and vertu of Goddis lawe to man, in to whos fynding, leernyng, and knowing mannis resoun may bi him silf aloon, or with natural helpis, rise and come,) mannis resoun may and can ȝeue the same leerning and know|ing, as experience ther upon to be take anoon wole schewe; for thou canst not fynde oon such gouer|naunce tauȝt in Holi Scripture to be doon, but that resoun techith it lijk weel and lijk fulli to be doon; and if thou wolt not trowe this, assigne thou summe suche and assaie. Wherfore folewith that of noon suche now seid gouernauncis the leernyng and knowing is had and tauȝt bi Holi Scripture oonli or aloone; and therfore the ije. premisse of the firste principal argument muste needis be trewe.
And thanne ferther, thus: Sithen the bothe premissis of the first principal argument ben trewe, and the argument is formal, nedis muste the conclusioun con|cludid bi hem in the same arguyng be trewe, which is the bifore set first principal conclusioun.
iij. CHAPITER.
THE ije. principal argument into the first bifore sett and spoken conclusioun or trouthe is this: Thilk thing is the ground of a gouernaunce, or vertu, or trouthe, out of which al the sufficient leernyng and knowing of the same gouernaunce, trouthe, and vertu cometh, procedith, and growith, and may be had, thouȝ al other thing pretendid to be ground ther of be awey or were not in being; but so it is, that al the leernyng and knowing, which Holi Scripture ȝeueth vpon eny bifore seid gouernaunce, deede, or trouthe of Goddis moral lawe, mai be had bi doom of natural resoun; ȝhe, thouȝ Holi Writt had not spoke ther of, or thouȝ he schulde neuere fro hens forthward speke ther of, as anoon aftir schal be proued; and ouer it al the forther kunnyng which Holi Writt ȝeueth not upon eny seid gouernaunce or deede or treuthe of Goddis lawe and
