Final verbatim record of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament [Meeting 023]

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN- NATION- COM~ITTEE ON DISARMAMENT PiAT E ENIDC/PV*23 18 April 1962 EN4GLISH THE UNIVERSITY, OF MICHIGAN T FN FR15 1963 DOCU MENT COLLECTION, FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ".TENTY-THMhJ MEEJ 'I Held at the Palai6 des Nations, Gen~eva, on Wednesday, 18 April 1962, at 10 a.m. Chairman: "Mr. CAVIAUJETTI (Italy) 62,.13318

ENBO/PY.23 2 PRESENT AT THE TABLE Braz i r MrI RODRIGUES RIBAOS ASUMPRCAO de ARAUJO A. ~,VALT1ADAO d 'e All'.;.?NCAR' ARARIIPE Bugaria: r Mr. MT0 Mr M*TALA.BANOY Ku. CFBRI S TGV N, ML\~hv N1 GULL Burma~ mr, J WBARItNGTOIN U TInMAUW;G U A-ye UMEN'.. Canada. Cz echo slovakia,: mlMrMr. Mr, Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. M r. Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr, Mr. Mr." L, I~M0BURN S J.E.&. HARD~Y J aF o MleBE LL R.M. TAIT J0HAE M, EL E-. PEPICH V4 VTAJNAR. Po SS4HLOU Mo H hM ID Ac MAiN DEEFRO0 A,mS, LALL AoS-, MPHTA KoKo RAO to.*Ko GAIROLA India:

ENDnC /PTV.2 3 PRESENT AT THE-TABLE (conttd.) It aly Mr*. Fe CAVALLETTI Mr,0 C 0 COSTA-RIGHINI Mr. F6 L0IJOILI OTTIERI Mr,, P. TOZZOLI Mr,, L. PAflILLA. NERVOMrt E, CALDERON PUIG Miss E. AGUIRRE Mr. Do GONZALEZ Me x ic Ol Mr4, AeAo ATTA Mr. L*C*No OBI P.1ol~and o Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr0 Mr. Mo M* E* NASZKOWVSKI BLIJSr. TAJN, BIEN~ VTIECZ OREK MAWGVESCU MA.LITZ.A.SAKDRU GLASER Romnania: Sweden: Mr s,,A,, MYRAL Baron C.H. von PLATEN Mr. H. BLDX M.& B. FRIEDMAN Mro V0,A, ZORIN Mr, SoKv TSARAPKIN Mr. V.0N. ZIEREPBTSOV Mro L.G. USACHEV Union ofl Soviet Socialis-t 'Re-publics:

END C/17Vo.2 3 4 PRESENT AT THE TABLE (caont d() United raepbic: IMr,> A.F* IHASSA.N Mvr. A., EL-BRIANJ Itrv, M.S. AJIMED Mir., S. ABDEL-HAMID M J.,B, GODBER Sir Michael WTRIGHT Mr. JSoHs SHA.TTOCK Mro J.H. LMABERT UnitdKingdom: United States of~ America: Mr4 A.He DEAN Mr,.C.,C. STELLE Mro RI* SPIERS Mr.* Rw A a -kRT IN Secretary-General: Dop~z--to the Special Representative Mr. 0. LOUWFI Mr* Wi. EPSTEIN

ENDC/PV.23 5 The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (interpretation from French): I declare open the twenty-third meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. Mr, DEAN (United States of America): On 25 September 1961 the President of the United States submitted to the United Nations the United States "Programme for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world" in order to end the ageold fear of mankind: the dread scourge of war. This programme provided for the elimination of all national armed forces and all national armaments. It provided for verification of disarmament obligations and for the strengthening of disputesettling and peace-keeping institutions, It called for the accomplishment of these ends in three balanced stages. You are all familiar with our 25 September programme. You have our pamphlet setting it forth. It has also been circulated as Conference document ENDC/6, The Secretary of State of the United States, when he met here with your Foreign Ministers last month, presented certain details. He emphasized that the United States plan for general and complete disarmament did- indeed provide for general and. complete disarmament. He presented additional details particularly in elaboration of stage I of the United States programme ENDC/PV.2 page 217, The Secretary of State proposed that in the first stage all nuclear delivery vehicles and all major conventional armaments be reduced by.thirty per cent. He explained that provision must be made not only to achieve and maintain reduced numbers of weapons but also, in the case. of strategic delivery vehicles, to achieve and maintain reduced destructive capability as well. He proposed that' after cessation of production of fissionable material for use in weapons^ the United States and the Soviet Union should each transfer 50000 kilogrammes of weapons-grade U-235 to non-weapons purposes7 in order to reduce stockpiles of nuclear weapons material. The Secretary of State proposed that a system of progressive zonal inspection might solve the verification problem in- a way which ensured that the amount of inspection was proportional to the amount of disarmament, He further proposed that steps be taken immediately to reduce the risks of war, He referred to measures designed to minimize the chances of war by accidents miscalculation, failure of communication or surprise attack, measures that we have offered to discuss in the Committee of the Whole.

ENDC/PV,23 6 (Mr. Dean, United States) Since the visit of the Secretary of State to Geneva, the United States has developed additional specific proposals in our plan for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful worldo These additional specific proposals are embodied in. a draft treaty outline which I now table on behalf of the United States Government at.this Conference. I ask that it be circulated as a Conference document. Copies of the document are now being distributed to you. The treaty outline is a detailed working paper containing the substance of the basic provisions which would ultimately be included in a formal treaty on general and complete disarmament as our work here at the Conference progresses, The United States wants this document, together with documents presented by other members of our Conference~ to be considered by the Conference in its efforts to produce agreement on general and complete disarmament. As you see, the United States document is entitled "Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world'%. We have not included in the document the preamble, the working draft (ENDC/Lll/Rev,1) of which was approved ad referendum at our meeting yesterday..The document does contain the sections which set forth the disarmament, verification and peacekeeping measures to be carried out in each of the three stages. Let.me.explain at the beginning that with respect to disarmament the scheme of the United Stae.s plan is a simple one. Fundamentally it is that the nations of the world should seize a moment in time to stop the arms race, to freeze the military situation as it then appears and to shrink it progressively to zero7 always keeping the relative military positions of the parties to the treaty as near as possible to what it was at the beginning. Of course, the simple.scheme of shrinking, or miniaturization, must allow for some variations. This is because it is probable that not all nations will be in the plan at the beginning; it is because production of all armaments cannot and should not be shut down overnight; i+ is because not all other things in the world. will be shrinking along with armaments, The skies, the oceans and outer space7 for example, will not be shrinking, nor will the.degree of commitment of a nation to its ideals, Those cannot be made to shrink with the armaments, and it is. fortunate that this iS soo, (1) ENDC/30 and Corrl

ENDC/PV.23 7 (Mr. Dean, United States) Nevertheless, as I have said, the scheme of. the United States plan is simple. It is a plan -- with minor variations during the first few years caused.by the taperingfff of production -- under, which all military forces and establishments of all parties shrink together and in proportion. This is as it should be. Each nation understands its present forces; each natiobn understands ts,. neighbours' present forces, The United States plan for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world maintains that positione Think of a balloon: instead of permitting more and more air to be blorn- into the balloon until it bursts, the air is let out of the balloon, and the balloon shrinks in simple proportion until the air is all gone, This is the essence of the United States plan, I now come to some details of the treaty outline. Of course, I shall not mention all its provisions; there are too many for that. But let me mention some highlights, Stage I starts on page 3, stage II on page. 2.0,.and stage III on.page. 28 of the text that is now being circulated to representatives.In stage I the United States proposes a broad series of measures with respect to the reduction of armaments and armed forces; the establishment of an international disarmament organization to ensure the enforcement in an agreed manner of the. obligations undertaken; and measures to strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace, The United States proposes during stage I a 30 per cent cut,in.all armaments the reduction of which it"'seems practicable to supervise. That is,. stage I provides for a 30 per:cent cut in all nuclear delivery vehicles and all major conventional armaments, This cut should be madc. in three yearly steps of 10 per cent each. *The cut would'be applied to the armaments of the United States,.those of the Soviet Union and those of other parties to the treaty. as might be agreedC It would be applied, with minor variations with which I will deal latera to all tyrpes of nuclear delivery vehicles and major.conventional armaments., Let me show you the armaments we are talking about and the way this cut would work. There is an illustrative list of categories on pages 3 and. A o-P the treaty outline,. This list is intended to include all nuclear delivery vehicles and all major conventional armaments; it is intended to include all armamoents the reduction of which we could reasonably expect to supervise in stage I,

