A philosophical enquiry into the origin of our ideas of the sublime and beautiful:

A Philosophical Enquiry INTO THE ORIGIN of our IDEAS OF THE SUBLIME and BEAUTIFUL. PART III. Of BEAUTY.

SECT. I.

IT is my design to consider beauty as distinguished from the sublime; and in the course of the enquiry, to examine how far it is consistent with it. But previous to this, we must take a short review of the opinions already entertained of this quality; which I think are hardly to be reduced to any fixed principles; because men are used to talk of beauty in a figurative manner, that is to say, in a manner extremely uncertain, and indeterminate. By beauty I mean, that qua∣lity

or those qualities in bodies by which they cause love, or some passion similar to it.

SECT. II. Proportion not the cause of BEAUTY in VEGETABLES.

BEAUTY is usually said to consist in cer∣tain proportions of parts; on consider∣ing the matter, I have great reason to doubt, whether beauty be at all an idea belonging to proportion. Proportion relates almost wholly to convenience, as every idea of order seems to do; and it must therefore be considered as a creature of the understanding, rather than a primary cause acting on the senses and imagination. It is not by the force of long at∣tention and enquiry that we find any object to be beautiful; beauty demands no assistance from our reasoning; even the will is uncon∣cerned: the appearance of beauty as effectu∣ally causes some degree of love in us, as the application of ice or fire produces the ideas of heat or cold. To gain something like a sa∣tisfactory conclusion in this point; it were well to examine, first, in what things we find this quality of beauty; next, to see whether

in these, we can find any assignable propor∣tions, in such a manner as ought to convince us, that our idea of beauty results from them. We shall consider this pleasing power, as it appears in vegetables, in the inferior animals, and in man. Turning our eyes to the vege∣table creation, we find nothing there so beau∣tiful as flowers; but flowers are of almost every sort of shape, and of every sort of disposition; they are turned and fashioned into an infinite variety of forms; and from these forms, bota∣nists have given them their names, which are almost as various. What proportion do we discover between the stalks and the leaves of flowers, or between the leaves and the pistils? How does the slender stalk of the rose agree with the bulky head under which it bends? but the rose is a beautiful flower; and can we undertake to say that it does not owe a great deal of its beauty even to that dispropor∣tion? the rose is a large flower, yet it grows upon a small shrub; the flower of the apple is very small, and it grows upon a large tree; yet the rose and the apple blossom are both beautiful, and the plants that bear them are most engagingly attired notwithstanding this disproportion. What by general consent is allowed to be a more beautiful object than an orange tree, flourishing at once with its leaves,

its blossoms, and its fruit? but it is in vain that we search here for any proportion between the height, the breadth, or any thing else con∣cerning the dimensions of the whole, or con∣cerning the relation of the particular parts to each other. I grant that we may observe in many flowers, something of a regular figure, and of a methodical disposition of the leaves. The rose has such a figure and such a diposi∣tion of its petals; but in an oblique view, when this figure is in a good measure lost, and the order of the leaves confounded, it yet re∣tains its beauty; the rose is even more beau∣tiful before it is full blown; in the bud; before this exact figure is formed; and this is not the only instance wherein method and exact∣ness, the soul of proportion, are found rather prejudicial than serviceable to the cause of beauty.

SECT. III. Proportion not the cause of BEAUTY in ANIMALS.

THAT proportion has but a small share in the formation of beauty, is full as evident among animals. Here the greatest variety of shapes, and dispositions of parts are well fitted,

to excite this idea. The swan, confessedly a beautiful bird, has a neck longer than the rest of his body, and but a very short tail; is this a beautiful proportion? we must allow that it is. But then what shall we say to the pea∣cock, who has comparatively but a short neck, with a tail longer than the neck and the rest of the body taken together? How many birds are there that vary infinitely from each of these standards, and from every other which you can fix, with proportions different, and often directly opposite to each other! and yet many of these birds are extremely beautiful; when upon considering them we find nothing in any one part that might determine us, a priori, to say what the others ought to be, nor indeed to guess any thing about them, but what expe∣rience might shew to be full of disappointment and mistake. And with regard to the colours either of birds or flowers, for there is some∣thing similar in the colouring of both, whe∣ther they are considered in their extension or gradation, there is nothing of proportion to be observed. Some are of but one single colour; others have all the colours of the rainbow; some are of the primary colours, others are of the mixt; in short, an attentive observer may soon conclude, that there is as little of proportion in the colouring as in the

shapes of these objects. Turn next to beasts; examine the head of a beautiful horse; find what proportion that bears to his body, and to his limbs, and what relation these have to each other; and when you have settled these proportions as a standard of beauty, then take a dog or cat, or any other animal, and ex∣amine how far the same proportions between their heads and their necks, between those and the body, and so on, are found to hold; I think we may safely say, that they differ in every species, yet that there are individuals found in a great many species so differing, that have a very striking beauty.

