In §9 of the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant raises a question that he flags as the "key to the critique of taste". He has already argued that a judgment of beauty has an essential relation to the feeling of pleasure; the key question in §9 is whether "the feeling of pleasure [das Gefühl der Lust] precedes the judging of the [beautiful] object or the latter precedes the former" (5:216). In response, Kant immediately rules out the former answer and appears to commit himself to the following thesis:

\[ J \rightarrow F \]: A judgment of beauty must ground the feeling of pleasure in a beautiful object.1

Kant’s reasons for asserting \( J \rightarrow F \) are as follows: If, on the contrary, the judgment of beauty were grounded in a feeling of pleasure, then, according to him, it could only amount to a report of one’s subjective liking for the beautiful object.2 But a criterial feature of a judgment of beauty, on Kant’s view, is that it is not merely an expression of one’s subjective preference. Rather, a judgment of beauty makes a claim to "universal validity": it claims, that is, that it is correct to — or, equivalently, that everyone ought to — find the judged object beautiful. This is possible, Kant argues, only if the pleasure is a consequence of judging. Unfortunately, \( J \rightarrow F \) immediately raises a problem. For it is in tension with another thesis that Kant appears equally committed to:

\[ F \rightarrow J \]: A judgment of beauty is aesthetic, that is, grounded in feeling.3

1. I will leave the sense of ‘ground’ here ambiguous for now, since in order to further specify it, one must commit oneself to a particular interpretation of the relation between the judgment of beauty and the feeling of pleasure.

2. “If the pleasure in the given object came first, and only its universal communicability were to be attributed in the judgment of taste to the representation of the object, then such a procedure would be self-contradictory. For such a pleasure would be none other than mere agreeableness in sensation, and hence by its very nature could have only private validity ...” (5:217).

3. E.g.: “The judgment is also called aesthetic precisely because its determining ground is not a concept but [a] feeling ...” (5:228).
The judgment ‘X is beautiful’, according to Kant, is essentially different from a cognitive judgment like ‘X is a triangle’. Whereas the latter judgment relies on a conceptual rule by which one can pick out instances of triangles, the former is aesthetic — that is, it is made not in accordance with rules that specify what counts as a beautiful object, but rather on the basis of the subject’s feeling. Properly translated, then, the judgment ‘X is beautiful’ claims that the feeling that the beautiful object gives rise to in the subject is universally valid.

The puzzle of §9 has to do with reconciling \( J \rightarrow F \) and \( F \rightarrow J \). A successful account of the structure of Kant’s judgments of beauty must explain, in other words, how the subject’s feeling of pleasure in a beautiful object could be grounded in, and therefore consequent on, her judging, even though Kant makes clear that she judges on the basis of her feeling in the beautiful.

Resolving this puzzle has been a central goal for commentators in the last few decades of work on the Critique of Judgment. Most attempts at a solution, however, have required ignoring or modifying significant portions of Kant’s text. In this paper, I will propose an interpretation that avoids these extreme measures. As I will discuss, Kant’s text indicates that he posits two distinct feelings in the beautiful: the first, the ground of judgments of beauty (\( F_{1} \rightarrow J \)); the second, the feeling of pleasure consequent on judging (\( J_{1} \rightarrow F_{2} \)). As such, the two theses above are consistent.

In §1, I briefly rehearse and criticize two prominent attempts to respond to the puzzle of §9. In doing so, I hope to motivate the alternative account of the structure of judgments of beauty that I develop and defend in §2. Finally, in §3, I argue that a virtue of my account is that it can help to resolve another notorious problem that arises for Kant’s “Deduction” of judgments of beauty. Kant argues in the Deduction that we are entitled to claim universal validity for judgments of beauty because they are grounded in a state that is a necessary condition of judgment in general. Interpreters have worried that this attempted deduction has the consequence that all judgments must involve the feeling of pleasure. As I will explain, my view can avoid this troubling consequence.

1 Accounts of §9

1.1 Guyer’s Two-Act View (\( J_{1} \rightarrow F \rightarrow J_{2} \))

In Kant and the Claims of Taste, Paul Guyer attempts to solve the puzzle of §9 by claiming that the judgment of beauty involves two distinct acts of judgment (Guyer, Claims of Taste, esp. 97–9). In the first, the subject submits the object to her “estimation” by engaging in an act of “simple reflection”. If the object is beautiful, this first act of judging gives rise to what Kant calls the “harmony of the faculties”: the agreement between the cognitive faculties of imagination and understanding that, on Kant’s view, is tied to the distinctive pleasure felt in the beautiful. The feeling of pleasure caused by the harmony of the faculties is then followed by a second judgment — which Guyer considers the judgment of beauty proper — during which the subject examines the source of her pleasure and, determining it to be the harmony of her faculties, judges it to be universally valid. On Guyer’s view, then, the feeling of pleasure in the beautiful is consequent on a first, general act of judging (\( J_{1} \rightarrow F \)); this pleasure then serves as the object of the judgment of beauty proper that claims its universal validity (\( F \rightarrow J_{2} \)).

Unfortunately, however, §9 makes clear that pleasure must be a consequence of the judgment of beauty itself and not some prior act of judging (5:217). Guyer concedes this, but suggests that Kant is being sloppy here by allowing a previously held aesthetic view — on which aesthetic response is tied to social communicability — to creep into a mature view with which that characterization is inconsistent (Ibid., 139–40). As many commentators have noted, however, it is rather uncharitable to attribute such an error to Kant especially in the very section that he describes as “key to the critique of taste” and “worthy of full attention” (5:216).
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1.2 Ginsborg’s One-Act View (J→F)

In “On the Key to Kant’s Critique of Taste”,4 Hannah Ginsborg rejects Guyer’s two-act view of judgments of beauty and attempts instead to take Kant’s claims in §9 at face value. In order to reconcile the theses \( J \rightarrow F \) and \( F \rightarrow J \), she suggests that the judgment of beauty is identical with the feeling of pleasure (\( J \rightarrow F \)). On her “one-act” view, to make a judgment of beauty is to be in a mental state that reflexively claims its own universal validity and is “manifest to consciousness” (Ginsborg, “On the Key”, 41) through a feeling of pleasure. Ginsborg describes this as follows:

I take my mental state in perceiving an object to be universally communicable, where my mental state is nothing other than the mental state of performing that very act of judgment, that is, of taking my mental state in the object to be universally communicable. ... The act of self-referentially taking my mental state to be universally communicable with respect to a given object consists, phenomenologically, in a feeling of pleasure in that object (Ibid., 41).

