Lectures on rhetoric and belles lettres: By Hugh Blair, ... In three volumes. ... [pt.1]

LECTURE III. CRITICISM.—GENIUS.—PLEASURES OF TASTE.—SUBLIMITY IN OBJECTS.

TASTE, Criticism, and Genius, are words currently employed, without distinct ideas annexed to them. In begin|ning a course of Lectures where such words must often occur, it is necessary to ascertain their meaning with some precision. Having in the last Lecture treated of Taste, I pro|ceed to explain the nature and foundation of Criticism. True Criticism is the applica|tion of Taste and of good sense to the seve|ral fine arts. The object which it proposes is, to distinguish what is beautiful and what is faulty in every performance; from parti|cular instances to ascend to general princi|ples; and so to form rules or conclusions concerning the several kinds of beauty in works of Genius.

THE rules of Criticism are not formed by any induction, à priori, as it is called; that is, they are not formed by a train of abstract reasoning, independent of facts and observa|tions. Criticism is an art founded wholly on experience; on the observation of such beau|ties as have come nearest to the standard which I before established: that is, of such beauties as have been found to please man|kind most generally. For example; Aris|totle's rules concerning the unity of action in dramatic and epic composition, were not rules first discovered by logical reasoning, and then applied to poetry; but they were drawn from the practice of Homer and So|phocles: they were founded upon observing the superior pleasure which we receive from the relation of an action which is one and entire, beyond what we receive from the re|lation of scattered and unconnected facts. Such observations taking their rise at first from feeling and experience, were found on examination to be so consonant to reason, and to the principles of human nature, as to pass into established rules, and to be conve|niently applied for judging of the excellency of any performance. This is the most natu|ral account of the origin of Criticism.

A MASTERLY genius, it is true, will of himself, untaught, compose in such a manner as shall be agreeable to the most material rules of Criticism; for as these rules are founded in nature, nature will often suggest

them in practice. Homer, it is more than probable, was acquainted with no systems of the art of poetry. Guided by genius alone, he composed in verse a regular story, which all posterity has admired. But this is no argument against the usefulness of Criti|cism as an art. For as no human genius is perfect, there is no writer but may receive assistance from critical observations upon the beauties and faults of those who have gone before him. No observations or rules can indeed supply the defect of genius, or in|spire it where it is wanting. But they may often direct it into its proper channell; they may correct its extravagancies, and point out to it the most just and proper imitation of nature. Critical rules are designed chiefly to shew the faults that ought to be avoided. To nature we must be indebted for the pro|duction of eminent beauties.

FROM what has been said, we are enabled to form a judgment concerning those com|plaints which it has long been fashionable for petty authors to make against Critics and Criticism. Critics have been represented as the great abridgers of the native liberty of genius; as the imposers of unnatural shackles and bonds upon writers, from whose cruel persecution they must fly to the Public, and implore its protection. Such supplicatory prefaces are not calculated to give very fa|vourable ideas of the genius of the author. For every good writer will be pleased to have

his work examined by the principles of sound understanding, and true Taste. The decla|mations against Criticism commonly proceed upon this supposition, that Critics are such as judge by rule, not by feeling; which is so far from being true, that they who judge after this manner are pedants, not Critics. For all the rules of genuine Criticism I have shewn to be ultimately founded on feeling; and Taste and Feeling are necessary to guide us in the application of these rules to every particular instance. As there is nothing in which all sorts of persons more readily affect to be judges than in works of Taste, there is no doubt that the number of incompetent Critics will always be great. But this affords no more foundation for a general invective against Criticism, than the number of bad philosophers or reasoners affords against rea|son and philosophy.