SECT. IV. Proportion not the cause of BEAUTY in the human species.

THERE are some parts of the hu∣man body, that are observed to hold certain proportions to each other; but before it can be proved, that the efficient cause of beauty lies in these, it must be shewn, that wherever these are found exact, the person to whom they belong is beautiful. I mean in the effect produced on the view, either of any member distinctly considered, or

of the whole body together. It must be like∣wise shewn, that these parts stand in such a relation to each other, that the comparison between them may be easily made, and that the affection of the mind may naturally result from it. For my part, I have at several times very carefully examined many of those pro∣portions, and found them hold very nearly, or altogether alike in many subjects, which were not only very different from one another, but where one has been very beautiful, and the other very remote from beauty. With re∣gard to the parts which are found so propor∣tioned, they are often so remote from each other, in situation, nature, and office, that I cannot see how they admit of any comparison, nor consequently how any effect owing to pro∣portion can result from them. The neck, say they, in beautiful bodies should measure with the calf of the leg; it should likewise be twice the circumference of the wrist. And an infi∣nity of observations of this kind to be found in the writings, and conversations of many. These proportions are certainly to be found in handsome bodies. They are as certainly in ugly ones, as any who will take the pains to try, may find. Nay, I do not know but they may be least perfect in some of the most beau∣tiful. How are the partizans of proportional

beauty agreed about the proportions of the human body? some hold it to be seven heads; others make it eight; a vast difference in such a small number of divisions! others take other methods of estimating the proportions, and all with equal success. But are these pro∣portions exactly the same in all handsome men? or are they at all the proportions found in beautiful women? nobody will say that they are; yet both sexes are capable of beauty, but the female of the greatest, which I believe will hardly be attributed to the superior exact∣ness of proportion in the fair sex. In fine, take the head as the measure of proportion in any species of animals, as in men; and having found what relation that bears to the other parts, examine the beautiful animals of the winged and four-footed kinds by this rule; and it will shew evidently what a fallacious standard we have chosen; the same will hap∣pen if you take any other part of any other animal whatsoever, as your rule to measure by. The proportions of animals are relative to the usual form in which we see them; if this is changed, we are shocked in the same manner that we are when any thing happens contrary to expectation. It must not be denied, that if the parts of any animal are so formed that they do not well support

each other, the effect is disagreeable; but to have them simply otherwise, that is, not bur∣thensome to one another, does not by any means produce beauty.

SECT. V. Proportion further considered.

NOW if it be allowed, that almost every sort of form, and every manner of ar∣rangement is consistent with beauty, I ima∣gine it amounts to a concession that no par∣ticular proportions are necessary to it. But if I am not mistaken, a great deal of the opi∣nions concerning proportion have arisen from this; that deformity has been considered as the opposite to beauty; and that the removal of the former of these qualities gave birth to the latter. This I believe is a mistake. For de∣formity is opposed, not to beauty, but to the compleat, common form. If one of the legs of a man be found shorter than the other, the man is deformed; because there is something wanting to compleat the whole idea we form of a man; and this has the same effect in natural faults, as maiming and mutilation pro∣duce from accidents. So if the back be humped, the man is deformed; because his

back has an unusual figure, and what carries with it the idea of some disease or misfortune; so if a man's neck be considerably longer or shorter than usual, we say he is deformed in that part, because men are not commonly made in that manner. But surely every hour's expe∣rience may convince us, that a man may have his legs of an equal length, and resembling each other in all respects, and his neck of a just size, and his back quite strait, without hav∣ing at the same time the least perceivable beauty. Deformity arises from the want of the common proportions; but the necessary result of their existence in any object is not beauty. I say the common proportions in each species of animals, because these pro∣portions vary in all of them; there can be no absolute proportion assigned which con∣stitutes an universal beauty; and a proportion which cannot be assigned, is, in other words, no proportion at all. But if proportion in na∣tural things be relative to custom and use, the nature of use and custom will shew, that beauty, which is a positive and powerful quality, can∣not result from it. We are so wonderfully formed, that at the same time that we are creatures vehemently desirous of novelty, we are as strongly attached to habit and custom. But it is the nature of things which hold us

by custom to affect us very little whilst we are in possession of them, but strongly when they are absent. I remember to have frequented a certain place, every day for a long time toge∣ther; and I may truly say, that so far from finding pleasure in it, that I was affected with a fort of weariness and disgust; I came, I went, I returned without pleasure; yet if by any means I passed by the usual time of my going thither, I was remarkably uneasy, and was not quiet till I had got into my old track. They who use snuff take it almost without being sensible that they take it, and the acute sense of smell is deadened so as to feel hardly any thing from so sharp a stimulus; yet deprive the snuff-taker of his box, and he is the most uneasy mortal in the world. So the want of the usual proportion in men and other animals is sure to disgust, though their presence is by no means any cause of real pleasure. It is true, that the proportions laid down as causes of beauty in the human body are frequently found in beautiful ones, because they are generally found in all mankind; but if it can be shewn too that they are found without beauty, and that beauty frequently exists without them, and that this beauty, where it exists, always can be assigned to other less equivocal causes, it will naturally lead us to conclude, that pro∣portion

and beauty are not ideas of the same nature. The true opposite to beauty is not disproportion or deformity, but ugliness; and as it proceeds from causes opposite to those of positive beauty, we cannot consider it until we come to treat of that. Between beauty and ugliness there is a sort of mediocrity, in which the assigned proportions are most com∣monly found, but this has no effect upon the passions.

