It is fairly clear then that early Russell, unlike Frege, regards forms as prior to functions. A proposition is a unity; its unity is provided by certain of its constituents' occurring in it as concept , i.e., in a special way that holds together the other entities in that proposition. A propositional function is itself a kind of unity built up just like a proposition, except that rather than containing a definite entity at some position, it contains instead an ambiguously denoting denoting concept . On pain of circularity, the unity of a propositional function cannot be explained by the application of function to argument. Indeed, Russell rejects the Fregean notion of an "incomplete" function, and with it, any possibility of explaining the unity of propositions in virtue of such incompleteness. Russell opts instead for explaining propositional unity in terms of the occurrence of relations-in-intension or universals occurring as concept . The very approach demands a distinction between universals and functions. The universal Love is capable of different modes of occurrence. When it occurs as concept, the propositions in which it occurs are instances of the function "x loves y ", but it is not identical with this function. The function contains variables; the relation does not. The values of the function (e.g., Socrates loves Plato ) contain Love , but not the function. Moreover, our grasp of such propositions as Socrates loves Plato , while surely requiring an understanding of ("acquaintance with") the concept of Love , do not require a prior understanding of the function "x loves y ", and indeed, an understanding of the function comes by first considering the variable-free proposition and imagining a term in it replaced by others.
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