Frontmatter
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Page [unnumbered] Occasional Papers CENTER FOR JAPANESE STUDIES No. University of Aichigan Pre.s Ann Arbor 1951
Page [unnumbered] Copyright, 1951 University of Michigan Lithoprinted in U.S.A. EDWARDS BROTHERS, INC. ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN 1951
Page [unnumbered] CONTENTS Page Patterns of Stability and Change in Rural Japanese Politics The Japan Communist Party 1922-1945 The Tokugawa Bakufu and the Merchant Class Territorial Claims of Russia and Japan in the Kurile Islands The Household in the Status System of Japanese Villages The Hakata Niwaka: A Study in Japanese Folk Drama Robert E. Ward Burke C. Peterson John Whitney Hall Joseph L. Sutton Richard K. Beardsley 1 7 26 35 62 William H. Dizer 75
Page [unnumbered] EDITOR'S PREFACE World War II and its aftermath created an unprecedented interest among Americans in Japan and Japanese culture. As a consequence within recent years there has been produced in this country an astonishing quantity of research in the field of Japanese studies. Unfortunately the means of making available the results of this research to the general public have not increased proportionately. One of the obstacles is that few journals and publishing houses are equipped to handle the problems involved in printing scholarly materials in this field. To improve this situation the University of Michigan Center for Japanese Studies has begun the preparation by photo-offset of a number of special publications in the Japanese field. The first to appear was the Bibliographic Series. The second is the present Occasional Papers Series. The Occasional Papers fulfill a long-felt need of the Michigan Center for Japanese Studies for the creation of a publication vehicle for research done by faculty and student members of the Center, a need which was accentuated by the establishment of the Michigan Field Station at Okayama and the consequent influx of reports and studies from the field. The first issue presents six papers which are intendedto represent as fully as possible the varied interests of the Center. Three of the authors are members of the faculty at the University of Michigan and three were students who prepared their papers as a part of the Center program either as Masters theses or as reports for the Center's Continuing Seminar. The papers are evenly distributed between historical and contemporary interest, andall six follow the Center's policy of reliance on either direct field study or on the extensive use of Japanese materials. Since none of these papers was written specifically for publication in the Occasional Papers Series certain differences in style, especially in the handling of Japanese terms and phrases, have been unavoidable. It is the intention of the Center to bring out two numbers of the Occasional Papers yearly. The contents of these subsequent numbers will vary from collections of several articles, as in this number, to single monographs. It is our hope to maintain a variety in subject matter as well as a balance between the interests of the specialist and the general informed public. This first issue of the Occasional Papers owes its existence to the inspiration of Professor Robert B. Hall, Director of the Center for Japanese Studies. Its preparation has in every respect been a cooperative venture of the Center staff. In addition the editor would like to mention two non-members of the Center who have helped to make possible the publication of this number. These are Mrs. Rosannah C. Steinhoff, who has assisted the editor in the work of preparing the manuscripts for publication and in proofreading, and Miss Noriko Osawa who prepared the typed copy and wrote in the characters. John Whitney Hall
Patterns of Stability and Change in Rural Japanese Politics
Robert E. Wardpp. 1-6
Page 1 PATTERNS OF STABILITY AND CHANGE IN RURAL JAPANESE POLITICS* Robert E. Ward It is the aim of the following article to point out very briefly the persistence of old attitudes and patterns of action in rural Japan and to contrast thereto whatever signs of significant change have become apparent in the past few years. Not all the views and practices described are specifically political; all do, however, have political implications of importance. Conclusions are based upon field studies conducted by the author and a number of colleagues from the University of Michigan Center for Japanese Studies in Okayama Prefecture throughout the year 1950. Most of the information obtained was based upon personal interviews with farmers, fishermen, foresters and public officials, supplemented in some cases by documentary and statistical materials. Three villages —representing farming, fishing and mountain communities —were covered with considerable thoroughness; a number of others including a small rural town, were sampled less intensively. It must be emphasized, therefore, that no sweeping claims are made for the overall validity of the data set forth in this paper. Strictly speaking they are representative only of beliefs and conditions in specific villages in Okayama Prefecture. They are based solely on studies of rural communities and do not take into account the widely variant and more mobile patterns to be found in urban areas. In a broader sense they are merely hypotheses to be confirmed, amended or discarded as the continuing and expanding research of the Center for Japanese Studies in other areas of Japan adds cultural and geographic depth to this basic sample. On the other hand these observations do represent the results of the first purely private and academic investigations by foreigners of conditions in postwar Japan. They may derive some added interest or significance from this fact. In respect to the persistence of older patterns of political thinking and practice one may first consider what seems to be the basic attitude of most peasants towards government. In general this might be characterized as a feeling of deep suspicion and mistrust, a conviction that under all normal circumstances they as peasants have little to expect from government save high taxes, haughty attitudes and varying degrees of exploitation. This belief is the product of centuries of historical experience with pre-feudal, feudal and modern forms of Japanese government. It is summed up with grim humor in Sansom's verdict on Tokugawa administration and administrators: "They thought highly of agriculture but not of agriculturists." In more recent times the peasantry undoubtedly fared worst among the four classes as a result of the Restoration settlement. The subsequent class experience, with tax rates heavily weighted to their disfavor, a similarly biased system of conscription, extortionate rural interest rates, * The following article was presentedas a paper at the third annual meeting of the Far Eastern Association at Philadelphia, March 27-29, 1951. 1
Page 2 2 ROBERT E. WARD the continued inadequacy of rural relief policies and systems, a fairly continuous attitude of relative governmental indifference to their welfare and obvious discrimination in favor of urban interests, did nothing to improve this sentiment. Nor can it be held that the five short years of reform since 1945 have substantially altered this ancient attitude. It is quite true that in some respects the nature of peasant contacts with their government has changed. From the peasants' standpoint by far the most important favorable development was the land reform program. Temporarily beneficial were the unprecedented high prices they were obtaining for their crops from 1946 to 1949, but this was essentially a black market phenomenon for which the government received no credit, only censure when administrators were finally obliged to take fairly effective steps to control agricultural prices and the black market. The high taxes and stringent crop requisition system of recent years have also confirmed the average peasant in his conviction that he has little good to expect from his rulers. Furthermore he knows quite well that the reforms which seem to promise him a better lot in life are the product of the Occupation not of Japanese planning and pressure. He has a lively fear that this is but a brief interlude in the national experience and that things will speedily slip back into their normal pattern after the peace treaty is signed. In the light of historical experience this is a well-founded fear. It is hardly surprising that the old attitudes of suspicion and mistrust have not undergone substantial alteration. Related to this feeling of suspicion and mistrust towards government is another attitude of equal importance and depth. This may be described as a strong and persistent tendency to conceive of government as the exclusive prerogative of a ruling class or group —or at least of a class other than the peasantry —and of themselves as largely passive members of the state, distinguished by a class obligation of obedience to the commands of their superiors. Those familiar with Tokugawa political thought will readily recognize the provenance of this belief. It accords perfectly with the four-class theory of society and, for that matter, with the far older tenets of Confucianism. Again this is an attitude firmly based on centuries of historical experience. In a national sense one might claim with considerable justice that an overt class distinctionof this sort between participants and non-participants in the governing process continued to exist in Japan as late as 1925 when for the first time the bulk of the male peasantry was enfranchised by the adoption of universal manhood suffrage. Even after 1925, however, there was little in the experience of average peasants to encourage the delusion that as a class theirs was anything but a passive, obedience-yielding role. Again it must be emphasized that attitudes so well and deeply founded in centuries of class experience as this one do not give way to more positive and optimistic views with either ease or speed. There is a great deal of evidence to indicate that the political attitudes of the majority of peasants are still shaped against this historical background. The countryside continues to be politically passive to a large degree, still responsive politically to the old socio-economic pressures and controls exercised in many instances by the sons and grandsons of the rural gentry of post-Restoration days or others of their ilk, and still controlled by the local representatives of the old, conservative political parties, lineal descendants of the original Jiyiut and Kaishinto. A third persistent attitude generally encountered in rural areas is a pronounced aversion to the judicial process. Resort to a court of law as a means of settling disputes is subject to strong social disapproval in peasant communities. This sentiment appears to be based about equally on a deep seated inherited prejudice in favor of settling disputes by the old familiar technique of concilation within the purview of the close-knit community system, on a feeling that disputes are per se unseemly and better concealed within the group than aired in open court to the social disgrace of all participants, on fear and distrust of the formal atmosphere and official position of courts and on a shrewd perception of the cost and duration of judicial pro
Page 3 RURAL JAPANESE POLITICS 3 ceedings. The cumulative result of these factors is great reluctance to go to court except as a last resort under the most desperate of circumstances. When his title to the ancestral farm is threatened and all other means of relief have failed, then one may expect a peasant with great reluctance and trepidation to take his case to court. Only the fundamental issues and disagreements in respect to land ownership generated by the Land Reform Act have brought any appreciable number of peasants into the courts of Okayama Prefecture in recent years, and even so the number of cases has been unbelievably small. This aversion to the use of judicial process has, of course, the further important consequence that administrative suits by peasants against the government or government officials at any level are extremely rare. As a result the rights of judicial appeal from official acts of mal-or misfeasance so carefully incorporated in all postwar reform legislation are largely meaningless in their application to rural areas. The foregoing sections indicate the stability and persistence of certain old patterns of thinking and attitude in the countryside. It is equally possible to detect the continued existence of old patterns of organization and practice which still possess important political overtones. It is quite obvious, for example, that the family, not the individual, continues to constitute the basic unit in rural Japanese society. The family structure has been subject to pressures and Invasions in recent years but it has not as yet been effectively replaced by any more fundamental unit of organization. This is a fact of major importance in understanding both local and national politics in rural areas. Campaigns for local office tend to be organized along family lines with this tendency growing notably stronger in less socially mobile communities. For example, this family pattern of politics was considerably more dominant and apparent in the isolated mountain village of Kusama than in agricultural Niiike, located on the coastal plain. It is less well known perhaps that there exists in rural Japan still another important unit of socio-political organization below the village level. This is the buraku, sometimes termed sonraku in literary treatments. It is not usually —in Okayama at least —a kinship group but rather a settlement group united in a physical sense by the mutual proximity of the homes and fields of its members. In size it may range from four or five houses of some seventeen to twenty individuals to seventy or eighty houses and several hundred persons. A village, which is the lowest legal unit of political organization, is actually made up of a varying number of such buraku. Buraku still comprise quite close-knit social groups and are possessed of formal organization and collective responsibilities in a number of fields including the political. They elect — in some cases by formal secret ballot —a headman for a stipulated term andcharge him with definite leadership, ceremonial and liaison functions; they sometimes appoint others of their members to perform financial, purchasing, irrigation or local maintenance functions; they have a significant part in the crop-requisitioning system and, in some cases, in the actual apportionment of local taxes; while at the same time they represent a political unit of major importance in local politics. It is impossible to understand village politics in Japan except in terms of the family and buraku units whose interplay determines much of its content and personnel. Positions on the village assembly, for example, are gained by campaigns organized primarily on the buraku unit in which the candidate resides and secondarily along the lines of whatever family connections he may have outside his own buraku but within the village. It is interesting to note that these buraku are not only a sublegal unit of political organization unrecognized by law but are also at present positively illegal. In the early days of the Occupation they were regarded as rural equivalents of the politically obnoxious tonarigumi or block associations of the cities and were officially dissolved by the same edict which abolished the tonarigumi. Today they, therefore, constitute an extra-legal kind of organization based on cohesive settlement groups which tend to function locally as units in many ways including the political. In this well and formally organized form buraku are not of great age. They owe their present
Page 4 4 ROBERT E. WARD configuration to government sponsorship and prompting since the years following the Manchurian Incident, but even so the government was merely building upon and formalizing a far older pattern of rural social organization going back for many centuries. It is the writer's opinion that the existence and socio-political importance of these two units - -the family and the buraku —especially the former, present fundamental problems in respect to thecultural capacity of the Japanese peasantry to comprehend, assimilate or operate democratic political institutions of the type recently presented to them. It is frequently forgotten that the institutions and practices of democracy were gradually worked out in the Occident to meet the rather peculiar needs of a predominantly individualistic and Christian society at a certain stage of economic and political advancement. The problems of forcibly grafting similar institutions onto the family-oriented, Confucian-Shinto-Buddhist stock of rural Japan are more formidable and far-reaching than has generally been recognized. This is not to say that the experiment is foredoomed. It does, however, distinctly indicate the possibility of strange fruit. Intrinsically related to this pattern of family-buraku organization is the system of sociopolitical status prevalent in rural areas. There exist in almost all buraku one or more elders who are generally regarded as outstandinglywise and experienced in all lines and particularly in respect to matters such as village or prefectural politics which transcend the normal daily experience of most members of the community. They are almost invariably old men; usually of good family in the sense that their fathers and grandfathers before them have also held positions of honor or trust in the village, as sh6ya or headmen, as members of the village assembly or perhaps only in an informal sense as distinguished members of the community. They are likely also to be of better than average economic circumstances, though relative wealth is by no means a prerequisite for such status. A great deal of respect is accorded by the community in general to the words and opinions of such elders, and their advice is often followed in many matters of collective concern. It is this type of social relationship, which is effective in respect to political matters as well as in other spheres, which underlies and makes possible the practice known locally in Okayama as kuiuchi (/f[iju literally "driving stakes"). A politician visiting and sometimes bribing these respected elders to use their influence in favor of his candidate is said to be "driving stakes" in the sense that he is nailing down the vote. It is on this practice that the so-called "political boss" system of rural Japan is based. It should be understood, however, that the political influence of these elders is merely incidental to a far broader status and span of control, and is in no sense based on coercion. They are usually the most respected and admired members of the community. Also more often than not their support appears to be extended to a particular politician or candidate on a basis of long-established loyalty to a specific local group or individual. Thus the elders of Kamo Son had traditionally supported Inukai Tsuyoshi until his assassination. The village of Kamo was regarded as a part of his jiban (b 2 ), or bailiwick. When the father died, his son Inukai Ken simply inherited the jiban and with it the staunch allegiance of the majority of elders. Bribery in the form of cash or other overt payments had practically nothing to do with this relationship. It was based primarily on the type of personal, semi-feudal loyalties which still characterize Japanese politics and which usually pay off in ways so subtle and varied as to defy general characterization. It is interesting to note that such loyalties and relationships are frequently passed on and perpetuated in a family from generation to generation by what amounts to inheritance. The foregoing examples of patterns of stability in rural Japanese politics could be extensively supplemented by further pertinent attitudes and practices. To mention but a few, one still finds scant evidence of any independent political thinking or action on the part of the newly enfranchised female voters in rural Japan; the meaningful contacts of the average peasant family
Page 5 RURAL JAPANESE POLITICS 5 with government are still surprisingly few and mostly unpleasant in nature, e.g. primarily taxpaying and the surrender of his crops under the requisition system; the old-time political parties continue to control the countryside with little effective challenge from new postwar parties; or again the degree of effective local autonomy at the village, or for that matter at the prefectural, level is far lower than is generally believed, owing to the persistence of old habits of political, legal and personal dependence on higher authorities. All of these attitudes and practices interact to produce a psychology and climate in rural areas which makes it extremely difficult for the postwar reforms in government and other lines to take root effectively. The new ways remain essentially alien in spirit and content to the old established patterns and as a'result tend to be given only pro forma observance. It is hard to conceive of a meaningfully democratic society reared on a foundation of deep mistrust and suspicion towards its own government reinforced by an attitude of passive obedience on the part of the majority peasant class towards the higher class or group whom they tend to regard as their rightful leaders. Equally serious questions about the democratic potential of the peasantry are posed by their basic alignment in terms of family rather than individual units, their responsiveness to an ancient and accepted pattern of control by community elders, their lack of interest in and knowledge of effective techniques of control over government, their aversionto the use of judicial process and a large number of analogous factors. In this country these questions have barely been posed in meaningful terms. They represent problems yet to be faced in serious fashion by American scholars and public officials, yet they must be dealt with if our Far Eastern policy is to have any long term basis in solid cultural fact rather than facilely accepted myth. The above observations are admittedly fragmentary and inconclusive. They represent local conditions in one very limited segment of rural Japan. Even in this area they need to be qualified by a number of other observations indicating the operation of contrary forces reinforcing patterns of cultural change. It should be noted, for example, that urban residents in general display greater mobility and receptiveness to the new institutions and ideas introduced since the war than do the considerably more conservative peasantry. Furthermore even in the countryside evidences of a slow process of change can be detected. The elders complain everywhere of disturbing currents of unrest especially among the younger generation. The most common complaint concerns the increasing tendency of the young people of the buraku to arrange their own marriages. This is a serious phenomenon in its cultural implications for it represents a direct attack on the foundations of family solidarity and bears witness to the incursions of subversive individualistic thinking. Youth in general displays somewhat less respect and obedience for the beliefs and orders of their parents than is traditionally proper. In certain areas and circumstances one finds the adult sons of farmers, often of fairly well-to-do farmers, organizing political support for relatively progressive or even radical causes. It would be gross exaggeration, however, to view such developments as the harbingers of imminent or widespread change. On any serious scale they are exceptional and localized in occurrence. Beyond this it should be noted that the sources of political, economic and social information presently available to the average peasant are far superior in quality, comprehensiveness and lack of bias than ever before. Most farmers can afford a subscription to the local newspaper; many own radios. As a result of these and other advantages they tend to be surprisingly well informed about public affairs both local and national, particularly when one considers the stereotype in this country of the ignorant Oriental peasant. It is difficult to say how effective the information gleaned from such sources is as a catalyst of change in rural attitudes and practices, butthe probability is that it has already had some and will have more effect, if some
Page 6 6 ROBERT E. WARD degree of freedom of the press continues to exist in Japan. The land reform program has also given some sections of the rural population a vaguely defined stake in certain aspects at least of the new as opposed to the old political order. Should the security of the new land titles be seriously challenged it is quite probable that the former tenants would be organized politically in their defense. The Socialist and Communist Parties have as a matter of fact already made overtures in this direction. In some areas one can also see signs of significant deterioration in the profoundand democratically deadening respect which the peasantry have traditionally held for the officials and commands of government. This is most apparent in tax-delinquency statistics during the past few years. Before the war such payments were normally met promptly if it was in any wise possible to do so. Recently, however, very high delinquency rates sometimes coupled with outright defiance of tax collectors have cropped up in some areas, particularly in fishing communities. It is also true that over a period of time the rural activities and propaganda of the new leftwing political parties may do something to change the old attitudes. In this connection, however, it should be remembered that both the Socialist and Communist Parties in Japan devote by far the largest portion of their time and limited funds to urban not rural agitation and campaigning. Finally it should be noted that the Occupation has rhade the formal governmental instruments of change far more readily available to the people of Japan than ever before, granted that they acquire the will to use them in positive and constructive fashion. At the moment, however, it seems reasonably doubtful that the rural populace of the nation comprising some 60-odd per cent of the total population have shown significant signs of abandoning those traditional patterns of thinking and practice which underlay and made possible the prewar system of Japanese government and society.
The Japan Communist Party 1922-1945
Burke C. Petersonpp. 7-25
Page 7 THE JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY 1922-1945 Burke C. Peterson The Communist party of Japan came into being as a result of conditions which followed in the wake of World War I. Aided by the growth of a strong labor movement and encouraged by the success of the proletarian revolution in Russia, Japan's leftist adherents turned rapidly from the intellectual contemplation of Marxism to an active participation in political affairs. The immediate predecessors of the Japan Communist Party were a number of Marxist study groups which emerged during the war years. On the international scene, the war brought Japan into the ranks of the democratic powers. The attention of intellectuals was directed increasingly toward the principles of the Western democracies. The formation of Marxist study groups indicated the upsurge of liberal thinking in the post-war era. The intellectual-student movement during the war period became the training ground for the proletarian leaders of latter years. Students under the leadership of Aso Hisashi),'L- I -k at Toky6 Imperial University formed the Shinjin Kai $t A- (New Man Society). At Waseda an organization known as the Minjin Domei.- f1 S. (Citizens League) appeared, while outside of the universities such groups as the Gyomin Kaig, t/t (Workers Society), Suiy6 Kai 7CIK 4t (Wednesday Club) and Mokuy6 Kait A. -t (Thursday Club) served as the nuclei for Anarchist, Syndicalist and Communist movements.1 Although these study groups met informally and usually in secret, their influence upon the proletarian movement was far beyondthat indicated by the small number of men who actively participated. Practically every prominent Communist leader of later years and the majority of militant Socialists were members or leaders of these groups. Amongthe various Marxist study groups, the Gyomin Kai was first to embrace Communism as such. In the autumn of 1921, the prominent Anarchist, Osugi Sakae3.M %,journeyed to Shanghai where he hoped to persuade the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern to support a Communist party in Japan. On his return, the Rdo6 Und6 ShaX+k '4 7 it- (Labor Movement Organization) was formed in collaboration with Kond6 Eizo6.i ' and Takatsu Masamichi ~ -, f^. The latter two, however, unable to agree with Osugi's Anarchist views, formed the Gyomin Kyosanto 98 ^ A.t t., (Workers Communist Party) in August, 1921, around which members of the old Gy6min Kai assembled. Although its existence was reported to the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern, this embryo Communist group did not receive the recognition of the Communist International. Meanwhile a number of Communist leaders had left Japan for travel to Europe and Russia. InJanuary, 1922, Tokuda Kyuichili 0 d -, Nosaka Sanzo +,. and Katayama Sen)t 1,~had participated in the Far Eastern convention of the Comintern after which Nosaka had been instructed to return to Japan to organize a party. On July 5, 1922, Nosaka, together with representatives of various Marxist study groups, met in T6ky6 to form the first Japan Communist Party. 2 Takase Kiyoshi M -,I f was dispatched as liaison representative to the Comintern in November, 1922, and at the Fourth Congress of the Third International he officially announced the formation of the Japanese party. The First Convention of the newly formed party was held in the town of Ichikawa in Chiba Prefecture on February 23, 1923, to elect a control committee and formulate a general policy. Policy decisions were extensive, bold, and to a certain extent politically naive. The major demands and policies were:3 7
Page 8 8 BURKE C. PETERSON Political: 1. Abolition of the emperor system and the House of Peers. 2. Abolition of the Army, Police, Kempei. and Secret Police. 3. Universal suffrage beginning at the age of eighteen. 4. Freedom of organization. 5. Freedom of labor to publish, assemble, demonstrate, and strike. 6. Arming of the workers. Economic: 1. An eight-hour working day and unemployment insurance. 2. A minimum wage based on market price index, and control of production by workers' committees. 3. Recognition by the government and industry of labor unions and other workers' organizations. 4. Confiscation and nationalization of Imperial, private and company land holdings without compensation. 5. Establishment of government subsidies for tenant farmers. 6. Income tax on accumulated wealth, and luxury tax. International: 1. Cessation of foreign intervention. 2. Withdrawal from Korea, Formosa and Karafuto. 3. Recognition of Soviet Russia. The international policies, designed to favor Soviet Russia, accorded of course with the promise made at the November, 1922, Comintern Convention.4 Furtherindications of a strong pro-Soviet policy were party slogans, such as "Recognize the Workers of Russia," "Begin Trade with Russia" and "Help Feed Russia," adopted early in 1923. There is little evidence, however, that these slogans were widely employed or gained any degree of public notice. A second convention was held in Iwakuni, Tokyo, on March 15, 1923, and attended by some thirty delegates, who selected Arahata Katsuz6 (Kanson),_ AJ- = to represent the party in Moscow. Shortly afterward Zenei (The Vanguard) was published though not as an official organ, owing to the underground nature of the party. Other vehicles of Communist thought were the publications R5do Kumiai 44 '/;./i-(Labor Union) and R6d6 Shimbun; 'jh Ftr (Labor Newspaper). Party members were also active in both the Rodo S6odmei ~^{f S] 1 (Japan Federation of Labor Union) and the Nippon N6min Kumiai tE 4,^ & i.& - (Japan Peasants Union.) Meanwhile the party's younger members, notably Shiga Yoshio, had joined in the student movement where they vigorously opposed the introduction of compulsory military service.5 In the labor unions, Communists fought Anarchists for leadership. This conflict had been especially evident at the inaugural meeting of the Osaka Kumiai Domei Ak P.i. S^/-~ _ d. in 1922, at which the hotly debated question of united or independent unions resulted in the complete failure of the conference. Indeed, Communist members themselves admit that this first period of party activity was characterized by the factionalism and sectism of the groups from which the party had been formed. The weak point of the organization at this time, as was recognized, was that instead of having a broad base of labor and peasant support, the party was merely a group of intellectuals urging a proletarian revolution. 6
Page 9 JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 9 The period of the "First Japan Communist Party" ended three months after the second convention. At Waseda University a clash between two student organizations, one headed by Sano Manabu~k Aim, led police to the home of a student where they discovered a complete list of leading Communists. On June 15, 1923, a round-up of these persons brought in thirty leading party members, including everyone of importance save Sano Manabu, Takatsu Masamichi, and Kond5 Eiz6, who had managed to escape to Russia. 7 On September 1, 1923, the earthquake and the resulting confusion gave the government an opportunity to turn the people against alien influences. Rumors that Communists and Koreans had poisoned wells incited mobs to riot against both groups at the expense of many lives. Thousands of students and others suspected of Communist thought were arrested, including some one hundred labor leaders and, interestingly, a few Prohibitionists. The most notable incident of this period was the murder of the Anarchist, Osugi Sakae, along with his mistress and nephew. Claiming "patriotic devotion" as his motive, the assassin, Captain Amakasu It $, was let off with a short prison sentence.8 The Dissolution Movement Despite the immediate effects of the June arrests and of the various incidents following the earthquake of September, the Communists could view these occurrences as generally beneficial to the party. Prison sentences had been relatively light, so that most Communist leaders were free after several months and able to resume their activity by early 1924. It was felt that the damage involved in the arrests was offset by the publicity which would make the party known to the mass of workers, few of whom had previous knowledge of a Japanese Communist movement.9 Moreover, it was expectedthat such violence against their leaders would further arouse the laboring masses against the government. The reorganization of the party in 1924, however, precipitated the first major split within the Communist group. Yamakawa HitoshiAL A [ SJ, under whose ideological leadership the party had operated since its inception, stressed a broad proletarian base as a first requirement. According to his views, the formation of the Communist Party, as such, should follow a strong mass movement. His group interpreted the government oppression in 1923 as evidence that the proletarian movement was yet immature and too shaky to support a Communist Party. Consequently, they urged postponing any party movement until the more immediate objective of broad organization of labor was achieved. In accordance with this view, it was decided March, 1924, to dissolve the party. 10 Informed of this decision, the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern in Shanghai issued a strong protest and refused to recognize the dissolution of the party. This action by the Comintern split the Japanese party into two factions. Arahata Kanson and Sano Manabu left immediately for Shanghai to discuss future policies with the Far Eastern Bureau. In Japan, meanwhile, the split reduced the active Communist elements to a small nucleus, whose attention was focused on internal difficulties rather than on propaganda and agitation. Groups desiring to keep the party alive were to a certain extent united under the leadership of Watanabe Seinosuke /X/ - #A', who tried desperately to hold these remnants together. As a result of prolonged negotiation in Shanghai, the "Shanghai Thesis" of January, 1925, was issued by the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern and brought to Japan as the framework upon which the new party was to build. The "Shanghai Thesis" severely criticized the
Page 10 10 BURKE C. PETERSON "anti-absolutism" of the Yamakawa faction and called for closer adherence to the Comintern. Since the policy decisions and organizational directives of the "First Japan Communist Party" had not been published or widely expressed, the "Shanghai Thesis" was in effect the first major declaration of the Japan Communist Party. In May, 1925, there followed the "Shanghai May Thesis," the work of Sano Fumio5- gf X:_ A-. and Tokuda Kyuichi. These two papers expressed the guiding policies of the so-called "Communist Bureau" which the active nucleus of the party had formed to establish working units within labor organizations. This "Bureau" was loosely held together by the active Communists during 1924 and 1925, but lacked any real cohesion. Communists Split the Proletarian Movement Outside the Communist Party, the general trend of the proletarian movement from early 1924 could be plainly seen. Impelled by government attempts at suppression a large segment of the proletarian leadership modified their demands, offering compromises, and emphasizing their non-political character as well as their antipathy toward the Communists. The breach between the "reformist" and the "revolutionist" groups widened rapidly. Signs of disagreement within the Sodomei j- fg S2, appeared in early 1925 when the Kant5o F X* federation was expelled for being too radical. In May, 1925, the conflict between moderate elements, wishing to purge the extremists from the Sod6mei, and Communist elements, insisting that pure "red" trade unions be formed, led the entire Communist faction to withdraw from the Sodomei and from their own federation, the Nippon Rodo6 Kumiai Hy6gikai 0 J 4J" i*-?.- ^', (Japan Labor Union Council). Later, in October, 1925, the S6d6mei was further split when other, more radical, unions seceded and formed the R6d6Kumiai S6rengo k 1'7 1JL Ju., (Association of Labor Unions). The introduction of universal manhood suffrage in 1925 convinced labor leaders that an overall proletarian party must be formed to unite the newly enfranchised working class. As early as February, 1924, the Nippon N6min Kumiai R 4-,.$ /J Ai'L (Japan Peasants Union) had proposedthe formation of such a party, and in 1925 it started to accomplish this plan. Preliminary meetings were held in August and October and attended by representatives of the Nippon N6min Kumiai, the Sodomei, "red" Hyogikai, and of the Seiji KenkyUkaiiC-;,"%f -t-' (Political Research Society), a small, intellectual Fabian society which had been formed by Abe Isoo '~ 4~A;$'~in the preceding year. The various factions, however, were unable to attain unity. The radical Hy6gikai insisted on the right to criticize the proposed party, while the conservative Sod6mei feared the influence of the radical element, andthe moderate Seiji Kenkyukai attempted vainly to settle differences. The radicals fought to adopt an extreme program, while their conservative opponents tried desperately to purge the proposed party of its Communist faction. Finally, although both the Sodomei and Hyogikai withdrew their support, the party was launched on December 1, 1925, by the remaining thirty-five unions representing only some 140,000 workers. The party, which called itself the Nomin Rodo To $. ),jP.' ' (Peasant-Worker Party) had adopted a moderate platform and chosen leaders who were trying to exclude all traces of radicalism. Nevertheless a few hours after its inauguration, it was charged by the government with still harboring Communist elements and dissolved for "insincerity." Two weeks later the Fabian Seiji Kenkyukai was disbanded. In March, 1926, the moderate S6domei and Nippon Nomin Kumiai undertook to form a new, moderate proletarian party, the Rodo Nomin T5o i'9: 4j* Sc, (Labor-Peasant Party), whose chairman was Sugiyama Motojir5o A,., - O g, head of the Nomin Kumiai. In July, however, a segment of its membership joined with a conservative part of the Nippon Nomin Kumiai to
Page 11 JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 11 form a new farmers' union, the Zenkoku Nomin Kumiai l $-5 %.. XL-f(All Japan Peasants Union) and a new party, the Nippon Nomin To -; 'Ht. (Japan Peasants Party). This group adopted a platform calling for agricultural reform and proclaiming faith in the parliamentary system. A further and more fundamental difference developed between the S6domei and the remainder of the Nippon Nomin Kumiai over the proposed admission into the Rodo Nomin To of certain unions accused of being Communist-dominated. When the S6domei found itself overruled, and the infiltration of radicals became apparent, it decided to withdraw in October, 1926. Thereafter, the R6od Nomin To, under the influence of the Hyogikai, which had been newly admitted, veered sharply to the left. The party leaders, Kawakami Hajime;. It. and Oyama Ikuo. h4 l., while professing to be non-Communists, must have been aware of and possibly sympathetic with the Communist elements within the party.11 On December 5, 1926, under its moderate leaders Abe Isoo and Suzuki Bunji 4 - -7a, the S6odmei made a third attempt to form a party and organized the Shakai Minshu T5o if-t..-.(Social Democratic Party). The party's program resembled that chosen by the Rodo Nomin T6 before its move toward the left: reform of the House of Peers, removal of restrictions on individual freedom, popular control of diplomacy, socialization of certain industries, land reforms, and rights for labor. While still only a few days old, however, the Shakai Minshu T6 was weakened by a rift. Dissatisfied with the conservative policies of the Sodomei Aso Hisashi XY- led his Japan Miners Union out of that federation, formed a new Rodo Kumiai Domei @#A7.tXIS1 1i, and together with a part of the Nippon Nomin Kumiai organized a new Nippon Rono T5o 4- ' '. (Japan Labor- Peasant Party). This party, placing itself somewhere between the conservative Shakai Minshu T6 and the radical Rodo N6min To, announced a platform similar to that of the former. It stood for the abolition of compulsory military training for students and for the regulation of food prices. In 1926 labor and peasant agitation reached another peak, despite increasing opposition from the Japanese Government. 12 While the coalition of the Kenseikai J /C/ and Seiyfikai xC.'It, headed by Kato Takaakira t A A A0t as Prime Minister, had passed the Manhood Suffrage Bill with much fanfare, increasing the electorate from three to thirteen million, this liberalism was more than counterbalanced by activities to control the growth of the proletarian groups. In April, 1925, the Peace Preservation Law, largely the work of Education Minister Okada )R1 f and Home Minister Wakatsuki^ 5 j, was passed despite the objection of a few liberals such as Ozaki YukioAJ. 1kJ i-At in the lower house and Marquis Tokugawa I' I in the House of Peers. The measure outlawed any organization which desired to "change the fundamental character of the state or deny the system of private property," and specified imprisonment up to ten years for violation and conviction. 13 Although, as we have seen, political arrests in Japan had occurred much earlier, the passage of this bill nevertheless heralded the beginning of the mass arrests which were to characterize the next decade. In China, meanwhile, the revolution was again active, and,with its Communist affiliations and proletarian-peasant objectives, was markedly encouraging to the proletarian leaders. Communists in Japan, jubilant over Communist successes in China and the signs of active support from Soviet Russia, made excellent propaganda of the Chinese situation. It appeared for the moment that Comintern hopes for success in Asia were being fulfilled.