SECT. VI. FITNESS not the cause of BEAUTY.

IT is said that the idea of utility, or of a part's being well adapted to answer its end, is the cause of beauty, or indeed beauty itself. This notion is closely allied to the former one of proportion, but surely never arose from experience. For at that rate, the wedge-like snout of a swine, with its tough cartilage at the end, its little sunk eyes, and the whole make so well adapted to its offices of digging, and rooting, would be extremely beautiful. The great bag hanging to the bill of a pelican, a thing highly useful to this animal, would be likewise as beautiful in our eyes. The hedgehog, so well secured against all assaults

by his prickly hide, or the porcupine with his missile quills, would be then considered as creatures of no small beauty. There are few animals, whose parts are better contrived than those of a monkey, he has the hands of a man, joined to the springy limbs of a beast; and is admirably calculated for running, leaping, grappling, and climbing: and yet there are few animals seem to us to have less beauty. To leave these foreign examples; if beauty in our own species, was annexed to use, men would be much more lovely than women; and strength and agility would be considered as the only beauties. But to call strength by the name of beauty, to have but one denomina∣tion for the qualities of a Venus and Hercu∣les, so totally different in almost all respects, is surely a strange confusion of ideas, or abuse of words. The cause of this confusion, I ima∣gine, proceeds from our frequently per∣ceiving the parts of the human and other animal bodies to be at once very beautiful, and very well adapted to their purposes; and we are deceived by a sophism, which makes us take that for a cause which is only a conco∣mitant; this is the sophism of the fly; who imagined he raised a great dust, because he stood upon the chariot that really raised it. The stomach, the lungs, the liver, as well as

other parts, are incomparably well adapted to their purposes; yet they are far from hav∣ing any beauty. Again, many things are very beautiful, in which it is impossible to dis∣cern any idea of use. And I appeal to the first and most natural feelings of mankind, whether on beholding a beautiful eye, or a well-fashion∣ed mouth, or a well-turned leg, any ideas of their being well fitted for seeing, eating, or running, ever present themselves. What idea of use is it that flowers excite, the most beautiful part of the vegetable world? It is true, that the infinitely wise and good Creator has, of his bounty, frequently joined beauty to those things which he has made useful to us; but this does not prove that an idea of use and beauty are the same thing, or that they are any way dependent on each other.

SECT. VII. The real effects of FITNESS.

WHEN I excluded proportion and fit∣ness from any share in beauty, I did not by any means intend to say that they were of no value, or that they ought to be dis∣regarded in works of art. Works of art are the proper sphere of their power; and here it

is that they have their full effect. Whenever the wisdom of our Creator intended that we should be affected with any thing, he did not confide the execution of his design to the languid and precarious operation of our rea∣son; but he endued it with powers and pro∣perties that prevent the understanding, and even the will, which seizing upon the senses and imagination, captivate the soul before the understanding is ready either to join with them or to oppose them. It is by a long deduction and much study that we discover the adorable wisdom of God in his works: when we dis∣cover it, the effect is very different, not only in the manner of acquiring it, but in its own nature, from that which strikes us without any preparation from the sublime or the beau∣tiful. How different is the satisfaction of an anatomist, who discovers the use of the muscles and of the skin, the excellent contrivance of the one for the various movements of the body, and the wonderful texture of the other, at once a general, covering and at once a general outlet, as well as inlet; how dif∣ferent is this from the affection which pos∣sesses an ordinary man at the sight of a de∣licate smooth skin, and all the other parts of beauty which require no investigation to be perceived? In the former case, whilst we

look up to the Maker with admiration and praise, the object which causes it may be odious and distasteful; the latter very often so touches us by its power on the ima∣gination, that we examine but little into the artifice of its contrivance, and we have need of a strong effort of our reason to disentangle our minds from the allurements of the object to a consideration of the wisdom of that hand which invented so powerful a machine. The effect of proportion and fitness, at least so far as they proceed from a mere consideration of the work itself, produce approbation, the ac∣quiescence of the understanding, but not love, nor any passion of that species. When we examine the structure of a watch, when we come to know thoroughly the use of every part of it, satisfied as we are with the fitness of the whole, we are far enough from per∣ceiving any thing like beauty in the watch-work itself; but let us look on the case, the labour of some curious artist in engraving, with little or no idea of use, we shall have a much livelier idea of beauty than we ever could have had from the watch itself, though the master-piece of Graham. In beauty, as I said, the effect is previous to any know∣ledge of the use; but to judge of proportion, we must know the end for which any work is

