A philosophical enquiry into the origin of our ideas of the sublime and beautiful:

A Philosophical Enquiry INTO THE ORIGIN of our IDEAS OF THE SUBLIME and BEAUTIFUL. PART I.

SECT. I. NOVELTY.

THE first and the simplest emotion which we discover in the human mind, is Curiosity. By curiosity, I mean whatever desire we have for, or what∣ever pleasure we take in novelty. We see children perpetually running from place to place to hunt out something new; they catch with great eagerness, and with very little choice, at whatever comes before them; their attention is engaged by every thing, because every thing has, in that stage of life, the charm of novelty to recommend it. But as those things which engage us merely by their novelty, cannot attach us for any length of

time, curiosity is the most superficial of all the affections; it changes it's object perpetually; it has an appetite which is very sharp, but very easily satisfied; and it has always an ap∣pearance of giddiness, restlessness and anxiety. Curiosity from it's nature is a very active prin∣ciple; it quickly runs over the greatest part of it's objects, and soon exhausts the variety which is commonly to be met with in nature; the same things make frequent returns, and they return with less and less of any agreeable effect. In short, the occurrences of life, by the time we come to know it a little, would be incapable of affecting the mind with any other sensations than those of loathing and weariness, if many things were not adapted to affect the mind by means of other powers besides novelty in them, and of other passions besides curiosity in ourselves. These powers and passions shall be considered in their place. But whatever these powers are, or upon what principle soever they affect the mind, it is absolutely necessary that they should not be exerted in those things which a daily and vulgar use have brought into a stale unaffecting familiarity. Some de∣gree of novelty must be one of the materials in every instrument which works upon the mind; and curiosity blends itself more or less with all our passions.

SECT. II. PAIN and PLEASURE.

IT seems then necessary towards moving the passions of people advanced in life to any considerable degree, that the objects designed for that purpose, besides their being in some measure new, should be capable of exciting pain or pleasure from other causes. Pain and pleasure are simple ideas, incapable of defi∣nition. People are not liable to be mistaken in their feelings, but they are very frequently wrong in the names they give them, and in their reason∣ings about them. Many people are of opinion, that pain arises necessarily from the removal of some pleasure; as they think pleasure does from the ceasing or diminution of some pain. For my part I am rather inclined to imagine, that pain and pleasure in their most simple and natural manner of affecting, are each of a positive nature, and by no means necessarily dependent upon each other for their existence. The human mind is often, and I think it is for the most part, in a state neither of pain nor pleasure, which I call a state of indif∣ference. When I am carried from this state into a state of actual pleasure, it does not ap∣pear

necessary that I should pass through the medium of any sort of pain. If in such a state of indifference, or ease, or tranquility, or call it what you please, you were to be suddenly entertained with a concert of music; or suppose some object of a fine shape, and bright and lively colours to be presented before you; or imagine your smell is gratified with the fragrance of a rose; or if without any previous thirst you were to drink of some pleasant kind of wine; or to taste of some sweetmeat without being hungry; in all the several senses, of hearing, smelling, and taste∣ing, you undoubtedly find a pleasure: yet if I enquire into the state of your mind pre∣vious to these gratifications, you will hardly tell me that they found you in any kind of pain; or having satisfied these several senses with their several pleasures, will you say that any pain has succeeded, though the pleasure is absolutely over? Suppose on the other hand, a man in the same state of in∣difference, to receive a violent blow, or to drink of some bitter potion, or to have his ears wounded with some harsh and grating sound; here is no removal of pleasure; and yet here is felt, in every sense which is affect∣ed, a pain very distinguishable. It may be said perhaps, that the pain in these cases had

it's rise from the removal of that pleasure which he enjoyed before, though that pleasure was of so low a degree as to be perceived only by the removal; but this seems to me to be a subtilty, that is not discoverable in nature. For if, previous to the pain, I do not feel any actual pleasure, I have no reason to judge that any such thing exists; since pleasure is only pleasure as it is felt. The same may be said of pain, and with equal reason. I can never persuade myself that pleasure and pain are mere relations, which can only exist as they are contrasted: but I think I can discern clearly that there are positive pains and plea∣sures, which do not at all depend upon each other. Nothing is more certain to my own feelings than this. There is nothing which I can distinguish in my mind with more clear∣ness than the three states, of indifference, of pleasure, and of pain. Every one of these I can perceive without any sort of idea of it's relation to any thing else. Caius is af∣flicted with a fit of the cholic; this man is actually in pain; stretch Caius upon the rack, he will feel a much greater pain; but does this pain of the rack arise from the removal of any pleasure? or is the fit of the cholic a pleasure or a pain just as we are pleased to consider it?

