Inner Sense, Self-Affection, & Temporal Consciousness in Kant’s

Critique of Pure Reason

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1. Introduction

In §24 in the B-edition Transcendental Deduction, while discussing the role of productive imagination — the capacity of the understanding to determine sensibility — Kant remarks that this discussion should make evident the solution to the apparent paradox of empirical self-knowledge — namely, that a subject has empirical knowledge of itself only as an appearance, and not as a thing in itself (B152–3). This position appears paradoxical because, given Kant’s doctrine of sensibility, it implies that the subject is affected by itself and, therefore, that the subject is passive in relation to itself. Kant apparently believes that his discussion of the faculty of productive imagination should help remove the air of paradox surrounding this position and open the way to a correct understanding of empirical self-knowledge. In this paper I will argue that what Kant says there is certainly coherent and, furthermore, is a more or less direct corollary of the view on empirical knowledge that emerges from the B-edition Transcendental Deduction. In fact, as I will argue in §2 of this paper, intuitions of the self as the object of inner sense and intuitions of outer objects can be made intelligible only together, as dependent in parallel ways on the very same act of synthesis of the imagination, or self-affection.

This view contrasts with the reading of the same parts of the Critique offered by Henry Allison. Although Allison agrees that Kant was led to his account of inner sense through the argument of the B-edition

1. Throughout, page references to the Critique of Pure Reason will be included parenthetically in the main text. Where the passage referred to is present both editions, page references to both will be given. I will throughout be using the Guyer and Wood (1998) translation, except where otherwise noted. References to other Kantian texts will be to the volume and page of the German Academy of Sciences edition, abbreviated as Ak.

2. Allison (1983, 2004). In the revised edition of his book — Allison (2004) — Allison has slightly changed the focus of his criticism: he no longer takes Kant to believe his account of inner sense can explain empirical self-knowledge. The substance of his charge of confusion against Kant has not changed, however, and in some places the first edition offers substantially more detail. For this reason I will use both editions in this paper.
Transcendental Deduction, he also believes that it falls short of providing an account of knowledge of the self as an empirical object: “[a]t best, it explains how one can have sensible knowledge of one’s own representations; what it does not explain is how we can have sensible knowledge of the soul, the mind, or self, considered as the empirical subject to which these representations belong.”\(^3\) Furthermore, when Allison remarks that this is what Kant’s account can give “at best”, he means that this is all we get from his own extensive reworking of the argument\(^4\) — not from Kant’s text itself. According to Allison, the original text falls short of even this reduced aim. I believe Allison is wrong to draw either of these conclusions, and that his reworking of the argument is accordingly both unsatisfactory and superfluous: Kant’s account can be read as an account of empirical self-knowledge, whereas Allison’s (by his own admission) cannot. Nevertheless, I think it will be useful to follow Allison’s analysis in order to bring to the fore the problems any interpretation of Kant’s account of inner sense must address.

One consequence of my interpretation of Kant’s account of inner sense will be to make pressing certain questions concerning Kant’s conception of time. In §3 of this paper I turn to address these issues. I do not hope to give a fully satisfying account of Kant’s conception of temporal consciousness; I am not even sure that Kant is fully coherent on this issue. But I do hope to shed some light on certain difficulties concerning his account of temporality, difficulties that any reader of the Critique has to face.

2. Inner Sense, Self-Affection and Empirical Self-Knowledge

2.1 The role of inner sense

My overall goal in §2 is to present a certain reading of Kant’s conception of inner sense, a reading that — contrary to Allison’s — gives support to Kant’s claim that empirical self-knowledge can be based on inner sense. To begin with, we need to get clear about what exactly inner sense is supposed to do.


As Kant announces in the Transcendental Aesthetic, inner sense is supposed to yield intuitions of our self and its inner states (A33/B49). This, however, does not mean that the matter of inner intuitions consists in sensory impressions received from the self, as that of outer intuitions consists in impressions received through affection from outer objects. As Allison usefully points out, according to Kant the manifold of inner sense consists in the representations of outer sense, rather than in impressions of the self. In Kant’s words, “the representations of outer sense make up the proper material with which we occupy our mind” (B67). This point is confirmed in the B-edition Deduction, when Kant returns to the topic of inner sense. He writes, for example: “I exist as an intelligence […] which, in regard to the manifold that it is to combine, is subject to a limiting condition that it calls inner sense” (B158–9). However the idea of inner sense as a “limiting condition” is to be understood, this passage clearly suggests that inner sense does not have a separate manifold of its own. Its epistemic role, rather, is exhausted by its involvement in the process of acquiring empirical knowledge from the manifold given in outer sense.\(^5\)

This move of Kant’s requires some comment, since many subjective states beside outer perceptions (for example, pains or desires) might initially have seemed equally natural examples of the matter proper to a faculty worthy of the name ‘inner sense’. But I do not think we should be surprised that Kant so radically restricts the material proper to inner sense. We should remember that Kant’s interests are primarily epistemological, and his account of our sensible faculties largely reflects that focus. Thus, his reason for excluding phenomenal states such as pleasure or pain from the proper material of inner sense appears to be that these states do not represent anything — not, presumably, even the state of the subject. States such as “pleasure and displeasure”, as he puts it, do not belong to “intuition” and are not properly “cognitions” at all (B67). To have a headache is not — at least, not for Kant — to represent one’s head as being in a certain state: it is simply to be in a

5. Allison, (2004: 278–80). Language supporting this conception of the material of inner intuition is to be found throughout §2. Similar notes are also sounded in the footnote about attention, in B156–7.
non-representational state with a characteristic subjective feel about it. But if these states are not representational, then they are not involved in cognition — and a fortiori they do not belong to intuition, as Kant puts it. In particular, purely phenomenal subjective states are not analogous to sensations — impressions of objects received through affection — since sensations are a species of the genus "representation", or *repraesentatio* (A320/B376–7). But if only representations can belong to the matter of intuition, and states such as pain or pleasure are not representations, then the latter are not part of the proper material of inner sense. Similar considerations appear to rule out states of the will as well: even though states of the will may be representational in their own way, they are not cognitive representations and they do not belong to intuition. We can see, therefore, why Kant would think that the only material proper to inner sense consists in the representations of outer sense.

Thus, I think it should be agreed that, in the first instance, the role of inner sense is to enable the subject to become aware of its outer representations as its *own*. Accordingly, the question is how to reconcile this role of inner sense with Kant's apparent insistence that inner sense affords empirical knowledge of the self. Allison thinks that such insistence is misplaced and ultimately rests on "an equivocation concerning 'my representations' and equivalent expressions. This can mean either representations of me or representations belonging to me." Kant appears to insist that inner sense yields the former; but Allison thinks that, in the absence of impressions of the self, he should have restricted himself to the claim that inner sense yields the latter. From this Allison concludes that, properly speaking, the subject does not get empirical knowledge of itself through inner sense: the self remains non-empirical, and it is known simply as the substratum in which our states inhere.

