An enquiry concerning the principles of morals: By David Hume, Esq;.

SECTION IX.

CONCLUSION of the Whole.

PART I.

IT may justly appear surprizing, that any Man, in so late an Age, should find it requisite to prove, by elaborate Reasonings, that VIRTUE or PERSONAL MERIT consists altogether in the Possession of Qualities, useful or agreeable to the Person himself or to others. It might be expected that this Principle would have occur'd even to the first rude, unpractis'd Enquirers concerning Morals, and been receiv'd, from its own Evidence, without any Argument or Disputation. Whatever is valuable in any Kind so naturally classes itself under the Di|vision of useful or agreeable, the utile or the dulce, that 'tis not easy to imagine, why we should ever seek farther, or consider the Question as a Matter of nice Research or Enquiry. And as every Thing

useful or agreeable must possess these Qualities with regard either to the Person himself or to others, the compleat Delineation or Description of Merit seems to be perform'd as naturally as a Shadow is cast by the Sun, or an Image is reflected upon Water. If the Ground, on which the Shadow is cast, be not broken and uneven, nor the Surface, from which the Image is reflected, disturb'd and confus'd, a just Figure is immediately presented, without any Art or Attention. And it seems a reasonable Presump|tion, that Systems and Hypotheses have perverted our natural Understanding, when a Theory, so simple and obvious, could so long have escap'd the most elaborate Scrutiny and Examination.

BUT however the Case may have far'd with Phi|losophy; in common Life, these Principles are still implicitely maintain'd; nor is any other Topic of Praise or Blame ever recur'd to, when we employ any Panegyric or Satyre, any Applause or Censure of human Action and Behaviour. If we observe Men, in every Intercourse of Business or Pleasure, in each Conference and Conversation, we shall find them no where, except in the Schools, at any Loss upon this Subject. What so natural, for Instance, as the following Dialogue? You are very happy, we shall suppose one to say, addressing himself to

another, that you have given your Daughter to Cle|anthes: He is a Man of Honour and Humanity. Every one, who has any Intercourse with him, is sure of fair and kind Treatment* 1.1. I congratulate you too, says another, on the promising Expectations of this Son-in-law; whose assiduous Application to the Sudy of the Laws, whose quick Penetration and early Knowledge both of Men and Business, prog|nosticate the greatest Honours and Advancement† 1.2. You surprize me much, replies a third, when you talk of Cleanthes as a Man of Business and Appli|cation. I met him lately in a Circle of the gayest Company, and he was the very Life and Soul of our Conversation: So much Wit with Good-manners; so much Gallantry without Affectation; so much in|genious Knowledge so genteely deliver'd, I have never before observ'd in any one‡ 1.3. You would ad|mire him still more, says a fourth, if you knew him more familiarly. That Cheerfulness, which you might remark in him, is not a sudden Flash struck out by Company: It runs thro' the whole Tenor of his Life, and preserves a perpetual Serenity on his Countenance, and Tranquillity in his Soul. He has met with severe Trials, Misfortunes as well as Dangers; and by his Greatness of Mind, was still

superior to all of them* 1.4. The Image, Gentlemen, you have here delineated of Cleanthes, cry I, is that of accomplish'd Merit. Each of you has given a Stroke of the Pencil to his Figure; and you have unawares exceeded all the Pictures drawn by Gratian or Castiglione. A Philosopher might select this Cha|racter as a Model of perfect Virtue.

AND as every Quality, which is useful or agreeable to ourselves or others, is, in common Life, admitted under the Denomination of Virtue or personal Merit; so no other will ever be receiv'd, where Men judge of Things by their natural, unprejudic'd Reason, without the delusive Glosses of Superstition and false Religion. Celibacy, Fasting, Penances, Mortification, Self-denial, Humility, Silence, So|litude and the whole Train of monkish Virtues; for what Reason are they every where rejected by Men of Sense, but because they serve no Manner of Purpose; neither advance a Man's Fortune in the World, nor render him a more valuable Member of Society; neither qualify him for the Entertainment of Company, nor encrease his Power of Self-en|joyment? We observe, on the contrary, that they cross all these desirable Ends; stupify the Under|standing and harden the Heart, obscure the Fancy

and sower the Temper. We justly, therefore trans|fer them to the opposite Column, and place them in the Catalogue of Vices; nor has any Superstition Force sufficient, amongst Men of the World, to pervert entirely these natural Sentiments. A gloomy, hair-brain'd Enthusiast, after his Death, may have Place in the Calendar; but will scarce ever be ad|mitted, when alive, into Intimacy and Society, ex|cept by those who are as delirious and dismal as himself.

