The repressor of over much blaming of the clergy.

xvij. CHAPITER.

THAT the ij^e. opinioun sett and spoken bifore in the firste chapiter [See page 6.] of this present book is vntrewe, y mai proue bothe bi experiencis and bi resoun. Bi ex|perience

thus: Among hem that holden the seid ij^e. opinioun many ben whiche han vndirstonde certein processis of Holi Scripture in oon certein maner of vnderstonding, whanne thei helden hem silf meeke and in good wil forto receyue and haue the trewe and dew vndirstonding therof; and ȝit aftirward, whanne thei were not more meke neither more willi to the same, thei han chaungid and varied fro the firste had vndirstonding into an other maner of vndirstonding the same processis, as y here of haue had sufficient knowing. Wherfore thei hem silf, whiche holden the seid ij^e. opinioun, ouȝten bi her owne experience takun vpon her owne deedis proue the same ij^e. opinioun to be vntrewe.

Also thus: Of the same noumbre which holden the seid ij^e. opinioun manye vndirstonden a processe of Holi Scripture in oon maner and wolen needis so vn|dirstonde it, and manye othere of the same noumbre wolen needis vndirstonde the same processe in an other maner not according therto: and in this tho ij. soortis of men stryuen, and ȝit ech soort of hem holdeth him [holden hem MS. (first hand).] silf so meke and so disposid, that he ouȝte haue the trewe vndirstonding of thilk same processe. And thilk same processe mai not haue bothe ij. vndirstondingis to gidere, (as it is proued in othere places of my writing,) and namelich not tho ij. vn|dirstondingis, for thei mowe not stonde to gidere. Wherfore bi open experience had among the holders of the ij^e. opinioun mai be openli knowe, that the same ij^e. opinioun is vntrewe.

Also thus: Open experience schewith that a viciose man is as kunnyng a clerk for to finde, leerne, and vndirstonde which is the trewe and dew sentence of Holi Scripture, how soone a vertuose clerk is kunnyng therto: and into the same vnderstondingis thei to

gidere accordingli fallen. Wherfore experience con|uicteth the ij^e. opinioun to be vntrewe.

Now forto proue the same ij^e. opinioun to be vntrewe bi resoun, y procede thus: Forto fynde the verri and iust vndirstonding of processis in Holi Writt is a labour of the witt or of the intellect, or of resoun in bihold|ing aboute the circumstauncis of the proces and in resonyng ther upon; and forto be good and holi is a labour of the wil or of the affecte or of the appe|tite: but so it is, that a badde man and a ful yuel disposid man in wil and in affect mai haue so cleer and so weel disposid witt and reson into alle thingis to be founde bi witt, as hath a good man weel dis|posid in maners of his affect and wil: wherfore folew|ith bi resoun, that as soone may a viciose man come to and fynde the dew vndirstonding of Holi Scripture, how soone mai a vertuose man finde, so that thei ben lijk witti in nature, or so that the viciose man haue a cleerer witt than the vertuose man hath.

If eny man wole seie here, that this now mad ar|gument proueth weel that, as bi nature and kinde, so soone schulde a witti viciose man fynde and come to the verri trewe vndirstonding of Holi Scripture, as schulde a vertuose euen witti or lasse witti man; neuertheles so it is, that God ȝeueth not hise ȝiftis to a viciose man lijk plenteuoseli as he ȝeueth to a ver|tuose man.

Aȝens this answere y mai meete thus: We han noon other knowing in experience but that men fynden and comen (as for the miche more parti) to the kun|nyng of Scripture and of alle othere divyne and godli trouthis rathir or latir, as thei ben disposid kindeli in her resoun and witt. And what euer ex|perience techith we ouȝte holde, but if resoun or Scripture or sure reuelacioun schewe other. Wher|fore we ouȝten noon other holde, but if resoun or Scripture or other sure reuelacioun schulde enforme vs that we schulde other holde. For ellis the holding

