experience, and makes us draw advantage from that similarity, which nature has placed among different objects. From causes, which appear similar, we ex|pect similar effects. This is the sum of all our expe|rimental conclusions. Now it seems evident, that if this conclusion were formed by reason, it would be as perfect at first, and upon one instance, as after ever so long a course of experience. But the case is far otherwise. Nothing so like as eggs; yet no one, on account of this apparent similarity, expects the same taste and relish in all of them. 'Tis only after a long course of uniform experiments in any kind, that we attain a firm reliance and security with regard to a particular event. Now where is that process of rea|soning, which from one instance draws a conclusion, so different from that which it infers from an hun|dred instances, that are no way different from that single instance? This question I propose as much for the sake of information, as with an intention of rais|ing difficulties. I cannot find, I cannot imagine any such reasoning. But I keep my mind still open to instruction, if any one will vouchsafe to bestow it on me.SHOULD it be said, that from a number of uni|form experiments, we infer a connection between the sensible qualities and the secret powers; this, I must confess, seems the same difficulty, couched in diffe|rent 0