Contrary to Allison, I think that a correct understanding of the way inner sense makes the subject aware of its outer representations entails that knowledge of the self as an appearance can be had through inner sense. My argument will, to some extent, take the form of an inference to the best explanation. Kant says relatively little directly concerning inner sense, and what he does say is scattered throughout his discussion of other issues; thus the main virtue I claim for my proposal is that it enables us to put Kant's sparse remarks about inner

6. Allison (1983: 261). It should be noted that Allison now thinks that Kant never intended inner sense to provide anything more than knowledge of the latter sort. See Allison (2004: 278–80).

7. Allison's reading is based partly on a *Reflection*, which (in Allison's translation) reads thus: 'All inner experience is (has) a judgment in which the predicate is empirical and the subject is I. Independently of experience, therefore, there remains merely the I for rational psychology; for I is the substratum of all empirical judgments' (R540, Ak 18:186, Allison [2004: 279]). But this *Reflection* does not have to be the way Allison reads it. The first sentence may be an ineluctable way to express the point that inner sense does not contain sensory impressions of the self; and the second sentence concerns the 'I' of rational psychology, that is, the 'I' of apperception — which, as we know from the *Paralogisms*, is supposed to be a non-empirical ('merely logical') substratum. If the *Reflection* is read this way, then it does not follow that the 'I' in inner experience is represented as a non-empirical substratum. My reading is supported by another *Reflection*, which, although hard to make full sense of, explicitly says that in judgments of inner experience we do employ an empirical concept of the self. From this, Kant concludes: "this constitutes a doubled I [...] (I appear to myself; I am in this empirical consciousness the observed and also the observer [...])" (R6354, Ak 18:680). It seems reasonable to assume that the observer 'I' is the 'I' of apperception, while the observed 'I' is the 'I' as appearance.
sense together with his general conception of experience in a natural way, so as to make sense of his insistence that empirical knowledge of the self can be had through it.

The main weight of my argument will fall on Kant’s account of the role of self-affection. I believe the fundamental reason why Allison holds the position he does concerning Kant’s account of inner sense is that he misinterprets Kant on this issue. Thus in the next section (2.2), I will examine the problems of Allison’s account, trying to make vivid the importance of a correct account of self-affection. In §2.3 I will offer my own suggestions about how to understand this difficult notion, and in §2.4 I will show how these suggestions throw light on Kant’s conception of inner sense.

2.2 Allison on Inner Sense and Self-affection
At B152–3, Kant writes:

[Inner sense] presents even ourselves to consciousness only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves, since we intuit ourselves only as we are internally affected [...].

Stressing the word ‘even’ in this passage, Allison takes Kant to be drawing an analogy between inner and outer sense: both represent their objects not as they are in themselves but only as appearances.

Allison is certainly right this far. He goes on, however, to claim that Kant rests this analogy on a purported further analogy, between self-affection (which in this passage is mentioned in connection with inner sense) and the affection of outer sense by outer objects. But this latter analogy is obviously a bad one: the role of affection in connection with outer sense is to provide it with sensory impressions, and whatever the role of self-affection might be, it is certainly not to provide inner sense with sensory impressions of the self: as we have seen, the manifold of inner sense does not consist in such impressions but rather in the representations of outer sense.

And this is not all: as Allison notes, self-affection is nothing other than the act of figurative synthesis — the determining of sensibility by the productive imagination. And this synthesis, far from being peculiar to inner sense, is a condition of every sensible representation of potential cognitive significance, of outer as well as of inner sense. In the case of outer sense, however, we know that the role of synthesis is certainly not to provide it with matter for its representations; it is rather to synthesize the matter according to a form. Why should it play such a radically different role with respect to inner sense?

Based on the extreme implausibility of this purported analogy between self-affection and affection by outer objects, Allison concludes that Kant is confused about his own terminology and cannot have the parallel he wants between inner and outer sense — at least, not by means of a direct appeal to self-affection.

It seems odd, however, that Kant should be confused about an issue as crucial as this. It is not as if his doctrine of self-affection, or the synthesis of the imagination, were peripheral to his project; quite the contrary, in fact. I think, therefore, that we should try to find another way to read Kant’s analogy between inner and outer sense. I believe we can simply take him to be saying that inner as well as outer sense represent their objects as appearances and not as things in themselves because they both presuppose the very same act of self-affection, the act of synthesis of the imagination. As I will argue, there is only one kind of self-affection involved, whose primary role is to synthesize the matter of outer sense into a determinate manifold of intuition; this act, however, simultaneously makes the representations of outer sense available to inner sense as the subject’s own representations. So Kant is not trying to draw an ill-conceived analogy between two completely


11. One may legitimately wonder what this talk of synthesis actually comes down to. I will give a more detailed account of synthesis later on in this paper. For now, all I need is the contrast between being given some sensory material and acting on that material — a contrast evident even on the surface of Kant’s text.

12. By this I mean simply a sensory manifold organized in space and time; I do not intend the notion of “determination” here to imply the use of concepts, at least not in the way judgment does.
different kinds of affection; he is just affirming the universal role of the synthesis of the imagination with respect to all sensible contents.  

Allison does not ignore the importance of the synthesis of the imagination, nor Kant’s identification of self-affection with it. Quite the contrary: his reworking of Kant’s argument is based precisely on this notion. Instead, however, of reading Kant as simply saying that the very same act of synthesis of the imagination that combines the contents of outer sense also makes them available to inner sense, he builds a more complex scheme centered on a special act of synthesis, whose sole purpose is to make representations of outer sense available to inner sense.

According to Allison, productive imagination, in a first act of self-affection — the synthesis of apprehension — combines the manifold of outer sense which thus becomes available for judgment. The subject then has the option of performing a second act of self-affection, involving the already synthesized contents of outer sense, through which it becomes aware of them as its own representations.

But there are many problems with this account. For one thing, the textual evidence that Kant had anything like that in mind is quite insufficient. Allison bases his reading on a remark in B152, which reads thus:


13. This is not to say that we cannot find language seeming to support Allison’s reading of the analogy between inner and outer sense. In §24, Kant says: ‘If we admit about [the determinations of outer sense] that we recognize objects by their means only insofar as we are externally affected, then we must also concede that through inner sense we intuit ourselves only as we are internally affected by ourselves’ (B156). But the support this passage provides is not unequivocal. The passage picks up from: “we must order determinations of inner sense as appearances in time in just the same way as we order those of outer sense in space”, and concludes with: “i.e., as far as intuition is concerned we cognize ourselves only as appearance but not in accordance with what it is in itself”. Putting the original remark in this context, it seems possible to insist that all Kant means by “internal affection” is the act of ordering the determinations of inner and outer sense as appearances in time and space, with the analogy between the two faculties lying in that they both provide knowledge of their objects only as appearances, not as things in themselves.