Ginsborg’s interpretation succeeds in reconciling the two theses in question without reading into the Critique of Judgment two separate acts of judging. If a feeling of pleasure is the phenomenological manifestation of the judgment of beauty, then pleasure in the beautiful can be said to be grounded in the judgment of beauty (\( J \rightarrow F \)). And since the judging is phenomenologically manifest as a feeling of pleasure, it counts as a judgment that is aesthetic and made through pleasure (\( F \rightarrow J \)). Furthermore, since the pleasurable state is one that reflects on and claims its own universal validity, it can be said that the judgment of beauty claims the universal validity of the pleasure.

Despite these advantages, the resulting proposal is — in Ginsborg’s own words — an “unusual and initially counter-intuitive model of what goes on when we judge an object to be beautiful” (Ibid., 34). The suggestion that an experience of beauty consists in being in a state that reflexively approves of itself but is otherwise empty of content is odd, to say the least. Adding to the implausibility is the fact that being in the state in question appears to set the subject off on a fruitless regress — one in which the state the judge to be universally valid is just the state of judging to be universally valid the state of judging to be universally valid... and so on.

It must also be noted that — notwithstanding its ability to reconcile the problematic theses in §9 — Ginsborg’s view bears an uneasy relationship to Kant’s text. For one, if Kant’s view really is that the judgment of beauty consists in only one act of pleasurable judgment, it is strange that he should say that the “key” question of his account concerns whether “the feeling of pleasure precedes the judging ... or the latter precedes the former” and seemingly affirm the latter option (5:216).5

Finally, the austerity of Ginsborg’s account of the mental state that grounds the judgment of beauty is in tension with Kant’s many


5. These particular worries do not arise for the one-act view that Rachel Zuckert argues for in Kant on Beauty and Biology, since she disagrees with Ginsborg that the judgment of beauty is identical to the feeling of pleasure. On Zuckert’s view, \( J \rightarrow F \) correctly expresses Kant’s thesis that aesthetic judging is “transcendentally prior” (310) to — that is, a necessary condition for the possibility of — aesthetic pleasure in the beautiful. As for the passages that suggest that feeling precedes the judgment of beauty, Zuckert argues that these are merely meant to pick out an “order in knowledge” (330) — viz., that it is in virtue of being conscious of her aesthetic pleasure that the subject first expresses her experience of the object as beautiful. The problem with Zuckert’s reading, however, is that it cannot do justice to \( F \rightarrow J \); as I have discussed, Kant makes clear that it is not merely the case that judgments of beauty are expressed through feeling, but rather that the determining ground of such judgments — that is, the basis on which they are made — is itself a feeling. Zuckert’s view conflicts with this central claim; indeed, she is forced to conclude that these assertions of Kant’s are “mischaracterizations of the structure of aesthetic judging” (330). On my view, \( F \rightarrow J \) is as central to Kant’s view as \( J \rightarrow F \); in fact, he treats the former as definitional of their status as aesthetic judgments (5:228). As such, I think Ginsborg is right to argue that a one-act view can do justice to both \( J \rightarrow F \) and \( F \rightarrow J \) only if it identifies the judgment of beauty and the pleasure.
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To accommodate his view, as we saw, Guyer has to charge Kant with extreme sloppiness in §9. Ginsborg succeeds in absolving him of that charge only by making much of the discussion in that section misleading or redundant. She attempts to mitigate this by pointing to “differences between eighteenth-century and twentieth-century modes of philosophical expression” (Ginsborg, “On the Key”, 52), but I think it is clear that an interpretation that is able to integrate and make sense of more of Kant’s discussion, if possible, is to be preferred. In the next section, I will propose such an interpretation.

2 Two Feelings in the Beautiful ($F_1 \to J \to F_2$)

My goal in this section is to develop a view that solves the puzzle of §9 while incorporating a more robust conception of the harmony of the faculties that is a central component of Kant’s account.

2.1 The Proposal

Let me begin by noting that Kant states clearly that (1) the harmonious free play of the faculties is the determining ground of the judgment of beauty; and (2) this harmony can be felt by the subject. At 5:228, for purposes to note that Kant clearly does allow for such a free harmony in the Critique of Judgment.

7. In Kant’s Theory of Taste, Henry Allison follows Kant’s text in assigning a significant role to the harmony of the faculties. According to Allison, the faculty of feeling is a “faculty of appraisal” (69) through which the subject senses her own mental state. On his view, the subject is capable — through her feeling of pleasure or displeasure — of judging “the capacity of a representation to occasion an enhancement or diminution of [her] cognitive faculties in their cooperative activity” (130). For Allison, then, the subject senses the harmony of her faculties through a feeling of pleasure, and this felt pleasure grounds the judgment of beauty. It is clear that on his account, the judgment of beauty proper is based on pleasure; as such, it violates $J \to F$ and does not provide a solution to the puzzle under discussion. In commenting on the puzzle, Allison says that some version of Guyer’s solution — “although it conflicts with Kant’s language in the passage in question” — “seems called for … and does provide a solution to the … problem” (112). For reasons that will become clear in the next section, I think Allison is right to stress the importance of the harmony of the faculties, but wrong to identify the feeling of harmony and the feeling of pleasure in the beautiful.

6. Ginsborg recognizes this implication of her view and accepts it: according to her, the possibility of the imagination and understanding harmonizing “freely” contradicts Kant’s description of their roles in cognition in the Critique of Pure Reason (Ginsborg, “On the Key”, 46, 50). I do not agree with this criticism, but I will not attempt to respond to it here. It should be sufficient for our descriptions of it. He characterizes the state as one in which the cognitive faculties of the imagination and the understanding are in a harmonious free play. When making an ordinary cognitive judgment, the imagination synthesizes the manifold of intuition in a manner that is determined by an appropriate concept supplied by the understanding. In this way, imagination and understanding work together to generate an objective representation that has both intuitive and conceptual content. In the case of beauty, in contrast, the relation between imagination and understanding is a “free play”: on Kant’s view, as I have mentioned, conceptual rules do not determine a judgment of beauty, and so the imagination synthesizes freely, without direction by the understanding. But the output of this free synthesis of the imagination is nevertheless meant to be in agreement with the conditions of the understanding; as Kant puts it, “the former in its freedom is in harmony with the latter in its lawfulness” (5:287).