SECT. III. The difference between the removal of PAIN and positive PLEASURE.

WE shall carry this proposition yet a step further. We shall venture to propose, that pain and pleasure are not only, not ne∣cessarily dependent for their existence on their mutual diminution or removal, but that, in reality, the diminution or ceasing of pleasure does not operate like positive pain; and that the removal or diminution of pain, in it's effect has very little resemblance to positive pleasure.* 1.1 The former of these propositions will, I believe, be much more readily allowed than the latter; because it is very evident that pleasure, when it has run it's career, sets us down very nearly where it found us. Pleasure of every kind quickly satisfies; and when it is over, we relapse into indifference, or rather we fall into a soft tranquility, which is tinged with the agreeable colour of the

former sensation. I own, it is not at first view so apparent, that the removal of a great pain does not resemble positive pleasure: but let us recollect in what state we have found our minds upon escaping some imminent dan∣ger, or on being released from the severity of some cruel pain. We have on such occasions found, if I am not much mistaken, the temper of our minds in a tenor very remote from that which attends the presence of positive plea∣sure; we have found them in a state of much sobriety, impressed with a sense of awe, in a sort of tranquility shadowed with horror. The fashion of the countenance and the gesture of the body on such occasions is so correspondent to this state of mind, that any person, a stranger to the cause of the appearance, would rather judge us under some consternation, than in the enjoyment of any thing like positive pleasure.

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As when a wretch, who conscious of his crime Pursued for murder from his native clime, Just gains some frontier, breathless, pale, amaz'd; All gaze, all wonder!

This striking appearance of the man whom Homer supposes to have just escaped an im∣minent danger, the sort of mixt passion of terror and surprize, with which he affects the spectators, paints very strongly the manner in which we find ourselves affected upon occa∣sions any way similar. For when we have suf∣fered from any violent emotion, the mind na∣turally continues in something like the same condition, after the cause which first produced it has ceased to operate; the tossing of the sea remains after the storm; and when this remain of horror has entirely subsided, all the passion, which the accident raised, subsides along with it; and the mind returns to it's usual state of indifference. In short, pleasure, (I mean any thing either in the inward sensa∣tion, or in the outward appearance like plea∣sure from a positive cause,) has never, I ima∣gine, it's origin from the removal of pain or danger.

SECT. IV. Of DELIGHT and PLEASURE, as opposed to each other.

BUT shall we therefore say, that the removal of pain or it's diminution is al∣ways

simply painful? or affirm that the ces∣sation or the lessening of pleasure is always attended itself with a pleasure? by no means. What I advance is no more than this; first, that there are pleasures and pains of a positive and independent nature; and secondly, that the feel∣ing which results from the ceasing or diminution of pain does not bear a sufficient resemblance to positive pleasure to have it considered as of the same nature, or to entitle it to be known by the same name; and that upon the same principle the removal or qualification of pleasure has no resemblance to positive pain. It is certain that the former feeling (the removal or mo∣deration of pain) has something in it far from distressing, or disagreeable in it's nature. This feeling, in many cases so agreeable, but in all so different from positive pleasure, has no name which I know; but that hinders not it's be∣ing a very real one, and very different from all others. Whenever I have occasion to speak of it, I shall call it Delight; and I shall take the best care I can, to use that word in no other sense. I am satisfied the word is not commonly used in this appropriated significa∣tion; but I thought it better to take up a word already known, and to limit it's signification, than to introduce a new one which would not perhaps incorporate so well with the lan∣guage.

I should never have presumed to at∣tempt the least alteration in our words, if the nature of the language, framed for the purposes of business rather than those of philosophy, and the nature of my subject that leads me out of the common track of discourse, did not in a man∣ner necessitate me to it. I shall make use of this liberty with all possible caution. As I make use of the word Delight to express the sen∣sation which accompanies the removal of pain or danger; so when I speak of positive plea∣sure, I shall for the most part call it simply Pleasure.

SECT. V. JOY and GRIEF.

