A treatise of human nature: being an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects. ... [pt.3]
Hume, David, 1711-1776.

SECT. X. Of the objects of allegiance.

BUT tho', on some occasions, it may be justifiable, both in sound politics and morality, to resist supreme power, 'tis cer∣tain, that in the ordinary course of human affairs nothing can be more pernicious and criminal; and that besides the convulsions, Page  166 which always attend revolutions, such a practice tends directly to the subversion of all government, and the causing an universal anarchy and confusion among mankind. As numerous and civiliz'd societies cannot sub∣sist without government, so government is entirely useless without an exact obedience. We ought always to weigh the advantages, which we reap from authority, against the disadvantages; and by this means we shall become more scrupulous of putting in prac∣tice the doctrine of resistance. The com∣mon rule requires submission; and 'tis only in cases of grievous tyranny and oppression, that the exception can take place.

SINCE then such a blind submission is commonly due to magistracy, the next question is, to whom it is due, and whom we are to regard as our lawful magistrates? In order to answer this question, let us re∣collect what we have already establish'd con∣cerning the origin of government and poli∣tical society. When men have once expe∣rienc'd the impossibility of preserving any steady order in society, while every one is his own master, and violates or observes the laws of interest, according to his present interest or pleasure, they naturally run into the in∣vention of government, and put it out of Page  167 their own power, as far as possible, to trans∣gress the laws of society. Government, therefore, arises from the voluntary conven∣tion of men; and 'tis evident, that the same convention, which establishes government, will also determine the persons who are to govern, and will remove all doubt and am∣biguity in this particular. And the volun∣tary consent of men must here have the greater efficacy, that the authority of the magistrate does at first stand upon the foun∣dation of a promise of the subjects, by which they bind themselves to obedience; as in every other contract or engagement. The same promise, then, which binds them to obedience, ties them down to a particular person, and makes him the object of their allegiance.

BUT when government has been estabish'd on this footing for some considerable time, and the separate interest, which we have in submission, has produc'd a separate senti∣ment of morality, the case is entirely alter'd, and a promise is no longer able to determine the particular magistrate; since it is no longer consider'd as the foundation of go∣vernment. We naturally suppose ourselves born to submission; and imagine, that such particular persons have a right to command, Page  168 as we on our part are bound to obey. These notions of right and obligation are deriv'd from nothing but the advantage we reapt from government, which gives us a repugnance to practise resistance ourselves, and makes us displeas'd with any instance of it in others. But here 'tis remarkable, that in this new state of affairs, the original sanction of government, which is interest, is not admitted to determine the persons, whom we are to obey, as the original sanc∣tion did at first, when affairs were on the footing of a promise. A promise fixes and determines the persons, without any uncer∣tainty: But 'tis evident, that if men were to regulate their conduct in this particular, by the view of a peculiar interest, either public or private, they wou'd involve them∣selves in endless confusion, and wou'd render all government, in a great measure, in∣effectual. The private interest of every one is different; and tho' the public interest in itself be always one and the same, yet it becomes the source of as great dissentions, by reason of the different opinions of par∣ticular persons concerning it. The same in∣terest, therefore, which causes us to submit to magistracy, makes us renounce itself in the choice of our magistrates, and binds us Page  169 down to a certain form of government, and to particular persons, without allowing us to aspire to the utmost perfection in either. The case is here the same as in that law of nature concerning the stability of pos∣session. 'Tis highly advantageous, and even absolutely necessary to society, that possession shou'd be stable; and this leads us to the establishment of such a rule: But we find, that were we to follow the same advantage, in assigning particular possessions to particu∣lar persons, we shou'd disappoint our end, and perpetuate the confusion, which that rule is intended to prevent. We must, therefore, proceed by general rules, and re∣gulate ourselves by general interests, in mo∣difying the law of nature concerning the stability of possession. Nor need we fear, that our attachment to this law will diminish upon account of the seeming frivolousness of those interests, by which it is determin'd. The impulse of the mind is deriv'd from a very strong interest; and those other more minute interests serve only to direct the mo∣tion, without adding any thing to it, or diminishing from it. 'Tis the same case with government. Nothing is more advan∣tageous to society than such an invention; and this interest is sufficient to make us em∣brace Page  170 it with ardour and alacrity; tho' we are oblig'd afterwards to regulate and direct our devotion to government by several con∣siderations, which are not of the same im∣portance, and to chuse our magistrates with∣out having in view any particular advantage from the choice.