were feyned, and lackid euydence and ground. But so it is, that neithir sufficient resoun, neither Scripture, neither other sure revelacioun schewith to us forto holde other wise ther yn than experience schewith. Wherfore as experience schewith, so ther yn it is to be holde: and that is what is now bifore seid, that men comen into the dew vndirstonding of Scripture rathir or latir, as thei therto ben kindeli disposid. And ferthermore, thouȝ God schulde not and wolde not suffre eny man to haue the dew vndirstonding of Holi Scripture saue bi his ȝifte, ȝit we mowe haue that hise ȝiftis and gracis of wit he ȝeue as plenteuoseli to a bad man as to a good man, and sumtyme more plenteuoseli to the lasse good man than to [Probably the should be inserted after to.] better man. Forwhi ellis what euere men were prophetis, or what euere men hadden reuelaciouns, were holier than eny othere men whiche hadden noon reuelaciouns and visiouns; and the holier that eny man or womman is, the more he or sche hath prophecie and reuelacioun than an othir lasse holi; which is knowun as vntrewe bi open experience. Wherfore folewith that thouȝ God wolde not suffre eny man to haue the dew vnderstonding of Holi Scripture bi his natural witt, but bi ȝifte of God, ȝit herwith stondith weel that a bad man haue as plen|teuosely thilk ȝifte as a good man, and that sum bad man haue thilk ȝifte more plenteuoseli than sum good man, riȝt as sum bad man or sum lasse good man hath ȝiftis of helth and of miraclis doing more plen|teuoseli ȝouen to him than a good man or than a more good man, as it is open in the Gospel [A space left in the MS. for the reference. Pecock seems to have in his eye Mark ix. 38, sqq. (Cf. Luke ix. 49); although Matth. vii. 22, would be in fact more to his pur|pose.] that a man not folewing the trewe and dew wey of Crist dide miraclis bi ȝifte of God, as the very and

trewe Apostlis diden. Wherfore folewith needis that the seid ij^e. opinioun is vntrewe.

Tho textis of Holi Scripture, whiche ben alleggid bifore in the firste chapiter for grounding of the ij^e. opinioun, doon no thing therto. Forwhi, thouȝ it mai be had bi tho textis that God schal ȝeue and do singulerli and notabili to meke men for her mekenes, certis ȝit bi noon of thilk textis is had, that God schal ȝeue or do into the wit or vndirstonding of ech meke man eny ȝifte aboue the ȝifte which he wole ȝeue into the resoun or vndirstonding of vnmeke men. And therfore thilke textis speken in so general maner of the visiting to be doon bi God to meke men, that thei mowe be verrified in manye othere wisis and for manye othere visitingis, than ben the visitingis and the ȝiftis of kunnyng. And verili to seie in myn ex|perience, ful manye passyng meke men y haue knowe, whiche han be ful lewid in the knowing of moral vertu and han be ful of doutis, ȝhe, and han be the lewedir bi so miche that thei laborid euere in meke|nes forto haue it in greet mesure, whilis thei myȝten [myȝte, MS. (first hand).] haue laborid forto haue had kunnyng of moral ver|tuosenes. And thus miche is ynouȝ for improuyng and reprouyng of the ij^e. opinioun.

The iij^e. opinioun put bifore in the first chapiter [See p. 7.] of this present book muste needis be vntrewe, for he is aȝens Holi Scripture and also aȝens resoun.

He is aȝens Holi Scripture; forwhi i. Petri iij^e. capitulum. it is writun in sentence thus: That ech Cristen man schulde be redi forto answere and ȝeue satisfac|cioun to ech asker of him resoun (that is to seie, argument) vpon his feith and his hope; and so wole not the iij^e. opinioun graunte or suffre. Also Iohun vj^e. capitulum. it is had, that mennis goode werkis ben not oonli the werkis of her affect and wil and the out|ward