IT must be observed, that the cessation of pleasure affects the mind three ways. If it simply ceases, after having continued a pro∣per time, the effect is indifference; if it be abruptly broken off, there ensues an uneasy sense called disappointment; if the object be so totally lost that there is no chance of enjoying it again, a passion arises in the mind, which is called grief. Now there is none of these, not even grief, which is the most violent, that I think has any resemblance to positive pain.

The person who grieves, suffers his passion to grow upon him; he indulges it, he loves it: but this never happens in the case of actual pain, which no man ever willingly endured for any considerable time. That grief should be willingly endured, though far from a simply pleasing sensation, is not so difficult to be un∣derstood. It is the nature of grief to keep it's object perpetually in it's eye, to present it in it's most pleasurable views, to repeat all the circumstances that attended it, even to the least minuteness, to go back to every particular enjoyment, to dwell upon each, and to find a thousand new perfections in all, that were not sufficiently understood before; in grief, the pleasure is still uppermost; and the affliction we suffer has no resemblance to absolute pain, which is always odious, and which we en∣deavour to shake off as soon as possible. The Odyssey of Homer, which abounds with so many natural and affecting images, has none more striking than those which Menelaus raises of the calamitous fate of his friends, and his own manner of feeling it. He owns indeed, that he often gives himself some intermission from such melancholy reflections, but he observes too, that melancholy as they are, they give him pleasure.

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Still in short intervals of pleasing woe, Regardful of the friendly dues I owe, I to the glorious dead, for ever dear, Indulge the tribute of a grateful tear. HOM. Od. 4.

On the other hand, when we recover our health, when we escape an imminent danger, is it with joy that we are affected? The sense on these occasions is far from that smooth and voluptuous satisfaction which the assured pro∣spect of pleasure bestows. The delight which arises from the modifications of pain, confesses the stock from whence it sprung, in it's solid, strong, and severe nature.

SECT. VI. Of the passions which belong to SELF-PRESERVATION.

MOST of the ideas which are capable of making a powerful impression on the mind, whether simply of Pain or Pleasure,

or of the modifications of those, may be re∣duced very nearly to these two heads, self-preservation and society; to the ends of one or the other of which all our passions are cal∣culated to answer. The passions which con∣cern self-preservation, turn mostly on pain or danger. The ideas of pain, sickness, and death, fill the mind with strong emotions of horror; but life and health, though they put us in a capacity of being affected with pleasure, they make no such impression by the simple enjoy∣ment. The passions therefore which are con∣versant about the preservation of the individual, turn chiefly on pain and danger, and they are the most powerful of all the passions.

SECT. VII. Of the SUBLIME.

WHatever is fitted in any sort to ex∣cite the ideas of pain, and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or ope∣rates in a manner analagous to terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is ca∣pable of feeling. When danger or pain

press too nearly, they are incapable of giving any delight, and are simply terrible; but at certain distances, and with certain modifica∣tions, they may be, and they are delightful, as we every day experience. The cause of this I shall endeavour to investigate hereafter.

SECT. VIII. Of the passions which belong to SOCIETY.

THE other head under which I class our passions, is that of society, which may be divided into two sorts. 1. The society of the sexes, which answers the purposes of pro∣pagation; and next, that more general society, which we have with men and with other ani∣mals, and which we may in some sort be said to have even with the inanimate world. The passions belonging to the preservation of the individual, turn wholly on pain and danger; those which belong to generation, have their origin in gratifications and pleasures; the plea∣sure most directly belonging to this purpose is of a lively character, rapturous and violent, and confessedly the highest pleasure of sense; yet the absence of this so great an enjoyment, scarce amounts to an uneasiness; and except

at particular times, I do not think it affects at all. When men describe in what manner they are affected by pain and danger; they do not dwell on the pleasure of health and the comfort of security, and then lament the loss of these satisfactions: the whole turns upon the actual pains and horrors which they endure. But if you listen to the complaints of a forsaken lover, you observe, that he in∣sists largely on the pleasures which he enjoyed, or hoped to enjoy, and on the perfection of the object of his desires; it is the loss which is always uppermost in his mind. The vio∣lent effects produced by love, which has some∣times been even wrought up to madness, is no objection to the rule which we seek to establish. When men have suffered their ima∣ginations to be long affected with any idea, it so wholly engrosses them, as to shut out by de∣grees almost every other, and to break down every partition of the mind which would con∣fine it. Any idea is sufficient for the purpose, as is evident from the infinite variety of causes which give rise to madness: but this at most can only prove, that the passion of love is capable of producing very extraordinary ef∣fects, not that it's extraordinary emotions have any connection with positive pain.