Page 12 12 BURKE C. PETERSON "Yamakawaism" vs. "Fukumotoism" Within the Communist Party, a new influence was provided by Fukumoto KazuoT s-*-%, who had joined the party in April, 1925. Throughout 1925 Fukumoto, using the nom de plume of Hojo Kazuo t;l f - _, wrote numerous articles in Marukusu Shugi - ) L 7 -. _- k and Kaizo Zig bitterly denouncing the "liberal" proletarian leadership and ideas of Kawakami Hajime, and Fukuda Tokuzo /,f i.9 -. He was particularly critical of "Yamakawaism." Rising rapidly, Fukumoto became within a few months chief of the Policy Section and Propaganda Section of the Communist organization. In August, 1925, a Communist "group" was launched by Tokuda, Arahata,Watanabe, and Fukumoto, whose immediate objective was to counter the influence of the bourgeois Fabian society and the Seiji Kenkyiikai. Meanwhile major Communist efforts and influence were directed toward the Suiheisha, ~b., Musan Seinen Domei Ai A a- [- rSI ~, and Rodo Kyoiku Kyokai T' C ' t:f. ) -; publication of the Musan Sha Shimbun by Sano Manabu marked the beginning of wider agitation. 14 Betweenthe believers in the Communist "absolutism" or pure Marxism expressed by Fukumoto and these moderate proletarian leaders there was already a wide cleavage. The violent ideological conflict which thus developed within the party prevented unified action among Communist leaders. The Communist "group" had appointed Tokuda Kyuichi as Comintern representative in Moscow during late 1925, and early in 1926 he attended a special Far Eastern Conference held in Russia during February and March. After long discussion of the Japan problem, a "thesis" of decisions was drawn up and was transmitted to the Japanese party when Tokuda returned in July. The Comintern felt that the time was at hand for a public appearance of the Japan Communist Party, particularly in view of the suffrage legislation and the increased entry of labor into the political arena. The "Moscow Thesis," as it was called, included the order to holda convention and form the new Communist Party before the end of 1926. The Comintern at this time provided a sum of $150,000 per year for the Japan party, transmitted through one Yanson, officially a trade representative with the Soviet Embassy, but actually the Cominternrepresentative in Japan. 15 Under the leadership of Fukumoto and Tokuda, the party held its reorganization convention on December 4, 1926, in a small hotel in Yamagata prefecture. There the "second" Japan Communist Party was officially formed. The members were, of course, violating the Peace Preservation Law of 1925, and so had to maintain even greater secrecy of organization and personnel than before. A decision which would end the struggle between "Fukumotoism" and "Yamakawaism" was imperative if the Communist Party hoped to exist as a cohesive force. "Fukumotoism" and "Yamakawaism" were, of course, nothing more than a reflection in Japan of the violent struggle between Stalinist and Trotskyite factions within the Comintern during this period. By 1927, however, with Stalin in control, the Comintern could act to eradicate "Trotskyism" within other Communist parties. Fukumoto, Tokuda, Watanabe, and Sano Fumio were called to Russia early in 1927 to hear the recommendations of the Comintern. Although Yamakawa himself did not go, he prepared a paper under the name "Hoshi" and submitted his views to the Comintern. Weeks of discussion in Moscow produced severe criticism of both "Yamakawaism" and "Fukumotoism" and the demand for reorientation of Japanese Communist leaders. The "1927 Thesis" or "Bucharin Thesis," drawn up on July 15, 1927, stated the Comintern's conception of a proper ideological basis for the party. Yamakawa's views were denounced because they underestimated the role of the Communist Party; Yamakawa himself was censured as an opportunist and "fair weather
Page 13 JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 13 friend." "Fukumotoism" was criticized as "sectarian," alienating the party from the masses and contradicting the principles set down by Lenin. 16 The 1927 Thesis redefined the objectives of the Japan Communist Party clearly and in detail, although it changed the 1922 platform of the party surprisingly little. Significant additions were the demand for non-intervention in the Chinese revolution and for a struggle against imperialist war. 17 How well theJapanese party conformed to the Comintern's doctrines was shown in the months just prior to the January, 1928, elections. The Communist Party worked feverishly to gain a foothold within the various proletarian groups, and had considerable success in the R6noto, Hy6gikai, Musan Seinen D6mei and the Shakai Kagaku Reng5 Kai tj- t4-,A J-'4J. Despite the Comintern's admonition to support a broad proletarian movement, however, Communists insisted upon criticizing the candidacy of moderates such as Suzuki Bunji and Akamatsu Katsumaro,If A>.t, andthus perpetuated the strife within proletarian ranks. Although the party itself placed eleven candidates, including Tokuda Kyuichi and Yamamoto Kenz6o -~.j, none were elected. The results of the 1928 election were not altogether encouraging to the proletarian parties, despite the enfranchisement of a great bulk of the working class. Some 500,000 votes were received, but only eight representatives were sent to the lower house. Interestingly, the Communist Party claimed credit for obtaining 200,000 of this total proletarian vote. 18 Out of many possible reasons for this relative failure, the important ones are:19 1. Political inexperience and primitive techniques in trade unionism had prevented the development of class consciousness. 2. Labor had only a limited number of recognized and experienced leaders within the ranks. 3. No campaign funds were available to compete with parties financed by the zaibatsu. 4. Intimidation by the government over a prolonged period had weakened opposition. 5. The electorate at large feared the radicals, and proletarian parties themselves were not united. Moreover, the placing of several proletarian candidates in one electoral district split the votes, which if combined would in several cases have elected one of the candidates. Following the election, the party held the Second Organizational Convention during the month of February to discuss the election as well as future plans and policy. The decisions, of this meeting were: to cleanse the party of "sectism," remnants of which were still causing friction, to increase party publishing activities beyond the central party organ by including regional and factory papers, and to strengthen factory cells and fractions as a whole. A national convention was proposed for April, for which various economic, political and agrarian theses had been prepared.
Page 14 14 BURKE C. PETERSON The Period of Mass Arrests Within the Japanese Government, foreign policy had meanwhile become a major issue. The criticism of Shidehara's "mild" policy toward China and internal financial difficulties forced the resignationof the Wakatsuki Cabinet in April, 1927, and power fell again to the Seiyukai led by General Tanaka Giichi m tV. -. Tanaka was a peculiar blend, a militaristclansman and at the same time the leader of a party backed by the moneyed barons; neither qualification gave hope for a liberal government. Tanaka's China policy became a target for proletarian attack almost immediately. Communists continually pointed to Japan's imperialist venture in China, Formosa and Korea, and protested strongly against the government' s hostility toward the revolution in China. Unemployment resulting from a banking crisis and subsequent production losses provoked further attack upon the internal policies of the Tanaka government. Suddenly, on March 15, 1928, the government decided to silence the opposition in one blow. Under the direction of Home Minister Suzuki Kisabur6'Vt4 --- -b, a nation-wide roundup of Communists and suspected Communists was carried out with military precision. In all, more than one thousand were arrested and jailed between March 15 and April 10, including all but a handful of important Communists. The Ministry of Justice announced the arrests, and declaredthat the Japanese Government henceforth would consider the activities of Communists and Communism as an attempt to destroy the national polity.20 When the news of the March 15 incident reached the Comintern, several members of the party school in Moscow, led by S6ma Ichir6o 4. -. R, were dispatched to search out the remaining party members and immediately reorganize the party. Watanabe, Nabeyama -, A, Mitamura _ t $, Sano, Yamamoto, and Ichikawa, being away from Japan, had escaped arrest. They secretly formed the new control committee and planned immediate action under the guidance of Moscow.21 The Sixth World Convention of the Comintern, held in Moscow from July to September, 1928, produced yet another thesis for the Japanese party. Conveyed by Ichikawa Sh-oichi P "I E -, who was present at the meetings, this "1928 Thesis" was in effect very like the thesis of the year before, stressing a mass appeal and setting a membership goal of 5,000 members. By February, 1929, some two hundred Communists had rejoined the party and carefully resumed their activity. In April, 1929, this revival was discovered by the vigilant government, and on April 16 a repeat performance of the March 15 incident was staged. This time every major Communist was caught in the net. By April 29 more than two hundred had been imprisoned, and Communist activity in Japan again came to an abrupt halt. The check was only temporary, however, for two months later students from the "Far Eastern Workers' College" in Moscow arrived to lead a third campaign. Along with Tanaka Seigen a; 4 -? ~, who had evaded arrest, they met on July 14 to plan a quiet and cautious move back into action.22 Shifting headquarters to Osaka, which was evidently a more fertile field for organization, the Communist Party began to issue propaganda and to agitate in preparation for the elections of February, 1930. In the Osaka shipyards particularly, the party billboards and slogans were conspicuously posted. These open endeavors, however, provoked the rapid arrest of the persons responsible for the February effort and touched off an intense year-long search by the Tokk6 Ka 4 f ~r.L(Special Higher Police), which jailed more than seven hundred persons in Osaka alone.23
Page 15 JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 15 During this period of the third revival of the so-called "Second Communist Party" significant developments in Communist Party policy and tactics appeared although their application was limited. One outstanding extension of Communist activities was a major drive to include such ostensibly non-political programs as appeals to intellectuals, emphasis on culture and the arts, and further attention to the students. 24 The intensity with which the government attacked those suspected of "dangerous thoughts" and the preponderance of students and intellectuals among those who were arrested vitally affected these groups, creating an atmosphere of caution which discouraged study or possession of Marxist and liberal writings. At the same time, however, many students defied the government, choosing to demonstrate their sincerity by a kind of martyrdom, which was then exploited by the Communist Party to win popular sympathy and support.25 The extreme danger of open activity forced the party to concentrate on propaganda technique, and a "Technique Section" was established. Members of this section worked out a complicated network for spreading literature and posting slogans, plans utilizing automobiles for rapid getaway, and various other strike-and-run methods. For several months after the February arrests, when all major leaders of the Japan Communist Party were behind bars, very little activity on the part of remaining Communists is evident. However, one person and his activities at this time were to become of great importance to the Japan Communist Party in later years. Among those arrested on March 15 was Nosaka Sanzo, the representative of the S5odmei at the formation of the Japan Communist Party in 1922, and prominent leader of the Hyogikai.26 In March, 1930, Nosaka was released from prison under police surveillance for treatment of an eye disorder. By skillfully prolonging the intervals between reports to the police, and with the aid of certain other active Communists, Nosaka slipped out of K6be disguised as a lumber merchant and made his way via Manchuria to Moscow.27 In 1933 when Katayama Sen died, after serving as a member of the Presidium of the Comintern since 1922, Nosaka was elected to fill the vacancy and thus became the number one Japanese Communist. Meanwhile, late in 1930, the Comintern again dispatched a representative, KazamaJokichi AsL i.1 k, to unite the scattered Communist forces in Japan and resume party activity. Kazama, a graduate of the school for party members, and Konno Yojir6 k.s -, 5/ formed a new control committee in January of 1931, with Kazama as chairman and Konno as head of the Politburo.28 Kazama concentrated particularly upon the Nippon Rod6 Kumiai Zenkoku Kyogikai [ * r^jj M+i.-4A - Ik 1[ Tr - I" (All Japan Labor Union Council) at this time and resumed the publication of Akahata,.; after disbanding the Musansha Shimbun. Kazama changed the tactics of the Communist Party of Japan in several significant ways. The Manchurian Incident, the Shanghai Incident, and the May 15 and "Ketsumeidan" 0.. ) affairs, all occurring in the months following Kazama's return to Japan, were considered signs that internal strife in Japan had reached a point where violent revolutionary techniques might be successful. As the first phase of an intensive campaign to raise funds and arm itself the party set up a Military Section to direct special activities within the army and navy. The most notable development in the armed services was the Communist infiltration of the Susaki No.1 Air School, which resulted in the arrest of its commanding officer and precipitated a nation-wide search to root out other Communist elements within the army and navy. 29 Meanwhile Communists also published Heitai no Tomo - A-c F A (The Soldiers Friend) in an attempt to stir up dissatisfaction within the armed forces. The party itself now operated on a new basis, giving active party workers monthly salaries of thirty to one hundred yen per month and financing their hideouts from party funds. Well indoctrinated and trustworthy housekeepers were employed, and every effort was made to main
Page 16 16 BURKE C. PETERSON tain the utmost secrecy about homes and offices occupied by the party leaders. In many ways this dramatic atmosphere surrounding the party reflected the spirit of its youthful new leaders. 30 On the other hand, their wariness did not inhibit action. Despite the well known presence of agents provocateurs within the party during the major period of government oppression, little caution was excercised in admitting new members and a program was planned to allow mass entry into the party and to indoctrinate large groups. 3i This seems to indicate that Communist leaders believed the time was opportune for a mass movement. The elections of February, 1932, reveal the aggressive character of the party at this time. One Communist, Yoshida Yuichi ~ i A, was entered from the Fifth Ward of Tokyo, and attempts were made to enter the names of the imprisoned Sano, Mitamura and Nabeyama on the ballot. This latter move was, of course, abortive. The Final Blow —Mass Trials and Traitors Following the elections, the mass trial of Sano, Mitamura, Tokuda, Ichikawa, and 270 other Communists began on March 31, 1932. The Justice Ministry and the major Communists had agreed on the mass trial procedure and agreed further that the accused might form a panel from their ownnumber to present the Communist case.32 Tokuda and other party leaders welcomed this opportunity to give nation-wide publicity to the party and its objectives, and hoped to make the trial a successful test of party strength. 3 The problem was, however, to align the views of the ten Communist representatives on party doctrine and policy, especially on such crucial questions as sources of authority and ultimate objectives. The lack of unity, however, was immediately apparent. Some wanted to declare the true aims of the party at the cost of martyrdom; others believed that playing down the radical nature of Communism would win them a more rapid release and hasten their return to active work. Between these extremes were various shades of opinion, and the group was soon split into opposing factions. Throughout the trial no one was certain which witnesses were considered responsible. representatives of the party, and the internecine strife, which a few months later resulted in the bolting of several prominent party leaders, was brought dramatically before the public. Interest in the trial became so great that applicants for special spectators' passes often stood in line throughout the night, and special galleries had to be provided for members of the government and persons of rank. To counter the bad publicity, party members who were still free were able to engage in sporadic agitation, a fact which would indicate a certain measure of popular sympathy for the accused. While the trial of major Communists was still in progress, the Comintern prepared another thesis, presumably the work of Nosaka, which was published by the Western European Bureau of the Comintern on May 26, 1932. The "1932 Thesis," closely following,the pattern of the 1927 "Bucharin Thesis," clearly emphasized the double revolution, i.e. a "bourgeois revolution" followedby the "proletarian revolution." A more clearly stated work than the preceding theses, the "1932 Thesis" has remained the basic plan for Communist action in Japan.34 The trial of the major Communists led to various active protests: a May Day demonstration, an "Anti-War" rally on August 1, 1932, an armed conflict known as the "Omori Incident" on October 6, 1932, and a violent strike of the T6ky6 Tramway workers. Again the government conductedanation-wide search for suspected Communists and leftists. The mass arrests took place on October 30, 1932. Attention had been focused upon Atamip $/, where a convention of Communist Party leaders was in progress, and here during the following weeks all major party leaders still at large were arrested along with some 2,200 others. Among those brought
Page 17 JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 17 in were sons and daughters of wealthy parents, as well as persons from all major universities, government ministries, and city offices. By the end of 1932 all major Communist leaders were again in jail, and the government had ended another round of Communist activity. Meanwhile, the non-Communist proletarian movement was undergoing internal and external pressures which forced significant changes. Proletarian groups had split into three major camps over the Manchurian incident. A pro-aggression faction was led by Akamatsu Katsumaro and his Nippon Kokka Shakai T6o e -li 1( 4t (Japan National Socialist Party); Abe Isoo and Suzuki Bunji, leaders of the middle-of-the-road Shakai Taishi To i-ti e n (Social Mass Party), tried to rationalize the necessity for Japan's actions in Manchuria, while the Nippon R6od Kumiai Kaigi 9 * S` ifI M t -t(Japan Labor Union Council) weakly criticized the government for its expenditures.35 Hamada, of the Hamada Seamen's Union, was ousted for publicly supporting the Manchurian Incident, a fact which indicated some resistance within the unions to the nationalistic trend. However, the right-wing Nippon N6min Kumiai (Japan Peasants Union) declared the aggression in Manchuria to be a means of solving Japan's peasant problems, while the centrist Nippon Nomin Sodomei iB * J ^ h f], (Japan Peasants Federation), alsounder Suzuki's leadership, paid lip service to the army's activities. Among the peasants, the famine of 1932 and other economic reverses had increased the number of disputes, many of which were extremely violent. As usual, however, these disputes occurred only in areas of immediate crisis and demands were usually concerned with purely local grievances, such as a need for rice, irrigation, fertilizer, and the like. The voice of the growing militarist faction was particularly effective with the agrarian population. It had two chief messages: peasant difficulties were a result of European oppression; and the only answer was for Japan to expand. Compulsory military training, indoctrination in the village schools, and the activities of reserve army units helped spread and preserve this line of thinking. The military groups relied on pressing emotional appeals to patriotism to quiet the unrest among workers and peasants and to divert popular dissatisfaction. Against Marxism and Communism the militarists laid down a barrage of irrational but effective appeal. Fujisawa CQ3ikao's 4 - Atjtc views expressed in periodicals of the time serve as an excellent example. The revelation of an insidious plot of hundreds of Communists concocted against the very foundations of the Japanese Empire has thrown us into an unprecedented consternation. The paramount danger is Communism, for it strikes at everything that makes Japan what she is. Were it to triumph, Japan would cease to be Japan. The issue between "Japanism" and Communism was decisively settled for a critical number of party members on June 7, 1933, when Nabeyama Sadachika and Sano Manabu issued a joint statement from prison condemning the Communist Party and withdrawing from it. As a result of their stand, some 133 of the 392 other imprisoned Communists also renounced the party.37 The effect upon the nation at large, which had closely watched the trials of these men, was two-fold: believers in the rising national philosophy were spurred to new enthusiasm, while the remaining leftist leaders suffered further disillusionment. The prisoners' statement renouncing Communism made it clear that they were reacting against the foreign or international character of the movement. Their major points were: 1. The present Japan Communist Party is sectarian and no longer the party of the working classes. 2. The Comintern has become increasingly distant from the struggles of labor.
Page 18 18 BURKE C. PETERSON 3. The Comintern is harming the workers and people of Japan by demanding a policy which will lose the war. 4. The Comintern is the organ of Soviet Russia alone. 5. We believe in a one-nation Socialism, not an international organization. 6. We are opposed to the anti-Emperor program of the Communist Party. 7. We believe that Taiwan, Chosen, and Manchuria should be incorporated into the Japanese Socialist state. Enough loyal Communists remained to attack Sano and Nabeyama as "opportunists" who would commit treason against the party in order to gain personal freedom.38 Nevertheless the manifesto of Sano and Nabeyama was followed in November by a similar statement from Kazama, who had moreover just returned from Russia. While the trial of major Communists was in progress, the active leadership of the party was taken over by Miyamoto Kenji 't - As > and Hakamada Satomi* to, W. Hakamada had been in prison since 1928 but was released in 1932; Miyamoto had joined the party for the first time in late 1931. When they assumed leadership, intellectuals and workers within the party were competing bitterly for control. Mutual distrust had bred fears of informers within the party, and members were constantly alert to avoid detection by the militant police. This factional strife reached a crisis in the death of Oizumi Kenz5 A j *_ j^,, allegedly at the hands of his opponents Hakamada and Miyamoto. Although medical autopsy showed no signs that Osumi had died by violence the two Communists were arrested and charged with his murder. A further complication was added by the fact that Osumi was reputed to be in the pay of the okkoi Ka. 39 Miyamoto was given an undesignated sentence, and Hakamada sentenced to thirty years.40 Thus during the period of the trials the party leadership was further weakened. Inasmuch as the sentences at the first Communist trial had been for the most part of undesignated duration, a second public trial was opened in 1935, Sano, Nabeyama, and their followers being tried separately. On October 17, the decision was handed down, sentencing Tokuda, Shiga, Ichikawa and the "loyal" Communists to ten years. Sano, Mitamura, and Nabeyama each received fifteen-year sentences, while some others received slightly lighter sentences than had been imposed in the first trial. The Communist Remnants, 1935-1945 Following the trials of 1935, the operations of the Communist Party in Japan are difficult to follow with precision. It would appear that party remnants were content to work through existing organizations rather than to organize a separate Communist Party. In 1934, a legitimate left-wing group appeared with the formation of the Zenkoku R6od Kumiai Hyogikai (National Labor Union Council), and the Musant6 o *.-;' (Proletarian Party), both under the leadership of Kat5 Kanjiiu o tiJ -t. Lowered wages and the increased military budget during 1935-1936 had made labor especially restive. At this time, it is interesting to note, Kat6 called for a "popular front" against war expenditures and for moderation of the China policy. Kato, though not a Communist, was the major political leader to carry out 4te tactics developed in the Seventh World Convention of the Comintern in the summer of 1936.
Page 19 JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 19 The elections of 1936 focused sharply upon the issue of fascism, and popular peace demonstrations on the part of the Shakai Taishu T5 brought fifteen new Diet seats in February. In all probability, this increased popular reaction helped precipitate the February 26 incident a few days later. Again inthe elections of April, 1937, fascism was a major issue. While leftist strength was apparently increasing, the military extremists again struck by attacking the Marco Polo Bridge in China, and again Japan seemed to be united by a national emergency. On the following day, July 8, a few Communists demonstrated and spread leaflets protesting against the China Incident, but they were quickly dispersed. In December, 1937, four hundred suspected leftists were arrested, including Arahata Kanson and Yamakawa Hitoshi, a Socialist since his bolting of the Communist Party. The Hyogikai and Musant5 were immediately dissolved. Nosaka, in Moscow, admitted that the "popular front" in Japan had been a failure, and that moderate trade union leaders had gone over to fascism.43 The National Mobilization Law of March, 1938, brought the government into the field of labor with the formation of the Sangyo Hokoku Kai it V tL t- (Society for Rendering National ServiceThrough Industry). 1940 saw the endof political parties and the abolition of labor unions. The Taisei YokusanKai AC.i-. i,t (IRAA) absorbed one and all. In 1940 one obscure Communist was arrested while forming a preparatory committee for the revival of the Communist Party. From then on, the war seems to have diverted all efforts from the leftist camps. Outside of Japan, the activities of a handful of Japanese Communists gained the attention and admiration of the Allied nations. Nosaka Sanzo, evidently impressed by the successful activities of Kaji Wataru& HP. V and his anti-war propaganda in central China, travelled toYenan from Moscow after the dissolution of the Comintern. There he began to organize activities to indoctrinate Japanese prisoners of war taken by the Communist Eighth Route Army and to train men to carry on front-line propaganda campaigns. He was joined by Sawada Jun-, 4e, a Communist who had managed to leave Japan in 1943. In January of 1944 the "Japanese Peoples Emancipation League" was organized. The activities of this group have been discussed at length by various American correspondents who visited Yenan during 1944-1945. The importance of the organization lies, of course, in its effectiveness in training Communist leaders for postwar Japan, a subject which has not been given extensive study.45 Conclusions We have reviewed briefly the history of the Japan Communist Party prior to the end of World War II, and noted its significant activities, programs and policies during this period. To evaluate properly the significance of the Communist Party during this period and analyse its effect upon the political scene as a whole is infinitely more difficult. In terms of the entire panorama of Japanese internal politics from 1920 to 1945 this position and influence would seem small indeed. In strength of numbers, for instance, it is doubtful that the Japan Communist Party at any time exceeded several hundred members. Yet the influence of this Communist hard core upon the Japanese proletarian movement was far more than these numbers would indicate. As has been pointed out above, the early Communists were of sufficient influence to form their own labor and peasant groups and, through their militant activity, to have led in the development of the entire leftist movement in Japan. As a training ground for the leader
Page 20 20 BURKE C. PETERSON ship of Japan's left-wing parties, the party had no peer. The names connected with the early Communist movement and later periods of party activity are yet prominent in Japanese political and intellectual circles. Perhaps the most general result of the formation of the Japanese Communist Party was negative in that it hastened the growth of reaction within the Japanese government and encouraged right-wing extremists outside of the government to take matters into their own hands. Unrest of the agrarian and proletarian populace in large measure forced the expansionist factions to create the diversion of a national emergency. Communism also had a negative effect upon the more conservative elements of the proletarian movement as well. Many Communist demands, as abhorrent to conservative labor and peasant leaders as to the government, provided a major target for Japanese Government reaction, and thus forced other proletarian elements to retreat and go on the defensive to avoid inclusion in the Communist realm. The radicalism of the Communist Party so tainted the whole proletarian movement thatthe milder Socialists, who might otherwise have been successful, were forced to abandon their programs. It was simple to see in all forms of liberal thought the spectre of Communism, and thus create a mistrust of any political opposition. Communist activity in the period under discussion thus repeats a common pattern. A strong Communist program geared to mass unrest brings about government oppression of the left and full scale attempts to eradicate its leaders and influence. Leaders of the more moderate leftwing factions are forced to become conservative andcautious, moving toward the right. Extreme rightist factions, following the general trend, obtain more influence and control. With each revolution of the wheel more of the left is eliminated until, after a decade and one-half in Japan, the left was all but eradicated, the center had become almost entirely right of the center line, and the ultra- right stood alone in control. About conditions within the Communist Party itself many general observations may be made. Constantly present were the elements of factionalism and sub-factionalism, which, as we have observed, prevented the formation of a united Communist Party except during limited periods of time. This factional tendency was carried beyond the party, vitally affecting the proletarian movement as a whole. The factional rifts reflected more than the usual Bolshevist-Menshevist, Stalinist-Trotskyite splits, having the added ingredient so common to political Japan of personal loyalties and "bossism.(" Yet tenacity and determination of the Communist Party to persevere under obvious hardship was remarkable. This will and determination to continue is attributable to two major factors. First was the sincerity of party leaders and their belief in their moral positions, giving them a sense of destiny and faith in ultimate victory so great that they accepted personal martyrdom. Secondly was the contribution of leadership and support from abroad. The role of the Communist International in the development and program of the Japan Communist Party must not be underestimated. As we have seen, it was the Comintern which organized the Japan Communist Party, carried it through the various periods of ideological strife, reconstructed the party time and time again after its dissolution, provided spiritual leadership, and afforded refuge to its leaders through the war period. The failure of Communism in Japan may be attributed to a number of basic reasons. It was, in the first place, a form of Western thought which came to Japan at a time when Western political thought had reached an apex and was on the verge of decline. It embodied ideas which were most feared by Japan's leaders in a period when all manner of Western liberal thought was suspect, and it met head-on the development of an ultra-right pattern of national thinking.
Page 21 JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 21 The foreign character of Communism was thus a great detriment. Since it was not only foreign but Russian the opposition had little difficulty in persuading the average Japanese that Communism represented the dual threat of a foreign ideology aimed against Japan's national structure, and of a weapon wielded by Japan's traditional military enemy. But Communism was a victim also of the general inmaturity of Japanese political thinking. Political apathy, ever present in Japan, protected the status quo, making the task of a deviationist group infinitely more difficult. Complete lack of understanding of the political potentialities of an electorate presented difficulties for even the conservative governments. The more extreme views under such a situation had little or no prospect of success. This, above all, has been the greatest task of political parties in Japan, and the greatest challenge to liberal thinking.
Page 22 22 BURKE C. PETERSON Notes 1. See Shiga Yoshio: k. t, Nippon Kakumei Undo Shi no Hitobito 0 $*A-_t - e AR (People in the History of the Japanese Revolutionary Movement), Tokyo, 1948; Noguchi Yoshiaki f' rv t. A, Musan Und5 Soto Shi Den Je. _ +f l1 }4t t (Biographies of leaders of the Proletarian Struggle), T6ky6, 1931. 2. The organizations represented were the Suiy6 Kai, Mokuyo Kai, Shomin Kai fi,-,, and Shinjin Kai, including such men as Yamakawa Hitoshi, Arahata Kanson, Tokuda Kyuichi, Sakai Toshihikoj*-4j, and Shiga Yoshio. In addition, the Suiheisha, Tokei Kumiai, and R6od5 Sodomei (Yuaikai) were represented by Hashiura TokioT 51 ' 0atKi, Kishino Shigeharu and Nosaka Sanzo, respectively. Smaller independent groups were represented by Nabeyama SadachikaV 5 a,A, Nakamura Yoshiaki t;t k. 8 A and Sano Manabu. Both Tokuda and Nosaka had just returned from Moscow. See Tokuda Kyuichi and Shiga Yoshio, Gokuchi Juhachi Nen J-iC t A. - (Eighteen Years in Prison), Toky6, 1946, pp. 31-34. Cf. Nosaka Sanz5, Bomei Jfroku Nen tj t ' - (Sixteen Years in Exile), T6kyo, 1948, p. 6, and Noguchi Yoshiaki, op. cit., pp. 384-385. 3. Nippon Ky6sant6 T5shi Shiry6 Iinkai 9E A; X J. 0, - $., t (Japan Communist Party Historical Documents Committee). Nippon Mondai Ni Kansuru Hoshin Sho —Ketsugishii E t4A,, l - PRt ' 3 -': ' t 't (Policy Papers and Collection of Decisions Concerning the Japan Problem), unpublished. 4. Communist International, Fourth Congress, Petrograd and Moscow, 1922. Communist Party of Great Britain, 1923. 5. It is interesting to note, however, that Shiga himself served his period of military service shortly thereafter. See Tokuda Kyiiichi - Shiga Yoshio, op. cit. 6. Ichikawa Sh6ichi, Nippon Ky6sant6 T6os Sh6shi 9 4 - j '. JI 'I'.t (Short History of the Struggle of the Japan Communist Party), Tokyo, 1948, pp. 66-67. 7. Noguchi Yoshiaki, op. cit., p. 386. 8. Harry Emerson Wildes, Social Currents in Japan, Chicago, 1927; p. 129. 9. Ichikawa Sh6ichi, op. cit., pp. 75-76. 10. Ichikawa Shoichi wrote in 1931 that this decision was "railroaded" by a limited group which had called a meeting of only those holding like views. There is little other evidence, however, that the majority of Communist leaders did not agree with this decision at the time. It seems likely that Ichikawa, with the benefit of hindsight,found it convenient to explain this decision as party sabotage to cover the wavering discipline of the party leaders atthat time. See Ichikawa Sh6ichi, op. cit., pp. 78-82. Present at the above meeting were Sano Manabu, Tokuda Kyiiichi, Ichikawa Sh6ichi, Watanabe Seinosuke, Arahata Kanson and Nosaka Sanzo. Mori Sh6z5 V _,A Fisetsu no Hi )L 0 9- (Tombstone in the Snow), Toky6, 1946, p. 24.
Page 23 JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 23 11. Kawakami later joined the Communist Party. Communists now relate that during the period when they were not organized as a party, they employed the R6d6 N6min T6 as a front and as a "link with the masses" through which to carry on an offensive against the more conservative labor groups. 12. Labor disputes jumped sharply from 293 in 1925 to 495 in 1926, while tenant disputes went over the 2,000 mark in both 1925 and 1926 as compared to only 408 disputes in 1920. The formation of peasant unions showed a marked growth, reaching a total of 3,926,organizations in 1926 as compared to 293 in 1918. Unemployment continued to mount during 1926, hitting day laborers the hardest, and affecting heavy industry in general. See the Japan Year Book, 1928, pp. 258-259. 13. Genk6 H6rei Shuran S/i-;{- I, II, bk. X, p. 17, as cited in Kenneth Colegrove, "Proletarian Parties in Japan", American Political Science Review, Vol. 23, May 1929, p. 341. 14. It is well to note, however, the extremely small membership of the Communist "group" at this time, in order to assess properly the relationship of the Communists to the proletarian movement as a whole. Ichikawa reports that there were approximately 100 members of the Communist party at the time of the group organization in 1924, and that the goal desired by 1926 was 300 members. 15. Yanson was evidently careless in the handling of his funds, for he was recalled to Russia when his payment of $ 10,000 to the Hy6gikai for a strike fund was discovered and given wide publicity. After Yanson's recall the jurisdiction of Voitinsky, head of the Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai, was extended to include Japan. See David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East, New Haven, 1948, p. 46. 16. Fukumoto's views were obviously contrary to Lenin's essay "Left-Wing Communism,and Infantile Disorder," written in 1920. See Committee on Foreign Affairs, "One Hundred Years of Communism, 1848-1948." The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, Supplement I, (House Doc. 619 80th Cong., 2d Session), pp. 34-64. 17. Nippon Ky5sant5 T6shi Shiry6 Iinkai, op. cit., pp. 7-28. 18. Ichikawa Sh5ichi, op. cit., p. 135. 19. Colegrove, op. cit., pp. 346-347. 20. Mori, op. cit.? p. 41. 21. Ichikawa andYamamoto had been in Moscow attending the Sixth Congress of the Comintern. Nabeyama, Mitamura -- W t, and Sano were in Shanghai awaiting instructions from Moscow. Watanabe, however, was detained in Formosa en route to Japan, and fearing arrest, committed suicide. 22. Tanaka had escaped imprisonment in the "March 15 Incident" by outrunning the police on a Yokohama dock and remaining in hiding for many months thereafter. Mori, op. cit., pp. 89-90. 23. Noguchi, op. cit., p. 393. 24. Amongthe artists reputedly sympathetic to the Communist cause at this time was Kataoka Teppei ) ^J A.-4,, producer of the Takarazukaf st productions. Noguchi, op. cit., p. 394.
Page 24 24 BURKE C. PETERSON 25. The sincerity of many students in opposing the national trend during the early thirties must be admired, particularly when it is rememberedthat the loss of a university degree in Japan meant almost sure loss of career in almost any field. 26. Nosaka was rich in Communist Party experience, having attended the formation of the British Communist Party as a delegate from a LondonDistrict in 1919, following which he studied in Moscow for a short period. See Nosaka Sanz6, Bomei Juroku Nen (Sixteen Years in Exile), Toky6, 1946, pp. 4-6. 27. Ibid., pp. 13-15. 28. Also active at this time were Iwata Yoshimichi 3 ^ sL, Tanaka Tameshichi / 4.j -~, Nagakuki Shoichi, Miyakawa Toraro 'T "' IAl, Hasegawa Shigeru -&b-"I A, and Kodama Shizuko L _. -i -. 29. The major Communist was Kajima Shujir, a director of the air school involved. Mori, op. cit., p. 71. 30. Both Konno and Kazama were in their twenties. 31. According to the Communist International the informers were Aiwa and Kato in 1928, Maniwe (sic) in 1930, and Momose in October, 1932. Communist International No. 24, pp. 56-57, Dallin, op. cit., p. 48. 32. The ten elected to the panel were Sano, Ichikawa, Tokuda, Sugiura, Kokury6 oi k, Shiga Takahashi, Nakao, Mitamura, and Nabeyama. Tokuda-Shiga, op. cit., pp. 60-61. 33. Tokuda-Shiga, ibid., pp. 60-61. 34. Nippon Kyosan Toshi Shiry6 Iinkai, Nippon Kyosanto ni Kansuru Kettei Shi oyobi Hoshin Sho 1 4t f i' t i -5 t At 4:1 $ At (Collection of Decisions and Policy Papers Concerning the Japan Communist Party), Toky6, 1947, (unpublished). It is interesting to note that this thesis was reputed to have been translated into Japanese by Kawakami Hajime, a new member of the party at that time. See Mori, op. cit., p. 255. 35. Suzukiaccompanied Matsuoka4t 1A l to the League of Nations and later travelled in Europe and the United States presenting Japan's position to labor. He lost much popularity within the Shakai Taishi T6 upon his return. 36. Fujisawa Chikao, Japanese and Oriental Political Philosophy, Tokyo, 1935, pp. 1, 180. 37. Mori, op. cit., p. 77. 38. Sano and Nabeyama were not released as a result of their statement. That both were convinced of their errors in embracing Communism would seem to be borne out by their activities in postwar Japan. Sano is presently engaged in the activities of Kazama's Minshii Zenei D6mei ^, q AJ] 1$T &r _. (People's Vanguard League), a nationalist-tinged group. Nabeyama, along with several other ex-Communists, is centering his efforts in anti-Communist trade union activities. It is interesting to note on the Emperor question that Sano was a dissenter in the first policy meeting of the Japan Communist Party in 1933, voicing his objection to the anti-Emperor system platform. See Tokuda-Shiga, op. cit., p. 33. 39. Mori, op. cit., pp. 75.
Page 25 JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 25 40. Both were released by SCAP in October, 1945. 41. The heavier sentence given to the group which bolted the party is misleading. Actually, the ten-year sentences carried an additional unspecified term which made release of this group at any time improbable. 42. Delegates from Japan were Tanaka and Nishikawa, (probably pseudonyms). 43. Kommunistichesky Internatsional (1938), No. 11, p. 91, as cited in Dallin, op. cit., p. 51. 44. See Harrison Forman, Report From Red China, New York, 1945. 45. The writer can recall no major Communist active in Japan during 1946-1947 who was a member of the JPEL. It may be that the majority of JPEL leaders were not repatriated, but were sent to the various indoctrination centers throughout Siberia to work with the unrepatriated prisoners of war yet in Soviet hands.