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[The] transcendental synthesis of the imagination [...] is an effect of the understanding on sensibility and its first application (and at the same time the ground of all others) to objects of intuition [...].

Allison takes the second clause of this sentence to refer to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination as the first act of self-affection, implying that there may be others to follow. Thus, in a first act of self-affection the understanding synthesizes the manifold of outer sense; then, according to Allison’s reading of the passage, there may be other acts of self-affection, re-synthesizing the very same contents.

This interpretation, however, seems quite gratuitous: what Kant most probably is saying in this passage is that the transcendental synthesis of the imagination is the first “application” of the understanding to the objects of intuition — and of course there might be other acts of *this* kind to follow, since these are the objects we judge about. This does not mean that there are other acts of self-affection. Once the sensed contents are synthesized, we can use them in indefinitely many judgments, that is, further acts of the understanding; but what need could be served by an act of re-synthesizing?

Allison has an answer to this question: this re-synthesizing makes them available to the subject as its own representations. But this should look strange, once we notice that Kant explicitly says that the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, the first act of self-affection according to Allison, already involves a determination of the manifold in inner sense:

[Inner sense] does not yet contain any determinate intuition at all, which is possible only through [...] the determination of the manifold through the transcendental action of the imagination (synthetic influence of the understanding on the inner sense), which I have named the figurative synthesis. [B154, emphasis removed]

But what could an act of determining the manifold in a receptive faculty be, if it did not make the manifold available to this faculty?
Further, even granting that there should be a special act of the understanding involved in the subject’s becoming aware in inner sense of its own outer representations, we shouldn’t expect it to involve re-synthesizing those very same representations: if the process of becoming sensibly aware of my representations involves messing with the content of those representations (‘re-conceptualizing’, as Allison says), it seems that I could never become sensibly aware of the original representations as my own; I could, at best, be aware only of the new, re-synthesized contents.

But anyway, all of this is problematic from the start, for a more fundamental reason: as Allison himself admits, all that this could amount to is providing the subject with an awareness of certain representations as its own, in the extremely thin sense of just belonging to it. Setting aside the question why that would even arise as a separate issue given Kant’s doctrine of transcendental apperception, it is clear that such an account would fall short of establishing anything like empirical self-knowledge. If this were all that empirical self-knowledge amounted to, then all we could say about the self would be that it is that in which these representations, as subjective states, inhere. But this would not be, according to Kant, any kind of empirical knowledge of the subject at all. Empirical objects — appearances — are concrete particulars, situated in space and time, not mere logical substrata. Thus, a representation of the self of this latter kind would certainly not count as empirical self-knowledge, for the empirical self has to be an appearance.

Therefore, Allison’s attempt will not do as a working account of the Kantian conception of empirical self-knowledge. But is it reasonable to expect anything more?

I think we can start to see a way out by observing that the interpretation Allison puts on the idea that inner sense provides an awareness of the subject’s outer representations as its own states is not the only possible one — nor, as I will argue, the most natural one in the context of Kant’s conception of empirical knowledge. Inner awareness need not consist merely in an awareness on the subject’s part that its representations inhere in it as its states. One can take it instead to consist in a full-blooded awareness that these representations disclose a part of the objective world as seen from the subject’s point of view. Such an awareness is, as I will argue, an essential feature of experiential episodes that are in the appropriate sense objective. I will try to make this clearer in what follows, but I think it should already look plausible that if this is indeed the role of inner sense, then we have a much better idea of how the self is known through it as an appearance: if through inner sense the subject is aware of its own perspective on things, then by the same token, it is aware of itself as having a determinate location in the same space and time as the things it perceives.

This conception of inner sense follows, I believe, from a correct understanding of certain central features of Kant’s account of experience that emerges from the B-edition Transcendental Deduction, and especially his account of the synthesis of the imagination, or self-affection. Thus, in the next section I will suggest a way of understanding self-affection; in the section after that I will propose a way of understanding inner sense based on that account.

2.3 The Synthesis of the Imagination

Kant’s doctrine of self-affection, or the synthesis of the productive imagination, is supposed to show how the a priori application of the pure concepts of the understanding — the categories — to any possible object of experience is grounded. Thus it is meant to show that this synthesis, which as an act of the understanding involves the categories, is a condition of the possibility of experience of objects and, therefore,

15. My setting this issue aside does not mean that I do not think that it could provide a powerful argument against Allison. It just means that I am not here prepared to take on the daunting task of explaining Kant’s notion of transcendental apperception.

16. My formulation here is cagey on purpose. I do not wish to commit myself to the view that the synthesis of the imagination is conceptual in any full-blown sense. On the other hand, given the goal of Ch2, the categories must in some sense ‘guide’ the synthesis of the imagination. This is a crucial and difficult exegetical question, but I cannot go into it here. On this point see, for example, Longuenesse (1998: 224), Allison (2004: 188–9).
that the categories are conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience themselves. Here I am not interested in exploring in any detail this line of argument, obviously the most central one in the second part of the B-edition Deduction. I am interested only in some of the things implied by the claim that the synthesis of the imagination makes experience of objects possible.

Imagination, as Kant says, is the capacity to represent an object even when it is not present to one’s senses (B151). But the crucial point is that imagination is necessary even when the object is present to one’s senses. In order to represent an object in intuition we need something more than just a bunch of impressions received from the object; we need these impressions to be organized in a spatiotemporal manifold. More generally, in order for a multiplicity of sensations to amount to an appearance of an object (whether veridical or not), it must be organized in a structure determinate with respect to space and time. This is one crucial difference between cases of perceiving (or even seeming to perceive, as in certain kinds of hallucination) and cases of non-objective sensory stimulation, such as after-images. When, for example, we see — or even just appear to see — a solid object, we must represent it as filling up a specific shape and volume of space, as having a spatial location with respect to all other things in space, and as being in a certain state for a duration that bears determinate relations to all other things temporal. If, by contrast, I cause myself to have a non-objective visual sensation (by pressing my eyeball with my finger, for example), then the resulting image does not represent anything as either bigger or smaller than, say, the desk I am writing on right now, nor as located at any particular distance from it. Similarly, whatever temporality pertains to such an episode, it concerns only my having that image, not any event or state represented by it.