The sensed harmony of the faculties that occurs in response to representing a beautiful object is, on Kant’s view, the fundamental basis of the pleasure in the beautiful, and as such, he offers up many rich descriptions of it. For example, Kant describes this state in §9 itself as one of the “animation of both faculties (the imagination and the understanding) to an activity that is indeterminate but yet, through the stimulus of the given representation, in unison”. When she has an experience of the beautiful, he says, the subject senses “the effect that consists in the facilitated play of both powers of the mind (imagination and understanding), enlivened through mutual agreement” (5:219). Ginsborg must disregard these many descriptions of the mental state that Kant claims is involved in making a judgment of beauty, since, on her view, its only content is the reflexive approval I have described above.
example, he says: “The judgment [of beauty] is also called aesthetic precisely because its determining ground is not a concept but the feeling (of inner sense) [das Gefühl (des inneren Sinnes)] of that unison in the play of the powers of the mind, insofar as they can only be sensed.” 8

Now, despite their other differences, most commentators assume that “the feeling … of that unison” of the faculties just is the feeling of pleasure in the beautiful. 9 They assume, in other words, that the harmony of the faculties is manifest to the subject through a feeling of pleasure.

Reading this commitment into §9 gives rise to the puzzle that is the topic of this paper. For after denying there that pleasure in the beautiful precedes the judgment of beauty, Kant continues:

[S] Thus it is the universal communicability of the state of mind in the given representation which, as the subjective condition of the judgment of taste, must serve as its ground and have the pleasure in the object as a consequence (5:217, my emphases).

The problem posed by sentence [S] is as follows: if the “state of mind” that is referred to in this sentence as the determining ground of the judgment of beauty is the harmony of the faculties and is itself pleasurable (F→J), how can Kant go on to suggest that the feeling of pleasure occurs only as a consequence of the judgment (J→F)?

I want to argue here that Kant does not in fact identify the feeling of the harmony of the faculties with the feeling of pleasure in the beautiful. In the following passage from the First Introduction, for example,

8.  Kant also refers to “a feeling of the free play of the powers of representation” in §9 itself (5:217).

9.  This is true on both Guyer’s and Ginsborg’s views, as I have discussed. Allison is also explicitly committed to this claim, as mentioned in n. 7. So, for example, are Béatrice Longuenesse (whose view I contrast with my own in n. 15), Linda Palmer (“A Universality Not Based”, 26; 29; 36) and Melissa Zinkin (“Pleasure of ‘Mere Reflection’, 437). Zuckert notes that Kant does not in fact identify the feeling of the harmony of the faculties as pleasure, but concludes that “it seems likely … that it is” (Zuckert, Beauty and Biology, 313n47).

Kant clearly distinguishes the subject’s awareness of the harmony of her faculties from the pleasure that accompanies this awareness:

[A]n aesthetic judgment is that whose determining ground lies in a sensation [Empfindung] that is immediately connected with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure [mit dem Gefühle der Lust und Unlust unmittelbar verbunden ist]. … In the aesthetic judgment of sense [i.e., judgments of the agreeable] it is that sensation which is immediately produced by the empirical intuition of the object, in the aesthetic judgment of reflection [i.e., judgments of beauty] … it is that sensation which the harmonious play of the two faculties of cognition in the power of judgment, imagination and understanding, produces in the subject insofar as in the given representation the faculty of the apprehension of the one and the faculty of presentation of the other are reciprocally expeditious, which relation in such a case produces through this mere form a sensation that is the determining ground of a judgment which for that reason is called aesthetic and as subjective purposiveness (without a concept) is combined with the feeling of pleasure (20:224, my emphases).

In this passage, Kant clearly distinguishes two elements: the sensation of the harmonious play of the faculties — which he identifies as the determining ground of the judgment of beauty — and the feeling of pleasure, which he says is combined with it.

In fact, Kant suggests in this passage (and again at 20:22650) that it
is the case for aesthetic judgments in general—both judgments of the agreeable, which report one’s merely subjective pleasure in an object, as well as judgments of beauty—that the pleasure they involve is combined with and grounded in a sensation that is distinct from the pleasure itself. In the case of judgments of the agreeable, Kant identifies the relevant sensation(s) as the one(s) produced by intuiting the object—the taste sensations, for example, caused by eating a chocolate that gives one pleasure. In the case of judgments of beauty, he says, the relevant sensation that gives rise to pleasure is the sensation of the harmony of one’s faculties. This indicates, however, that just as taste sensations are distinct from and give rise to the pleasure in eating chocolate, so the sensation of the harmony of the faculties is distinct from and gives rise to the pleasure in the beautiful.

Reading a distinction between the sensation of harmony and the feeling of pleasure back into §9, we can see that there Kant explicitly identifies “the state of mind in the given representation”—which, in sentence [S] above, was meant to be the ground of the judgment of beauty and have the pleasure in the beautiful as a consequence—as the “feeling of the free play of the powers of representation” (5:217). If the feeling of harmony and the feeling of pleasure in the beautiful are two distinct feelings, as suggested in the passage above, there is no longer any problem in reading [S] literally: once disambiguaed, it says simply that the feeling of harmony must be the ground of the judgment of beauty and have the feeling of pleasure as its consequence.

In fact, towards the end of §9, Kant explicitly raises and responds to the question of how we come to be aware of the harmony of the faculties when making a judgment of beauty. Here is how he puts the question:

... in what way do we become conscious of a mutual subjective correspondence of the powers of cognition with each other in the judgment of taste—aesthetically, through mere inner sense and sensation, or intellectually, through the consciousness of our intentional activity through which we set them in play? (5:218)

He answers that the harmonious relation between the faculties “can make itself known only through sensation [Empfindung]” (5:219), and adds:

The animation of both faculties (the imagination and the understanding) to an activity that is indeterminate but yet, through the stimulus of the given representation, in unison, namely that which belongs to a cognition in general, is the sensation whose universal communicability is postulated by the judgment of taste (5:219, my emphasis).

The implication is clear. Recall once again that in sentence [S], Kant claims that it is the “universal communicability of the state of mind” in representing the beautiful object that grounds the judgment of beauty and has the pleasure as its consequence. In the passage above, he says that the judgment of beauty “postulates”—that is, is made on the basis of—the universal communicability of the sensation of the harmony of the faculties. If the sensation of the harmony of the faculties is distinct from the feeling of pleasure, as I have suggested, this is all perfectly consistent.

