A philosophical enquiry into the origin of our ideas of the sublime and beautiful:

SECT. X. Of BEAUTY.

THE passion which belongs to genera∣tion, merely as such, is lust only; this is evident in brutes, whose passions are more unmixed, and which pursue their purposes more directly than ours. The only distinction

they observe with regard to their mates, is that of sex. It is true, that they stick severally to their own species in preference to all others; but this preference, I imagine, does not arise from any sense of beauty which they find in their species, as Mr. Addison supposes, but from a law of some other kind to which they are subject; and this we may fairly conclude, from their apparent want of choice amongst those objects to which the barriers of their species have confined them. But man, who is a creature adapted to a greater variety and intricacy of relation, connects with the gene∣ral passion, the idea of some social qualities, which direct and heighten the appetite which he has in common with all other ani∣mals; and as he is not designed like them to live at large, it is fit that he should have some∣thing to create a preference, and fix his choice; and this in general should be some sensible quality; as no other can so quickly, so pow∣erfully; or so surely produce it's effect. The object therefore of this mixed passion which we call love, is the beauty of the sex. Men are carried to the sex in general, as it is the sex, and by the common law of nature; but they are attached to particulars by personal beauty. I call beauty a social quality; for where women and men, and not only they,

but when other animals give us a sense of joy and pleasure in beholding them, (and there are many that do so) they inspire us with sen∣timents of tenderness and affection towards their persons; we like to have them near us, and we enter willingly into a kind of relation with them, unless we should have strong rea∣sons to the contrary. But to what end, in many cases, this was designed, I am unable to discover; for I see no greater reason for a connection between man and several animals who are attired in so engaging a manner, than between him and some others who en∣tirely want this attraction, or possess it in a far weaker degree. But it is probable, that pro∣vidence did not make even this distinction, but with a view to some great end, though we cannot perceive distinctly what it is, as his wisdom is not our wisdom, nor our ways his ways.