as y haue openli schewid in othere places of mi writingis. And therfore ful weel and ful treuli ouȝte arguyng and disputing be clepid liȝt.
That the iije. opinioun is also aȝens reson, y mai schewe thus: Euen as thilk opinioun or conclusioun of lawe of kinde is not worthi be holde trewe, but if he mai be susteyned bi hise propre to him groundis and evidencis, withynne the boundis of lawe of kinde, perteynyng to the grounding of suche conclusions; and but if sufficient aunswere can be mad to al arguyng, which may ther aȝens be maad, bi skilis in lawe of kinde: riȝt so thilk feith or conclusioun of bileeue is not worthi to be holde trewe, but if he may be susteyned bi hise propre to him groundis and evi|dencis perteynyng to the grounding of feith; and but if sufficient answere can be ȝeue to al arguyng, which mai be mad ther aȝens. Goddis forbode that eny man schulde so trowe and feele that eny conclusioun of feith ouȝte be holde for trewe and for feith, and ȝit couthe be proued bi eny argument to be vntrewe and fals; and that eny argument couthe be mad aȝens eny conclusioun of trewe feith, to which argument it couthe not cleerli at fulle be answerid. For whi ther is no treuthe knowun for a treuthe (whether it be a treuthe of lawe of kinde or of lawe of feith), but that if he be knowe perfitli and fulli bi hise euydencis and groundis, as it mai bi good labour of arguyng be knowe, he schal be proued trewe aȝens alle aȝenseiers whiche euere thei ben, Cristen or hethen, and thei mowe bi strengthe of argument be constreyned in her reson for to consente therto, wole thei nile thei, if thei ȝeue sufficient attendaunce to the arguyng; and also sufficient cleer at fulle answere mai be ȝeuun to al arguyng mad aȝens the same conclusioun of feith.