SECT. IX. The final cause of the difference between the passions belonging to SELF-PRESER∣VATION, and those which regard the SOCIETY of the SEXES.

THE final cause of the difference in character between the passions which regard self-preservation, and those which are directed to the multiplication of the species, will illustrate the foregoing remarks yet fur∣ther; and it is, I imagine, worthy of obser∣vation even upon it's own account. As the performance of our duties of every kind de∣pends upon life, and the performing them with vigour and efficacy depends upon health, we are very strongly affected with whatever threatens the destruction of either; but as we were not made to acquiesce in life and health, the simple enjoyment of them is not attended with any real pleasure, left satisfied with that, we should give up ourselves to indolence and inaction. On the other hand, the generation of mankind is a great purpose, and it is re∣quisite that men should be animated to the pursuit of it by some great incentive It is therefore attended with a very high pleasure; but as it is by no means designed to be our

constant business, it is not fit that the absence of this pleasure should be attended with any remarkable pain. The difference between men and brutes in this point, seems to be re∣markable. Men are at all times pretty equally disposed to the pleasures of love, because they are to be guided by reason in the time and manner of indulging them. Had any great pain arisen from the want of this satisfaction, reason, I am afraid, would find great diffi∣culties in the performance of its office. But brutes who obey laws, in the execution of which their own reason has but little share, have their stated seasons; at such times it is not improbable that the sensation from the want is very troublesome, because the end must be then answered, or be missed in many, perhaps for ever, as the inclination returns only with its season.

SECT. X. Of BEAUTY.

THE passion which belongs to genera∣tion, merely as such, is lust only; this is evident in brutes, whose passions are more unmixed, and which pursue their purposes more directly than ours. The only distinction

they observe with regard to their mates, is that of sex. It is true, that they stick severally to their own species in preference to all others; but this preference, I imagine, does not arise from any sense of beauty which they find in their species, as Mr. Addison supposes, but from a law of some other kind to which they are subject; and this we may fairly conclude, from their apparent want of choice amongst those objects to which the barriers of their species have confined them. But man, who is a creature adapted to a greater variety and intricacy of relation, connects with the gene∣ral passion, the idea of some social qualities, which direct and heighten the appetite which he has in common with all other ani∣mals; and as he is not designed like them to live at large, it is fit that he should have some∣thing to create a preference, and fix his choice; and this in general should be some sensible quality; as no other can so quickly, so pow∣erfully; or so surely produce it's effect. The object therefore of this mixed passion which we call love, is the beauty of the sex. Men are carried to the sex in general, as it is the sex, and by the common law of nature; but they are attached to particulars by personal beauty. I call beauty a social quality; for where women and men, and not only they,

but when other animals give us a sense of joy and pleasure in beholding them, (and there are many that do so) they inspire us with sen∣timents of tenderness and affection towards their persons; we like to have them near us, and we enter willingly into a kind of relation with them, unless we should have strong rea∣sons to the contrary. But to what end, in many cases, this was designed, I am unable to discover; for I see no greater reason for a connection between man and several animals who are attired in so engaging a manner, than between him and some others who en∣tirely want this attraction, or possess it in a far weaker degree. But it is probable, that pro∣vidence did not make even this distinction, but with a view to some great end, though we cannot perceive distinctly what it is, as his wisdom is not our wisdom, nor our ways his ways.

SECT. XI. SOCIETY and SOLITUDE.

THE second branch of the social passions, is that which administers to society in general. With regard to this, I observe, that society, merely as society, without any par∣ticular

heightnings, gives us no positive plea∣sure in the enjoyment; but absolute and entire solitude, that is, the total and perpetual ex∣clusion from all society, is as great a positive pain as can almost be conceived. Therefore in the balance between the pleasure of general society, and the pain of absolute solitude, pain is the predominant idea. But the pleasure of any particular social enjoyment, outweighs very considerably the uneasiness caused by the want of that particular enjoyment; so that the strongest sensations relative to the habi∣tudes of particular society, are sensations of pleasure. Good company, lively conversations, and the endearments of friendship, fill the mind with great pleasure; a temporary soli∣tude on the other hand, is itself agreeable. This may perhaps prove, that we are crea∣tures designed for contemplation as well as action; since solitude as well as society has it's pleasures; as from the former observa∣tion we may discern, that an entire life of so∣litude contradicts the purposes of our being, since death itself is scarcely an idea of more terror.