AN objection more plausible may be form|ed against Criticism, from the applause that some performances have received from the Public, which, when accurately considered, are found to contradict the rules established by Criticism. Now, according to the princi|ples laid down in the last Lecture, the Public is the supreme judge to whom the last appeal must be made in every work of Taste; as the standard of Taste is founded on the senti|ments that are natural and common to all men. But with respect to this we are to ob|serve, that the sense of the Public is often

too hastily judged of. The genuine public Taste does not always appear in the first ap|plause given upon the publication of any new work. There are both a great vulgar and a small, apt to be catched and dazzled by very superficial beauties, the admiration of which in a little time passes away: and sometimes a writer may acquire great tem|porary reputation merely by his compliance with the passions or prejudices, with the party-spirit or superstitious notions, that may chance to rule for a time almost a whole nation. In such cases, though the Public may seem to praise, true Criticism may with reason condemn; and it will in progress of time gain the ascendant: for the judgment of true Criticism, and the voice of the Pub|lic, when once become unprejudiced and dis|passionate, will ever coincide at last.

INSTANCES, I admit, there are, of some works that contain gross transgressions of the laws of Criticism, acquiring, nevertheless, a general, and even a lasting admiration. Such are the plays of Shakespeare, which, con|sidered as dramatic poems, are irregular in the highest degree. But then we are to re|mark, that they have gained the public ad|miration, not by their being irregular, not by their transgressions of the rules of art, but in spite of such transgressions. They possess other beauties which are conformable to just rules; and the force of these beau|ties has been so great as to overpower all cen|sure,

and to give the Public a degree of sa|tisfaction superior to the disgust arising from their blemishes. Shakespeare pleases, not by his bringing the transactions of many years into one play; not by his grotesque mixtures of Tragedy and Comedy in one piece, nor by the strained thoughts, and affected witti|cisms, which he sometimes employs. These we consider as blemishes, and impute them to the grossness of the age in which he lived. But he pleases by his animated and masterly representations of characters, by the liveli|ness of his descriptions, the force of his sen|timents, and his possessing, beyond all wri|ters, the natural language of passion: Beau|ties which true Criticism no less teaches us to place in the highest rank, than nature teaches us to feel.—This much it may suffice to have said concerning the origin, office, and im|portance of Criticism.

I PROCEED next to explain the meaning of another term, which there will be fre|quent occasion to employ in these Lectures; that is, Genius.

TASTE and Genius are two words fre|quently joined together; and therefore, by innaccurate thinkers, confounded. They signify however two quite different things. The difference between them can be clearly pointed out; and it is of importance to re|member it. Taste consists in the power of judging: Genius, in the power of executing.

One may have a considerable degree of Taste in Poetry, Eloquence, or any of the fine arts, who has little or hardly any Genius for com|position or execution in any of these arts: But Genius cannot be found without includ|ing Taste also. Genius, therefore, deserves to be considered as a higher power of the mind than Taste. Genius always imports something inventive or creative; which does not rest in mere sensibility to beauty where it is perceived, but which can, moreover, produce new beauties, and exhibit them in such a manner as strongly to impress the minds of others. Refined Taste forms a good critic; but Genius is farther necessary to form the poet, or the orator.

IT is proper also to observe, that Genius is a word, which, in common acceptation, extends much farther than to the objects of Taste. It is used to signify that talent or ap|titude which we receive from nature, for ex|celling in any one thing whatever. Thus we speak of a Genius for mathematics, as well as a Genius for poetry; of a Genius for war, for politics, or for any mechanical employment.

THIS talent or aptitude for excelling in some one particular, is, I have said, what we receive from nature. By art and study, no doubt, it may be greatly improved; but by them alone it cannot be acquired. As Ge|nius is a higher faculty than Taste, it is ever,

according to the usual frugality of nature, more limited in the sphere of its operations. It is not uncommon to meet with persons who have an excellent Taste in several of the po|lite arts, such as music, poetry, painting, and eloquence, altogether: But, to find one who is an excellent performer in all these arts, is much more rare; or rather, indeed, such an one is not to be looked for. A fort of Uni|versal Genius, or one who is equally and in|differently turned towards several different professions and arts, is not likely to excel in any. Although there may be some few ex|ceptions, yet in general it holds, that when the bent of the mind is wholly directed to|wards some one object, exclusive, in a man|ner, of others, there is the fairest prospect of eminence in that, whatever it be. The rays must converge to a point, in order to glow intensely. This remark I here chuse to make, on account of its great importance to young people; in leading them to examine with care, and to pursue with ardour, the current and pointing of nature towards those exer|tions of Genius in which they are most likely to excel.