The full story of how these conditions are met in experience is very complicated, and I will not attempt to unravel it here. What is crucial for my purposes here, though, is that according to Kant, intuitions determinate in these ways are possible only in virtue of the affection of sensibility by the understanding. This is the act that Kant in §24 calls the synthesis speciosa, or the figurative synthesis (B151).

Kant’s talk of an act of the understanding should not be taken to imply that there is any moment in which what is present to our consciousness is a spatiotemporally un-determined multiplicity of impressions, which the understanding then proceeds to determine. That space and time are the forms of sensibility surely entails that we are never in experience conscious of anything less than an already spatiotemporally organized manifold of impressions. Kant’s point, rather, must be that the spatiotemporal order of the manifold, even though necessary in order for it to be present to our sensibility, is ultimately due not just to sensibility itself but also to the understanding.

Now, this spelling out of the role of the figurative synthesis makes pressing the following question: why can’t the existence of forms of sensibility itself explain the spatiotemporal order of intuitive manifolds? Why should we suppose that the understanding must be involved as well? Kant’s answer to this question is given in §26, in a move that effectively concludes the Deduction. Space and time are themselves intuitions — pure or “formal” intuitions7 — and as such they too contain a manifold that needs to be determined:

17. Allison distinguishes between forms of intuition and formal intuitions: pure intuitions are in some sense “indeterminate”; formal intuitions, on the other hand, are determinate products of the synthesis of the understanding in Allison (1983: 97, 2004: 114–6). But this distinction seems to me to be mistaken. The forms of intuition, in the sense in which they are identified by Kant with pure intuitions, clearly are determinate representations: they are representations of infinite, homeomorous individuals (A21/B35; A24–5/B39; A31–2/B47–8). Thus, there seems to be no ground to distinguish them from formal intuitions: presumably, in either case determinacy will have to be the result of an act of synthesis.

Allison’s distinction is motivated in part by Kant’s mysterious distinction in a footnote to §26 between the “mere” form of outer intuition, which “merely gives the manifold”, and the formal intuition, which “gives unity of the representation” (B166f). Although this distinction is indeed difficult to make sense of, taking the forms of intuition as discussed in the Aesthetic not to be intuitive representations containing determinate manifolds is not an option. Longuenesse (1998: 214–28) offers a careful and, to my mind at least, quite convincing analysis of this very issue. Her point is that the expression “form of sensibility” has some of the slipperiness that the notion of form often has. In particular, Kant seems to have use for a notion of such a form that is more primitive than that of the Aesthetic: in that use, it refers simply to innate propensities of the mind to be affected in certain ways. As Longuenesse points out, Kant almost never uses this notion of form; but this is what he seems to

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We have forms of outer as well as inner sensible intuition \textit{a priori} in the representations of space and time \text{[\ldots]}.
But space and time are represented \textit{a priori} not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but also as intuitions themselves (which contain a manifold) and this with the determination of the unity of this manifold in them. [B160–1]

Space is not a mere receptacle inside which things can be. It has a determinate formal (geometrical) structure; similarly, time has its own determinate formal structure as well. Thus — given the Kantian principle that unity or determinacy is never merely given — the pure intuitions of space and time themselves depend on some determination whose source is in us. But this determination can be due only to the understanding: nothing else could be the source of this determination, in the way that the forms of sensibility initially seemed a likely source of the determinacy of empirical intuition. On the contrary, the upshot of the Transcendental Deduction is that sensibility itself owes its spatiotemporal form to the synthetic activity of the understanding. Again, this should not be taken to imply that there is (or could be) such a thing as an originally un-formed sensibility, which the understanding then proceeds to inform. The point, rather, is that we can make sense of the formedness of sensibility only if we consider it in its co-operation with the understanding.\textsuperscript{18}

In the picture that emerges, the figurative synthesis appears to have two distinct roles — to use terminology borrowed from Allison, the one “formal”, or transcendental, the other “material”, or empirical.\textsuperscript{19}

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The figurative synthesis in its formal or transcendental aspect is what Kant calls the “transcendental synthesis of the imagination”, while the figurative synthesis in its material or empirical aspect is what (in the B-edition Deduction, at least) is called the “synthesis of apprehension” (B15ff, B160). The transcendental synthesis of the imagination is the synthesis whose results are the pure or formal intuitions of space and time, or particular determinations thereof (such as, for example, geometrical figures constructed in spatial imagination). Since any outer experience involves the pure intuition of space, and since any experience whatsoever involves the pure intuition of time, the figurative synthesis in its formal or transcendental guise is present in experience as well. As we have seen, however, in experience the figurative synthesis has a further role to play: the particular spatiotemporal order of an empirical manifold given to our sensory consciousness is due to the figurative synthesis in its specifically empirical aspect, or the synthesis of apprehension.

With this sketch of an account of the synthetic activity of imagination in the background, we can return to our discussion of inner sense. In particular, considering some of the details of the way in which the figurative synthesis is involved in experience should help us get a clearer view of inner sense as well.

2.4 \textit{The Faculties of Inner and Outer Sense}

We just saw that the role of figurative synthesis in its empirical aspect is to synthesize the impressions of sense into a spatiotemporal manifold. This involves synthesizing these impressions into a perspectival representation of the objects of the subject’s outer experience, since the way an outer intuition represents its object depends in obvious ways on the subject’s spatiotemporal situation in relation to it. But in order for this to amount to an objective intuition determinate with respect to space and time, the resulting experiential episode must further include an awareness of its perspectival character. If an experiential episode is to amount to my seeing a solid before me as occupying space in three dimensions, it is not enough for me to merely have a

\textsuperscript{18} mean in the footnote in question. From this point of view, Kant’s calling this “mere form” a form of intuition must presumably be interpreted as a slip: a mere form cannot give the unity that intuitions require.

\textsuperscript{19} Taking this to be Kant’s point has some significant exegetical consequences, which I cannot go into here. In particular, it entails that the account of sensibility given in the Transcendental Aesthetic is in an important sense provisional, since Kant there abstracts from the relation between sensibility and understanding. The view that Kant’s account of sensibility is not finalized until the end of the Deduction is explicitly defended in Longuenesse (1998: 214–28).

\textsuperscript{19} Allison (2004: 196).
representation of its aspect facing my vantage point; I must also be aware that it has aspects not currently making any impact on my senses, depending on my particular vantage point. Similarly, if I am aware of what is going on with the object I perceive as taking place within time, standing in determinate relations to all other things temporal, I must also be aware of my perception of it as an event in time, affording me a partial glimpse of a sequence of events that may go on independently of me. Experience of things in space and time, therefore, is not possible simply on the basis of the perspectival intuitions of outer sense.