SECT. XII. SYMPATHY, IMITATION, and AMBITION.

UNDER this denomination of society, the passions are of a complicated kind, and branch out into a variety of forms agree∣ably to the great variety of ends they are to serve in the great chain of society. The three principal links in this chain are sympathy, imi∣tation, and ambition.

SECT. XIII. SYMPATHY.

IT is by the first of these passions that we enter into the concerns of others; that we are moved as they are moved, and are never suffered to be indifferent spectators of almost any thing which men can do or suffer. For sympathy must be considered as a sort of substitution, by which we are put into the place of another man, and affected in a good measure as he is affected; so that this passion may either partake of the nature of those which regard self-preservation, and turning upon pain may be a source of the sublime;

or it may turn upon ideas of pleasure, and then, whatever has been said of the social af∣fections, whether they regard society in gene∣ral, or only some particular modes of it, may be applicable here. It is by this principle chiefly that poetry, painting, and other affecting arts, transfuse their passions from one breast to ano∣ther, and are often capable of grafting a de∣light on wretchedness, misery, and death it∣self. It is a common observation, that objects which in the reality would shock, are in tra∣gical and such like representations the source of a very high species of pleasure. This taken as a fact, has been the cause of much reason∣ing. This satisfaction has been commonly at∣tributed, first, to the comfort we receive in considering that so melancholy a story is no more than a fiction; and next, to the con∣templation of our own freedom from the evils which we see represented. I am afraid it is a practice much too common in inquiries of this nature, to attribute the cause of feelings which merely arise from the mechanical struc∣ture of our bodies, or from the natural frame and constitution of our minds, to certain con∣clusions of the reasoning faculty on the objects presented to us; for I have some reason to ap∣prehend, that the influence of reason in pro∣ducing

our passions is nothing near so exten∣sive as is commonly believed.

SECT. XIV. The effects of SYMPATHY in the di∣stresses of others.

TO examine this point concerning the ef∣fect of tragedy in a proper manner, we must previously consider, how we are affected by the feelings of our fellow creatures in cir∣cumstances of real distress. I am convinced we have a degree of delight, and that no small one, in the real misfortunes and pains of others; for let the affection be what it will in appearance, if it does not make us shun such objects, if on the contrary it induces us to approach them, if it makes us dwell upon them, in this case I conceive we must have a delight or pleasure of some species or other in contemplating objects of this kind. Do we not read the authentic histories of scenes of this nature with as much pleasure as romances or poems, where the incidents are fictitious? The prosperity of no empire, nor the gran∣deur of no king, can so agreeably affect in the reading, as the ruin of the state of Ma∣cedon, and the distress of it's unhappy prince.

Such a catastrophe touches us in history as much as the destruction of Troy does in fable, Our delight in cases of this kind, is very greatly heightened, if the sufferer be some ex∣cellent person who sinks under an unworthy fortune. Scipio and Cato are both virtuous characters; but we are more deeply affected by the violent death of the one, and the ruin of the great cause he adhered to, than with the deserved triumphs and uninterrupted prosperity of the other; for terror is a passion which always produces delight when it does not press too close, and pity is a passion accompanied with pleasure, because it arises from love and social affection. Whenever we are formed by nature to any active purpose, the passion which animates us to it, is attended with de∣light, or a pleasure of some kind, let the sub∣ject matter be what it will; and as our Cre∣ator has designed we should be united toge∣ther by so strong a bond as that of sympathy, he has therefore twisted along with it a pro∣portionable quantity of this ingredient; and always in the greatest proportion where our sympathy is most wanted, in the distresses of others. If this passion was simply painful, we would shun with the greatest care all persons and places that could excite such a passion; as, some who are so far gone in indo∣lence

as not to endure any strong impression actually do. But the case is widely different with the greater part of mankind; there is no spectacle we so eagerly pursue, as that of some uncommon and grievous calamity; so that whether the misfortune is before our eyes, or whether they are turned back to it in history, it always touches with delight; but it is not an unmixed delight, but blended with no small uneasiness. The delight we have in such things, hinders us from shunning scenes of misery; and the pain we feel, prompts us to relieve ourselves in relieving those who suf∣fer; and all this antecedent to any reasoning, by an instinct that works us to its own pur∣poses, without our concurrence.