A GENIUS for any of the fine arts, as I before observed, always supposes Taste; and it is clear, that the improvement of Taste will serve both to forward and to correct the ope|rations of Genius. In proportion as the Taste of a poet, or orator, becomes more refined with respect to the beauties of composition,

it will certainly assist him to produce the more finished beauties in his work. Genius, how|ever, in a Poet or Orator, may sometimes exist in a higher degree than Taste; that is, Genius may be bold and strong, when Taste is neither very delicate, nor very correct. This is often the case in the infancy of arts; a period, when Genius frequently exerts itself with great vigour, and executes with much warmth; while Taste, which requires expe|rience, and improves by slower degrees, hath not yet attained its full growth. Homer and Shakespear are proofs of what I now assert; in whose admirable writings are found in|stances of rudeness and indelicacy, which the more refined Taste of later writers, who had far inferior Genius to them, would have taught them to avoid. As all human perfec|tion is limited, this may very probably be the law of our nature, that it is not given to one man to execute with vigour and fire, and, at the same time, to attend to all the lesser and more refined graces that belong to the exact perfection of his work: While, on the other hand, a thorough Taste for those inferior graces, is, for the most part, accompanied with a diminution of sublimity and force.

HAVING thus explained the nature of Taste, the nature and importance of Criti|cism, and the distinction between Taste and Genius; I am now to enter on considering the sources of the Pleasures of Taste. Here opens a very extensive field; no less than all

the pleasures of the imagination, as they are commonly called, whether afforded us by na|tural objects, or by the imitations and de|scriptions of them. But it is not necessary to the purpose of my Lectures, that all these should be examined fully; the pleasure which we receive from discourse, or writing, being the main object of them. All that I purpose is, to give some openings into the Pleasures of Taste in general; and to insist, more par|ticularly, upon Sublimity and Beauty.

WE are far from having yet attained to any system concerning this subject. Mr. Ad|dison was the first who attempted a regular enquiry, in his Essay on the Pleasures of the Imagination, published in the sixth volume of the Spectator. He has reduced these Plea|sures under three heads; Beauty, Grandeur, and Novelty. His speculations on this sub|ject, if not exceedingly profound, are, how|ever, very beautiful and entertaining; and he has the merit of having opened a tract, which was before unbeaten. The advances made since his time in this curious part of philosophical Criticism, are not very consi|derable; though some ingenious writers have pursued the subject. This is owing, doubt|less, to that thinness and subtility which are found to be properties of all the feelings of Taste. They are engaging objects; but when we would lay firm hold of them, and subject them to a regular discussion, they are always ready to elude our grasp. It is difficult to

make a full enumeration of the several ob|jects that give pleasure to Taste; it is more difficult to define all those which have been discovered, and to reduce them under proper classes; and, when we would go farther, and investigate the efficient causes of the pleasure which we receive from such objects, here, above all, we find ourselves at a loss. For instance; we all learn by experience, that certain figures of bodies appear to us more beautiful than others. On enquiring farther, we find that the regularity of some figures, and the graceful variety of others, are the foundation of the beauty which we discern in them; but when we attempt to go a step beyond this, and enquire what is the cause of regularity and variety producing in our minds the sensation of Beauty, any reason we can assign is extremely imperfect. Those first principles of internal sensation, nature seems to have covered with an impenetrable veil.

IT is some comfort, however, that although the efficient cause be obscure, the final cause of those sensations lies in many cases more open: And, in entering on this subject, we cannot avoid taking notice of the strong im|pression which the powers of Taste and Ima|gination are calculated to give us of the be|nignity of our Creator. By endowing us with such powers, he hath widely enlarged the sphere of the pleasures of human life; and those, too, of a kind the most pure and

innocent. The necessary purposes of life might have been abundantly answered, though our senses of seeing and hearing had only served to distinguish external objects, without conveying to us any of those refined and de|licate sensations of Beauty and Grandeur, with which we are now so much delighted. This additional embellishment and glory, which, for promoting our entertainment, the Author of nature hath poured forth upon his works, is one striking testimony, among many others, of benevolence and goodness. This thought, which Mr. Addison first start|ed, Dr. Akenside, in his Poem on the Plea|sures of the Imagination, has happily pur|sued.