IT seems a Happiness in the present Theory, that it enters not into that vulgar Dispute concerning the Degrees of Benevolence or Self-love, which prevail in human Nature; a Dispute, which is never likely to have any Issue, both because Men, who have taken Party, are not easily convinc'd, and because the Phaenomena, which can be produc'd on either Side, are so dispers'd, so uncertain, and subject to so many Interpretations, that 'tis scarce possible accu|rately to compare them, or draw from them any de|terminate Inference or Conclusion. 'Tis sufficient for our present Purpose, if it be allow'd, what surely, without the greatest Absurdity, cannot be disputed, that there is some Benevolence, however small, in|fus'd into our Bosom; some Spark of Friendship for human Kind; some Particle of the Dove, kneaded into our Frame, along with the Elements of the

Wolf and Serpent. Let these generous Sentiments be suppos'd ever so weak; let them be hardly suf|ficient to move even a Hand or Finger of our Body; they must still direct the Determinations of our Mind, and where every Thing else is equal, produce a cool Preference of what is useful and serviceable to Man|kind, above what is pernicious and dangerous. A moral Distinction, therefore, immediately arises; a general Sentiment of Blame and Approbation; a Tendency, however faint, to the Objects of the one, and a proportionable Aversion to those of the other. Nor will those Reasoners, who so earnestly maintain the predominant Selfishness of human Kind, be any way scandaliz'd at hearing of the weak Sentiments of Virtue, implanted in our Nature. On the con|trary, they are found as ready to maintain the one Tenet as the other; and their Spirit of Satyre, (for such it appears, rather than of Corruption) naturally gives Rise to both Opinions; which have, indeed, a great, and almost indissoluble Connexion together.

AVARICE, Ambition, Vanity, and all Passions, vulgarly, tho' improperly, compriz'd under the De|nomination of Self-love, are here excluded from our Theory concerning the Origin of Morals, not be|cause they are too weak, but because they have not a proper Direction, for that Purpose. The Notion of Morals implies some Sentiment, common to all

Mankind, which recommends the same Object to general Approbation, and makes every Man, or most Men, agree in the same Opinion or Decision concerning it. It also implies some Sentiment, so universal and comprehensive as to extend to all Man|kind, and render the Actions and Conduct, even of Persons the most remote, an Object of Censure or Applause, according as they agree or disagree with that Rule of Right, which is establish'd. These two requisite Circumstances belong alone to the Senti|ment of Humanity here insisted on. The other Passions produce, in every Breast, many strong Sen|timents of Desire and Aversion, Affection and Hatred; but these neither are felt so much in com|mon, nor are so comprehensive, as to be the Foun|dation of any general System and establish'd Theory of Blame or Approbation.

WHEN a Man denominates another his Enemy, his Rival, his Antagonist, his Adversary, he is understood to speak the Language of Self-love, and to express Sentiments, peculiar to himself, and arising from his particular Circumstances and Situation: But when he bestows on any Man the Epithets of vicious or odious or deprav'd, he then speaks another Language, and expresses Sentiments, in which he expects all his Audience are to concur with him. He must here, therefore, depart from his private and particular

Situation, and must choose a Point of View, com|mon to him with others: He must move some uni|versal Principle of the human Frame, and touch a String, to which all Mankind have an Accord and Symphony. If he means, therefore, to express, that this Man possesses Qualities, whose Tendency is pernicious to Society, he has chosen this common Point in View, and has touch'd the Principle of Hu|manity, in which every Man, in some Degree, concurs. While the human Heart is compounded of the same Elements as at present, it will never be al|together indifferent to the Good of Mankind, nor entirely unaffected with the Tendencies of Characters and Manners. And tho' this Affection of Humanity may not generally be esteem'd so strong, as Ambition or Vanity, yet, being common to all Men, it can alone be the Foundation of Morals, or of any ge|neral System of Conduct and Behaviour. One Man's Ambition is not another's Ambition; nor will the same Event or Object satisfy both: But the Huma|nity of one Man is the Humanity of every one; and the same Object touches this Passion in all human Creatures.