ENDC/PV,23 (Mr. Dean, United States) The list includes all missiles and rockets with range in excess of ten kilometres together with their related fixed launching pads; all armed aircraft weighing over 2,500 kilogrammes; all tanks; all armoured cars and armoured personnel carriers; all aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyer types and submarines; and so on. Look with me, if you will, at the first category, on page 3. By "category", I mean, of course, a fairly broad class of armaments, and by "type", a further sub-division within a category, This first category includes the most powerful armaments. It includes all armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 40,000 kilogrammes, missiles having a range of 5,000 kilometres or greater, together with their fixed launching pads, and submarine-launched missiles and air-to-surface missiles having a range of 300 kilometres or greater, We propose not only that the total armaments in this category but also, with the small exception I have referred to before, that each type of armament in this category be cut 30 per cent, A "type" is a very narrow class of armament. The United States would therefore have to apply this cut to its B-52 aircraft, to its Titan missiles, to its Atlas missiles, to its submarine-launched Polaris missiles: to its Hound Dog missiles and to any other type of delivery vehicle which, by the time the treaty was negotiated, came into the category description. The United States inventory of each of these types of vehicles would have to be reduced by 30 per cent. In this same category of nuclear delivery vehicles, the Soviet Union, for example, would have to apply the 30 per cent cut to its heavy four-turboprop bomber designed by Tupolev and known in the West as the "Bear"; to its heavy four-jet bomber designed by Miasishchev and called in the West the "Bison"; to its intercontinental missiles of the types fired to the Kamchatka peninsula and into the Pacific; to its missiles on submarines; to its air-to-surface missiles displayed last year with the "Bear" bomber; and so on, In the case of the United States Titan and Atlas missiles, as in the case of the Soviet missiles in this category, related fixed launching pads would be cut along with the missiles. The same would be true with respect to fixed launching pads related to missiles which would be cut in other categories. Another category can be used to illustrate the manner of reduction. For example, category 7 includes all tanks. In the case of the United State.s, the cut in armaments would be a cut in each and every type of United States tank -- such as the M-47 medium tank, the M-48 medium tank, and the M-60 main battle tank,

ENDC/PV,23 9 (Mr& Dean, United States) In the case of the Soviet Uniont the destruction would have to apply to its JS-III heavy tanks, the T-10 heavy tanks, the T-54 medium tanks, the T-34/85 medium tanks. the PT-76 emphibious light tanks, and so on -- a 30 per cent reduction in the inventories in each and every type. The same principle would apply across the board in stage I, andt as you will see later, it would apply through stages II and III. The method of reduction is described in paragraph 2, which begins on page 4 of the treaty outline. This method of reduction proposes that, during the first part of each of the three one-year steps, one-third of the armaments to be eliminated during the whole of stage I would be placed in depots under the supervision of the international disarmament organization. During the second part of each step, the deposited armaments would be destroyed or, where it made sense and could be adequately supervised, converted to peaceful uses. Verification that armaments were destroyed and assurance that retained armaments did not exceed agreed levels would be provided by the international disarmament organization in accordance with arrangements to be worked out and set forth in an annex to the treaty. I will describe later in more detail the type of method the United States has in mind for verifying the fact that retained armaments do not exceed agreed levels. It is enough to say at this point that it will be worked out in such a manner as to provide that the extent of the inspection is related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to the parties to the treaty of possible violations, In dealing with armaments, we have of course to deal with the problem of production. The United States treaty outline provides that, by the beginning of stage II, production shall be halted, except for the production of spare parts, It is simply not practical to impose such a restriction on the production of armaments while we are just starting down the path to disarmament in stage I, Why? First, all nations will not be in the plan at the start, and second, we will not have developed the necessary confidence in the process to make this possible, This confidence will come and increase as our work on general and complete disarmament goes on, It will be possible, however7 to impose restrictions on production during stage IY and the United States treaty outline provides that, during stage I, production should be limited to agreed allowances which permit only limited

ENDC/PV,23 10 (Mr. Dean, United States) production in each of the categories to which I have. roeferred, It is in this connexion that, during stage I only, the reductions of armaments. as I mentioned earlier, cannot be precisely by type across the board. It might not be possible to slice up a battleship in three parts. But by the end.of stage I, production of all new armaments will have been halted, There should be no"misunderstanding about one thing, however. The production which is permitted in no way limits the obligation, which is absolute, to reduce armaments by-a ne.t of 30 per cent over the three years in stage I. Any armament produced in a category must be compensated for, under the United States treaty outline, by the destruction of sufficient additional armaments in that category to ensure that the 30 per cent reduction in the category is maintained. The exact way in which these adjustments are handled is set out on pages 5 and 6 of the treaty outline. As for force levels, you are familiar with the United States proposal.for reduction by the United States and the Soviet.Union,.. In stage I the United States and the Soviet Union would reduce their armed forces to.2,1.million each. The treaty outline., at page 6. provides further that the forces of other "specified parties" would be fixed at agreed levels not exceeding. 2.1 million each. It. provides also that all other parties to the treaty would, with certain agreed exceptions, reduce their force levels to 100,000 or one per cent of their population, whichever was higher, provided:that in.no case would existing force levels be exceeded. The United States treaty outline also attacks directly the nuclear threat. During stage I, fissionable material production for use in weapons would be halted and the United States and the Soviet Union would begin to transfer agreed.quantities of weapons-grade U-235 from past production to purposes other.than weapons. You will note that I used the term "agreed quantities". As I recalled earlier this morning, the Secretary of State in his speeches here last month proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union should each transfer 50,000 kilogrammes of weapons-grade U-235 to non-weapons purposes, The United States stands behind this offer of 50,000 kilogrammes each, It is a very meaningful offer, We are prepared to implement it^ and we are prepared to listen to views on it. In substance, what the United States is now saying to. the Soviet Union is this: "If our earlier offer of 50,00Q kilogrammes of

ENDC/PV,23 11 (Mr, Dean, United States) weapons-grade U.235 is not acceptable to you, then what is acceptable? Make an offer of your own, We can discuss it and see if we cannot agree on the quantities of this death-dealing material which each of us should remove from weapons or weapon pipelines, But let us get on with this discussion." As you can see7 stage I includes other measures: The nuclear Powers would agree not to transfer control over any nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear State and not to assist a non-nuclear State in manufacturing any nuclear weapons, The parties would agree, if such an agreement had not already been reached2 to prohibit, under effective international control, the testing of nuclear weapons, The parties would agree not to place in orbit weapons capable of producing mass destruction. Such measures would include advance notification of launchings, pre-launch inspection of space vehicles and missiles, and limitations on the productionS stockpiling and testing of boosters for space vehicles, Agreement on this measure could represent a real step forward towards international co-operation.in peaceful uses of outer space. The. parties would implement a group of measures by which the risk of war by accident, miscalculation. failure of communications or surprise attack might be reduced. Measures to reduce the risk of war would include advanoe notification of military movements and manoeuvres, the establishmenv of observation posts at agreed locations to report on concentrations and movements of military forces) the creation of additional observation arrangements, an exchange of military missions, rapid communications between heads of government, and the creation of an international commission to examine and make recommendations reiar.dinj further measures, Measures designed to strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace are an important part of stage I. The parties would agree to refrain from the threat or use of any type of force contrary to the purposes and the principles of the United Nations Charter, They would agree to refrain from indirect aggression and subversion, and would undertake to examine methods of'.assuring all States against such indirect aggression or subversion, Studies regarding the establishment of further rules of international conduct and the strengthening of procedures to maintain peace and settle disputes would be undertaken, The parties would agree

ENDC/PV, 23 12 (Mr. Dean, United States) to support measures to improve the capability of the United Nations to maintain peace and security. Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the treaty could be referred to the International Court or ustice, A United Nations peace observation corps would be.established.. Finally, ine parties to the treaty would undertake to develop arrangements during stage I for the establishment of a United Nations peace force in stage II, including the conclusion of a detailed agreement relating to such a force. Stage II carries on boldly from stage I, It would become feasible to include more armaments and to cut off entirely the production of new armaments; remaining inventories of armaments would be reduced; dispute-settling and peace-keeping machinery would be developed further, Stage II, as I said earlier, would7 like stage I, be of three years' duration) according to our present best estimate.In stage II, those parties which had been in since the beginning'would slash their remaining armaments in half, New parties to the treaty would reduce their armaments by 65 per cent, to match the reductions made in stages I and II by the original parties to the treaty. Remaining armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union would likewise be cut by half. This means that the United States is proposing force levels of 1,050,000 each for itself and for the Soviet Union. t. the end of stage II, The forces of other States would be reduced by agreed. percentages. The parties to the treaty would in stage II, on the basis of agreed percentages, reduce nuclear weapons and stockpiles of fissionable materials for use in weapons to minimum levels$ determined in the light of their stage I examination of the means of reducing and.eliminating nuclear weapon stocKpiles. The:parties to the treaty would also dismantle or convert to peaceful uses agreed military bases and facilities. wherever they might be located, in an agreed sequence,.During, stage II the strengthening of the dispute-settling and peace-keeping arrangements begun in stage I would continue, This process would include acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to decide international legal disputes, the development of rules of international conduct and methods of settling dispute.s, and the establishment and progressive strengthening of the United Nations peace force,

