear'd desperate, it was a CRITIC, our author shews us for the honour of the Art he here teaches, who at length broke the charm of Dulness, dissipated the inchantment, and, like an|other Hercules, drove those cowl'd and hooded serpents from the Hesperian tree of knowledge, which they had so long guarded from human approach.
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VER. 694.
At length Erasmus, etc.]Nothing can be more artful than the application of this example; or more happy than the turn of compliment to this admirable man. To throw glory quite round his illustrious character, he makes it to be (as in fact it really was) by his assistance chiefly, that Leo was ena|bled to restore letters and the fine arts, in his Pontificate.
VER. 698.
But see each Muse in Leo's golden days]This pre|sents us with the second period in which the true Critic appear'd; of whom he has given us a perfect idea in the single example of Marcus Hieronymus Vida: For his subject being poetical Criti|cism, for the use principally of a critical Poet; his example is an eminent poetical Critic, who had had written of that Art in verse.
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VER. 710.
But soon by impious arms, etc.]This brings us to the third period, after learning had still travelled farther West; when the arms of the Emperor, in the sack of Rome by the duke of Bourbon, had driven it out of Italy, and forced it to pass the Mountains—The Examples he gives in this period, are of Boileau in France, and of the Lord Roscommon and the duke of Buckingham in England: And these were all Poets, as well as Critics in verse. It is true, the last instance is of one who was no eminent poet, the late Mr. Walsh. This small deviation might be well over-looked, was it only for its being a pious office to the memory of his friend: But it may be farther justified as it was an homage paid in particular to the MORALS of the Critic, no|thing being more amiable than the character here drawn of this excellent person. He being our Author's Judge and Censor, as
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well as Friend, it gives him a graceful opportunity to add himself to the number of the later Critics; and with a character of him|self, sustained by that modesty and dignity which it is so difficult to make consistent, this performance concludes.
I have given a short and plain account of the Essay on Criti|cism, concerning which I have but one thing more to acquaint the reader: That when he considers the Regularity of the plan, the masterly Conduct of each part, the penetration into Nature, and the compass of Learning, so conspicuous throughout, he should at the same time know, it was the work of an Author who had not attained the twentieth year of his age.
Page 140
NOTES.
VER. 15.
Let such teach others]
Qui scribit artificiose, ab aliis commode scripta facile intelligere poterit. Cic. ad Herenn. lib. 4.
De pictore, sculptore, fictore, nisi artifex, judicare non po|test. Pliny.P.
VER. 20.
Most have the seeds]
Omnes tacito quodam sensu, sine ulla arte, aut ratione, quae sint in artibus ac rationibus recta et prava dijudicant. Cic. de Orat. lib. iii.P.
Page 141
VER. 25.
So by false learning]
Plus sine doctrina prudentia, quam sine prudentia valet doctrina. Quint.P.
VER. 26, 27.
Some are bewilder'd, etc.]This thought is taken from Lord Rochester, but more decently expressed:
God never made a Coxcomb worth a groat, We owe that name to industry and arts.
Page 142
VER. 28.
In search of wit these lose their common sense,]This observation is extremely just. Search of wit is not only the oc|casion but the efficient cause of loss of common sense. For wit con|sisting in chusing out, and setting together, such ideas from whose likenesses pleasant pictures are made in the fancy; the Judgment, thro' an habitual search of Wit, loses by degrees its fa|culty of seeing the true relations of things; in which consists the exercise of common sense.
VER. 32.
All fools have still an itching to deride,And fain would be upon the laughing side.]The sentiment is just. And if Hobbes's account of laughter be true, that it arises from pride, we see the reason of it. The expression too is fine, it alludes to the condition of Idiots and natural-fools who are always on the grin.
Page 143
VER. 43.
Their generation's so equivocal:]It is sufficient that a principle of philosophy has been generally received, whether it be true or false, to justify a poet's use of it to set off his wit. But to recommend his argument he should be cautious how he uses any but the true. For falsehood, when it is set too near, will tarnish the truth he would recommend. Besides, the ana|logy between natural and moral truth makes the principles of true Philosophy the fittest for his use. Our Poet has been care|ful in observing this rule.