BUT the Sentiments, which arises from Humanity, are not only the same in all human Creatures, and produce the same Approbation or Censure; but they also comprehend all human Creatures; nor is there

any one, whose Conduct and Character is not, by their Means, an Object, to every one, of Censure or Approbation. On the contrary those other Pas|sions, commonly denominated selfish, both produce different Sentiments in each Individual, according to his particular Situation; and also contemplate the greatest Part of Mankind with the utmost Indiffe|rence and Unconcern. Whoever has a high Regard and Esteem for me flatters my Vanity; whoever expresses Contempt mortifies and displeases me: But as my Name is known but to a small Part of Man|kind, there are few, that come within the Sphere of this Passion, or excite, on its Account, either my Affection or Disgust. But if you represent a tyran|nical, insolent, or barbarous Behaviour, in any Country or in any Age of the World; I soon carry my Eye to the pernicious Tendency of such a Con|duct, and feel the Sentiments of Repugnance and Displeasure towards it. No Character can be so re|mote as to be, in this Light, altogether indifferent to me. What is beneficial to Society or to the Person himself must still be prefer'd. And every Quality or Action, of every human Being, must, by this Means, be rank'd under some Class or Denomination, expressive of general Censure or Applause.

WHAT more, therefore, can we ask to distinguish the Sentiments, dependant on Humanity, from those 〈…〉〈…〉 any other Passion, or to satisfy us 〈…〉〈…〉 the Origin of Morals, and not the 〈◊〉〈◊〉? Whatever Conduct gains my Approbation, by 〈…〉〈…〉 Humanity, procures also the Ap|plause o•• all Mankind, by affecting the same Prin|ciple in 〈◊〉〈◊〉. But what serves my Avarice or Am|bition pleases only these Passions in me, and affects not the Avarice or Ambition of the rest of Mankind. No Conduct, in any Man. which has a beneficial Tendency, but is agreeable to my Humanity, how|ever remote the Person: But every Man, so far re|mov'd as neither to cross nor serve my Avarice and Ambition, is altogether indifferent to those Passions. The Distinction, therefore, betwixt those different Species of Sentiment being so strong and evident, Language must soon be moulded upon it, and must invent a peculiar Set of Terms to express those uni|versal Sentiments of Censure or Approbation, which arise from Humanity or from Views of general Use|fulness and its contrary. VIRTUE and VICE become then known: Morals are recogniz'd: Cer|tain general Ideas are fram'd of human Conduct and Behaviour: Such Measures are expected from Men, in such Situations: This Action is determin'd con|formable

to our abstract Rule; that other, contrary. And by such universal Principles are the particular Sentiments of Self-love frequently controul'd and limited* 1.5.

FROM Instances of popular Tumults, Seditions, Factions, Panics, and all Passions, which are shar'd with a Multitude; we may learn the Influence of Society, in exciting and supporting any Emotion;

while the most ungovernable Disorders are rais'd, we find, by that Means, from the slightest and most frivolous Occasions. Solon was no very cruel, tho', perhaps, an unjust Legislator, who punish'd Neuters in civil Wars; and few, I believe, would, in such Cases, incur the Penalty, were their Affection and Discourse allow'd sufficient to absolve them. No Selfishness, and scarce any Philosophy, has there Force sufficient to support a total Coolness and Indif|ference; and he must be more or less than Man, who kindles not in the common Blaze. What Won|der, then, that moral Sentiments are found of such Influence in Life; tho' springing from Principles, which may appear, at first Sight, somewhat small and delicate? But these Principles, we must remark, are social and universal: They form, in a Manner, the Party of Human-kind against Vice or Disorder, its common Enemy: And as the benevolent Concern for others is diffus'd, in a greater or less Degree, over all Men, and is the same in all, it occurs more frequently in Discourse, is foster'd by Society and Conversation, and the Blame and Approbation, consequent on it, are thereby rouz'd from that Le|thargy, into which they are probably lull'd, in so|litary and uncultivated Nature. Other Passions, tho' perhaps originally stronger, yet being selfish and private, are often over-power'd by its Force, and

yield the Dominion of our Breast to those social and public Principles.

