The present state of the Socinian controversy, and the doctrine of the Catholick fathers concerning a trinity in unity by William Sherlock ...

SECT. VIII. Concerning the Divine Relations.

BUT it will be of great use more particularly to consider this Doctrine of Relations, without which it is im∣possible rightly to understand what the Schools teach, about a Trinity in Unity: And to reduce it into as narrow a com∣pass as I can, I shall 1. shew, What the Schools mean by Relations in the Divine Nature. 2. Why they insist so much upon Relations.

1. What they mean by Divine Relations. Now they tells us, That they are real Relations, not made by the Mind from some external Respects and Habitudes which it observes between things, but antecedent to all the Acts of Reason in the things themselves: That they are not inhe∣rent Accidents, but Substance, and subsisting Relations; not relative Names and Appellations, but the Relatives themselves; the Persons related being the Relations, and the Relation the Person; which are therefore by some cal∣led Substantiae Relativae, and Entia Realia Relativa, Rela∣tive Substances, and Real Beings, but Relative; that is, not Absolute Substances, and Absolute Beings, with a Relation, as it is in Creatures, where the Son is as Absolute a Man, and as Absolute a Person as the Father is, though they are related to each other as Father and Son; but the very Sub∣stance and Person is the Relation.

Before I shew, That this is the Doctrine of the Schools, the better to understand what they say, and the Reasons of it, it will be necessary to give as plain and intelligible an Idea of this as I can; especially since I find some Learn∣ed Men boggle very much at the Notion of Relative Sub∣stances, which are not merely the Subjects of Relations, but the Relations themselves.

What their Objection is against this, I can't tell, unless they think that a Relative Substance is not True and Perfect Substance; which is very far from the Notion of the Schools, who attribute compleat and perfect Subsistence to these Divine Relations or Persons, not as Accidents in their Subjects, nor as Parts in a Whole, which is their Notion of Substance and compleat Subsistence; but a Relative Sub∣stance only signifies such a Substance as is not the Original, but is all that it is from another, which they call the Rela∣tio Originis, not merely such a Relation as is between the Cause and the Effect, which is seldom a substantial subsist∣ing Relation, but the Relation between Substance and Sub∣stance, when one Substance, in the notion of Suppositum, is wholly and perfectly derived and expressed from the other.

The easiest Representation of this, is the relation between the Prototype or Original, and its Image; which is not a mere Relation of Likeness and Simili∣tude,* 1.1 but of Origination, that the Image is taken from the Original, which is the foundation of the Relation. Though Two Eggs were never so perfectly alike, yet One is not the Image of the Other, because it is not of the Other, nor its na∣tural Representation, though perfectly like it; but the Image is that which re∣sults from the Object, like a Face in the Glass, or the Impression of a Seal; and the whole Essence of such an Image, as

an Image is relative. And it is the same case as to a living substantial Image of that Life and Substance from whence it proceeds; it is as perfect Life and Substance it self, as its Original, or else it could not be a natural Image of Life and Substance; but yet it is Relative Life and Substance, Life of Life, the Prototype begetting its own Image in a per∣fect Identity and Sameness of Nature, Whole of Whole. And this is the Notion of the Schools concerning Relative Substances, which is intelligible enough.

And that this is what they mean by Relations in the God∣head or Divine Nature, is as plain.

The Master of the Sentences tells us, That these Names, Father, Son,* 1.2 and Holy Ghost, signify the Properties of Paternity, Filiation, and Procession; for they are Relatives, which speak a mu∣tual respect, and denote Relations, which are not Accidents in God, but immuta∣bly in the Persons themselves; so that they are not mere relative Appellations, but are Relations or Notions in the things themselves, that is, in the Persons.