THE first of those principles I shall take notice of, as a foundation of the right of magistracy, is that which gives authority to all the most establish'd governments of the world without exception: I mean, long pos∣session in any one form of government, or succession of princes. 'Tis certain, that if we remount to the first origin of every na∣tion, we shall find, that there scarce is any race of kings, or form of a commonwealth, that is not primarily founded on usurpation and rebellion, and whose title is not at first worse than doubtful and uncertain. Time alone gives solidity to their right; and ope∣rating gradually on the minds of men, re∣conciles them to any authority, and makes it seem just and reasonable. Nothing causes any sentiment to have a greater influence upon us than custom, or turns our imagina∣tion more strongly to any object. When we have been long accustom'd to obey any set of men, that general instinct or tendency, Page  171 which we have to suppose a moral obligation attending loyalty, takes easily this direction, and chuses that set of men for its objects. 'Tis interest which gives the general instinct; but 'tis custom which gives the particular direction.

AND here 'tis observable, that the same length of time has a different influence on our sentiments of morality, according to its different influence on the mind. We natu∣rally judge of every thing by comparison; and since in considering the fate of kingdoms and republics, we embrace a long extent of time, a small duration has not in this case a like influence on our sentiments, as when we consider any other object. One thinks he acquires a right to a horse, or a suit of cloaths, in a very short time; but a century is scarce sufficient to establish any new go∣vernment, or remove all scruples in the minds of the subjects concerning it. Add to this, that a shorter period of time will suffice to give a prince a title to any addi∣tional power he may usurp, than will serve to fix his right, where the whole is an usurpation, The kings of France have not been possess'd of absolute power for above two reigns; and yet nothing will appear more extravagant to Frenchmen than to talk Page  172 of their liberties. If we consider what has been said concerning accession, we shall easily account for this phaenomenon.

WHEN there is no form of government establish'd by long possession, the present possession is sufficient to supply its place, and may be regarded as the second source of all public authority. Right to authority is nothing but the constant possession of autho∣rity, maintain'd by the laws of society and the interests of mankind; and nothing can be more natural than to join this constant possession to the present one, according to the principles above-mention'd. If the same principles did not take place with regard to the property of private persons, 'twas be∣cause these principles were counter-ballanc'd by very strong considerations of interest; when we observ'd, that all restitution wou'd by that means be prevented, and every vio∣lence be authoriz'd and protected. And tho' the same motives may seem to have force, with regard to public authority, yet they are oppos'd by a contrary interest; which consists in the preservation of peace, and the avoiding of all changes, which, how∣ever they may be easily produc'd in private affairs, are unavoidably attended with blood∣shed Page  173 and confusion, where the public is interested.

ANY one, who finding the impossibility of accounting for the right of the present possessor, by any receiv'd system of ethics, shou'd resolve to deny absolutely that right, and assert, that it is not authoriz'd by mo∣rality, wou'd be justly thought to maintain a very extravagant paradox, and to shock the common sense and judgment of mankind. No maxim is more conformable, both to prudence and morals, than to submit quietly to the government, which we find establish'd in the country where we happen to live, without enquiring too curiously into its origin and first establishment. Few govern∣ments will bear being examin'd so rigorously. How many kingdoms are there at present in the world, and how many more do we find in history, whose governors have no better foundation for their authority than that of present possession? To confine ourselves to the Roman and Grecian empire; is it not evident, that the long succession of emperors, from the dissolution of the Roman liberty, to the final extinction of that empire by the Turks, cou'd not so much as pretend to any other title to the empire? The election of the senate was a mere form, which always Page  174 follow'd the choice of the legions; and these were almost always divided in the dif∣ferent provinces, and nothing but the sword was able to terminate the difference. 'Twas by the sword, therefore, that every emperor acquir'd, as well as defended his right; and we must either say, that all the known world, for so many ages, had no govern∣ment, and ow'd no allegiance to any one, or must allow, that the right of the stronger, in public affairs, is to be receiv'd as legiti∣mate, and authoriz'd by morality, when not oppos'd by any other title.

THE right of conquest may be consider'd as a third source of the title of sovereigns. This right resembles very much that of pre∣sent possession; but has rather a superior force, being seconded by the notions of glory and honour, which we ascribe to con∣querors, instead of the sentiments of hatred and detestation, which attend usurpers. Men naturally favour those they love; and there∣fore are more apt to ascribe a right to suc∣cessful violence, betwixt one soverign and another, than to the successful rebellion of a subject against his sovereign a.

