The repressor of over much blaming of the clergy.

THE FIRST CHAPITER.

EER than y schal come doun so speciali into the ij^e. iij^e. iiij^e. and v. parties of this present book forto reherce, proue, and iustifie the xi. gouernauncis, for whiche manye of the lay peple blamen ouermiche the clergie, y schal sende and putte bifore certeyn sup|posiciouns or reulis opene ynouȝ to be grauntid of ech man, and whiche schulen helpe and availe into the prouyng and iustifiyng of ech of tho xj. gouernauncis. Neuertheles, who euer schal thenke that thei ben ouer hard or not nedeful to be of him ouerrad and leerned, y wole vouche saaf that he ouerlepe hem and go at the firste into the ij^e. chapiter of this same ij^e. partie, vnto tyme his witt be growen hiȝer.

Of whiche supposiciouns or reulis the firste is this: Ech treuthe which is knowen in mannys vndirstonding is knowen bi doom of resoun rennyng vpon the mater of thilk trouthe, and upon hise causis and circum|stauncis and purtenauncis; or ellis it is knowun by the assercioun or the witnessing of a persoon, which is not likeli ther yn to make lesing and to bigile. This now seid reule is so open that no man may ther aȝens seie nay. Forwhi no man can fynde or assigne eny maner in which a man mai leerne and kunne eny thing, save oon of these ij. maners now seid.

The ij^e. reule or supposicioun is this: Al the kun|nyng or knowing gete and had in the firste of these ij. maners now seid is clepid Philsophie, bi cause it is had bi labour of kindeli witt without telling or witnessing fro aboue kinde; and al the kunnyng or knowing gete and had in the ij^e. now seid maner is credence or feith, and is dewli to be clepid Pure Divynite or Pure Theologie, forto speke propirli of divynite and theologie as it is dyuerse fro philsophie. This reule is open bi what y haue write in the book clepid The iust apprising of Doctouris, and mai be proued thus. Sum kunnyng gete bi mannys resoning, with|out certifiyng ther of fro aboue kinde, is to be clepid Philsophie; and skile is noon whi eny oon such kunning or knowing schulde be seid Philsophie, more than ech other such kunnyng or knowing schulde be clepid Philsophie. Wherfore ech kunnyng or knowing, getun and had bi labour of mannis kindeli resoun without the seid affermyng and certifiyng mad ther upon fro God aboue, is to be clepid Philsophie. And if this be trewe, thanne, (sithen ech kunnyng or knowing of mannis vndirstonding is gete and had in this now seid maner, or ellis in certifiyng and assercioun maad fro God as the firste reule seid,) it muste nedis folewe that if eny kunnyng or knowing is to be clepid propirli divynyte (as he is dyuers fro philsophie), he must be oonli the kunnyng or knowing gete and had in the ij^e. now seid maner, that is to seie, bi assercioun and certificacioun and reuelacioun mad fro God to man. And so it is open that the ij^e. reule is trewe.

The iij^e. reule or supposicioun is this: If a treuthe be knowen bi doom of resoun, thanne it is knowen or sureli and sikirli; or it is knowen oonli probabili

and likeli. This reule is open at the fulle. Forwhi mo maners or eny other maner, dyuers from oon of these now seid ij. maners, no man can assigne and ȝeue, in which a treuthe may be knowun.

The iiij^e. reule is this: If a treuthe be knowe sureli and sikirli, thanne thilk kunnyng or knowing is woned be clepid intellect, science, craft, or prudence. And if a treuthe be knowun oonli bi probabilnes and likelihode and not sureli, thanne thilk kunnyng or knowing is woned be clepid opinioun vpon the mater of science, craft, or prudence; for vndirstonding of which now spokun names recours is to be had into The folewer to the donet, the chapiter, and therbi this present reule schal be open ynouȝ.

The v^e. reule or supposicioun is this: If a treuthe which we mowe not knowe in the now bifore seid maner bi doom of resoun, withoute assercioun of an other trewe persoon, be knowen in mannys vndir|stonding bi the seid assercioun or witnessing of a trewe persoon, which assercioun is the ground of feith; thanne it is knowe bi assercioun or witnessing of God doon bi his Holi Scripture, or bi eeldist and lengist vce of bileeuyng in the Chirche, or bi godli myracle doon into witnessing of it, or bi speche of God doon bi him silf, or bi his suer messanger with|oute writing; and in ech of these caasis the knowing is holi feith or goostli feith. Or ellis it is knowe bi assercioun or witnessing of man or aungel not as messanger of God; and that, or bi his writing in storiyng or cronycleing, or bi spech of him silf, or of his messanger without writing: and in ech of these caasis is credence or worldli feith and not goostli feith, sich as is in the next maner now bifore seid. Al this is so open to be grauntid, that who euer

denyeth eny point of it, he is vnable to be admittid and to be receyued into eny enquiraunce or commu|naunce forto fynde, leerne, and knowe treuthis, so that the significacioun of these wordis be maad open to him, that he vnderstonde what the wordis meenen.

