Abraham Lincoln quarterly. [Vol. 5, no. 3]

Lincoln Publications

Books
LINCOLN AND THE WAR GOVERNORS. By William B. Hesseltine.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1948. x, 405 PP. $4.50.
Readers of the article., "Lincoln's War Governo'rs," which appeared in the-December, 1946, issue of this Quarterly are familiar
with Professor Hesseltine's basic contention that by 1 865 national
centralization was triumphant over states' rights because Lincoln,
with his "superior intellect,") was a more skillful politician than
the governors of the Northern states. In his. opinion, only New
York's Horatio Seymour-of the sixty-three state executives with
whom Lincoln dealt in the four years, of the "iwar between the
states"-approached the President in quality of mind. From a
federal union the United States emerged as a consolidated nation,
and Lincoln was the master architect.
Dr. Hesseltine gives some consideration to. other factors. He
shows how, in many situations, Lincoln had the advantage of
dealing with the governors separately. Gubernatorial groups assembled to formulate policy only three. times, the last being the
Altoona (Pennsylvania) conference of September, 186,2, on the
eve of which Lincoln is-sued the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. This cut the ground from under Andrew of Massachusetts and other more radical and hostile governors who had
been against the President's lenient border-state policy and his
refusal to make the destruction of slavery the prime purpose of
the war. Nor does the author ignore the fact that army and civil
patronage was available to the President and was used to help
put the Republican party exclusively in his hands. Nevertheless,
throughout the study, the triumph of Lincoln's mind and personality over the war governors, is the predominant theme; the interplay of events and forces are only secondary considerations.
It is true that such men as Andrew of Massachusetts, Yates of
Illinois, Curtin of Pennsylvania, Morton of Indiana, and Buckingham of Connecticut, yielded more influence in organizing
armies and directing military operations than the Administration
did during the first year of the war. But a gradual change ensued,
164