Page  175 WHEN neither long possession, nor pre∣sent possession, nor conquest take place, as when the first sovereign, who founded any monarchy, dies; in that case, the right of succession naturally prevails in their stead, and men are commonly induc'd to place the son of their late monarch on the throne, and suppose him to inherit his father's authority. The presum'd consent of the fa∣ther, the imitation of the succession to pri∣vate families, the interest, which the state has in chusing the person, who is most power∣ful, and has the most numerous followers; all these reasons lead men to prefer the son of their late monarch to any other person b.

THESE reasons have some weight; but I am persuaded, that to one, who considers impartially of the matter, 'twill appear, that there concur some principles of the imagina∣tion, along with those views of interest. The royal authority seems to be connected with the young prince even in his father's Page  176 life-time, by the natural transition of the thought; and still more after his death: So that nothing is more natural than to com∣pleat this union by a new relation, and by putting him actually in possession of what seems so naturally to belong to him.

To confirm this we may weigh the fol∣lowing phaenomena, which are pretty curi∣ous in their kind. In elective monarchies the right of succession has no place by the laws and settled custom; and yet its in∣fluence is so natural, that 'tis impossible en∣tirely to exclude it from the imagination, and render the subjects indifferent to the son of their deceas'd monarch. Hence in some governments of this kind, the choice com∣monly falls on one or other of the royal family; and in some governments they are all excluded. Those contrary phaenomena proceed from the same principle. Where the royal family is excluded, 'tis from a re∣finement in politics, which makes people sensible of their propensity to chuse a so∣vereign in that family, and gives them a jealousy of their liberty, lest their new monarch, aided by this propensity, shou'd establish his family, and destroy the free∣dom of elections for the future.

Page  177 THE history of Artaxerxes, and the younger Cyrus, may furnish us with some reflections to the same purpose. Cyrus pre∣tended a right to the throne above his elder brother, because he was born after his father's accession. I do not pretend, that this reason was valid. I wou'd only infer from it, that he wou'd never have made use of such a pretext, were it not for the qua∣lities of the imagination above-mention'd, by which we are naturally inclin'd to unite by a new relation whatever objects we find al∣ready united. Artaxerxes had an advantage above his brother, as being the eldest son, and the first in succession: But Cyrus was more closely related to the royal authority, as being begot after his father was invested with it.

SHOU'D it here be pretended, that the view of convenience may be the source of all the right of succession, and that men gladly take advantage of any rule, by which they can fix the successor of their late so∣vereign, and prevent that anarchy and con∣fusion, which attends all new elections: To this I wou'd answer, that I readily allow, that this motive may contribute something to the effect; but at the same time I assert, that without another principle, 'tis impossible Page  178 such a motive shou'd take place. The in∣terest of a nation requires, that the suc∣cession to the crown shou'd be fix'd one way or other; but 'tis the same thing to its in∣terest in what way it be fix'd: So that if the relation of blood had not an effect in∣dependent of public interest, it wou'd never have been regarded, without a positive law; and 'twou'd have been impossible, that so many positive laws of different nations cou'd ever have concur'd precisely in the same views and intentions.

THIS leads us to consider the fifth source of authority, viz. positive laws; when the legislature establishes a certain form of go∣vernment and succession of princes. At first sight it may be thought, that this must resolve into some of the preceding titles of authority. The legislative power, whence the positive law is deriv'd, must either be establish'd by original contract, long pos∣session, present possession, conquest, or suc∣cession; and consequently the positive law must derive its force from some of those principles. But here 'tis remarkable, that tho' a positive law can only derive its force from these principles, yet it acquires not all the force of the principle from whence it is deriv'd, but loses considerably in the transi∣tion; Page  179 as it is natural to imagine. For in∣stance; a government is establish'd for many centuries on a certain system of laws, forms, and methods of succession. The legislative power, establish'd by this long succession, changes all on a sudden the whole system of government, and introduces a new constitu∣tion in its stead. I believe few of the sub∣jects will think themselves bound to comply with this alteration, unless it have an evi∣dent tendency to the public good: But will think themselves still at liberty to return to the antient government. Hence the notion of fundamental laws; which are suppos'd to be inalterable by the will of the sovereign: And of this nature the Salic law is under∣stood to be in France. How far these funda∣mental laws extend is not determind'd in any government; nor is it possible it ever shou'd. There is such an insensible gradation from the most material laws to the most trivial, and from the most antient laws to the most modern, that 'twill be impossible to set bounds to the legislative power, and deter∣mine how far it may innovate in the prin∣ciples of government. That is the work more of imagination and passion than of reason.