Page 144
VER. 51.
And mark that point where sense and dullness meet.]Besides the peculiar sense explained above in the comment, the words have still a more general meaning, and caution us against going on, when our Ideas begin to grow obscure; as we are
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apt to do, tho' that obscurity is a monition that we should leave off; for it arises either thro' our small acquaintance with the subject, or the incomprehensibility of its nature. In which circumstances a genius will always write as heavily as a dunce. An observation well worth the attention of all profound writers.
VER. 56.
Thus in the soul while memory prevails, The solid pow'r of understanding fails: Where beams of warm imagination play, The memory's soft sigures melt away.]These observations are collected from an intimate knowledge of human nature. The cause of that languor and heaviness in the understanding, which is almost inseparable from a very strong and tenacious memory, seems to be a want of the proper exercise and activity of that power; the understanding being rather passive while the memory is cultivating. As to the other ap|pearance,
Page 146
the decay of memory by the vigorous exercise of Fan|cy, the poet himself seems to have intimated the cause of it in the epithet he has given to the Imagination. For if, according to the Atomic Philosophy, the memory of things be preserved in a chain of ideas, produced by the animal spirits moving in continued trains; the force and rapidity of the Imagination per|petually breaking and dissipating the links of this chain by form|ing new associations, must necessarily weaken and disorder the recollective faculty.
VER. 67.
Would all but stoop to what they understand.]The ex|pression is delicate, and implies what is very true, that most men think it a degradation of their genius to employ it in cultivating what lies level to their comprehension, but had rather exercise their ambition in subduing what is placed above it.
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VER. 88.
Those Rules of old, etc.]Cicero has, best of any one I know, explained what that is which reduces the wild and scattered parts of human knowledge into arts.—
Nihil est quod ad artem redigi possit, nisi ille prius, qui illa tenet, quorum artem instituere vult, habeat illam scientiam, ut ex iis rebus, quarum ars nondum sit, artem efficere possit.—Omnia fere, quae sunt conclusa nunc artibus, dispersa et dissipata quondam fuerunt, ut in Musicis, etc. Adhibita est igitur ars quaedam extrinsecus ex alio genere quodam, quod sibi totum PHILOSOPHI assumunt, quae rem dissolutam divul|samque conglutinaret, et ratione quadam constringeret. De Orat. l. i. c. 41, 2.
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VER. 98.
Just precepts]
Nec enim artibus editis factum est ut argumenta inveniremus, sed dicta sunt omnia antequam proe|ciperentur; mox ea scriptores observata et collecta ediderunt. Quintil.P.
Page 151
VER. 112.
Some on the leaves—Some drily plain.]The first, the Apes of those Italian Critics, who at the restoration of letters
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having found the classic writers miserably mangled by the hands of monkish Librarians, very commendably employed their pains and talents in restoring them to their native purity. The second, the plagiaries from the French, who had made some ad|mirable Commentaries on the ancient critics. But that acumen and taste, which separately constitute the distinct value of those two species of foreign Criticism, make no part of the character of these paltry mimics at home, described by our Poet in the following lines,
These leave the sense, their learning to display, And those explain the meaning quite away.Which species is the least hurtful, the Poet has enabled us to determine in the lines with which he opens his poem,
But of the two less dang'rous is th'offence To tire our patience than mislead our sense.From whence we conclude, that the reverend Mr. Upton was much more innocently employed when he quibbled upon Epicte|tus, than when he commented upon Shakespear.
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VER. 130.
When first young Maro etc.]
Virg. Eclog. vi.Cum canerem reges et proelia, Cynthius aurem Vellit.It is a tradition preserved by Servius, that Virgil began with writing a poem of the Alban and Roman affairs; which he found above his years, and descended first to imitate Theocritus on rural subjects, and afterwards to copy Homer in Heroic poetry. P.
Page 156
VER. 146.
If, where the rules etc.]