—Not content With every food of life to nourish man, By kind illusions of the wondering sense, Thou mak'st all nature, Beauty to his eye, Or Music to his ear.—

I SHALL begin with considering the Plea|sure which arises from Sublimity or Gran|deur, of which I propose to treat at some length; both, as this has a character more precise and distinctly marked, than any other, of the Pleasures of the Imagination, and as it coincides more directly with our main subject. For the greater distinctness I shall, first, treat of the Grandeur or Sublimity of external objects themselves, which will em|ploy the rest of this Lecture; and, after|wards,

of the description of such objects, or, of what is called the Sublime in Writing, which shall be the subject of a following Lec|ture. I distinguish these two things from one another, the Grandeur of the objects them|selves when they are presented to the eye, and the description of that Grandeur in dis|course or writing; though most Critics, inac|curately I think, blend them together; and I consider Grandeur and Sublimity as terms synonymous, or nearly so. If there be any distinction between them, it arises from Su|blimity's expressing Grandeur in its highest degree* 1.1.

IT is not easy to describe, in words, the precise impression which great and sublime objects make upon us, when we behold them; but every one has a conception of it. It consists in a kind of admiration and expan|sion of the mind; it raises the mind much above its ordinary state; and fills it with a degree of wonder and astonishment, which it cannot well express. The emotion is cer|tainly delightful; but it is altogether of the serious kind: a degree of awfulness and so|lemnity, even approaching to severity, com|monly attends it when at its height; very distinguishable from the more gay and brisk emotion raised by beautiful objects.

THE simplest form of external Grandeur appears in the vast and boundless prospects presented to us by nature; such as wide ex|tended plains, to which the eye can see no limits; the firmament of Heaven; or the boundless expanse of the Ocean. All vast|ness produces the impression of Sublimity. It is to be remarked, however, that space, extended in length, makes not so strong an impression as height or depth. Though a boundless plain be a grand object, yet a high mountain, to which we look up, or an awful precipice or tower whence we look down on the objects which lie below, is still more so. The excessive Grandeur of the firmament arises from its height, joined to its boundless extent; and that of the ocean, not from its extent alone, but from the perpetual motion and irresistible force of that mass of waters. Wherever space is concerned, it is clear, that amplitude or greatness of extent, in one di|mension or other, is necessary to Grandeur. Remove all bounds from any object, and you presently render it sublime. Hence infinite space, endless numbers, and eternal duration, fill the mind with great ideas.

FROM this some have imagined, that vast|ness, or amplitude of extent, is the founda|tion of all Sublimity. But I cannot be of this opinion, because many objects appear sublime which have no relation to space at all. Such, for instance, is great loudness of sound. The burst of thunder or of cannon,

the roaring of winds, the shouting of multi|tudes, the sound of vast cataracts of water, are all incontestibly grand objects.

"I heard the voice of a great multitude, as the sound of many waters, and of mighty thunderings, saying Allelujah."

In general we may ob|serve, that great power and force exerted, always raise sublime ideas: and perhaps the most copious source of these is derived from this quarter. Hence the grandeur of earth|quakes and burning mountains; of great conflagrations; of the stormy ocean, and overflowing waters; of tempests of wind; of thunder and lightning; and of all the un|common violence of the elements. Nothing is more sublime than mighty power and strength. A stream that runs within its banks, is a beautiful object; but when it rushes down with the impetuosity and noise of a torrent, it presently becomes a sublime one. From lions, and other animals of strength, are drawn sublime comparisons in poets. A race horse is looked upon with pleasure; but it is the war-horse,

"whose neck is clothed with thunder,"

that carries grandeur in its idea. The engagement of two great armies, as it is the highest exertion of human might, combines a variety of sources of the Sublime; and has accordingly been always considered as one of the most striking and magnificent spectacles that can be either presented to the eye, or exhibited to the imagination in description.