designed. According to the end the propor∣tion varies. Thus there is one proportion of a tower, another of an house; one proportion of a gallery, another of an hall, another of a chamber. To judge of the proportions of these, you must be first acquainted with the purposes for which they were designed. Good sense and experience acting together, find out what is fit to be done in every work of art. We are rational creatures, and in all our works we ought to regard their end and pur∣pose; the gratification of any passion, how innocent soever, ought only to be of second∣ary consideration. Herein is placed the real power of fitness and proportion; they ope∣rate on the understanding considering them, which approves the work and acquiesces in it. The passions, and the imagination which prin∣cipally raises them, have here very little to do. When a room appears in its original naked∣ness, bare walls and a plain cieling; let its proportion be ever so excellent, it pleases very little; a cold approbation is the utmost we can reach; a much worse proportioned room, with elegant mouldings and fine festoons, glasses, and other merely ornamental furniture, will make the imagination revolt against the reason; it will please much more than the naked proportion of the first room which

the understanding has so much approved, as admirably fitted for its purposes. What I have here said and before concerning propor∣tion, is by no means to persuade people ab∣surdly to neglect the idea of use in the works of art. It is only to shew that these excellent things, beauty and proportion, are not the same; not that they should either of them be disregarded.

SECT. VIII. The RECAPITULATION.

ON the whole; if such parts in human bodies as are found proportioned, were likewise constantly found beautiful, as they certainly are not; or if they were so situated, as that a pleasure might flow from the com∣parison, which they seldom are; or if any assignable proportions were found, either in plants or animals, which were always attend∣ed with beauty, which never was the case; or if, where parts were well adapted to their purposes, they were constantly beautiful, and when no use appeared, there was no beauty, which is contrary to all experience; we might conclude, that beauty consisted in proportion or utility. But since, in all respects, the case

is quite otherwise; we may be satisfied, that beauty does not depend on these, let it owe its origin to what else it will.

SECT. IX. Perfection not the cause of BEAUTY.

THERE is another notion current, pretty closely allied to the former; that Perfection is the constituent cause of beauty. This opinion has been made to extend much further than to sensible objects. But in these, so far is perfection, considered as such, from being the cause of beauty; that this quality, where it is highest in the female sex, almost always carries with it an idea of weakness and imperfection. Women are very sensible of this; for which reason, they learn to lisp, to tot∣ter in their walk, to counterfeit weakness, and even sickness. In all this, they are guided by nature. Beauty in distress is much the most affecting beauty. Blushing has little less power; and modesty in general, which is a tacit allowance of imperfection, is itself con∣sidered as an amiable quality, and certainly heightens every other that is so. I know, that it is in every body's mouth, that we ought to love perfection. This is to me a sufficient

proof, that it is not the proper object of love. Who ever said, we ought to love a fine wo∣man, or even any of these beautiful animals, which please us? Here to be affected, there is no need of the concurrence of our will.

SECT. X. How far the idea of BEAUTY may be ap∣plied to the qualities of the MIND.

NOR is this remark in general less appli∣cable to the qualities of the mind. Those virtues which cause admiration, and are of the sublimer kind, produce terror rather than love. Such as fortitude, justice, wisdom, and the like. Never was any man amiable by force of these qualities. Those which en∣gage our hearts, which impress us with a sense of loveliness, are the softer virtues; easiness of temper, compassion, kindness and liberality; though certainly those latter are of less immediate and momentous concern to society, and of less dignity. But it is for that reason that they are so amiable. The great virtues turn principally on dangers, punish∣ments, and troubles, and are exercised rather in preventing the worst mischiefs, than in dis∣pensing favours; and are therefore not lovely,

though highly venerable. The subordinate turn on reliefs, gratifications, and indulgences; and are therefore more lovely, though inferior in dignity. Those persons who creep into the hearts of most people, who are chosen as the companions of their softer hours, and their reliefs from care and anxiety, are never persons of shining qualities, nor strong vir∣tues. It is rather the soft green of the soul on which we rest our eyes, that are fatigued with beholding more glaring objects. It is worth observing, how we feel ourselves affected with reading the characters of Caesar, and Cato, as they are so finely drawn and con∣trasted in Salust. In one, the ignoscendo, largiundo; in the other, nil largiundo. In one, the miseris perfugium; in the other, malis perniciem. In the latter we have much to ad∣mire, much to reverence, and perhaps some∣thing to fear; we respect him, but we re∣spect him at a distance. The former makes us familiar with him; we love him, and he leads us whither he pleases. To draw things closer to our first and most natural feelings; I will add to this a remark made upon reading this section by an ingenious friend. The authority of a father, so useful to our well-being, and so justly venerable upon all accounts, hinders us from having that entire love for him that

we have for our mothers, where the parental authority is almost melted down into the mo∣ther's fondness and indulgence. But we gene∣rally have a great love for our grandfathers, in whom this authority is removed a degree from us, and where the weakness of age mel∣lows it into something of a feminine par∣tiality.