My proposal, then, is as follows: We can solve the puzzle of §9 once we allow that, for Kant, there are two distinct feelings involved in an aesthetic judgment of the beautiful. The first is the feeling of the harmony of the faculties, which is the aesthetic determining ground of the judgment of beauty \((F_i \rightarrow J)\). The second is the feeling of pleasure in the beautiful, which is its consequence \((J \rightarrow F_j)\).  

See also A29 in the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant says that a “pleasant taste” \(\text{Wohlgeschmack}\) is grounded in “a feeling of pleasure and displeasure as an effect of the sensation [of taste]”.

12. Guyer briefly considers the possibility of an interpretation like mine, although without noting the passages I cite here in support of it (Guyer, Claims of Taste, 90). He immediately rules it out, however, on the grounds that it
Let me pause to clarify an important terminological point here. Kant moves between referring to the feeling of harmony as a *sensation* ([Empfindung]) and as a *feeling* ([Gefühl]), without apparently intending any difference in meaning. The same is true for pleasure, which he refers to as a sensation (e.g. 20:229; 5:204), as well as (more frequently) a feeling. In §3 of the Analytic of the Beautiful, Kant says that, in order to avoid confusion, he intends to reserve the term ‘feeling’ for a sensation that “must always remain merely subjective and absolutely cannot constitute a representation of an object” (5:206). In other words, the term ‘feeling’, for Kant, designs a type of sensation in virtue of which a subject is made aware of a merely subjective state of herself rather than of a property that can be ascribed to an object. Thus, a sensation of greenness, for example, counts as an “objective sensation” since it affords the subject awareness of a property she ascribes to objects she cognizes as green; in contrast, the sensation of pleasure is a “subjective sensation” or *feeling*, through which the subject becomes aware merely of her own state, rather than of a property she can ascribe to objects.¹³ Now, since the sensation of the harmony of the faculties is a sensation by which the subject becomes aware of the state of her own cognitive faculties rather than a property of objects, it properly counts as a feeling by Kant’s definition. I refer to it here as a sensation when Kant’s text does so, and as a feeling on all other occasions. I choose the latter by default because it brings out the *aesthetic* character of the judgment of beauty (which Kant emphasizes, for example, in the passage quoted above from 5:228). My doing so may give rise to a worry, however: Does Kant allow for any feelings besides pleasure and displeasure? I address this worry in §2.4; for now, I return to completing the discussion of my proposal.

I have been arguing that the feeling of harmony and the feeling of pleasure are distinct feelings for Kant. Distinguishing them, I think, also helps to clarify another aspect of the opening paragraphs of §9. As I mentioned, Kant begins the section by arguing that pleasure in the beautiful could not precede the judgment of beauty. If this were the case, he explains, the subject’s basis for judgment would consist in the immediate sensory pleasantness of the judged object: the kind of pleasure she might take in a piece of chocolate, say, that she finds tasty. But a judgment that a piece of chocolate is tasty has, according to Kant, “merely private validity”: that is, it expresses a merely subjective preference. For the empirical fact that she feels immediate pleasure in the chocolate does not give the subject any grounds for demanding that others do so as well.

In contrast, as I have already emphasized, Kant takes it to be criterion of a judgment of beauty that it has “universal validity”: it does not express a merely subjective preference for the beautiful object, but rather claims that everyone ought to find it beautiful. Kant’s point in §9, I want to suggest, is that such a claim cannot be legitimate if the basis for the subject’s judgment of beauty *in any way* involves her feelings of pleasure. For in the latter case, her grounds would involve the immediate pleasantness of a sensation, rather than its universal communicability.¹⁴ Any interpretation that makes the determining ground of judgments of beauty a state of the harmony of the faculties that is appears to conflict with Kant’s claim in §12 that consciousness of the “subjective purposiveness” of a beautiful object is identical to the feeling of pleasure itself. I address this in §2.3, where I argue that the latter claim is compatible with the interpretation I defend in this paper.

Kant also characterizes feelings this way in the *Prolegomena*, where he refers to the warmth of a room, the sweetness of sugar and the repugnance of wormwood as *feelings* which “are merely subjective and which must therefore never be attributed to the object” (4:299n).

¹³ Kant also characterizes feelings this way in the *Prolegomena*, where he refers to the warmth of a room, the sweetness of sugar and the repugnance of wormwood as *feelings* which “are merely subjective and which must therefore never be attributed to the object” (4:299n).

¹⁴ Kant expresses a similar point in the case of the pleasure or displeasure that accompanies the representation of a possible action in the *Metaphysics of Morals*. He distinguishes there between a pleasure that “precedes [vorhergeht] the representation of the [moral] law”, which he characterizes as “pathological”, and the pleasure that “can only follow” from recognition of the law, which alone counts as genuinely moral (6:399). As I see it, Kant makes the parallel point in §9 that any pleasure that precedes a judgment of beauty could only be “pathological” — that is, a merely contingent, psychological response to an object akin to pleasure in the agreeable — whereas genuine pleasure in the beautiful must follow upon a judgment of beauty.
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itself pleasurable, I want to argue, runs afoul of this point. On my view, in contrast, the feeling of harmony is not itself pleasurable, but is rather the ground of both the judgment of beauty and the pleasure in the beautiful. Unlike feelings of pleasure, the feeling of harmony is an awareness of the state of the subject’s cognitive faculties that—as I will explain in §3— does give the subject grounds to demand that others agree with her judgment of beauty.

Armed with the distinction between the feeling of harmony and the feeling of pleasure, I can now fully specify what I take the structure of Kant’s judgments of beauty to be. Of relevance here is the fact that Kant characterizes such judgments as “reflecting” judgments—on his view, they involve an act of reflection in which the subject compares the relation her faculties are brought into by a given representation with the relation they must be in for judgment in general to be possible (20:220; see also 20:211). Bearing this in mind, I argue that, for Kant, judgments of beauty involve the following stages: When the subject perceives a beautiful object, she senses the harmonious relation between her faculties. She then reflects on this relation, comparing it with the relation that is a condition on judgment in general. This reflection issues in the judgment of beauty, in which the subject claims that the harmonious state of her faculties in representing the beautiful object is universally valid—that is, that anyone who represents the object ought to share that state (I will have more to say about what is meant to ground this claim in §3). This judgment is accompanied by the feeling of pleasure.

In the remainder of this section, I work out further details of the account I am proposing by responding to a number of potential questions and objections. In §2.2, I relate the universal validity of the harmony of the faculties to the universal validity of pleasure in the beautiful. In §2.3, I respond to the objection that my view is ruled out by passages in which Kant identifies consciousness of the ‘subjective face value.’