02DC /PV n 2 3 13 (Ma D e A UnitedeSte During stage III the parties would continue the disarmament process which had boon started in, stages I and II until they achieved the goal of general and comploee di3armament in a peaceful world, An additional measure which would have to be included in stage III would be the reporting to the international disarmament organization of all scientific and technological discoveries of possible military significance. The international disarmament organization would be charged with establishing agreed arrangements to ensure that these discoveries were not used for military purposes - to ensure that some new scientific breakthrough did not "reverse the process of general and complete disarmament which had been so carefully...chieved. The duration of stage III; as I said at the beginning, is not specified. Rather it is proposed tha- stage III "would be completed within an agreed period of time as promptly as possible", At the end of stage III, States will have at their disposal only those nonnuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens, States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force which would be progressively strengthened during Stage III until it had sufficient armed forces and armaments so that no State -- I repeat, no State -- could challenge itExcept in connexion with the reporting of scientific discoveries in stage III I have so far not mentioned the international disarmament organization. The organization, referred to as the IDO, will of course play an important role in the plan from the very beginning. The United States proposes the establishment of an international disarmament organization which would have the function of verifying that countries lived up to the obligation, or the several obligations, which thqy undertook in a disarmament agreement. In describing the functions of this organization, the United States has given a great deal of thought to the proper application of two principles which were set forth in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for disarmament negotiations which representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union signed on 20 September 1961. The first of these principles is: "All disarmament measures should be. implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligationso" (ENDC/. page 2)

ENDC/PV.23 14 (Mr., Deane United States) I think we can cut through all the unprofitable:, 'unrealistic and tiresome exercises in somantics ua To whether a particular measure of control is control over "disarmament" or control over "armaments" by pointing out that under this principle it is the nature of the obligation that determines the type of con+rol which is necessary, Paragraph 3 on page 13 of the draft treaty outline sets forth the way in whi.ch the United States has tried to put this principle into practic6e Sub-paragraph (a) of the paragraph points out that, where the obligation relates solely to the reduction of armaments, the verification measures need relate only to the reduction processo A good illustration of this point is our proposal that the United States and the Soviet Union each transfer specified quantities!of weapon-grade U-235 to nonweapon purposes. All that is necessary to verify such a measure is that the IDO be able to assure that the agreed quantities of U-235 -- 50'000 kilogrammes, or whatever we agree upon -- were indeed transferred to purposes other.than for use in weapons and that the IDO be able to inspect and verify that the agreed quantities continue to be used for these non-weapon purposes. In verifying a measure of this kind, the IDO would not look at the remaining stockpiles, because in this particular instance that has no bearing on the measure -- it does not relate to the specific obligation which the parties have undertaken. Sub-paragraph b of the same paragraph deals with the situation which exists when the measure is one in which the parties agree to halt or limit production. An illustration of this sort of measure is the United.States proposal to cut off production of weapon-grade fissionable material, Here again the IDO is required to have access to the relevant.production facilities and activities, wherever locatedr on the territory of the party to the treaty. In verifying such a measurer we believe it would,be reasonable to start with facilities declared by the party, and the interest of the. IDO in inspection areas where no facilities have been declared is solely one of determining whether clandestine facilities exist. Sub-paragraph c on page 13 deals with the verification procedures which are necessary when the obligation is one not to exceed agreed, levels of armaments or armed forces or not to engage in clandestine production activities. An illustration of this type of measure would be the 2.1 million-man force..levels proposed, the maintenance of inventories of armaments only at reduced levels, and the limitation

ENDC/PVy,23 15 (Mr. Dean, United States) on production of armaments, In this sub-paragraph the United States has made an effort to live up to the sound principle agreed to by the United States and the Soviet Union on 20 September 1961, in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, that the nature and extent of such control depends on: "the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage." (ENDC/5, page 2) The United States has restated the principle in stage I of the treaty outline in the following way: "The extent of inspection during any step or stage would be related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to the parties to the treaty of possible violations," (page 13) In its treaty outline the United States proposes, as an example of the means by which this principle might be given effect, the concept of progressive zonal inspections. I think I should emphasize that this concept is proposed merely as an example, All of us will want to give it further study, but it is the sort of measure towards which we must work if we are to break the impasse which we have so far faced on matters of inspection and verification. Under this concept of progressive zonal inspections, the territory of each party would be divided into an agreed number of appropriate zones; each party would declare the total levely but initially not the precise location, of the armaments, forces and other activities subject to verification within each zone. These zones would be progressively inspected, starting at the beginning of stage I, With the first 10 per cent reduction in armaments would come the inspection of the first zones; with the next 10 per cent reduction in armaments, more zones would be open to inspection; and so on until at the end, when disarmament was general and complete, there would be inspection of the entire territory, The procedure for selecting the zones to be inspected would be such that the State being inspected would have no advance notice of which zone would be chosen, Moreover, there would be necessary arrangements to prevent clandestine movements of armaments into and out of the zone being inspected. Under a system of progressive zonal inspection, production facilities which were declared would be subject to inspecticn wherever located. The progressive zonal inspection would be the only means available to the IDO to check on clandestine production.

ENDC/PV'23 16 (Mr. Dean, United States) As I indicated earlier, the United States is putting forward this concept or theory of progre-ssive.zonal inspection merely;,s;an interesting example of how we might achieve the objective of relating the extent of inspection during any step or stage to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risks to the parties to the treaty of possible violations. I urge that we all study this method, and indeed all other methods, of achieving this objective, We have a completely open mind on this subject. If we make this study, I am confident that we can work out a successful system.of verification which will provide firm assurance that the parties to the treaty are indeed honouring their obligations. This system, nevertheless, makes the extent of disarmament and the extent of inspection proceed together, side by side, until all arms of whatever kind or description are destroyed, In conclusion- I want to repeat the key characteristics of. this United States treaty outline which we have submitted to the Conference today, It truly beats the swords into ploughshares and realizes the oldest dream of man --the end. of warfare, It carries us all the way to general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.:It provides f.or the simultaneous development of peace-keeping machinery. It provides-for verification which is in proportion to disarmament, It ceallsp, as near a:s- may be, for a halt in the arms race -- a freezing of the great n.,ational: military capabilities in the world and an across-the-board shrinking of those capabilities until. they no longer exist. Let us work together on this proposal with goodwill and imagination. Let us put into.fruitful ideas of construction the same amount of creative power we now put into weapons of destruction, In this way we shall free men for their true destiny, and we shall move forward together in conquering disease and poverty and improving the material, the cultural and the spiritual welfare of mankind. It is to this task that we pledge our solemn obligations, Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): We have just listened to the succinct statement of the United States representative on the Outline of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament, which the United States has placed before our Committee,

ENDC/PV.23 17 (Mr, Taraba.nov Bu -a aria) I should like to express our satisfaction that the United States has found it possible and desirable, after our discussions have begun, to submit a draft on the most important problem of our time - general and complete disarmament, It is a draft treaty which7 together with the treaty submitted at the beginning of our Commiitteets work, will give us an overall view of the general ideas of the two parties on the problem of general and complete disarmament. This draft treaty will also give us a clearer understanding of some of the ideas which the United States has put forward during our past discussions on general and complete disarmament, and of those it has been expounding more recently. It is certainly a fairly long document, which deserves to be studied with the closest attention, and that we shall do, W`ie shall then state our views.on the whole series of measures proposed in this treaty. I should like to point out at once7 however7 after a first very superficial look at the draft treaty following the statement made by the representative of the United States, that it more or less faithfully reproduces all the measures so far put forward by the United States delegation on various occasions, both here and in United.Nations debates. I also wish to point out, after this first glance, that the draft treaty reflects certain very controversial former positions that have not in any way facilitated our progress towards general and complete disarmament, which our Committee and the United Nations have taken.as their main objective. We had thought that, as this draft treaty was submitted in the middle of our discussions; it would have taken account of their beginning, of our difficulties in organizing certain things, and of the ideas that have been expressed here during our discussions, and would thus have been able to facilitate our work even more than it does, so that we could achieve really positive results. At the first sight we have not/in fact found anywhere in this draft treaty the reflection of certain ideas that would be calculated to facilitate our task much more than the mere presentation of a few old concepts which have been expounded in the past. In particular,' this draft treaty and the way the measures are presented do not facilitate my task today either, when I have to speak on control over disarmament measures. For the draft presents the disarmament measures in such a way that control is difficult to organize. I would now like to consider this question, which was covered by the first part /E'DC/187 submitted to us by the United States a few days ago, shortly before this complete draft.

LENDC /PW2 3 18 (Mr. Tarabanov Bulgaria) The discussion and examination of the general obligations relating to disarmament measures have.been concluded. and we are now going to draw up a joint text. We have already had an.o.portunity.of doing this for article 1 of our "treaty..It seems to us no'w that it is necessary to continue, while giving the most careful attention, of course, to the draft just submitted and to the other specific paints which this draft will enable us to develop in rather more detail, We must go on to the subsequent questionso Now the next question- after the first, which was article 1 on the obligations to be included in a treaty on general and complete disarmament -- is that of the possibility of defining, in a general way, all the obligations which States should assume in connexion with disarmament and, of course, the.question of the control which should be exercised over the disarmament measures, the extent of. the control and, if possible, certain procedures for its application. The absolute necessity of effective control while disarmament measures are being carried out, if general and complete disarmament is to be achieved, has been brought out clearly and definitely enough in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of 20 September 1961. In that Statement the principle of control is defined as follows: "6, All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide.firm assurance that all parties.. are honouring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general -and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on.the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each.stage," (EN 5,pae 2) This text enlightens us oi the purpose and nature of control relating.to disarmament^ and on the place control should occupy in.the system of general and complete disarmament, Thus.the function assigned to control is to provide the firm assurance that all parties are honouring and.executing the disarmament measures they have undertaken to carry out, It follows from this that the control measures depend in a general way on.the disarmament measures. and are applied to the disarmament measures. This, incidentrlly, is even more clearly put in that part of the sentence I quoted) which refers to "the nature and extent of. such. control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage".