Neque enim rogationibus plebisve scitis sancta sunt ista Praecepta, sed hoc, quicquid est, Uti|litas excogitavit. Non negabo autem sic utile esse plerumque; verum si eadem illa nobis aliud suadebit Utilitas, hanc, relictis magistro|rum autoritatibus, sequemur. Quintil. lib. ii. cap. 13.P.
VER. 150.
Thus Pegasus, &c.]We have observed how the precepts for writing and judging are interwoven throughout the whole work. He first describes the sublime slight of a Poet, soaring above all vulgar bounds, to snatch a grace directly, which lies beyond the reach of a common adventurer. And af|terwards, the effect of that grace upon the true Critic: whom it penetrates with an equal rapidity; going the nearest way to his heart, without passing through his Judgment. By which is not meant that it could not stand the test of Judgment; but that, it being a beauty uncommon, and above rule, and the Judgment habituated to determine only by rule, it makes its direct application to the Heart; which once gained, soon opens and enlarges the Judgment, whose concurrence (it being now set above forms) is easily procured. That this is the poet's sub|lime conception appears from the concluding words:
and all its end at once attains.For Poetry doth not attain all its end, till it hath gained the Judgment as well as Heart.
Page 158
VER. 175.
A prudent chief etc.]
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
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〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉—Dion. Hal. De struct. orat.
VER. 180.
Nor is it Homer nods, but we that dream.]
Mo|deste, et circumspecto judicio de tantis viris pronunciandum est, ne quod (quod plerisque accidit) damnent quod non intelligunt. Ac si necesse est in alteram errare partem, omnia corum legentibus pla|cere, quam multa displicere maluerim. Quint.P.
VER. 183.
Secure from flames, from envy's fiercer rage,Destructive war, and all-involving age.]The Poet here alludes to the four great causes of the ravage amongst ancient writings: The destruction of the Alexandrine and Palatine libraries by fire; the fiercer rage of Zoilus and Maevius and their followers against Wit; the irruption of the Barbarians into the
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empire; and the long reign of Ignorance and Superstition in the cloisters.
VER. 189.
Hail, Bards triumphant!]There is a pleasantry in this title, which alludes to the state of warfare that all true Genius must undergo while here upon earth.
VER. 196.
The last]This word, spoken in his early youth, as it were by chance, seems to have been ominous.
Page 162
VER. 209.
Pride where Wit fails steps in to our defence,And fills up all the mighty void of sense.]A very sensible french wri|ter makes the following remark on this species of pride.
"Un homme qui sçait plusieurs Langues, qui entend les Auteurs
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Grecs et Latins, qui s'eleve même jusqu' à la dignité de SCHO|LIASTE; si cet homme venoit à peser son véritable mérite, il trouveroit souvent qu'il se réduit à avoir eu des yeux et de la mémoire, il se garderoit bien de donner le nom respectable de science à une érudition sans lumiere. Il y a une grande difference entre s'enrichir des mots ou des choses, entre alle|guer des autoritez ou des raisons. Si un homme pouvoit se surprendre à n' avoir que cette sorte de mérite, il en rougi|roit plûtôt que d'en être vain."
VER. 217.
There shallow draughts, etc.]The thought was taken from Lord Verulam, who applies it to more serious en|quiries.
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VER. 233.
A perfect Judge, etc.]
Diligenter legendum est, ac paene ad scribendi sollicitudinem: Nec per partes modo scrutanda sunt emnia, sed perlectus liber utique ex integro resumendus. Quin▪
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VER. 235.
Survey the Whole, nor seek slight faults to find,Where nature moves, and rapture warms the mind;]The second line, in apologizing for those faults which the first says should be overlooked, gives the reason of the precept. For when a writer's attention is fixed on a general view of Nature, and his imagination warm'd with the contemplation of great ideas, it can hardly be but that there must be small irregularities in the disposition both of matter and style, because the avoiding these requires a coolness of recollection, which a writer so bu|sied is not master of.
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VER. 248.