SECT. XI. How far the idea of BEAUTY may be applied to VIRTUE.

FROM what has been said in the fore∣going section, we may easily see, how far the application of beauty to virtue may be made with propriety. The general application of this metaphorical quality to virtue, has a strong tendency to confound our ideas of things; and it has given rise to an infinite deal of whimsical theory; as the affixing the name of beauty to proportion, congruity and perfec∣tion, as well as to qualities of things yet more remote from our natural ideas of it, and from one another, has tended to confound our ideas of beauty, and left us no standard or rule to judge by, that was not even more uncertain and fallacious than our own fancies.

SECT. XII. The real cause of BEAUTY.

HAVING endeavoured to shew what beauty is not, it remains that we should examine, at least with equal attention, in what it really consists; for beauty is a thing much too affecting not to depend upon some positive qualities. Now certainly, since it is no creature of our reason, since it strikes us without any reference to use, and even where no use at all can be discerned, since the order and method of nature is generally very diffe∣rent from our measures and proportions, we must conclude that beauty is, for the greater part, some merely sensible quality, acting mechanically upon the human mind by the in∣tervention of the senses. And we ought there∣fore to consider in what manner those sensible qualities are disposed, in such things as by ex∣perience we find beautiful, or which excite in us the passion of love, or some correspond∣ent affection.

SECT. XIII. Beautiful objects small.

THE most obvious point that presents itself to us in examining any object, is its extent or quantity. And what degree of extent prevails in bodies, that are held beau∣tiful, may be gathered from the usual manner of expression concerning it. I am told that in most languages, the objects of love are spoken of under diminutive epithets. It is so in all the languages of which I have any knowledge. in Greek the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and other diminutive terms, are almost always the terms of affection and tenderness. These diminutives were com∣monly added by the same people to the names of persons with whom they conversed on terms of friendship and familiarity. Though the Romans were a people of less quick and de∣licate feelings, yet they naturally slid into the lessening termination upon the same occasions. Anciently in the English language the di∣minishing ling was added to the names of persons or things that were the objects of love. Some we retain still, as darling, (or little dear) and a few others. But to this day in ordinary conversation, it is usual to add the endearing

name of little to every thing we love; the French and Italians make use of these affection∣ate diminutives even more than we. In the animal creation, out of our own species, it is the small we are inclined to be fond of. Little birds, and some of the smaller kinds of beasts. A great beautiful thing, is a manner of ex∣pression scarcely ever used; but that of a great ugly thing, is very common. There is a wide difference between admiration and love. The sublime, which is the cause of the former, always dwells on great objects, and terrible; the latter on small ones, and pleasing; we submit to what we admire; but we love what submits to us; in one case we are forced, in the other we are flattered into compliance. In short, the ideas of the sublime and the beau∣tiful stand on foundations so different, that it is hard, I had almost said impossible, to think of reconciling them in the same subject, with∣out considerably lessening the effect of the one or the other upon the passions. So that at∣tending to their quantity, beautiful objects are comparatively small.

SECT. XIV. SMOOTHNESS.

THE next property constantly observable in such objects is * 1.1 Smoothness. A qua∣lity so essential to beauty, that I do not now recollect any thing beautiful that is not smooth. In trees and flowers, smooth leaves are beau∣tiful; smooth slopes of earth in gardens; smooth streams in the landscape; smooth coats of birds and beasts in animal beauties; in fine women, smooth skins; and in several sorts of ornamental furniture, smooth and polish∣ed surfaces. A very considerable part of the effect of beauty is owing to this quality; in∣deed the most considerable. For take any beautiful object, and give it a broken and rugged surface, and however well form∣ed it may be in other respects, it pleases no longer. Whereas let it want ever so many of the other constituents, if it wants not this, it becomes more pleasing than al∣most all the others without it. This seems to me so evident, that I am a good deal sur∣prised, that none who have handled the sub∣ject

have made any mention of the quality of smoothness in the enumeration of those that go to the forming of beauty. For indeed any ruggedness, any sudden projection, any sharp angle is in the highest degree contrary to that idea.

SECT. XV. Gradual VARIATION.