15. This is the case on the interpretations defended by Guyer, Ginsborg and Allison. It is also an important difference between my account and the one suggested by Béatrice Longuenesse in ‘Kant’s Leading Thread’. Longuenesse suggests that the pleasure in the beautiful is a “two-fold” pleasure: a first-order pleasure in the harmony of the faculties, combined with a second-order pleasure in the universal validity of the harmony of the faculties (207–9). My account resembles Longuenesse’s insofar as we both identify two feelings in the beautiful. A crucial difference, however, is that, according to me, the feeling of the harmony of the faculties is a sui generis feeling that is not itself pleasurable. This is important, I think, because it respects Kant’s insistence in §9 that a judgment made on the basis of pleasure could have only subjective validity. On whether Kant allows for feelings distinct from pleasure and displeasure, see §2.4 below. That the harmony of the faculties is not itself pleasurable will also be key for the solution to the problem for Kant’s deduction that I go on to offer in §3.

16. Admittedly, Kant refers to pleasure as the determining ground of the judgment of beauty on at least two occasions (20:225, 5:191). In this paper, however, I proceed on the assumption that his most careful statement of the structure of judgments of beauty is presented in §9, where, as we have seen, he explicitly asks whether pleasure precedes the judgment of beauty and argues unequivocally that it cannot do so. As such, I think we cannot take those passages where he nevertheless refers to pleasure as a determining ground at face value.
purposiveness” of a beautiful object with the feeling of pleasure. In §2.4, I discuss the worry that Kant does not make room for any feelings besides pleasure and displeasure. Finally, in §2.5, I make some comments about the relation between the feeling of harmony and the feeling of pleasure.

2.2 The Universal Validity of Pleasure
Kant makes clear that, on his view, the judgment of beauty claims the universal validity not only of the feeling of harmony, but of the feeling of pleasure itself. In §11, for example, he says:

the relation of the powers of representation to each other insofar as they are determined by a representation ... is combined with the feeling of pleasure that is at the same time declared to be valid for everyone through the judgment of taste (5:221).

Since I follow Kant in claiming that pleasure in the beautiful is only a consequence of the judgment of beauty, can my view accommodate the claim that the judgment itself “declare[s]” the universal validity of the pleasure? I think it can. As we have seen, Kant says that the judgment of beauty claims that the feeling of harmony produced by a beautiful object is universally communicable. It claims, that is, that the state of the subject’s faculties in representing the beautiful object — one of mutual agreement between the imagination and the understanding — is one that any subject appraising that object can and ought to share.

Now, so long as the pleasure felt in the beautiful object is a pleasure in the feeling of harmony that is claimed to be universally valid, it follows, for Kant, that it is itself universally valid. As such, it can be said that the judgment of beauty claims the universal validity of the feeling of harmony and at the same time and on that basis establishes the universal validity of the subject’s pleasure in the harmony. This is just what we see Kant say in §9:

The subjective universal communicability of the kind of representation in a judgment of taste ... can be nothing other than the state of mind in the free play of the imagination and the understanding (so far as they agree with each other as is requisite for a cognition in general): for we are conscious that this subjective relation suited to cognition in general must be valid for everyone and consequently universally communicable .... Now, this merely subjective (aesthetic) judging of the object, or of the representation through which the object is given, precedes the pleasure in it, and is the ground of this pleasure ... but on that universality of the subjective conditions of the judging of objects alone is this universal subjective validity of satisfaction, which we combine with the representation of the object that we call beautiful, grounded (5:217–8, my emphases).

2.3 “Subjective Purposiveness” and Pleasure
I also need to address what may seem to be a significant textual obstacle to my view: the fact that it appears inconsistent with passages in which Kant says alternatively that the “representation” (20:228, 20:248), the “consciousness” (5:222) or even the “concept” (20:230) of the “subjective purposiveness” of a beautiful object is identical with the feeling of pleasure. Since what it means for an object to be “subjectively purposive” is just for it to be such that representing it puts one’s cognitive faculties into harmony, it is not unreasonable to assume that “consciousness of the subjective purposiveness” is nothing over and above the feeling of harmony. And since Kant claims that the former is identical to the feeling of pleasure, it would follow that so is the latter. But this would spell trouble for my view, since it turns precisely on denying that the feeling of harmony is identical to the feeling of pleasure.

Let me schematize the worry before responding to it. In what follows, SP refers to consciousness of the subjective purposiveness of an
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object, HF to the feeling of the harmony of the faculties, and PL to the feeling of pleasure.

Objection:

(1) \(SP = PL\). [20:228, 230, 248, 5:222]
(2) \(SP = HF\). [By assumption]
(3) \(\Rightarrow HF = PL\)

To begin to respond to the objection, let me note that endorsing (3) commits Kant to an explicit inconsistency. For, as we have already seen, he also clearly asserts both (4) and (5):

(4) HF is the determining ground of a judgment of beauty.
   [e.g. 5:228]
(5) PL cannot be the determining ground of a judgment of beauty, but rather must be its consequence. [5:217]

Together, these entail:

(6) \(HF \neq PL\).

As I have argued so far, the fact that Kant endorses and argumentatively defends (4) and (5) in response to the “key” question of §9 strongly indicates that he is indeed committed to (6). The only way to avoid saddling his view with incoherence, then, is to resist (3). I will now suggest that the correct way of doing so is to deny (2): that is, to reject the assumption that consciousness of subjective purposiveness (SP) is identical with the feeling of harmony (HF).

To begin with, note that in the passages cited by the objection, “subjective purposiveness” is primarily ascribed to the beautiful object. At 20:228, for example, Kant says that it is “the representation of a subjective purposiveness of an object” that is “even identical with the feeling of pleasure”. To represent an object as subjectively purposive, however, is plausibly to do more than merely feel the harmony of the faculties. Through the feeling of harmony, the subject becomes aware of the state of her own faculties; when she represents subjective purposiveness, on the other hand, she goes beyond this and ascribes a (subjective) property to the object she judges beautiful. Whereas the former gives one grounds for a judgment of beauty, the latter — as Kant makes clear in the Third Moment (5:236) — is part of the content of the judgment itself. If this is right, consciousness of subjective purposiveness is not identical with the feeling of the harmony of one’s faculties: assumption (2) that underpins the objection should be rejected.