SECT. XV. Of the effects of TRAGEDY.

IT is thus in real calamities. In imitated distresses the only difference is the plea∣sure resulting from the effects of imitation; for it is never so perfect, but we can perceive it is an imitation, and on that principle are somewhat pleased with it. And indeed in some cases we derive as much or more pleasure from that source than from the thing itself. But then

I imagine we shall be much mistaken if we attri∣bute any considerable part of our satisfaction in tragedy to a consideration that tragedy is a de∣ceit, and its representations no realities. The nearer it approaches the reality, and the further it removes us from all idea of fiction, the more perfect is its power. But be its power of what kind it will, it never approaches to what it represents. Chuse a day on which to represent the most sublime and affecting tragedy which we have; appoint the most favourite actors; spare no cost upon the scenes and decorations; unite the greatest efforts of poetry, painting and mu∣sic; and when you have collected your audi∣ence, just at the moment when their minds are erect with expectation, let it be reported that a state criminal of high rank is on the point of being executed in the adjoining square; in a moment the emptiness of the theatre would demonstrate the comparative weakness of the imitative arts, and proclaim the triumph of the real sympathy. I believe that this notion of our having a simple pain in the reality, yet a delight in the representation arises from hence, that we do not sufficiently distinguish what we would by no means chuse to do, from what we should be eager enough to see if it was once done. We delight in seeing things, which so far from doing, our heartiest wishes would

be to see redressed. This noble capital, the pride of England and of Europe, I believe no man is so strangely wicked as to desire to see destroyed by a conflagration or an earthquake, though he should be removed himself to the greatest distance from the danger. But sup∣pose such a fatal accident to have happened, what numbers from all parts would croud to behold the ruins, and amongst them many who would have been content never to have seen London in it's glory? Nor is it either in real or fictitious distresses, our immunity from them which produces our delight; in my own mind I can discover nothing like it. I ap∣prehend that this mistake is owing to a sort of sophism, by which we are frequently im∣posed upon; it arises from our not distinguish∣ing between what is indeed a necessary con∣dition to our doing or suffering any thing, and what is the cause of some particular act. If a man kills me with a sword; it is a necessary condition to this that we should have been both of us alive before the fact; and yet it would be absurd to say, that our being both living creatures was the cause of his crime and of my death. So it is certain, that it is absolutely necessary my lise should be out of any im∣minent hazard before I can take a delight in the sufferings of others, real or imaginary,

or indeed in any thing else from any cause whatsoever. But then it is a sophism to ar∣gue from thence, that this immunity is the cause of my delight either on these or on any occasions. No one can distinguish such a cause of satisfaction in his own mind I believe; nay when we do not suffer any very acute pain, nor are exposed to any imminent danger of of our lives, we can feel for others, whilst we suffer ourselves; and often then most when we are softened by affliction; we see with pity even distresses which we would accept in the place of our own.

SECT. XVI. IMITATION.

THE second passion belonging to society is imitation, or, if you will, a desire of imi∣tating, and consequently a pleasure in it. This passion arises from much the same cause with sympathy. For as sympathy makes us take a concern in whatever men feel, so this affecti∣on prompts us to copy whatever they do; and consequently we have a pleasure in imitating, and in whatever belongs to imitation merely as it is such, without any intervention of the reasoning faculty, but solely from our natural

constitution, which providence has framed in such a manner as to find either pleasure or de∣light according to the nature of the object, in whatever regards the purposes of our being. It is by imitation far more than by precept that we learn every thing; and what we learn thus we acquire not only more effectually, but more pleasantly. This forms our manners, our opinions, our lives. It is one of the strongest links of society; it is a species of mutual com∣pliance which all men yield to each other, without constraint to themselves, and which is extremely flattering to all. Herein it is that painting and many other agreeable arts have laid one of the principal foundations of their power. I shall here venture to lay down a rule, which may inform us with a good degree of certainty when we are to attribute the power of the arts, to imitation, or to our pleasure of the skill of the imitator merely, and when to sympathy, or some other cause in conjunction with it. When the object represented in poe∣try or painting is such, as we could have no desire of seeing in reality; then I may be sure that it's power in poetry or painting is owing to the power of imitation, and to no cause operating in the thing itself. So it is with most of the pieces which the painters call Still life. In these a cottage, a dunghill, the meanest and most