BUT as perfectly beautiful bodies are not composed of angular parts, so their parts never continue long in the same right line. † 1.2 They vary their direction every moment, and they change under the eye by a deviation continually carrying on, but for whose be∣ginning or end you will find it difficult to as∣certain a point. The view of a beautiful bird will illustrate this observation. Here we see the head increasing insensibly to the middle, from whence it lessens gradually until it mixes with the neck; the neck loses itself in a larger swell, which continues to the middle of the body, when the whole decreases again to the tail; the tail takes a new direction;

but it soon varies its new course; it blends again with the other parts; and the line is perpetually and insensibly changing, above, below, upon every side. In this description I have before me the idea of a dove; it agrees very well with most of the conditions of beauty. It is smooth and downy; its parts are (to use that expression) melted into one another; you are presented with no sudden protu∣berance through the whole, and yet the whole is continually changing. Observe that part of a beautiful woman where she is perhaps the most beautiful, about the neck and breasts; the smoothness; the softness; the easy and insen∣sible swell; the variety of the surface, which is never for the smallest space the same; the de∣ceitful maze, through which the unsteady eye slides giddily, without knowing where to fix, or whither it is carried. Is not this a demon∣stration of that change of surface continual and yet hardly perceptible at any point which forms one of the great constituents of beauty?

SECT. XVI. DELICACY.

AN air of robustness and strength is very prejudicial to beauty. An appearance of delicacy, and even of fragility, is almost es∣sential to it. Whoever examines the vege∣table or animal creation, will find this obser∣vation to be founded in nature. It is not the oak, the ash, or the elm, or any of the robust trees of the forest which we consider as beautiful; they are awful and majestic; they inspire a sort of reverence. It is the delicate myrtle, it is the orange, it is the almond, it is the jessamine, it is the vine, which we look on as vegetable beauties. It is the flowery species, so remarkable for its weakness and momentary duration, that gives us the liveliest idea of beauty, and elegance. Among animals; the greyhound is more beautiful than the mastiff; and the delicacy of a gennet, a barb, or an Arabian horse, is much more amiable, than the strength and stability of some horses of war or carriage. I need here say little of the fair sex, where I believe the point will be easily allowed me. The beauty of women is con∣siderably owing to their weakness, or delicacy,

and is even enhanced by their timidity, a quality of mind analogous to it. I would not here be understood to say, that weakness be∣traying very bad health has any share in beau∣ty; but the ill effect of this is not because it is weakness, but because the ill state of health which produces such weakness alters the other conditions of beauty; the parts in such a case collapse; the bright colour, the lumen purpu∣reum juventae is gone; and the fine variation is lost in wrinkles, sudden breaks, and right lines.

SECT XVII. Beauty in COLOUR.

AS to the colours usually found in beauti∣ful bodies; it may be somewhat difficult to ascertain them, because in the several parts of nature, there is an infinite variety. How∣ever, even in this variety, we may mark out something on which to settle. First, the colours of beautiful bodies must not be dusky or muddy, but clean and fair. Secondly, they must not be of the strongest kind. Those which seem most appropriated to beauty, are the milder of every sort; light greens; soft blues; weak whites; pink reds; and violets.

Thirdly, if the colours be strong and vivid, they are always diversified, and the object is never of one strong colour; there are almost always such a number of them (as in variegated flowers) that the strength and glare of each is considerably abated. In a fine complexion, there is not only some variety in the colour∣ing, but the colours, neither the red nor the white are strong and glaring. Besides, they are mixed in such a manner, and with such gra∣dations, that it is impossible to fix the bounds. On the same principle it is, that the dubious colour in the necks and tails of peacocks, and about the heads of drakes, is so very agreeable. In reality, the beauty both of shape and colour∣ing are as nearly related, as we can well sup∣pose it possible for things of such different natures to be.

SECT. XVIII. RECAPITULATION.

ON the whole, the qualities of beauty, as they are merely sensible qualities, are are the following. First, to be comparatively small. Secondly, to be smooth. Thirdly, to have a variety in the direction of the parts; but fourthly, to have those parts not angular,

but melted as it were into each other. Fifthly, to be of a delicate frame, without any remarkable appearance of strength. Sixthly, to have its colours clear and bright; but not very strong and glaring. Seventhly, or if it should have any glaring colour, to have it diversified with others. These are, I believe, the properties on which beauty depends; properties that ope∣rate by nature, and are less liable to be altered by caprice, or confounded by a diversity of tastes, than any others.

SECT. XIX. The PHYSIOGNOMY.

THE Physiognomy has a considerable share in beauty, especially in that of our own species. The manners give a certain deter∣mination to the countenance, which being ob∣served to correspond pretty regularly with them, is capable of joining the effect of cer∣tain agreeable qualities of the mind to those of the body. So that to form a finished human beauty, and to give it its full influence, the face must be expressive of such gentle and amiable qualities, as correspond with the soft∣ness, smoothness, and delicacy of the outward form.

SECT. XX. The EYE.