The Tokugawa Bakufu and the Merchant Class
John Whitney Hallpp. 26-34
Page 26 THE TOKUGAWA BAKUFU AND THE MERCHANT CLASS* John Whitney Hall It is impossible to study the history of the Tokugawa period (1600-1868) without being impressed by the importance of the economic factor in determining the destiny of the Japanese feudal regime. The writings in English of Honjo, N. Skene Smith, Takekoshi, Takizawa, Tsuchiyal and others have described in considerable detail the remarkable commercial growth of the Tokugawa era and have charted the spread of pre-capitalist money economy which contained the seeds of destruction of the feudal order. The great merchants of Edo and Osaka had, by the middle of the eighteenth century, so expanded their power and influence that the entire economy of the land responded to their touch, while the feudal authorities were so in debt to them that they dared not incur their displeasure. Thus it would seem that Japan's rise to a capitalistic world power after the Meiji Restoration of 1868 was the inevitable outcome of the pressure of economic forces having their origin in the Tokugawa period. While this view is certainly true in a general sense, it is nevertheless significant to note that none of the writers cited above carries the study of Japanese capitalistic development sufficiently into the Meiji period to verify it or to explain the mechanics of merchant participation in the Restoration. Had they done so, as a number of more recent Japanese scholars have,2 they would discover that the apparent continuity between Tokugawa economic growth and Meiji constitutional and capitalistic development requires considerable qualification. Politically and socially, for instance, the commercial class played a surprisingly minor role in the momentous years on either side of the Meiji Restoration. The Restoration itself could hardly be described as a bourgeois revolution. Though it had many hidden bourgeois elements, and Tokugawa bourgeoisie had little direct influence in obtaining them. Even economically, the development of Meiji capitalism appears to show little direct relationship with the main current of Tokugawa commercial activity. Thus despite the remarkable growth of pre-capitalist economy in Tokugawa Japan the old style merchants of that period remained politically and economically backward. Though the "penetration of money economy" formed a leaven for change in 19th century Japan, the chief bearers of that economy failed to become an anti-feudal force of any consequence. Rather, they remained resigned to the feudal regime and relinquished, in the crucial years following the opening of Japan's ports in 1858, the political and entrepreneurial leadership which should have been theirs. This is not to deny that without the active cooperation of certain segments of the mercantile class the samurai leaders of the Restoration could not have accomplished their purpose or that without a broad pre-capitalist foundation the economic policies of the Meiji government could hardly have succeeded. The Meiji Restoration was accomplished essentially by a coalition of feudal forces with the city merchants and commercialized country gentry, or,to use Norman's phrase, by a "feudal-merchant alliance." But it should be pointed out that this alliance had both an active and passive phase: passive in that the merchant class as a whole remained dependentuponthe feudal regime, active only in that certain sectors of the merchant class joined * Based on a paper read at the Annual Meeting of the Far Eastern Association, Ann Arbor, April 12, 1950. 26
Page 27 TOKUGAWA MERCHANT CLASS 27 directly with the feudal administration to engage in state-operated businesses or to add business experience to feudal financial administration. The active phase was largely a feature of certain fringe areas of commercial development where direct contact between feudal government and business activity was strongest and where innovations were most likely to appear. The main line of Tokugawa mercantile development characterized by the great kabu-nakama 4t!,qkPM guilds of Edo and Osaka was not part of the active alliance. By the 1850's these groups, which dominate the scene in the studies of Tokugawa economic growth, had become stagnant economically, while politically they remained attached to feudal conditions. In the years which followed the reopening of the country, they were destroyed along with the bakufu and the daimyo system. The revolutionary economic development which took place after the Restoration was the work, not of the old mercantile class, but of upstarts drawn from the samurai or the rural gentry. It is this subtle but revolutionary shift within the capitalistic class which is lost sight of by the writers who terminate their studies at the end of the Tokugawa period. Several obvious reasons may be cited for the backwardness of the Tokugawa bourgeoisie. The kabu-nakama merchants, in the first place, had become so enmeshed in the feudal system, so reliant upon feudal privileges, that they became politically identified with the feudal class and economically unable to adapt to the new competitive environment created by the opening of the ports. Furthermore their adjustment to the feudal economy had been such that the scope and nature of business in which they engaged was unsuited to rapid conversion to industrialized, capitalistic enterprise. Despite the relative wealth of the Tokugawa merchants, their ventures were limited by the size of the country and the restrictions placed upon them by the feudal government. Capital accumulation remained small, decentralized, and largely of commercial origin. Built upon the premise of a feudal peasantry as the chief producing class, it could not be immediately transformed to modern productive capital. Hence the kabu-nakama, while carrying forward the commercial development of Japan, were by-passed in the end, just as the anti- Tokugawa feudal aristocracy were by-passed by the young samurai leaders. Fundamentally the Tokugawa guild merchants were as feudal as the daimyo, a fact which becomes easily understandable when we look into the environment in which the kabu-nakama matured. The Tokugawa regime presented to the merchant class a strange mixture of conditions both favorable and unfavorable to growth. First of all it will be remembered that the Tokugawa period represented a final, vigorous phase of rule by the military elite in Japan. For two and a half centuries after 1600, Japan continued to be dominated by a self-conscious military caste, extremely jealous of its special privileges. The administration of the shogun and daimy6 combinedto give Japan a militaristic, absolute rule characterized by repressive laws and extreme insistence on discipline and regimentation. Of more specific consequence to the merchant class was the fact that the warrior-aristocrat, the bushi or samurai, was historically a man of the soil. His economic and social attitudes were distinctly anti-mercantile. The merchant, whose function it was to handle money, was thus treated with contempt. This attitude of disdain paved the way for the application of Confucian social concepts through which the subordinate position of the merchant was eventually rationalized and institutionalized. Tokugawa law, as it applied to the merchant, placed him at the bottom of the social hierarchy and denied him or his property any semblance of protection. The repressive nature of Tokugawa society was further accentuated by the adoption of the national policy of exclusion. Although this policy was the outcome of political rather than economic causes, it had the effect of confirming Japan's feudal rulers in their course of agrarian self-sufficiency at the same time that it drastically reduced the sphere of the merchant's activity and independence. Seclusion cut the merchant off from foreign trade and threw him back upon his own small undeveloped domestic market where he was at the mercy of the still vigorous feudal administration. Furthermore, by removing Japan from the current of world
Page 28 28 JOHN W. HALL development, seclusion kept from the Japanese the stimulus of intellectual and technological progress which might have brought more rapid modernization. Instead the strength of feudal institutions was perpetuated far beyond normal expectancy; Tokugawa society became ingrown and stagnant, and the tendency to formalism, hereditary controls, and adherence to precedent was carried to extremes. On the other hand the Tokugawa regime presented the merchant with certain auspicious conditions for growth. The large Tokugawa domains, which included the major cities, brought under unified administration the greater portion of the land and permitted unimpaired commercial activity on a nearly nation-wide scale. In addition, a unified currency, ample communications, and long years of peace encouraged a rising standard of living. In the final analysis, however, it was the nature of feudal economy itself, in particular the nature of the relationship of the ruling class to its source of revenue, which worked to the advantage of the merchants. The military aristocracy in Tokugawa times differed from the bushi of previous feudal periods by being concentrated in cities widely separated from the land which supported them. In this way an economic anomaly was created. The Tokugawa bushi became dependent upon the merchants as middlemen, a service group bridging the gap between city and countryside, between the consuming and producing segments of society. Thus like it or not, the ruling class made the merchant its economic ally, while the merchant found in the warrior class his chief market. It was in this context of fundamental distrust, but also of practical need for cooperation, that the Tokugawa merchant grew up, and this particular set of positive and negative conditions which fashioned the merchant community of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is not within the scope of this paper to enlarge upon all the many formative factors which have just been alluded to, but rather to concentrate upon one of pivotal importance: the relationship of the bakufu to the merchant class. For since it was in the shogunal cities of Edo and Osaka that the great Tokugawa guilds flourished, the bakufu from the first had a preponderant hand in the fashioning of the feudal environment of the merchant class. Bakufu policy with respect to the commercial class passed through three distinct phases. There was first an early period, continuing until 1721, which was largely a carry-over from the years of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi. This phase was characterized by an official policy of free trade which stemmed from the desire of the feudal rulers to break up the medieval mercantile associations and turn commerce to their own advantage. Nobunaga and other feudal barons had been active in breaking the restraining hold of the early guilds, or za, and had encouraged the patronage of free markets set up in their castle towns. This policy of relative leniency (which, it should be emphasized, was not conceived purely for the benefit of the merchants) was continued under the first Tokugawa rulers. Early Tokugawa edicts spoke out against guilds and other types of restraining organizations. The merchants of Ky6to and Osaka were bountifully treatedby the Tokugawa authorities. Moreover, under the theory that commerce was basically an unproductive occupation, the merchant class did not suffer the systematic and crushing taxes which burdened the peasantry. So also the daily lives of the city dwellers, though circumscribed, were not subject to the excessive restrictions imposed upon the peasant class. While the official policy of the first century of Tokugawa rule was relatively liberal, it must be admitted that the actual conditions of the time were not conducive to commercial freedom. The seclusion restrictions in particular circumscribed the merchant, brought him under feudal law and exposed him to the frequently arbitrary action of the feudal rulers. Furthermore, in a closed economy, the limit of free commercial expansion was easily reached. Thus before long the merchant began to desire the creation of protective and self-regulative organizations. And this resulted in the formation of new guilds and associations generally called nakama. Though not direct descendants of the earlier za, the nakama represented a return to feudal regulation of commercial activity.
Page 29 TOKUGAWA MERCHANT CLASS 29 Nakama, except for a few found useful to the authorities for police purposes, were at first not recognized by the bakufu. But as time went on the official attitude changed, largely as the result of certain economic problems which forced themselves on the attention of the feudal rulers after the beginning of the eighteenth century. During the first century of Tokugawa administration the merchant prospered. This prosperity in itself would have occasioned little concern had it not been paralleled by a general economic deterioration of the other classes. In simplest terms the problem was a matter of supply and demand. As population began to press upon production, the people as a whole began to suffer. As extra sources of feudal income, such as that from mines and foreign trade, began to dry up, the Tokugawa rulers began to run into serious financial difficulties. The eyes of the country thus turned toward the one class which appearedto be sucking prosperity from both the warrior and the peasantry, and the bakufu began to reconsider its policy toward the merchant. Eighteenth century Japan produced in great abundance learned treatises which offered solutions to the economic crisis. These studies, written for the most part by scholars and officials of the feudal administration, presented to the bakufu two widely differing alternatives. One group, by far the more vocal, attempted to apply Confucian theory to the current scene. Ignoring possibilities of expansion of national income through trade, these writers put their faith in an agrarian economy in which the ideal situation was for the agricultural producers to be many and diligent and the consuming class few and frugal. They saw in the past an ideal had not contaminated military morale. Accordingly, this group urged three lines of action. First, they advised resettling the warrior class on the land, a policy which they believed would eliminate the merchant and place the bushi back in idyllic rural surroundings. Second, they advocated a policy of direct suppression of the merchant class, especially by the application of price controls and restrictions on interest rates and profit taking. Third, they urged the necessity of building up national and regional self-sufficiency. Balancing this group of conservative theorists was another school of more realistic thinkers who called for a recognition of the productive nature of commerce. They argued that profit from commerce and usury was not necessarily different from the warrior's rice income and should not be despised merely because it took the shape of money. They urged that such profit be turned to the advantage of the feudal rulers. As a means of achieving this end they conceived of a program of a mercantilist nature in which the merchant would be encouraged, protected, and taxed. Wealth was to be drained from him by state controlled monopolies, guilds under government charter, and forced loans. It is significant that both these lines of theory stemmed from a basically anti-merchant conviction. They both urged upon the government the creation of commercial organizations, the one in order to control the merchant, the other to make possible the extraction of profit from commerce. Furthermore, it is of interest to note that both of these policies could more readily be carried out in the smaller feudal domain than on a national level. Thus the mid-Tokugawa period is known for the appearance of a number of model domains in which the accepted ideas of frugality and feudal paternalism brought prosperity to all, while the late Tokugawa periodis characterized by the successful operation of mercantilist policies on a domain basis, especially in those domains of south and western Japan. But the bakufu, whose fundamental concern had to be the over-all economic stability of the country, was faced with economic forces too large to handle by either policy. Though it attempted both it succeeded in neither. The second century of the Tokugawa period constituted a second phase in the official policy towards the merchant, during which commercial organization matured under government sponsorship. Enunciating this new policy was the eighth shogun, Yoshimune, the first of the shogun actively to face the economic difficulties which were closing in upon the feudal regime.
Page 30 30 JOHN W. HALL Yoshimune,who succeeded to the shogunate in 1716, was basically a conservative, having spent his early career as daimy6 of the Kii domain. His policies stemmed largely from the Confucian fundamentalist school, though he had to his credit a liberal capacity for military pragmatism. In the economic realm he strove for both a general increase in national productivity and a decrease in consumption. The first he accomplished by encouragement of land reclamation and the cultivation of new food-producing plants such as the sweet potato and sugar cane. The secondhe sought to accomplish by legislation to effect strenuous economy and by insistence upon the military virtues of self-sacrifice and frugality. In the course of his reforms Yoshimune was brought to recognize the usefulness of commercial organizations as a way of controlling price fluctuations and of enforcing economy. It was for this reason that in 1721 Yoshimune gave official recognition to the merchant guilds. His decree of this year is of special importance in that it set the basic conditions for the development of mercantile organizations for over a hundred years. Under its provisions guilds were not only sanctionedbut were required in those fields of business not previously organized. Here was the origin of the great kabu nakama, or chartered guilds, which shortly extended their control over the entire field of Tokugawa commercial activity. Like the previous za, these monopoly organizations cut out competition, set prices, and limited membership. Such privileges were recognized and guaranteed by the bakufu in return for payment of a fee, myoga kin o. obakufu minister Tanuma Okitsugu held sway in Edo. During the three decades from 1760-1787, known in Japanese history as the Tanuma period, the Tokugawa government vigorously followed the policy of mercantile encouragement. In order to bolster its weakening finances, the bakufu sought to multiply state monopolies and sold an unprecedented number of tax-bearing charters to merchant guilds. It was during these decades that the famous Twenty-four Guilds (Nijushigumi Donya -- t r.L A oi f 4 ) of Osaka came into existence. Tanuma enunciated a policy which might have carried the bakufu beyond its dependence upon a strict feudal economy to a situation more nearly resembling that of European mercantilism, in which the merchants would have had a new and secure place and the basis of taxation would be shifted from land to trade. But Tanuma failed to break through the feudal premises upon which his society was based. In the first place he failed to put the fiscal relationship between the bakufu and the merchants on an impersonal and legal basis. Rather, the whole matter continued to be worked out on a personal level in which merchants were granted favors in terms of monopoly-charters in return for monetary contributions. On the merchant's side, guilds and wholesalers paid, not according to their capacities, but on a price-haggling basis. On the side of the shogunate, mercantile taxes were never accepted as legitimate government revenue. Funds from this source continued to be treated as extraordinary income along with the profit from currency debasement. In other words Tanuma failed to establish moral acceptance of his realistic policy. This failure was illustrated by the extensive private corruption which attended the conduct of affairs between the bakufu financial office and the merchants. Tanuma failed secondly because the mercantilist policy which he envisaged could not succeed in a state of national seclusion. Although he managed to increase the Nagasaki trade, and although he toyed with the idea of opening up new trade ventures with the Russians, he could not force the abandonment of the exclusion policy. Thus the attempt to enrich the state through taxes on commerce brought additional burdens in the end upon an already impoverished people. Ageneralriseinpricescreatednation-widedistress. Whenin 1786-7 a series of poor harvests, natural calamities, and famines struck the country, resentment was heaped on Tanuma. He and his party were swept out of the bakufu and reaction, under Matsudaira Sadanobu, set in.
Page 31 TOKUGAWA MERCHANT CLASS 31 Sadanobu, whose personal animosity to Tanuma was such that he at one point had considered assassinating him, systematically suppressed Tanuma's schemes and substituted a policy derived from the Confucian-minded fundamentalists. He began by issuing strenuous frugality measures, went on to dissolve numerous state and private monopolies, to nullify contracts of foreign trade commitments at Nagasaki, and to retract sword-wearing privileges for certain merchants. He placed the business community under restrainingorders and price-fixing laws, and finally struck consternation into the merchants by ordering a general cancellation of samurai debts. But though Sadanobu was backed in his policies by the best of Confucian theory, even he could not go as far as helikedin the direction which he proposed. After his brief attempt at reform, the bakufu slid back to its policy of keeping solvent by coinage debasement and the unsystematic squeezing of the merchant class. Thus despite many vicissitudes commercial organizations grew during the 18th century. This growth at first represented a continuing increase in volume and quality of goods and services handled. But, as we approach the 19th century, the restrictive aspects of the guilds became more and more pronounced. Controls on free business activity, and on membership, as well as the practice of deliberate price raising in order to pass the myoga off on the public, brought increased resentment against the kabu-nakama. Such tactics, which signalized the growing fossilization of the Tokugawa merchant class, in the end aroused the bakufu to drastic action. In 1842 Mizuno Tadakuni, as part of his ill-fated reform, attempted to revert to a preYoshimune economic policy. In order to put a stop to rising prices he determined to sacrifice the entire state revenue derived from merchant taxation. In one stroke he dissolved all guilds and monopolies and went back to the earlier policy of unrestricted trade. His scheme, as might be expected, ended in disaster, for when the great transport guilds ceased operations, the entire distribution system of Tokugawa Japan collapsed. In 1851 the guilds were reinstated, but bakufu policy towards the merchant continued hostile. The mercantilist policy of the middle period under which the kabu-nakama had thrived was never revived. Instead, during theremaining years of the bakufu's existence, merchants led an increasingly precarious existence under the interfering hand of the government, subjected to the crushing demands of forced loans and the uncertainties of a constantly fluctuating currency. The 1842 abolition of the guilds marked the beginning of the third phase in the bakufu relationship to the merchant class. It also heralded the end of power for the kabu-nakama, for though the guilds were brought back in name their position was never the same. After 1851 the old guilds never regained their ability to raise prices to passontite government fee. Furthermore, during the period of abolition, merchants outside the kabu-nakama system were given the opportunity to forge ahead. With the opening of ports to foreign trade in 1858 the kabunakama system quickly passed out of existence. In the new ports, new commercial practices and new economic necessities made obsolete the older merchant guilds. Osaka and Edo gradually lost their places as the centers of commercial activity. A new class of traders outside the city guild system and in more direct touch with the rural productive centers emerged to take over foreign trade. In the domains and in the Tokugawa territories new strategic considerations brought about the active participation of samurai in industrial enterprises. These new and flexible associations became the basis of Meiji capitalistic development, while the political convictions developed by the so-called "business samurai" became the leading sentiments of the Restoration. To conclude, then, we find several factors combining to limit the enterprise and political developmentof the merchant in Tokugawa times. A crucial factor was the continued domination of the feudal ruling class, made possible largely by the existence of economic isolation. Thus throughout the Tokugawa period the attitude of the ruling authorities played an inordinately large part in determining the position and scope of activity of the merchant class. This official attitude, we saw, after the beginning of the 18th century was calculated to stunt the independent
Page 32 32 JOHN W. HALL growth of the merchants. Although bakufu action stemmed from two widely divergent theoretical bases, in actuality both policies worked to the detriment of the merchant. Positively, the feudal administration placed the merchant under an elaborate system of restriction and controls, kept from him the possibility of foreign outlets and by constant government interference denied him normal entrepreneurial opportunities. Negatively, it failed to extend to the merchant recognition appropriate to his wealth or to supply him with an impersonal, uniform commercial law either for protective or taxation purposes. As a result the commercial class was forced to seek security on what was essentially an extra-legal basis by the formation of mutual protective groups or by compromising with the feudal system. In the first instance merchants organized themselves into guilds for defensive purposes. The official recognition of these guilds was a matter of convenience to the authorities. As a consequence, after the first century of Tokugawa rule, there occurred a rapid refeudalization of economic activity. The business world became encased in organizational controls of a confining and hereditary nature. It was largely due to the strength of these self-made controls that the main body of the merchant class found itself unable to take advantage of the free competitive environment of post-Restoration Japan. In the second instance we find merchants, both individually and collectively, seeking to identify themselves with or to secure protective alliances with the ruling interests. This was apparent in a number of separate ways: for instance, in the way in which large banking houses in Edo and Osaka continued to act as financial backers of the shogun and daimyo; in the extensive development of state and domain enterprises in which the merchants subordinated their business know-how to feudal management; finally, in the manner in which the most ambitious merchants, rather than opposing the feudal ruling class attempted to gain admittance to bushi ranks. Hence the most progressive merchant leadership was drained off and became identified with the ruling group itself. Thus the Tokugawa merchant, in reacting to the repressive conditions of feudal military rule and to the limitations imposed upon him by the exclusion policy, entered the Restoration period either stunted in certain essential capacities or resigned to accepting a subordinate role. It is this fact which explains his failure to take the vanguard in the struggle for political and economic change. Notes 1. I refer to the following works: Honjo Eijiro, The Social and Economic history of Japan, Ky6to, Institute for Research in Economic History of Japan, 1935. Smith, Neil Skene, ed., "Materials on Japanese Social and Economic History: Tokugawa Japan," TASJ, Second Series, 14, (1937). Takekoshi Yosabur6, The Economic Aspects of the History of the Civilization of Japan, New York, Macmillan, 1930, v. 3. Takizawa Matsuyo, The Penetration of Money Economy in Japan and Its Effects Upon Social and Political Institutions, Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, No. 285, New York, Columbia University Press, 1927.
Page 33 TOKUGAWA MERCHANT CLASS 33 Tsuchiya Takao, "An Economic History of Japan," translated by Michitar6 Shidehara, revised by Neil Skene Smith, edited with an introduction and notes by Kurt Singer, TASJ, Second Series, 15, (1937). 2. The following works were used in the preparation of this article. Hattori Shis6 I& L Meiji Ishin shi kenkyfi 0J1 -;'a' - (A study of the Meiji Restoration), T6ky6, Kurewa Shoten, 1948. Hayakawa Jir6 -L "I P-, Yuibutsu shikan Nihon rekishi dokuhon ot V/7 jl t& fit i A ~t ~ ~-(A reader of Japanese history, as viewed by the historical materialist), T6ky5, Kobunsho, 1948. Horie Yasuz6 AA V$A ir$, Nihon keizai shi 9 - i /5 A. (An economic history of Japan), T5ky6, T~y~shokan, 1941. Horie Yasuz6, Kinsei Nihon no keizai seisaku i -- P- 0- '9 -7~-ji* $JThe economic policy of modern Japan), T~ky6, Yiihikaku, 1942. Miyamoto Mataji 'W' #- )L, "Jitsugy6sha"'F It j (Industrialists), inNihonKeizaishi Kenkyiijo a * z ~* -A-.fj?r, Nihon keizaishi jiten i 4 --- A. 1-.-. (Dictionary of Japanese economic history), TVky5, Nihon Hyoronsha, 1940. v.1, pp. 717-719. Miyamoto Mataji, Kinsei sh6gy6 keiei no kenkyi -it MIJ % -It % 3 'it (Studies in modern commercial operations) Ky5to, Dai Hassh-u Shuppan, 1948. Miyamoto Mataji, Nihon shigy6shi i 4- iK %2 O (History of Japanese commerce), Toky6, Ryfiginsha, 1943. NomuraKanetar6!fU *-fi- 5 Tokugawa jidai nokeizai shis6 4~ "1 4?, III x -~ (Economic thought of the Tokugawa period), Ty5ky, Nihon Hy6ronsha, 1939. Sakada Yoshio JV,~- iv,Chonin vf A. (The bourgeoisie), T~ky6, Kobund6 Shob6, 1939. Takahashi Kamekichi A lr1, 0, Tokugawa h6ken keizai no kenkyi i lit "f ~14i *4-~ r,q 61 IX (Studies in Tokugawa feudal economy), T~ky6, Zenshinsha, 1932. Tsuchiya Takao t- A *r P-, Nihon shihonshugishi j6 no shid6shatachi 9 -P- P - - Jt -t- * I -' Lj -AW r (Leading figures in the history of Japanese capitalism), T6ky5, Iwanami Shoten, 1939.
Page 34 - ~ V ARAITO M A SHIMUSHU *1 ~ ' '' *kJ ' PARAMUSHIRU r \ 4 7 g, 44 4 '. / ~//, ^ oil ~ MAKANRU HARIMUKOTAN JHONSHU / \ * i+ r4 0**8.4~~ C ~L~r 4 MUCHIRETSU IWA 3 ~~?~~~~~~~ ~SHIKOKU /X 0RAIKOKE MATSUWA JKYUSHU/ / -, 40o, Y/~~~IAMBYI~ OSHJ~~IMA / RASHOWA USHICHI i 'so /KETOI s0 ________ / at ~ SHIMUSHIRU BUROTON O b KITA JIMA MINAMI JIMA t URUPPU ETOROFU < v, KURILE ISLANDS KUNASHIRI 4/1o ( CHISHIMA RETTO ) t1 ~r Y> SHIKOTAN TARAKU b e P' SCALE I: 2000000 >) suIso SHIBOTSIu c5 0 HARUKARI YURI 50 0__ _ 100 200 r -k ^T * MILES MAP BY J. TAKESHITA V. MEEKER
Territorial Claims of Russia and Japan in the Kurile Islands
Joseph L. Suttonpp. 35-61
Page 35 TERRITORIAL CLAIMS OF RUSSIA AND JAPAN IN THE KURILE ISLANDS Joseph L. Sutton Early Russian Exploration of the Kuriles The first Russians to reach the Kurile Islands were the adventuresome Cossacks who had pushed beyond the Urals in 1581 and had swept to the end of the Kamchatka Peninsula by 1697. In this year the scouts of the adventurer-explorer, Vladimir Atlassov, found a fisherman from Osaka, Dembei by name, who had been shipwrecked on the peninsula of Kamchatka. After hearing Dembei's exaggerated accounts of the wealth of the Kuriles, Atlassov sent a subordinate to pillage the nearby islands of the group. Dembei was sent on to Moscow in 1701 where he held conversations with the Tsar and impressed the Russian court with his account of the vast wealth of his country. As a reward for his information, he was made a professor in the Academy of Arts and Sciences where he taught Japanese to several scientists to aid their explorations in the Kuriles. 1 As a result of conversations with Dembei, Peter the Great (1672-1725) ordered the first official expedition to the Kuriles, which went out in 1706 under the command of Vasily Koliesov, a merchant from Kamchatka. His orders were to explore the islands and determine the character of the people, how they fought, and the nature of their trade and government. Koliesov reached the islands, but native resistance prevented him from obtaining the information requested.2 A second expedition was soon formed under the command of Anzivorov, guided by surviving crew-men of another Japanese shipwreck. It too failed of its objectives. The Tsar, however, persisted and ordered a third expedition, this time led by Ivan Petrovich Kosirewski, grandson of a Polish prisoner of war and himself a condemned murderer, who volunteered thusto expiate his crime.3 The Kosirewskiexpedition was ordered to "investigate Kamchatka and the nearby islands, to inquire into what government the people owed allegiance andto force tribute from those who have no sovereign, to inform themselves as much as possible about Japan and the way thither, what weapons the inhabitants have and how they wage war, whether they might be willing to enter into friendly commercial relations with Russia, and if so, what kind of merchandise they might be induced to buy."4 The party of fifty Russians, eleven Kamchatkans and a Japanese, possibly the same one used the year before by Anzivorov, landed on one of the islands in August, 1711, but only after a sharp fight in which ten natives were killed and many others wounded. Kosirewski visited the islands again in 1713 and returned with a small quantity of silks and metals, as well as iron kettles, lacquered cups, and cotton and silk goods obviously of Japanese manufacture. He also managed to prepare a chart from information supplied by natives showing the relative position of about half the islands, and located the city of Matsumae in the southern part of Ezo. Part of this booty, along with a report, was sent to the provincial governor.6 So far the first Russian explorers had been local voevodas (governors) or Cossack criminals!who sought to expiate their crimes by discovering new sources of tribute. But Peter the Great was not content to leave exploration of this vast, rich area to renegades. After perusing carefully the report of Kosirewski's expedition and interrogating Dembei, Peter organized a new 35
Page 36 36 JOSEPH L. SUTTON expedition on a scientific basis. Feodor Luzhin and Ivan Yevreinov, heads of this semi-secret expedition, were ordered to retrace the course of Kosirewski. Their instructions, other than the secret ones, read in part: You are to go to Kamchatka and farther, as you have been ordered, and determine whether Asia and America are united; and go not only north and south, but east and west, and put on a chart all that you see. 7 Luzhin and Yevreinov started from Russia in 1719 and, with a Dutch sailor, Hendrick Busch, as a guide, left Yakutsk for Kamchatka in 1720. Peter took a great personal interest in this expedition and tried to keep in touch with its movements. The party reached a point as far down as the fifth Kurile, but they were forced to return after a storm in which they lost their anchors on the sharp rocks off the coast. At Yakutsk in 1722 they refused to give their information to anyone but the Tsar himself. Indeed, their report was kept so secret that a Russian scholar writing in 1891, 169 years later, still did not have the facts, although he had access to government files.8 The report is believed to have contained a revised map of the Kuriles plus other geodetic information.9 Vitus Bering headed the next party of exploration, the plans for which had been drawn up by Peter the Great before his death in 1725. His instructions were as follows: 1. To build in Kamchatka or in some other place one or two decked boats. 2. To sail on these boats along the shore which runs to the north and which, since its limits are unknown, seems to be a part of the American coast. 3. To determine where it joins with America. To sail to some settlement under European jurisdiction, and if a European ship should be met with, learn from her the name of the coast and take it downin writing, make a landing, obtain detailed information, draw a chart, and bring it here. 10 Bering, a Danish naval officer, had been connected with the Russian navy since 1704. His lieutenants were Martin Spanberg, likewise a Dane, and Alexei Chirikov, a Russian. Since this was a much more scientific expedition than the others, the personnel consisted of' a corps of scientists, naturalists, astronomers, historians, etc. The advance party left St. Petersburg on January 25, 1725, making a hazardous trek across the ice and snow of Siberia, and reaching Yakutsk in June of the following year. The voyage beyond the coast was fruitless, and when the expedition returned to St. Petersburg the Senate was loath to pay Bering's salary. However, influential friends in the government obtained backing for a second expedition. The plan for this adventure, set forth in writing by Bering, listed five objectives, the third of which concerned itself with Japan and the Kuriles as follows: It would not be without advantage to find a sea route from Kamchatka or Okhotsk Rivers to the Amur River or Japan, since it is known that these regions are inhabited. It would be very profitable to open trade relations with these people, particularly the Japanese, and as we have no boats there (Okhotsk Sea), we might arrange it with the Japanese that they meet us halfway in their boats. For such an expedition a ship about the size of the one mentioned above would be needed (forty or fifty tons), or one somewhat smaller might serve the same purpose. l
Page 37 KURILE ISLANDS 37 This part of the expedition was entrusted to Captain Spanberg who was given additional instructions about conducting affairs with the Japanese. His first duty was to find a route from Kamchatka to Japan. He was to examine the islands between Kamchatka Cape and Japan, in other words the Kuriles, to note those islands under the jurisdiction of the Emperor of Japan, and try to make friends with the inhabitants. He was to continue to Japan and there learn about the government, ports, and the possibilities of entering into relations with the people. Any shipwrecked Japanese he might find in Kamchatka were to be returned to Japan as a sign of friendliness. This approach was to become routine in Russian efforts to open Japan to trade. Spanberg was further instructed to represent the return of these shipwrecked sailors as his pretext for going to Japan. If they were not received by their government, as they usually were not, he was to put them ashore in a secluded spot. He was not to carry out Bering's suggestion in the original outline for the expedition, of meeting the Japanese in the Kuriles and engaging in trade. Spanberg's fleet, the flagship "Archangel Michael," the "Nadezhda," captained by Walton, and the "St. Gabriel," commanded by Shelting, left Okhotsk on July 15, 1738, and soonafterward lost sight of one another in a heavy fog. Spanberg turned back after sailing in the vicinity of Uruppu, arriving back at the Bolshaya River on August 17 where he was awaited by Shelting; Walton joined them there a week later. In the winter of 1738-1739 Spanberg had a fourth boat constructed and equipped with oars, in order to move among the islands with greater ease. On May 21, 1739 the four vessels left Kamchatka and arrived at the first Kurile Island on the twenty-fifth. Here they picked up an interpreter, departing for Japan on June 1. On June 14 Walton was separated from the rest of the fleet in a storm. Spanberg continued his course and on June 16 sighted the coast of Japan. Here Spanberg made a brief visit, but fearing treachery on the part of the Japanese he sailed farther southward. Again he approached the coast and this time met some Japanese in a small village ashore. After some trading and exchanges of pleasantries, Spanberg again took leave, this time because of the large number of guard boats which the Japanese threw around his vessel. His mission to Japan completed, Spanberg sailed northward and after a short stay in one of the Kurile Islands arrived back in Kamchatka on the 29th of August. Spanberg reported to Bering the results of his trip and requested permission for a third voyage, arguing that if his ships had not become separated in the fog he would have been able to bring those Kuriles nearest Kamchatka under Russian domination. Bering, however, refused this request and ordered Spanberg back to St. Petersburg. But on the way Spanberg received orders from St. Petersburg to return to Kamchatka and sail again to the Kuriles and Japan. He arrivedback at Okhotsk in the summer of 1740. After wintering there, he received a new ship, the "St. John," and set sail with his fleet on May 23, 1742. Two young men from the St. Petersburg Academy were to act as interpreters. These two had learned Japanese from two shipwrecked Japanese who had been taken as teachers to St. Petersburg. 12 Again Spanberg became separated from the rest of the fleet but put men ashore in Komaishi.,J5Jq (in present-day Miyagi Prefecture) on the main island of Honshu, and made a brief visit to the east coast of Ezo (Hokkaid5). He arrived back in Okhotsk on August 26 without having conquered the Kuriles; thus his last voyage ended in failure. This entire series of expeditions caused a sensation in Russia, not because of their scientific discoveries but because of the intrigue and bitter denunciations among the scientists and officers. The major charge was that Spanberg had never been to Japan, but through errors in navigation had sailed the coast of Korea instead. The Admiralty College could not decide the case and turned the documents over to Professor Shishkov of the Naval Academy. Shishkov ruled
Page 38 38 JOSEPH L. SUTTON that Spanberg actually had been in Japan, but inaccuracies in his journal made it impossible to chart the position of the islands. 13 Japanese Activities in the North Meanwhile these events were having their repercussions in Japan. Though accurate knowledge of Russia's sweep across Asia and of the motives of her penetration of the northern islands came into the hands of the Shogunate very late, the Japanese were dimly aware of the new activities in the north. In 1715 a book written by Arai Hakuseki fr 4- f 6i called the Seiy5 Kibun tf -;, Z ]fj (A Report on Western Lands) revealed to the officials of the Shogunate the existence of a nation called Moskobiya. 14 The appearance of Spanberg and Walton in Japanese waters, though not immediately recognized as indicating that a new power had entered the Pacific sphere, did cause the Tokugawa government some anxiety. Apparently, however, the first Japanese reports of Russian vessels simply described them as foreign ships. Not until a much later date, when the Dutch at Deshima ii j recognized certain coins and cards as Russian, were these unwelcome callers identified. 15 The first Japanese to learn of Russian activities in the Kuriles were the members of the Matsumae han (domain) who had taken over the administration of the island of Ezo in 1590. The Matsumae domain was unique in many respects. Its wealth was not measured in rice, as was usual, but rather in fish and furs, mostly acquired from the native Ainu, the original inhabitants of this region. The Matsumae officials farmed out rights to trade with the aborigines to "contract merchants" who came from the mainland of Japan. The reports of these merchants provide the first documentary evidence concerning the foreigners from the north. In the history of Matsumae relations with the Kuriles, one is struck by the slow start which the Japanese had in their penetration northward. Indeed it was only in 1754 that Matsumae officials opened up direct trade relations with Kunashiri F JtJL, the island closest to Hokkaido. Nor did the Matsumae authorities ever dominate the Kuriles north of Etorofu;4tt, the second island. Rather, the practice of the Japanese was to depend upon the Ainu for trade and for information on conditions in the more northerly portions of the Kurile chain. Thus as early as 1700 the names of some of the islands had been reported to the Shogunate. These in part formed the basis of Arai Hakuseki's work, Ezo shi FZAL;_(Gazetteer of Ezo), compiled in 1720. In this work Arai attempted to construct a map of the Kuriles, but the result was extremely crude. It was not until the 1750's that the Japanese were in possession of accurate information on the northern islands by which time the Russians were also much in evidence. In 1756 a report was sent to Matsumae by one Minato Kakunosuke JAL 4-)h, who wrote: When Makita Tomouchi 7 4-t 9 went to Akkeshi as Supreme Magistrate in 1756, there was a foreign vessel16 anchored at an island off the coast. There were around a hundred crewmen who all looked alike. I saw them whenthey came to gaze at Akkeshi in Ezo, and they resembled merchants. They had with them, contrary to rights, three Ezo women. (The name Ezo applied to the natives as well as to the island which later became known as Hokkaido.) They stayed for three days. When they left they fired flaming stones. By afternoon they (the foreigners) could no longer be seen. 17
Page 39 KURILE ISLANDS 39 These men were not positively identified, but the facts strongly suggest that they were Russians, since no other nation had vessels or nationals active in the North Pacific during this period. There are no Russian data available to substantiate this supposition, but it is known that many outlaws were active out of Siberia and Kamchatka during this period. If the subjects of the report were hunter-outlaws, as seems likely, the voyage would not, of course, be officially reported. Three years later Minato had even more startling news to report. In 1759 he was at Akkeshi Jf$j pacifying some of the Ainu who were giving trouble. He reported that Kakkoro, tribal chief of Etorofu, told him that in the previous year foreigners had landed in the Kuriles and established a guard station. He said that they were numerous and had built several houses. Minato noted that Kakkoro was wearing red cloth of foreign make and carrying a spear of iron, also foreign. He also had obtained an axe from the foreigners, and Minato records that he was impressed with its manufacture. 18 From these interviews with the tribal chief Minato learned the names of the various islands in the Kurile chain and was able to draw a fairly accurate map of them. 19 It is significant that none of these findings were reported to the Shogunate by the Matsumae han. Onthe contrary, the Matsumae officials, jealous of their independence, made every effort to keep such information secret, although incidents concerning the Russians and the Ainu continued on the increase. In 1768 a score or so of Russians built a house on the eastern shore of Uruppu4*f.. and engaged in hunting sea otter. In 1771 an official of the Matsumae reported that barbarians came to the island of Kunashiri and hunted sea otter with firearms. A year earlier the Russians on Uruppu made a hunting expedition to Etorofu. Here they not only killed the tribal chief, Niseokote, and one other, but frightened many natives away from the island. As a result of such excesses the Ainu of Rashowa, A a joined forces with other Ainu and in 1771 crossed over to the island of Uruppu, the base of the Russian hunters in the Kuriles. They attacked the Russians on both the eastern and western sides, and after killing and wounding a score or so drove the remainder, about seventy, into the sea. Of these incidents, however, the authorities at Edo were told nothing. The Sh6gunate Learns of the Russians The honor of reporting Russian activities to the Shogunate fell not to a Japanese but to a world adventurer and spinner of tall tales, Count Moritz August Beniowsky. Beniowsky was a Hungarian nobleman who had been a colonel in the Polish army until he was taken prisoner by the Russians and sent to Siberia. Here he rounded up a group of fellow prisoners and captured a Russian ship. Placing himself in command, he began a voyage of high and dubious adventure which took him to the coast of Japan at Awa X A and southward to the island of Oshima A J in the Ryfikyii chain. Here, as an expression of gratitude for kind treatment, he wrote a letter to the Japanese government to be transmitted by the Dutch at Deshima. In the letter Beniowsky assured the Japanese that the Imperial Russian Government had every intention of conquering Japan and was not only preparing bases in the Kuriles for the sweep southward but sending men to spy on the lands of the Matsumae. These warnings were not clearly grasped by the Shogunate officials. In the first place, Beniowsky's motive was obscure; in the second place, they were not familiar enough with the geography of the north to understand his references to the Kurile Islands and Kamchatka. Therefore, instead of preparing for the promised attack, they sought to repress the news to prevent
Page 40 40 JOSEPH L. SUTTON public discussion of it. The authorities undoubtedly feared that the disclosure of a threatened attack would imperil their hold on the government. 20 This policy of secrecy was a dismal failure. Too many people had been involved in the translationof the letter to permit a close control of its contents. Eventually news of the warning leaked out of Nagasaki. In August of 1774, Hirasawa Motoyasu-F 5i fi, ''l. heard it from the translator, Matsumura Yasuno,*^ Ii nq. In 1777 Hayashi Shihei 35- Sf-, while on leave for study in Nagasaki, learned of the warning from a Dutch captain. There is good reason to believe that the Dutch were eager to spread such terrifying intelligence among the Japanese. Beniowsky, himself, had little to gain but the embarrassment of Russia. He carried his rumors clear around the world, and upon his arrival in Europe he informed the French government that the British and Russians were in a secret pact to divide the world. This caused a minor sensation even in the courts of Europe where the diplomats were politically sophisticated. It is therefore easy to understand the effect on the uninformed Shogunate. The Matsumae han did not hear of the threat until 1778 when Hirasawa Motoyasu happened to go to Ezo where he stayed with Matsumae Hiromichi-Z q j..i, uncle of the Matsumae daimy6. In the course of his visit Hirasawa told his hosts of the warning and of the other information concerning Russian conquest in Asia.21 Meanwhile, the Russians were making the situation complicated for the Japanese. Visits from these fierce foreigners became more frequent and their demands for trade relations more persistent. In June, 1778, a group of Russians living on Uruppu arrived in Kiitappu W: AP 22 in two boats with the tribe chief from Kunashiri, Tsukinoe, as a guide. After firing their guns, they landed to the east of Kiitappu in Notsukamaku, the commercial section of the city. Using a Shimushiru-f.a~ Ainu as an interpreter, they met the head Matsumae official for this area, Araita Oyoso {t{+ _, and the senior censor, Kudo Yaoueimon:- rI a *[ {~ ~ 9, and demanded the opening of trade relations. The two officials explained that they could make no such arrangements, but promised an answer by the following year. At Fukuyama jA Jm they reported the incident to the domain authorities and awaited instructions. Three Matsumae officials, Asari Kohy5e A \'J l 4 4t, Kud6 Seiuemon X: -J gi r', and Matsui Shigehy~oei,^ i-r4, -, were entrusted with the reply of the han authorities. They left the city of Matsumae in April but did not arrive in Akkeshi until August owing to unfavorable winds. Meanwhile, the Russians, tired of waiting in Etorofu, had come to Akkeshi. There the three emissaries faced them with the news that trade relations would be impossible and that they must leave. The Russians tried to get other information from the men, such as the names of the officials in Matsumae who had refused permission to trade. Available documents do not explain this effort, but subsequent events suggest that the Russians were seeking information to facilitate the trade mission sent several years later to Nemuro. The Japanese refused to disclose the facts and sent the Russians on their way, after first allowing them to purchase fifteen hyo54 23 of rice, some tobacco and sake. This incident, coupled with the many other recorded and unrecorded meetings between the officials of the Matsumae domain and the Russians, afforded the han authorities an excellent opportunity to observe the Russian activities and to plan against the growing pressure in the north. However, the northern han as if paralyzed by fear, continued to ignore the threat. There is no question but that the Japanese were alarmed by the Russian strength. Exaggerated accounts were circulated about the complement and armament of the vessels which brought these strangers. The Japanese had never seen ships from which small boats could be lowered over the side, and when they reported to their chiefs they counted each of these small boats as a shipof-war. But despite the growing alarm, the Matsumae han took no real measures of defense, and their only actual policy was to keep news of these happenings from the Shogunate.