The vj^e. supposicioun or reul is this: What euer thing is knowe in mannys vndirstonding to be vn|trewe is knowe to be vntrewe bi the same ij. kindis of groundis bifore rehercid, bi which treuthe is knowun, as ben the doom of resoun and the asser|cioun of a trewe persoon; and so forth descending into membris of hem, as the bifore ij^e. reule hem dividith and departith. This reule is openli trewe. Forwhi what other ground than eny of these now rehercid couthe be assigned, forto bi it knowe a thing to be vntrewe, no man can seie. Also, whan euer a thing is knowun to be vntrewe, than al it which is ther in knowun is a treuth. Forwhi al what is so ther yn knowun is this: That thilk thing is vntrewe, and this is a trouthe; and ech trouthe is knowun bi the seid groundis oonli, as the firste and ij^e. reule schewen. Wherfore nedis this, that this is vn|trewe, is knowe bi the same kindis of groundis oonli. And therfore this vj^e. reule is nedis to be grauntid as for trewe.

This vij^e. reule is this: Ech treuthe knowun in mannis vnderstonding is a treuthe considerable or spe|culable or biholdable oonli, that is to seie, such as where vpon neither mannis doing in moral conuersa|cioun, neither mannis making in craft fallith; as is this, that aungelis ben vnbodili substauncis; and this, that the planetis moven fro eest into west, and suche othere; or it is a treuthe doable or makeable, that

is to seie, upon which mannys doing in moral conuer|sacioun leding fallith; as is this, that God is to be loued aboue alle creaturis; and this, that man ouȝte be temperat in eting and drinking; and this, that he ouȝte be meke; and that this werk is to be mad by cumpas, and thilk werk is to be mad bi squyer, and suche othere.

The viij^e. reule is this: Ech thing, which is doon of man in his moral conuersacioun, is such that doom of resoun or the bifore seid ground of feith it ap|proueth; as is, that God is to be loued, and oure neiȝbour is to be loued; and as is, that we loke to be baptisid; and so of othere: or is such that doom of resoun or the bifore seid ground of feith it re|proueth; as is this, that a man take his neiȝboris wijf into fleischli comunyng; and this, that we waite not aftir to be hoosilid with the sacrament of the auter, and suche othere; or it is such that neither doom of resoun neither eny bifore seide ground of feith it approueth or reproueth, but is of neuer neither of hem approued or reproued; as is this, that a man lete his heer growe vnto bynethe hise eeris, or that he wole haue his heer schorne of, and his heed to be dod; and this, that a man wole were a girdel, or that he wole go vngerd. And so forth of othere suche.

The ix^e. reule or supposicioun is this: Ech doable thing longing to moral conuersacioun, which thing doom of resoun or ground of feith approueth, is lee|ful; and it is leeful in propre maner forto clepe a thing leeful, for that it is approued bi doom of resoun or bi ground of feith: and ech doable thing don in moral conuersacioun, which thing doom of resoun or ground of feith reproueth, is vnleeful; and it is vn|leeful in contrarie maner to the now seid maner of

leefulnes, for that it is bi resoun or bi ground of feith reproued. And ech such doable thing, which neither doom of resoun neither ground of feith approueth neither reproueth, is in it silf neither leeful neither vnleeful, in eny of the ij. now seid maners of propre taking leefulnes and vnleefulnes. And it is so neither leeful neither vnleeful, for that it is neither approued neither reproued bi resoun or bi ground of feith.

The x^e. reule or supposicioun is this: Al doable thing which in propre maner now bifore sett is nei|ther leeful neither vnleeful, and namelich if it be not vnleeful, mai and is woned conuenientli ynouȝ as in a larger speche to be seid and clepid leeful; and that for as miche as ech doable thing, for whos doing the doer is not to be blamed and to be punyschid, mai be clepid leeful: and so al such thing is woned to be clepid leeful, thouȝ not so propirli as it is leeful which doom of resoun or ground of feith approueth.

I wote not that it is worth forto talke in reson|yng with eny persoon of the laife vpon eny mater of Goddis lawe, but if he be able forto vndirstonde thes now bifore sett x. reulis, and but if he graunte hem and holde hem for trewe.

Notes

• ellis in a later hand.
• the in a later hand.
• crdence, MS.
• The in a later hand.
• A space left in the MS. for the number.
• into the membris, MS.; but the is cancelled by a later hand.
• A later hand has joined this word to the foregoing, needlessly and against the more usual division in this MS.
• by added by a later hand.
• thus, MS.
• in is interlineated by a later (?) hand, which has also altered the preceding word by an erasure.