ANOTHER Spring of our Constitution, that brings great Addition of Force to moral Sentiment, is, the Love of Fame; which rules, with such uncontrol'd Authority, in all generous Minds, and is often the grand Object of all their Designs and Undertakings. By our continual and earnest Pursuit of a Character, a Name, a Reputation in the World, we bring our own Deportment and Conduct frequently in Review, and consider how they appear in the Eyes of those, who approach and regard us. This constant Habit of surveying ourself, as it were, in Reflexion, keeps alive all the Sentiments of Right and Wrong, and begets, in noble Natures, a certain Reverence for themselves as well as others; which is the surest Guardian of every Virtue. The animal Conve|niencies and Pleasures sink gradually in their Value; while every inward Beauty and moral Grace is studi|ously acquir'd, and the Mind is accomplish'd in each Perfection, that can adorn or embellish a rational Creature.

HERE is the most perfect Morality we are ac|quainted with: Here is display'd the Force of many Sympathies. Our moral Sentiment is itself a Feeling chiefly of that Nature: And our Regard to a Cha|racter

with others seems to arise only from a Care of preserving a Character with ourselves, in order to which we find it necessary to prop our tottering Judgment on the correspondent Approbation of Mankind.

BUT in order to accommodate Matters, and re|move, if possible, every Difficulty, let us allow all these Reasonings to be false. Let us allow, that when we resolve the Pleasure, that arises from Views of Utility, into the Sentiments of Humanity and Sympathy, we have embrac'd a wrong Hypothesis. Let us confess it necessary to find some other Expli|cation of that Applause, which is paid to all Ob|jects, whether inanimate, animate or rational, if they have a Tendency to promote the Welfare and Advantage of others. However difficult it be to conceive, that an Object is approv'd of, on Account of its Tendency to a certain End, while the End itself is totally indifferent; let us swallow this Ab|surdity, and consider what are the Consequences. The preceding Delineation or Definition of VIRTUE must still retain its Evidence and Authority: It must still be allow'd, that every Quality of the Mind, which is useful or agreeable to the Person himself or to others, communicates a Pleasure to the Spectator, engages his Esteem, and is admitted under the ho|nourable Denomination of Virtue or Merit. Are

not Justice, Fidelity, Honour, Veracity, Allegiance, Chastity esteem'd solely on Account of their Ten|dency to promote the Good of Society? Is not that Tendency inseperable from Humanity, Benevolence, Lenity, Generosity, Gratitude, Moderation, Ten|derness, Friendship, and all the other social Vir|tues? Can it possibly be doubted, that Industry, Discretion, Frugality, Secrecy, Order, Perseverance, Forethought, Judgment, and that whole Class of Virtues, of which many Pages would not contain the Catalogue; can it be be doubted, I say, that the Tendency of these Virtues to promote the In|terest and Happiness of their Possessor is the sole Foundation of their Merit? Who can dispute that a Mind, which supports a perpetual Serenity and Cheerfulness, a noble Dignity and undaunted Spirit, a tender Affection and Good-will to all around; as it has more Enjoyment within itself, is also a more animating and rejoicing Spectacle, than if de|jected with Melancholy, tormented with Anxiety, irritated with Rage, or sunk into the most abject Baseness and Degeneracy? And as to the Qualities, immediately agreeable to others, they speak sufficiently for themselves; and he must be unhappy, indeed, either in his own Temper, or in his Situation and Circumstances, who has never perceiv'd the Charms of a facetious Wit or flowing Affability, of a delicate

Modesty or decent Genteelness of Address and Man|ner.