19 (Mr. Tarabanov', Buljgaria) In his statement this morning the United. States representative, if I am not mistaken) dwelt on the difficulty of deciding exactly how control should be applied to disarmament measures and of defining how far it should go. I agree with the United States representative that there are certain difficulties. But when we know exactly what the disarmament measures are, the difficulties will have to be overcome. In addition, it seems to me that if we know exactly what the disarmament measures are, we shall also know exactly the phases of disarmament to which control should be applied. The necessity of control and the method of applying it have, moreover) been emphasized by several speakers and several statesmen who have spoken on general and complete disarmament and on disarmament in general, both during our discussions in the Eighteen Nation Committee and earlier. Everyone has admitted that control, as an integral part of disarmament, constitutes one of the essential elements of proposals for general and complete disarmament. It is therefore understood that each party to a treaty on disarmament is entitled to appropriate guarantees that the disarmament undertakings entered into by common consent will be strictly fulfilled. That has been confirmed by the explicit statements of many delegations and statesmen. In his statement at the second meeting of our Conference, on 15 March 1962, Mr. Gromyko, the Minister for Foregin Affairs of the Soviet Union, said: "The Soviet Union wishes to have the necessary guarantees that the disarmament obligations that have been agreed upon will be strictly carried out and that there are no loopholes which will permit the clandestine production of aggressive armaments once the process of general and complete disarmament has begun. Our country does not intend to take anyone at his word7 least of all States which have established close military alignments, are pursuing a policy of building up armaments and have placed their military bases as close as possible to the Soviet Union, Nor do we expect others to take us at our word. The Soviet Union is a firm advocate of strict control over disarmament.' (ENDC/PV,2, page 11) Other representatives and political leaders have enlarged on this question of control both during our Conference and in the past. Mr. San Thiago Dantas7 the Foreign Minister of Brazil, who not only stated his country's position, but also referred to the results of past discussions on this question which have made it

.ED C/PVY23 20 (Mr,_ Tarabanov, Bulgaria) possible to sum up the work done in more or less precise.te.rmss aidi -in his wtwbement of 16 March /ENDC/.PV.3, page 92, that he would like to recall the. formu~L arrived after lon.alscussions and accepted by everyone: no disarmament without control, no control without disarmament.. This formula which, as I said, is the result of lonr and laborious discussion and examination of the question of disarmament, has been generally accepted in all the discussions that have taken place on disarmament: it has become, so to speak, an axiom, In the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union, article 2 is devoted to general provisions concerning the control that would have to be exercised. over disarmament measures. "The States parties to the present treaty' - says the first paragraph of this article - "solemnly undertake to carry out all disarmament measures, from beginning to end, under strict international control, and to ensure the implementation in their territories of all control measures set forth in Parts II, III and IV of the present Treaty" (ENDC/2, page 3). It is.also stated that each disarmament measure shall be accompanied by such control measures as.are necessary for verification of that measure. These definitions used in the Soviet draft treaty are a subsequent elaboration of the principle enunciated in the Joint Statement of.20 September 1961 on control over measures for general and complete disarmament. Hence not only do they remain within the limizs, within the framework of that principle, but. they embody its whole content. They are supremely necessary definitions, and are also sufficient for the exercise of strict international control over the disarmament measures undertaken while general and complete disarmament is being carried oit.. For the execution of the control measures by which every disarmamentt:measure would have to be accompanied during the implementation of the treaty, it is provided that there shall be established, within the framework of the United Nations, an international disarmament organization including all the States.parties to the treaty, which in fact would have to include all States without exception, In this respect, too, the Soviet draft strictly conforms to the agreed principles set out in the Joint Stateiento At the same time, it provides a subsequent and very useful elaboration of the formula employe.d in this Statement, The purpose of this elaboration is to define, in general terms7 the structure of the inter-. national disarmament organization, its mode of operation, the information to which it should have access and the powers to be vested in it,

ENDC /PV, 23 21 (Mxr, 'aabanov. Bularia) In the draft L~NDC 8/submitted by the United States for the first part of the treaty on general and complete disarmament - which has been adequately defined - it is also provided /pae 27 that control measures will have to be taken to ensure that the agreed reductions are made, That draft also provides ror the establishment of an international disarmament organization within the framework of the United Nations to ensure that all the disarmament measures are carried out and respected at all times, Up to that point there is no difference, on the substance of the problem of controlg between the positions of the two parties in the documents submitted, Now whereas the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union is in conformity throughout with the principles for control set out in the Joint Statement of 20 September 1961, which specifies that the nature and extent of such control must depend on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures oeing carried out in each stage, the United States draft is not in conformity with those principles, It departs from those principles and goes far beyond their real content, In the second part of the sentence dealing with controls the United States draft in fact provides not only that all measures relating to disarmament shall be effectively verified7 but also that control shall be established over the levels of armaments and armed forces, In taking up that position, the United States is seeking to introduce control and verification of the armaments retained, and when we conslaer the United States declaration on disarmament /NDC/6 entitled "A programme for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world" - a declaration which, moreover, is reflected in the document just introduced - it becomes clear that such control and verification would apply to practically all armaments, In the document now before us, a new concept of zonal inspection has been introduced, It will be seen at once that control is to be exercised over all armaments 4n the various zones, at least that is my first impression, That follows directly from the fact that during the first stage, for example, the United States programme and proposals do not provide for any disarmament measures at all7 or only provide for measures which do nothing to reduce the military potential of the zreat Powers or of other States, This is all the more significant because that doctrine of control over armaments has been formulated on several occasions by various representatives of the United States during previous discussions on

E..DC/2V.;2J 22 (Mr. Tarabanov Blgaria) general and complete disarmament, We should liko to remind you that it was expounded at the last session of the United NIations General Assembly by Mr. Stevenson, the United States representative, who said on 15 November 1961: "If it is the position of the Soviet Union that verification of agreed levels of armaments retained by States under a disazrmament plan is espionage, then clearly there can be no general and complete disarmament agreement- for armaments destroyed are of less concern to us than armaments retained"' Thus it is *he r.emaining arms that interest the United S-tates:,, o n: att-er how many weapons were destroyed it would be the weapons,,,,which were lof" that would be utilized in a military operation9 This is a stumbling block which could be crucial to our deliberations," (AZCgPLV.195.- nap:es,63-65) Thus the representatives of the We.-ern Power. are persisting in their wish to establish control not only over the implementation of disarmament measures, as laid down in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, but'also over retained armaments, In other words) and according to the United States proposals, this demand would mean establishing control over the armaments existing at present, for reference to the declaration submitted by the United States as a disarmament programme, shows that no real disarmament measure - I stress this again - is provided for in Stage I or perhaps even in Stage II. At least. so far as Stage II is concerned we lack precise information, I should like to point out that unlike the Soviet Union draft, the United States programme - and now its Outline of a Treaty - for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, as it is called -provides only soothing, one might say imaginaryy disarmament measures such as reducing the quantity of fissionable material for military purposes by fifty tons during the first stage. For to make this United States proposal to reduce.fissionable material by fifty tons into a real disarmament measure; it would be necessary to make a considerable reduction in the weapons already manufactured and stocked by the United States at presents or at the time when the first stage of general and complete disarmament begins. The fact is that, even while proposing the reduction of fissionable material by fifty tonst the United States will not only keep all its stocks of nuclear weapons, but will also be able to manufacture new and improved ones4 Thus not only will its nuclear striking power not be reducedy but it will be able to increase this considerably. That being so - and it seems unnecessary to labour the point - the desire to establish control over existing armaments might have a very unfavourable effect on The development of the international situation.