I HAVE hitherto purposely omitted to speak of the Eye, which has so great a share in the beauty of the animal creation, as it did not fall so easily under the foregoing heads, though in fact it is reducible to the same prin∣ciples. I think then, that the beauty of the eye consists, first, in its clearness; what coloured eye shall please most, depends a good deal on particular fancies; but none are pleased with an eye, whose water (to use that term) is dull and muddy. * 1.3 We are pleased with the eye in this view, on the principle upon which we like diamonds, clear water, glass, and such like transparent substances. Secondly, the motion of the eye contributes to its beauty, by continually shifting its direction; but a slow and languid motion is more beautiful than a brisk one; the latter is enlivening; the former lovely. Thirdly, with regard to its union with the neighbouring parts, it is to hold the same rule that is given of other beautiful ones; it is not to make a strong deviation from the

line of the neighbouring parts; nor to verge into any exact geometrical figure. Besides all this, the eye affects, as it is expressive of some qualities of the mind, and its principal power generally arises from this; so that what we have just said of the physiognomy is applicable here.

SECT. XXI. UGLINESS.

IT may perhaps appear like a sort of repe∣tition of what we have before said, to insist here upon the nature of Ugliness. As I ima∣gine it to be in all respects the opposite to those qualities which we have laid down for the con∣stituents of beauty. But though ugliness be the opposite to beauty, it is not the opposite to proportion and fitness. For it is possible that a thing may be very ugly with any propor∣tions, and with a perfect fitness to any uses. Ugliness I imagine likewise to be consistent enough with an idea of the sublime. But I would by no means insinuate that ugliness of itself is a sublime idea, unless united with such qualities as excite a strong terror.

SECT. XXII. GRACE.

GRacefulness is an idea not very different from beauty; it consists in much the same things. Gracefulness is an idea belonging to posture and motion. In both these, to be grace∣ful, it is requisite that there be no appearance of difficulty; there is required a small inflexion of the body; and a composure of the parts, in such a manner, as not to incumber each other, nor to appear divided by sharp and sudden angles. In this ease, this roundness, and de∣licacy of attitude and motion, it is that all the magic of grace consists, and what is called its je ne scai quoi, as will be more obvious to any body who considers attentively the Venus de Medicis, the Antinous, or any statue generally allowed to be graceful in an high degree.

SECT. XXIII. ELEGANCE and SPECIOUSNESS.

WHEN any body is composed of parts smooth and polished, without pressing upon each other, without shewing any rugged∣ness

or confusion, and at the same time affect∣ing some regular shape, I call it elegant. It is closely allied to the beautiful, differing from it only in this regularity; which however, as it makes a very material difference, in the affection produced, may very well constitute another species. Under this head I rank those delicate and regular works of art, that imitate no determinate object in nature, as elegant buildings, and pieces of furniture. When any object partakes of the abovementioned qualities, or of those of beautiful bodies, and is withal of great dimensions; it is full as remote from the idea of mere beauty. I call it fine or specious.

SECT. XXIV. The beautiful in FEELING.

THE foregoing description of beauty, so far as is taken in by the eye, may be greatly illustrated by describing the nature of objects, which produce a similar effect through the touch. This I call the beautiful in Feeling. It corresponds wonderfully with what causes the same species of pleasure to the sight. There is a chain in all our sensations, they are all but different sorts of feeling, calculated to be affected by various forts of objects, but

all to be affected after the same manner. All bodies that are pleasant to the touch, are so by the slightness of the resistance they make. Re∣sistance is either to motion along the surface, or to the pressure of the parts on one another; if the former be slight, we call the body, smooth; if the latter, soft. The chief pleasure we receive by feeling, is in the one or the other of these qualities; and if there be a combination of both, our pleasure is greatly increased. This is so plain, that it is rather more fit to illustrate other things, than to be illustrated itself by any exam∣ple. The next source of pleasure in this sense, as in every other, is the continually presenting somewhat new; and we find that bodies which continually vary their surface, are much the most pleasant, or beautiful, to the feeling, as any one that pleases may experience. The third property in such objects is, that though the surface continually varies its direction, it never varies it suddenly. The application of any thing sudden, even though the impression it∣self have little or nothing of violence, is dis∣agreeable. The quick application of a finger a little warmer or colder than usual, without notice, makes us start; a slight tap on the shoulder, not expected, has the same effect. Hence it is that angular bodies, bodies that

suddenly vary the direction of the outline, af∣ford so little pleasure to the feeling. Every such change is a sort of climbing or falling in miniature; so that squares, triangles, and other angular figures, are neither beautiful to the sight nor feeling. Whoever compares his state of mind, on feeling soft, smooth, va∣riated, unangular bodies, with that in which he finds himself, on the view of a beautiful object, will perceive a very striking analogy in the effects of both; and which may go a good way towards discovering their common cause. Feeling and sight in this respect, dif∣fer in but a few points. The touch takes in the pleasure of softness, which is not primarily an object of sight; the sight on the other hand comprehends colour, which can hardly be made perceptible to the touch; the touch again has the advantage in a new idea of pleasure resulting from a moderate degree of warmth; but the eye triumphs in the infinite extent and multiplicity of its objects. But there is such a similitude in the pleasures of these senses, that I am apt to fancy, if it were pos∣sible that one might discern colour by feeling, (as it is said some blind men have done) that the same colours, and the same disposition of colouring, which are found beautiful to the

sight, would be found likewise most grateful to the touch. But setting aside conjectures, let us pass to the other sense; of hearing.