werkis comaundid bi the wil to be doon, but also mennis werkis ben inward werkis of his intellect or vndirstonding, and therfore ben hise opiniouns and sciencis upon treuthis in lawe of kinde: and also thei ben hise feithis had upon treuthis being not fyndeable and knoweable bi lawe of kinde, whanne thei folewen choicis and deedis of the wil, as it is tauȝt in The folewer to the donet, and as it is open by Cristis wordis, Iohun the vj^e. capitulum. Forwhi whanne the Iewis ask|iden of him thus: What schulen we do that we worche the werkis of God? Iesus [Ihs, MS.] answeride and seide to hem thus: This is the werk of God that ȝe bileeue in to him which he sende. And sithen herby it is open that mennis feithis ben her werkis, it folewith that tho men whiche reulen hem bi the iij^e. opinioun and wolen not bringe forth and schewe her feithis at liȝt (that is to seie, at argumentacioun) ben of thilk soort of peple which God reproueth, Iohun the iij^e. capitulum., where Crist seide thus: This is the iugement, for liȝt came in to the world, and men loued more derknes than liȝt, sotheli her werkis weren yuel. Forsothe [for sothe, MS., apparently; but elsewhere conjunctim.] ech that doith yuel hatith liȝt, and he comith not to liȝt, that hise werkis ben not vndernome. He that doith treuthe cometh to liȝt, that hise werkis be [The MS. had originally ben, but the last letter is scraped out.] mad open, for that thei ben doon in God. Thus miche there. Se now therbi how openli men of the iij^e. opinioun ben reproued of Crist, and therfore the iij^e. opinion is aȝens Holi Writt.

Certis withoute argument can no trouthe be knowe neither leerned in the intellect of man, and that whe|ther thilk trouthe be of lawe of kinde or of feith, except thilk treuthis in lawe of kinde which ben openest of alle othere treuthis, and han noon opener treuthis than thei ben bi whiche thei mowe be proued,

as y haue openli schewid in othere places of mi writingis. And therfore ful weel and ful treuli ouȝte arguyng and disputing be clepid liȝt.

That the iij^e. opinioun is also aȝens reson, y mai schewe thus: Euen as thilk opinioun or conclusioun of lawe of kinde is not worthi be holde trewe, but if he mai be susteyned bi hise propre to him groundis and evidencis, withynne the boundis of lawe of kinde, perteynyng to the grounding of suche conclusions; and but if sufficient aunswere can be mad to al arguyng, which may ther aȝens be maad, bi skilis in lawe of kinde: riȝt so thilk feith or conclusioun of bileeue is not worthi to be holde trewe, but if he may be susteyned bi hise propre to him groundis and evi|dencis perteynyng to the grounding of feith; and but if sufficient answere can be ȝeue to al arguyng, which mai be mad ther aȝens. Goddis forbode that eny man schulde so trowe and feele that eny conclusioun of feith ouȝte be holde for trewe and for feith, and ȝit couthe be proued bi eny argument to be vntrewe and fals; and that eny argument couthe be mad aȝens eny conclusioun of trewe feith, to which argument it couthe not cleerli at fulle be answerid. For whi ther is no treuthe knowun for a treuthe (whether it be a treuthe of lawe of kinde or of lawe of feith), but that if he be knowe perfitli and fulli bi hise euydencis and groundis, as it mai bi good labour of arguyng be knowe, he schal be proued trewe aȝens alle aȝenseiers whiche euere thei ben, Cristen or hethen, and thei mowe bi strengthe of argument be constreyned in her reson for to consente therto, wole thei nile thei, if thei ȝeue sufficient attendaunce to the arguyng; and also sufficient cleer at fulle answere mai be ȝeuun to al arguyng mad aȝens the same conclusioun of feith.

Al this is open bi what y haue write of feith in The folewer to the donet, and in the first parti of Cristen religioun, and in the firste parti of The book of feith and of sacramentis, and in the book clepid The prouyng of Cristen feith. And ferthermore the more eny treuthe, whether he be of feith or of no feith, be brouȝt in to examinacioun of arguyng, the more trewe and the more cleerli trewe he schal be seen; and if he be not trewe, but seme trewe eer he come into triyng of argumentis, the lenger he abidith the ex|amynacioun of arguyng, the more vntrewe and the more cleerli vntrewe he schal be seen; riȝt as good trewe gold, the more it suffrith the fier, the more cleerli he is seen to be trewe gold; and if he be not but countirfeet goold, certis the lenger he abi|dith the examynacioun of fier, the more cleerli it schal be seen that he is fals and not trewe gold. And therfore Goddis forbode that any Cristen man schulde thinke and trowe to be a trewe and a good gouernance forto kepe hise feithis and his othere opiniouns priuey, and lete hem not come into what euer examynacioun of argumentis whiche mowe be mad ther upon; namelich whanne and where the holder of tho feithis and of hise othere opinions mai be sikir forto come and go and speke and argue and answere withoute eny bodili harme, and with out eny losse of his ricches or of his fame. Certis if eny man dare not in the now seid casis suffre his feith and hise othere opiniouns be brouȝt into liȝt and into fier of argumentis to be at uttrist examyned, he ouȝte be trowid that in that he hath vntrewe chaffar and vntrewe gold, which mai not abide liȝt and fier.