When Kant claims, then, that the consciousness, or representation, of the subjective purposiveness of an object is even identical with pleasure, I suggest we read him as saying that the judgment of beauty itself can be said to be expressed through pleasure. His point in these passages, in other words, is that in feeling a pleasure that she takes to be universally valid, the subject in effect expresses her judgment that the object is beautiful or, equivalently, subjectively purposive. This is precisely what he says at 5:189: “pleasure can express nothing but [the object’s] suitability to the cognitive faculties that are in play in the reflecting power of judgment, insofar as they are in play, and thus merely a subjective formal purposiveness of the object” (my emphasis). This is compatible with the ground for the judgment of purposiveness being an independent feeling of the harmony of the faculties that is not itself pleasurable: as is the case on my view.

20. At 5:222, Kant also allows the ascription of subjective purposiveness to “the play of the cognitive powers of the subject in the case of a representation through which an object is given”. I do not take his meaning here to be significantly different, however, from the passages in which he speaks of ascribing subjective purposiveness directly to the beautiful object. In either case, I take him to be referring to a judgment that the object (or its representation) gives rise to the harmonious free play of the faculties. My suggestion here is that making such a judgment goes beyond merely feeling that harmony.

21. Zuckert makes a similar point against Guyer’s understanding of purposiveness (Zuckert, Beauty and Biology, 332n19).

22. This fits well with passages in which Kant claims that pleasure functions as the “predicate” in a judgment of beauty (5:191; 5:288; 5:289). On this point, see Aquila (“A New Look”) and Rind (“What Is Claimed”, 83–4). I return to this point in §2.4 below.
2.4 Feelings Other than Pleasure and Displeasure

I have been arguing that, for Kant, the feeling of harmony is a sui generis feeling, distinct from the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. This brings with it a worry, however: Does Kant allow for any feelings distinct from pleasure and displeasure? It may appear that he rules out this possibility in the First Introduction, where he says that “there is only one so-called sensation that can never become a concept of an object, and this is the feeling of pleasure and displeasure” (20:224). This admittedly puts pressure on my claim that the feeling of harmony is a distinct sensation that pertains merely to the state of the subject rather than to objects.

Let me begin by noting some factors that I think mitigate the worry. As I have already discussed, Kant defines a feeling as any sensation by which the subject becomes aware of her own subjective state, rather than of properties she can ascribe to objects. His definitions of pleasure and displeasure in §10 of the Critique of Judgment, on the other hand, are narrower:

The consciousness of the causality of a representation with respect to the state of the subject, for maintaining it in that state, can here designate in general what is called pleasure; in contrast to which displeasure is that representation that contains the ground for determining the state of the representations to their own opposite (hindering or getting rid of them) (5:220).

To claim that pleasure and displeasure are the only possible feelings, then, would be to claim that the only state of herself that a subject can be aware of that does not amount to awareness of the properties of a cognized object is a state that either tends to maintain the representational state the subject is in (i.e., pleasure), or tends to prompt her to change the representational state she is in (i.e., displeasure). But does Kant really think that this is the only possible subjective state one can be aware of? There is evidence that at least as late as the Prolegomena, Kant is willing to countenance feelings other than pleasure and displeasure. For one, as I noted above, he there characterizes sensations of warmth and sweetness as feelings, precisely on the grounds that these sensations “are merely subjective and ... must therefore never be attributed to the object” (4:299n). Now, Kant is not always consistent in whether he considers sensations that correspond to secondary qualities to be subjective or objective. Nonetheless, the important point for my purposes here is that his usage in the Prolegomena — where he employs the same definition of ‘feeling’ that he does in the Critique of Judgment — suggests that he does not operate with an understanding of the term that in principle only picks out determinations of pleasure or displeasure.

In fact, there is yet another instance in the Prolegomena where Kant uses the term ‘feeling’ to characterize a subject’s awareness of herself that does not obviously involve any pleasure or displeasure. In the context of a discussion of self-consciousness, he says that a subject’s awareness of herself in apperception does not amount to awareness of the properties of an object, but rather expresses merely a “feeling of an existence” [Gefühl eines Daseins] (4:334n, my emphasis). Now, as Kant emphasizes in the Critique of Pure Reason, a subject’s awareness of herself in apperception consists in awareness of her own activity of thinking, rather than of any property that she can ascribe to an object (even to herself as an object). This explains why Kant would characterize such awareness as a feeling: since it consists in awareness of the subject rather than of any property of an object, it satisfies the definition of feeling discussed above. But there is no reason to think that it involves any feelings of pleasure or displeasure; indeed this would be very far from Kant’s description of what a subject’s awareness of herself in

23. In the Critique of Pure Reason, for example, Kant suggests that colors, tastes, etc. are subjective sensations that “do not allow any object to be cognized” (A29/ B44). However, in §3 of the Critique of Judgment, as we have seen, he calls the sensation of greenness an objective sensation, on the grounds that it constitutes “perception of an object” (5:206).

apperception is like.\textsuperscript{25} This provides further evidence, then, that Kant allows for feelings that are not reducible to pleasure or displeasure.

How, then, should we understand Kant’s claim in the First Introduction that pleasure and displeasure are the only sensations that can never become “a concept of an object”? My suggestion is that Kant here means to refer to the specific role that he takes pleasure and displeasure to play with respect to aesthetic judgments. As I mentioned in §2.3 above, Kant sometimes refers to pleasure as playing the role of a “predicate” in aesthetic judgments: in feeling a pleasure that she takes to be universally valid, he suggests, the subject in effect expresses her judgment that the object that gives rise to the pleasure is beautiful.\textsuperscript{26} In such judgments, Kant indicates, the feeling of pleasure plays the role played by a concept in an objective judgment. In subsuming a particular object under the concept “triangle”, for example, the judgment “This is a triangle” claims universal validity: it claims, that is, that it is correct to — or, equivalently, that any subject ought to — apply the concept “triangle” to the given object. Similarly, in feeling a pleasure that she judges to be universally valid, the subject in effect judges that any subject ought to combine the representation of the beautiful object with a feeling of pleasure.

As I understand it, then, we need not read Kant as claiming at 20:224 that pleasure and displeasure are the only subjective sensations \textit{tout court}, but rather that they are the only sensations that play the role of “subjective predicates” in aesthetic judgments. In fact, in the very sentence preceding, he characterizes aesthetic judgments in general as judgments “whose \textit{predicate} can never be cognition”, going on to identify the “predicate” in question as pleasure or displeasure (20:224). Once again, this is compatible with the determining ground of judgments of beauty being the independent awareness that one’s faculties are in harmony, as is the case on my view.