It further requires our taking these intuitions to be perspectival glimpses of the world. The solution to the problems surrounding inner sense rests, I believe, on noticing that the role of inner sense is precisely to make the subject aware of its outer perceptions as its own in just this sense, and thereby becoming aware of itself in relation to the objects of its outer perceptions as well.20

The crucial claim here is that we cannot take awareness of the perspectival character of outer intuitions to be part of the content of outer sense itself, for outer sense is supposed to give us representations strictly of objects other than, and independent of, our actual perceptual states (even though, of course, objects of experience are not independent of our capacity for perception). Outer intuitions are indeed perspectival, in the obvious sense that the way in which they represent their object depends on the spatial position of the subject and the timing of the perception. To give just an obvious example, a cube seen from one angle presents a different aspect from the one it would present if seen from another. But, although the intuitions of outer sense are perspectival, we cannot take the required awareness of them as perspectival — i.e., as dependent on our own spatiotemporal position — to be the job of outer sense itself; for that would clearly violate the restriction that outer representations must be of objects independent of our actual perceptual states.

We can make this point more precise. An outer intuition is perspectival and therefore contains geometrical information determining a specific point in space as the point of view from which its object is perceived. But this information does not exhaust the information given to me, in that very same experiential episode, regarding that point of view. On top of this purely geometrical information, I am also aware — in that very same experience — that I am the occupant of that point of view or, in other words, that the perspective of the outer intuition is my perspective. This further, self-locating information is not optional: it is required if the episode is to really be a case of having an experience of objects (or even a case of seeming to have an experience of objects, for that matter). We cannot make sense of the idea that a subject might enjoy perspectival, empirical representations of objects, independently of its being aware of its own place at the origin of that perspective: this much is clear just on the basis of reflecting on the phenomenology of perception. Now, my claim is that, for Kant, this further information cannot be part of the content of outer intuitions; it must, rather, be characteristic of the specific mode in which we are aware of our outer intuitions in experience. This mode of being aware of our outer intuitions in experience is, I claim, inner sense.21

20. One might object that I do not respect a distinction that Kant obviously insists on: the distinction between space as the form of outer sense and time as the form of inner sense. I want to stand by my way of speaking: the outer manifold is determinate not only in space but also in time (see Kant’s example of perceiving the freezing of water in B162–3); and the representation of oneself in inner sense normally is determinate not only in time but also in space. Yet if this is to be plausible as a reading of Kant, the apparent tension needs to be dealt with. I attempt to deal with it in §3 of this paper.

21. This thesis may seem to invite an objection along the following lines. We can imagine a spatially scattered being whose outer sensory input is transmitted to its information-processing center over long distances. There is no obvious reason to deny that such a being will be capable of objective experience; yet it is also not obvious that it should take its own location to coincide with that of its outer point of view. (Dennett [1978] suggests that a human whose brain is surgically separated from the rest of her body should think of “here” as where her point of view is; but it is not obvious that the same considerations would apply to any conceivable scattered being, regardless of the details of the case — it seems crucial to Dennett’s case, for example, that point of view and locus of action coincide.) So it may be thought that objective experience does not necessarily require the further, self-locating information I have been talking about. This argument, however, does not damage the idea that some information about the point of view not contained in the outer intuition is required for objective experience, even in the case of the being we are
My argument for this relies on the premise that outer sense provides information strictly about objects other than, and independent of, our actual perceptual states (although not, as I noted earlier, independent of our perceptual capacity). This restriction on what can be part of the content of outer intuitions follows from Kant’s general conception of objective representation. As he puts it:

One quickly sees that, since the agreement of cognitions with object is truth, [...] appearance, in contradistinction to the representations of apprehension, can thereby only be represented as the object that is distinct from them [...]. (A191/B236).

Here Kant explicitly says that in apprehension — hence in intuition — we are aware of the object — ‘appearance’, in Kant’s jargon — as distinct from our representations of it. An object of experience is that to which our empirical representations correspond; therefore, in an objective representation, the object must be represented as independent of our awareness of it. The object of experience, or appearance in the transcendental sense, is in this way distinguished from what Kant would call an appearance in the empirical sense. This distinction, however, would lapse if awareness of their dependence on the subject’s spatiotemporal position were part of the content of outer intuitions. In order for the subject to be aware of this dependence we need a form of awareness whose objects are these intuitions themselves; and that awareness cannot be due to outer sense itself.

Imagining, for even such a being would have to be aware of the perspectival character of its outer representations in relation to itself in a special way. It could not straightforwardly take their point of view to be its own location; but it must still take it to be the origin of its own perspective on the world, if it is to be capable to synthesize them in a series of objective experiences.

For this distinction, see A28–9/B45, B69–71, and especially A191/B236 (quoted later in the text). The necessity of such a distinction is at the center of Strawson (1966). Of course, appearances in the transcendental sense are still dependent on the structure of our perceptual capacities.

The essentially perspectival character of the products of the synthesis of the imagination is emphasized by both Sellars (2003: 426) and Allison (2004: 188). Yet neither of them notes that awareness of this perspectival character should not be attributed to outer sense, and hence neither considers the possibility of my interpretation of the role of inner sense.

Thus, an outer intuition must be strictly about outer objects: for example, it should be just about the desk in front of me, as it is presented to me, and not about my representation of the desk. But in having that intuition I must at the same time be aware of it, and in a very specific way: I must be aware of it as a representation of part of my environment from my current point of view. The solution to this apparent difficulty is that the synthesis of the imagination performs a two-fold function: on the one hand, it synthesizes the manifold in a perspectival outer intuition whose content we can — at least, for the sake of the argument — express in the form ‘his F’, and on the other, it makes this content available to inner sense as a glimpse of the world from one’s current point of view.

If this is right, then it follows that inner sense can do significantly more than what Allison allows; it can actually provide us with intuitions of the empirical self and not merely awareness of our ownership of our outer representations. On my account, inner sense provides us with an awareness of ourselves as located at the point of origin of the perspective of our outer intuitions at a given time. This awareness is sensory, just as the outer intuitions that it involves: it is, just as they are, a result of the synthesis of the manifold given in experience.

On my account, therefore, inner sense can provide the basis for a certain kind of empirical self-knowledge. According to Kant, empirical knowledge is never a matter of mere intuition: it further involves conceptualization and judgment. But as we saw, inner sense provides the subject with intuitions of itself as a spatiotemporally located subject of outer perceptions; it therefore at least lays the foundation for the
subject to be able to judge about itself as a member of the world of appearances. This is not to say that inner sense provides the subject with intuitions of itself as a physical body; that, for Kant, is possible only through outer intuition (B409, 415). In inner sense the subject appears simply as a mere point of view, mobile through the world of appearances.26

3. Temporal Consciousness

3.1 Inner sense and Temporality
I hope the previous sections have made my interpretation of Kant’s account of inner sense seem like an attractive option. There is, however, a part of Kantian doctrine that my account may appear to fail to do justice to — namely, Kant’s distinction between time and space as, respectively, the forms of inner and outer sense. I will spend the last few sections of this paper responding to this worry.

