A Chapter Summary of ‘Emerging Viruses’ for Reporters

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
A Th~hrbITh7hT AmTrxNTCIr -i-m I o

Summay ofChaper- P.Scientif:. Bcgroun

A RORIK1ATJUINSo JU 19/U Chapter 1. The "World Health Organization Theory"
SOVIET CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONSof AIDS- During the past decade, at least six internationally
Mr. Sncs. The statements indicate that the Soviets have made ex- known authorities advanced theories that the AIDS virus
tensive progress in chemical and hiological weapons. I would like you
to provide for the record a statement which shows what they are doing (HIV) was developed by biological weapons researchers and
in this area and with some indication of their capabilities in this area.. bo giare ach s
Mr.Pioo. Weiwill be happy to provide that. either accidentally or intentionally transmitted with the help
(The information follows:)Yy
The Soviet Unionis er equipped deesively. ofenvely, ilitariy,d of d States Public Health Service (USPHS) and the
world. She has placed a great deal of emphasis on these systemos in her military
a Utilizing a wide spectrum of chemical munitions, the Soviets cotsider \Vorld Health Organization (WHO). A document like that
ons or separately, as the case may dictate The Soviet agent stockpiles include a
variety of agents and atittitioits caalte odl intg a wide ratige fmeects ot thle t db
E" "A"~t'tsinyp us cog g..s n:,:::;; ohtie byone investigator, through the Freedom of Inforbattlefield. The Soviet soldier is well equipped defensively. tic trainis vigo.rous ly ob ind yoeivstg orth uhteFed mofI o
and for long periods of time utilizing his equipment. He looks upon chemical as a
real pttssibility it attyfItuire conillict, titd respects his tro tective cm iilpumet Thte f~'l c nw
resetrchi"protgraiii l theSoviet tiiorlctceitcsalwarfare adbitlogicalagentiIs mation Act, is shown here-a DOD appropriations request
has encompassed every facet from incapacitating to lethal effects, both offensively
atid defeitsively. tie for $10 million for the development of AIDS-like viruses.
(Addilititnal classified ititortitatiottss'as stiuplied ti thte cotitteelIce Includinth
testimony belowj.)
SYNTHETIC BIOLOGICAL AGENTS
'Ih e re a re tw o th in g s a b o u t lt h t b i tg ic l a g e n t fie ld I I w o u ld lik e 1Op.ssn
tt mtenititti. Onte is ilie pi ssilitty t I Iechnllol gical surprise. Mtltlular Witi n the next 5 to 10 years, it would probhitlttgy is a field that is advancing very rapidly and emninent ltitltigists
beieve that within a period o5 10 tyeasitwodbepossiblto ably be possible to make a new infective microorproduce a synthetic biological agent, an agent that does not naturally
exist and fortwhich no natural intnuity could have been acquired. which could differ in certain importan
Dr. MAcARTHUR. We are not.r1n
aMr. SlKS. Why not? Lack of money or lack of interest?pykorgan
Dr. MACARTHUR. Certainly ntt lack of interest.
wn SIKEs. Would you provide for our records information on what isms. Most important of these is that it might be
wol erequired, what the advalitages tif such a program would he,
the time and the cost involvedvr ap o refractory to the immunological and therapeutic
Dr. MACARThUR. We will he very happy to.p
(The information follows:),processes upon which we depend to maintain ou
investigate the relevance of this field of science to biological warfare. A small
group of experts considered this matter and provided the following observa- r6IalVe freedom from infectious disease.
1. All biological agents up to the present time are representatives of naturally
occurring disease, and are thus known by scientists throughout the world. They
are easily available to qualified scientists for research, either for offensive or
2. ithin the nest to 10 years, it wutldl probably he possible to ntake a tiewv
infective nmicroorganism which citulds differ in certait imnportantt aspects trttn Chapter 2. WHOPlyinteBgL aus eisr
lit'i nano 7 go e hatr2 H Plays in the Big Leagues-Begins Dr.
atty known disease-causitng organtismis. Most inmportant of ttese is that it mnigtt
be refractory to the intunological ans terapeuticprocesses upon which we Horowitz's search for the origin of AIDS. Archival WHO
3. Aresearchi proigratm to esplsire Ite easiblty oftis 5conud e ctitmtietedl
in approxiiiately 5 years at a total cost of $ Ilmillion.
i. It would he very difficult to establish such a program. Molecular biology documents are explored along with links to American health
Is a relatively new science There ate not many highly comluitent scientists in te
field, almost all are in university laboratories, and they are generally adetiuately
supported from sources other than 1)D However, it was considered possible agencies, including the Centers for Disease Control and Pr
to i nit te aeuat program th rough the National Academy of Sciencesof tiwe agecieeicludnghheCentescfrlDieasACotrolandPre
5 h aewsiuitt he NAS-NR( and tentati wt eritai vention (CDC) and National Cancer Institute (NCI). These
tintaeteprogram. However. sectreasittg funiss Ini CB. grotwinig criticism
sir the CB progratm, ansI our retuctanice to Iinvottve the NAS-NRC Ili suclt a 5coh- ~XJC ia
trsiversianevh to poistpnsit tie years ble sitel institutions played leading roles in the WHO's early viral rersacshldotibe tiiierttikett test iiItltyet tiltitlertme thttdiofitmassive se chn woNte
kitligsitlargeouilatitns. Ontheotlst,withsut tiestunscietiic lw SechDetwork. During the 1960s and early 1970s the WH
edlge that such a weapot s potssible, uaitt ainttitterstattditg sif lie ways It coultds
te uoe, there is little tist canii dheilte o devise defetsive titeastites Stilit iian
etnty devel it there is little doubt hat tisaninprtant atea ofpotentiat served as the omnipotent supplier of the world's pharmaceuntilitary technological inferiority i hc hr sn adequate reseaircht protical, bacteriological, and viral test reagents. Investigations
revealed the NCI, a branch of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), functioned as the WHO's chief distributor of
viruses and viral testing reagents during the late 1960s. By 1968, the WHO had provided technical advisors and
supplies of "prototype virus strains" for more than "120 laboratories in 35 different countries." By 1969, this
number increased to "592 virus laboratories." In this one year, four of the most active centers, including the NCI
and CDC, distributed 2,514 strains of viruses, 1888 ampoules of experimental vaccines, and about 100 samples of
cell cultures throughout the network. 70,000 virus isolations were reported by 1970.
Chapter 3. Cold War, Biological Weapons and World Health -The international scientific community's
efforts to stop biological warfare and biological weapons (BW) research and development are reviewed here. The
chapter reveals how, why, and to what extent tJ. S. biological weapons research continued despite staunch foreign
and domestic opposition. President Nixon's false claims that BW research and development ceased after signing
the Geneva Accord in 1969 are documented, as arc the WIHO's objections to safeguarding genetic engineering of mutant
viruses for biological warfare and cancer research.
In March of 1970, WHO consultants noted that it was "possilbl that biological agents may be used... to
achieve the siuhltalneous inflecti101 of key groufps of people, aId %d~ fitary col1equncl1Cs Iligilt well be of major

importance...." They noted the"calculated risk that a virulent mutant might appear and spread rapidly to produce
an uncontrollable epidemic on a large scale. In addition, if mutants are deliberately produced in the laboratory,"
they wrote, " there is the ever-present risk of an accidelnlal escape."
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