veyn fallacis as to schewe treuthe of feith; for thei han no place in mater of feith; and argumentis takun vpon evidencis of Goddis assercioun, or [or of, MS., but of is scraped out.] Goddis affermyng or reveling that the thing is trewe, ben the oonli argumentis which han propre place forto proue and grounde articles, treuthis, and conclusiouns of feith; but certis thei (that is to seie, argumentis of philsophie) and noon othere argumentis han place forto groundli and fundamentali schewe and proue maters of lawe of kinde not being of feith; and suche maters ben maters of Goddis lawe and seruice, as weel as ben maters of feith. And therfore the first text alleggid gooth not into the proof of the iije. opinioun.
And in lijk maner it is to be seid that Poul meened in the ije. place, alleggid bifore to be i. Cor. i. capitulum., that in mater of feith Poul vsid not hiȝnes of wisdom and of pure resoun oonli, thouȝ not al maner of arguyng may be excludid fro the fynding, the leernyng, the knowing, and the prouyng of feith, as it is proued weel in the book clepid The book of feith and of sacramentis, and as it is tauȝt in The folewer to the donet and in the ie. partie of Cristen religioun; bicause that no treuthe (except tho which ben at vttrist degre pleyn and open treuthis) mai be leerned, kunne, and proued without argument, as it is in my writingis sumwhere ellis sufficientli schewid; and ech argument muste needis be maad bi werk and deede of the resoun. And thus it is answerid to the textis whiche in the first chapiter of this book ben brouȝt into proving of the iije. opinioun.