First we need to get clearer on what exactly my interpretation commits me to in that regard, and in what way these commitments might be thought to conflict with Kant’s own views. As will emerge, there is a certain reading of the Kantian distinction — a “moderate” reading, in a sense I will make clearer in what follows — that is clearly compatible with my interpretation of Kant’s account of inner sense and also attractive in its own right. I will outline this reading in the next section. Nevertheless, as I will show in the section after that, this reading is hard to square with all of Kant’s stated or suggested views on the matter.

In particular, on Kant’s view, not only is the form of inner intuitions, it moreover appears to be (in a sense that will be examined) primarily inner or subjective. The application of temporal properties and relations to outer appearances is secondary, and mediated by the inner temporality (see, for instance, A34/B50–1). This feature of Kant’s account of time makes possible a reading — what I will call a “radical”

26. My account of empirical self-knowledge in this section is in some obvious ways related to Strawson’s (1966: 97–104, 162–9). There are, however, important differences between my account and Strawson’s. In particular, Strawson’s mistrust of any talk of synthesis or distinct cognitive faculties would have made him suspicious of much that I say here.

reading — that would be very hard to square with the account of inner sense I have been proposing here. As I will argue, however, the tension is not with the specifics of my account but rather with the account of figurative synthesis that underlies it. In a nutshell, if one takes our pure intuitions of space and time to be joint products of the figurative synthesis (as, according to what I have argued, the B-edition Deduction clearly suggests), then Kant’s stronger claims concerning the interiority of time (the ones emphasized by the radical reading) seem problematic, regardless of the details of his conception of inner sense.

As I will explain, I am not at all sure that Kant’s text allows us to choose confidently between these competing readings. I will close this paper by briefly sketching a diagnosis of the source of this tension, and by suggesting that a version of the moderate account is preferable, since it is able to preserve more that is of value in Kant.

3.2 A “moderate” account of the interiority of time
At the heart of my account of inner sense lies the claim that the representations of both outer and inner sense depend on the very same act of synthesis of the imagination, or figurative synthesis: the same act of the understanding that makes the subject aware of something outside of it also makes this awareness available to inner sense as a subjective, perspectival take on the world. Consequently, I claimed, it is possible for the subject to conceive of itself on the basis of inner sense not simply as a logical subject, in which its perceptions inhere as states, but as a member of the same spatiotemporal world as the objects of its outer experience.

It is, therefore, part of my interpretation that inner sense involves awareness, on the part of the subject, of a certain spatial fact — namely, the fact that it is located at the point of origin of the perspective of its perceptions. This might initially appear puzzling: how can inner sense involve an awareness of spatial facts? But I do not think there really is an issue here. As we have already seen, outer sense alone cannot account for objective experience as we know it. The account of the synthesis of apprehension I proposed shows that what is further required
is a specific way of being aware of one’s outer intuitions: namely, that one be aware of them as one’s perspectival glimpses of the world. That special mode of awareness of one’s own perceptual states is, I argued, the job of inner sense. This is why Kant says that the proper materials of inner sense consist in the representations of outer sense (see above, §2.1). But since the latter are of course spatial, it is clear that there is nothing strange in taking inner sense to provide one with awareness of spatial relations. In particular, it does not require us to take space to be a “form” of inner sense, on any plausible understanding of what that would entail.

We can see this by noting that the spatiality involved in the representations of ourselves in inner sense is not due to the nature of inner sense itself. In fact, it is open to us to speculate about a finite being with an inner sense constituted just like ours and a non-spatial “outer” sense. (Of course “outer” here must not be understood in spatial terms, as it seems to be in A22/B37.27 Any sensory faculty whose given does not consist in the subject’s own states counts as “outer” in this extended sense.) Since this being is finite, its “outer” sensible representations will presumably be perspectival just as much as our own outer intuitions are — although of course not in a spatial sense, but rather in a sense appropriate to the constitution of its “outer” sensory faculty.28 Therefore, the possibility of its having objective experiences would, just as in our case, depend on its having a mode of awareness of itself as an occupant of a “point of view” — which again would not amount to an awareness of itself as spatially located but rather would depend on the unspecified nature of our being’s “outer” sense. Such speculation is obviously idle for most purposes, but it does serve to show that  

28. A finite or discursive intellect is restricted to only partial or perspectival knowledge, because its knowledge depends on the sensibly given. But the given is always given in some particular way or other; this is why discursive knowledge of objects rests on the application of general marks or concepts on the sensibly given, through comparison (A68/B93). By contrast, an infinite intellect knows its objects through original, not sensible, intuition; hence its knowledge is complete, and not partial or perspectival (B139).
sense of space as the form of outer intuition. The formal framework of space provides the manner in which intuitions are synthesized in outer sense, precisely because the matter of these intuitions consists in impressions of individual physical objects, and we are necessarily aware of such objects as possessing spatial properties and standing in spatial relations to each other.

Now, on this account, to say that time is the form of inner sense is simply to say that what we are aware of in inner sense is ordered in time: the things represented in inner sense are temporally ordered.\(^{30}\) According to this account, temporality comes on the scene as the result of the figural synthesis, which makes the subject’s outer intuitions available to it as its own glimpses of the world. Unfortunately, however, it is hard for such a reading to fit everything Kant says or suggests about time as the form of inner sense. There is, I believe, considerable evidence that Kant occasionally tends to think of the interiority of time in a much more radical way. As I will argue in the next section, a faithful interpretation of his stronger claims concerning why time is primarily inner, and only derivatively applicable to outer appearances, requires us to take inner temporality to concern the order in which certain subjective episodes (crucially, episodes of affection) occur, regardless of how these episodes are represented in inner sense, and therefore independently of the figural synthesis. Since spatiality comes into play only in virtue of this synthesis, the temporality of spatial objects can only be secondary and derived from the temporality of inner episodes.

Passages suggesting something on these lines are obviously hard to square with my understanding of inner sense, since that is based on the idea that spatiality and temporality appear on the scene together, as the joint result of the figural synthesis. However, since this

\(^{30}\) My moderate account of Kant’s views on temporality largely coincides with what James Van Cleve (1999: 52–61) calls Kant’s “radical line”, the line that temporal relations only hold among items as represented. That I consider it moderate whereas he considers it radical has more to do with a difference in focus than anything else: his main concern is idealism, and of course the present view is radically idealist about time.  

latter view is, as I argued earlier, supported by the argument of the Deduction, this indicates a tension in Kant’s own views. It is not simply a problem with my interpretation of his account of inner sense but rather an issue any reader of Kant has to confront.