The world's just wonder, and ev'n thine, O Rome!]The Pantheon. There is something very Gothic in the taste and judgment of a learned man, who despises this master-piece of Art for those very qualities which deserve our admiration.—
"Nous esmerveillons comme l'on fait si grand cas de ce Panthe|on, veu que son edifice n'est de si grande industrie comme l'on crie: car chaque petit Masson peut bien concevoir la ma|niere de sa façon tout en un instant car estant la base si mas|sive, et les murailles si espoisses, ne nous a semblé difficile d'y
Page 167
adjouster la voute à claire voye."Pierre Belon's Observations, etc. The nature of the Gothic structures apparently led him into this mistake of the Architectonic art in general; that the excellency of it consisted in raising the greatest weight on the least assignable support, so that the edifice should have strength without the appearance of it, in order to excite admiration. But to a judicious eye it would have a contrary effect, the Ap|pearance (as our poet expresses it) of a monstrous height, or breadth, or length. Indeed did the just proportions in regular Architec|ture take off from the grandeur of a building, by all the single parts coming united to the eye, as this learned traveller seems to insinuate, it would be a reasonable objection to those rules on which this Master-piece of Art was constructed. But it is not so. The Poet tells us,
The Whole at once is BOLD and regular.
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VER. 261.
verbal Critic]Is not here used in its common signification, of one who retails the sense of single words; but of one who deals in large cargo's of them without any sense at all.
Page 169
VER. 267.
Once on a time, etc.]This tale is so very apposite, that one would naturally take it to be of the Poet's own inven|tion; and so much in the spirit of Cervantes, that one might easily mistake it for one of the chief strokes of that incomparable Satire. But, in truth, it is neither this nor that; but a story taken by our Author from the spurious Don Quixote; which shews how proper an use may be made of General reading, when if there is but one good thing in a book (as in that wretch|ed performance there scarce was more) it may be pick'd out, and employ'd to an excellent purpose.
Page 170
VER. 285.
Thus Critics of less judgment than caprice,Curious not knowing, not exact but nice.]In these two lines the poet finely describes the way in which bad writers are wont to imitate the qualities of good ones. As true Judgment
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generally draws men out of popular opinions, so he who cannot get from the croud by the assistance of this guide, willingly follows Caprice, which will be sure to lead him into singularities. Again, true Knowledge is the art of treasuring up only that which, from its use in life, is worthy of being lodged in the memory. But Curiosity consists in a vain attention to every thing out of the way, and which, for its uselessness the world least regards. Lastly, Exactness is the just proportion of parts to one another, and their harmony in a whole: But he who has not extent of capacity for the exercise of this quality, contents himself with Nicety, which is a busying one's self about points and syllables.
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VER. 297.
True Wit is Nature to advantage dress'd, etc.]This definition is very exact. Mr. Locke had defined Wit to consist in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those together, with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, whereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy. But that great Philosopher, in separating Wit from
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Judgment, as he does in this place, has given us (and he could therefore gives us no other) only an account of Wit in general: In which false Wit, tho' not every species of it, is included. A striking Image therefore of Nature is, as Mr. Locke observes, certainly Wit: But this image may strike on several other ac|counts, as well as for its truth and amiableness; and the Philo|sopher has explained the manner how. But it never becomes that Wit which is the ornament of true Poesy, whose end is to represent Nature, but when it dresses that Nature to advantage, and presents her to us in the clearest and most amiable light. And to know when the Fancy has done its office truly, the poet subjoins this admirable Test, viz. When we perceive that it
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gives us back the image of our mind. When it does that, we may be sure it plays no tricks with us: For this image is the creature of the Judgment; and whenever Wit corresponds with Judgment, we may safely pronounce it to be true.
Naturam intueamur, hanc sequamur: id facillime accipiunt ani|mi quod agnoscunt. Quintil. lib. viii. c. 3.
VER. 311.
False eloquence, like the prismatic glass, etc.]This simile is beautiful. For the false colouring, given to objects by the prismatic glass, is owing to its untwisting, by its obliquities, those threads of light, which Nature had put together in order to spread over its works an ingenuous and simple candor, that
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should not hide, but only heighten the native complexion of the objects. And false Eloquence is nothing else but the straining and divaricating the parts of true expression; and then daubing them over with what the Rhetoricians very properly term, CO|LOURS; in lieu of that candid light, now lost, which was reflected from them in their natural state while sincere and en|tire.