I AM sensible, that nothing can be more unphilo|sophical than to be positive or dogmatical on any Subject; and that, even if excessive Scepticism could be maintain'd, it would not be more destructive to all just Reasoning and Enquiry. I am convinc'd, that, where Men are the must sure and arrogant, they are commonly the most mistaken, and have there given Reins to Passion, without that proper Delibera|tion and Suspence, which can alone secure them from the grossest Absurdities. Yet I must confess, that this Enumeration puts the Matter in so strong a Light, that I cannot, at present, be more assur'd of any Truth, which I learn from Reasoning and Ar|gument, than that Virtue consists altogether in the Usefulness or Agreeableness of Qualities to the Person himself, possest of them, or to others, who have any Intercourse with him. But when I reflect, that, tho' the Bulk and Figure of the Earth have been measur'd and delineated, tho' the Motions of the Tides have been accounted for, the Order and Oeconomy of the heavenly Bodies subjected to their proper Laws, and INFINITE itself reduc'd to Calculation; yet Men still dispute concerning the Foundation of their moral Duties: When I reflect on this, I say, I fall back into Diffidence and Scep|ticism,

and suspect, that an Hypothesis, so obvious▪ had it been a true one, would, long 'ere now, have been receiv'd, by the unanimous Suffrage and Con|sent of Mankind.

PART II.

THERE remains nothing, but to consider briefly our Obligation to Virtue, and to en|quire, whether every Man, who has any Regard to his own Happiness and Welfare, will not best find his Account in the Practice of every moral Duty. If this can be clearly ascertain'd from the foregoing Theory, we shall have the Satisfaction to reflect, that we have advanc'd Principles, which not only, 'tis hop'd, will stand the Test of Reasoning and Enquiry, but may contribute to the Amendment of Men's Lives, and their Improvement in Morality and social Virtue. And tho' the philosophical Truth of any Proposition by no Means depends on its Tendency to promote the Interest of Society; yet a Man has but a bad Grace, who delivers a Theory, however true, which, he must confess, leads to a Practice, dangerous and pernicious. Why rake into those Corners of Nature, which spread a Nuisance all around? Why dig up the Pestilence from the Pit, in which it is bury'd? The Ingenuity of your

Researches may be admir'd; but your Systems will be detested: And Mankind will agree, if they can|not refute them, to sink them, at least, in eternal Silence and Oblivion: Truths, which are pernicious to Society, if any such there be, will yield to Errors, which are salutary and advantageous.

BUT what philosophical Truths can be more ad|vantageous to Society, than those here deliver'd, which represent Virtue in all her genuine and most engaging Charms, and make us approach her with Ease, Familiarity and Affection? The dismal Dress falls off, with which many Divines, and some Philo|sophers had cover'd her; and nothing appears but Gentleness, Humanity, Beneficence, Affability; nay even, at proper Intervals, Play, Frolic, and Gaiety. She talks not of useless Austerities and Rigors, Suf|ferance and Self-denial. She declares, that her sole Purpose is, to make her Votaries and all Mankind, during every Instant of their Existence, if possible, cheerful and happy; nor does she ever willingly part with any Pleasure but in Hopes of ample Compen|sation in some other Period of their Lives. The sole Trouble she demands is that of just Calculation, and a steady Preference of the greater Happiness. And if any austere Pretenders approach her, Enemies to Joy and Pleasure, she either rejects them as Hypo|crites and Deceivers, or if she admits them in her

Train, they are rank'd, however, among the least favour'd of her Votaries.

AND indeed, to drop all figurative Expression, what Hopes can we ever have of engaging Mankind to a Practice, which we confess full of Austerity and Rigour? Or what Morality can ever serve any use|ful Purpose, unless it can show, by a particular Detail, that all the Duties it recommends, are also the true Interest of each Individual? And the peculiar Ad|vantage of the foregoing Theory, seems to be, that it furnishes proper Mediums for that Purpose.