ENDC/PV, 23 23 (Mr. Tarabanov Bulgaria) It is necessary to point out that the object of.all our efforts should be to formulate disarmament measures in such a way, and to apoly -them on such a scale and in such proportions, that they can facilitate the establishment and carrying out of effective control over the disarmament measures themselves. That is precisely how the Soviet proposal is conceived and drafted, The United States proposal, on the other hand, is worded in such a way that not only does it not meet the need for organizing control, but on the contrary it tends to transform control over disarmament measures into control over remaining weapons and hence into control over armaments pure and simple, The effect of the proposal submitted to us this morning seems to be to split up disarmament measures in a way that would scarcely facilitate the establishment and execution of control and verification, This proposal is entirely consistent with what was already to.be found in the disarmament programme presented by the United States, It is true that in his statements during the general discussion Mr. Rusk, the United States Secretary of State, put forward proposals which, according to him, would facilitate control - proposals to which we shall have occasion to revert when.we discuss this matter in greater detail, Moreover, those proposals, have probably been elaborated in the draft submitted to us this morning, But it can be said at once that the whole United States programme, and the draft submitted' to us now.far from facilitating the application of control measures to the corresponding disarmament measures, merely complicate the task and create situations in which control and inspection would in fact become pure and simple spying. It is no mere coincidence that the representative of the Soviet Union, when explaining his countryts position yesterday, gave an example which also illustrates the idea I.have been explaining to you. That example was as follows. "The force levels envisaged in Stage I would mean a reduction of approximately 15 p.er cent in. the armed forces of the United. States and the USSR. However, the demand for the verification of levels would. entail an inspection and examination of all the remaining 85 per cent of their armed forces, A reduction of 15 per cent would not, of course, substantially weaken the military potential of States. But, on the other hand, it would enable an aggressive State,,....to collect information,.." (ENDC/V,21, pae 3l)

ENDC/ FV23 24 (Mr, Tarabanov, Bulgaria) In the presentation of the United States draft we heard this morningy, we were told about the method of carrying out inspection by zones, developing and increasing it progressively parallel with the increase in the amount of disarmament being undertakeno But as the zones to be controlled and inspected were chosen, the work might be so arranged that certain persons could obtain not only a general idea7 but even precise information about those zones - information which, with the help of other information, would provide an accurate picture of the country's defencesY so that those who were harbouring certain intentions would be able to carry them out, Furthermore, the unduly long periods for the stages - I should like to dwell on that too - and especially for stage I, proposed by the United States representative, are liable to cause additional difficulties, Indeed7 the excessive duration of stage I itself and of the period for disarmament as a whole, by unduly prolonging the time-limits for carrying out various measures involving insignificant reductions in armaments, might make for an atmosphere of distrust between States and fresh international tensions7 over and above those which already exist. All these considerations confirm.the Bulgarian delegationts fears concerning the definitions and the formulation of the provisions presented in the United States proposal for the first part of the Treaty, concerning the control and verification of general and complete disarmament. Since we are considering the question of time-limits in direct connexion with inspection, it is worth recalling here the idea expressed at the meeting of 11 April by Mr. Lall, the representative of India, when he said: "Now if there is a rapid process of disarmament leading to zero, obviously the period of uncertainty arising out of the controls not reaching a mathematical 100 per cent is diminishedc That is a very valuable consideration, one which I think should lead just those countries which say they favour effective controls to propose a very quick plan," (ElDC/P/.S._page3) If; therefore, the Western Powers wish control to be carried out in full from the beginning or almost from the beginning of the disarmament process, they should also agree to the destruction of all armaments and the disbanding of all armed forces at the beginning.

ENDC/PV,23 25 (MIr. Tarabanov, Bulraria) Moreover, if they did that the Western countries would themselves be able to work out the control system to be applied to the process of disarmament; they need only accept the proposals made by the Soviet Union and the Soviet programme for carrying out general and complete disarmament, The Soviet Union.has proposed this more than once through the head of the Soviet Government, Mr, Ihrushchev; and Mr, Gromyko, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, recalled the proposal at this Conference when he said on 15 March: ".,the Soviet Union is ready to accept any proposals on control over disarmament put forward by the Vestern Powers if they will accept Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament." (_ENDC/EY.22_ pae. J ) In conclusion, I should like to sum up the situation as it now stands with regard to the control measures to be provided for, which correspond to the disarmament measures, The Soviet Union proposals in part I, article 2 of the Soviet draft Treaty are in full conformity with the principles set forth in the Joint Statement of 20 September 1961$ and, as we have stressed, embody their whole content. These proposals are also in conformity and in full accord with the facts and with the world situation as it stands today, They are not apt to cause fresh tensions or to arouse further suspicion that control'over general and complete disarmament, in present circumstances, may turn into inspection of existing armaments and.hence into legalized espionage, Furthermore, we find in the United States draft a whole section concerning inspection which corresponds to the measures proposed by the Soviet Union, It would be realistic and perfectly consistent with the task the Conference has set itself, and with its method of work, to record the already existing agreement whichp moreover, corresponds to the Joint Statement7 and to adopt a joint text for article 2 of the treaty on general and complete disarmament, It is true that if we agree to proceed in this way at once there will still be some drafting work to be done, and this work is not always very easy; but that is why we have all agreed to have two co-Chairmen to help us in our work. as we help them in theirs, and it would be their task to set to work and submit an agreed text to us, Mr_, LALL (India): I should like to make two sets of remarks, The first set of remarks is directed to the pleasant surprise with which we were confronted today, In a sense it was a surprise; in a sense we had some expectation that

ENMDC/PV',23 26 (Mr. Lall, India) o-,ir United States colleagues would be producing a more elaborate paper on a treaty dealing with general and complete disarmament, I see it is called "general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world", Welly "in" peaceful world or "for" a peaceful world, in either case we are in favour of peace, I must say. e are very glad that this elaboration has been presented. As has been pointed out by our Bulgarian colleague, it will help the process of consideration of proposals dealing with general and complete disarmament, May I add that I was personally glad to see that the first stage' includes force limits and that in the second stage these limits have been set down ds 1o05 million? I was not so glad to see that no time limit is specified for thb third stage so far, but we presume that later some time limit will be set f.or the thira stage. We are happy that this document is here; *we will study it very carefully -of course we havo not yet had time to do so, We are grateful to Mr, Dean for introducing the document in the speech which he made earlier todays Now I come to my secona set of remarks. What are we 'going to do about general and complete disarmamentY So far we have discussed a preamble, and'we have also discussed another set of ideas which we have thought of as obligations, or as objectives and principls,. I think we must now ask the co-Chairmen. who have before them two fairly elaborate draft treaties to tell us what we should discuss next, My thought is that we should inot start di'scussion of the t-otal draft treaty which has been presented to us by the Urited 'States, ' This is not. because we do not wish to discuss this treaty, but because we wish tO discuss it in some sort of order. Are we going to discuss the parts of 'the prestage::of this draft and the corresponding parts in the Soviet draft dealing with control measures? We heard a statement on control measures by Mr. Zorin the other' day; we heard another statement on this general subject by the Bulgarian representative today, I should like to ask the co-Chairmen whether we are going to discuss in-a general way control measures, or control obligations as they are called in the relevant part of the Soviet draft - that is to say in article 2'. Then after that, in the Soviet draft, ther: is article 3, "Obligations to maintain international peace and security". There are also relevant clauses in the new United Statesdraft dealing with the same matter, In any event we must first decide what we are going to" discuss; otherwise I fear that our consideiation.of general and complete disarmament'might become rather 'amorphous, and'might flow:in too many directions which will not be helpful" to tne orderly-progress of our work;

ENDC/PV.,23 27 (Mr. Lall, India) I therefore address the following question to the co-Chairmen -- I do not ask for a reply at this moment; of course, if they can give a reply today, so much the better because we do not. want to waste time: What are we going to discuss now? Are we going to discuss control obligations, or are the co-Chairmen going to bring us a document on general obligations relating to disarmament, on which, I presume, they are working? I should like some clarification of this issue, The' CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): If no one else wishes to speak, I should like to say a few words in my capacity as representative of Italy, I too wish to thank the representative of the United States of America for the important contribution he has made to the work of the Conference today, by submitting the Outline of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World. At first sight the text appears very specific, complete and constructive. I am sure that it will be most useful in helping us to make rapid progress in our work. I think these proposals are very valuable because they are fully consistent with the objective we have set ourselves: to build a new worlda a world without armaments: a peaceful world in which all peoples can enjoy security and peacefully pursue their efforts to achieve moral and material progress, under the aegis of international law, This objective seems to be very clearly stated in the United States proposal, which also shows us practical methods of attaining it. Of course7 this is only a preliminary appraisal, We intend to examine the United States document with the greatest care, and when we do so the interesting and comprehensive statement made today by Mr. Dean will be extremely helpful, I am sure that Mr. Dean will'allow us later to put a few questions to him and ask.for clarification on various points, Personally, I hope we can have a thorough general discussion on this United States document as soon as possible0 The first part of the statement by the Bulgarian representative, despite his somewhat hasty criticisms, seems to have opened such a discussion already, The Indian delegation has also commented, In any case, I think that the Conference7 which now has two completo texts before it - the Soviet draft treaty, and the outline of a treaty submitted today by the United States delegation - has a solid basis for its future work, and that the discussion will become increasingly constructive. Since goodwill is not lacking on either side and we can rely on

ENDC/PV.23 28 (The Chairman, Italy) the active co-operation of all delegations, I should like to confirm the confidence which I expressed yesterday after the drafting of the preamble was nearly completed. The Italian delegation considers that, in spite of the inevitable difficulties which, incidentally, were expected, the Conference is now really on the right road which should soon lead us to general and complete agreement, Mr, -HAJEK (Czechoslovakia): Today we have listened with attention to the speech of our United States colleague, and we have had a look at the document which he has tabled, It is, as Mr. Lall has observed, a document which we had been expecting for a long time: we had, in fact, been expecting an elaboration of the position of the United States delegation on the problem of general and complete disarmament -- an elaboration which would take account of the general position and of the method of procedure of our Conference. My delegation.will, of course, carefully study the document we now.have in our hands and will comment at the appropriate moment on its different parts. At first sight it seems that the Soviet proposal is more.systematic, more logical, more pertinent to the task before this Conference. - that is. to say, the elaboration of a treaty on -general and complete disarmament under.-strict international control. As far as the contents of the'United States document are concerned, we feel, again at first sight, that it does not provide the quickest and most direct way to the accomplishment of our task. It is, we feel, a repetition --with some additional points -- of the old and known positions which we have already had an opportunity to comment upon and in which we have indicated certain weaknesses. Of course, as I have sa.id, we will carefully study this very voluminous document and comment on the separate provisions and measures as the systematic procedure of the work of the Conference brings us to those provisions and measures at the different points of our discussion. I do not share the doubts that my colleague Mr. Lall has expressed concerning the method of our work. I think that this Conference has adopted a certain method of work which we have followed up to now with good results. Yesterday we all congratulated our co-Chairman on the first good result of this work. My delegation is of the opinion that we have to follow this up, and at the corresponding stages to compare and to comment upon the two basic documents which we now have at our disposal.

