of men, which is the verri cause wirching tho synnes. And therfore, bitwixe the hauyng, bi which a tree hath him silf anentis his fruyt, and the hauyng, bi which ricches hath him silf anentis the synnes com|yng fro, out, and bi him, [bihim, MS.] is a greet dyuersite. Cer|tis, if the synnes comyng forth fro and bi ricches weren causid of the ricches, and the ricches were cause of tho synnes and made tho synnes, as the tree makith the fruyt, the now first mad skile and argument schulde procede weel, and schulde proue sufficientli his entent. But sithen it is so, that ricchessis ben not causis of the vicis whiche comen fro and bi hem, but the freel wil of the man which vsith tho ricchessis is the making cause of tho synnes, and the ricches is not more than an occasioun of hem oonli, therfore the firste argument and skile is not worth. What difference is bitwixe a cause of a thing and an occasioun of the same thing schal be tauȝt aftir in the iiije. parti of this present book the iije. chapiter, where more is seid perteynyng to this present answere.
That ricches is not cause of eny synne mai be proued thus: Thou canst not seie whi and wherfore ricches schulde be cause of synne, saue for that fro, out, and bi ricches synne cometh. Weel [Weel is added (by a later hand?) in the margin.] thanne, y therto seie aȝen [aȝens, MS. (first hand).] thus: Fro, out, and bi ricches comen ful manye and ful grete vertuose deedis, as ful grete and huge almesful and piteful deedis, summe perpe|tuel, summe for a tyme to dure; wherfore thou ouȝtist graunte that ricches is cause of vertu and of good, as it is cause of synne and of yuel. And so ricches schulde in lijk and euen maner be [bi, MS.] cause of ij. contrarie effectis, which is not to be grauntid,