VER. 324.
Some by old words, etc.]
Abolita et abrogata reti|nere, insolentiae cujusdam est, et frivolae in parvis jactantiae. Quintil. lib. i. c. 6.P.
Opus est ut verba à vetustate repetita neque crebra sint, neque manifesta, quia nil est adiosius affectatione, nec utique ab ultimis repetita temporibus. Oratio cujus summa virtus est perspicuitas, quam sit vitiosa, si egeat interprete? Ergo ut novorum optima erunt maxime vetera, ita veterum maxime nova. Idem.P.
Page 176
VER. 328.
—unlucky as Fungoso etc.]See Ben Johnson's Every Man in his Humour. P.
VER. 337.
But most by Numbers, etc.]
Quis populi sermo est? quis enim? nisi carmina molli Nunc demum numero fiuere, ut per laeve severos Effundat junctura ungues: scit tendere versum Non secus ac si oculo rubricam dirigat uno. Pers. Sat. i.P.
Page 177
VER. 345.
Tho' oft the ear, etc.]
Fugiemus crebras vocalium concursiones, quae vastam atque hiantem orationem readunt. Cic. ad Heren. lib. iv. Vide etiam Quintil. lib. ix. c. 4.P.
Page 178
VER. 364.
'Tis not enough no harshness gives offence;The sound must seem an Echo to the sense:]The judi|cious introduction of this precept is remarkable. The Poets, and even some of the best of them, have been so fond of the beauty arising from this trivial precept, that, in their prac|tice,
Page 179
they have violated the very End of it, which is the en|crease of harmony; and, so they could but raise an Echo, did not care whose ears they offended by its dissonance. To remedy this abuse therefore, the poet, by the introductory line, would infinuate, that Harmony is always presupposed as observed; tho' it may and ought to be perpetually varied, so as to produce the effect here recommended.
VER. 365.
The sound must seem an Echo to the sense,]Lord Roscommon says,
The sound is still a comment to the sense.They are both well expressed: only this supposes the sense to be assisted by the sound; that, the sound assisted by the sense.
Page 180
VER. 374.
Hear how Timotheus, etc.]See Alexander's Feast, or the Power of Music; an Ode by Mr. Dryden. P.
Page 182
VER. 402.
Which from the first etc.]Genius is the same in all ages; but its fruits are various; and more or less excellent as they are checked or matured by the influence of Government or Religion upon them. Hence in some parts of Literature the Ancients excell; in others, the modern; just as those accidental circumstances influenced them.
Page 185
VER. 444.
Scotists and Thomists]These were two parties amongst the schoolmen, headed by Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas, of different opinions, and from that difference deno|minated Realists and Nominalists; they were perpetually disput|ing on the immaculate conception, and on subjects of the like im|portance.
Page 186
VER. 444.
Scotists]So denominated from Johannes Duns Scotus. He suffered a miserable reverse of fortune at Oxford in the time of Henry VIII. That grave Antiquary Mr. An|tony Wood sadly laments the deformation, as he calls it, of that University by the King's Commissioners; and even records the blasphemous speeches of one of them in his own Words—We have set DUNCE in Boccardo, with all his blind Glossers, fast nailed up upon posts in all common houses of easement. Upon which our venerable Antiquary thus exclaims:
"If so be, the commissioners had such disrespect for that most famous Au|thor J. Duns, who was so much admired by our predecessors, and SO DIFFICULT TO BE UNDERSTOOD, that the Doctors of those times, namely Dr. William Roper, Dr. John Kynton, Dr. William Mowse, etc. professed, that, in twenty eight years study, they could not understand him rightly, What then had they for others of inferior note?"—What indeed! But then, If so be, that most famous J. Duns was so difficult to be under|stood
Page 187
(for that this is a most classical proof of his great value, who doubts?) I should conceive our good old Antiquary to be a little mistaken. And that the nailing up this Proteus was done by the Commissioners in honour of the most famous Duns: There being no other way of catching the sense of so slippery an Author, who had eluded the pursuit of three of their most renowned Doctors, in full cry after him, for twenty eight years together. And this Boccardo in which he was confined, seemed very proper for the purpose; it being observed, that men are never more serious and thoughtful than in that place. SCRIBL.