ENDC/ PV23 29 (Mr. Hajek, Czechsolovakia) With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would follow this method. I would like to.express the opinion of my delegation on,tne point now under discussion: that is, the/general obligations and the general character of control in a treaty on general and complete disarmament such as we are preparing here. Yesterday the representative of the Soviet Union opened this discussion in his remarks on article 2. I think that all of us in this Conference agree that reliable and effective international control is a necessary component of general and complete disarmament, The realization of this general and complete disarmament presupposes that all participating States will be assured of a maximum degree of certainty that all partners will strictly honour all the obligations they have undertaken. Therefore it is necessary, it is logical, that the agreed control measures should ensure reliable and effective verification as to whether these disarmament obligations are being fulfilled, On the other hand, control obligations and measures have a direct impact on the vital interest of each of the participating States in. safeguarding security, Therefore it is necessary to ensure that the oea;~zation of appropriate control measures should not go beyond the function of control over disarmament. Control must not be a pretext for collecting information of another character -- namely, information of an espionage character. I think that this has been recognized in our previous discussions by many speakers, and I will not dwell on this general principle any longer. Taking this principle into consideration, we should consistently proceed from it. We should take into account that it is embodied in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, where it.is stated that control must be adequate to disarmament and that - "the nature and extent of such control /should depon/ on the requirements for- verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage," (ENDC/5, page 2) This adequacy of control has several aspects, First and foremost is the extent of control measures, and one might say that this is the quantitative aspect, The extent of control measures must correspond to the extent of the disarmament measures to be undertaken and must not o beyond them. It cannot be permitted that activities not directly linked with verification of the implementation of the agreed disarmament measures be carried out under the pretext of control,

fEhDLOPV,22 30 (Mrs Hjie Cechoslovakia) Adequate cdnt'ol also 4presupposEs that the respect-ive control measures are in keeping with the Tverified disarmament measures c*s to their nat-ure also, One might call this'the qualitative''aspect.of `the adequacy of control1 Control must be carried out by the- application of suuh methods.:and means as, on the one hand, will ensure a -truly reliable verificatio, of the respective dsarmament measures but, on the other hand, will not make itb possible to acquire other,kinds of information which have nothing in common with. disarmament, and specifically with the corresponding step or measure of disarmament, Finhally. the adequacy of control presupposes that' control depends on disarmament measures also as far as the timing of the measures is concerned. There must be assurance that the implementation of the respective disarmament measures will be verified from beginning to endo At the same time, it must not be admitted thatl any measures should be introduced uxider the name of control earlier than the respective disarmament measures begin to be implemented" Having in mind these basic lines the draft 'treaty submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union consistently proceeds from the principle of the adequacy of control0 The basic principles That should guide reliable control over general and complete disarmament are formulated in article 2 of the draftu This artic., elaborates paragraph 6 of the Joint Statement. It adheres.to that paragraph strictly and renders its b'asic provisions concrete. and precise. Therefore we regard this draft as the most appropriate:basis for the Corrmmitteets consideration of this auestion, Ihe basic conept of the Soviet draft provides that in the process of general and complete dis 1rmamentb, a;long wit.h the growing extentV of disar.aament measures the extent of control should also expand, sc t ha-t whe:n general and complete disarmament has been conmpleted>ontrol will also be general and complete. We welcome the fact that in some of their recent statements the representatives of the United States and other Western Powers have 6eognized. the principle of adequacyz that contrTl n-iust b deouate to the ertont of the disarmament measures beinp carried out, It is ba positive sign that the Wostorn Powers agreed to formulate this principle in the Joint Statemont and that in some statements made in this Conference the (lele-gation of the United. Statos has also expressed agreement with this principleo Of coubse ~We should like to see Ihes principle applied in dealing with the practical consideratLon of ho w tc ensare:elia'le control over the implementation of general and complete disI'ae-nent In this sense the

-ENDC v'',23 31 (Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia) wording of paragraph 3, part B, of the first'United States draft presented to the Conference, with regard to the general obligations of general and complete disarmament, gives:rise tocertain doubts on our part, We think it would be of no benefit for our talks if we were pressed to accept, instead of reliable control over disarmament7 the demand for what, in literature on the subject and in statements by officials of the United States and other Western Powersy is called "arms control", This would of course place Obstacles in the way of our deliberations. This concept of arms controls of course, is not consistent with the idea of general and complete disarmament under reliable international control, and in its substance it even opposes this idea, It has been a tradition for the authors and promoters of this idea of arms control-to place it in contrast with general aid complete disarmament. My delegation would like to point to several works which have been written precisely to develop the idea of arms control in the West. I should like to quote from the book "Strategy and Arms Control"y by TC - Shelling and MH. Halperin, who are, if I am not mistaken9 recognized authorities on this question in the United States "What is striking is not how novel the methods and purposes of arms control are, and how different from the methods andpurposes of national military policy; what is striking is how much overlap there is. There is hardly an objective of arms control to be described in this study that is not equally a continuing urgent objective of national military strategy -- of our unilateral- military plans and policies," i think that this shows that the substance of the concept -of arms control is different from general and corplete disarmament. Wh are convinced that the question of control of %he implementation of general and complete disarmament cannot be approached in such a way that it should be an instrument for enforcing unilateral military plans of individual countries, Therefore arms control' cannot replace control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament. The demanc for arms control is in evident contradiction of the principle contained in the Joint Statement that in the process of general and complete disarmament the security and justified interests of all participating States should be safeguarded in equal measure, In its substance it provides for safeguarding the security and justified interests of only some countries,

ENDC/PV.23 32 (Mrg Hajek, Czechoslovakia) Those who advocate so-called arms control declare at the same time that no State would be at a disadvantage since equal possibilities of control would be secured for all States. But the reality is different. Information which could be acquired by the introduction of so-called arms control is not of equal importance for all States. It is practically insignificant for countries which make efforts to safeguard their own security exclusively. For such safeguarding it is sufficient to have reliable verification that all States are honouring their obligations in respect of the reduction and elimination of agreed armed forces and armaments of a certain kind. On the other hand, such information would be of considerable significance to a potential aggressor. The main essence of these demands is not to acquire data on the level of armed forces and armaments, for such data would be freely available in the process of general and complete disarmament. What is in the background of these demands is that they would make it possible to acquire exact information on the dislocation of certain armed forces, armaments and installations, The importance of such information from the point of view of the preparation of an effective surprise attack has been underlined here on a number of previous occasions7 and there is no need for me to deal with it again, Both the Soviet draft in article 2 and the United States draft contained in document ENDC/18 envisage the establishment of an international disarmament organization which would be charged with the exercise of control over the implementation of oblisations ensuing from general and complete disarmament. The Soviet draft has the good feature, which makes it preferable to us, of outlining.certain concrete principles in accordance with which such an organization would be established, especially with respect to the composition of its principal organs, The main principles have been formulated in article 2 and have been further elaborated in detail in part V of the Soviet draft treaty. W'e have noted from a first reading of the United States treaty outline submitted today that it also contains provisions for the setting up of an international disarmament organization. Of course we think that it is good to include some general provisions outlining the character of such an organization in the introductory articles of the treaty. That is provided for in article 2 of the Soviet draft treaty. The Soviet draft envisages that the control commission7 which would be a permanent bodyý would consist of representatives of the three groups of States; that is, that its organs would reflect the existing three groups of States: the

ENDC/PV,23 33 (Mr_, Hajek, Czechoslovakia) socialist countries, the countries members of the Western military and political alliances, and the neutral countries. The principle of the participation of the three existing groups of States in the solution of principal international issues has been put on our agenda by life itself, It is a recognition of the objective reality that there are three groups of States existing in the world today, Life has also confirmed the correctness of the consistent application of this principle. The best evidence of this is the work of our Conference, which has started the concrete consideration of general and complete disarmament and has accomplished certain results. This is of course due to a number of factors7 but, in our view, it is indisputable that the participation of representatives of eight non-aligned countries in our deliberations has played an important part. We believe that, as in the disarmament talks) these three main groups of countries should also be represented in the safeguarding of reliable and effective control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament, We believe that the adoption of the concept of general and complete disarmament and the agreed principles formulated in the Joint Statement create prerequisites for overcoming the obstacle which the question of reliable and adequate control seems to have posed in disarmament talks in the past. The Joint Statement is beyond doubt a step forward in the solution of these problems. The principles which it contains are consistently applied in the Soviet draft) and particularly in article 2, which we are considering today. Therefore, we see no reason why a great majority of the provisions contained in article 2 of the Soviet draft should cause any problems or difficulties, We think that we should adopt the same procedure in this question as we adopted, with some results7 in the consideration of the preceding provisions. This procedure has7 in fact7 moved us forward. It would also certainly be helpful in finding mutually acceptable wording on a number of basic issues with respect to the general outline of provisions for ensuring effective and reliable international control over general and complete disarmament. It may be expected that, as in the case of the preamble, we will perhaps not reach agreement on all aspects here, Those outstanding problems could be solved at a further stage of our talks when we are faced with the concrete application of control measures corresponding to the concrete disarmament measures in the different stages of the process of general and complete disarmament.