FOR the farther illustration of this subject, it is proper to remark, that all ideas of the solemn and awful kind, and even bordering on the terrible, tend greatly to assist the Su|blime; such as darkness, solitude, and silence. What are the scenes of nature that elevate the mind in the highest degree, and produce the sublime sensation? Not the gay land|scape, the flowery field, or the flourishing city; but the hoary mountain, and the solita|ry lake; the aged forest, and the torrent fall|ing over the rock. Hence too, night-scenes are commonly the most sublime. The fir|mament when filled with stars, scattered in such vast numbers, and with such magnifi|cent profusion, strikes the imagination with a more awful grandeur, than when we view it enlightened by all the splendour of the Sun. The deep sound of a great bell, or the strik|ing of a great clock, are at any time grand; but, when heard amid the silence and stillness of the night, they become doubly so. Dark|ness is very commonly applied for adding su|blimity to all our ideas of the Deity.

"He maketh darkness his pavilion; he dwelleth in the thick cloud."

So Milton

—How oft, amidst Thick clouds and dark, does Heav'ns all-ruling Sire Chuse to reside, his glory unobscured, And, with the Majesty of darkness, round Circles his throne—BOOK II. 263.

Observe, with how much art Virgil has in|troduced all those ideas of silence, vacuity, and darkness, when he is going to introduce his Hero to the infernal regions, and to dis|close the secrets of the great deep.

Dii quibus imperium est animarum, umbraeque silentes, Et Chaos, et Phlegethon, loca nocte silentia latè, Sit mihi fas audita loqui; sit numine vestro Pandere res altâ terrâ, & caligine mersas. Ibant obscuri, solâ sub nocte, per umbram, Perque domos Ditis vacuos, et inania regna; Quale per incertam lunam, sub luce maligna Est iter in sylvis—* 1.2.

These passages I quote at present, not so much as instances of Sublime Writing, though in themselves they truly are so, as to shew, by the effect of them, that the objects which they present to us, belong to the class of su|blime ones.

OBSCURITY, we are farther to remark, is not unfavourable to the Sublime. Though it render the object indistinct, the impressi|on, however, may be great; for, as an inge|nious Author has well observed, it is one thing to make an idea clear, and another to make it affecting to the imagination; and the imagination may be strongly affected; and, in fact, often is so, by objects of which we have no clear conception. Thus we see, that almost all the descriptions given us of the appearances of supernatural Beings, car|ry some Sublimity, though the conceptions which they afford us be confused and indis|tinct. Their Sublimity arises from the ideas, which they always convey, of superior power and might, joined with an awful obscurity. We may see this fully exemplified in the fol|lowing noble passage of the book of Job.

"In thoughts from the visions of the night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, fear came upon me, and trembling, which made all my bones to shake. Then a spirit pass|ed before my face; the hair of my flesh stood up: it stood still; but I could not discern the form thereof; an image was before mine eyes; there was silence; and I heard a voice—Shall mortal man be more just than God* 1.3?" (Job, iv. 15.)

No

ideas, it is plain, as are so sublime as those taken from the Supreme Being; the most un|known, but the greatest of all objects; the infinity of whose nature, and the eternity of whose duration, joined with the omnipotence of his power, though they surpass our con|ceptions, yet exalt them to the highest. In general, all objects that are greatly raised above us, or far removed from us, either in space or in time, are apt to strike us as great. Our viewing them, as through the mist of distance or antiquity, is favourable to the impressions of their Sublimity.

AS obscurity, so disorder too, is very com|patible with grandeur; nay, frequently heightens it. Few things that are strictly regular, and methodical, appear sublime. We see the limits on every side; we feel ourselves confined; there is no room for the mind's exerting any great effort. Exact pro|portion of parts, though it enters often into the beautiful, is much disregarded in the Sublime. A great mass of rocks, thrown together by the hand of nature with wild|ness and confusion, strike the mind with

more grandeur, than if they had been ad|justed to each other with the most accurate symmetry.