Ibid.
Thomists,]From Thomas Aquinas, a truly great Genius, who was, in those blind ages, the same in Theology that Friar Bacon was in natural Philosophy: less happy than our Coun|tryman in this, that he soon became surrounded with a number of dark Glossers, who never left him till they had extinguished the radiance of that light which had pierced thro' the thickest night of Monkery, the thirteenth century, when the Waldenses were suppressed, and Wicklisse not yet risen.
VER. 445.
Duck-lane]A place where old and second-hand books were sold formerly, near Smithfield. P.
VER. 450.
And Authors think their reputation safe,Which lives as long as fools are pleas'd to laugh.]This is a just and ad|mirable satire on those we call, Authors in fashion; for they are
Page 188
the men who get the laugh on their side. He shews, on how pi|tiful a basis their reputation stands, the changeling disposition of fools to laugh; who are always carried away with the last joke.
VER. 463.
Milbourn]The Rev. Mr. Luke Milbourn. Den|nis served Mr. Pope in the same office. And indeed the attend|ance of these slaves is necessary to render the triumphs of a great Genius complete. They are of all times, and on all oc|casions. Sir Walter Raleigh had Alexander Ross, Chilling|worth had his Cheynel, and Locke his EDWARDS: Not Fun|goso of Lincoln's-Inn. Mr. Locke's Edwards was a Divine of parts and learning, this Edwards is a critic with neither. Yet
Page 189
(as Mr. Pope says of Luke Milbourn) the fairest of all critics; for having written against the Editor's remarks on Shakespear, be did him justice in printing at the same time his own.
VER 468
For envy'd Wit, like Sol eclips'd, etc.]This simi|litude implies a fact too often verified; and of which we need not seek abroad for examples. It is, that frequently those very Authors, who have at first done all they could to obscure and depress a rising genius, have at length, in order to keep themselves
Page 190
in some little credit, been reduced to borrow from him, imitate his manner, and reflect what they could of his splendor. Nor hath the poet been less artful, to insinuate also what is sometimes the cause. A youthful genius, like the Sun rising towards the Meridian, displays too strong and powerful beams for the dirty genius of inferior writers, which occasions their gathering, con|densing, and blackening. But as he descends from the Meridian (the time when the Sun gives its gilding to the surrounding clouds) his rays grow milder, his heat more benign, and then
—ev'n those Clouds at last adorn its way, Reflect new glories, and augment the day.
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VER. 484.
So when the faithful pencil, etc.]This similitude, in which the poet discovers (as he always does on this subject) real science in the thing spoken of, has still a more peculiar beauty, as at the same time that it confesses the just superiority of antient writings, it insinuates one advantage the modern have above them; which is this, that in these, our intimate acquaint|ance with the occasion of writing, and the manners described, lets us into all those living and striking graces which may be well compared to that perfection of imitation only given by colouring: While the ravage of Time amongst the monuments of former ages, hath left us but the gross substance of ancient wit, so much of the form and matter of body only as may be expressed in brass or marble.
Page 192
VER. 507.
—by Knaves undone!]By which the Poet would insinuate, a common but shameful truth, That Men in power, if they got into it by illiberal arts, generally left Wit and Science to starve.
Page 195
VER. 546.
Did all the dregs of bold Socinus drain;]The seeds of this religious evil, as well as of the political that encouraged it (for all Revolutions are in themselves evils, tho' brought about thro' necessity, for the removal of greater) were sown in the preceding fat age of pleasure. The mischiefs done, during Cromwell's usurpation, by fanaticism, inflamed by erroneous and absurd notions of the doctrine of grace and satisfaction, made the loyal Latitudinarian divines (as they were called) at the Restoration, go so far into the other extreme of resolving all Christianity into Morality, as to afford an easy introduction to Socinianism: Which in that reign (founded on the principles of Liberty) men had full opportunity of propagating.