3.3 A “radical” account of the interiority of time

We can begin to approach this tension by examining more closely the connection between time and inner sense. Although the formal distinction exploited by the moderate account enables us to see why inner sense is temporally formed, it gives us no reason to think that temporality must be primarily inner. Why should states of the subject be apprehended as temporal in a more fundamental way than states of outer objects? It is of course true that, in one direction, there is on my moderate account a tight connection between inner sense and time: inner sense must be temporal, since it involves awareness of states of the subject. The crucial question, however, is whether the temporality of the inner states of the subject should be privileged over that of external states, and if so, why. As I will argue in this section, Kant’s answer to this question is incompatible with the moderate account I offered above, and indeed in tension with any account that takes time to be the product of figural synthesis.

In a crucial passage from the Aesthetic, Kant says:

[S]ince […] all representations, whether or not they have outer things as their object, nevertheless as determinations of the mind [in] themselves belong to the inner state, while this inner state belongs under the formal condition of inner intuition, and thus of time, so time is an a priori condition of all appearance in general, and indeed the immediate condition of the inner intuition (of our souls), and thereby also the mediate condition of outer appearances. [A34/B50–1, emphasis mine]\(^{31}\)

31. I inserted the “in” in “in themselves” in the translation of this passage in order to be more faithful to the German original.
In this passage inner temporality is described as immediate, and it is contrasted to the mediate temporality of outer appearances. This by itself, of course, could be made to fit the moderate reading. According to the formal distinction exploited by that reading, the objects of outer sense — individual physical objects — are in some sense not directly temporal: they are temporal only as the subjects of states. Their temporality could thus be thought of as “mediate”. On the basis of that formal distinction alone, however, the states of outer objects should have no reason to be any less immediately temporal than the states of the subject; and there is no hint of anything along these lines in this passage. On the contrary, it is suggested that whatever temporality pertains to outer experience, it derives from the immediate temporality of the inner states of the subject. But how are we to understand this distinction?

It is clear that inner sense provides the subject with an awareness of its own perceptual states as a temporally ordered series. Thus, one might suggest that this temporal order we represent in inner sense is what Kant has in mind in the above passage. If that were true, his claim would amount to the — quite bizarre, on its face — claim that the experience of temporal facts outside us is derived from an introspected temporal order. On this reading, Kant’s view is that we experience outer temporality only through perceiving ourselves having outer perceptions in a determinate order. This interpretation of the passage — despite saddling Kant with a counter-intuitive view of the experience of temporal facts — has the virtue that it does not conflict with the view of temporality that emerges from the B-edition Deduction. Precisely because the inner temporality from which we derive outer temporality is a temporality we represent in inner sense, it can very well be the product of figurative synthesis, just as on the moderate account. Presumably, this is what makes this reading attractive to commentators such as Longuenesse, who take the figurative synthesis to be crucial to the constitution of sensibility:

[A]ll we perceive (apprehend) is the succession of our \( \textit{Inner Sense, Self-Affection, & Temporal Consciousness} \)

representations, whereas the simultaneity and succession in states of things are not directly perceived. Rather, the representation we have of objective simultaneity and succession is the result of the way we interpret the succession of perceptions.\(^\text{32}\)

Even though Longuenesse doesn’t take “interpretation” in this context to involve a conscious inferential move,\(^\text{33}\) she evidently endorses the view that we are aware of outer temporality only by perceiving ourselves perceive.

This, however, cannot be the correct interpretation of the passage. If the temporality of the subject’s inner states in this passage had to do with the temporal order of the already synthesized intuitions of inner sense, then it would be very hard to understand why that temporality would be any more immediate than the temporality pertaining to outer experience. As we saw, inner sense does not have a manifold of its own: the manifold that is temporally synthesized in inner sense \( \textit{just is} \) the manifold of the representations of outer sense (see above, §2.1). Thus, if the manifold is already available to inner sense in a temporal order, nothing further should be required in order to perceive external temporality: specifically, there should be no need for any mental act such as an interpretation.

This is not to say that the temporal order of outer representations as it appears in inner sense must \( \textit{coincide} \) with the temporal order that appears in outer sense: as is made clear in the Analogies, I can for example perceive every part of a house as existing simultaneously, despite being aware of my perception of them as successive (A190–1/ B235–6). The point is just that any synthesis that imposes a temporal order on our outer representations in inner awareness \( \textit{ipso facto} \) involves being aware of the \( \textit{contents} \) of these outer representations as in

\(^{32}\) Longuenesse (1998: 335). See also Longuenesse (1998: 236–237) for an explicit discussion of the passage in question. On this reading, the job of the Analogies of Experience is to lay down the rules for this kind of interpretation.

time. If I am conscious of a temporal series of outer perceptions in me, then — by the same token — I am also conscious of temporal goings on outside of me. How could it be otherwise? We cannot make sense of the idea of being inwardly aware of a temporal series of outer representations, which series nevertheless fails to represent anything as in time. Put this way, the idea seems plainly incoherent. If this is right, however, then there is no prying apart the appearance of inner temporality from the appearance of outer temporality.

If, therefore, the inner temporality in question is a temporality represented in inner sense, then we can make no sense of the idea that the apparent outer temporal order is any less immediate than the inner one, or to be derived from it by means of some special mental act. Such an act might be required, perhaps, in order to move from the apparent outer temporal order to a considered belief about the real outer temporal order; but the apparent order itself should be available simply as the outcome of the figurative synthesis. I think, instead, that we have to take Kant’s immediate temporality to be not a temporal order represented in inner sense but rather a temporal order in which distinct subjective states and events, considered just as such — “in themselves” (and not as represented), as Kant puts it — stand. This temporal order is immediate because it is simply there: it depends, of course, on the innate structure of our receptive faculty, but it is not the result of our synthetic activity.34

34. It has been suggested to me (by an anonymous referee) that Kant’s brief discussion of motion as the act of successively ordering the spatial manifold, from which our ‘concept of succession’ first derives (B135; also footnote to the same page), might help explain his insistence on the interiority of time without being inimical to the account of inner sense developed in this paper. As I have been urging, in inner sense we are aware of our outer intuitions as dependent on a particular point of view. But, arguably, awareness of our current point of view requires awareness of the possibility of alternative points of view, and thus awareness of the possibility of motion, in a highly abstract sense.

Since motion is the source from which our concept of succession — one of the ‘modi’ of time (A177/B219) — first derives, and awareness of the possibility of motion is a necessary condition of inner sense, it follows that a condition of the possibility of inner sense is the possibility of thinking temporally (at least in respect of succession).

