Universalist Religions in Yugoslavia [Volume: 7(1988), pp. 57-74]

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some fairly moderate conclusions: "Religion and its organizations are not
specially partial to nationalism, although they are no more immune to it
than some other sections of society."4 A more pessimistic view was expressed by Stipe Suvar, a leading party ideologist, who noted that "the
church and religion are sporadic causes of nationalism and... are always
present as negative factors whenever the national question sharpens."5
The worst view of the subject appeared recently in accounts about the
alleged role of Islam in the stirrings among Yugoslavia's Albanians: "Religion is an exceptionally favorable ground for the sprouting of nationalism.
Is it possible to avoid linking the schooling of the thousands of boys and
girls in the mosques of western Macedonia with the activities of Albanian
nationalism in the same part of the republic? To believe that there is no
direct connection between these two developments means to be excessively naive."6
Naive or not, it is truly impossible to understand the role of religion
in multinational Yugoslavia without an assessment of the current state
of confessional thought on the subject of nationality. The three main South
Slavic religious groups hold national concepts that are not only real and
important, but are also a result of specific experiences and recent reevaluations of their individual traditions. If the state played a far lesser role in
the current conceptual growth of religious attitudes toward nationhood
than is sometimes assumed, it is all the more important to understand the
national concepts of Yugoslavia's postrevolutionary confessions, especially
as they pertain to ecumenical dialogue. That is the task imposed especially
by the evidence of national concerns in religious thought.
The national concepts of the Catholic church in Yugoslavia depend
on the national community. In Slovenia, which is still one of Yugoslavia's
uniquely uninational republics (moreover without any alternative religious
tradition), the church has had little incentive to take up any leading role
in the defense of the national cause.7 This does not mean that the Slovene
Catholics view their church as inconsequential to Slovene national identity.
For example, a writer for the semi-oppositional journal Nova revija (New
Review), in a recent issue devoted exclusively to the Slovene national program, defined the Slovene civilization as Hebraeo-Graeco-Christian. "The
historical carrier of this civilization," he continued, "(also per negationem,
as with the appearance of Protestantism, bolshevism, etc.) is the Roman
Catholic church." Hence the defense of Slovenian heritage and resistance
to "new barbarism" depends in good part on the church.8 As pointed
as this claim might be, it accords with the unselfconscious stand of Slovene
Catholicism in matters of nationality, ready acceptance of Yugoslavia's
federal framework, and the ease with which the hierarchy exercises-and
is allowed to exercise-its rights of citizenship. A recent statement of the
"Iustitia et pax" council of the Slovene episcopal conference called for
federal constitutional reforms that would further democratization and