more precise location from the first. Also the Plat, to which the deeds refer, connects itself with the known State line on the South, and with the natural boundary of Rock-River on the West. By this unmistakeable boundaries [sic], apply the Plat to the face of the ground and it identifies each lot where the inhabitants claim it to be---locates the lots on the land owned by Crane when he made the deeds, and so passes the titles under and by the deeds.
There being no difficulty in identifying or locating the several lots, the deeds are not void.
I assume that the deeds from Crane to the inhabitants were duly recorded, before the execution of Cranes deed to Cooper, under which latter, Dillingham claims. If so, Dillingham can not set up want of notice to Cooper, first, because the recorded deeds notified him of the Plat, and the Plat notified him of the locality of the ground,---and it is nothing to the point, that the Plat was wanting in legal sufficiency to pass the title of a boat-landing, or other easement, to the public. And secondly, because the actual possession was notice to him as to all the lots actually occupied.
I have no doubt this class can successfully defend against ejectment brought by any one claiming through the deed from Crane to Cooper.
The class who claim under conveyances from Crane before his Patent issued, have to meet some additional questions.
The titles of this class, I think, are also good, in Equity, if not at law, as against the Cooper title. Any one claiming under that title can not, in equity, question the validity of Cranes pre-emption entry---because his own title, equally with ours, stands on that entry. In equal right better is the condition of him in possession.
The validity of the pre-emption entry being thus out of question, Crane's quit claim deeds to us, gave us the equitable title at least, even granting that the strict legal title did not devolve upon Crane before his Patent issued, and did not inure to us when the Patent did issue.
This, however subject to the question whether our deeds from Crane are or not absolutely void, as being in the teeth of the pre-emption law under which Crane made the entry.
That they were so void, our adversary can urge against us, without, at all, assailing his own title.
The pre-emption Act of Congress, May 29, 1830 was for one year's duration only, and contained a provision that ``all assignments and transfers of the right of pre-emption given by this act, prior to the issuance of patents, shall be null and void'' 1. Land Laws---473.
On the 23. Jany. 1832, and after the above act had expired by