THAT the Virtues, which are immediately useful or agreeable to the Person, possest of them, are de|sirable in a View to Self-interest, it would surely be superfluous to prove. Moralists, indeed, may spare themselves all the Pains they often take in recom|mending these Duties. To what Purpose collect Arguments to evince, that Temperance is advanta|geous, and the Excesses of Pleasure hurtful? When it appears, that these Excesses are only denominated such, because they are hurtful; and that, if the un|limited Use of strong Liquors, for Instance, no more impair'd Health or the Faculties of the Mind and Body than the Use of Air or Water, it would not be a whit more vicious or blameable.

IT seems equally superfluous to prove, that the companionable Virtues of Good-manners and Wit, Decency and Genteelness are more desirable than the contrary Qualities. Vanity alone, without other Considerations, is a sufficient Motive to make us wish the Possession of these Accomplishments. No Man was ever willingly deficient in this Particular. All our Failures here proceed from bad Education, Want of Capacity, or a perverse and unpliable Dis|position. Would you have your Company coveted, admir'd, follow'd; rather than hated, despis'd, avoided? Can any one seriously deliberate in the Case? As no Enjoyment is sincere, without some Reference to Company and Society; so no Society can be agreeable or even tolerable, where a Man feels his Presence unwelcome, and discovers all around him Symptoms of Aversion and Disgust.

BUT why, in the greater Society or Confederacy of Mankind, should not the Case be the same as in particular Clubs and Companies? Why is it more doubtful, that the enlarg'd Virtues of Humanity, Generosity, Beneficence are desirable with a View to Happiness and Self-interest, than the limited En|dowments of Ingenuity and Politeness? Are we apprehensive, that those social Affections have a greater and more immediate Interference, than any

other Pursuits, with private Utility, and cannot be gratify'd without some important Sacrifices of Ho|nour and Advantage? If so, we are but ill instructed in the Nature of the human Passions, and are more influenc'd by verbal Distinctions than by real Dif|ferences.

WHATEVER Contradiction, may vulgarly be sup|pos'd betwixt the social and selfish Sentiments or Dis|positions, they are really no more opposite than selfish and ambitious, selfish and revengeful, selfish and vain. 'Tis requisite there be an original Pro|pensity of some Kind, in order to be a Basis to Self-love, by giving a Relish to the Objects of its Pur|suit; and none more fit for this Purpose than Bene|ficence or Humanity. The Goods of Fortune are spent in one Gratification or other: The Miser, who accumulates his annual Income, and lends it out at Interest, has really spent it in the Gratification of his Avarice. And 'twould be difficult to show, why a Man is more a Loser by a generous Action, than by any other Method of Expence; since the utmost he can attain, by the most elaborate Selfishness, is the Indulgence of some Affection.

NOW if Life, without Passion, must be altogether insipid and tiresome; let a Man suppose he has full Power of modelling his own Disposition, and let

him deliberate what Appetite or Desire he would choose for the Foundation of his Happiness and Enjoyment. Every Affection, he would observe, when gratify'd by Success, gives a Satisfaction, pro|portion'd to its Force and Violence; but besides this Advantage, common to all, the immediate Feeling of Benevolence and Friendship, Humanity and Kindness, is sweet, smooth, tender, and agreeable, independent of all Fortune and Accidents. These Virtues are besides attended with a pleasing Con|sciousness and Remembrance, and keep us in Hu|mour with ourselves as well as others; while we re|tain the agreeable Reflection of having done our Part towards Mankind and Society. And tho' all Men show a Jealousy of our Success in the Pursuits of Avarice or Ambition; yet are we almost sure of their Good-will and Good-wishes, so long as we persevere in the Paths of Virtue, and employ our|selves in the Execution of generous Plans and Pur|poses. What other Passion is there, where we shall find so many Advantages united; an agreeable Sen|timent, a pleasing Consciousness, a good Reputa|tion? But of these Truths, we may observe, Men are, of themselves, pretty much convinc'd; nor are they deficient in their Duty to Society, because they would not wish to be generous, friendly, and hu|mane; but because they do not feel themselves such.