Page 41 KURILE ISLANDS 41 For this policy the Matsumae authorities had other motives than preserving the Shogunate's peace of mind. For a long time these officials, defying the law, had been selling Japanese goods to the Ainu who traded them to the Russians for Russian goods to be sold in turn to the Japanese. The Matsumae officials were willing to allow the occasional depredations of the Russians to go unpunished in order that their lucrative and illegal trade might continue. Undoubtedly behind all the secrecy was the fear that, should the Shogunate become aroused over the northern problem, the Matsumae han would lose its coveted freedom from central control. Response of the Intellectuals to Russian Contacts Despite the attempts of both the Shogunate and the Matsumae han to maintain secrecy, before long the news of Russian encroachment became the common knowledge of the Japanese intellectual world and arouseda number of scholars to voice alarm at the Russian menace. One of the foremost of these men was Kud5 Heisuke J. '- + ~i7 (1738-1809), a physician from a northern han who was residing in Edo. Kud6 wrote a two-volume work entitled Aka Ezo fusetsu k6,if ~7j.1 itj (A Report on Rumors Concerning the Red Barbarians) in which he described Russian activity in the north and recommended that Japan open up the north country herself. He reasoned that, since the Russians were primarily interested in the mines of Ezo, if Japan should open these mines and use the metals to trade with the Russians, they would halt their descentonHokkaido. Japan would be able to strengthen her defense by her increase in wealth and could also learn more about the outside world.24 Sugita Gempaku;f s - 6X (1733-1817), noted physician and student of Dutch and Chinese, setup two alternatives:(1) Japanmight go to war with Russia to destroy Russian military forces on land and sea; and (2) she might grant privileges to Russia, thereby establishing friendly relations with her. He cautioned, however, that the military forces of the Shogun were softened by years of easy living; whereas the forces of Russia were noted for their military might. He then recommendedthat Japan follow the course of Emperor Kang-hsi (1662-1723) of China when he granted the Russians trade privileges in the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689). The profit of the trade and the interim of peace would permit Japan to train and equip her armies so that in a short time she would be able to combat the Russians.25 Not all of the writers of this period were as realistic as Sugita and Kudo. Hirayama K6z6; J, 4ja,. j(1758-1828) proposed to lead the robbers and cut-throats in Japan, who would be trained in military science, to Ezo and conquer the Russians. Honda Toshiaki r f,J 0A (1744 -1821) and Hayashi Shihei (1738-1793) urged Japanese development of Ezo and the Kuriles. They believed these territories contained "inexhaustible" gold and silver deposits which would make Japan the wealthiest nation in the world.26 The works of these men nevertheless increased the interest of the Shogunate in the northern territories, and urged upon it the necessity of taking steps against the Russian menace. Thus, all throughthe 1780's and 1790's the bakufu begandesperately searching to consolidate its position in the north. It recognized that the periodic uprisings on Kunashiri and in northern Hokkaido had been mainly due to the abuses of the government's charter merchants. Heretofore, responsibility for the natives and for defense of the area had lain with the Matsumae han, but its failure to report the true situation and the many instances of illegal trading with foreigners led the Edo government to realize that it must take matters into its own hands. In 1786 the bakufu sent official census takers into the Ainu country. One of them, Mogami Tokunai jL A.- A pi, arrived at Sharushamu on the island of Etorofu and was there greeted
Page 42 42 JOSEPH L. SUTTON by three Russians. He set about making a shelter for himself and invited the Russians to dine with him. After making friends with them and giving them some Japanese foodstuffs, medicine and coins, he asked them why they had come to Etorofu. They replied that they had originally dwelled on Uruppu, but following a quarrel with their comrades they had fled to Etorofu. Mogami took the Russians to Kunashiri with him and questioned them further, learning much of the Russian activities on Uruppu. Later he returned to Etorofu and then explored Uruppu, the first government official to reach that place and meet the Russians there. Back at Hokkaid5 he ordered the Matsumae samurai to return the Russians to Etorofu, from which they were to go back to Uruppu.27 In 1789 a rather serious uprising of the Ainu on Kunashiri and in Akkeshi on northern Hokkaido resulted from mistreatment of the natives by contract merchants who had been in the region since 1774. As a result, in 1790, the bakufu decided to replace earlier harsh methods with a policy of "assisting trade," i.e. trade from which the Ainu would benefit. Since the Ainu had also suffered from the Russians, they might thus be encouraged to help halt the Russian descent of the Kurile chain. In preparation for this new policy, Mogami was again sent to the Kuriles to investigate conditions there. At Etorofu he learned that the Russians he had ordered away from there three years earlier had left just before his arrival. He also heard more rumors that the Matsumae clansmen were trading with the Russians, and that the Russians were infiltrating Karafuto (Sakhalin). Furthermore, he was told that the Russians had a plan afoot to return some shipwrecked Japanese as a pretext for demanding a trade agreement with the bakufu.28 Meanwhile, more facts about Russian activity in Uruppu were gleaned. In 1744 a shipwrecked Japanese named Sh6zaemon t-r' — WP 9, from the village of Sai )i- t (Aomori-* 4* prefecture), was taken by the Russians to Irkutsk where he married a Russian and became a minor official in the Siberian service. Some years later, in 1784, his son led an expedition of Russians to the island of Sakhalin but was driven off by the natives. On the return voyage to Siberia the party was shipwrecked on the island of Uruppu and all perished. The Ainu of this island salvaged the valuables remaining from the wreck and burned the rest. Soon afterwards another Russian vessel appeared in Uruppu, and the Ainu leader, fearing reprisals, gathered his followers in small boats and fled the island. They ran into a storm at sea and all were killed. When this story eventually reached the Russians, they raided the Ainu off Etorofu and Kunashiri in reprisal for the looting.29 More Russian Pressure Meanwhile the expedition about which Mogami heard rumors was forming in Siberia. The Russians planned to return castaways from the crew of the "Shinsho-maru" ^t S tU, a rice ship from the province of Kii.64fT, which had run into a storm off SurugaAzL-Aff in December, 1782, and drifted helplessly for seven months, finally washing ashore in Amchitka in the Aleutian Islands in July, 1783. In 1787 the survivors had sailed a small boat to Kamchatka and then, after a year of traveling about on the continent, made their way to Irkutsk. In 1791 they were taken to St. Petersburg where they had an audience with Catherine II and were returned in the same year to Irkutsk. These Japanese had aroused great interest in Russia, and Erik Laxman, a noted Finnish scientist and a professor at the Academy in St. Petersburg, evolved a plan to open relations with Japan by returning them. He felt that this gesture would win the goodwill of the Japanese govern
Page 43 KURILE ISLANDS 43 ment, so that trade relations, as well as a boundary agreement, could be arranged. His son, Adam Laxman, was to head the expedition, and a boat, the "Ekaterinal' assigned the group, which included not only military men, but cartographers, surveyors, merchants to help in the trade agreements, translators, and the three Japanese castaways, Kodayu t X- k., Isokichil0Sk; t and Koichi '1 -. All in all, there were thirty-nine Russians plus the three Japanese. They set sail from Okhotsk and arrived in north Kunashiri in October of 1792. Moving down the coast to the southern tip of the island, they met on October 19, 1792, some of the island's Ainu with whom they traded tobacco for fresh fish. Ashore they found a trading hut establishedbythe Matsumaehan. On the 20th they encountered some Japanese, who were afraid of them at first but seeing Isokichi and the others entered into conversation with the Russians. The voyagers learned of a good port at Nemuro, and on October 21, 1792, arrived at Nemuro Bay, guided into the port by a Japanese boat. Ashore the three shipwrecked Japanese were taken into custody by the officials and sent to Edo where their adventures were set down in a book called the Hokusa Bunryaku 3L A p~-,. Laxman reported his mission to the Matsumae officials but could get no satisfactory response. On November 11 he sent them a letter saying that he intended to go directly to Edo if they did not take some action on his demands. His letter was forwarded to Edo by the Matsumae officials. After a considerable delay officials of the Shogunate arrived and directed that the Russians be sent to Hakodatev 4/, where they were guided by a Japanese vessel. Here Laxman entered into lengthy negotiations with to negotiate. He obtained, however, a permit to enter the port of Nagasaki which was to be used by the next Russian expedition. After an exchange of presents, Laxman left Japan on July 16, 1793, reaching Okhotsk in August.30 Although Laxman had not achieved his main objective of opening Japan to trade, he did receive a permit for one ship a year to enter the port of Hakodate. This Russian venture once more warned the Shogunate that they must consolidate their position in the north. In an effort to bring Ezo and the adjacent islands under their control, another group of officials was sent out in 1798 to investigate these areas. Kunashiri and Etorofu were again visited, and markers posted on these islands declaring them possessions of the Shogunate. 31 In 1801 observers were sent to Uruppu to find out if the Russians intended to stay or not, and, if they had already withdrawn from the island, to take a census of the natives. Arriving in June the investigators soon carved a statement on a tree which declared Uruppu to be a Japanese possession. Subsequently one of the investigators, who had been with Laxman earlier and had learned a little Russian, met a lone Russian who requested some rice and sake and offered some pelts in return. The Japanese gave him the foodstuffs but refused the pelts, saying that ancient law forbade trade with foreigners. In 1802 the Japanese officials heard from the Ainu of Etorofu that the Russians were preparing to leave Uruppu. The Japanese, in the following year, forbade the Ainu of Etorofu to go to Uruppu and informed them that trading with the Russians was absolutely forbidden. Meanwhile, the Russians again prepared to press for trading privileges with Japan. This time the moving force was the famed Russian-American Company. In 1781 a Siberian fur merchant, Shelekhov, formed a company to exploit the Kuriles and Alaska. In 1799 this company merged with another under the direction of Alexander Baranov to form the Russian-American Company whose influence spread rapidly throughout Alaska and California.32 With Alexander I as one of its directors, it became an acknowledged tool of Russian expansion. Since the Russian-American Company hoped to add Japan to its territory of trade, one of the company's directors, Rezanov, was appointed Ambassador to Japan by Alexander I. In 1804 Rezanov,
Page 44 44 JOSEPH L. SUTTON aboard the "Nadezhda," commanded by Captain Krusenstern, set sail from Petropavlosk to Nagasaki. Rezanov's orders were: (1) broaden the terms of the agreement received by Laxman (one ship ayear),andto seek the opening of more ports; (2) if the Japanese governmentwill permit an additional trade post, secure the port of Matsumae for this purpose; (3) if these propositions are refused, attempt to establish trade with Japan through Uruppu; (4) investigate whether Sakhalin belongs to Japan or China; (5) question the Japanese about conditions atthe mouth of Amur River; (6) clarify Japan's relations with China and Korea; find out if the Ryukyui Islands are independent or if they belong to Japan, and,if they are independent, open trade relations with them. 33 Although the Japanese were reluctant to deal with the Russians at all, they finally did commence relations with them, but kept them in the same strict isolation as the Dutch. They allowed officers to keep their swords and Ambassador Rezanov to take his bodyguard ashore with him without surrendering their arms, but the weapons of the rest of the crew were seized. The Russians were not allowed any intercourse with the Dutch except in the presence of Japanese interpreters. As in the previous expedition, the Russians relied on the device of returning Japanese castaways. One of the returned sailors, however, told the officials of the Shogunate that the Russians were bigoted Christians who had come to force this forbidden religion upon the Japanese. He said that he and his comrades had been abused by the Russians and that most of his comrades had been forced to take up Christianity and remain in Russia.34 The truth of the matter was that the Japanese had been given every consideration by the Russians. In fact a number of the rescued crew had preferred to embrace Christianity and stay in Russia, probably because they feared the consequences of violating the Japanese law against returning from a foreign land. They may also have heard of those Japanese returning with the Laxman expedition who were forced afterward to live in strict confinement under suspicion of being spies. It was probably to avoid similar treatment that the Japanese with Krusenstern spoke so harshly of their benefactors. Whether because of this report or for other reasons, the negotiations with the Japanese at Nagasaki not only did not improve conditions, but worsened them. Instead of one ship a year as arranged by Laxman, no Russian ship was to come to Japan again. All presents, as well as the letter, from the Russian Emperor, Alexander I, to the Emperor of Japan, were refused. Should any more Japanese be shipwrecked on the coast of Russia, they were to be turned over to the Dutch who would return them by way of Batavia. The Japanese then furnished necessary supplies, made the crew a present of silks, and thus ended their relations with the Russians, who set sail from Japan on April 16, 1805.35 Soon after the Russians had left Japan, another incident occurring in the Kuriles alarmed the Shogunate. In June of 1805, a group of Ainu from Rashowa arriving at Shibetoro in Etorofu were promptly arrested by the Japanese, sent to Shana in Hokkaido, and imprisoned as Russian spies. They disclosed that they had been ordered by their tribal chief to look over the island of Etorofu and to try and develop trade with the inhabitants of that island. They also bore out the rumor heard earlier by the Ainu of Etorofu that the Russians on Uruppu had run out of supplies and had wanted to return to Siberia in the fall of 1804. The Russians reportedly left this same year but were forced back to Uruppu by the weather. Those who survived the hardships of the winter left the island in the summer of 1805. Acting on this information in 1806, a party of Japanese officials led by an Ainu guide found that the Russians had, indeed, vacated Uruppu.
Page 45 KURILE ISLANDS 45 When Captain Rikord came to free Golovnin in 1813, he was confronted with information about Rashowa Ainu believed by the Japanese to have been sent to trade with them. Since other Russian suggestions featured this very plan, it is likely that these natives had, indeed, been agents of the Russian traders. New Policies of the Shogunate The constantly increasing pressure of the Russians on the northern territories forced the Shogunate to face the northern menace more resolutely. Since the Laxman affair, the chief counsellors of the Sh5gun had been busily evolving a Russian policy. This finally crystallized in 1799 when the bakufu ordered the temporary confiscation of the eastern portion of Ezo and its incorporation into the direct shogunal domains. A bakufu official, first called the Ezo bugy6o %Lk 4-4T (Ezo Magistrate), later the Hakodate bugy6 /g -.j (Hakodate Magistrate), was set in charge of this area and of any negotiations with the Russians which might follow. Finally, in 1807, the bakufu went the entire distance and took over the administration of all Ezo and the islands to the north. The Matsumae daimyo was transferred to a 9,000 koku domain at Yanagawa -i "I' in the province of Mutsu F I. The office of Hakodate bugyo was renamed the Matsumae bugyo (Matsumae Magistrate).36 Thus the worst fears of the Matsumae daimyo were realized. Concurrently the Shogunate developed a more positive policy for handling the Russians. As a first step, the bakufu authorities decided to send a warning to those Russians then residing onwhat was considered Japanese territory, namely the island of Uruppu. They were to be told that they had broken the laws of Japan, and that if they refused to leave immediately they were to be killed or taken prisoner. 3 7 Furthermore, in order to guard the Kuriles from further Russian incursions, the Shogunate accepted a plan drawn up by the magistrate of Hakodate in 1806 who suggested the use of summer patrols consisting of Japanese troops and groups of Ainu. The patrols could guard gard against the coming of the Russians, and the Ainu could hunt and fish. In the winter, when navigation in the Kuriles would be almost impossible for the Russians, the patrols and the Ainu could be withdrawn. In 1807 thirty light troops of the Tsugaru dme han and thirty Ainu hunters and fishers were dispatched to Uruppu.38 They operated under a set of instructions issued by the Shogunate in 1806 which read: "If Russians arrive, they are to be warned and caused to return; if they meet with unfavorable winds and are shipwrecked, they are to be given food, water and kindling, but they are not to be allowed to land. If they reject the warning and refuse to depart they are to be driven off by force. "39 During the years 1806-7, however, incidents occurred to provoke much harsher measures on the part of the Japanese. Two young officers of the Russian-American Company, Lieutenants Davydov and Khvostov, chagrined by the manner in which the demands of Rezanov had been refused, appeared with their two small men-of-war off Sakhalin in 1806. After a bombardment they landed at Kushunkotan t> - 4-+, where they raided the village and put up a copper plate which said that the Japanese were unjust in prohibiting trade and that if they changed their policy they were to send a message to Uruppu or Sakhalin. Otherwise the Russians would ravage the northern parts of Japan.40 The Japanese immediately reacted by calling on the northern han of Numbu il -P, Tsugaru, Akita At Q, and Shonai,>- p for reinforcements. The Nambu han was held responsible for the defense of Nemuro Jr, and the island of Kunashiri, while the Tsugaru han was charged with the defense of Sawara ^,r on the island of Hokkaido and of the island of Etorofu. The other han were to serve under these two. The garrison at Etorofu was increased to three hundred men and the Hakodate garrison to 2,500.
Page 46 46 JOSEPH L. SUTTON By this time the Japanese had developed a rather flourishing community on Etorofu consisting of some 300-350 Japanese and 1,000 Ainu. A brewery had even been established to serve the soldiers. The Ainu engaged in hunting and fishing and traded their catch to the Japanese in Hakodate. The population was gathered into two settlements, one at ShanayF -A and one at Naiho Aq 4,, the garrison being at Shana. The raids of Davydov and Khvostov continued; in 1807 they appeared off the coast of Etorofu and made a landing at Naiho. After a brief encounter in which the Japanese guards were driven off, they left with five Japanese prisoners. They next appeared at Shana, drove off the major Japanese garrison, and captured the castle headquarters. They then burned the castle, the brewery and the Ainu huts. They were afraid to attempt a landing at Hakodate, fearing the superior forces of the Japanese, but they did send ashore a note to the officials stating that they would return nextyear in greater force unless the Japanese accepted their terms for trade. 41 Existing records do not make clear the relationship between these two young officers of the Russian-American Company and the official expedition under Rezanov. Golovnin insists that they acted purely on their own, arguing chiefly that these two men were not in the naval service of Russia, but rather in that of the Russian-American Company.42 That, of course, is the truth, but he fails to explain the semi-official standing of the Russian-American Company whose charter gave it the right to call upon Russian troops to protect its annexations. Whatever the official role of Davydov and Khvostov, the effect on the already suspicious Shogunate was electric. In 1807 they issued new orders stating that the Russians, because of their acts of violence, were to be attacked on sight; all who landed were to be taken prisoner or killed except those from wrecked vessels, who would be held for final disposition by the central government. Some officials felt that even this policy was too mild, believing that the Russians could not be kept at a distance by defensive measures alone, but that strong offensive steps should be taken, such as the conquest of the islands north of Etorofu and "depending on the circumstances, the conquest of Kamchatka, itself." The Shogunate sent these written regulations to their officials in Hokkaido, with a letter to the Russians stating that their policy of demanding trade by force of arms would never be countenanced, and urging them to improve their conduct and return those Japanese taken in the raids. No opportunity occurred to deliver this letter until the arrival of Golovnin in 1811.43 Golovnin had been sent by the Russian government to survey the Kurile Islands and to observe what he could. In search of supplies and information, Golovnin landed on the island of Kunashiri where he was met by members of the Japanese garrison. He agreed to accompany them to their camp for a friendly parley, but while engaged in conversation he and a number of his men were taken prisoner. Their capture was a direct result of the earlier raids by Khvostov and Davydov. The disposition of these prisoners posed a problem to the Japanese which was eventually solved by the return of the Russian vessel "Diana" to Japan under thecommandof Captain Rikord in 1813 for the purpose of rescuing captives. The Russians were first informed that their comrades were dead and that the Japanese could enter into no negotiations with Russia, but at length they learned that the prisoners still lived and would be returned on the following conditions: (1) the Russians must show official papers signed by two district commanders certifying that Khvostov and Davydov had carried out their raids on the Kurile Islands without knowledge or consent of the Russian government; (2) the booty taken by the raiders was to be returned to Japan, and signed statements from the district commanders must be brought confirming that no more remained in their districts.44 Rikord set sail for Okhotsk in July, 1813, and returned in August of the same year. After much protracted negotiation Golovnin and his fellows were released. Golovnin's account of his departure from Japan refers to a letter given him by the Japanese stating that since the Russians had lived among the Japanese for some
Page 47 KURILE ISLANDS 47 time, they had come to know the laws of Japan and could instruct their compatriates, thereby preventing further useless trips to Japan. Japanese accounts, however, tell of another letter given to the Russians just as they departed from Japan, defining the boundary between Japan and Russia in the Kuriles, and setting forth the procedure for the return of shipwrecked mariners. In this letter it appears the Japanese set as their boundary the island of Etorofu, and Shimushirias the Russians' southernmost island. No building was to be done in the intervening islands. Shipwrecked sailors might be put ashore on Uruppu, but punitive measures would be taken if the Russians appeared in Etorofu or south of it.45 The Decline of Russian Influence This period of Russian expansion was really guided and inspired by Peter the Great. Although Catherine II succeeded him in 1725 and ruled until 1796, she was actually carrying out the program outlined by Peter before his death. With the death of Catherine in 1796 the program of expansion and exploration in the Far East began to drag to a halt, for Alexander I's preoccupation with Napoleon Bonaparte in Europe and his predilection for the role of European policeman virtually ended for some thirty years Russian interest in the Far East. Not until Muraviev was appointed Governor-general of Eastern Siberia in 1847 did Russia again begin to loom mightily on the shores of the Pacific. There were, however, a few contacts. In 1815 some Russians attempted to land shipwrecked Japanese on Etorofu, but sailed away after finding no one to receive them. This vessel carried a letter from the Governor of Kamchatka to Japan. In 1816, a heavy fog prevented Russians from landing Japanese mariners on Etorofu, and they were put ashore on Uruppu. In 1818, lida GorosukeL. i Q z' - A, in Uruppu on government business, found a letter from the Russians in a box nailed to a post. Badly faded from the rain but partially readable, it said that in 1814 the Russians had come to the northern part of Japan but had failed to see anyone to whom the letter could be given.46 Despite the lull in their relations with the Russians, the Shogunate demonstrated clearly that their minds were still not easy over the threat of Russian invasion in the north. In 1822, the Shogunate's new orders to the magistrate of Matsumae stated that because of the proximity of Etorofu and Sakhalin to the Russians and the importance of the lands every effort should be made to maintain an adequate defense; it was added that no reply had yet been received to the Japanese demand for a border delineation at Etorofu and Shimushiri. According to these orders the Russians could now land on Etorofu, probably so that they could reply to the letter sent with Golovnin, although the reasons are not made clear. Further, anything offered by the Russians to the Japanese on the island was to be refused; those Russians pretending that they were shipwrecked were to be investigated. All foreign vessels which attempted landings in the territory of Matsumae or in that controlled by the Nambu or Tsugaru daimyo were to be driven off. This was to remain the standing order for the treatment of all foreign ships until 1842, after which ships might be given supplies and sent away instead of being attacked.47 Russia Returns With the appearance of Muraviev on the Far Eastern scene in 1847 Russian policy acquired a new dynamism. The next contact with the Japanese was not made by Putiatin, as has been
Page 48 48 JOSEPH L. SUTTON commonly supposed, but by Captain Lindenberg of the Russian-American Company. This expedition was organized by the Russian commander of the Colony of Sitka upon his hearing of America's intention to open Japan under Commodore Aulick in 1851. Lindenberg arrived in Shimoda in the Russian-American Company's ship, "Prince Menshikov," on July 28, 1852. He had aboard seven Japanese sailors and a letter written in Chinese which he showed to the governor of the port. The governor was much moved by the kindness of the Russians in returning the shipwrecked sailors, but he informed Lindenberg that he could accept neither his countrymen nor the letter. He did, however, take the letter ashore and have it copied, saying that he would have it sent to Edo where there were persons who could read Chinese. The governor then inquired if the ship was in need of supplies, and after learning that the Russians were short of water and food sent water and dried fish to the vessel. The governor of the port first gave the Captain leave to go ashore, so long as the others remained, then asked permission to inspect the ship. Meanwhile, a number of guard ships drew near and sketched the vessel. He also questioned the shipwrecked Japanese in detail about their stay in Russia and asked questions about Sitka, Okhotsk and the other places they had visited. Lindenberg commented, "It seems that the government of Japan is becoming afraid of the near neighborhood of the Russians." As these amenities and interrogations were going on Lindenberg noticed that soldiers were gathering in Shimoda, and cannon were being brought into place behind tents. On July 31 the Vice-Governor of Odawara arrived and once again interrogated the returned Japanese. On the following day, additional cavalry and foot troops were seen entering the city. On August 2 the Vice-Governor again came aboard to tell Lindenbergthat he had received orders from Edo forbidding the return of the Japanese sailors or acceptance of the letter. He said that intercourse with foreigners was forbidden in Shimoda and asked Lindenberg to withdraw. After a vain attempt to reason with the Japanese, Lindenberg complied. At the request of the returnees, he put them into a small boat and saw them row ashore undetected.48 After the failure of the Lindenberg expedition, the Russian government, deciding that a more official group might open trade with Japan, organized an expedition in charge of Admiral Evfrimi Vasilevich Putiatin. Putiatin had been ordered to Japan earlier, in 1842, but the Russian Minister of Commerce, Kankrin decided that the finances of Russia could not support such a project at that time. At length, the expedition headed by Putiatin arrived in Nagasaki in August of 1853, consisting of four vessels, the frigate "Pallas," the steamer "Vostok," the corvette "Dlivusta" andthe transport "Kniaz Menshikov." Putiatin bore a letter for the Sh6gun containing two demands from Count Nesselrode, then the foreign minister. One was territorial and asked that the border between Japan and Russia be delimited; the other was commercial and askedthat Japan open one or two ports to Russian vessels and commence trade relations. The main point was, however, the establishment of the border in Sakhalin, the Russians desiring the border to be Aniwa Bay at the southernmost tip of the island. In general the desires of the Russians were as follows: (1) all the Kurile Islands north of Etorofu to be Russian; (2) all of Sakhalin to be Russian; (3) Osaka and Hakodate to be opened to Russian trade and ships, in addition to which, the Russians to be accorded freedom of worship in these two cities; (4) consuls to be allowed in the ports opened for Russian trade and to have extraterritorial jurisdiction over Russian subjects; (5) Russia to be accorded the most favored nations' clause. 49
Page 49 KURILE ISLANDS 49 The Shogunate sent two officers to deal with the Russians, Tsutsui Masanori ijj KiC, Lord of Hizen; and Kawaji Masanori 1'( 5-Xt-.. They stated that since the Russians had come in friendship the Japanese must respond with friendship —no doubt an explanation for their acting against earlier orders which forbade any intercourse with foreigners. About boundaries, they informed the Russians that the daimy5 to whom the disputed territory nominally belongedhadalreadybeen instructed to investigate all the old documents on the problem. As for the rest of the demand, the opening of ports and the commencement of commercial relations, etc., were absolutely forbidden by the immutable laws of their ancestors. Even so, they had regarded these matters in the light of the changing universe which seemed to bring scores of persons to Japan begging to trade. Such wishes had been under constant consideration. However the very recent succession of a new Shogun required all of their attention, and a decision on the Russian demands would require from three to five years.50 The Japanese also took this opportunity to discuss the Russian occupation of Sakhalin in September of 1853, following an expedition by Boshniak to the island in 1852. According to the Japanese accounts,the Russians claimed to be protecting Japanese interests against prying foreigners until Japan herself could do so. Since the Crimean war was in progress at the time, it takes no imagination to discern that the foreign country referred to was England. The Russians admitted that the Japanese authorities had occupied Sakhalin first. Russian sources state that the Japanese tried to incite the Ainu to drive Russian forces off the island, but this attempt failed. To justify the occupation they issued a statement to the effect that "Inaccordance with the Treaty of Nerchinsk concluded between Russia and China, the island of Sakhalin, being a prolongation of the basin of the Amur, incontestably belongs to Russia. "51 Tsutsui was loath to give any groundat all to the Russians on the score of territorial possessions, stating that the Kuriles had always belonged to the Japanese. As for the claim that Sakhalin was Russian by virtue of proximity to the Amur basin, the Japanese had frequently gone as far as the Amur River estuary and had established guard posts there. He added that even foreign maps showed no agreement as to the boundary on Sakhalin, and that the matter must be taken up later; but as for the Kuriles, that question had already been settled by the agreement with Golovnin. He then told the Russians that although in emergencies they could come into any Japanese port but Edo for supplies, Japan was closed to commercial relations. On this note the negotiations ended. Russians returned again in March of 1854 and asked that either Tsutsui or Kawaji meet the Russians at Aniwa on Sakhalin to decide the border. Failing any permanent decision, a temporary boundary was to be established and laws agreed upon regulating commerce between the two nations on the island. However, the increasing pressure of the Crimean war compelled Russia to shorten her borders in the Far East and the Russian forces on Sakhalin were withdrawn to Kamchatka before the Japanese emissaries arrived. 52 Thus, although the first real negotiations failed to solve the boundary dispute between Russia and Japan, they did make clear the position and desires of both. The Japanese admittedly intended to hold the Kuriles as far as Etorofu; and, although the Sh6gun had forbidden any definite commitments regarding the boundary of Sakhalin, the 550 latitude was suggested as the logical boundary. The Japanese were not ignorant of the mineral deposits, mainly coal, in the southern half of the island which was also valuable as a fishing base. The Russians, on the other hand, constantly faced the spectre of English conquest of an island held by such weak Japanese forces. The British had just gained considerable advantages from China in the Opium War of 1841-42, and if they decided to take Sakhalin from the Japanese, as they could do at any time, they could penetrate the Amur River and seal it against Russian naval vessels. Thus Sakhalin was to become the major scene of conflict for the next several decades; and the Kuriles, which had occupied the center of the stage until now, were to fade into the background.