ordinary utensils of the kitchen, are capable of giving us pleasure. But when the object of the painting or poem is such as we should run to see if real, let it affect us with what odd sort of sense it will, we may rely upon it, that the power of the poem or picture is more owing to the nature of the thing itself than to the mere effect of imitation, or to a consideration of the skill of the imitator however excellent. Aristotle has spoken so much and so solidly upon the force of imitation in his poetics, that it makes any further discourse upon this subject the less necessary.

SECT. XVII. AMBITION.

ALTHO' imitation is one of the great instruments used by providence in bring∣ing our nature towards it's perfection, yet if men gave themselves up to imitation entirely, and each followed the other, and so on in an eternal circle, it is easy to see that there never could be any improvement amongst them. Men must remain as brutes do, the same at the end that they are at this day, and that they were in the beginning of the world. To prevent this, God has planted in man a

sense of ambition, and a satisfaction arising from the contemplation of his excelling his fellows in something deemed valuable amongst them. It is this passion that drives men to all the ways we see in use of signalizing themselves, and that tends to make whatever excites in a man the idea of this distinction so very plea∣sant. It has been so strong as to make very miserable men take comfort that they were supreme in misery; and certain it is, that where we cannot distinguish ourselves by some∣thing excellent, we begin to take a compla∣cency in some singular infirmities, follies, or defects of one kind or other. It is on this principle that flattery is so prevalent; for flat∣tery is no more than what raises in a man's mind an idea of a preference which he has not. Now whatever either on good or upon bad grounds tends to raise a man in his own opinion, produces a sort of swelling and tri∣umph that is extremely grateful to the human mind; and this swelling is never more per∣ceived, nor operates with more force, than when without danger we are conversant with terrible objects, the mind always claim∣ing to itself some part of the dignity and im∣portance of the objects with which it is con∣versant; hence proceeds what Longinus has observed of that glorying and sense of inward

greatness, that always fills the reader of such passages in poets and orators as are sublime; it is what every man must have felt in himself upon such occasions.

SECT. XVIII. The RECAPITULATION.

TO draw the whole of what has been said into a few distinct points. The passions which belong to self preservation, turn on pain and danger; they are simply painful when their causes immediately affect us; they are delightful when we have an idea of pain and danger, without being actually in such circum∣stances; this delight I have not called plea∣sure, because it turns on pain, and because it is different enough from any idea of positive pleasure. Whatever excites this delight, I call sublime. The passions belonging to self-pre∣servation are the strongest of all the passions.

SECT. XIX.

THE second head to which the passions are referred in relation to their final cause, is society. There are two sorts of societies. The first is, the society of sex. The passion belonging to this is called love, and it contains a mixture of lust; its object is the beauty of women. The other is the great society with man and all other animals. The passion sub∣servient to this is called likewise love, but it has no mixture of lust, and its object is beauty; which is a name I shall apply to all such qua∣lities in things as induce in us a sense of affecti∣on and tenderness, or some other passion the most nearly resembling these. The passion of love has its rise in positive pleasure; it is, like all things which grow out of pleasure, capable of being mixed with a mode of un∣easiness, that is, when an idea of its object is excited in the mind with an idea at the same time of having irretrievably lost it. This mixed sense of pleasure I have not called pain, because it turns upon actual pleasure, and be∣cause it is both in its cause and in most of its effects of a nature altogether different.

SECT. XX. The same.

NEXT to the general passion we have for society, to a choice in which we are directed by the pleasure we have in the object, the particular passion under this head called sympathy has the greatest extent. The nature of this passion is to put us in the place of another in whatever circumstance he is in, and to affect us in a like manner; so that this passion may, as the occasion requires, turn ei∣ther on pain or pleasure; but with the modi∣fications mentioned in some cases in sect. 11. As to imitation and preference nothing more need be said.

SECT. XXI. The CONCLUSION.