TREATING Vice with the greatest Candour, and making it all possible Concessions, we must acknow|ledge, that there is not, in any Instance, the smallest Pretext for giving it the Preference above Virtue, with a View to Self-interest; except, perhaps, in the Case of Justice, where a Man, taking Things in a certain Light, may often seem to be a Loser by his Integrity. And tho' 'tis acknowledg'd, that, without a Regard to Property, no Society could subsist; yet according to the imperfect Way, in which human Affairs are conducted, a sensible Knave, in particular Incidents, may think, that an Act of Ini|quity or Infidelity will make a considerable Addition to his Fortune, without causing any considerable Breach in the social Union and Confederacy. That Honesty is the best Policy, may be a good general Rule; but is liable to many Exceptions: And he, it may, perhaps, be judg'd, conducts himself with most Wisdom, who observes the general Rule, and takes Advantage of all the Exceptions.

I MUST confess, that if a Man thinks, that this Reasoning much requires an Answer, 'twill be a little difficult to find any, that will to him appear satisfactory and convincing. If his Heart does not rebel against such pernicious Maxims, if he feels no

Reluctance to the Thoughts of Villainy or Baseness, he has indeed lost a considerable Motive to Virtue; and we may expect, that his Practice will be an|swerable to his Speculation. But in all ingenuous Natures, the Antipathy to Treachery and Roguery is too strong to be counter-ballanc'd by any Views of Profit or pecuniary Advantage. Inward Peace of Mind, Consciousness of Integrity, a satisfactory Re|view of our own Conduct; these are Circumstances very requisite to Happiness, and will be cherish'd and cultivated by every honest Man, who feels the Im|portance of them.

SUCH a one has, besides, the frequent Satisfaction of seeing Knaves, with all their pretended Cunning and Ability, betray'd by their own Maxims; and while they purpose to cheat only with Moderation and Secrecy, a tempting Incident occurs, Nature is frail, and they give into the Snare; whence they can never extricate themselves, without a total Loss of Reputation, and the Forfeiture of all future Trust and Confidence with Mankind.

BUT were they ever so secret and successful, the honest Man, if he has any Tincture of Philosophy, or even common Observation and Reflection, will discover, that they themselves are, in the End, the greatest Dupes, and have sacrific'd the invaluable

Enjoyment of a Character, with themselves at least, for the Acquisition of worthless Toys and Gewgaws. How little is requisite to supply the Necessities of Na|ture? And in the View of Pleasure, what Compa|rison betwixt the unbought Satisfactions of Conver|sation, Society, Study, even Health and the common Beauties of Nature, but especially the peaceful Re|flection on one's own Conduct: What Comparison, I say, betwixt these, and the feverish, empty Amuse|ments of Luxury and Expence? These natural Plea|sures, indeed, are really without Price; both because they are below all Price in their Attainment, and above it in their Enjoyment.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Qualities useful to others.
• † 1.2

  Qualities useful to the Person himself.
• ‡ 1.3

  Qualities immmediately agreeable to others.
• * 1.4

  Qualities immediately agreeable to the Person himself.
• * 1.5

  It seems certain, both from Reason and Experience, that a rude, untaught Savage regulates chiefly his Love and Hatred by the Ideas of private Utility and Injury, and has but faint Conceptions of a general Rule or System of Behaviour. The Man, who stands opposite to him in Battle, he hates heartily, not only for the pre|sent Moment, which is almost unavoidable, but for ever after; not is he satisfy'd without the most extreme Punishment and Vengeance. But we, accustom'd to Society and to more enlarg'd Reflections, consider, that this Man is serving his own Country and Community; that any Man, in the same Situation, would do the same; that we ourselves, in like Circumstances, observe a like Conduct; that in general human Society is best supported on such Maxims: And by these Suppositions and Views, we correct, in some Measure, our ruder and narrower Passions. And tho' much of our Friendship and Enmity be still regulated by private Considerations of Benefit and Harm, we pay, at least, this Homage to general Rules, which we are accustom'd to respect, that we commonly pervert our Adversary's Conduct, by imputing Malice or Injustice to him, in order to give Vent to those Passions, which arise from Self-love and private In|terest. When the Heart is full of Rage, it never wants Pretexts of this Nature; tho' sometimes as frivolous, as those, from which Horace, being almost crush'd by the Fall of a Tree, affects to ac|cuse of Parricide the first Planter of it.