And by this Argument Tho. Aquinas proves, That these are real Relations,* 1.3 and are really in God, because the Father is so called from the Relation of Pater∣nity, and the Son from Filiation; that were not Paternity and Filiation realiter in Deo, real subsisting Relations in the Divinity, it would follow, That God is not really Father or Son, but only ac∣cording to different Conceptions,* 1.4 which is the Sabellian Heresy. And proves, That these Relations in God are real, be∣cause they are Divine Processions in the

Identity of Nature; that is the Son, who proceeds from the Father in the Identity of the same Nature; and the Ho∣ly Spirit, who proceeds from Father and Son in the Identity of the same Nature: For they called both the Generation of the Son, and the Spiration of the Holy Ghost, Processions, as the Greeks did 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; the one processio intellectus, the other amoris. Now these real Processions are Respects in the nature of things, and such Respects are real Relations;* 1.5 for when any thing proceeds from a Principle of the same Nature, both that which proceeds, and that from which it proceeds, must ne∣cessarily be of the same Order, and there∣fore have a real respect to each other. Divine Processions in the Identity of Nature must be related to each other in the Unity of the same Nature, and must be substantial subsisting Relations; for they are no other than the Persons themselves, who thus proceed.

It is a received Conclusion in the Schools,* 1.6 That a Relation in God is the same with the Divine Essence: That Per∣sonal Relations are not reipsa distinguish∣ed either from the Persons or the Essence. And Gilbertus Porretanus, who taught the contrary, was forced to recant in the Council of Rhemes. The real Distinction of these Relations in the Unity of the Divine Nature, is another avowed Doctrine of the Schools; and by a real Distinction they mean a Distinction in re, in the Subject and Suppositum: And this they prove from the real Distinction of Persons, which are distinguished only by Relations: From a real Trinity, which is One in Substance, but multiplied by Relations, (relatio multiplicat Trinita∣tem;) and therefore unless these Relations be really distin∣guished from each other, there can't be a Real, but only a Notional Trinity, which is Sabellianism. That these Rela∣tions

which constitute the Trinity, are opposite Relations,* 1.7 which require distinct Subjects, as Paternity and Filiation, for no man can be Father and Son to himself: That these Divine Relations are real Relations, and therefore must be really distinct or else they are not all real, unless they be really opposed to each other, which makes a real distincti∣on; and therefore there must be a real distinction in God, not as to any thing absolute (secundum rem absolutam), which is the Divine Essence, which has the most perfect and simple Unity, but secundum rem relativam, with respect to a Relative Being and Subsistence: So that these Relations are Relative Beings▪ Relative Subsistences, and, as they are sometimes called. Relative Substances, which are really di∣stinct, though not in Nature, yet in their Suppositums; not as T••ree Absolute Beings, which makes a distinction in Nature, but as Three Real Subsisting Relations, in the Unity of the same Nature.

But not ••o multiply words in so plain a Case, I shall ob∣serve bu•• one thing more to this purpose, and that concerns the Dispute conc••••ning the Number of the Divine Persons. The Catholick Faith owns a Trinity, or only Three Divine Persons in the Unity of the Godhead, Father, Son, and Holy 〈◊〉〈◊〉; and it is the known Doctrine of the Schools, That the Relation is the Person; How comes it to pass then, that when there are Four Relations in the Godhead, Pater∣nity, Filiation, Active Spiration, and Procession, there should be but Three Persons?

Now the Answer, which Aquinas and others give to this Difficulty, is this. That it is not every Relation,* 1.8 but only opposite Relations, which constitute and distinguish Per∣sons; for more Pers••ns are more subsisting Relations really distinct from each other; but there can be no real distin∣ction between the Divine Relations, but upon account of their relative opposition: And therefore two opposite Rela∣tions must belong to two Persons, but such Relations as are

not opposite to each other, must belong to the same Per∣son; and therefore Paternity and Filiation must belong to two Persons, as being relatively opposed; and therefore a subsisting Paternity is the Person of the Father, and a sub∣sisting Filiation the Person of the Son: Which can never be one Person, as requiring distinct Suppositums for such oppo∣site Relations: But now the other two Relations, Spiration and Procession are not opposed to either of these, but only to each other: And therefore Spiration does not constitute another Person, as not being opposed either to Paternity or Filiation, and therefore may and does belong both to Father and Son; but Procession must constitute a Third Person, as opposed to Spiration, and so necessarily distinguished from Father and Son.

And therefore, though there are Four Relations, yet one of them, Spiration, is not separated from the Person of the Father, and the Son, but belongs to them both; nor is it a Property, as not being proper and peculiar to any one Person; nor is it a Personal Relation, or that which consti∣tutes a Person, and therefore there are but Three Relations, Paternity, Filiation, and Procession, which are Personal Properties, which constitute Persons, and therefore but Three Persons.