IN the feeble attempts, which human art can make towards producing grand objects (feeble, I mean, in comparison with the pow|ers of nature), greatness of dimensions al|ways constitutes a principal part. No pile of building can convey any idea of Sublimity, unless it be ample and lofty. There is, too, in architecture, what is called Greatness of manner; which seems chiefly to arise, from presenting the object to us in one full point of view; so that it shall make its impression whole, entire, and undivided, upon the mind. A Gothic cathedral raises ideas of grandeur in our minds, by its size, its height, its aw|ful obscurity, its strength, its antiquity, and its durability.

THERE still remains to be mentioned one class of Sublime objects; what may be called the moral, or sentimental Sublime; arising from certain exertions of the human mind; from certain affections, and actions, of our fellow-creatures. These will be found to be all, or chiefly, of that class, which comes under the name of Magnanimity or Hero|ism; and they produce an effect extremely similar to what is produced by the view of grand objects in nature; filling the mind with admiration, and elevating it above it|self. A noted instance of this, quoted by

all the French Critics, is the celebrated Qu'il Mourut of Corneille, in the Tragedy of Ho|race. In the famous combat betwixt the Horatii and the Curiatii, the old Horatius, being informed, that two of his sons are slain, and that the third had betaken himself to flight, at first will not believe the report; but being thoroughly assured of the fact, is fired with all the sentiments of high honour and indignation at this supposed unworthy behaviour of his surviving son. He is re|minded, that his son stood alone against three, and asked what he would have had him to have done?—

"To have died,"

—he answers. In the same manner Porus, taken prisoner by Alexander, after a gallant defence, and asked in what manner he would be treated? answering,

"Like a king;"

and Caesar chid|ing the pilot who was afraid to set out with him in a storm,

"Quid times? Caesarem ve|his;"

are good instances of this sentimen|tal sublime. Wherever, in some critical and high situation, we behold a man uncommon|ly intrepid, and resting upon himself; supe|rior to passion and to fear; animated by some great principle to the contempt of popular opinion, of selfish interest, of dangers, or of death; there we are struck with a sense of the Sublime* 1.4.

HIGH virtue is the most natural and fer|tile source of this moral Sublimity. How|ever, on some occasions, where Virtue either has no place, or is but imperfectly displayed, yet if extraordinary vigour and force of mind be discovered, we are not insensible to a de|gree of grandeur in the character; and from the splendid conqueror, or the daring conspi|rator, whom we are far from approving, we cannot with-hold our admiration* 1.5.

I HAVE now enumerated a variety of in|stances, both in inanimate objects and in hu|man life, wherein the Sublime appears. In all these instances, the emotion raised in us is of the same kind, although the objects that produce the emotion be of widely different kinds. A question next arises, whether we are able to discover some one fundamental quality in which all these different objects agree, and which is the cause of their pro|ducing an emotion of the same nature in our minds? Various hypotheses have been formed concerning this; but, as far as appears to me, hitherto unsatisfactory. Some have imagined that amplitude, or great extent, joined with simplicity, is either immediately, or remotely, the fundamental quality of what|ever is sublime; but we have seen that am|plitude is confined to one species of Sublime Objects; and cannot, without violent strain|ing, be applied to them all. The Author of "a Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful," to whom we are indebted for several inge|nious and original thoughts upon this subject, proposes a formal theory upon this founda|tion, That terror is the source of the Su|blime, and that no objects have this charac|ter, but such as produce impressions of pain