Page  180 WHOEVER considers the history of the several nations of the world; their revolu∣tions, conquests, increase, and diminution; the manner in which their particular go∣vernments are establish'd, and the successive right transmitted from one person to another, will soon learn to treat very lightly all dis∣putes concerning the rights of princes, and will be convinc'd, that a strict adherence to any general rules, and the rigid loyalty to particular persons and families, on which some people set so high a value, are virtues that hold less of reason, than of bigotry and superstition. In this particular, the study of history confirms the reasonings of true philo∣sophy; which, shewing us the original quali∣ties of human nature, teaches us to regard the controversies in politics as incapable of any decision in most cases, and as entirely subor∣dinate to the interests of peace and liberty. Where the public good does not evidently demand a change; 'tis certain, that the con∣currence of all those titles, original contract, long possession, present possession, succession, and positive laws, forms the strongest title to sovereignty, and is justly regarded as sacred and inviolable. But when these titles are mingled and oppos'd in different degrees, Page  181 they often occasion perplexity; and are less capable of solution from the arguments of lawyers and philosophers, than from the swords of the soldiery. Who shall tell me, for instance, whether Germanicus, or Drusus, ought to have succeeded Tiberius, had he died while they were both alive, without naming any of them for his successor? Ought the right of adoption to be receiv'd as equivalent to that of blood in a nation, where it had the same effect in private fami∣lies, and had already, in two instances, taken place in the public? Ought Germanicus to be esteem'd the eldest son, because he was born before Drusus; or the younger, because he was adopted after the birth of his brother? Ought the right of the elder to be regarded in a nation, where the eldest brother had no advantage in the succession to private fami∣lies? Ought the Roman empire at that time to be esteem'd hereditary, because of two examples; or ought it, even so early, to be regarded as belonging to the stronger, or the present possessor, as being founded on so recent an usurpation? Upon whatever prin∣ciples we may pretend to answer these and such like questions, I am afraid we shall never be able to satisfy an impartial enquirer, who adopts no party in political controver∣sies, Page  182 and will be satisfied with nothing but sound reason and philosophy.

BUT here an English reader will be apt to enquire concerning that famous revolu∣tion, which has had such a happy influence on our constitution, and has been attended with such mighty consequences. We have already remark'd, that in the case of enor∣mous tyranny and oppression, 'tis lawful to take arms even against supreme power; and that as government is a mere human inven∣tion for mutual advantage and security, it no longer imposes any obligation, either natural or moral, when once it ceases to have that tendency. But tho' this general principle be authoriz'd by common sense, and the practice of all ages, 'tis certainly impossible for the laws, or even for philo∣sophy, to establish any particular rules, by which we may know when resistance is lawful; and decide all controversies, which may arise on that subject. This may not only happen with regard to supreme power; but 'tis possible, even in some constitu∣tions, where the legislative authority is not lodg'd in one person, that there may be a magistrate so eminent and powerful, as to oblige the laws to keep silence in this par∣ticular. Page  183 Nor wou'd this silence be an effect only of their respect, but also of their pru∣dence; since 'tis certain, that in the vast va∣riety of circumstances, which occur in all governments, an exercise of power, in so great a magistrate, may at one time be bene∣ficial to the public, which at another time wou'd be pernicious and tyrannical. But notwithstanding this silence of the laws in limited monarchies, 'tis certain, that the people still retain the right of resistance; since 'tis impossible, even in the most des∣potic governments, to deprive them of it. The same necessity of self-preservation, and the same motive of public good, give them the same liberty in the one case as in the other. And we may farther observe, that in such mix'd governments, the cases, wherein resistance is lawful, must occur much oftener, and greater indulgence be given to the subjects to defend themselves by force of arms, than in arbitrary govern∣ments. Not only where the chief magistrate enters into measures, in themselves, ex∣tremely pernicious to the public, but even when he wou'd encroach on the other parts of the constitution, and extend his power beyond the legal bounds, it is allowable to resist and dethrone him; tho' such resistance Page  184 and violence may, in the general tenor of the laws, be deem'd unlawful and rebellious. For besides that nothing is more essential to public interest, than the preservation of public liberty; 'tis evident, that if such a mix'd government be once suppos'd to be establish'd, every part or member of the constitution must have a right of self-defence, and of maintaining its antient bounds against the encroachment of every other authority. As matter wou'd have been created in vain, were it depriv'd of a power of resistance, without which no part of it cou'd preserve a distinct existence, and the whole might be∣crowded up into a single point: So 'tis a gross absurdity to suppose, in any govern∣ment, a right without a remedy, or allow, that the supreme power is shar'd with the people, without allowing, that 'tis lawful for them to defend their share against every invader. Those, therefore, who wou'd seem to respect our free government, and yet deny the right of resistance, have renounc'd all pretensions to common sense, and do not merit a serious answer.