SECT. XXV. The beautiful in SOUNDS.

IN this sense we find an equal aptitude to be affected in a soft and delicate manner; and how far sweet or beautiful sounds agree with our descriptions of beauty in other senses, the experience of every one must decide. Milton has described this species of music in one of his juvenile poems * 1.4. I need not say that Milton was perfectly well versed in that art; and had as fine an ear, with as happy a man∣ner of expressing the affections of one sense by metaphors taken from another, as any man that ever was. The description is as follows.

—And ever against eating cares, Lap me in soft Lydian airs; In notes with many a winding bout Of linked sweetness long drawn out; With wanton heed, and giddy cunning, The melting voice through mazes running;

Untwisting all the chains that tye The hidden soul of harmony.

Let us parallel this with the softness, the wind∣ing surface, the unbroken continuance, the easy gradation of the beautiful in other things; and all the diversities of the several senses, with all their several affections, will rather help to throw lights from one another to finish one clear, consistent idea of the whole, than to obscure it by their intricacy and variety.

SECT. XXVI. Continued.

TO the abovementioned description I shall add one or two remarks. The first is; that the beautiful in music will not bear that loudness and strength of sounds, that may be used to raise other passions; nor notes, which are shrill, or harsh, or deep; it agrees best with such as are clear, even, smooth, and weak. The second is; that great variety, and quick transitions from one measure or tone to another, are contrary to the genius of the beautiful in music. Such † 1.5 transitions often

excite mirth, or other sudden and tumultuous passions; but not that sinking, that melting, that languor, which is the characteristical effect of the beautiful, as it regards every sense. The passion excited by beauty is in fact nearer to a species of melancholy, than to jol∣lity and mirth. I do not here mean to con∣fine music to any one species of notes, or tones, neither is it an art in which I can say I have any great skill. My sole design in this remark is, to settle a consistent idea of beauty. The infinite variety of the affections of the soul will suggest to a good head, and skilful ear, a va∣riety of such sounds, as are fitted to raise them. It can be no prejudice to this, to clear and distinguish some few particulars, that be∣long to the same class, and are consistent with each other, from the immense croud of dif∣ferent, and sometimes contradictory ideas, that rank vulgarly under the standard of beau∣ty. And of these it is my intention to mark such only of the leading points as shew the conformity of the sense of hearing, with all the other senses in the article of their pleasures.

SECT. XXVII. TASTE and SMELL.

THIS general agreement of the senses is yet more evident on minutely considering those of taste and smell. We metaphorically apply the idea of sweetness to sights, and sounds; but as the qualities of bodies by which they are fitted to excite either pleasure or pain in these senses, are not so obvious as they are in the others, we shall refer an explanation of their analogy, which is a very close one, to that part, wherein we come to consider the common efficient cause of beauty as it regards all the senses. I do not think any thing better fitted to establish a clear and settled idea of visual beauty, than this way of examining the similar pleasures of other senses; for one part is sometimes clear in one of the senses, that is more obscure in another; and where there is a clear concurrence of all, we may with more certainty speak of any one of them. By this means, they bear witness to each other; nature is, as it were, scrutinized; and we report nothing of her, but what we receive from her own information.

SECT. XXVIII. The Sublime and Beautiful compared.

ON closing this general view of beauty, it naturally occurs, that we should com∣pare it with the sublime; and in this com∣parison there appears a remarkable contrast. For sublime objects are vast in their dimen∣sions, beautiful ones comparatively small; beauty should be smooth, and polished; the great, rugged and negligent; beauty should shun the right line, yet deviate from it insen∣sibly; the great in many cases loves the right line, and when it deviates, it often makes a strong deviation; beauty should not be ob∣scure; the great ought to be dark and gloomy; beauty should be light and delicate; the great ought to be solid, and even massive. They are indeed ideas of a very different nature, one being founded on pain, the other on pleasure; and however they may vary afterwards from the direct nature of their causes, yet these causes keep up an eternal distinction between them, a distinction never to be forgotten by any whose business it is to affect the passions.

The end of the Third Part.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Part. 4 sect. 21.
• † 1.2

  Part 5. sect. 23.
• * 1.3

  Part 4. sect. 25.
• * 1.4

  Il allegro,
• † 1.5

  I ne'er am merry, when I hear sweet music.SHAKESPEAR.