Page 50 50 JOSEPH L. SUTTON The Boundary Question and Anglo-Russian Rivalry The next negotiations with Japan were also conducted by Putiatin. This time the Russians appeared on the 18th of September, 1854, off the coast of Osaka, causing great alarm in court circles. The Shogunate instructed Tsuchiya Uneme J- If % -*-, Keeper of Osaka Castle, to meet the Russian envoy and inform him that negotiations must take place at Shimoda. The Russians left for Shimoda forthwith arriving there on October 14. On this trip they made a great point of having brought but one vessel, the "Diana," saying that their good intentions could not be doubted, since they did not place any pressure on the Japanese by arriving with a great fleet. This argument had very little to do with the success of the Russian venture, however, for the Japanese resistance against increasing Western pressure had already been broken by the American and British treaties of March, 1854, and October, 1854, respectively. The Russian Ambassador, Putiatin, met again with his old adversaries, Tsutsui and Kawaji, this time in a Buddhist temple at Shimoda. Their readiness to deal with the Russians was shown by their attitude when, during the negotiations, the single Russian vessel was damaged by a tidal wave resulting from an earthquake. Putiatin was allowed to sail for the port of Heda. After the ship sank, the Shogunate permitted the Russians to build a vessel for their return to Russia —the first modern, Western ship to be constructed in Japan.53 Putiatin then returned to Shimoda and completed his negotiations, the treaty beingsigned on February 7, 1855. This was similar to Perry's first treaty. The only part relevantto this paper was the boundary settlements in the Kuriles, disposed of in Article II of the treaty, which states: "The boundary between Japan and Russia shall be between the islands of Etorofu and Uruppu. The island of Etorofu belongs entirely to Japan, and the island of Uruppu and all of the Kurile Islands north of Uruppu belong to Russia." The problem of establishing a border in Sakhalin still remained too much for the emissaries to handle, but the rest of ArticleII settled this by stating, "As for the island of Karafuto (Sakhaline or Saghalien), it remains as before, a condominium of Russia and Japan. "54 It is interesting to note that this first Russian treaty was the first to introduce the principle of extraterritoriality in full into Japanese foreign relations. Supplementary treaties were signed on October 24, 1857, and August 19, 1858, but neither pertained to the boundary settlement, serving mainly to clarify arrangements for port facilities and other commercial details.55 The next Russian attempt to define the boundary was in charge of Count Muraviev Amurskii. Muraviev had considerable success in negotiating in 1858 the Chinese treaties of Aigun and Tientsin which gave Russia the left bank of the Amur River and equal rights with the Chinese on the Manchurian sea coast.56 He had been increasingly concerned with the British, greatly fearing that they might obtain Sakhalin, largely nullifying Russian gains inthe Amur region since they wouldthen control the estuary of the river. He arrived in Japan in August, 1859, with a squadron of seven vessels carrying one hundred and five guns. A few days later two more ships arrived to join his fleet. With this display of strength, Muraviev intended to persuade the Japanese to relinquish all claims to Sakhalin. His title of Count of Amur had come as recognition for services already rendered toward control of this region; with Sakhalin, Russian control would be complete. The entire negotiations were marked by obvious bad feeling among the local populace. Before Muraviev had even established official residence in Edo, some of his men were stoned by the citizens of the shogunal capital, but on his complaint the Japanese officer in charge of the district was removed. Muraviev then came ashore in state on the 22nd of August. Three days later he began his negotiations, but the proceedings were further marred when a lieutenant and two seamen from his command were cut down by some samurai. 57
Page 51 KURILE ISLANDS 51 This occurrence threw a damper on the negotiations, and Muraviev departed late in September leaving behind a Russian officer, Captain Ounkovsky, to see that Japanese apologies were carried out satisfactorily. Upon his return to Russia, Muraviev bitterly suggested that Russia should take Sakhalin by force of arms. Russian sources credit British chicanery with being responsible for the failure of Muraviev's plan.58 During this same year, 1861, another incident occurred to disturb Russo-Japanese relations. The Russians in their anxiety to obtain a warm water port, and to forestall the British from gaining a base off their newly acquired territory along the coast of Manchuria, set out to seize the Japanese-controlled island of Tsushima. In March, 1861, a Russian corvette, the "Possadnick," under Commander Barilev was ordered to set up a base on the island. Hearing of this latest venture into Japanese territory, Edo dispatched several officials to investigate, but the Russians merely claimed that they had put into the island to effect necessary repairs. The fact that their ship had only recently left Nagasaki in good condition heightened Japanese suspicions, and they demanded further information. The Russians then said that they really came to forestall the British who intended to seize the island, an excuse used earlier to explain the establishment of a base on Sakhalin. At this point the Japanese appealed to the British Ambassador, who dispatched an English ship to the island to determine the intentions of the Russians. When reports came back of a naval establishment, complete with the Russian flag flying over it, the British informedthe Russian governmentthat they could not recognize any occupation of Japanese territory by any foreign power unless formalized by a treaty. The Russians then ordered Barilev to withdraw. Later the British Ambassador to St. Petersburg made representations to the Russian government on the affair, and Prince Gorchakov himself sent a reply. 59 From this incident, and the earlier Russian accusations of British interference with RussoJapanese relations, it is obvious that the main object in the Russian scramble to settle the boundary question in the North was to forestall any British attempt to gain a base close to the Amur River region. Japan Loses Sakhalin The Russian efforts to resolve the Sakhalin boundary question by establishing colonies on the island alarmed the Shogunate, and in 1862 the Japanese mission to Europe was authorized to visit St. Petersburg and negotiate a settlement of the boundary, the dividing line to be at the fiftieth parallel, north. The two Japanese representatives, Takenouchi Yasunori;T '9 '- ~-? and Matsudaira 4$' f, Lord of Iwami, explained to their Russian counterpart, Count Ignatiev, that the fiftieth parallel represented the division between the Ainu, considered by the Shogunate to be Japanese subjects,and another tribe, referred to as the Smelenkur. When the Russians denied that the Ainu extended as far north as the fiftieth parallel, Ignatiev suggested a compromise at the forty-eighth parallel. In subsequent discussions the Japanese delegates discovered a map in the Russians' possession dividing Sakhalin into two colors at the fiftieth parallel, the southern half marked as belonging to Japan. With this evidence the Japanese succeeded in winning recognition of the fiftieth parallel, in principle, as the boundary on the condition that a Russo-Japanese commission be appointed to determine a natural boundary. When the Japanese pressed for an immediate settlement, the Russians told them that their earlier suggestion of a line at Aniwa Bay was the only immediate solution acceptable to them. In 1863, the Russian commission came to Hakodate prepared to discuss the natural boundary, but owing to the internal state of Japan were sent back, thus ending the first real chance for a solution. 60
Page 52 52 JOSEPH L. SUTTON In 1866, the Edo government, greatly disturbed by the information that the Russians were proceeding at a rapid pace in their colonization of Sakhalin, decided again to negotiate for a solution. They instructed their emissaries, Koide /'1 f4, Lord of Yamato, the Governor of Hakodate; andIshikawa I,I, Lord of Kawachi, the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, to make the dividing line through Kunashiri, the southernmost Kurile Island. But the Russians refused,61 and the Japanese also refused a counter-proposal that the Russian Kuriles be exchanged for Japanese claims to southern Sakhalin. 62 In 1869, the new Imperial Government established the Board of Exploration of Ezo; and in 1870, the Board for the Exploration of Sakhalin under Kuroda Kiyotaka ~ a - F*, in order to consolidate the northern territories.63 A subsequent attempt to colonize Sakhalin with Japanese farmers was not too successful. As the question of the boundary grew more complex, the other powers became involved, and in 1870, the United States Minister to Japan, Charles De Long, requested a statement from the Japanese on their northern boundaries. A short time later, the Japanese Minister asked the mediation of the American President in the dispute since neither Russia nor Japan had accredited ministers at the capital of the other. Further reasons were the friendly relations between the United States and Russia, and the proximity of the area in question to United States possessions. Also, the United States-Japanese Treaty of 1858 carried a clause stating the willingness of the United States to aid Japan in negotiations with other powers. De Long told the Japanese that the United States would be willing to offer its services and requested full information including historical documents on the problem. The Japanese presented their claims: they wanted Sakhalin south of the fiftieth parallel because of their early contacts with the island beginning in 650 A.D., and they pointed out that a history of the island had been written by a Japanese during the Kyho period (1716-35). Also, trading posts had been built on the island as early as 1790, and colonization begun as early as 1801, while the Russians had no contact with the island before 1806. The Japanese wanted the boundary at the fiftieth parallel, the port of Aniwa declared an "open" port, and a promise from the Russians to respect claims to land cultivated beyond the boundary by either nationals who made payment of ground rent. De Long sent this information plus the Japanese request for mediation to Hamilton Fish, then Secretary of State, who in turn sent it to the American representative at St. Petersburg. The Russian government refused the American offer of mediation, stating that if they accepted it might lead to other Western interference in their relations with Japan.64 With the failure of American intervention, the Japanese took up direct negotiations with the Russians; in 1871 Soejima Taneomi J t A, a State Councillor, was sent to Siberia to confer with the Russian government there on the problem, but failed to arrive at any solution. The Iwakura A 4 mission, working abroad to secure treaty revisions with the great powers, negotiated at St. Petersburg during this same period for a solution, but they too failed. Soejima, however, had come to realize the importance of the island of Sakhalin to Japan, and when he became Foreign Minister in 1873 he persuaded Count Okuma to advance him two million gold yen to purchase Russian claims to the northern half of the island. Soejima was encouraged to attempt the purchase by the Russians'recent sale of Alaska to the United States. Negotiations were commenced with the Russian Charge d'Affaires in TlkyZ3, but the Japanese offer was refused. Thereupon, Soejima offered to cede the whole of Sakhalin to Russia and be satisfied with Uruppu, Kunashiri and Etorofu in the Kuriles if the Russians would permit the Japanese free passage of troops through Russian territory in case of war with a continental power. One writer notes that Soejima undoubtedly had in view the "invasion of Korea from the north. "65 The Russians, though anxious for full possession of Sakhalin, apparently objected to Soejima's terms for the matter was again left unsettled.
Page 53 KURILE ISLANDS 53 Soejima was called to China in connection with events in Formosa, but upon his return the United States Minister to Toky6 informed him that the Russians had decided to accept the Japanese offer. Shortly afterward Soejima heard through Councillor Itagaki that the Cabinet, taking the view of Kuroda Kiyotaka that Sakhalin was worthless because of the climate and the poor soil, had decided to drop all claims to it. Furthermore, the Cabinet believed that the island would remain a source of constant conflict between Japan and Russia and was not worth the risk. News of the Cabinet's changed attitude soon reached the Russian Ambassador, who now sought to obtain the entire island for Russia and informed Soejima that he, alone, stood between a complete and peaceful settlement of the problem by preventing Japanese cession of the island. Soejima continuedto press for purchase of the island, but was soon retired. Terashima Munenori -HJi, i' succeeded him as Foreign Minister. Terashima, continuing the struggle to solve the Sakhalin problem peacefully, sent Admiral Enomoto Buyo 4ftA- o T*N to Russia in 1874 as Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to propose a natural boundary in Sakhalin. If the Russians refused he was empowered to offer Japanese claims to the island in exchange for all of the Russian Kuriles plus compensation for all roads and other works in Sakhalin and a guarantee that the Japanese fishing interests in the waters adjacent to the island would be protected. The Russians at first refused these terms, but approaching trouble in the Balkans forced them to accept the Japanese alternative of exchanging the Kuriles for Japanese claims to Sakhalin. The treaty, signed on May 7, 1875, by Prince Gorchakov for the Russians, and Enomoto for Japan, consisted of eight articles. Article I fixed theRusso-Japaneseborder at the Straits of La Perouse at the southernmost tip of Sakhalin; Article II enumerated the Kurile Islands that went to Japan and set the border in this area between the northernmost Kurile, Shimushu and Kamchatka; Article III stipulated that the transfer of sovereignty was to take place immediately upon exchange of ratification, and that both governments should appoint officers to carry this out; Article IV stated that each nation was to pay for the buildings and installations of the other which they received in the exchange at values set by the appointed officer mentioned in Article III; Article V gave the nationals affected by the transfer the option of choosing their citizenship; Article VI gave Japan fishing rights off Sakhalin and Kamchatka; and Article VII and VIII concerned Enomoto's powers to negotiate. 66 The Treaty of 1875 settled the fate of the Kurile Islands until World War II. Sakhalin sprang back into historical importance with the Treaty of Portsmouth resulting from the RussoJapanese War of 1904-05, which returned to Japan the island of Sakhalin south of the fiftieth parallel. The Kurile Islands, which were effective bases in the blockade of the Russian Far Eastern ports, remained unaffected by the treaty, although both nations undoubtedly recognized that their strategic location served to make the Russian ports on the Sea of Okhotsk untenable in time of war and prevented their cooperation with the more southerly Russian ports.67 The Kuriles in World War II The global battles of World War II made the strategic and political importance of the Kuriles a matter of world-wide interest and concern. Japanese incursions into the American islands of Attu and Kiska were directed from and based on the Kurile Islands. The first American raids on the islands were reported on July 13, 1943. These were aimed at the island of Paramushiru, which together with the island of Shimushu formed the platform from which the Japan nese launched their invasion of the Aleutians and thus threatened Alaska.68 Kataoka Bay on the island of Shimushu, the site of a naval base, and Kashibara Bay on Paramushiru, an army staging area, were to become the major targets for American raids lasting until the end of the
Page 54 54 JOSEPH L. SUTTON war. The islands were also subjected to a number of surface strikes by the United States Navy. One result of the first raid, against Paramushiru, in February, 1944, and of coordinated movements of American troops in Alaska and the Aleutians, was that the Japanese radio began to express a grave concern that an American invasion was soon to follow.69 The raids continued to harass the Kuriles, last bombings occuring on August 14, 1945 —the day on which Japan surrendered. Japanese prisoners of war and high Japanese officers who commanded in the area disclosed later that almost continuous fog made the air raids and surface strikes less effective than first reports indicated. The attacks, however, did disorganize Japanese fishing in the area and drain off crucial Japanese fighter and anti-aircraft strength to defend the islands. As the rumor of Russian participation in the war against Japan spreadthroughoutthe Allied world, there were suggestions in the press that the Kuriles might serve as stepping stones for the Russian army in an invasion of Hokkaido. There was also talk that the Kuriles, as well as the Ryukyus, should be taken from Japan at the close of the war and used as United Nations air bases.70 The first hint that this idea was to be embodied in official policy came in August of 1945 when the London Sunday Observer published an article saying that a secret meeting between the Big Three (Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin) had taken place at Yalta, and that "some of the northern Kurile Islands are to be leased to Russia to allow direct access to Petropavlosk, the Soviet ice free naval base (sic) with an open outlet to the Pacific." The next announcement concerning the Kuriles came from the Japanese Imperial Headquarters in a message to General Douglas MVacArther charging that "some of your forces" had landed on Shimushu Island in the northern Kuriles on Saturday, August 18, 1945. It was added that the Japanese forces there were obliged to resist in self defense. 71 The alleged American invasion of Shimushu was again brought up by the Japanese for immediate discussion at the meeting between the Japanese military surrender mission to Manila and American officers. The mystery of the "American" invasion of the Kuriles was cleared up on August 22 when It was announced that Russians had occupied Shimushi with paratroops from bases in Kamchatka. On the following day Premier Stalin, in his victory proclamation, announced that his troops were occupying Paramushiru, as well as Shimushu and southern Sakhalin. On August 26 a Russian communique announced that the Kuriles as far south as the island of Matsuwa had been occupied by airborne troops under the command of General Maxim Purkaev. Two days later the Russians had extended their occupation of the islands to Etorofu leaving only the island of Kunashiri in Japanese hands. By September 1 the Soviet government announced that the entire chain of the Kuriles had been occupied, including Kunashiri and Shikotan. Thus, the Russian Army had completed almost without bloodshed the occupation of a chain of islands 660 miles long, putting Russia in complete control of the Sea of Okhotsk, fourth largest in the world. On September 2, 1945, Stalin announced in another of his victory proclamations that possession of the Kuriles and Sakhalin was necessary to provide "a base for the defense of our country against Japanese aggression." The Soviet radio at Kharbarovsk, amplifying this statement, said that the Kuriles would be turned into "veritable bastions forming a screen of steel" to protect Russian Pacific waters. Also stressed was the intention to keep Russian troops permanently on the islands "to stand guard against any future Japanese aggression, while assuring freedom of the Pacific Ocean for the Soviet Fatherland." Shortly afterward these islands were incorporated, along with Sakhalin, into the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic.72 It is noteworthy that the islands were not incorporated into any of the republics bordering the Sea of Okhotsk, but into a central Russian state. This fact makes clear the importance of the new North Pacific possessions to the Soviets.
Page 55 KURILE ISLANDS 55 The Kuriles and Yalta While Russia was moving rapidly to present the world with her fait accompli, the western half of the United Nations was still largely in the dark as to the fate of the Kuriles. On September 4, 1945, shortly after the Russian announcement of permanent occupation of the Kuriles, Secretary of State James F. Byrne told the press that, although the Kuriles had been discussed at Yalta and Russian occupation agreed to, no formal agreement had been reached.73 On January 22, 1946, the Acting Secretary of State, Acheson, stated that so far as he knew the Yalta Agreement had dealt only with occupation of the Kuriles, and that no decision had been made as to their final disposition. Shortly after this statement, the Moscow radio replied that the Yalta Agreement had definitely given the Kurile Islands to Russia. In an effort to clarify the situation, Byrnes denied that the Yalta Agreement was a formal transfer of the islands to Russia. The United States and Great Britain had merely agreed to support Russian claims to the islands at the future peace conference. On January 30, 1946, the British ForeignOffice announced that it could not find a copy of the Kurile agreement among its "full records of the Yalta Conference." The Prime Minister's office also stated that it did not have a copy. Next the British War Department disclosed that they had made an "exhaustive search" and could testify that they did not have the agreement or copy of it.74 The text of the Yalta Agreement, not made public until February 12, 1946, a year after it had been signed, states that the Kurile Islands were to be "handed over to Russia" as a consequence of her entering into the war with Japan within ninety days of the conclusion of the war with Germany. Secretary Byrnes' interpretation still represents the United States official view as far as can be determined. 75 So understood, the agreement must, of course, result in a command that the Japanese approve the transfer. However, since the Russians, by word and deed, have indicated that they regard the words of the agreement as final, they will probably refuse to discuss the islands at the conference. In January, 1947, Izvestia stated that a report of a subcommittee of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the United States House of Representatives indicated a desire to annex the Kurile Islands. Izvestia reminded the United States that the islands were already Russian territory and remonstrated against the "rare appetite for annexation" shown by the report. A published summary of the committee's report disclosed that the Kuriles were not mentioned.7 Some indication of the Japanese stand on the Kurile annexation can be seen in the request of the Hokkaid5 Prefectural Assembly, on July 23, 1947, that the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri and Shikotan plus the minor islands off the coast of the Nemuro Peninsula in northern Hokkaid6 be returned to Japan. This request stated that these islands were formerly administered as part of Hokkaido, and that their return would greatly improve the shaky food situation, since they formed the base of an important fishing industry. 77 Strategic Value of the Kuriles That the islands are of major importance to Russia, there can be little doubt. Without them, Russian naval bases on the Sea of Okhotsk and Sea of Japan were practically worthless. The naval force at Vladivostok was denied free access to the south by the heavily fortified Straits of Tsushima and the Korean Straits. In the east, they were cut off by the S6ya and Tsugaru Straits. In the north, their escape route through the Tartary Straits lay under Japanese guns
Page 56 56 JOSEPH L. SUTTON as far north as the fiftieth parallel and led no farther than the Sea of Okhotsk, navigable for only five months of the year. The naval base at Petropavlosk was in no better position. It could neither support itself nor retreat to Vladivostok, since the entire route lay along the Japanese Kuriles. Although the Kuriles themselves lack protected harbors, their deep water affords excellent submarine bases, and the fog provides an almost impenetrable cover against air attacks, as American experience demonstrated. Their location between the cold and warm currents permits excellent weather observation along the strategic air routes between Eastern Siberia and North America. Though their value to Russia is mainly strategic,fishing, hunting and farming are being carried on commercially. Demobilized Red Army soldiers have been settled there with hundreds of girls sent in to be their wives.78 The Soviet press tells how well the Soviet fishers in the islands are fulfilling their quotas, and extols the "socialist competition between the north and south islands." Reports also mention government loans to the people there and additional colonists (besides soldiers) from the Ukraine and other regions.79 As for the Japanese, the loss of the islands not only prevents control of the Sea of Okhotsk, but places the island of Hokkaido under Russian observation. Major fishing revenues have also been lost, since these came largely from areas around the Kuriles, Sakhalinand off Russian coasts. The United States has a double interest in the islands. Possessing them does not bring the Soviets any closer to United States territory, but does free the Russian fleet for operations in vations have made especially dangerous. But the loss to the United States is not only strategic. The deficit in Japanese food resulting from the loss of fishing banks in the North is being made up by American dollar purchases of food for Japan. Japan will be dependent on United States aid even longer than if the islands had not been lost. The Future of the Kuriles No clear statement about the cession of the Kuriles to Russia can be found. According to the terms of the Cairo Conference on December 1, 1943, Japan was to be "stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914," as well as all of the territories taken from China, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores. It is quite evident that the Kuriles, acquired in 1875, do not fall into this category. The next important statement regarding the disposal of Japanese territory is in the Yalta Agreement signed February 11, 1945. Article II states that "The former rights of Russia violatedby the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz: (a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union." Subparagraphs (b) and (c) concern Russian rights on the mainland. This, then, is the reason given for taking Sakhalin from the Japanese. The Kurile Islands are not treated in the same paragraph, which might indicate that they were taken for a different reason. Article III says simply that "The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union." The historical evidence presented in the preceding part of this work demonstrates that the Japanese did not acquire the Kuriles by treachery or violence. They controlled the islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu before the Russians arrived there, and Russia never advanced any claims to these islands or to the other small groups off the Nemuro Peninsula of Hokkaid6. The Japa
Page 57 KURILE ISLANDS 57 nese acquired the rest of the chain from Uruppu north to the Kamchatka Peninsula in 1875 when they were pressed into exchanging supposedly worthless islands for their rights in Sakhalin. Comments by some of the leading protagonists in these negotiations show that this fact was not understood and that the Kuriles were thought to be among those possessions taken from Russia by violence. In a recent magazine article Summer Welles quotes President Roosevelt as saying that "he thought the Russians should, of course get back the Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin, ceded under the Treaty of Portsmouth. "86 Evidently President Roosevelt's support of Russian claims was based on the supposition that these islands had been wrested from her. No record of any Russian statement at the Yalta Conference is available, but former Secretary of State Byrnes states: "The agreement as to the Kurile Islands was reached in private conversations among the Big Three instead of at the conference-table. "81 Thus, if the President was laboring under the illusion that Russia had been the victim of Japanese aggression in the Kuriles, Premier Stalin was careful not to disenchant him. Mr. Welles and the public at large are still under the impression that the Kuriles were claimed upon the same basis as Sakhalin. In the article already mentioned, he says, "Russian possession of southern Sakhalin and of the Kuriles is essential if the Soviet government is to obtain security for its Siberian provinces. Both territories were torn from Russia by Japan. "82 The truth of the matter is that Russia forced the Kuriles on Japan, but now wants them back because of their strategic importance. Granting Russia, as co-victor in World War II, had some right to the strategic advantage of theKurilesthere was no reason to sacrifice the entire chain and thus strain Japanese economy. Possession of the islands down to Shimushiru in the middle of the chain would have eliminated the Russian disadvantage and still allowed Japan fishing bases in islands traditionally hers. Now evident as another blunder in the Yalta Conference was the failure to designate those islands belonging to the Kurile group, for the Russians have been annexing such groups as the Habomae and Shikotan which were never considered as part of the Kurile chain, a move which has placed the Russians within a few hundred yards of Hokkaido. The Kurile Islands have not passed permanently from the international scene. Japan and Russia have not as yet signed a peace treaty. Presumably when such a time comes the final dispositionof these islands will be discussed. The Japanese will probably try to obtain at least a return of the southern portion of the chain. But, in view of America's continued presence in the Ryukyus, it seems extremely unlikely that Russia will voluntarily abandon the territory which she holds in the north. This reluctance would be all the greater due to the strategic role of the Kurile Islands in the present world tension.
Page 58 58 JOSEPH L. SUTTON Notes 1. N. N. Ogloblin, "Pervyi Yaponiets v Rossii" (The First Japanese in Russia), Russkaia Starina, 1892, Vol. 72, pp. 10-24. 2. Pamiatniki Sibirskoi Istorii (Documents of Siberian History), St. Petersburg, 1882, Vol. 1, p. 461. 3. Frank Alfred Golder, Russia Expansion on the Pacific, 1641-1850, Cleveland, 1914, p.23, n. 4. Harry Emerson Wildes, Aliens in the East, Philadelphia, 1937, pp. 74-75. 5. Pamiatniki Sibirskoi Istorii, p. 462. 6. Golder, op. cit., p. 113. 7. Ibid., p. 114, n. 8. N. N. Ogloblin, op. cit., p. 78. 9. Ibid., and Wildes, op. cit., p. 78. 10. Golder, op. cit., p. 134. 11. Ibid., pp. 166-169. 12. Ibid., p. 228. 13. Ibid.,p. 227,footnote quoted in the Zapiski, Hydrograficheskovo Departamenta, IX,pp. 363-5. 14. Kawano Tsunekichi { 'S i ~'. "Anei izen Matsumae-han to Rojin to no kankei" v je At;. ^ — ~ t. G -i t Ptj 4r (The Relations of the Matsumae-han with the Russians Before 1772), Shigaku Zasshi, 1916, p. 662. 15. Ibid., p. 662. 16. The crew was described in the Japanese text as Tojin) A, a phrase which in its limited sense meant Chinese, but could also be used to refer to foreigners in general. 17. Kawano, op. cit., p. 665. 18. Hokkaido-cho A ->i i;, Hokkaido-shi )VL Aj t (A History of Hokkaido), TfkyO, 1918, pp. 311-312. 19. Kawano op. cit., p. 667. 20. Tabohashi Kiyoshi 0 1.? A, -5I Zotei Kindai Nippon Gaikoku Kankei Shi;~Ti.f6fV 04% -7h1rF1..t (Revised History of Recent Japanese Foreign Relations), Tokyo, 1943, pp. 126-28
Page 59 KURILE ISLANDS 59 21. Kawano, op. cit., p. 667. 22. Now the city of Nemuro. 23. A hyo equals roughly 1.9 bushels, but was a variable measure in Tokugawa times. 24. Hokkaid6-ch op. cit., pp. 323-326; Tokutomi Iichir5o4 X '* Kinsei Nippon Kokumin-shiJ.. -i 0 A, tot (A History of the Japanese People in Modern Times), TokyO, Meiji Shoin, 1935, XXV, pp. 18-22. 25. Tokutomi, op. cit., XXV, pp. 336-349; Yoshino Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent, University of California Press, 1940, II, pp. 2;2-3. 26. Kuno, op. cit., pp. 235-37. 27. Hokkaido-cho, op. cit., pp. 300-301. 28. Ibid., pp. 374-6. 29. Ibid. 30. Tokutomi, op. cit., XXV, pp. 107-136. 31. Hokkaido-cho, op. cit., pp. 459-60. 32. A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Asia, Macmillan Company, New York, 1933, p. 128. 33. Hokkaido-cho, op. cit., p. 539. Kussian sources state that Rezanov's orders concerning Sakhalin were to consider it a Russian possession and to annex it in the name of the Russian-American Company. 34. A. J. Von Krusenstern, Voyage Round the World, London, 1813, Vol. II, pp. 282-3. 35. Krusenstern, op. cit., pp. 386-7. 36. Tabohashi, op. cit. pp. 37. Hokkaido-cho, op. cit., pp. 481-2. 38. Ibid., pp. 381-5. 39. Ibid., p. 556. 40. W. G. Aston, "Russian Descents on Saghalin and Itorup in the Years 1806 and1807," Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, series 1, no. 2, 1874, pp. 86-95. 41. J.W. Stanton, Foundation of Russian Policy in Asia and on the Pacific, Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1932, p. 425. 42. Vasilii M. Golovnin, Memoirs of Captivity in Japan, London, 1824. 43. Hokkaido-cho, op. cit., pp. 556-7.
Page 60 60 JOSEPH L. SUTTON 44. Golovnin, op. cit., II, pp. 305-11. 45. Hokkaido-cho, op. cit., pp. 584-5 and Roy Akagi, Japan's Foreign Relations 1542-1936, Hokuseid6 Press, Tokyo, 1936, p. 61. 46. Hokkaido-ch6, op. cit., pp. 586-7. 47. Ibid., pp. 649-50. 48. Paul E. Eckel, "A Russian Expedition to Japan in 1852," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, XXXIV, pp. 159-67, April, 1943. 49. Stanton, op. cit., p. 442. 50. Hokkaid6-cho, op. cit., pp. 683-4. 51. Lobanov-Rostovsky, op. cit., p. 139. 52. Hokkaido-cho, op. cit., pp. 687-689. 53. Yosoburo Takekoshi, The Economic Aspects of the History of the Civilization of Japan, London, 1930, III, p. 324. 54. John H. Gubbins, The Progress of Japan 1853-1871, Oxford, 1911, p. 236, and Takekoshi, op. cit., p. 324. 55. Gubbins, op. cit., pp. 239-45. It will be noticed that there is a considerable discrepancy in the dates given for the signing of these treaties between the Japanese, Russian and English language sources. This results from the use of three different calendars —the Russians, at this time, still adhered to the ancient Julian calendar and the Japanese used the Chinese or Lunar calendar, while the United States and the other Western nations used the Gregorian calendar. Wherever possible, the Gregorian dates have been used, although frequently Japanese dates have had to be relied upon. Where this has been true, only the month and the year has been given, as the day of the month would be inaccurate to the extent of being entirely useless. 56. Payson J. Treat, Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan 1853-1895. Stanford, 1932, I, pp. 90-91. 57. Ibid., p. 91. 58. Stanton, op. cit., p. 467. 59. E. M. Satow, "Japan," Cambridge Modern History, New York, Macmillan Company, 1909, XI, pp. 843-4. 60. E. M. Satow, "Kinse Shiriaku —A History of Japan from the First Visit of Commodore Perry in 1853 to the Capture of Hakodate by the Mikado's Forces in 1869," Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, I, 1873, p. 76; and R. H. Akagi, Japan's Foreign Relations 1542-1936, Tokyo, Hokuseido Press, 1936, p. 62. 61. Stanton, op. cit., p. 469.
Page 61 KURILE ISLANDS 61 62. U. S. Department of State, Messages and Documents, Part II, 1867-68, Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1868, pp. 61-2; and Foreign Office, British Foreign and State Papers 1870-71, London, 1877, LXI, pp. 558-9. 63. Alfred Stead (ed.), Japan by the Japanese, London, William Heinemann, 1904, p. 151. 64. Treat, loc. cit., pp. 364-9; Stanton, op. cit., p. 469; Akagi, op. cit., p. 63. 65., Stead, op. cit., p. 172. 66. Stead, op. cit., pp. 172-5; Akagi, op. cit., 63-5; for text of treaty see British and Foreign State Papers, 1874-75, LXVI. pp. 218-23. 67. TheHistorical SectionoftheCommittee of Imperial Defense, Official History of the RussoJapanese War, London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1912, II, pp. 640-41; III, pp. 724, 742, 798. 68. New York Times, July 14, 1943. 69. Ibid., January 24, 1944. 70. Ibid., January 10, 1945. 71. Ibid., August 19, 1945. 72. Julian Towster, Political Power inthe U. S. S. R. —1917-1947, New York, Oxford University Press, 1948, p. 109. 73. New York Times, September 5, 1945. 74. Ibid., January 30, 1946. 75. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, New York, Harper Brothers, 1947, p. 221. 76. New York Times, January 13, 1947. 77. Ibid., July 24, 1947. 78. David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1948, pp. 369-70. 79. Far Eastern Institute, Soviet Press Translations, III, No. 12, June 15, 1948, pp. 378-381. 80. Sumner Welles, Harper's Magazine, "Roosevelt and the Far East, II", March 1951,p. 73. 81. Byrnes, op. cit., p. 43. 82. Welles, op. cit., p. 76.
The Household in the Status of Japanese Villages
Richard K. Beardsleypp. 62-74
Page 62 THE HOUSEHOLD IN THE STATUS SYSTEM OF JAPANESE VILLAGES* Richard K. Beardsley Field data from two Japanese villagesI are presented in this paper to illustrate the importance of the household as a unit in the social and political affairs of rural villages. In particular, they show that the householdunit plays a peculiarly important part in establishing the status of persons in Japanese village society. Moreover, since this conclusion seems to be true of a wide range of communities beyond the small rural hamlet, its implications for clearer understanding of Japanese social structure and the value system of the Japanese in the largest, national sense will also be examined. It is often said, with good evidence, that the average Japanese is required to sublimate his personal interests and welfare in those of his family to an extent that seems painfully extreme to persons reared in the traditions of the West, or at least of America. It is not often made clear, however, just what persons and social relations are meant by the term "family." We may pause a moment to make the necessary distinction between a conjugal family on the one hand, which is made up of husband, wife, and their children, and a consanguine family on the other hand, which in Japan comprises persons related through the male line, beginning with the descendants of first-born sons, but extending secondarily to "branch families" established by second sons. Any married person, of course, is a member of a conjugal family as well as the consanguine family into which he was born. The effective difference lies in the response which is expected in cases of conflict of loyalties; if a man's loyalties to his parents and blood kindred overshadow his loyalty to his wife, the consanguine family is said to take precedence over the conjugal family. Yet wives must live with husbands as much as children with their parents, and so the residence group, or household, can also be regarded as one sort of family embracing the conjugal and part of the consanguine families. The conjugal family consistently lacks recognition in everyday Japanese situations, and it goes almost unmarked in common speech. The terms shotaifr * (i it 2 ie c, uchi p (X) or kazoku t., refer principally to the household, while the consanguine family group in its largest sense may be called kabus., kabu-uchiA4 ^ (stock), or by other terms, depending on the locality. (D6zoku-danr] JH., "kin group," is the academic term.) The members of this larger group are universally known as shinruiT -$ or shinseki &t A(relatives). No common word seems to be used precisely for the conjugal family, although shotai, a more or less official term, can have this reference in special cases. A married couple in the past might request registration in the village records as a separate shotai even while remaining in the same house with their parents or other couples. Since the Occupation, marriage has very often automatically entailed setting up a new shotai in the records for each couple; but, previously, the new conjugal pair was usually submerged within the household so far as official procedure was concerned, and the shotai seldom meant any group less than a household. The term kazoku may vary in the other direction by referring to previous generations of the male line and their wives, * Based on a paper read at the Annual Meeting of the Far Eastern Association, Philadelphia, March 27, 1951. 62
Page 63 HOUSEHOLD AND STATUS IN JAPAN 63 who, after all, once inhabited the same house and are felt to be potentially present at any time to watch over and help the present occupants. In this way, kazoku comes to be applied to the descent lineage reckoned through men, which is the kabu-uchi group. Usually, however, kazoku, together with ie and uchi, refers to the household group which comprises unmarried siblings andchildren and often one or both parents. Two conjugal families under one roof are not at all uncommon. 2 Thus the Japanese reduce the potential range of family types. Any society must choose between these different ways of treating the same central group of persons, who must be in fairly close association whether they live under one roof or not, in order to resolve conflicts of loyalty which inevitably occur. The so-called "family system," so prevalent in the Orient, is in contrast with that which is regarded as normal by people of Western nations insofar as it consistently emphasizes the bonds of the consanguine family at the expense of conjugal loyalties between husband and wife. The wife in Japan, as has often been stressed, is an intruder from the outside, whose place is most insecure until she has contributed an heir to the consanguine family. What has often escaped attention, however, is the emphasis placed by law and by custom on the household as an integral unit of Japanese society. Individuals and conjugal families alike are submerged for most purposes within the household, which is treated as a consanguine livinggroup. The extended consanguine family, which becomes important on certain occasions such as marriages and funerals, is thought of as a series of households, not as a body of individuals, so that the household group does not lose its identity even in largerkin-groupings. This is amply borne out by the evidence from two Japanese rural villages which will be detailed below. Besides many points of similarity in family and household characteristics between these two villages, there are also important points of difference which will be considered later and which may be anticipated from their physical and economic contrasts. These may most briefly be summedupas the contrasts between two particular villages, one isolated and conservative, and the other centrally-placed and progressive. II. Conservative Tsutsu is a natural village of 404 households (population: 1,868),3 on the southwestern tip of the island of Tsushima in the Korean Straits. The compact community occupies a narrow stream-bottom which is flat and open only as compared with other villages on the steep, hilly island of Tsushima. It has very little rice-paddy land. About three-quarters of the tilled area is dry fields on the hillside and, in addition, most families catch fish from small boats. They farm and fish mostly for household use. Only certain fishery catches and timber from the hillsides are important for cash sales outside the village. The island is isolated ftom commerce and its villages are isolated from each other. For centuries, from before the thirteenth-century Mongol invasions until the end of the last war, the island was held under strict military control, which made it a march-zone rather than an ordinary frontier zone. Because of this situation, influences from nearby Korea or from Japan could not easily enter and mingle; and for these reasons it is among the more isolated, conservative regions of Japan. ModernizedNiiike, a buraku of twenty-two households (128 persons), on the other hand, lies in the middle of the fertile coastal plain of Okayama Prefecture near the Inland Sea. It possesses excellent rice-paddy land and is, in fact, a purely paddy-farming village. The Okayama coastal plain is ordinarily regarded as an area with progressive, advanced economic characteristics based on farm products but also benefited by numerous cotton mills in the vicinity. The area has a long tradition of economic well-being because of its good farm soil and its favorable
Page 64 64 RICHARD K. BEARDSLEY situation astride the main roads. The people of Niiike, besides raising food for household use and local sale, are linked to national markets with their crops of rice, wheat, and i-grass (a swamp-reed used in mat-making) as well as with the mats they weave on factory-built looms. Theirs is not a large nor exceptionally wealthy village, but it shares the respectable prosperity of its neighboring communities. Both villages, Tsutsu and Niiike, have schools, electric lights, and newspapers. The gap between the most prosperous and the poorest families is not very wide. Although Tsutsu, isolated, is relatively poor, while Niiike, more closely linked with national commerce, is relatively well-off, the contrasts between the two villages are not so great as to put either one outside the range of the great number of Japanese rural communities. Similarities which exist in the basic organization of these villages will apply to many other rural communities. Their composition of households is fairly similar. Of the twenty-two Niiike households, averaging 5.5 persons per house, nine (40%) include two married couples. In twelve (54%) of the houses, three generations are represented. In Tsutsu, although parallel figures unfortunately are not available, about one-third of the households, which average 5.0 persons per house, shelter three or more generations.4 In both villages, groups of up to six or so households form an extended consanguine lineage by means of the "branch house" (bunke ' St) system. Through past generations, the second son of any house which could assemble enough plots of landwould set up a separate branch household and take a portion (in Niiike, about one-third) of the family land as his patrimony instead of being lost to the family by being adopted elsewhere. The relationship of branch to main household is not forgotten, of course, because it is a relationship in the male line. These households are basically important units in the ordinary activities of these two villages. Official communications which must be received by every adult are delivered to each household rather than to each adult or voter, as in societies of greater mobility. Village office records are also arranged by household, even down to the personal record of important events in the life of each individual person, which in fact is called koseki 9 A, or "household record." The law also authorizes the household head to act for the household or any of its members or to appoint a surrogate. Hence, only one member from each household (regardless of how many conjugal families it may comprise) is expected to attend the village political meetings. Long established social custom grants to the household unit an existence as clear and definite as that recognized in law. The many traditional meetings and activities which do not enter into legal regulations, such as calendric religious ceremonies or the road and ditch cleaning performedaccordingto custom by the village as a whole, are adequately attended if one representative from each household is present. At the funeral or marriage of even a close relative, one representative from the household pays the respects for all. One takes for granted that when it is said "everyone attends" a particular function, four-fifths of the total population will actually be absent. The only occasions when individuals participate in village affairs without reference to the household group are provided by meetings of the Youth Association, to which all young men may belong; prefectural or national elections; and, to a certain extent, ParentTeachers Association activities of the post-war period. Inbothvillages,wivesare selected by the household as a whole, acting through go-betweens, rather than by their bridegrooms. The new wife lives with her husband's family. Deprived of almost any contact with her former family, she must bend every effort to make herself a part of this new group. Yet she knows that she is an outsider, tolerated on condition that she remain acceptable to the entire household, especially to her mother-in-law. She is less likely tobe sent home after she bears a child, but she cannot have full security until the day when her husbandwillbecome household head. Then the full responsibility of the woman's part in maintaining the name and well-being of the household will come to her. Thus, by law and by custom, individuals and the conjugal family are regularly submerged within the household.