I Believed that an attempt to range and me∣thodize some of our most leading passions would be a good preparative to an enquiry of the nature of that which is to be attempted in the ensuing discourse. The passions I have

mentioned are almost the only ones which it can be necessary to our present design to con∣sider; though the variety of the passions is great, and worthy in every branch of that va∣riety of an attentive investigation. The more accurately we search into the human mind, the stronger traces we every where find of his wisdom who made it. If a discourse on the use of the parts of the body may be considered as an hymn to the Creator; the use of the passions, which are the organs of the mind, cannot be barren of praise to him, nor unpro∣ductive to ourselves of that noble and uncommon union of science, and admiration, which a contemplation of the works of infinite wisdom alone can afford to a rational mind; whilst re∣ferring to him whatever we find of right, or good, or fair in ourselves, discovering his strength and wisdom even in our own weak∣ness and imperfection, honouring them where we discover them clearly, and adoring their profundity where we are lost in our search, we may be inquisitive without impertinence, and elevated without pride; we may be admit∣ted, if I may dare to say so, into the counsels of the Almighty by a consideration of his works. This elevation of the mind ought to be the principal end of all our studies, which

if they do not in some measure effect, they are of very little service to us. But besides this great purpose, a consideration of the rationale of our passions seems to me very necessary for all who would affect them upon solid and sure princi∣ples. It is not enough to know them in ge∣neral; to affect them after a delicate manner, or to judge properly of any work designed to affect them, we should know the exact boun∣daries of their several jurisdictions; we should pursue them through all their variety of opera∣tions, and pierce into the inmost, and what might appear inaccessible parts of our nature,

Quod latet arcanâ non enarrabile fibrâ.

Without all this it is possible for a man after a confused manner, sometimes to satisfy his own mind of the truth of his work; but he never can have a certain determinate rule to go by, nor can he ever make his propositions sufficient∣ly clear to others. Poets, and orators, and painters, and those who cultivate other branches of the liberal arts, have without this critical knowledge succeeded well in their se∣veral provinces, and will succeed; as among artificers there are many machines made and even invented without any exact knowledge of

the principles they are governed by. It is, I own, not uncommon to be wrong in theory and right in practice; and we are happy that it is so. Men often act right from their feelings, who afterwards reason but ill on them from princi∣ple; but as it is impossible to avoid an attempt at such reasoning, and equally impossible to pre∣vent its having some influence on our practice, surely it is worth taking some pains to have it just, and founded on the basis of sure experi∣ence. The artists themselves, who might be most relied on here, have been too much oc∣cupied in the practice; the philosophers have done little, and what they have done, was mostly with a view to their own schemes and systems; and as for those called critics, they have generally sought the rule of the arts in the wrong place; they sought it among poems, pictures, engravings, statues and buildings. But art can never give the rules that make an art. This is, I believe, the reason why artists in general, and poets principally, have been confined in so narrow a circle; they have been rather imitators of one another than of nature; and this with so faithful an unifor∣mity, and to so remote an antiquity, that it is hard to say who gave the first model. Critics follow them, and therefore can do little as

guides. I can judge but poorly of any thing whilst I measure it by no other standard than itself. The true standard of the arts is in every man's power; and an easy observation of the commonest, sometimes of the meanest things in nature, will give the truest lights, where the greatest sagacity and industry that slights such observation, must leave us in the dark, or what is worse, amuse and mislead us by false lights. In an enquiry, it is almost every thing to be once in a right road. I am satisfied I have done but little by these observations considered in themselves, and I never should have taken the pains to digest them, much less should I have ever ventured to publish them, if I was not convinced that nothing tends more to the corruption of science than to suffer it to stagnate. These waters must be troubled be∣fore they can exert their virtues. A man who works beyond the surface of things, though he may be wrong himself, yet clears the way for others, and may chance to make even his errors subservient to the cause of truth. In the following parts, I shall enquire what things they are that cause in us the affections of the sublime and beautiful, as in this I have con∣sidered the affections themselves. I only de∣sire one favour; that no part of this discourse

may be judged of by itself, and independently of the rest; for I am sensible I have not dis∣posed my materials to abide the test of a cap∣tious controversy, but of a sober and even for∣giving examination; that they are not armed at all points for battle; but dressed to visit those who are willing to give a peaceful en∣trance to truth.

The end of the first Part.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Mr Locke (essay on human understanding, l. 2. c. 20. sect. 16.) thinks that the removal or lessening of a pain is considered and operates as a pleasure, and the loss or diminishing of pleasure as a pain. It is this opinion which we consider here.