2.5 The Relation Between the Feeling of Harmony and Pleasure

Another question that may arise for my proposal is the nature of the relation between the two feelings I have argued it is necessary to distinguish. Does the feeling of the harmony of the faculties \textit{cause} the feeling of pleasure? Or is the feeling of pleasure intentional — that is, \textit{about} the feeling of harmony?

This question is the analogue of one that has been much discussed in the secondary literature. Though other commentators do not distinguish the feeling of harmony from the feeling of pleasure as I do, they have disagreed about whether pleasure is merely the causal effect of the faculties being in harmony or, alternatively, whether it has intentional content and is \textit{about} the harmony of the faculties.\textsuperscript{27} In response, most commentators note that Kant is far from clear on this issue and, indeed, that textual support can be found for either reading. A first point in favor of the causal reading is Kant’s language: the feeling of pleasure, he says, is “aroused” by (5:190) or “immediately connected with” (20:224) the harmony of the faculties.\textsuperscript{28} Even more significantly, he appears to rule out the intentionalist reading at 5:206, where, as I have already mentioned, he says that the feeling of pleasure “does not serve for any cognition at all, not even that by which the subject cognizes itself”.

Nevertheless, proponents of the intentionalist reading have argued that treating pleasure merely as an effect of the harmony of the faculties turns the judging of beauty into an empirical exercise wherein the subject attempts to determine the causal origin of her own feeling of

27. Guyer argues that pleasure in the beautiful is merely the causal effect of the harmony of the faculties; making a judgment of beauty, on his account, involves determining whether one’s pleasure in fact has this causal origin (Guyer, \textit{Claims of Taste}, 94–7; 134, 147). Most other commentators, including Aquila (“A New Look”), Allison (“Pleasure and Harmony”; \textit{Kant’s Theory of Taste}, 53–4; 122), Ginsborg (“On the Key”, 42–5; 96) and Zuckert (“Kant’s Theory of Pleasure”; \textit{Beauty and Biology}, esp. 231–48) disagree with Guyer on this issue and argue that pleasure in the beautiful has intentional content.

28. More precisely (and in line with my view), Kant says that pleasure is immediately connected with the \textit{sensation} of harmony, which he once again identifies as the determining ground of the judgment of beauty (20:224).
pleasure. Such a psychological exercise is at odds, however, with the normative status that Kant clearly accords judgments of beauty. As textual support for the intentionalist reading, commentators point out that Kant clearly says that the subject can become aware of the relation between her cognitive faculties through feeling.

Now, the account I have been developing here has the resources to split the difference between the causal and intentionalist readings. Kant clearly does allow that the harmony of the faculties can be aesthetically sensed; as mentioned above, he characterizes this sensation as the “sensible representation of the state of the subject” (20:223, see also 5:291). I have argued, however, that this sensation is not identical to the feeling of pleasure; rather, as Kant goes on to say, pleasure is combined with it. On my view, then, it is the feeling of harmony that undeniably has intentional content: through it, the subject becomes directly aware of the state of her cognitive faculties. This commitment — in contrast with views on which the feeling of pleasure itself is intentional — is compatible with Kant’s claim that the subject does not recognize anything through pleasure, not even her own state.

It is true, however, that the intentionalist reading finds some support in the passages I have discussed in which Kant suggests that the judgment of beauty itself can be expressed through pleasure, or that pleasure plays the role of a “predicate” in a judgment of beauty. Ultimately, I believe that Kant’s text does not fully settle the issue. The virtue of my account, however, is that it can reflect this ambiguity and is not forced to choose between causal and intentionalist construals of pleasure. On my view, the subject becomes aware of the harmony of her faculties through an independent feeling that does have intentional content; this is consistent with the feeling of pleasure being caused by the feeling of harmony and/or being about the harmony of the faculties.

In addition to resolving the problem of §9, distinguishing the feeling of harmony from the feeling of pleasure can remove a crucial worry for Kant’s “Deduction” of judgments of beauty. I explain how in the next section.

3 The Deduction of Judgments of Beauty

A virtue of my view is that it can also help to resolve another long-standing problem for Kant’s account of judgments of beauty. That problem has to do with Kant’s “Deduction” of judgments of beauty, in which Kant attempts to answer the question of what entitles a subject who judges an object to be beautiful to claim that others ought to agree with her judgment. The question arises in the case of judgments of beauty because it is Kant’s view, as we have seen, that such judgments are not determined by concepts. A subject can legitimately demand, for example, that others agree with her when she judges of some shape X that it is a triangle, if she can cite the criteria that pick out triangles, and prove that X meets them. On Kant’s view, however, it is not possible to specify a set of features that any and all beautiful objects must have. Rather, judgments of beauty are made on the basis of the subject’s feeling, which she nevertheless claims everyone ought to share. But what could possibly entitle her to make such a claim?

Now, in the Deduction (§38, 5:289–92), Kant argues that as long as she has made a pure judgment of beauty, a subject is entitled to claim that others agree with her judgment. A full explanation of the argument of the deduction is beyond the scope of this paper. The following sketch of it, however, should be sufficient to bring the problem into view:

1. The pleasure in the beautiful is grounded in the harmony of the faculties.

30. See 20:223. Allison appeals to this consideration against Guyer, for example (Allison, ‘Pleasure and Harmony’, 468).
2. The harmony of the faculties is a necessary condition of judgment in general.

3. The necessary conditions of judgment in general are valid for all judging subjects.

4. So, the pleasure in the beautiful is valid for all judging subjects.

Kant’s general strategy in the deduction of judgments of beauty, then—as in his other deductions—is transcendental. His argument relies on the claim that the harmony of the faculties is a necessary condition of judgment in general, since the agreement of imagination and understanding is necessary for any act of cognition to occur. From this it is meant to follow that—unlike in the case of judgments based merely on sensory pleasantness—the mental state the subject takes pleasure in in a judgment of beauty is one that any judging subject must be able to share. If her state is genuinely determined merely by the conditions on judging, Kant argues, she is entitled to claim that all judging subjects ought to be in that state. And this is supposed to entitle her to claim that all other subjects ought to feel the pleasure she does.