Now this Answer evidently proves, That by Relations they did not mean meer Habitudes, Respects, and Exter∣nal Denominations; for then every Relation must of neces∣sity be a Person, and there must be as many Persons, as there are Relations; but they mean relative Beings, and Subsisten∣cies, and therefore allow no Relations to constitute distinct Persons, but such as necessarily require distinct Subjects; that is, such opposite Relations, as can never meet in the same Subject; and therefore their Suppositums must be re∣ally distinct, as Paternity and Filiation, for no one can be Father and Son to himself. There is no imaginable Ac∣count, why only opposite Relations constitute Persons, but

because they distinguish their Subjects; for when opposite Relations meet in the same Subject, but not in opposition, they do not distinguish and multiply Persons, as the same man may be Father and Son, and but One Person; but when opposite Relations distinguish their Subjects, as the Divine Relations necessarily do, they multiply Persons too: And no Relations, Properties, Notions, according to the Doctrine of the Schools, constitute a Person, but such as distinguish their Subjects, that Three Persons, and Three Relations, are not Three Respects and Denominations of the same Singular Subject, but Three real distinct Relative Beings, and Subsistencies.

2. Let us now consider, why they insist so much upon the notion of Relations, that when they allow every Divine Relation to be the Divine Essence, Substance, an incommu∣nicable Subsistence and Substance, yet they will not allow us absolutely to say Three Substances, but Three Relations, or Three Relative Beings, Subsistencies, or Substances. And the plain and short account of it is this; That this is essential to the Unity of God, and gives us the truest and most perfect conception of a Trinity in Unity. As to shew this particularly;

1. These Divine Relations (though each of them be in∣communicably in his own Person, Essence, and Substance) secure the perfect Unity of the Divine Essence. For Three Relative Substances are essentially but One Substance, which Three Absolute Substances can never be, though they never so perfectly agree in the same Specifick Notion and Idea.

By an absolute Substance, I mean one intire, perfect, indi∣vidual, whole, which is compleat in it self, and subsists compleatly by it self, without any Internal, Essential Uni∣on to, or necessary dependence on, any Being of the same kind: By Relative Substances, I mean, such Substances as are internal subsisting Relations in the same One whole indi∣vidual

Nature: Of Absolute Substances we have as many Instances, as there are particular Creatures in the World; of Relative Substances we have no instance in Created Na∣ture, but some such Images and Resemblances, as may help us to form an intelligible notion of them. Now it is evident, without any need to prove it, that every compleat absolute Substance, how many soever they are, multiplies the Indivi∣duals of the same kind; Three absolute Human Substances are Three Men, and Three Absolute D••vine Substances would for the same reason be Three Gods; but it is ••therwise as to Relative Substances, which are ••ubsisting Personal Relations in the same One individu••l Nature; and it is demonstrable, that the Relations of the same One individual Nature and Substance, can't multiply Natures and Substances, for then they would not be Relations in the same individual Sub∣stance, but would be Ab••olute, not Relative Substances.

As to explain this by a familiar Example. The Fathers, and after them the Schoolmen, find some Images of the Trinity in Human Souls, as Memory, Vnderstanding. Will; or which they think a nearer resemblance, Mind, Know∣ledge, Love: And a late S••cinian is very fond of such a Tri∣nity, as Original Mind, Reflex Wisdom, and Love.

* 1.9Peter Lombard explains this particularly from the Do∣ctrine of St. Austin, and it is evident that all these are very distinct, and never can be each other; but all have a mu∣tual and necessary relation to each other; are in each other, and equal to each other, but are but One, One Mind, One Life, One Essence, and One Substance; because they sub∣stantially exist in the same Soul and Mind, not as Accidents in their Subjects, which may be parted, but as Essential Properties and Powers.

This our Socinian Adversaries like well enough; for these distinct Properties and Powers do not multiply Persons, and therefore though they grant something like such di∣stinct Powers in the Divine Nature, yet still there is but

One Divine Person, and therefore according to their own Notion, but One God.

