|Author:||La Chambre, Marin Cureau de, 1594-1669.|
|Title:||A discourse of the knowledg of beasts,: wherein all that hath been said for, and against their ratiocination, is examined. / By Monsieur de la Chambre, counsellor to the King of France in his counsels, and his physitian in ordinary. Translated into English by a person of quality.|
|Publication Info:||Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library
2011 April (TCP phase 2)
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A discourse of the knowledg of beasts,: wherein all that hath been said for, and against their ratiocination, is examined. / By Monsieur de la Chambre, counsellor to the King of France in his counsels, and his physitian in ordinary. Translated into English by a person of quality.
La Chambre, Marin Cureau de, 1594-1669., Person of quality.
London: Printed by Tho. Newcomb for Humphrey Moseley at the Princes Arms in St. Pauls Church-Yard, 1657 [i.e. 1658]
|Alternate titles:||Traité de la connoissance des animaux. English|
Chanet, Pierre. -- De l'instinct et de la connoissance des animaux
To the READER.
A DISCOURSE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF ANIMALS.
That the Imagination forms the Images of things. And that its there wherein the first Knowledge consists.
CHAP. I. That the Pefection of things is begun in those which are inferiour to them.
CHAP. II. That Knowledge is an Action and a Producti∣on of Images.
The sensible Species enter not the Memory.
The Images which the Imagination forms, are different from those which pass from the Objects, as those are of the Ʋnderstanding.
CHAP. III. The Imagination represents not only the Accident, but also their Subject.
The Imagination represents things all entire.
The Nature of the Imagination is altogether Representative.
That the Imagination can unite or divide the Images it hath formed.
CHAP. I. That the Imagination makes Affirmative Propositions.
Whence the confusion of Thoughts comes in Dreams and in Sickness.
The Imagination can add an Est and a Non est to the Terms it unites.
The Imagination may add Images to those of its Object.
CHAP. II. That the Imagination can make Nega∣tive Propositions.
How the Negation may be represented by the Imagination.
How Beasts judge of Things.
That the Imagination can unite divers Propsitions, And out of them make Discourses.
CHAP. I. An Examen of the Reasons which M. C. hath produced against the Syllogism we used for an example of the Reasoning of Beasts.
That there is somewhat in the Conclusion of this Syllogism which is not in the An∣tecedent.
That one may Reason in a moment:
That the Ʋnderstanding supposeth Ratiocination.
That sweetness cannot move the Appetite untill the Imagination hath judged it good.
CHAP. II. Examination of the Objections M. C. hath made against the first of our Experi∣ences.
Wherein Ratiocination consists, and what the Action is which the Soul doth in reasoning.
CHAP. III. The Examen of what M. C. hath said against the second Experience which we proposed, Touching the wiles of Beasts.
CHAP. IV. The Examen of what M. C. hath said against our third Experience drawn from the Custom and the Instruction of Beasts.
Beasts hope for things to come.
Beasts fear the evill to come.
How we are frighted with present objects.
How past dangers trouble the Mind.
How Beasts know the differences of time.
The Imagination may know the Time to come.
Time is amongst sensible Objects.
That the Imagination hath Images, of which the Senses give it no Knowledge.
How the knowledge of Time is reserved to the Ʋnderstanding.
To wit, whether without Ratiocination the Images of the Memory move the Imagination as if the objects were present.
Of Custom, and that it cannot be acquired without Reason.
To wit, whether Memory is necessary to all sorts of Habits.
To wit, Whether one may accustom ones self to some things without Reasoning.
CHAP. V. Examen of M. C. Objections against our last proof of the Reasoning of Beasts.
To wit, Whether Animals doubt.
It follows not that Beasts Deliberate because they Doubt.
Answers to those Objections made against the Reason of Beasts.
CHAP. I. The First OBIECTION. Of the difference there is betwixt the Un∣derstanding and the Imagination.
The first difference which there is betwixt the Ʋn∣derstanding and the Imagination.
The second Difference which is betwixt the Ʋn∣derstanding and the Imagination.
That Reason in general is not the specifick differ∣ence of Man.
Whether general Knowledges are more confused then the particular?
CHAP. II. The Second OBIECTION. Of the Deliberation which accompanies Ra∣tiocination.
Whether one can Deliberate when there is but one mean.
Whether Ratiocination be onely to clear doubt∣ful things.
That we cannot apply the Means to the End with∣out Ratiocination.
Beasts know the End and the Means.
CHAP. III. The Third OBIECTION. Of the Language of Beasts.
Beasts communicate Thoughts.
Speech is an Articulate Voyce.
Wherein the Articulation of the Voyce consists.
That the Voice of Beasts is made with design and in∣tention to express their Thoughts.
Whether dumb persons speak, and how.
Since Beasts Speak, they must needs Reason.
Beasts which run to the cry of others, know it to be a means to call them.