Even though I agree that the possibility of alternative points of view must be built into the empirical conception of the self derived from inner sense, I think that any appeal to that idea as a way to spell out the interiority of time will be subject to difficulties of just the same sort as the ones discussed in the text. The possibility of motion requires of the subject to have a capacity to synthesize the manifold so as to compensate for its own changing point of view: as a subject of objective experiences I must have some ability to keep track of an object stationary in relation to me while I am on the move. This much, I think, can be agreed upon; but there are two ways of taking this point, and neither of them seems to me to avoid the difficulties discussed in the text.

According to the first reading of the point, the source of temporality is my capacity to represent myself as moving in relation to the stationary object of my experience. But if it is this possibility of representing motion that is the primary source of temporality, then it is again entirely unclear why that would be primarily inner. In order to represent motion I must be capable of synthesizing the manifold of outer sense so as to keep track of what moves and what remains still. But if I do so synthesize the manifold, I am thereby temporally ordering the contents of outer sense — and thus I perceive an outer temporality. Alternatively, we can take the source of temporality to be not the order represented in the synthesized manifold but rather the successiveness of my apprehensions — of my acts of putting impressions together in a single manifold. But if it is this latter that is the source of temporality, then temporality is not a result of our synthetic activity at all.
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Now the way in which something is apprehended in appearance can be determined a priori, so that the rule of its synthesis at the same time yields this intuition a priori in every empirical example. [A178/B221]

Here apprehension is said to be capable of a priori determination, so that an a priori manner of combination is represented in every empirical manifold. If this is right, then apprehension is evidently not a merely contingent juxtaposition. Thus, unless we take Kant to be flatly contradicting himself, we must take him to mean two different things by ‘apprehension’: most plausibly, in the second passage he refers to the empirical aspect of the figurative synthesis, whereas in the first passage he refers to the contingent juxtaposition of episodes of affection. If Kant is indeed operating with such a distinction, it seems inevitable that the notion of an immediate temporality should attach to the second of these orders rather than to the first.

If my understanding of these passages is correct, then a radical conception of the interiority of time emerges. According to this conception, we have to recognize an immediate temporality that is not a result of the figurative synthesis at all. On this conception, time is the form of inner sense not because it is the form of the representations of inner sense (as on the moderate conception) but rather because it is the form according to which subjective states and events — primarily, episodes of affection — are ordered, regardless of their being objects of inner awareness. This order is, on the one hand, “immediate” precisely because it is independent of the figurative synthesis; on the other hand, it is inner, because it concerns subjective items. When representations are combined in the figurative synthesis, the result is a “mediate” temporality that pertains to the subject’s awareness of its states in inner sense, as well as to its perception of the objects of those states: it pertains, that is, to appearances in general. But this temporality is derivative of the immediate one, which pertains to subjective states and events simply in virtue of the structure of our receptivity.35

35. An important source of indirect support for the radical reading consists in the fact that it makes possible a plausible understanding of the Analogies. On the

Inner Sense, Self-Affection, & Temporal Consciousness

That Kant considers time to be primarily inner is generally recognized by commentators. Thus, Longuenesse writes: “only by the mediation of its being given in inner sense does every appearance, whether ‘outer’ or ‘inner’ have temporal determinations”.36 As we have seen, there is indeed good evidence that this is one aspect of Kant’s view. What I have here argued, however, is that this thesis does not cohere well with another much-emphasized claim of Kant’s — namely, the claim that space and time are both products of the figurative synthesis. If the latter claim is true, then there is no reason to think that temporal determinations apply to outer appearances any less immediately than to inner ones. The radical view on the interiority of time requires a conception of inner temporality as independent of, and prior to, the figurative synthesis.

This difficulty is not generally recognized. Longuenesse, for instance, combines the claim that, for Kant, time is primarily internal with the claim that space and time as a priori intuitions “are made possible by acts of a priori synthesis”,37 without questioning why the temporality thus made possible should apply only, or even primarily, to the subject’s inner states. As I have tried to argue, Kant does not have a good answer to this question.38

38. Van Cleve (1999: 60—1) recognizes that there is a tension in Kant between two positions roughly equivalent to the ones I have presented here. He does not, however, identify it as a tension between the Deduction and the doctrine of the interiority of time. Instead, he takes Kant to be consistent throughout the Aesthetic in taking time to pertain only to things as represented. As I have
3.4 Conclusion
The textual evidence makes it hard to believe that Kant was not at times prone to thinking of the interiority of time in the second, radical way. Choosing to develop either of the two lines of interpretation would involve one in difficulties with parts of Kant’s text. But taking the radical line involves doing violence to crucial parts of the Transcendental Deduction, and in the process rendering unavailable a quite attractive conception of inner sense. For this reason I think it is the first, moderate line of interpretation that deserves more attention.

The root of the radical conception is to be found in the fact that it is hard to conceive of inner states and events, considered not as objects of introspection but just in themselves, otherwise than as already in time. The case is markedly different from that of space: although it would be an evident confusion to take episodes of perception to have any interesting spatial properties (except, perhaps, that of occurring where the perceiving subject is), it is not at all obvious that episodes of perception do not stand in temporal relations to each other, quite independently of whether the subject represents them introspectively or not. Kant recognizes the intuitive force of this point in his response to an objection against his doctrine of the ideality of time:

Against this theory, which concedes empirical reality to time but disputes its absolute and transcendental reality, insightful men have so unanimously proposed one objection that I conclude that it must naturally occur to every reader […]. It goes thus: Alterations are real (this is proved by the change of our own representations, even if one would deny all outer appearances together with their alterations). Now alterations are possible only in time, therefore time is something real. [A36–7/B53]

Recognizing the force of the objection does not, of course, move Kant to reject the dependence of time on the structure of the human cognitive faculty. Nevertheless, it does seem to tempt him into the kind of double-talk about time that we have been considering: for even though on the radical alternative, temporality pertains to our inner states only because of the structure of our sensibility, it nevertheless pertains to them independently of the synthesis of apprehension that makes them available to inner awareness.

From the moderate perspective, however, this cannot be right. Inner states and events, considered simply as such, do not stand in temporal relations to each other; they do so only as constituents of sensible manifolds determined by the understanding. Perhaps it is possible to reconcile the passages in which Kant seems to lapse into the radical conception of the interiority of time with this view. To embark on this project one would have, first of all, to accommodate the intuitive point that I suggested motivates the radical conception of the interiority of time. But it is surely beyond the scope of this paper to explore the prospects of such a project.40

and was raised in response to Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation (Guyer and Wood [1998: 165, note 26]).

40. I thank two anonymous referees for useful comments. I am also especially grateful to John McDowell, Lissa Merritt, and Sasha Newton for reading, and commenting on, several different versions of this paper. Stephen Engstrom provided helpful feedback at a very early stage of this project.
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