trouthis, the conclusioun is to be take for sure trouthe; and if the bothe premyssis be knowun not for sure trouthis, but for suche that for the more parti thei ben trewe and seeldem fallith the contrarie that thei ben vntrewe, or if oon of the premissis be such as is now seid and the other is sure trouthe, thanne the conclusioun is knowen as probabili or likeli trewe.
And this difference here now touchid is the differ|ence bitwix a demonstratijf sillogisme and a probable sillogisme, that is to seie bitwixe a sillogisme which ȝeueth sure and vndoutable kunnyng and a sillogisme which ȝeueth probable kunnyng oonli, that is to seie kunnyng of likelihode and of opinioun but not of cer|teinte. And so no treuthe is a this side the openest fundamental treuthis, but that into proof of him mai be had a sillogisme weel reulid forto proue him sureli trewe, or forto proue him likeli to be trewe; ȝhe, and so likeli to be trewe that he is rather to be holde for trewe than for vntrewe, and that he is to be holde trewe into tyme [The word into seems required before his.] his contrarie parti be had strenger and euydenter premissis than ben the premyssis whiche ben had into him now. And euen as a pre|misse, whos suer knowing is lokid aftir and souȝt after, is to be resolued bi arguyng of sillogismes in the maner now seid, into tyme it be come into pre|missis of openest suerte; so whanne eny premysse is such that his suer trouthe is not lokid aftir neither souȝt after, but his probabilite or likelihode of trouthe is lokid aftir and souȝt aftir, he is to be resolued upward bi sillogismes, into tyme it be come vp into premyssis of whiche euere either is openest in likeli|hode thouȝ not in suerte, or ellis into premyssis of which oon [ooon, MS.] is openest in suerte of trouthe and the other is openest in suerte of likelihode or of proba|bilite