Also that this iij^e. opinioun is aȝens resoun it is euydent herbi: He is lijk to the lawe of Macomet and of Sarezenis in thilk point in which her lawe is moost vnresonable. Forwhi the lawe of Macomet biddith, vndir greet peyne of horrible deeth suffring, that no

man aftir he hath receyued the feith of thilk lawe dispute or argue with eny other man upon eny point, article, or conclusioun of thilk lawe: and bi this wrecchid and cursid maundement the peple of thilk secte ben so miche lockid up vndir boond, that manie mo of hem myȝten be conuertid into trewe feith than ȝit ben, if thilk so vnresonable maundement of the same lawe ne were. And if any Cristen men wolen locke hem silf so up in her feithis and othere opiniouns of Cristis lawe fro arguyng and disputing ther upon with othere men, as y haue knowe bi reporting of ful trewe persoones that thei so doon, certis ther in thei doon foul vilonie to Cristis lawe of feith and of lawe of kinde, making as thouȝ Cristis seid lawe were so feble chaffare and so countirfetid and so vntrewe, that it durst not saue his worschip if he were thriftili examyned. And thei doon also ful periloseli to hem silf for to make hem so sikir in a feith, eer it be sufficientli tried and proued forto be holde worthi a trewe feith or no. And therfore the thridde bifore sett opinioun in the first chapiter of this book is vnresonable.

Now forto answere to tho textis, whiche ben there bifore alleggid for grounding or ellis witnessing or prouyng of the iij^e. opinioun, it is liȝt forto an|swere. Forwhi to ech diligent considerer vpon the processis forth and aftir, bifore and behinde, where thilke textis ben writun, it schal be riȝt liȝtli and soone seen, that the first text there alleggid, Coloc. ij^e. capitulum., wole that in mater of Cristis Incarnacion, which is a mater of pure feith, no man schulde be bigilid bi philsophi; that is to seie, no man schulde be moved aȝens the feith ther of bi evidencis and bi argumentis mad oonli vpon evidencis of lawe of kinde and of pure resoun without evidencis takun vpon Goddis affermyng or Goddis reveling. Forwhi tho ben argumentis of pure philsophie, and thei ben

veyn fallacis as to schewe treuthe of feith; for thei han no place in mater of feith; and argumentis takun vpon evidencis of Goddis assercioun, or [or of, MS., but of is scraped out.] Goddis affermyng or reveling that the thing is trewe, ben the oonli argumentis which han propre place forto proue and grounde articles, treuthis, and conclusiouns of feith; but certis thei (that is to seie, argumentis of philsophie) and noon othere argumentis han place forto groundli and fundamentali schewe and proue maters of lawe of kinde not being of feith; and suche maters ben maters of Goddis lawe and seruice, as weel as ben maters of feith. And therfore the first text alleggid gooth not into the proof of the iij^e. opinioun.

And in lijk maner it is to be seid that Poul meened in the ij^e. place, alleggid bifore to be i. Cor. i. capitulum., that in mater of feith Poul vsid not hiȝnes of wisdom and of pure resoun oonli, thouȝ not al maner of arguyng may be excludid fro the fynding, the leernyng, the knowing, and the prouyng of feith, as it is proued weel in the book clepid The book of feith and of sacramentis, and as it is tauȝt in The folewer to the donet and in the i^e. partie of Cristen religioun; bicause that no treuthe (except tho which ben at vttrist degre pleyn and open treuthis) mai be leerned, kunne, and proued without argument, as it is in my writingis sumwhere ellis sufficientli schewid; and ech argument muste needis be maad bi werk and deede of the resoun. And thus it is answerid to the textis whiche in the first chapiter of this book ben brouȝt into proving of the iij^e. opinioun.