Page 65 HOUSEHOLD AND STATUS IN JAPAN 65 IIL We might expect that a person's standing in the community depends a great deal on the status of his household. Status, to be sure, is everywhere determined by complex factors. These are systematized in such a way that in some societies the qualities ascribed to a person by birth or inheritance are most emphasized, whereas in other societies more emphasis is given to the qualities achieved by one's talents or accomplishments. In general, in societies which have no legally-privileged classes, andinwhichbuying and selling of goods and services and mobility of population are well marked, a person's achievements in occupation, wealth, political office-holding, character, and talents figure as prominent components in his status position. Even though certain status components are still invariably ascribed through birth and other factors, such societies may yet be called achieved-status societies. By contrast, an ascribed-status society, which places emphasis upon a person's birth or inheritance, minimizes the achievements and talents of its members. In an achieved-status society, personal achievements could, within one generation, considerably alter the close-knit household's position for better or worse. But in an ascribedstatus society, the status functions of the household are affected more by the fate of the larger, consanguine family to which it belongs than by the achievements of its individual members. With reference to Tsutsu and Niiike, we need to look further into their structures —beyond the household organization itself —to discover which type of society they most closely resemble. A glance at the situation in Tsutsu leaves no doubt of the overwhelming importance of ascribed status. A deep and broad gulf separates Honko (* f "Old Timers"; literally:main houses) from Kiryiu(i- "outsiders"; literally: sojourners), who are in the minority. Many Kiryii households have been in the village area for fifty years, not a few since before the Meiji Restoration; yet they bear the indelible stigma of "not belonging." Since, for lack of land, many took to fishing as a major occupation, their economic position from this more lucrative occupation may equal or even better that of the farming Honko; but they are unquestionably at the bottom of the social heap because they are not from the "original" households. Moreover, the Honko majority alone is divided into classes derived from the pre-Restoration ranks of warrior (shizoku: tf. )and commoner (heiminSF F ). Although the warrior families no longer have any legal prerogatives throiugh rank, their higher actual standing is clearly shown in social activities. An example of this distinction is clear in the small, traditional social segments called Shimitsu-cho6, = SfT or Ise-Kocho f f j %, which exist beneath the very recently established political divisions of the village. These groups, each containing six to twelve households, constitute cooperative work groups to clear and burn new fields on the hillsides, or to assist in burial ceremonies when a death occurs among their members. Each Shimitsu-cho must be composed partly of warrior households, partly of commoner households, to carry out the division of labor required at funerals. As in most of Japan where there are no professional undertakers, the bereaved household retires in mourning to arrange the corpse for burial; the other Shimitsu-cho members prepare a death-feast, dig the grave, and carry the bier to the cemetery. Commoners should be in each such group to dig graves and shoulder the bier, which are menial tasks beneath the dignity of warriors. Restiveness of commoners under this symbolic discrimination has led them to secede from some of the Shimitsu-ch5 in recent years, rank long ago having lost its legal support, but in the remaining work groups warrior households still do not have to dig their own graves or carry their own
Page 66 66 RICHARD K. BEARDSLEY dead. There are also exceptions to the general rule that branch and main houses of the same lineage should be in a single work group, although these exceptions do not need to be detailed here. It remains true, however, that Kiryui households, with one recent and partial exception, are completely excluded from the work groups. This overt distinction in status position on the basis of one-time rank is preserved quite clearly in house form, also. The houses of Honko, which they always own, average twice the size of those of Kiryu, three-fifths of whom rent their dwellings.5 Pre-Meiji sumptuary regulations were applied to houses, limiting the size of the room used on formal occasions. Whereas commoners were restricted to rooms of six-mat size, warriors, depending on their rank, had eightto twelve-mat rooms and, moreover, had the privilege of erecting a distinctive arch over the entrance. Many such homes in the village to-day testify to the large proportion of households which has warrior rank on this militarized island as well as to the considerable age of the houses. Nor are the arches destroyed or room size forgotten in rebuilt houses. I watched while carpenters, who were putting the final touches on a rebuilt "warrior" house, installed a new arch in the exact shape and with the house mon (crest) of the old arch. The newest and finest houses, however, which display luxuries such as glass-paned sliding doors and expensive imported woods, belong to fishermen, for fishing is actually far more profitable than tilling the rocky hillsides of Tsutsu. Those who emphasize fishing, and so live near the beach, include the most well-to-do men in the village. Yet they are almost all commoner or Kiryi households, whose forebears were suffered to occupy the beach area by the warriors who controlled the farmland and stayed with the honorable, though unrewarding, occupation of farming. Class-conscious descendants of the warrior farmers have been slow to make a primary occupation of fishing and still live mostly in the ancient house-sites at the up-stream end of the village. Theirs is the prestige, but not the profit, in Tsutsu. Thus, we see how the ascribed statuses of household, lineage, and rank in conservative Tsutsu govern social and even economic privileges so rigidly that a high achieved status of, say, financial success cannot overturn them. Whereas the people of Tsutsu rather prided themselves on their social archaisms and made no attempt to conceal the part played by household and lineage in their status system, it was only after intensive study at the much smaller buraku of Niiike in Okayama that direct evidence showed the part that lineage plays as a component of social position in that general area. At the overt level, the people of Niiike profess themselves to be equal with each other and their neighbors in all matters except intelligence. They claim equality in wealth and education, in simplicity of tastes, interests in their fields, and affection for each other. But other factors were quickly apparent: learning and hard work are respectable qualities, and honest dealing as well as astuteness in money matters or political affairs affect the status judgments of men of Niiike and of neighboring buraku. These achieved qualities are even joined by the quality of healthy old age, which is regarded not without justice as something of an achievement for a farmer. The relative respectability of different occupations also was admitted to figure in status ratings, but status was in effect said to be fixedmainly by one's age or personal achievements. Although this picture was not entirely incompatible with the clear importance of households in village affairs, it seemed there should be some more concrete evidence of lineage or other ascribed components of status ratings. For one thing, the Inland Sea region, where population characteristics were anciently established, has a high proportion of villages or village segments occupied by Eta j, -, the one-time outcaste group which lived by unclean occupations such as slaughtering, leather working, grave tending, and the making of geta footgear. Their economic and social position is still very low as compared with ordinary persons, but a reaction against the discriminations which are practiced against them has led in modern days to a sensitivity
Page 67 HOUSEHOLD AND STATUS IN JAPAN 67 amounting to a taboo on use, in polite speech, of their traditional name. This name actually is not familiar to some youngsters. It finally turned out that the village immediately next to Niiike was blamed for stealing, crop damage, and similar depredations, not merely because its children were carelessly reared, but because certain households had the outcaste stigma. One revelation led to others. Of two family names belonging to Niiike itself, the households of one family name thought themselves to be superior to those of the other family name. Younger people either denied that this criterion any longer affected social position or descried it, but admitted,.for example, that the village headman was always chosen from the traditionally superior family group. Moreover, when an incident of violence occurred in this community, the crisis of suspicion divided the village strictly along family-name lines. Further inquiry showed that ascription of status by household, lineage, and family name, which cross-cuts groupings by occupation, financial welfare, and personal characteristics or achievements, primarily determines status position, a situation which is equally true of surrounding villages and in the city of Okayama itself. Lineage and rankl are far less conspicuous features of status in Niiike, however, than they are in Tsutsu. They exercise a strong covert influence on social groupings rather than appearing as overtly stated determinants. The outcaste group of the neighboring buraku is certainly beset by low ascribed status; but at least the younger people respect some of these neighbors as individuals because they work hard, raise their living standards by honest labor, and are not ignorant. Thus, in this buraku of progressive Okayama, individuals may to some extent be freed from the matrix of their households and lineage and gain personal status by achievement. These data indicate that family units which begin with the household group and stretch out to the consanguine lineage are persistent factors in the status system of small communities in Japan, not merely in a remote and impoverished region such as Tsushima Island, but also in the modernized, progressive areas. The individual,, especially one who is not household head, scarcely ever emerges with any capacity for independent mobility, even in these days of rapid transformation of social forms and values. It need not be repeated that these two villages are far from representing a cross-section of Japan as a whole, but they do stand as examples taken from the dominant segment of the Japanese millions- -the small farmers- -and one village represents two of the former feudal ranks —warrior and commoner. Ter. her implications are borne out by the general statements of Japanese ethnologists who, in writing of personal status (Mibun 44 ), emphasize the household over the individual6 and give a conspicuous position to family status (iegara'j 4#q ) in the modern as well as the traditional social life of Japan.7 IV. In two Japanese villages we have observed how the consanguine family and the households of which it is built are so important as to all but obscure the individual. Further, we have seen that these social units function most often in an atmosphere of ascribed rather than achieved status. Now we may briefly illustrate the significance of these observations in a wider field of Japanese social structure and behavior. The most ambitious and celebrated study of Japanese national character is Ruth Benedict's The Chrysanthemum and the Sword. Her remarkable insights into individual behavior have been widely applauded, particularly because of the peculiar difficulty of accomplishing this war-time task without the opportunity of visiting Japan to verify her study. But her method of
Page 68 68 RICHARD K. BEARDSLEY study, relying on informants often long removed from Japan, has drawn the criticism that her characterizations apply less well to the modern scene than to an earlier period.9 Japanese social scientists, moreover, while admiring her accomplishment, have observed that Benedict is specifically at fault for reducing her data to one overall pattern of conduct despite the existence of separate class levels distinguished by different codes of behavior. 10 Criticism must be carried further to permit constructive modification. Benedict's theme is that Japanese behavior and values are based on concepts which are unique in kind, not mere ly distinctive in emphasis and arrangement. She urges upon us a new vocabulary concerning duties and attitudes, there being no near equivalent words in English. But it may be suggested that Benedict is forced to this position less because of the unique features of Japanese society than because her analysis unconsciously uses American preconceptions as the basis for comparison, and attempts to carve Japanese society up on an American model. American individualism frequently stresses the individual and his freedom even above the family and other social groups of which he is a member. We assume that each person should be free to choose his life work, his marriage partner, and his religion apart from family influence. Benedict's concern is this individual. Her study, in focusing on the individual and his behavior in Japanese society, treats household, consanguine family, and class as situations in which the individual is influenced or exerts influence rather than as the real and basic units of Japanese society. She starts well, by citing the family (i.e., household) as the place in which respect rules are learned and observed (p.48), but she does not finally see what our farm village data show, that the individual is all but swallowed up in his household and consanguine family. She treats the relations of household members to their household, and of branch to main households as if they were no more than the hierarchy-framed interactions between so many individual persons (pp. 51-57). As the Japanese critics point out, she then ignores the class differences to which household and family should have led her, although any nuclear pattern of behavior which may be common to all Japanese is enormously variegated by the presence of distinct behavior codes for separate classes. Her definition of obligation and duty, crucial to her entire interpretation of the Japanese pattern of conduct, is predicated on the individual. This definition suffers from her inability to grasp the Japanese conception of class, consanguine family, and household as real and almost tangible entities rather than as mere situations for individual activity. In analyzingthe concept of duty as the inescapable response to obligations which determines Japanese conduct, Benedict found two words in use: gimu ^.and giri ]* A_. She defined these in terms of time limits and in terms of the persons to whom they are owed. Gimu is an obligation on which there is no time limit, owed to one's country (or the Emperor), one's parents, and one's work. Giri is a duty with a fixed time limit (hence also, a limit in quantity relative to the favor received) which one owes to more distant relatives including affinal relatives, to one's liege lord or others who give favors, and to one's own good name (p.116). These concepts of duty, as defined by Benedict, are so foreign to Americans that they have an air of unreality. It is hard to imagine parallels to them in our own society. Moreover, so defined, they have no clear relationship to class levels, to family units, or to the prevalence of ascribed status. But when we rearrange the perspective of the picture by pushing the individual person back into his place as a mere component of household, family and class, we are in a position to re-define duty in terms of the real social units of Japan. We then find that the distinction between gimu and giri is not unique to Japan, but is understandable because it holds true to some degree in America or other parts of the world which have similar social units. Except for kindred, who are inappropriately divided in Benedict's scheme, we do not need to reshuffle the categories of persons to whom gimu and giri, respectively, are owed. We reject the distinction in time limits, however, as being meaningless. Gimu is the natural duty of anyone
Page 69 HOUSEHOLD AND STATUS IN JAPAN 69 with ordinary human feeling (ninjo A. + )11. Americans and Japanese alike will accept, as "natural," loyalty to one's country, family, or work, and will expect such loyalty from everyone. This kind of duty is limitless and unending simply because it is part of life and goes on untilthe end of life. Note, however, that characteristically different gimu behavior does occur as the result of different emphasis or arrangement of social units. To Americans family duty means above all duty to one's spouse and children —the conjugal family —whereas the consanguine family-household comes first in Japanese thinking. Benedict, citing one case of a young husband helping his mother to retrieve his baby son from his estranged but still-loved wife, interprets his behavior as an example of filial piety to his mother (p. 123). Better to think of the miserable youngster andhis mother as putting their duty to their mutual consanguine familyhousehold above personal feeling and conjugal affection. As regards duty to one's country, Americans have never been taught as a nation to fasten their patriotic loyalty to one person, whereas the Japanese were led to venerate the Emperor as the personal symbol of their nation; the difference is real and significant, but both cases assume a fundamentally similar attitude of patriotism. Giri, on the other hand is noblesse oblige or as Benedict herself mentions, die Ehre, the Beau Geste tradition of what "our sort of people" does. It is for those who prize the superiority of their class, family, or individual status position. Well-bred people observe giri to avoid being placed with the common herd. One must be jealously concerned for the honor of one's name in proportion to the eminence of one's class, because what people think of a person reflects on his family, and the standing of families determines the position of the class they compose. For this reason, the most strict and clearly stated codes of conduct come into being among the higher families and the more clearly class-structured societies. Upper-class families of the Japanese feudal period were pledged to their lords, who were the highest members of their class or belonged to still higher classes. The binding force of a personalized class-loyalty or giri so strong that it could supersede ordinary gimu or ninj6 (human feeling) has its classic example in the famous feudal story of the Forty-seven Ronin, which Benedict uses without labelling the conduct of these outlawed samurai as class-determined (pp. 199-205). The head of such an upper-class family who gave allegiance to his lord bound all his household and his extended family in proportion to the closeness of their consanguine kinship. The forty-seven r6nin deserted, sold, and killed their wives, sisters, and other relatives when such action favored their chance to avenge the death of their unrelated but high class lord; or they made great show of succumbing to human passions in bawdy houses to give the appearance of abandoning giri while they waited their chance for revenge. Such conduct would never be expected of the peasant, whose attachments are assumed to be limited within his household group by bonds of human feeling (ninjn). The terminology of explicit codes developed among the higher classes of a society tends to gain common currency and, if class boundaries are sufficiently blurred, may become moral precepts voiced even by commoners to guide their own conduct. From this alone, the application of giri as a guide to conduct in certain situations by Japanese peasants might be understood. 12 But the revolution from the top level which followed the Meiji Restoration intensified the process by using giri as a two-edged weapon to strengthen the centralized state. One edge was formed by equating patriotic gimu with the giri of household to liege lord, through treating the emperor both as the highest liege lord and as the embodiment of the state; the other edge was forged by universalizing the gi concept of duty through urging the "Samurai Code" on all Japanese regardless of original rank. In this way a modern state was developed by manipulating instead of destroying the personal and family bonds inherent in the household-family structure. The Japanese concept of duty has been different in its emphasis and arrangement from Western concepts, but not different in kind. Far from being uniquely Japanese, this two-fold gimu-giri conception of duty is wide spread or perhaps universal amongclass-structured
Page 70 70 RICHARD K. BEARDSLEY societies. The same may be said to be true of other phenomena described here: householdbased status position or the submergence of individuals within the families into which they are born. In America, to be sure, professions of equality of birth and opportunity for all men have robbed class-defined terminology of its class meaning and required us to put class connotations into innocuous words, often unawares, by tone of voice. "Gentleman" no longer refers by common consent to a person of high-born degree but to an ideal mode of behavior for all men. When phrases such as "nice people," or "our sort of people," are given just the tonal inflection which distinguishes the speaker and his kind from "that type of person," it is difficult to say without fear of contradiction that class-differences are implied, even though such phrases tacitly assume the existence of a lower type of humanity. Moreover, standards of conduct which in England may distinguish gentry from tradesmen have undeniably been adopted in some degree by the entire American middle-class, and class lines have been blurred by wealth, mobility and other factors. But persons whose marriages are matters of family arrangement and whose lives are spent in the service of the family for family name, instead of being freely arranged by each person for his own satisfaction, are by no means unknown in America. America has, in some of its conservative upper classes and in certain tradition-conscious localities, groups which observe precepts of the type of duty called giri in Japan. That we can identify both gimu and giri as existing in our society does not vitiate the contrast between American and Japanese society in general. This contrast is better expressed, not in the phrasing of an ideal, but in concrete terms of the respective emphasis and organization of household, family, and class. The Japanese villagers emphasize the household over the individual, the consanguine over the conjugal family, and ascribed status over achieved status. There are correspondingly numerous occasions when corporate status position more than personal inclination affects the Japanese estimate of where duty lies. Hence giri is a word clearly defined and fairly often used, though probably less often in lower social levels than in upper classes. It is clear that successful generalizations about such characteristics of the Japanese people as a whole depend on our acquiring information from a larger number of specific localities in Japan and from groups which include a wide range of the various social classes.
Page 71 HOUSEHOLD AND STATUS IN JAPAN 71 Notes 1. Gathered in 1950, during my participation in the multi-disciplinary intensive research project of the Center for Japanese Studies of the University of Michigan. The materials from Niiike Buraku, in Okayama Prefecture, come from nine months of study there with other members of the Center; the information from Tsutsu, Tsushima Island, was gathered in the one month of July during which I participated in a social science survey of the island by Japanese Scholars from the Eight Learned Societies of Japan. 2. Yanagida, Kunio4.P W G W (ed.), Minzokugaku Jiten & t7.',-t (Dictionary of Folklore), pp. 17 ff. Some significant variations by locality or period in composition and inheritance procedures are cited here. 3. Figures are published by Suzuki, Jiro$4 A - gb "Tsutsu-son Tsutsu-mura no shakai ko5z6o. t8t' 'I 7 A -v ) iF S'- 4 i (Social structure of Tsutsu in Tsutsu-mura), Jimbun A. L, (The Cultural Sciences), v. 1:1, May, 1951, p. 162. I have relied on this preliminary report for verification and amplification of my own notes, made on the same field trip. The "natural village" of Tsutsu is only one part of the politicalvillage Tsutsumura, but it is a complete community in itself. 4. Op. cit., p. 163. 5. Op. cit., p. 67. 6. "A sense of the rights and duties of each person was far from strong. A feeling of household honor was everywhere passed on as a basic notion... and in to-day's villages the powerful families have generally been so for generations; even though new-rich families rise in the village, [the old ones] retain their sense of superiority on the simple ground of household name, and defer their position to no one." Yanagida, Kunio, op. cit., p. 561. 7. "...in such a place as Japan where the family has played a large part in social life, family status has attained an especially large meaning in relation to social life." Yanagida, Kunio (ed.), op. cit., p. 19. 8. Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, Houghton Mifflin, 1946. 9. This opinion is also delivered by the Japanese. Yanagida, Kunio, "Jinjojin no jinseikan.. X e A,. k At(The view of life of the common man)," Minzokugaku kenkyfi A A j J- (Japanese Journal of Ethnology), v. 14:4, 1949, p. 30. 10. Kawashima, Takeyoshi, "l A| t~ "Hyoka to hihan" Phi. L Jtt (Evaluation and criticism), " and Ariga, Kizaemon a '.. SltjPj,, "Nihon shakai no kozo ni okeru kaisosei no mondai0,f.:t- -It, - X - 3 f f. ' 9J Pf, (Benedict's conception of hierarchy in Japanese social structure)," Minzokugaku kenkyu 5^R,~?g (Japanese Journal of Ethnology), v. 14:4, 1949, p.5 and pp. 16-22, passim. 11. The frequent use of this term is discussed by Kawashima, Takeyoshi, loc. cit., p. 5 ff. 12. An example of gir at the village level, taken from the author's field notes, is the emphatic declaration by Niiike villagers, commenting on a recent funeral, thatthe newhousehold
Page 72 72 RICHARD K. BEARDSLEY head, who had been adopted by marriage, had to spend more than a "real son" would on the funeral, because of giri. He had to rise above any suspicion of not recognizing his obligation to the older generation of his adoptive family, whereas a natural son would be excused for reducing ceremonial expenses in these hard times.
Page 73 Above: House t ypegs in Tsuu s w 4ng a 1Ommonerls" hmse (4t Aanld a warrim" isc house I aTright} iMe A rthed entka nce Below- Seenes from NMike~ Grand-^ parents aid in child care, lighht work and i skiied ta:s'- s-mh _as trafflmng young oxen,
Page 74 1 01 W go,, e n e s f r X m two tI~ata, Niak'a,fg ing male anid femal~e TwigsAt and wigs A I )VI/, e, AX: i X h e. t r a.41
The Hakata Niwaka: A Study in Japanese Folk Drama
William Haven Dizerpp. 75-101
Page 75 THE HAKATA NIWAKA A Study In Japanese Folk Drama William Haven Dizer Introduction The western student of Japanese drama generally finds his attention directed to translations and descriptions of only the major traditional forms such as the No6 drama, the Ningy6 J6ruri A { S> at and the Kabuki Ajtf 4. Notwithstanding the literary merit of these types, their historical importance or their influence on contemporary stage productions, at present their position inthetheatrical world is decidedly limited. N5 performances are extremely few, restricted in locale and patronized only by dilettanti. Ningyo J6ruri are presented by only one troupe, the Osaka Bunraku Gekij6oJ. L fL 5-fJ of Osaka, and performances are limited to several months during the year. Kabuki still attracts appreciative audiences among the older Japanese, but provincial troupes have almost disappeared, and in 1950 actors of the first rank numbered no more than five. Although motion pictures are now rapidly replacing legitimate drama throughout metropolitan Japan, theatrical productions are still popular in provincial areas where technical difficulties restrict the exhibition of films. Here itinerant troupes and local amateur organizations provide most of the productions, which are largely plays dealing with the life and events of the feudal period. Many of these productions reveal strong local traditions whose origins go back not to the sophisticated N6 or Kabuki but to what may more properly be termed folk drama. Comparatively little concerning such local folk drama has been written either in Japanese or English mainly owing to the tendency of Japanese to depreciate regional cultural contributions, and to the inability of foreign students to obtain close contact with various aspects of provincial life. Immediately after World War II, however, various directives issued by authority of the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers ordered pre-censorship of all theatrical productions in public amusement centers and delegated this duty to the Civil Censorship Detachment, Civil Intelligence Section, GHQ. From April, 1946, until November, 1949, the writer was stationed with the Civil Censorship Detachment, District Station III, Fukuoka, Kyiishu, Japan, with the duty among others, of supervising the pre-censorship of all theatrical productions originating in the Kyuishii and Chugoku regions of western Japan. Thus he was given a unique opportunity to study the scripts and productions of dramatic troupes from Kyishii and Chugoku as well as those of itinerant troupes from other parts of Japan. It was in the course of this study that the author came across a unique form of popular dramatic entertainment, performed by certain Fukuoka troupes in Hakata S' 4 dialect and called the Hakata Niwaka tf*' 0'~;.l 75
Page 76 76 WILLIAM H. DIZER Origin and Development The Hakata Niwaka, a genre indigenous to Hakata (present day Fukuoka), consists of an exposition and dramatic struggle, satirical and often comic, solved by a play on words. Delivery is in Hakata dialect and particular masks, wigs, and stage arrangements are utilized for histrionic effect. Like most other Japanese drama, it has a religious origin, traceable to the Buddhist Bon or Urabon ja. L festival. This festival is essentially the All Souls'Day of Japanese Buddhism, for at this time spirits of deceased ancestors are believed to return to the family home and partake of special offerings of food prepared by living descendants. While the Bon festival is of Indian origin, its observance by the Japanese has taken on many features derived from native Japanese custom. This is especially noticeable in the incorporation of songs and dances out of the deep tradition of Japan's folk religion. The Japanese are disposed to receive the spirits of ancestors with song and dance rather than shrinking and aversion, and no occasion is so marked by performances of dancing as the Bon festival. Thus, although their origin has long been forgotten, the Bon dances, performed in connection with the Bon festival constitute an off-shoot of primitive Shint5 religious dances. At the beginning of the 17th century the Bon festival was especially popular in Hakata. On this occasion crowds of common people, men, women, and children, in festive dress packed the streets. Possibly influencedby the religious use of lanterns in the festival, many covered their heads with paper lanterns, with eye-holes cut in front, and strolled back and forth, exchanging impromptu jests with whomever they met. Special emphasis was placed on caustic, enigmatic allusions, the participants entertaining themselves as well as others. The opening speeches made at these encounters appear to be the basis for dialogue later utilized in the Hakata Niwaka, and certainly the idea of facial masks and the types of gestures seen at this time influenced its subsequent development. The evolution of the Hakata Niwaka is directly conditioned by the local history of Fukuoka and the nature of her citizens. A flourishing port early in Japanese history, Hakata enjoyed a place of economic, political and military importance owing to its strategic location in the northwest section of Kyiishii, its natural harbor, and its proximity to Korea and China. In the latter part of the 16th century, Hakata was inhabited primarily by merchants, artisans, and farmers and enjoyed a largely autonomous rule. Municipal administration, as well as the execution of justice, was conducted entirely by local magistrates. In 1578 Toyotomi Hideyoshi ~ 4k r @ (1536-1598) visited Hakata during the great expedition against the ShimazuJ -: daimy6 of Satsuma. During his stay he adjusted city lots, made plans for enlarging municipal facilities, and appointed several magistrates. In 1600 Kuroda Nagamasa., ie./Kt (1568-1623) was appointed daimyo of Chikuzen by Tokugawa Ieyasui'ti, I.tJ (1542-1616), and the free and easy life of the Hakata merchants was soon brought to an end. Kuroda built a castle in the western part of the city and named the surrounding area Fukuoka after a locality of the same name formerly controlled by his ancestor. Hakata residents were quick to resent the despotic rule of the new feudal lords who had absolute power of life and death over all citizens and allowed no open criticism. The local inhabitants had no hesitation in challenging the haughty samurai whenever possible, even at the expense of incurring physical punishment. Takeda Shiuro ' W $ Correlates the following tale to describe the arrogance displayed by the merchants of Hakata and retaliation by the samurai.2
Page 77 HAKATA NIWAKA 77 Legend has it that an innocent child sat in a Hakata shop watching the procession of a feudal lord and his retainers. The lord sent a retainer to the master of the shop to ask in jest whether the legs of the child were for sale. The merchant replied fearlessly that as a merchant he was only too willing to sell anything, even the legs of his son. In anger, the samurai ordered the child's legs cut off on the spot. Seeking some means of venting their anger against the hated samurai, Hakata merchants were quick to see the advantages offered by the exchange of caustic railleries at Bon festival time. The paper lantern which covered the head prevented any possibility of recognition; the use of Hakata dialect made comprehension difficult for the targets of abuse; and the enigmatic remarks provided no direct evidence that the participants were guilty of criticizing the local government. Gradually this type of dialogue, later named Hakata Niwaka, became the broadside of the day andwas used as a medium through which Hakata townsmen could air complaints about their daily existence. The success of their indirect censure of official rule and the lack of reproof gave rise to the performance of Hakata Niwaka at times other than the Bon festival, and groups were formed of amateur actors who specialized in puns and riddles delivered in Hakata dialect as a means of criticizing the tyrannical actions of the samurai. During this stage of its evolution, the Hakata Niwaka also lost its religious significance. Once the rulers of Fukuoka became aware of this type of criticism, they wisely decided that it could be used as an excellent sounding board of public opinion and that it also provided the chance for observing the daily lives of their subjects and discovering abuses for correction. Consequently no punitive action was taken against the performers. On the contrary, freedom of expression through this medium was encouraged, and magistrates of Fukuoka often frequentedHakata stages to listen to tales of their own misconduct. Thus the energetic, self-confident, pleasure-seeking Hakata citizens came to find an outlet for their suppressed resentment in the performance of Hakata Niwaka. After the Hakata Niwaka had completely lost its original religious significance and had become a popular form of amusement, it was performed at certain customary places. These included the Daijoji-k. t~ and Sh6fukuji I.4 -F Buddhist Temple compounds, the Kushida$l W Shinto Shrine compound, and the Nakashima-machi + A VT and Higashi Nakazu t + - public parks. There were still no professional Niwaka actors, but ordinary citizens who enjoyed amateur reputations gathered together to perform impromptu selections on various occasions. Although rule by feudal lords disappeared with the Meiji Restoration (1868), arrogant offspring of samurai families and overbearing government officials presented the same problems of autocratic rule and oppression of individual freedom. Consequently the Hakata Niwaka retainedits popularity because it exposed malpractices of the bureaucratic administration, criticized despotic police action, and aired economic problems. During Bon festivals of the post-Meiji period, a yearly All Hakata Niwaka Elimination Meet was held to determine the best performers. The first four days of the festival were taken up by elimination matches of Niwaka actors on Hakata street corners, and on the final day a grand contest took place for selecting the year's champion performers. The last known champion list was posted in 1874, after which the practice died out. In 1882 the Eirakusha C.U, a semi-permanent theater was built in Hakata, and in 1884 several permanent theaters were constructed for public performances. With the establishment of permanent theaters, the Hakata Niwaka became a perennial form of entertainment, not limited to time, season or occasion.
Page 78 78 WILLIAM H. DIZER The Hakata Niwaka reached its height as an amateur performance during the period between the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5). Most plays used daily happenings and current social problems for themes and experienced few restrictions by civil authorities. However, accordingto Hirata Kyugetsu *~- 1 at f, on one occasion the actors went too far and depicted a policeman carrying a bucket of night soil during the performance of his duties. This scene provoked political argument, and as a result scripts (heretofore not used) had to be submitted for censorship. The consequent deletion or suppression of all piquant and racy lines in the plays made them dull and insipid; the Hakata Niwaka deteriorated into vulgar farce, aimed solely at drawing laughs from the audience and paying lip service to the authorities. This condition existed until the end of World War IL At the zenith of the form's popularity there had been more than three hundred Niwaka actors, all amateurs. Female roles were played by men. The majority of actors were fairly wealthy, politically-minded merchants, who thus exerted considerable influence over the masses, but any man possessing the basic qualifications of a sense of humor and ready wit could win success. No records exist of early performers and it was not until 1902 that scripts were printed for reference. During the last decade of the 19th century and the first part of the 20th, various groups of actors formed troupes and competed with each other in Niwaka contests. When compulsory censorshipof scripts caused a marked decline in the popularity of Niwaka performances, most troupes disbanded. A few attempted to capitalize on their reputations and abilities andturned professional with considerable success. An increased number of permanent theaters in northern Kyushu made continuous, non-seasonal runs possible, and it is mainly these professional troupes which have been responsible for the development of the Hakata Niwaka as a commercial form of drama. Most of the contemporary performers gained their acting experience during the first part of the 20th century when the Hakata Niwaka was still in its prime as an amateur production. Since the main actors are fairly well advanced in years, there is fear that the traditional Hakata Niwaka is on the path to oblivion. However, most actors select young apprentices to follow in their footsteps and assume the troupe name when trained. Hirata Kyfigetsu is considered the outstanding living playwright and authority on Hakata Niwaka. All those interested in the Hakata Niwaka Association headed by Hirata Kyugetsu. This organization sponsored a three-day schedule of authentic Bon festival Niwaka from August 24-26, 1949. In addition to professional productions, Hakata Niwaka performances form an integral part of Fukuoka's three popular yearly festivals, the Bon and YamagasaLJ4t religious festivals, and the Hakata Dontakut't ->77,a social celebration. On these occasions various Hakata Niwaka are performed incessantly by amateurs and professionals on temporary stages erected in shrine and temple compounds and in commercial centers throughout the city. A history of the Hakata Niwaka would not be complete without some mention of its offshoots in other parts of Kyishii. Available records show that the HigoJA t.or Kumamoto Niwaka t. *^~ ^ came into existence about 1895, the Saga Niwaka4_ n# 1~ at the time of the RussoJapanese War, Kurume Niwaka x 3. IS' (Kurume City, Fukuoka Prefecture) about 1899, and the Yanagawa Niwaka k ",1 I (Yanagawa-machi, Fukuoka Prefecture) about 1901.3 A fairly recent derivative has been the Kagoshima Niwaka.A tt d. These theatrical forms, based on the Hakata Niwaka are essentially alike with the exception of dialect, since each locality ordinarily uses its own idiom.
Page 79 HAKATA NIWAKA 79 Scripts At first all Hakata Niwaka dialogues were improvised exchanges of jokes and puns, each participant trying to best the other. However, with the increased number of performances and of actors required for a single production, it became obvious that written directions were necessary to assure rapid presentation. Consequently the troupe manager or chief actor would sketch briefly in a notebook each scene, illustrating the makeup, stage position and characterof all participants, and verbally explain the plot, dramatic exposition and general outline of the speeches to be delivered. The exchanges of jests, puns and plays on words were still left up to the individual actors. The hero of the play ordinarily spoke the last comic lines, which constitute the dramatic solution, but each actor was allowed to indulge his own wit and engage in humorous repartee on the stage as long as the progress of the production was not hampered.4 According to an investigation conducted in 1935, approximately six hundred scripts with only rough pictures or written outlines were in existence, of which two hundred still possessed performance value. 5 Since the repertoire for today's professional troupes is unique for each troupe and seldom changes, most plays are committed to memory by the actors, although one or two handwritten copies are prepared for reference purposes. All scripts submitted to military censorship for post-war presentation were handwritten. Amateur groups usually prepare one copy for reference or use no scripts at all. Hakata Niwaka dilettanti have compiled for publication several collections of outstanding scripts. At present the Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan, has on file 123 professional scripts used in post-war performances. Costumes Two articles of traditional costume are worn in all presentations, a half-mask and a wig. The Hakata Niwaka mask in its present form first appeared about 1832 and is credited to Okazakiya Kihei PA -jXt, a famous actor of Hakata. 6 The wig represents the headdress of the merchant class during the first years of the Tokugawa era, a topknot for the males and a high coiffure for the females. Now, as originally, ordinary clothes are considered adequate, and no effort has been made to dress up the modern Niwaka by adopting the beautiful costumes seen in other types of Japanese drama. Staging and Presentation No permanent stages were required for early Niwaka productions, but temporary platforms were constructed within temple compounds and precincts of Shinto shrines. A simple curtain draped from two poles at the rear of the platform served as a background and no front curtain was used. Rape-seed oil lamps supplied light. When grand contests were held, a second platform was built in front of and below the stage for honored guests. 'Since no covering was used, the Niwaka could not be performed in bad weather.