ENDC/PV.23 (jMr. Hqjek2, Czechoslovakia) We are convinced that the adoption of the basic obligations in the question of control over the iimplementation of general and complete disarmament as. formulated in art-icle 2 of the- Soviet; draft would play a p.o.sitivq. role in concrete deliberations at a later. svaie, Their.observance would at a later stlage make it easier to elaboratoe concrete control measures Thich should be carried out in connexi6n with individual disarmament measures0 MrI GODBER (United Kingdom): I have listened with.interest to the statemrents this morning, I would first. of all like to say e, few words about the most important statement which we heard from the representative of the United States and about the new and irpressive document which he submitted. If I may say so I' thought it was a most valuable and striking. statement., which he made to the Conferzence this morning, and I am sure we shall all want tp study it with care, In so far as we have had time to look at this massive document in the brief period since it has been subaiAttedy i&J. cervcinly.appears to my delegation to be a Most valuable,aiaplification of Se:Unite 3tates proposals of September 1961.. In tha-t sense I.am very pleased indeed that we have it before us. I am sure that it will contribute veity miuchi towards facilitating the further progress of our work, I do not propose to comment 6on this document in detail this morning, because it obviously des'erves the most close and. careful study, Eut I shall hope in due course to hav-e the opportunity- ofq speaking constriuctively on. the many new points which it clearly rhises for us, Of course I shall want to have the opportunity of comparing the relevant articles with.the Soviet propo.sals which have been in our hands for several weeks. We shall want to try and marry the relevant prdposals here; and I would assume that this was what wras in the mind of the representative of Ixndia this norning when he asked= where do we go from here? In relation to that it seems to me that we have qCarted on a discussion which our Soviet colleague introduced on MoInday /JEDQg i nage_26/ in regard to article 2 of the Soviet draft andalso the relevant part of the United States document which had previously been circulated as document ENIDC/l80 That, I noticed, is largely incorporated in the new, proposal which, the United States has put forward, but it is still in the initial.part of the freaty0 Therefore I assume we would wish to comulete our deliberatIions on thes.e introductory and initial articles, Thereafter, I would think the questions of the representative

35 (Mr.GodberUnited Kinadom of India would be very relevant indeed. I think that we shall probably have once more to ask our co-Chairmen to get together in relation to this and decide what is the most effective way of proceeding once we have disposed of the introductory articles. once in fact we.are ready to get down to discussion of stage I. I think that is inevitably how we shall have to proceed. I therefore do not propose to comment in detail on this new draft this morning7 although I shall wish to comment briefly on one aspect of what the representative of the United States had to say in introducing the document to us7 because to some ex+.ent it overlaps the debate in regard to verification and control, In that sense I should certainly like to have the opportunity of commenting on what our United States colleague said, Before continuing, I would refer very briefly to the intervention of our colleague from Bulgaria, If he will forgive me for saying sot I thought he was just a little too quick in criticizing the provisions of this new document. I think that he, like the rest of us. will want to study it7 and I hope that at a later stage he will find it more to his baste. He went on to discuss the control provisions in the document9 and made some fairly critical remarks, at.the end of which he urged us all to be in harmony. I am all for harmony, but it must not come from one side -- I leave it at that, Our colleague from Czechoslovakia, at one stage in the interesting spieech to which we have just listened) argued -- very genuinely, I am sure -- that control could provide a country with information which could help it to launch a surprise attack. He seemed to be arguing that if control were allowed to go beyond what had been actually discarded it could encourage a country to launch a surprise attack, I listened to this with interest because it seemed to me to have some relevance to some comments which I think I made yesterday, and which other representatives have made7 on the value of discussing surprise attack as a separate item. in the Committee of the Whole. I believe that our Soviet colleague doe~s not fully realize the value of discussing that item at this moment, and if our Czechoslovak colleague would have a word with Mr, Zorin after this meeting it might possibly facilitate our discussion of this valuable matter at a later date, I come now to the question of control, and to the very important speech made by the representative of the Soviet Union the other day /ji7 I have studied that speech with great care and have again compared the relevant

iNDC/PT Y23 36 (Mr. Godber, United Kingdom) article of the Soviet treaty with the proposals in the United States memorandum put before us earlier, Of course, every measure of disarmament that we tackle will call for a different degree of verification, We should not lose sight of the fact that the verification process itself, whatever we decide upon, will be extremely expensive and extremely complex. For this reason I am quite certain that neither side will call for more than what it considers to be the minimum necessary for any given measure or stage. When we come to work out these specific measures we can at the same time work out precisely what degree of verification will be necessary for each. In doing so we can be guided, I think, by article 6 of the Agreed Principles, that the nature and extent of control should depend on the requirements for verification of the individual measures being carried out at each stagec What, above all,.it seems to me we have to aim at is that these measures should involve a continuous process of the destruction of weapons and should be accompanied by a continuous and adequate process of verification. I should have thought that that was basic to the consideration of us all in regard to this matter. Therefore.. when I look at the toxt, I could agree with a number of the intentions expressed in the Soviet article 2; though not necessarily with all the wording. I would pick out here onvl one point on which to comment in criticism, I. refer to the last words in article 2, paragraph 4, which speak of ensuring adequate representation on the organization of "all three existing groups of States", Frankly, I am not very happy.ih that phrase, because I doubt very much whether many of our colleagues outside the Eastern and Western groupings like to regard themselves as a group, I should have thought that this could be very much more happily worded for achieving the same object which I think our Soviet colleague has in mind.. I throw that out merely as a drafting pointo But of course one has to study also the United States proposals', wording, with which I find myself largely in agreement, It would seem that when we have had our debate on this we can once more ask orr co-Chairmen to try and draw together the ideas in relation to this particular wording, The discussion we have so far had does undoubtedly, I think, show some of the difficultues with which we shall be confronted MLr,. Zorin himself, when he spoke on Monday I think, said that he did not want to go into detail op the subject of the international disarmament organization since this was covered at a later stage in the Soviet draft, I agree with that: I think that is right,

ENDC/PV.23 (Mro Godber, United Kingdom) I am quite ready to discuss it in detail whenever the Committee thinks it appropri-ate -Vital as will be this organization in the disarmament process, that discussion could, I personally think% be deferred until we have got some way into the discussion of the substantive issueso Indeed, I should have thought that this agreed very largely with the thinking of the Soviet delegation in this regard, I understand it has said on various occasions that it wishes to discuss control and verification not in isolation but in relation to particular projects. I would therefcre like to confine myself now to just one -or two points of principle0 One which hns alreo.dy emerged very strongly is the question of.. what is sometimes referred to as remainders3 but what I refer to as retained war potential, what is left at any stage after any reduction has taken place. Mr. Zorin gave us to understand at several points in his speech on Monday that the Soviet Government w ould in no circumstances agree to any verification of the numbers of troops and quantities of armaments remaining after agreed reductions had taken place, That has really been repeated again this-morning in the speeches to which we have listened from the representative of Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, Again we have been told that verification, of this nature is or could be espionage. Perhaps in this context I might recall to the Committee something that my leader, Lord Home, said when he was here at the start of our discussions, On 20 March he said: "There may at one time have been a great military advantage in secrecy..o but as there is now no military advantage in war, where do the profits of secrecy lie?" -(ENDC/PV., page 11) I think that was a very profound phrase, and I recall it to my colleagues because it seems to me that this is an argument which certainly goes with some of the arguments we heard the other day to the effect that war cannot be used as an element of policy0 Lord Homets argument is exactly in line with that: if in fact there are now no military advantages in war, what is the value of secrecy? But undoubtedly we have to face the fact that this anxiety does still exist, It was brought out very clearly in various comments made by Mr. Zorin on Monday, But at..the same time he.made. it quite clear early in his speech that the Soviet Union did not expect others -to take their word any more than the Soviet Union would. take the word of others, He said: "V'e are not prepared to take anyone at their word, particularly States wbich have organized closed military alignments pursuing a policy of proliferating armaments and establishing their military bases along the frontiers of the Soviet Union"t' ( jCi V,21, 2a27)