and danger. It is indeed true, that many terrible objects are highly sublime; and that grandeur does not refuse an alliance with the idea of danger. But though this is very pro|perly illustrated by the Author (many of whose sentiments on that head I have adopt|ed), yet he seems to stretch his theory too far, when he represents the Sublime as con|sisting wholly in modes of danger, or of pain. For the proper sensation of Sublimity, ap|pears to be very distinguishable from the sen|sation of either of those; and, on several oc|casions, to be entirely separated from them. In many grand objects, there is no coincid|ence with terror at all; as in the magnificent prospect of wide extended plains, and of the starry firmament; or in the moral dispositi|ons and sentiments, which we view with high admiration; and in many painful and terrible objects also, it is clear, there is no sort of grandeur. The amputation of a limb, or the bite of a snake, are exceedingly terrible; but are destitute of all claim what|ever to Sublimity. I am inclined to think, that mighty force or power, whether accom|panied with terror or not, whether employed in protecting, or in alarming us, has a bet|ter title, than any thing that has yet been mentioned, to be the fundamental quality of the Sublime; as, after the review which we have taken, there does not occur to me any Sublime Object, into the idea of which, power, strength, and force, either enter not directly, or are not, at least, intimately asso|ciated

with the idea, by leading our thoughts to some astonishing power, as concerned in the production of the object. However, I do not insist upon this as sufficient to found a general theory: It is enough, now, to have given this view of the nature and different kinds of Sublime Objects; by which I hope to have laid a proper foundation for discus|sing, with greater accuracy, the Sublime in Writing and Composition.

Notes

• * 1.1

  See a Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful. Dr. Gerard on Taste, Section II. Elements of Criticism, Chap. IV.
• * 1.2

  Ye subterranean Gods, whose awful sway The gliding ghosts and silent shades obey; O Chaos, hear! and Phlegethon profound! Whose solemn empire stretches wide around! Give me, ye great tremendous powers! to tell Of scenes and wonders in the depths of Hell; Give me your mighty secrets to display, From those black realms of darkness to the day. PITT.

  Obscure they went; through dreary shades, that led Along the waste dominions of the dead; As wander travellers in woods by night, By the moon's doubtful and malignant light. DRYDEN.
• * 1.3

  The picture which Lucretius has drawn of the dominion of superstition over mankind, representing it as a portentous spectre showing its head from the clouds, and dismaying the whole human race with its countenance, together with the magnanimity of Epicurus in raising himself up against it, car|ries all the grandeur of a sublime, obscure, and awful image.

  Humana ante oculos foede cum vita jaceret In terris, oppressa gravi sub religione, Quae caput a coeli regionibus ostendebat, Horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans, Primum Graius homo mortales tollere contra Est oculos ausus.— LIB. I.
• * 1.4

  The Sublime, in natural and in moral objects, is brought before us in one view, and compared together, in the follow|ing beautiful passage of Akensides's Pleasures of the Imagina|tion:

  Look then abroad through nature; to the range Of planets, suns, and adamantine spheres, Wheeling, unshaken, thro' the void immense; And speak, O man! does this capacious scene, With half that kindling majesty, dilate Thy strong conception, as when Brutus rose, Refulgent, from the stroke of Caesar's fate, Amid the crowd of patriots; and his arm Aloft extending, like eternal Jove, When guilt brings down the thunder, call'd aloud On Tully's name, and shook his crimson steel, And bade the father of his country hail! For lo! the tyrant prostrate on the dust; And Rome again is free.BOOK I.
• * 1.5

  Silius Italicus has studied to give an august idea of Hanni|bal, by representing him as surrounded with all his victories, in the place of guards. One who had formed a design of as|sassinating him in the midst of a feast, is thus addressed:

  Fallit te, mensas inter quod credis inermem; Tot bellis quaesita viro, tot coedibus, armat Majestas aeterna ducem. Si admoveris ora Cannas, & Trebiam ante oculos, Trasymenaque busta Et Pauli stare ingentem miraberis umbram.

  A thought somewhat of the same nature occurs in a French author,

  "Il se cache; mais sa reputation le decouvre: Il marche sans suite & sans equipage; mais chacun, dans son esprit, le met sur un char de triomphe. On compte, en le voiant, les ennemis qu'il a vaincus, non pas les serviteurs qui le suivent. Tout seul qu'il est, on se figure, autour de lui, ses vertus, & ses victoires que l'accompagnent. Moins il est superbe, plus il devient venerable." Oraison funebre de M. de Turenne, par M. Flechier

  —Both these passages are splendid, rather than sublime. In the first there is a want of justness in the thought; in the second, of simplicity in the expression.