Now, there are obviously many gaps in Kant’s argument as I have stated it here. Rather than attempting to fill in these gaps, however, I will focus on one problem for the deduction that many commentators have taken to tell decisively against it. The problem has been put in the form of the following dilemma: Either the harmony of the faculties is a necessary condition of judgment in general, or it is not. If it is, and the harmony of the faculties is identical to a feeling of pleasure, then every judgment—not merely judgments of beauty—should be pleasurable. But this is absurd. On the other hand, if the harmony of the faculties is not a condition on judgment in general, then Kant’s argument fails to provide the necessary entitlement for the claim of universal validity made by a judgment of beauty.

Now, an important assumption that underlies the dilemma and generates its first horn is that the harmony of the faculties is itself pleasurable. But that is precisely the claim that I have denied in this paper. In §2, I argued that there are two feelings in an experience of the beautiful: the feeling of the harmony of the faculties, which is not itself pleasurable, and an independent feeling of pleasure that is consequent on it. If this is correct, then the dilemma as stated above is a false one. For if the harmony of the faculties is not itself pleasurable, then Kant can claim that it is a necessary condition of all judgments without generating the absurd entailment that all judgments are pleasurable. And this would remove one of the biggest obstacles thought to face Kant’s deduction.

Of course, if the harmony of the faculties accompanies every judgment, the question can still be asked why it should give rise to pleasure only in the case of the beautiful. Couldn’t the dilemma be restated, in other words, as turning on whether the awareness of the harmony of the faculties is always accompanied by the feeling of pleasure, even if it is not identical with it?

In this case, however, the entailment can be blocked by appealing to secondary features that distinguish the aesthetic case from the cognitive one. Though both involve the same harmonious relation between the cognitive faculties, this relation comes about differently

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32. For a helpful discussion of various attempts to respond to the dilemma, see Rind, “Can Kant’s Deduction Be Saved?” Rind concludes that none of the attempts to rescue the deduction as it is presented in §38 are—or indeed, can be—successful. This is because, as he sees it, the only way to block the entailment that all judgments are pleasurable is to find a relevant distinction between the harmony of the faculties that accompanies cognition from the harmony that accompanies aesthetic judgments of beauty. But then what is true of the former—that it is a condition on cognition—need not be true of the latter, and the deduction fails. On my view, as will become clear, the need to distinguish cognitive harmony from aesthetic harmony does not arise. I discuss this further in n. 33.

33. This is a key advantage of a view that distinguishes the feeling of harmony and the feeling of pleasure. On such a view, there is no need to differentiate aesthetic from cognitive harmony in order to avoid the first horn of the supposed dilemma posed by the deduction. Instead, we can preserve Kant’s claim that there is just one species of harmony that is instantiated in both the cognitive and the aesthetic case and that is always universally valid with
in the two cases. First, as I have already discussed, the harmony in the case of beauty comes about freely: the activity of the imagination is not governed by a concept of the understanding. Second, and of a piece with this, the faculties in the case of beauty are said to be in play: their agreement is brought about not by the subject’s intentional cognitive activity, but rather unintentionally. The product of the free synthesis of the imagination that is triggered by its attempt to represent the beautiful object just happens to accord with the conditions of the understanding.\(^\text{34}\) As Kant puts it, in an experience of beauty, “the imagination ... is unintentionally (\emph{unabsichtlich}) brought into accord with the understanding ... through a given representation and a feeling of pleasure is thereby aroused” (5:190).

In other words, the gap that my view opens up between the harmony of the faculties and the feeling of pleasure allows for the conjecture that it is only when the harmony is discovered to occur while the faculties are in a state of free play that pleasure is aroused. This conjecture strikes me as defensible: we can see why there would be no cause for pleasure when the imagination synthesizes a triangle, say, under the direction of the understanding’s concept “triangle” and is for that reason in harmony with the conditions of the understanding. As Kant says, when it is “a concept, which unite[s] understanding and imagination in the judging of the object into a cognition of the object, then the consciousness of this relationship [is] intellectual” (5:219). In the case of the beautiful, as we have seen, Kant claims that since no concept of the understanding is adequate to a beautiful object, the latter triggers a free synthesizing on behalf of the imagination that is nonetheless discovered, through the feeling of harmony, to conform respect to the object that produces it. As such, the worry raised by Rind in “Can Kant’s Deduction Be Saved?” (14–6) does not arise.

\(^{34}\) There are obviously genuine questions here about how Kant can claim that the manifold synthesized by the imagination in an experience of beauty is in accordance with the lawfulness of the understanding, even though the understanding does not succeed in bringing the beautiful object under a concept. But responding to these questions is beyond the scope of this paper.

to the requirements of the understanding. Such an unexpected discovery could quite plausibly be regarded as grounds for pleasure.

On my view, then, Kant’s deduction can be saved from the charge of absurdity levied in the first horn of the so-called dilemma above. The harmony of the faculties is a necessary condition of judgments of beauty as well as cognitive judgments, and is not itself pleasurable. In the case of cognitive judgments, the harmony is brought about as a result of the subject’s rule-governed activity of synthesis in accordance with concepts, and the output is a determinate judgment (for example, “X is a triangle”), not a feeling of pleasure. In the case of beauty, as I have discussed, the synthesis of the imagination is not determined by a concept, but is nevertheless discovered to be in harmony with the understanding. Kant can consistently claim, then, that it is exclusively when the faculties are unintentionally put into harmony as they freely “play” with the representation of the beautiful object that pleasure is aroused. But since the harmonious state the faculties are unintentionally put into is the very same state they must be in for cognition in general, Kant can argue that pleasure in the beautiful is grounded in a universally valid state and is, therefore, itself universally valid.

**Conclusion**

To sum up, I have defended an interpretation of Kant’s account of judgments of beauty on which the experience of the beautiful involves two separate feelings: the feeling of the harmony of the faculties, and the feeling of pleasure. Distinguishing these two feelings, I argued, helps resolve two long-standing puzzles concerning Kant’s account. The first puzzle is the one presented by Kant’s apparently conflicting claims that the judgment of beauty both is made through feeling and grounds the feeling in the beautiful. I argued that it is the feeling of harmony that grounds judgments of beauty, and the feeling of pleasure that is consequent on them, and as such, that Kant’s claims are consistent. The second puzzle concerns Kant’s deduction of judgments of taste, and the worry that if, as he argues, the harmony of the faculties is a necessary condition of all judgments, then all judgments should
turn out to be pleasurable. The worry disappears on my view, since I argue that the feeling of the harmony of the faculties is not identical to the feeling of pleasure; rather, its occurrence when the faculties are in free play is the ground of the feeling of pleasure that is meant to be a distinctive element of the experience of beauty.

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