ENTDC/PIV,23 38 (Mr. Godber, United Kingdom) I think we know whom Mr, Zorin was thinking of there. Then he said: "We ourselves do not ask bhat we should be taken at our word." (ibidL.) That; I think, is straightforward talking, and as such I admire it. I think it is right that we start from that conception; we know precisely that we all think alike in regard to this. But, that being sop we have got to have ways and means of giving one another that assurance that we need, Mr. Zorin said; a little later in his speech --and I agree with this: "...The volume of control should be in strict conformity with the volume and nature of the disarmament measures,,." (ETDC/PV.21, page 30) I think our United States colleague used almost identical words this morning when he was referring to this point. There is thus general agreement, at any rate, on the fact that there must be a genuine correspondence between the actual element of disarmament and the element of control. Our difficulty -- and it is a difficulty which-we have got to face - is to find an agreed way of carrying that into effect,.taking into account on the onehand the fears of espionage that are expressed, and on the other hand the feeling of a genuine need to know that measures which have been undertaken are in fact really being carried out. Mr. Zorin. I thought, tried to deal with this in his speech on Monday when he said: "If, in the course of disarmament; both sides reduce their armed forces to an agreed extent at each stage, the threat of a military conflict will undoubtedly be lessened.,,." (E3.C/P621,pap 0) A little later on he said this in regard to the equilibrium of terror between East and West: "If this expression were translated into normal human language this would signify, from the military point of view, that between the two main military groups there is an equilibrium of forces. If this is so and if during the process of disarmament each side were to reduce its military power to an agreed strength as regards armaments and troops, it is obvious that the ratio of forces would not be impaired.".(ibid) That last phrase is prefaced by the word "If", and Mr0 Zorin went on to say "each side would reduce its military power to an agreed strength".. This is the key to the problem, really: how one ascertains whether a Power has reduced to an agreed strength.

ENDC/P7., 2 3 39 (MrI, Godber, United Kindom) It seems to me that there are two separate issues to face, If one reduces by an agreed number, that is one matter, But if one reduces to an agreed strength or to an agreed level, that is quite another matter, Because if one is going to reduce to an agreed level7 then one must have some way of verifying that the reduction actually has been made to that level. Of course, there is always the fact: to be remembered that when one is reducing to an agreed level there must be a check that that level has not been exceeded by new production going on at the same time. But if one is reducing to an agreed levely one must find a way of getting some sort of check which will not bring into play the fears and anxieties which were expressed by our Soviet colleagues and yet at the same time will give a measure of security to others of us who feel that we must have assurances that an agreed level is in fact an agreed level and that it has not been exceeded. Reductions by an agreed number -- and one suggestion in this respect was, I think, put to us by our colleague from the United States this morning -- that clearly could be verified without difficulty, But when it is reduction to an agreed level, we have got to find a way -- and it is our duty around this table to find a way -- which will satisfy both sides. In that context, then, I listened with very great care to what our United States colleague said this morning on this question of what is sometimes called "sampling techniques". In the plan that has just been tabled, there is a suggestion for zonal or sampling inspection - it is made quite clear that this is not put forward as a positive, definite proposal, as being the only way in which the problem could be solved. Our United States colleague went on to "explain to us the provisions which the United States had in mind in that regard. I think we have to look at this very carefully indeed. It does seem to me) and it has seemed to me from the moment I first heard this suggestion -- I think it was first put forward at one of the Pugwash Conferences -- that this does provide the elements of a solution between East and West on this problem. I hope that we can consider it carefully and dispassionately. As I understood my United States colleague this morning7 he was saying that countries will be divided into zones, and as one proceeded with disarmamente so one would proceed with the zones, I understood him to mean -- I am not sure whether he precisely said this and I do not want to put words into his mouth -- that if one agreed to 10 per cent disarmament, then one had the right to inspection of 10 per cent of the territory of the other country. In other words,

ENDC/PV.23 40 (M r. Godber, United Kingdom) 10 per cent of the zones -- however many there would be -- would be available for inspection, and they would be chosen by the country on the other side. As one advanced to 20 per cent of elimination of armaments, so one would advance to 20 per cent of zones. It seems to me that if it is married mathematically in that way it does accept the basic principle to which our Soviet colleague attaches so much importance -- the basic principle that the percentage of inspection must not exceed the percentage of disarmament. If that be so, I do think there is merit in this proposal. However, if it does not satisfy our Soviet colleague - and I hope very much it does -- then I would say very sincerely to him that he has an obligation to make some other suggestion which will help to overcome this difficulty. In other words, it seems to me that an imaginative proposal has been put forward here; I hope it will be accepted; but if it is not accepted it is not sufficient merely to rest on these declarations that anything which seeks verification of agreed remaining war potential is espionage, because to rest on that is in fact to put the other representatives at this Conference in an impossible position. We have got to find a way out of this difference. I think this suggestion is a worthwhile one, but if it is not accepted we must have 'some other proposal from our Eastern colleagues which really faces up to this problem. I was encouraged when irr. Zorin said that his delegation was fully prepared to study carefully any other proposals or measures which might be advanced by other States. I say to him that I very much hope he will study this suggestion, because it seems to me that it does offer very definite advantages. In the same way, he recognized the need for international control over -- "...enterprises.which previously were wholly or partly engaged in manufacturing the means of delivering nuclear weapons with a view to preventing any clandestine resumption of their manufacture." (ENDC/PV.21 pae 32) Presumably, if he accepts that principle for nuclear weapon vehicles, he will also accept it for other weapons. It therefore seems that there is a considerable measure of agreement here if only we can get to the bottom of this basic difficulty, which I have tried to define as seems to me to be required. And I say again -- I have made this suggestion before in various contexts and it has not been taken up -- that possibly this is a question which could, be studied by a sub-committee. I do

j i! i - -t.': J(Mro Godber. United Kingdom) not press that if it' is not acceptable; but it seems to me that this is a matter which requires the most careful consideration if our problem is to be solvedo Let us consider this further at some stage, but it neeu not hold up our work of completing our discussion in regard to the relevant article of the treaty which we are considering, because it is a preliminary article, If necessaryy we could of course deal 'ith it as we dealt with the preamble, including the maximum of agreement on both sides and putting between brackets such points as are not agreed, I think this would help us in our worko I am very conscious of the fact that we want to get on to the discussion of substantive measures of actual disarmament% and in that discussion some of the problems of verification and control may not seem so difficult as when we discuss them in the abstractI would therefore suggest that when this debate has been concluded we ask our co-Chairmen to try to get the greatest measure they can of common agreement on the wording of such an article, to set aside the points on which they are not ab7,e to agree and to permit us to proceed as soon as we can thereafter to the discussion in some form or other of substantive measures in this.field, In saying that I am not xorgetting, of. course, that there is also in the initial part of the Soviet draft treaty another important article dealing with the obligation to maintain international peace and.security. These are matters to which I attach very great irrportance, and presumably we would wish to have a discussion on them too, What I am seeking to do is get.ahead so that we can come to the substantive matters which I am sure we all wish to discusso MrF EAiLJE (Czechoslovaki'a) I would like to clarify one point concerning the conclusions drawn by the representative of the United Kingdom from our arguments on the adequacy of controlo We are of course grateful that he paid so much attention to our arguments in favour of the adequacy of control not exceeding the corresponding disarmament measures; but we feel that the conclusions he drew concerning the procedure in,the Committee of the Whole were not quite accurate, Our arguments lead uslogically to insist on adequacy of control when discussing the problem of general and complete disarmament, but they do not lead us to another conclusion which wre feel 'to be inconsistent but which Mr, Godber put forward -- that is2 that we are in favour of starting up again the discussion on surprise attack, which in the past proved to be a very lengthy and7 unfortunately, rather fruitless discussion, He concluded that we should be in favour of holding

E1mC/PV,23.42 (Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia) this discussion once again in the Committee of the'Whole, whose task it is to deal with measures which would help to lessen international tension and to create a more favourable climate for solving the problem of general and complete disarmament. With great respect, however, I must assure the representative of the United Kingdom that we will not follow his kind suggestion and, like our Soviet and Polish colleagues, will not agree to give priority to the doubtful discussion of the item on surprise attack over the discussion of the problems of non-nuclear zones and the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, of the urgency of which our delegation is fully conscious and on which we are insisting in full agreement with our Soviet and Polish colleagues. Mr, GODBER (United Kingdom): I only want to say how sad it makes me to observe how ineffective my arguments are. The Conference decided to issue the following communique: "The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its twenty-third meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr, F. Cavalletti, the representative of Italy. "Statements were made by the representatives of the United States, Bulgaria, India7 Italy, Czechoslovakia and the United Kingdom. "The delegation of the United States submitted to the Conference an outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. "The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 19 April 1962, at 10 am, The meeting rose at 12,50 pm,