IT does not belong to my present pur∣pose to shew, that these general principles are applicable to the late revolution; and that all the rights and privileges, which ought Page  185 to be sacred to a free nation, were at that time threaten'd with the utmost danger. I am better pleas'd to leave this controverted subject, if it really admits of controversy; and to indulge myself in some philosophical reflections, which naturally arise from that important event.

First, We may observe, that shou'd the lords and commons in our constitution, with∣out any reason from public interest, either depose the king in being, or after his death exclude the prince, who, by laws and settled custom, ought to succeed, no one wou'd esteem their proceedings legal, or think themselves bound to comply with them. But shou'd the king, by his unjust practices, or his attempts for a tyrannical and despotic power, justly forfeit his legal, it then not only becomes morally lawful and suitable to the nature of political society to dethrone him; but what is more, we are apt likewise to think, that the remaining members of the constitution acquire a right of excluding his next heir, and of chusing whom they please for his successor. This is founded on a very singular quality of our thought and imagi∣nation. When a king forfeits his authority, his heir ought naturally to remain in the same situation, as if the king were remov'd Page  186 by death; unless by mixing himself in the tyranny, he forfeit it for himself. But tho' this may seem reasonable, we easily comply with the contrary opinion. The deposition of a king, in such a government as ours, is certainly an act beyond all common autho∣rity, and an illegal assuming a power for public good, which, in the ordinary course of government, can belong to no member of the constitution. When the public good is so great and so evident as to justify the action, the commendable use of this licence causes us naturally to attribute to the parlia∣ment a right of using farther licences; and the antient bounds of the laws being once transgressed with approbation, we are not apt to be so strict in confining ourselves precisely within their limits. The mind naturally runs on with any train of action, which it has begun; nor do we commonly make any scruple concerning our duty, after the first action of any kind, which we perform. Thus at the revolution, no one who thought the deposition of the father justifiable, esteem'd themselves to be confin'd to his infant son; tho' had that unhappy monarch died innocent at that time, and had his son, by any accident, been convey'd beyond seas, there is no doubt but a regency wou'd have Page  187 been appointed till he shou'd come to age, and cou'd be restor'd to his dominions. As the slightest properties of the imagination have an effect on the judgments of the people, it shews the wisdom of the laws and of the parliament to take advantage of such properties, and to chuse the magistrates either in or out of a line, according as the vulgar will most naturally attribute authority and right to them.

Secondly, Tho' the accession of the Prince of Orange to the throne might at first give occasion to many disputes, and his title be contested, it ought not now to appear doubt∣ful, but must have acquir'd a sufficient au∣thority from those three princes, who have succeeded him upon the same title. No∣thing is more usual, tho' nothing may, at first sight, appear more unreasonable, than this way of thinking. Princes often seem to acquire a right from their successors, as well as from their ancestors; and a king, who during his life-time might justly be deem'd an usurper, will be regarded by posterity as a lawful prince, because he has had the good fortune to settle his family on the throne, and entirely change the antient form of government. Julius Caesar is regarded as the first Roman emperor; while Sylla and Page  188Marius, whose titles were really the same as his, are treated as tyrants and usurpers. Time and custom give authority to all forms of government, and all successions of princes; and that power, which at first was founded only on injustice and violence, becomes in time legal and obligatory. Nor does the mind rest there; but returning back upon its footsteps, transfers to their predecessors and ancestors that right, which it naturally ascribes to the posterity, as being related to∣gether, and united in the imagination. The present king of France makes Hugh Capet a more lawful prince than Cromwell; as the establish'd liberty of the Dutch is no incon∣siderable apology for their obstinate resistance to Philip the second.