VER. 547. The author has omitted two lines which stood here, as containing a National Reflection, which in his stricter judgment he could not but disapprove on any People whatever. P.
Page 196
VER. 562.
For 'tis but half a Judge's task, to know.]The Cri|tic acts in two capacities, of Assessor and of Judge: in the first, science alone is sufficient; but the other requires morals like|wise.
Page 199
VER. 587.
And stares, tremendous, etc.]This picture was taken to himself by John Dennis, a furious old Critic by profession, who, upon no other provocation, wrote against this Essay and its author, in a manner perfectly lunatic: For, as to the men|tion made of him in ℣ 270. he took it as a Compliment, and said it was treacherously meant to cause him to overlook this Abuse of his Person. P.
Page 200
VER. 620.
Garth did not write, etc.]A common slander at that time in prejudice of that deserving author. Our Poet did him this justice, when that slander most prevail'd; and it is now (perhaps the sooner for this very verse) dead and forgot|ten. P.
Page 202
VER. 632.
But where's the man, etc.]The Poet, by his man|ner of asking after this Character, and telling us, when he had described it, that such once were Critics, does not encourage us to search for it in modern writers. And indeed the discovery of him, if it could be made, would be but an invidious busi|ness. I will venture no farther than to name the piece of Criti|cism in which these marks may be found. It is intitled, Q. Hor. Fl. Ars Poetica, with an English Commentary and Notes.
Page 203
VER. 643.
with REASON on his side?]Not only on his side, but actually exercised in his service. That Critic makes but a mean figure, who, when he has found out the excellencies of his author, contents himself in offering them to the world, with only empty exclamations on their beauties. His office is to ex|plain the nature of those beauties, shew from whence they arise, and what effects they produce; or, in the better and fuller ex|pression of the Poet,
To teach the world with Reason to admire.
Page 204
VER. 653.
Who conquer'd Nature, should preside o'er Wit.]By this is not meant physical Nature, but moral. The force of the observation consists in our understanding it in this sense. For the Poet not only uses the word Nature for human nature, throughout this poem; but also, where, in the beginning of it, he lays down the principles of the arts he treats of, he makes the knowledge of human nature the foundation of all Criticism and Poetry. Nor is the observation less true than apposite. For, Aristotle's natural enquiries were superficial, and ill made, tho' extensive: But his logical and moral works are incomparable. In these he has unfolded the human mind, and laid open all the recesses of the heart and understanding; and by his Catego|ries, not only conquered Nature, but kept her in tenfold chains: Not as Dulness kept the Muses, in the Dunciad, to silence them; but as Aristaeus held Proteus in Virgil, to deliver Ora|cles.
Page 205
VER. 666.
See Dyonysius]Of Halicarnassus. P.
Page 207
VER. 695.
The glory of the Priesthood and the shame!]Our author elsewhere lets us know what he esteems to be the glory of the Priesthood as well as of a Christian in general, where, comparing himself to Erasmus, he says,
In MODERATION placing all my glory,and consequently, what he esteems to be the shame of it. The whole of this character belong'd most eminently and almost solely to Erasmus: For the other Reformers, such as Luther, Calvin, and their followers, understood so little in what true Christian Liberty consisted, that they carried with them, into the reformed Churches that very spirit of persecution, which had driven them from the church of Rome.
Page 209
VER. 724.
Such was the Muse—]Essay on Poetry by the Duke of Buckingham. Our Poet is not the only one of his time
Page 210
who complimented this Essay, and its noble Author. Mr. Dry|den had done it very largely in the Dedication to his translation of the Aeneid; and Dr. Garth in the first Edition of his Dis|pensary says,
The Tyber now no courtly Gallus sees, But smiling Thames enjoys his Normanbys.Tho' afterwards omitted, when parties were carried so high in the reign of Queen Anne, as to allow no commendation to an opposite in Politics. The Duke was all his life a steady adhe|rent to the Church of England-Party, yet an enemy to the ex|travagant measures of the Court in the reign of Charles II. On which account after having strongly patronized Mr. Dryden, a coolness succeeded between them on that poet's absolute attach|ment to the Court, which carried him some lengths beyond what the Duke could approve of. This Nobleman's true cha|racter had been very well marked by Mr. Dryden before,
the Muse's friend, Himself a Muse. In Sanadrin's debate True to his prince, but not a slave of state. Abs. and Achit.Our Author was more happy, he was honour'd very young with his friendship, and it continued till his death in all the circum|stances of a familiar esteem. P.