Page 80 80 WILLIAM H. DIZER After the Hakata Niwaka assumed commercial features and was performed in permanent theaters, more elaborate scenery was introduced, although, compared to other types of drama, Niwaka stage properties have always been simple. In the center of the stage a few straw mats are placed inside a house-shaped frame to depict the interior of a room. Ordinarily, a wooden lattice sliding door is constructed at the edge of the stage to represent the front door, through which all actors enter and leave. A brazier, some cushions, benches and tables complete the properties necessary for today's productions. Sometimes an elevated wooden aisle leads up through the audience to the stage. Referred to as the hanamichiA.tL* (flower way), it constitutes an essential part of the Japanese legitimate stage and is used for histrionic effect by actors making entrances and exits. The orchestra or hayashikata # f consists of a large drum (taikok.i ), hand drum (tsuzumi j), flute (yokobue, g ) and samisen.-.f;, and plays both for a short period before the curtain is drawn and during the performance. At the beginning, one of the main actors, clad in plain clothes but wearing a Niwaka wig and mask, advances to the center of the stage and makes a short introductory speech or K6ojo 2. about the play to be performed. A typical introduction goes as follows: Dear spectators: Allow me to speak a few clumsy lines from this high stage amid the hushed silence of the music. We now present a new Niwaka entitled... As soon as he retires, the Niwaka commences. Conventionally, actors appear from both sides of the stage, and on passing each other one will speak: "Say, where to?" The answer is usually, "Well now, if it isn't...," and the conversation begins. Frequently one represents a simpleton and the other a well informed person. This procedure is quite similar to the crosstalking and exchange of jests and enigmatic remarks which characterized the Bon festival and Bon festival dance. With the unfolding of the plot the scene shifts, and other actors come on until all the action has been completed. The Niwaka concludes with a comic play on words called otoshi;.. A typical example of the Hakata Niwaka form is translated on the following pages. The text in both dialect and standard Japanese is included after the translation. The play, a work by Izumi Seimai of Mizuchaya, Fukuoka City, was written about 1905, shortly after the RussoJapanese war. The scene is laid at Haruyoshi-mura, a suburb of Fukuoka City, on the day of departure for the front by the Fukuoka 24th Reserve Infantry Regiment. The action takes place during the war, when even in remote sections of the country people demonstrated their ardent patriotism by displaying national flags and colored lanterns and by showering favors on departing troops.
Page 81 HAKATA NIWAKA 81 THE GIFT: A LOYALTY CONTEST BETWEEN NEIGHBORS By Izumi Seimai Characters IKEGAMI, a merchant. SEIMAI, a merchant. OYONE, AOYAGI's wife. SHIBATA, a friend of SEIMAI. SAKUZO, a friend of AOYAGI. SAKAI, a workman. AOYAGI, a reserve soldier. Friends who come to bid AOYAGI farewell. SHOSAKU, a friend of AOYAGI. Neighbors. (Amidst lively music the curtain rises to reveal a painted background of serrated town houses. IKEGAMI, carrying two bottles of beer in one hand, is walking to the center of the stage. From upstage enters SAKAI, apparently on his way home. He collides with IKEGAMI and stops.) SAKAI: Hey, where are you going with the beer? IKEGAMI: Hello SAKAI, working hard as usual, aren't you? By the way, you know AOYAGI previously enlisted in the reserves and I hear he is starting for the front on the next train. Since I wanted to have a parting drink with him, I'm taking the beer to his barracks now. It is a good omen, my taking beer to him. SAKAI: Why is beer a good omen in your opinion? IKEGAMI: Because Russia will be defeated.7 What do you think of that pun? SAKAI: That's fine. I know AOYAGI too. If he's leaving now, let's see him off. However, I too want to give him a significant farewell present. What shall it be, I wonder? Well, I know. I'll take that worn-out blouse of mine, since it's no good to me. IKEGAMI (unable to comprehend this reasoning): Why is a worn-out blouse significant? SAKAI: It means that when AOYAGI fights he will take as many prisoners as possible. 8 IKEGAMI: You are mistaken. It isn't that word. It is another. SAKAI: You're right. It isn't that, is it? I thought it was. (The two burst into laughter. From upstage enters SEIMAI walking with both hands clasped over his stomach, apparently in severe pain. SAKAI and IKEGAMI watch him pass by.) IKEGAMI: Say, SEIMAI, what's the matter with you? What a strange posture! (Hearing his name called, SEIMAI turns around revealing a face distorted with pain. He is relieved to find two acquaintances.) SEIMAI: Hello! Well met, old fellows! Please help me. Why do you laugh so? Is the pain on my face so humorous? Can't you see how I'm suffering from a stomach-ache? Stop laughing and help me out of this pain, won't you? (The two, realizing for the
Page 82 82 WILLIAM H. DIZER first time that he is really suffering from a stomach-ache, grow serious.) SAKAI: Hey, SEIMAI, what did you eat? Since you are a pig by nature, I'm sure it must have been something that disagreed with you. SEIMAI: My stomach-ache doesn't come from eating. There is an underlying reason for this pain. You don't know anything. Don't call me a pig! My stomach hurts because of AOYAGI who lives next door. We have been quarrelsome neighbors for quite a while. Also, beingthe same age, we took our conscription examinations at the same time. However, since I'm quite delicate, as you know, I was disgracefully rejected. At that time, AOYAGI passed the examination and entered the service. He served safely for three years. I hear he's been mobilized now as a reserve soldier and is leaving for the front today. By the way, AOYAGI's wife, as you well know, is a shrew and chatters beyond endurance. And with her sarcastic chatter she scolds me and says that those who can't go to war and perform their patriotic duty had better die inahurry. You canunderstandhow angry I have become at her. On second thought, though, she seems quite right, doesn't she? Because, how else can a man be useful if he can't be of service to his country in time of emergency? One can participate in this present war and fulfillhis patriotic duty. If I could be a soldier, I could repay my gratitude for having been born. When I consider how unfortunate it is that I cannot do so, it is impossible for me to remain calmly at home. Therefore I went to the municipal office just now and pleaded with them to make me a soldier so I could go to war. However, the official said, "I would like to grant your earnest wish very much. But there are rules established for becoming soldiers; and since you can't become one now, you know it is also a patriotic duty to devote oneself to domestic affairs at home; therefore, you had better go home now and get to work." Since it can't be helped I'm on my way home now. However, all the way home, when I considered my unfortunate plight in not being able to go to war, I couldn't help becoming angry, and then a lump formed in my stomach which gives me so much pain I can't walk a step further. As it is proverbially said of rascals, I'malmostinclinedtoresentmyparents. Grantedthat it might have been unpleasant work since it was done at night, yet if they had taken more pains in creating me, Iwouldbe strong enough to go to war and fulfill my duty to my country. I'm sorry, but I can't help holding resentment towards my parents. SAKAI: I'm proud of you, SEIMAI! You are a real Japanese! That one lump which pains you so much must be the Japanese spirit. You must be careful. If it is too painful to walk, I'll carry you on my back. SEIMAI: Don't be a fool. If I could be carried on your back, the pain couldn't be too bad. The truth is that it hurts so much, it tingles even when touched by a finger tip. I would probably die if your hard body touched my stomach. Please think of some plan to get me home without anything touching my stomach. (IKEGAMI stands backto-back with SAKAI, whose obi he grasps, and bends forward to demonstrate to SEIMAL) SAKAI: That's good! Now you can ride home without anything touching your stomach at all. Just ride! (SEIMAI climbs gladly up on IKEGAMI's back. IKEGAMI, still concerned about SEIMAI, turns his head obliquely as though to glance at him.) IKEGAMI: How do you feel now, SEIMAI? Still in pain? SEIMAI: How wonderful! My stomach-ache was due to my fervent desire to go to the front wasn't it? Now that I'm on your back, I feel as though I were really on horseback
Page 83 HAKATA NIWAKA 83 in a battle. My stomach-ache has completely disappeared. How fortunate! But I have a favor to ask of you. Will you listen to me? My request is this. Since I can't go to the front, I want to play at war to the door of my house. It may be a bit hard on you but won't you play the part of the horse? Just stick it out for a while. SAKAI: Say, IKEGAMI, since he is a sick man, we'll have to listen to him and play the horse. SEIMAI: Many thanks! Nobody but true friends would comply kindly with such a request. I shall be grateful to you forever. (He glances around, as if lost in thought.) Say, I'm really a cavalryman! The captain has ordered me to ascertain secretly the strength of the enemy on yonder mountain. Hey, SAKAI, you, head of the horse there... Open your mouth and stick out your tongue! SAKAI: What do you want? SEIMAI: Shut up and stick out your tongue! (Leaning forward, he grabs SAKAI's tongue with his finger. SAKAI, frightened, sweeps away SEIMAI's hand.) SAKAI: Ouch! How dare you grab my tongue? You'll kill me! SEIMAI: Be patient and think carefully. If the enemy hear a horse, they will know immediately that there is a patrol about. Therefore, to prevent my horse from neighing, I grabbed your tongue. SAKAI: Well, what nerve! I shan't have my tongue pulled out. SEIMAI: Oh, you've made such a noise the enemy has come. Now we've done it! (He appears to be frightened, as though the enemy had really taken him by surprise, and squirms upon his horse (SAKAI) who turns and starts away.) Why did you turn? SAKAI: Since you said that many enemy had come, I wanted to run away. SEIMAI: You idiot! Aren't you also a Japanese? Don't say you are going to run, but advance. (He turns the head of his horse (SAKAI) to the front with both hands.) Hey, look alive and gallop! (Spanking the horse (SAKAI) they all go off stage by way of the hanamichi.) (The scene now changes to Hakata (Fukuoka) Station. The waiting-room entrance is decorated with two large flags. Several lanterns are hanging from street stalls, and a large streamer on which is written "Good Luck Soldiers" is displayed. Upstage, rickshaws are waiting for customers. The whole scene is intended to give the atmosphere prevailing at the departure of troops for the front. Private AOYAGI, accompanied by many friends, enters the stage from the waiting room. OYONE, AOYAGI's wife, hurriedly enters by way of the hanamichi, advances to the front of the stage and looks around for her husband. One of the friends notices her presence.) FRIEND: Hello, OYONE-san, welcome! We are just now going to have a farewell drink with AOYAGI. Come right in. (The group has entered a street stall during this dialogue.) OYONE Isthat right? Thank you very much for your kindness. I have a private matter for him, so would you please call him over here? FRIEND: Of course. Naturally you will have some private discussion. I'll call him for you. (While speaking, he enters the stall. Private AOYAGI comes out wondering what his wife can want.)
Page 84 84 WILLIAM H. DIZER OYONE (greeting him with an expression of relief): Ah, I'm relieved. I was worrying about whether or not I could see you. AOYAGI: After I've gone, you must entertain those who came to see me off. In order that.you could make necessary preparations and see that everything goes all right, I told you not to come to see me off. Why did you come? OYONE: I well understand that, but my father has just sent you a farewell present and so I came here with it, thinking to see you off at the same time. Father wanted to come to see you off very much, but on this very day he is so busy at the town office he can't make it. He sends his best regards. Here is his farewell present. (She hands him the present which is Indian corn (tokibi). AOYAGI, looking perplexed, stares at it.) Look here. He said this was a riddle. Think carefully and try to solve it. AOYAGI: (guessing the meaning, bursts into laughter): Of course. Just like your father. OYONE: Do you understand it? AOYAGI: The first character of the word (tokibi) means foreign and the red fuzz of the corn signifies the red beard of the enemy. 9 That's what the riddle probably means. OYONE: Exactly right! I heard him say so. Just like my husband. Wonderful! Wonderful! AOYAGI: If it means red beard, our enemy,I will make it a victim on the spot. (He breaks the corn in two and throws it on the ground while OYONE clasps her hands in joy. Just then the warning bell sounds, and AOYAGI, realizing it is time to leave, says farewellto all his friends and enters the station. They accompany him to the platform. A thundering roar of banzai is heard, and OYONE is left alone on the stage.) OYONE: I know that soldiers go to the front bravely, but now that my husband has left, I feel like crying. (Wiping away a few tears, she chances to see the corn scattered on the ground by her husband.) This corn is too good to throw away. I hear it is our duty to help the wounded in war even though they be the enemy. Oh well, even if it is red beard (Russian), I'll clean him up. (Looking around, she picks it up.) Poor thing, broken in two at the trunk and what an ugly dead face! This punishment is owingto your rudeness in actions and words toward Japan. Good enough for you, corn. l When I think of you as Japan's enemy, you become unbearable. I'll take you home, burn you at the stake and take a bite out of you. (At this point the stage revolves, now representing the house of SEIMAI. To a lively rhythm, SAKAI and SHIBATA enter the stage from the hanamichi.) SHIBATA: I hear that SEIMAI has been sick for a long time. Since we are fortunately passing his house, let's drop in for a visit. SAKAI: I haven't been to visit him lately. Anyway, let's go together. (They approach SEIMAI's house.) SHIBATA: SEIMAI, how is your illness? SAKAI also came today. Are you sleeping in the parlor? If it is all right we'll go there. SEIMAI (from within): I feel better today, so I'll go over and meet you. (Opening the sliding door downstage, he quietly appears. To the amazement of his two visitors, he bears a twig with a flower in his chest.)
Page 85 HAKATA NIWAKA 85 SAKAI: What is that flower? What's the matter with you? SEIMAI: Well, something serious has happened. This flower grew in my stomach and I'm sorely troubled. Let me tell you my story. As SAKAI knows, last year some time I was so anxious to go to war that a lump formed in my stomach and you helped me out when Iwas suffering on the way home. From then until today Ihave been in bed, but that long rain we had the other day must have moistened the lump and a bud beganto grow. Finally it grew big like this and bears flowers and fruit. After careful consideration, I think that the lump was formed because of my desire to fulfill my duty, to go to war, in short, the Japanese spirit. Strange to say, the figure of the tree is exactly like that of a cherry tree. I think, therefore, that this is the socalled Japanese cherry tree. Again, the figure of the leaf, square and jagged on all sides and having a round center with small lines leading in all directions, looks just like a regimental flag. SHIBATA: I see. The tree growing from the Japanese spirit is the Japanese cherry tree, and its leaf is shaped like a regimental flag. It's wonderful, indeed! SEIMAI: As you see, the flowers are just exactly like the banzai crysanthemums. The fruit is a little bit smaller than that of the spear-flower Since it is smaller than that of the spear-flower, I think it is that of the senryo. l SAKAI: Since it is smaller than the fruit of the spear-flower, to call it senryo is appropriate for the Japanese spirit. It becomes a fruit after blossoming, doesn't it? SEIMAI: No, it doesn't. Since we hear shouts of banzai after military occupation (senryo), so the banzai flower blooms after the fruit. 12 SHIBATA: If so, the fruit comes before the flower. SEIMAI: Now that's more reasonable. This Japanese cherry tree grows and grows in the night dew. It grows so violently because dew is expressed by ro characters, also the first character of the word Russia; and the tree, which is the incarnate Japanese spirit, marches on with all its might against the enemy, Russia or the dew country, when exposed to the night dew.13 Then in progression the senry6 seed is born and the banzai flower blooms.14 Isn't this wonderful? SAKAI: (He hits upon an idea.): Say, SEIMAI, you've got a precious thing. You might receive the Order of the Golden Kite. SEIMAI: Why will I get the Order of the Golden Kite? SAKAI: Well, when Miss Roosevelt, daughter of the president of the United States, came to Japan on her trip around the world, they offered to give her some Japanese article as a farewell present. However, they say that she told them that if she were to have a Japanese present, she would like something closely connected with the Japanese spirit. Therefore the Japanese Cabinet Ministers are very muchconcernedwith what to give her for a present if it is to be connected with the Japanese spirit. If you offer to make a present of the Japanese cherry tree which sprang from the Japanese spirit, the Cabinet Ministers will be very much pleased, and Miss Roosevelt too will be satisfied with the exact gift she ordered. This also is loyalty, to make your offer immediately.
Page 86 86 WILLIAM H. DIZER SEIMAI: Can I be loyal that way? Well then, I'll go along to the municipal office. Would you take the trouble to come with me? (The three leave the stage by way of the hanamichi.) (To spirited music the stage is revolved. This time the scene represents the interior of Private AOYAGI's home. SHOSAKU, a friend of AOYAGI, enters the stage carrying a copy of the Fukuoka Nichi Nichi Newspaper. He is accompanied by SAKUZO.) SHOSAKU: SAKUZO: SHOSAKU: Well, today's newspaper says that the peace treaty has finally been concluded and that the 24th Reserve Regiment is coming home from a triumphant campaign. Also AOYAGI finally received the Order of the Golden Kite for meritorious service. That's just it. It's nice that AOYAGI got the Order of the Golden Kite, but that shrew of a wife of his will surely brag. Of course her boasting will be disagreeable but we should pay her a visit. (Both proceed to the door downstage.) OYONE, are you home? OYONE: Who is it? (While speaking she appears from upstage and sees the two visitors.) Well, if it isn't SHOSAKU and SAKUZO. Please come in. (Both enter the house.) SHOSAKU: You did very well to live alone during AOYAGI's absence. SAKUZ3O: According to his letters, when will he be home? OYONE: Why should any letters come? He explained perfectly when he left. He said not to expect him home alive once he was at the front. If he were killed in action the municipal office would bring a notice, so I should consider that no news is good news. Therefore no letters have come from the front. I'm fully resigned for the sake of my country. SAKUZO: A suitable husband for OYONE. OYONE: Allow me to say that my husband is far superior to others. But all the neighbors have been so nice to me that I'm at a loss how to repay their kindness. After being treated so kindly by all the neighbors, if my husband should disgrace himself at the front, I wouldn't know what to say to them. Therefore if I knew my husband's address, I'd like to drop him a line. As it is, he seems to have done nothing wrong but is returning home after discharging his duty satisfactorily. Since I was resigned to my husband's death when he left for the front, it was all right; but now that I hear he is cominghome safe and sound, I'm anxious to see him as soon as possible. SHOSAKU: All the neighbors admire you, OYONE, for the way in which you have lived alone during the long absence of your husband. OYONE: Thank you. While my husband was at home, I used to get very angry thinking, "How lucky a man he is that he can be idle every day, sitting around in easy contentment"; but when I was left alone many things happened which were too much for me and made me realize how grateful I should have been to my husband. And as you well know, SEIMAI who lives next door is that type of a person who speaks insultingly because I'm just a woman living alone. SHOSAKU: By the way, I have some news that will please you, OYONE. Today's Fukuoka Nichi Nichi Newspaper reports that AOYAGI has received the Order of the Golden Kite.
Page 87 HAKATA NIWAKA 87 OYONE: Well, well, is that so? And why do you suppose? SAKUZO: Well, the paper says that he rendered distinguished service as a spy. OYONE: Yes, I would expect as much. Although it's rude to say so, since he's my husband, it is a wonderful thing for him to return home with the Order of the Golden Kite! Excuse me a minute please. (She goes to the door and peers towards SEIMAI's house.) SEIMAI! Are you home? Did you see today's newspaper? Answer me, SEIMAI! I guess you can't say anything now! You can never get the Order of the Golden Kite by remaining at home. Although it is rude to say so, my husband is coming home with the Order of the Golden Kite. Come and see him when he has returned. SHOSAKU: OYONE, you don't have to be so rude to him. OYONE: No. If Idon'ttell him he won't understand. Why not tell him again? It's a perfectly reasonable story. (Beaming with pride she faces upstage.) OYOSHI! Please warm the sake. Say, clerk, what are you doing? Just fix the fish raw. Gentlemen, please wait a little longer since they are preparing a feast for you. OYOSHI, clerk, what are you doing? (Laughing, she looks at the two men.) Really, the clerk and OYOSHI should not answer since Ihave employed neither. We can't expect an answer from people who are not present. I'll make the preparations myself so please wait a moment. (The two exchange glances, smiling in anticipation, while OYONE enters her house. Soon she reappears bringing sake and raw fish prepared on a tray; but for some strange reason her nose has grown long and protruding, exactly like that of a tengu("goblin"). This really isn't much but please have a drink. (Unconscious of her changed appearances she offers sake cups to her guests, who look at her in great astonishment. SAKUZO is frightened out of his wits and his teeth start chattering. SHOSAKU flees upstage and clings to the door, his face white as a sheet. OYONE, perceives this wonderingly.) What's the matter with you? Come now, have a drink. (While speaking she glances at both men from right to left. The two cry desperately with fear.) SHOSAKU: Ah, OYONE, look in the mirror. OYONE (Pullingout a mirror, she looks at her image and sees that her nose, now resembling that of a goblin, presents the most ugly sight imaginable. She throws away the mirror as if disbelieving what she sees but then picks it up again and carefully examines her image. She whines tearfully.): Say, why has my nose become so long? It's most strange. My husband will be returning home soon, and what will I do with this face? (As is usually the way with distressed women, she believes that the men have tricked her.) There is no reason why my nose should have grown so long. You must have played tricks on me out of spite. I won't stand it any longer. (Grabbing the bottles she has brought, she prepares to throw them at her guests. Unable to stand any more, they flee for their lives down the hanamichi with OYONE frantically pursuing.) NEIGHBOR (entering from downstage and rushing up to the door of OYONE's house): OYONE 1 OYONE! Are you home? Great news! AOYAGI is coming on the next train! The municipaloffice just sent the news. OYONE! OYONE! (Thus speaking he departs down the hanamichi. Shortly afterward Private AOYAGI, resplendent in full uniform with the Order of the Golden Kite pinned on his chest, triumphantly marches down the hanamichi to the stage, followed by neighbors. His neighbor SEIMAI,
Page 88 88 WILLIAM H. DIZER similarly decorated with the Order of the Golden Kite bestowed in recognition of his presentof the Japanese cherry tree to Miss Roosevelt, enters from downstage.) SEIMAI: Hello, AOYAGI, congratulations on your safe return. AOYAGI: Ican't really express my gratitude for the kindness shown by you neighbors during my absence. I did bring back the Order of the Golden Kite, though, and hope you will consider this a mark of appreciation to you all. SEIMAI: (piquedto hear his old foe speak so boastfully): That is a nice decoration all right, but you are not the only one who got one. (He throws out his chest to display his own decoration to AOYAGI.) AOYAGI (wonderingly): SEIMAI, what have you got on your chest? SEIMAI: Compare mine with yours. AOYAGI: Right. It's a fine decoration. And how did you...? SEIMAI: Why is it strange for me to wear a decoration? Useless as I may be, I know how to be loyal to my country. Not only do I know how to render service to my country, I actually did. By the way, I hear that there is someone who was so proud of the Order of the Golden Kite given her husband that she bragged about it until her nose grew very long. NEIGHBOR (stepping in to settle the dispute): Say, AOYAGI and SEIMAI, in spite of yourbeing neighbors, you have been quarreling constantly. Now that you both have won the Order of the Golden Kite, you should behave differently in all things, and I beg you to forget old scores and associate with each other on a friendly basis. AOYAGI: It's kind of you to say so. If it's all right with SEIMAI, it's all right with me. SEIMAI: It certainly is kind of you to say so. Actually the reason why I quarreled with AOYAGI is that he tried never to be beaten by me and I tried never to be beaten by him; thus our association naturally became disagreeable. Since we have both received the Order of the Golden Kite on this occasion we have nothing between us to quarrel about any longer. We shall be friends now, please rest assured. (turning to AOYAGI) Say, AOYAGI, as neighbors it is shameful for us to be sounfriendly, so let's forget all past grudges and associate in a cordial fashion. AOYAGI (delighted with the offer): I'm very happy to hear you say so, SEIMAI. But there are rules and regulations governing the bestowal of this decoration, and it is impossibleto get it without rendering distinguished service in the war. You've never been to the front, much less served as a soldier, so how did you get the Order of the Golden Kite? SEIMAI: The reason is that I made Miss Roosevelt a farewell present of the Japanese cherry tree that sprouted from my stomach, and for this service received the decoration. 15
Page 89 HAKATA NIWAKA 89 JAPANESE TEXT In transcription, the dialect as it appeared in the script has been romanized. Immediately following is the transposition of each dialect phrase to standard Japanese. SAKAI: Omae wa biiru motte doko yukiya? (Omae wa biiru o motte doko ni yuku no ka?) IKEGAMI: Ya, SAKAI, aikawarazu y6 hataraku ne. Tokoro ga kyo wa AOYAGI ga kanete k6bi de nyiiei shite kondo no kisha de shuppatsu suru s6 na. Sore de ippai nonde wakaruru tsumori de biiru motte eisho made yukiyoru ga ore ga biiru motte yuku ta kiss5 tottoru. (SAKAI, aikawarazu yoku hataraku ne. Tokoro ga ky6 wa AQYAGI gakanete k5bi de nyiiei shite kondo no kisha de shuppatsu suru s5 da. Sore de ippai nonde wakareru tsumori de biiru o motte eisho made itte iru ga ore ga biiru o motte yuku to wa engi ga ii.) SAKAI: Biiru de kiss6 ta d6shite kiss6 ya? (Biiru de engi ga yoi to ili no wa d~shite ka?) IKEGAMI: Rokoku horo biiru to wa d6 kai? (Rokoku horo biiru to iii no wa d~ka ne?) SAKAI: Omoshiroka ya ne. Ore mo sono AQYAGI wa shirube no aidagara ja ga ima shuppatsu suru nara miokuri shiy6. Shikashi ore mo nani ka kiss5 totte sembetsu 0 shitaka ga nani motte yuk6 kai? Aa chigawan, ore ga shigotogi no yaburete kirarento no aru ken sore motte yuk6. (Omoshiroi ne. Ore mo sono AQYAGI wa shirube no aidagara da ga shuppatsu suru nara mi~okuri shiy6. Shikashi ore mo nani ka engi no yoi sembetsu o shitai ga nani o motte yuk6 ka? Aa s6 da, ore no shigotogi de yaburete kirenai no ga aru kara sore o motte yuk6.) IKEGAMI: Yabureta kimono ga nan no kiss6 ni naru kai? (Yabureta kimono ga nan no engi ni naru no ka?) SAKAI: AQYAGI ga sens6 shita toki Rokoku no hei o takusan "boro" i shite koi to _yii kiss6 tai. (AOYAGI ga sens6 shita toki ni Rokoku no hei o takusan "boro" ni shite koi to iii engi da yo.) IKEGAMI: Sore machig~toru. "Boro" ja naka. "Horyo" ja ga. (Sore wa machigatte iru. "Boro" ja nai. "Horyo" da yo.) SAKAI: A chigawan. "Horyo" jatta ne. Ore ya "boro" ka to om~totta. (A s6da. "Horyo" datta ne. Ore wa "boro" ka to omotte ita.) IKEGAMI: SEIMAI ja naka ya? D6 ka aru to kai? Nan to yii koshimae kai? (SEIMAI ja nai no ka? D5 ka aru no ka? Nan to iu koshimae ka?) SEIMAI: Yoi, omaetachiyayoka toko de Sta ya. Tonikaku tasukete yariyai. Nangotoi waraiyoru to kai? Ore ga hitai awase ga okashika nanto? Ore ga kore dake hara no itamiyoruto no omaetachiyawakaran to ya? Warawanna d6ka shichatten yai. Hara no tatsu! (Oi, omaetachi wa yoi tokoro de atta.. Tonikaku tasukete kure. Nandatte warau no ka? Ore ga hitai o awasete iru no ga okashii no ka? Ore ga kore hodo hara ga itande iru no ga wakaranai no ka? Warawanaide d6ka shite kure. Hara ga tatsu!)
Page 90 90 90 ~~~~~~WILLIAM H. DIZER SAKAI: SEIMAI, kore, nan kiltan ya? Nanka waruka mon ba kuiawasetoru. Kanete ga iyashika mono ja ken. (SE IMAI, kora, nani o kutta no ka? Nani ka warui mo no o kuiawaseta no da. Kanete ga iyashii kara.) SEIMAI: Nangoto iiyoru to kai? Kiite hara no itamu to ja naka. Kore nya fukai wake no aru. Nannimo shiran na. Ore ga iyashii ka? Nanto warukuchi ba iiyana! Ore ga hara no itamu wake wa ne, oren ga e no tonarii iru AQYAGI ja mon ne. Kanete tonarid~shi de ikk5 ki no awan. Tokoroi toshi mo ch6do onaji nenrei ja ken ch~hei kensa mo onaji tokii uketoru. Tokoro ga ore shite mirya kono t~ri gotai ga yowaka mon ja ken migoto ni hanerareta. Sono jibun AOYAGI kensazumi to natte nyiiei shita. Mansankanen buji de tsutomete, s5shite kondo k~bi de sh5shii sarete nandemo ky6 senchi mukete shuppatsu suru ge na. Soko de ja, AQYAGI ga kanai wa omaetachi' mo shittoru go chakichaki de kuchi no kiitoru no nannote... Sono kiita kuchi de ore atekosuri ba yii no iwannote sens6 ni yuku koto no dekinna kokumin no gimu mo tsukushikiran mona hayaku shinu ga yoka nanto ore atete yui mon ne. Mi, hara no tatsu no tatannotte suiry6 shichatten yai. Shikashi mata yoku yoku kangaete mirya sono t~ri ja mon ne. Shikashi ningen to umarete kite kokka no kyiimu ni yakui tatan mono ga nanii naru ya? Kondo no sens6 ni jiigun shite, s~shite chfigi tsukushite kokumin no gimu ba matt5 suru to ja mon ne. Ningen to umareta onh5ji suru to ja mon. Sono onh~ji mo suru koto no deken ta d~shita nasake naka koto ka to om6tara uchii jitto shichaoraren. Soko de ima yakushoi itte sono jij6 ba yiite sens6 ni yukaruru goto heitaii shite kudasai to issh~kenmei ni neg6ta. Tokoro ga yakunin no iwareru no ni, "Sekkaku no negai de kikitodokete yaritaka ga, shikashi gunjin ni naru ni tsuite wa kisoku ga atte ima omae o gunjin ni suru kota dekin gara uchii nokotte jfibun kaji ni benky6 suru nomo hitotsu no chfigi ja ken, hay5 kaette hatarakette"l iwassharu. Shikata nashii ima kaeru. Tochfi mo fugainaka jibun no minoue, sens6 ni yukaren ta d6shita zannen na koto jar6 kai to om5te kiyottara hara ni hitotsu no katamari ga dekite sore ga itamu no itamann~tte katade ayumaren. Sate kangaeyoru to hanashi no hito urami ka shiran ga oyatachi ba uramiy6 goto aru. Yoru no shigoto de sazo shiroshikattsuro ga ima sukoshi nen ireteoreba tsukutte gozatta nara sens6 ni mo yukarurya kokka no gimu mo tsukusu koto no dekiy6 mon to suman ga oyatachi ba uramiru ya ne. (Nani o itte iru no ka? Kutte hara no itamu no de wa nai. Kore ni wa fukai wake ga aru. Nanimo shiranai ne. Ore ga iyashii ka? Nan to warukuchi o iu na! Ore no hara no itamu wake wa. ne ore no ie no tonari ni iru AOYAGI da. Kanete tonari-d~shi de ikk5 ki ga awanai. Tokoro de toshi mo onaji nenrei da kara ch6hei kensa mo onaji toki ni uketa. Tokoro ga ore ni shite mireba kono tori gotai ga yowai mono da kara migotoni hanerareta. Sono jibun AOYAGI wa kensazumi to natte nyiiei shita. Mansankanen buji de tsutomete, s6shite kondo k~bi de sh~shii sarete nandemo ky6 senchi ni mukete shuppatsu suru s5 da. Soko de ne, AOYAGI no kanai wa omaetachi mo shitte iru y6 ni chakichaki de kuchi no kiite iru koto to kitara... Sono kiita kuchi de ore ni atekosuri o iu to kitara sens6 ni yuku koto no dekinai mono wa kokumin no gimu tsukusenai mono wa hayaku shinu ga ii nado, to ore ni atekosuri o iu no dakarane. Mi. hara ga tatsu koto to ittara suiry6 shite kure. Shikashi yoku yoku kangaete mireba sono t6ri da kara ne. Shikashi ningen to umarete kite kokka no kyiimu ni yaku ni tatanai mono ga nani ni naru ka? Kondo no sens6 ni jiigun shite, s6shite chiigi o tsukushite kokumin no gimu o matt6 suru no dakara ne. Ningen to umareta ongaeshi suru no da kara. Sono ongaeshi mo suru koto no dekinai no wa nanto nasakenai koto ka to omottara uchi ni jitto shite orarenai. Sokode ima yakusho ni itte sono jij6 o itte sens5 ni yukareru yo ni heitai ni shite kudasai to issh~kenmei ni negatta. Tokoro ga yakunin no iwareru no ni, "Sekkaku no negai de kikitodokete yaritai ga, shikashi gunjin ni naru ni tsuite wa kisoku ga atte ima omae 0 gunjin ni suru koto wa dekinai kara uchi ni nokotte julbun kaj i no benky6 suru nomo hitotsu no chiigi dakara, hayaku kaette hatarake&', to iwareru. Shikata nashi ni ima kaeru.
Page 91 HAKATA NIWAKA 9 91 Tochfi mo fugainai jibun no minoue, sens5 ni yukarenai to wa nanto zannen na koto dar6 to omotte kitara hara ni hitotsu no katamari ga dekite sore ga itamu. koto to kitara zenzen arukenai kurai da. Sate kangaete iru to hanashi no hito urami ka shiranai ga oyatachi o uramitai gurai da. Yoru no shigoto de sazo tsurakattaro& ga m6 sukoshi nen o irete ore o tsukutte kudasattara senso ni mo yukarereba kokka no gimu mo tsukusu koto ga dekiy6 to sumanai ga oyatachi o uramu no da.) SAKAI: SEIMAI, jitsu ni kanshin shita! Sore de koso Nippon no ningen! Itamiyoru sono hitotsu no katamarya yamatodamashii ni chigawan. Taisetsu ni senya naran. Ayumu goto no dekin goto arya ore ga 6te yuk5. (SE IMAI, jitsu ni kanshin shita! Sore de koso Nippon no ningen! Itande iru sono, hitotsu no katamari wa yamatodamashii ni chigainai. Taisetsu ni seneba naranu. Ayumenai hodo nara ore ga otte yuk6.) SEIMAI: Baka na koto ba yii na! Owareraruru kurai nara yoppodo ee ga chotto te no saki no atatte sai itakatai. Omae ga sono kataka gotai ga ore ga kono harai atatta nara sore koso shinu ka mo shiren. Nan toka kuffi shite harai mono no sawaran goto shite uchi made okuritodokete yariyai, tanomu. (Baka na koto o iu na!I Owarerareru kurai nara yohodo ii no daga chotto te no saki ga atatte sae itai no da. Omae no sono katai gotai ga ore no kono hara ni atattara sore koso shinukamo shirenai. Nan to ka kuffi shite hara ni mono no sawaranai y6 ni shite uchi made okuritodokete kure, tanomu.) SAKAT: Omoshiroka! Kore nara harai sawaranna yukurui chigawan. Sora notte miro! (Omoshiroi! Kore nara hara ni sawaranaide yukeru ni chigainai. Sora notte miro!1) IKEGAMI: SEIMAI, c16 aru ya? Itamu kai? (SEIMAL, d6 aru ka? Itamu ka?) SEIMAL: D6shita fushigi na mono kai! Daitai ore ga hara no itamu ta senchi ni yukitaka to om5te itamu to ja mon ne. Tokoro ga ima k6 shite omaetachi ga umai natchatte ore ga nottarya d6yara uma ni notte sens6 shiyoru goto aru kimochi ga suru ya ne. Sore de hara no itamu to ga rippa ni naotta. Aa, saiwai no koto ja ga ore ga omaetachi s6dan no aru ga kiicharan ya? Hoka ja naka ga ore mo senchi ni yuku kota dekinnotte kore kara uchi no yado made sens6 no mane suru ken omaetachi mo kitsukar5 ga sono tsumori de uma no d~sa ba shite yare, tanomu ken ne. Shimbo shite yariyai. (Dashita fushigi na koto ka! Daitai ore no hara no itamu to wa senchi ni yukitai to omotte itamu no dakara ne. Tokoro ga ima k6 shite omaetachi ga uma ni natte ore ga nottara d6yara uma ni notte sens6 shite iru yo na kimochi ga suru yo. Sore de hara no itamu no ga rippa ni naotta. Aa, saiwai na koto daga ore ga omaetachi ni sodan ga aru ga kiite kurenai ka? Hoka de wa nai ga ore mo senchi ni yuku. koto ga dekinai kara kore kara uchi no to made sens6 no mane suru kara omaetachi mo ki'tsukar5 ga sono tsumori de uma no d~sa o shite kure, tanomu yo. Shimb5 shite kure.) SAKAI: Ne, IKEGAMI, by~nin no yfi koto ja ken shimb6 shite uma no mane se ja. (Ne, IKE-. GAMI, by~nin no iu koto dakara shimb6 shite uma no mane o shiy6.) SEIMAI: Arigataka! Tomodachi nara koso shinsetsu ni kiite yaru. Onna wasureya sen. (Arigatai! Tomodachi nara koso shinsetsu ni kiite kureru. On wa wasurenai.) Do.shitemo ore ga kihei ja ne. Soko de taich6 kara muk6 no yama ni teki ga dono gurai iru ka, teki ni shirenu yo ni mite koi nan to yii meirei o uketa ya ne. Yoi, SAKAI, kora, uma no atama..... Kuchi akete shita ba dashiyai! (D6shitemo ore ga kihei da ne. Soko de taich6 kara muk6 no yama ni teki ga dono kurai iru ka, teki ni shirenai y6 ni mite koi nado to iu meirei o uketa yo. Yoi, SAKAI, kora uma no atama... kuchi o akete shita o dase!)
Page 92 92 92 ~~~~~~WILLIAM H. DIZER SAKAI: D6 suru to kai? (D6 suru no ka?) SEIMAI: Yoka! Shita ba dashiyai! (Ii yo! Shita o dase!) SAKAI: Itaka! Ore ga shita ba tsukamu yatsu ga aru kai? Shmnu gal (Itai l Ore no shita o tsukamu yatsu ga aru ka? Shinu ga!) SEIMAI: Sa, sore ba shimb6 se ja. Y6 to kangaetenyai. Uma no koe de teki ga sugu sekk6 no kita koto ba shiru. Soko de uma no inanaki o tomeru tame omae ga shita ba tsukamidashiyoru to tai. (Sa, sore o shimbO shite yoku kangaete miro. Uma no koe de teki ga sugu sekk6 no kita koto o shiru. Sokocle uma no inanaki o tomeru tame omae no shita o tsukamidashite iru no da.) SAKAL: Ma, ee kishoku shita. Tsukamidasarete tamaru kai? (Ma, ii kishoku shita. Tsukamidasarete tamaru ka?) SEIMAI: Aa.... Ammani yakamashiku yii ken teki ga kita. Sa, 6goto no dekita! (Aa.... Amari yakamashiku iii kara teki ga kita. Sa, 6goto ga dekita!) Nangotoi ushiro sai mukinaotta to kai? (Nandatte ushiro ni mukinaotta no ka?) SAKAI: Teki ga 6zei kita to omae ga yii ken nigeru to tai. (Teki ga 6zei kita to omae ga iii kara nigeru no da.) SEIMAI: E kono baka ga, kisama mo Nippon ni umaretoru to jar6 ga nigeru nanto s6 gen koto iwanna mae e susume! (f kono baka ga, kisama mo Nippon ni umaretan ja nai ka? Nigeru nado to sonna koto iwazu ni mae e susume!) E futaranuruka! Shikkari kaken ka? (-E namanurui! Shikkari kakero!) FRIEND: Ya, QYONE-san, yoitokoi kinatta. Ch6do imakono mise de mmna AQYAGI to wakare no sakazuki shiyoru. Sa, mise sai kinai. (Ya, QYONE-san, yoi tokoro ni kinasaimashita. Ch6do ima kono mise de minna AOYAGI to wakare no sakazuki o kawashite iru tokoro desu. Sa, mise ni ohairinasai.) QYONE: 56 de gozaimasu na? Dandan arigat6 gozaimasu ga watasha kagitta y~ji no atte teishui aii kimashita ga gomeiwaku de gozaimasu ga chotto teishu ba koko made yonde tsukawasai. (56 de gozaimasu ka? Iroiro arigat6 gozaimasu ga watashi wa naimitsu no hanashi ga atte teishu ni ai ni kimashita ga gomeiwaku de gozaimasu ga chotto teishu o koko, made yonde kudasai.) FRIEND: 56 na. Naruhodo. Mata naish5 no hanashi mo ar6. Sonnara yonde yar6. (56 da ne. Naruhodo. Mata naisho no hanashi mo ar6. Sonnara yonde yar6.) QYONE: Aa, ando shita. Awaruru jaro6 ka to om6te shimpai shite kimashita. (Aa, ando shita. Awareru dar5 ka to omotte shimpai shite kimashita.) AQYAGI: Ore ga shuppatsu shita atoi ch6nai no miokurinin ni chotto ippai dasanya naran. Sono y6i mo aru kara ky6 wa miokuri ni wa kozu ni banji futsug6 naka goto senya naran to iitsuketoru. Soree nangotoi kita to kai? (Ore ga shuppatsu shita ato ni ch6nai no miokurinin ni chotto lippai dasanakereba naranai. Sono y6i mo aru kara ky6 wa miokuri ni wa kozu ni banji futsug6 no nai y6 ni seneba, naranai to iitsuketa noni naze kita no ka?) OYONE: Sora watashi mo yoku sh~chi shitorimasu ga ima sato no toto-san kara sembetsu no shinamono ba motte kimashita ken miokuri katagata kore made kimashita. Toto
Page 93 HAKATA NIWAKA 9 93 san mo zehi miokuri ga, shitaka, ga, ky6 ni kagitte yakuba, no ho6 ga isogashii shite koraren ken anata eyoroshiku yiite yarete. S6shite sembetsu no shinamono ga kore de gozaimasu. (Sore wa watashi MO yoku sh6chi shite imashita ga ima sato no ot6 -san kara sembetsu no shinamono o motte kimashita kara miokuri katagata kore made kimashita. 0t6-san mo zehi miokuri ga shitai ga ky6 ni kagitte yakuba no ho6 ga isogashikute korarenai kara anata, ni yoroshiku itte kure to no koto deshita. Sashite sembetsu no shinamono ga. kore de gozaimasu.) Moshi kore wa nandemo hanjimon de gozaimasu ga na. Y6 to kangaete hanjitennasai. (Moshi kore wa nandemo hanj imono de gozaimasu s6 desu. Yoku kangaete hanjite goran nasai.) AQYAGI: Naruhodo. Sasuga oyaji ja na., (Naruhodo. Sasuga oyaji da na.) QYONE: Wakarimashita, na? (Wakarimashita ka?) AQYAGI: "T~kibill no "t6"1 no ji wa "karall to yii ji, mata kono "t6kibi"l no ke no akai tokoro wa akahige to yii hanjimono jaro. ("T~kibill no "t6"1 no ji wa "karall to iu ji, mata kono "t6kibill no ke no akai tokoro wa akahige to iii hanjimono dar6.) QYONE: Chigaimassen. Sono t6ri de gozaimasu. Watasha, kiite kimashita. Sasuga watashi no teishu ga, to aru. Kanshin! Kanshin! (Tashika, ni sono t6ri desu. Watashi wa kiite kimashita. Sasuga watashi no teishu dake aru. Kanshin! Kanshmn!) AQYAGI: Akahige nara, ore ga kado de no chimatsuri. (Akahige nara ore no kado de no chimatsuri da.) QYONE: Gunjin to mona isagiyoku shuppatsu suru mono to yii kota sh6chi shitoru ga sate k6 shite wakarete miru to nan to naku namida no deru. (Gunjin to iii mono wa isagiyoku shuppatsu suru mono to wa sh6chi shite iru ga sate k6 shite wakarete miru to nan to naku namida ga deru.) Kono t6kibi mo suteru to nya oshika ga nandemo hanashi kikya fush6 shita mono nara tekihei demo taslukete yaranya naran ge na. Yokatai. Akahige no shitai demo katazukete miy6., (Kono t6kibi mo suteru no ni wa oshii ga nandemo hanashi ni kikeba fush6 shita mono nara tekihei demo tasukete yaraneba naranai. Ii desu. Akahige no shitai demo katazukete miy6.) Kawais6 ni d6naka kara futatsui orarete shinigao no mligurushika koto. Ima made ga Nippon ni taijite burei na koto ytitari shitari shita bachi bai. Kore ga ee kibi, t6kibi, sannen kibi. Nippon no teki to omoya nan to naku tsuranikuka. Ima kara uchii motte kaette hiaburi ni awasetewatashi ga kuitsuite yarimash&. (Kawais6 ni d6naka kara futatsu ni orarete shinigao no migurushii koto., Ima made Nippon ni taishite burei na koto o ittari shitari shita bachi da yo. Kore wa ii kibi, t6kibi, sannen kibi. Nippon no teki to omoeba nan to naku tsuranikui. Ima kara uchi ni motte kaette hiaburi ni awasete watashi ga kuitsuite yarimash6.) SHIBATA: SEIMAI mo naga no byaki de komattoru moy6 jaken saiwai omote toru kara tazunete miy6. (SE IMAI mo nagai by~ki de komatte iru myoy6 dakara saiwai omote o t6ru kara tazunete miy6.,) SAKAI: Ore mo chikagoro wa mimai senoru kara tonikaku tazuneru kotoi sh6. (Ore mo chikagoro wa mimai shinai kara, tonikaku tazuneru koto ni shiy5.) SHIBATA: SEIMAI, by6ki wa d6 aru ya? Ky6 wa SAKAI mo kitoru. Zashikii netoru to ya? Sashitsukae no nakerya sokoi ik6 ka? (SEIMAI, by6ki wa, d5 ka? Ky6 wa SAKAI mo kite iru. Zashiki ni nete iru no ka? Sashitsukae ga, nakereba. sokoni ik-6 ka?.)
Page 94 94 4WILLIAM H. DIZER SEIMAI: Ky6 wa kokoromochi mo yoka ken ore ga sokoi itte aO. (Ky6 wa kokoromochi mo yoi kara ore ga soko ni itte a5,.) SAKAI: Sono hana wa nankai? D~shita to kai? (Sono hana wa nanika? D~shita no da?) SEIMAI: Sa, kore ga daiji no dekitoru tai. Kono hana ga hara kara haete ore mo komattoru ga sono wake ba kiite yariyai. SAKAI mo shittoru goto kyonen no itsujatta ka ne, sens6 ni yukitaka tame harai katamari no dekite tochii de nangi shitoru toki omae ga tasukete yatta. Sore kara ky6 made mo netsuite kono aida kara no pagaame de izure hara no katamari ga shimetta ka shite sono katamari kara me no deta no ga hajimari de t6t6 kono t~rii futotte hana mo sakya mi mo naru ga ittai kangaete mirya hajimarii dekita katamari to yi ga chilgi ga tsukushitai ka, sens6 ni yukitaka to yii isshin ga katamatta to ja ken tsumari yamatodamashii ja mon ne. Tokoro ga fushigi na koto nya kono ki no moy6 ga sakurai hitotsu mo chigawan. Soko de ore ga kono ki ga yamato zakura jars to omotoru. Mata kono ha no katachi ga kaku de shih-o ni dekoboko no dekite ha no mannaka ni maru no hone ga atte, sorekara kobone no shihU e chittoru guai wa d-ashitemo rentaiki ja mon ne. (Sa, kore ga daiji ga dekita no da. Kono hana ga hara kara naete ore mo komatte iru ga sono wake o kiite kure. SAKAI mo shitte iru y6 ni kyonen no itsu datta ka ne, sens6 niyukitai tame hara ni katamari ga dekite tochii denangi shite iru toki ni omae ga tasukete kureta. Sore kara kyd made mo netsuite kono ailca no nagaame de izure hara no katamari ga shimetta no ka, sono katamari kara me no deta no ga hajimari de t6t6 kono tlri ni futotte hana mo sakeba mi mo naru ga ittai kangaete mireba hajime ni dekita katamari to iti- no ga chiigi ga tsukushitai, senso ni yukitai to iii isshin ga katamatta no dakara tsumari yamatodamashii na no da. Tokoro ga fushigi na koto ni wa kono ki no moy6 ga sakura ni hitotsu mo chigawanai. Soko de ore wa kono ki ga yamato zakura dar6 to omotte iru. Mata kono ha no katachi ga kaku de shih6 ni dekoboko ga dekite ha no mannaka ni maru no hone ga atte, sore kara kobone no shih6 ni chitte iru guai wa d6shitemo rentaiki da.) SHIBATA: Naruhodo, yamatodamashii kara haeta ki ga yamato zakura de sono ha ga rentaiki no moy6 shitoru to jitsu ni kanshin ja ne. (Naruhodo, yamatodamashii kara haeta ki ga yamato zakura de sono ha ga rentaiki no moy6 shite iru to wa jitsu ni kanshin da ne.) SEIMAI: Hana wa omaetachi ga miru t6ri banzai gikui hitotsu mo kawaran. Mi ga manry6 no mi no sukoshi komaka to ja ne. Sokode manry6 no mi no komai no dakara senryo dar6 to om6te iru. (Hana wa omaetachi ga mniru t6ri banzai giku ni hitotsu mo kawaranai. Miga manry6 no mi no sukoshi chiisai no da ne. Sokode manry6 no mi no chiisai no dakara senry6 dar6 to omotte iru.) SAKAI: Manryb no mi yori komai kara senry6 ta yamatodamashii ni tekit6 shitoru. Soko de sono mi wa hana no saita ato de mi no naru tai ne. (Manry6 no mi yori chiisai kara senry6 to wa yamatodamashii ni tekit6 shite iru. Sokode sono mi wa hana no saita ato de mi ga naru no da ne.) SEIMAI: Tokoro ga s6 ja naka. Senry6 shite banzai no koe kiku ken senryo no mi no natte banzai no hana ga saku no da. (Tokoro ga sU ja nai. Senry5 shite banzai no koe o kiku kara senry5 no mi ga natte banzai no hana ga saku no da.) SHIBATA: S6, surya mi ga sakii natte ato kara hana no saku ya ne. (So sureba mi ga saki ni natte ato kara hana ga saku no da ne.)
Page 95 HAKATA NIWAKA 9 95 SEIMAI: Sore ga ima yii goto ril atattoru. Mata yotsuyui' utasuru to kono yamato zakura ga futoru no nannotte. Muk~mizu ni susumu to yfi nya yotsuyu no Iltsuyu"l to yii ji wa Rokoku no "rollno jija ken sono yotsuyu no tsuyu ni awaseta nara tonto issh~kenmei susumu. Soshite susumui tsukete senry6 no mi no natte banzai no hana ga saku ga do kai? (Sore ga ima ifa y6 ni rikutsu ni atatte iru. Mata yotsuyu ni utas era kono yamato zakura ga futoru koto to ittara....Muk6mizu ni susumu to iui no wa yotsuyu no Iltsuyullto iii ji wa Rokoku no "roll no ji dakara sono yotsuyu no tsuyu ni awasete nara dondon issh6kenmei ni susumu no da. S~shite susumu ni tsukete senry6 no mi ga natte banzai no hana ga saku to wa d6 da ne?) SAKAL: Kora, SEIMAI, omae wa ogoto no dekitoru.- Hyotto suru to kinshi kunsh6 ni naru ka mo shiren zo. (Kora, SEIMAI, omae wa 6goto ga dekita zo. Hyotto shitara kinshi kunsh5 ni naru ka mo shirenai zo.) SEIMAI: D~shite kinshi kunsh5 ni naru kai? (D6shite kinshi kunsh6 ni naru no ka?) SAKAT: Sa, sore ga kondo Beikoku dait-ory?5 no musume Riizuberuto-j5 ga sekai manyii no to ni Nippon ni korareta kara nani ka sembetsu to shite Nippon kara shinamono ba shinja shiy5 to iwareta. Tokoro ga Riizuberuto-jo ga iwaruru koto nya sekkaku Nippon kara shinamono morau nara Nippon no yamatodamashii ni chinanda mono ga moraitai to iwaruru ge na. Sore de Nippon no daijingata mo yamatodamashii ni chm'amumono nara nan ba shinj6 shitara yokar6 kai to yiite ima nakanaka no oshim.pai sareyoru. Soko de ima omae ga yamatodamashii kara haeta sono yamato zakura ba kenj5 suru to yiite negaideru nara daijingata mo oyorokobi, mata Riizuberuto-jomo chi~mon d~ri no shina ba mor6te manzoku sarurui chigawan. Kore mo chfigi no hitotsu ja ken sassoku negaideten yai. (Sa, sore ga kondo Beikoku dait5ry6 no musume Riizuberuto-j6 ga sekai manyti no to ni Nippon ni korareta kara nani ka sembetsu to shite Nippon kara shinamono o shinj5 shiy6 to iwareta. Tokoro ga Riizuberuto-j6 ga iwareru kotoni wa sekkaku Nippon kara shinamono morau nara Nippon no yamatodamashii ni chinanda mono ga moraitai to iwareru s6 da. Sorede Nippon no daijingata mo yamatodamashii ni chinamu mono nara nani o shinja shitara yoi dar6 ka, to itte ima nakanaka oshimpai o sarete iru. Soko, de ima omae ga yamatodamashii kara haeta sono yamato zakura o kenj6 suru to itte negaideru nara daijingata mo oyorokobi, mata Rfizuberuto-j6 mo chiimon d6ri no shina o moratte manzoku sareru ni chigainai. Kore mo chiigi no hitotsu dakara, sassoku negaidete kure.) SEIMAI: S5 surya chiigi no hitotsui naru ya? Sonnara ima kara yakushoi yuk5. Omaetachi mo melwaku nagara kite yariyai? (S6 sureba chfigi no hitotsu ni naru ka? Sonnara ima kara yakusho ni yuk6. Omaetachi mo meiwaku nagara kite kurenai ka?) SHOSAKU: Tokii ni ky5 no shimbun no moy5 de wa iyoiyo k~wa mo naritatte k6bi 24 Rentai mo chikaii uchi gaisen suru sO ja ne. Sore kara AQYAGI mo senchi de hij6 ni hataraite iyoiyo kinshi kunsh5 mor~toru ya ne. (Toki ni ky5 no shimbun no moy6 de wa iyoiyo k6wa mo naritatte kabi 24 Rentai mo chikai uchi ni gaisen suru s6 da ne. Sore kara AQYAGI mo senchi de hij6 ni hataraite iyoiyo kinshi kunsh5 morattayo.) SAKUZO: Sore tai. AQYAGI ga kinshi kunsh6 wa yoka ga ano kanai no yatsu ga ibarui chigawan. (Sore da yo. AQYAGI no kinshi kunsho6 wa yoi ga ano kanai no yatsu ga ibaru ni chigainai.) SHOSAKU: Sa, sono t6ri ibaru to ga kii kuwan batten aisatsu dakya seja ne. (Sa, sono t6ri ibarunowakinikuwanai ga aisatsu dake wa shinakereba....) QYONE-san, uchi na? (QYONE-san, ouchi desu ka?)
Page 96 96 96 ~~~~~~WILLIAM H. DIZER QYONE: Donata de gozaimasu na? (Donata de gozaimasu ka?) Donata ka to omoya SHO5SAKUsanto SAKUZO5-san tai. Ma, Ohainnasai. (Donata ka to omottara SHOSAKU-san to SAKUZO-san desu ne. Ma, ohairinasai.) SHOSAKU: Toki ni QYONE-san, AOYAGI ga rusu wa y5 hitori de kurashite yukinatta na. (Toki ni OYONE-san, AOYAGI no rusuchii wa yoku hitori de kurashite yukimashita na.) SAKUZO: Tegami nya itsu kaeru to na? (Tegami de wa itsu kaeru ka?) QYONE: Tegami ga kimasu mon kai? Shuppatsu suru jibun ni chanto yiite gozaimasu. Senchi ni yukya ikite kaeran to omoe, shinda nara yakusho kara tsiichi shite kuru kara tayori no naka aida ga buji de iru to omoete yiite gozaimasu. Sore de senchi kara tegami nanto kita kota gozaimasen. filbun kokka no tamei kakugo shite gozaimasu. (Tegami ga kimasu mono desu ka? Shuppatsu suru jibun ni chanto iimashita. Senchi ni yukeba ikite kaeranai to omoe, shinda, nara yakusho kara tsiichi shite kuru kara tayori no nai aida ga buji de iru to omoe to iimashita. Sore de senchi kara tegami nado kita koto wa gozaimasen. Jilbun kokka no tame kakugo shite gozaimasu.) SAKUZO: Sasuga OYONE-san no teishu ja na. (Sasuga QYONE-san no teishu da lie.) QYONE: Sora yosogata to wa goburei de gozaimasu ga watashi no h6 no teishu wa chigaimasu. Tokoro ga ch~nai de shinsetsu ni shite mor6ta node watasha honni kinodoku na goto gozaimasu. Kore dake shinsetsui shite moraiyoru noi moshimo senchi de futsugG demo sassharu to watasha ch6nai no hitoi taishite m5shiwake no gozaimasen ken teishu no orareru tokoro no wakaru nara tegami ba dashitaka to omoimasu ga.... Ima no moy6 ja futsug6- mo dekinna jiibun chiigi tsukushite kaeru goto gozaimasu. Shuppatsu sareru toki nya m6 teishu wa uchi jini sassharu mon to kakugo shitorimashita ken nan to mo gozaimassen jatta ga buji de kaeraruru to hanashi kikya chikagoro wa kaeraruru to no machidoshika goto gozaimasu. (Sore wa hoka no hito nara....shitsurei nagara watashi no teishu wa chigaimasu. Tokoro ga ch6 -nai de shinsetsu ni shite moratta node watashi wa hont6 ni kinodoku na y6 de gozaimasu. Kore dake shinsetsu ni shite moratte iru noni moshimo senchi de futsug6 de'mo shite irassharu to watashi wa chanai no hito ni taishite moshiwake ga gozaimasen kara teishu no orareru tokoro ga wakaru nara tegami o dashitai to omoimasu ga..... Ima no moy6 de wa futsug6 mo dekinaide jiibun chilgi o tsukushite kaeru y5 de gozaimasu. Shuppatsu sareru toki ni wa mo teishu wa uchijini shite irassharu mono to kakugo shite imashita kara nan to mo gozaimasen deshita ga buj i de kaerareru to no hanashi o kikeba chikagoro wa kaerareru no ga machidashii y6 de gozaimasu.) SHOSAKU: Ma, QYONE-san, rusuchii mo nagai aida hitori de rusu ba tatete yukinatta tokoroa ch6naijii mo minna kanshin shitoru. (Ma, QYONE-san, rusuchti mo nagai aida hitori de rusuban shita tokoro wa ch~naijii mo kanshin shite imasu.) QYONE: Arigat6 gozaimasu. Teishu no oraruru jibunna otoko, nanto d~shita toku na mon jar6 kai. Nangoto mo senna, mainichi asonde, 'lee kishoku tail' nanto watasha hara tateyorimashita ga... Sate, rusui naru to watashi wakaran koto ga takusan dekimasu. Kondo kono setsu teishu no on ga wakarimashita. S~shite anatagata mo shittonnasaru goto tonari no SEIMAI-san ga ageena hito ja ken rusuchii wa onago hitori om6te taitei yasu k~te nantoka kantoka iwassharu. (Arigat6 gozaimasu. Teishu no orareru jibun wa otoko nado nanto toku na mono dar6. Nanigoto mo sezu ni mainichi asonde, "ii kimochi dana" nadoto watashi wa hara o tateteorimashita ga..... Sate, rusui naru
Page 97 HAKATA NIWAKA 9 97 to watashi de wa wakaranai koto ga takusan dekimasu.. Kondo kono setsu teishu no on ga wakarimashita. S~shite anatagata mo shitte orareru yo ni tonari no SEIMALsangaannahito, dakara rusuchil wa onago hitori to omotte hij6 ni baka ni shite nantoka kantoka iwareru.) SHOSAKU: Toki ni OYONE-san, antai yorokobasenya naran koto no dekitoru. Ky6 kono Fukuoka Nichi Nichi Shimbun ni detoru ga nandemo AOYAGI ya kinshi kunsh6 mor6toru yana. (Toki ni QYONE-san, anata o yorokobasenakereba naranai koto ga dekite iru. Ky6 kono Fukuoka Nichi Nichi Shimbun ni dete iru ga nandemo AOYAGI wa kinshi kunsh6 o moratte iru yo.) OYONE: He..hO.. honna koto de gozaimasu na? So..so.. soshite, d~shite gozaimasu kai na?. (He..h5).. hontb no koto de gozaimasu ka? So..so..s~shite d~shita wake desu ka?) SAKUZO: Nandemo kono shimbun no moy~de wa sekk6 ni dete hij6 na hataraki o shitoru ya na. (Nandemo kono shimbun no moy6 de wa sekk6 ni dete hij5 na hataraki o shite iru yo.) QYONE: De gozaimassh6. Sore kurai no koto wa attorimassh6. Goburei nagara,9 watashi no teishu ja mon. Kinshi kunsh6 sagete kaerarurunanto d6shita arigatai koto de gozaimasu kai na! Chotto matte tsukasai. (De gozaimash5. Sore kurai no koto wa atta desh6. Goburei nagara, watashi no teishu desu kara..... kinshi kunsh5 sagete kaerareru nado nanto arigatai koto de gozaimashd! Chotto matte kudasai.) SEIMAIsan! Uchii innaru na? Ky6 no shimbun minatta na? Henji ba shinasai ya, SEIMAIsan! Henji no saren to mo mottomo ja mon na! Uchii jitto shite itatecha kinshi kunsh6 wa morawaren. Watashi no h6 no teishu wa, goburei/nagara, kinshi kunsh6 motte kaerimasu ya na. Sono jibun na ippen mige kinasai. (SEIMAI-san! Uchi ni imasu ka? Ky6 no shimbun o mimashita ka? Henji o shinasai yo. SEIMAI-san! Henji ga sarenai no mo mottomo desu ne! Uchi ni jitto shite itemo kinshi kunsh6 wa moraemasen yo. Watashi no teishu wa, shitsurei nagara, kinshi kunsh6 o motte kaerimasu yo. Sono toki ni wa ichido oide nasai.) SHOSAKU: QYONE-san, ma, 55s iwantemo yoka ja naka na? (QYONE-san, ma, s6 iwanakutemo yoi ja nai desu ka?) QYONE: lie, yiitokanya wakarimassen. Mata iya dU gozaimasu na? Atarimae no hanashi ja mon. (Iie, itte okanakereba wakarimasen. Mata ieba do gozaimasu ka? Atarimae no hanashi da.) QYOSHI-san! Chotto okan tsukenaren na? Mata bant6-san na!I Nangoto shiyonnaru to na? Chotto sakana ba namazukuri shichatten nai. Aa donata mo chotto ippai y5i saseyorimasu ken mattoite tsukawasai. QYOSHI-san mo, bant~san mo,9 nangoto shiyonnaru to na? (QYOSHI-san! Chotto okan o tsukete kudasai. BantW-san wa nani o shite iru. no desu ka? Chotto sakana onamary6ri shite kure. Aa, donata mo chotto ippail y6i sasete imasu kara matte oite kudasai. QYOSHI-san mo, bant6-san mo, nani 0 shite iru no desu ka?) Banto-san mo, QYOSHI-san mo, henji sen hazu ja mon. Taigo watashi no hS nya yatocha oran to ja mon. Oran ningen na henji ja shimassen. S55, watashi ga y5i shite kimasu ken chotto matte tsukawasai. (Bant6-san mo, QYOSHI-san mo,7 henji shinai hazu desu. Tende watashi no hS de wa yatotte wa inai no dakara. Inai ningen wa henji shimasen. S6, watashi ga y6i shite kimasu kara chotto matte kudasai.) Sa nannimo gozaimassen ga ippai nonde tsukawasaimassei. (Sa, nanimo gozaimasen ga ippai nonde kudasaimase.) Anatagataa nangoto shiyonnasaru na? Sa, ippai nominasai. (Anatagata wa nani o shite iru no desu ka? Sa, ippai nominasai.)
Page 98 98 98 ~~~~~~WILLIAM H. DIZER SHOSAKU: Aa, QYONE-san, kagami ba, miten nai. (Aa, QYONE-san, kagami o mite goran.) QYONE; Moshi, do.. do.. d5shite watashi ga hana no tak6 natta to na? Koraa, fushigi. Teishu mo chikai uchi kaeraruru goto nattoru toi ko gena kaoi natte d6 suru na? (Moshi, do.do..d~shite watashi no hana wa takaku natta. no dar6 ka? Kore wa fushigi da. Teishu mo chikai uchi ni kaerareru y6 ni natte iru no ni konna kao ni natte d5 shiy6 ka?) Ikura nantete ko ge hana no takaku naru hazu wa, naka. Sadamete kisamatachi ga netami o irete nikujil shita ni chigawan. M5 kannin naran. (Ikura nandemo konna ni hana ga takaku naru hazu wa nai. Sadamete kisamatachi ga netami kara, itazura shita ni chigainai. M6 kannin naranai.) NEIGHBOR:OYONE-san! OYONE-san! Rusu na? Ogoto! Ogoto!Kondo no kisha de AQYAGI ga kaette kuru ge na! Ima, yakusho kara shirasete kita! OYONE-san! OYONEsan! (OYONE-san! GYONE-san! Rusu desu ka? Ogoto! Ogoto! Kondo no kisha, de AQYAGI ga kaette kuru s6 da yo! Ima, yakusho kara shirasete kita! OYONE.-san OYONE.-san!) SEIMAI: Ya, AOYAGI, mazu buji de gaisen, omedetU. (Ya, AQYAGI, mazu buji de gaisen, omedet5.) AQYAGI: Iya, rusuchil wa ch6nai kara iroiro gok6i ni azukarimashite makoto ni orei no m&.shiagey6 mo nai kurai desu ga mazu kinshi kunsh5 o motte kaetta node kore ga, owabi no shirushi to demo om6te moraitai no desu. (Iya, rusuchiiu wa ch~nai kara iroiro gok5i ni azukarimashite makoto ni orei no m~shiagey6 mo nai kurai desu ga mazu kinshi kunsh5 o motte kaetta node kore ga owabi no shirushi to demo omotte moraitai no desu.) SEIMAI: Ya, naruhodo rippa, na kunsh6 ja ga omae hitori no kunsh6 ja naka ken. (Ya, naruhodo rippa na kunsh5 da ga omae hitori no kunsh6 de wa nai kara.... ) AOYAGI: SEIMAI, omae ga mune ni aru to wa nani kai? (SEIMAI, omae no mune ni aru no wa nan da?) SEIMAI: Omae ga kunsh5 to mikurabetenyai. (Omae no kunsh6 to mikurabete kure.) AOYAGI: Naruhodo. Rippa na kinshi kunsh6. D~shite omae ga.... (Naruhodo. Rippa na kinshi kunsh6. D~shite omae ga..... ) SEIMAI: Ore ga kunsh6 sagetoru to ga nani ga fushigi kai? Tsumaran ore demo kokka no tamei chilgi tsukusu klurai no koto wa shittoru. Shittoru to ja naka. Tsukushitoru. Sore jibun hitori no kinshi kunsh6 gurai om~te hana, no tak5 naru made ibaru yatsu ga atta ge na. (Ore ga kunsh6 sagete iru no ga naze fushigi ka? Tsumaranai ore demo kokka no tame ni chiigi o tsukusu kurai no koto wa shitte iru. Shitte iru no ja nai. Tsukushita no da. Sore ni jibun hitori no kinshi kunsh5 da to omotte hana ga takaku naru made ibaru yatsu ga atta s6 da.) NEIGHBOR:Toki ni, AOYAGI-san, SEIMAI-san, kimitachi futari wa tonari-d6shi de arinagara kore made zuibun naka ga warukatta ga futaritomo ni k6shite kinshi kunsh5 morainatta kara, ima made to wa banji chigawanya, naran mibun to natta node kore made no kotoa kawai nagashite musumajiku k~sai shite moraitaka ga watashi no tanomi ja na. (Toki ni AOYAGI-san, SEIMAL-san, kimitachi futari wa tonari-d~shi de aninagara kore made zuibun naka ga warukatta ga futaritomo ni k6shite kinshi kunsh5 o moraimashita kara ima made to wa banji chigawaneba naranai mibun ni natta, node
Page 99 HAKATA NIWAKA 9 99 kMore made no koto wa kawa ni nagashite mutsumajiku k~sai shite moraitai no ga watashi no tanomi desu.) AOYAGI: Sa, s6 iwareru to kinodoku desu ga jibun wa nan to mo omowan. SEIMAL ga sh~chi surya... (Sa, s6 iwareru to kinodoku desu ga jibun wa nan to mo omowanai. SEIMAI ga sch~chi sureba...) SEIMAI: Naruhodo, s5 iwareru to kinodoklu ja ga ittai AQYAGI to fuwai natta sono wake to yii no wa AOYAGI wa watashi kara makemai, watashi AGYAGI kara maken to yii ikigomi kara shizen to naka no warti natta to ja ken. Kono setsu futaritomo onaji kinshi kunsh6 o morau kara mo urami mo nanimo naka. Kore kara shimmitsu ni k5sai shiy6. D~ka anshin shite tsukawasai. (Naruhodo, s6 iwareru to kinodoku da ga ittai AQYAGI to fuwa ni natta sono wake to iui no wa AOYAGI wa watashi kara makemai, watashi wa AQYAGI kara makemai to ifi ikigomi kara shizen to naka ga waruku natta no dakara. Kono setsu futaritomo onaji kinshi kunsh6 o moratta kara m6 urami mo nanimo nai. Kore kara shimmitsu ni k5sai shiy6. D5ka anshin shite kudasai.) Ne, AOYAGI, tonari-d~shi demo aru shi mata seken no kikinari mo warui kara kore made no kotoa mizui nagashite iss6 shimmitsu ni k~sai sh6. (Ne, AOYAGI, tonari-d6shi demo aru shi mata seken no kikoe mo warui kara kore made no koto wa mizu ni nagashite iss6 shimmitsu ni k~sai shiy6.) AGYAGI: SEIMAI, kimi ga s6 yiite yarya jitsu ni boku mo ureshii. Shikashi, SEIMAL, kono kunsh6 o morau ni tsuite wa sorezore kitei ga atte sore dake no senk6 ga nakerya kinshi kunsh6 wa morau k-otoa dekin. Kimia 'senchi ni kita koto mo ani shi mashite gunjin demo nai ni d~shite kinshi kunsh6 moratta ka ne? (SE IMAI, kimi ga s5 itte k-urereba jitsu ni boku mo ureshii. Shikashi, SEIMAI, kono kunsh6 o morau ni tsuite wasorezore kitei ga atte sore dake no senk6 ga nakereba kinshi kunsh5 wa morau koto ga dekinai. Kimi wa senchi ni itta koto mo nai shi mashite gunjin demo nai noni d~shite kinshi kunsh6 o moratta ka ne?) SEIMAI: Naruhodo, omae ga yii ta mottomo ja ga daitai ore ga kono kunsh6 o moratta wake wa Beikcoku no dait6ry6 no sokujo, Rfizuberuto-j6, ni sembetsu to shite ore ga hara kara haeta yamato zakura o kenj6shita. Sono k6 ni yotte mor~ta to ja ken senretsu no k?5 wa tatetoru. (Naruhodo, omae ga iii no wa mottomo da ga daitai ore ga kono kunsh6 o moratta wake wa Beikoku no dait6ry6 no sokujo,9 Rfizuberuto-j6, ni sembetsu to shite ore no hara kara haeta yamato zakura o kenj6 shita. Sono k6 ni yotte moratta no dakara senretsu no k~o wa tatetoru.)
Page 100 100 WILLIAM H. DIZER Notes 1. The author wishes to express his indebtedness to Mr. Hirata Kyugetsu, current head of the Hakata Niwaka Association and eminent Niwaka playwright, for furnishing background and technical information; to Dr. Sakurai Masashi, former Kyishu University librarian, for assistance in historical research; to Tada K6zo, Fukuoka Higher School instructor in English, and Sat5 Sabur6, Saga University instructor, for assistance in translating and editing the appended Hakata Niwaka script; andtothe Nishi Nippon News for photographs. 2. Takeda Shur5o /T tl, Hakata Monogatari t. tfJ St (Tales of Hakata) (Fukuoka:Kimbund6 Shoten, 1920), pp. 185-186. 3. Yoshimachi Yoshio, o At ii-t, "Hakata Niwaka Kyakuhonshi Kaiko" lt JfPP'j 1 OA (Review of Hakata Niwaka Script Collections), Uwasa a (Rumors), Vol. III, (December 1948), p.12. 4. Takeda Shur5, op. cit., pp. 186-187. 5. Yoshimachi Yoshio, op. cit., p. 12. 6. Takeda Shuro, op. cit., p. 188. 7. This is a typical play on words. The speaker has intentionally used the words horo biiru which very closely resemble the verb horobiru ("to be laid waste"), thus giving the additional meaning "Russia will be laid waste." 8. SAKAI has attempted a play on words by drawing a parallel in sound between boro ("worn out") blouse mentioned previously and what he mistakenly believes to mean "captive" as seen inthe next speech. In other words, he is implying that if AOYAGI wears a boro blouse which is given as a significant farewell present, he will be able to take many boro ("prisoners"). 9. Another typical play on words. 10. The expression is ee kibi, tokibi, sannenkibi, used primarily for alliteration rather than coherency. Sannenkibi refers to a vague implication of"three years" although it has no actual meaning. The use of the sound kibi in three consecutive words represents a good example of the type of linear rhyming found in most Niwaka. 11. This play on words involves the two terms manryo ("10,000 tael") and senryo ("1,000 tael"); Written in other characters the words have different meanings, manryo ("spear flower") and senry5 ("military occupation"). SEIMAI formed a pun by stating that the fruit was not big enough for manryo ("spear flower") or ("10,000 tael") but rather was probably a senry6 ("1,000 tael") or (military occupation"), in this case, "military occupation of Russia." 12. Another pun utilizing the same words. 13. This play on words utilizes the similarity in sound and meaning between the Chinese characters which express tsuyu ("dew") and Rokoku ("Russia") which can also mean "dew country."
Page 101 HAKATA NIWAKA 101 14. A recapitulation of two previous puns. 15. The otoshi or final play on words which constitutes the dramatic solution utilizes the similarity in sound between sembetsu ("farewill present") and senretsu ("front lines"). SEIMAI states that he performed distinguished front line sevice, senretsu no kO, with the merits of his farewell present, sembetsu no k~.