Page 141
VARIATIONS.
Between ℣ 25 and 26 were these lines, since omitted by the author:
Many are spoil'd by that pedantic throng, Who with great pains teach youth to reason wrong. Tutors, like Virtuoso's, oft inclin'd By strange transfusion to improve the mind, Draw off the sense we have, to pour in new; Which yet, with all their skill, they ne'er could do.P.
Page 148
VER. 80.
There are whom Heav'n has blest with store of wit, Yet want as much again to manage it.
Page 153
VER. 123.
Cavil you may, but never criticize.]The author after this verse originally inserted the following, which he has however omitted in all the editions:
Zoilus, had these been known, without a name Had dy'd, and Perault ne'er been damn'd to fame; The sense of sound Antiquity had reign'd, And sacred Homer yet been unprophan'd. None e'er had thought his comprehensive mind To modern customs, modern rules confin'd; Who for all ages writ, and all mankind.P.
Page 154
VER. 130.
When first young Maro sung of Kings and Wars, Ere warning Phoebus touch'd his trembling ears,
Page 164
VER. 225.
So pleas'd at first the tow'ring Alps to try, Fill'd with ideas of fair Italy, The Traveller beholds with chearful eyes The less'ning vales, and seems to tread the skies.
Page 186
VER. 447. Between this and ℣ 448.
The rhyming Clowns that gladded Shakespear's age, No more with crambo entertain the stage. Who now in Anagrams their Patron praise, Or sing their Mistress in Acrostic lays? Ev'n pulpits pleas'd with merry puns of yore; Now all are banish'd to the Hibernian shore! Thus leaving what was natural and fit, The current folly prov'd their ready wit; And authors thought their reputation safe, Which liv'd as long as fools were pleas'd to laugh.
Page 201
VER. 624. Between this and ℣ 625.
In vain you shrug and sweat, and strive to fly; These know no Manners but of Poetry. They'll stop a hungry Chaplain in his grace, To treat of Unities of time and place.
Page 203
Between ℣ 647 and 648. I found the following lines, since supprest by the author:
That bold Columbus of the realms of wit, Whose first discov'ry's not exceeded yet. Led by the light of the Maeonian Star, He steer'd securely, and discover'd far. He, when all Nature was subdu'd before, Like his great Pupil, sigh'd, and long'd for more: Fancy's wild regions yet unvanquish'd lay, A boundless empire, and that own'd no sway. Poets, etc.
Page 206
Between ℣ 691 and 692. the author omitted these two,
Vain Wits and Critics were no more allow'd, When none but Saints had licence to be proud.P.
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IMITATIONS.
VER. 346.
While expletives their feeble aid do join,And ten tow words oft creep in one dull line.]From Dryden.
"He creeps along with ten little words in every line, and helps out his numbers with [for] [to] and [unto] and all the pretty expletives he can find, while the sense is left half tired behind it." Essay on Dram. Poetry.
Page 179
VER. 366.
Soft is the strain, etc.]
Tum si laeta canunt, etc. Vida Poet. l. iii. ℣ 403.
VER. 368.
But when loud surges, etc.]
Tum longe sale saxa sonant, etc. Vida ib. 388.
VER. 370.
When Ajax strives, etc.]
Atque ideo si quid geritur molimine magno, etc. Vida ib. 417.
VER. 372.
Not so, when swift Camilla, etc.]
At mora si suerit damno, properare jubebo, etc. Vida ib. 420.
Page 208
VER. 708.
As next in place to Mantua,]Alluding to
Mantua vae miserae nimium vicina Cremonae. Virg.