But this is not the Question, Whether such distinct Fa∣culties, Properties, and Powers, multiply Persons, which we grant they do not, because they do not multiply Na∣tures, and One Individual Human Natu••e is but One Man, or One Human Person; but the Q••estion is, Whether, if instead of these distinct Powers and Faculties, there were real subsisting Persons, as essentially related to each other in the same Individual Nature, they would any more divide or multiply Nature, than such distinct Powers and Facul∣ties do? And I am pretty confident, no man can give me any good reason, why Relative Subsistencies, or Personal Relations should any more divide or multiply the Divine Nature, than Relative Powers and Properties divide or multiply Human Nature: For if these Divine Persons are as essentially related to each other in the Divine Nature, as such distinct Powers and Faculties are in Human Nature, a Trinity of Persons must be as essentially One in the same One Individual Divinity, as a Trinity of Powers and Facul∣ties are in the same single Human Nature. It is certain, Three such Divine Persons, though each of them be by him∣self true and perfect God, are not Three Absolute Divini∣ties, and therefore not Three Gods, but Three Divine Re∣lative Subsistencies in the same One Individual Godhead, and therefore but One God; as Memory, Understanding and Will, are all that a Mind is, and each of them all that the other is, and yet not Three Minds, but One Mind.

This shews the diff••rence between Absolute and Relative Substances; Three Absolute Substances are always distinct∣ly and separately Three, and can never be any otherwise than specifically One; but Relative Substances may be es∣sentially One in the same One Individual Nature; and this is the Account both the Fathers and Schools give of a Tri∣nity in Unity, Three Relations, or Three Relative Sub∣stances,

or Subsistencies, essentially related to each other in the Unity of the same One Individual Essence.

St. Gregory Nyssen has given the most particular Account of this matter in his Catechetical Oration.* 1.10 To convince the Heathens of the Eternal Subsistence of the Divine Word in the Unity of the same Godhead, he lays the foundation of all in that universally received Prin∣ciple, That the Divinity is not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which I translate (not, irrational, without Reason, or Understanding, but) not without its Word; which is not the Personal Wisdom of the Father,* 1.11 whereby the Father is wise, as I have already shewn (Chap. 3.) but a Perso∣nal, Living, Subsisting, Word: Which answers to that Word which we feel in our own Minds, and which is essential to all Minds, that no Mind can be with∣out its Word; but is not a vanishing No∣tion and Idea, or a transient sound, as Human words, but answers to the per∣fection of the Divine Nature. And therefore as our Mortal Nature has a Vanishing, Perishing Word, so the In∣corruptible, and Eternally Permanent, Im∣mutable Nature, has an Eternal Subsist∣ing Word. And (as he proceeds) if this Divine Word subsists, it lives; for it does not subsist like stupid inanimate Stones, but as Mind, and Spirit, which must live, if it subsists; and if it lives, the absolute simplicity of the Divine Na∣ture, which admits of no composition, proves that he lives, not by a participa∣tion

of Life, but as Life it self. And if the Word lives, as being Life it self,* 1.12 it must have 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a power to do, what it freely wills and chuses. For that which cannot will and chuse (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) does not live; and an Impotent Will is a contradiction to the Nature of God; and therefore its Power must be equal to its Will: But this Di∣vine Word can will nothing but what is good, and wills whatever is good; and being able to effect whatever it wills, is not unactive (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) without doing any thing, but does the good it wills: And since we must acknowledge the World, and all things in it, which are wisely and artifici∣ally made, to be good; all things are the Works of this Living Subsisting Word. This is his Proof,* 1.13 That God has a Subsisting, Living, Almighty, Creating Word, which is another di∣stinct Person from him, whose Word he is. For the Word is a Relative Term, and signifies a Relative Subsistence, and necessarily supposes the Father; for he is not the Word, but with relation to him, whose Word he is. And by this means he tells us, we may escape both the Polytheism of the Gentiles, and the Singularity of the Iews, by acknow∣ledging the Living, Energetical, Ope∣rative Word, which the Iews deny, and the Unity and Identity of Nature, between the Word, and Him, whose Word he is. For as our Word proceeds out of our Mind, and is neither every way the same with the Mind, nor yet upon all accounts another. For that it

is of the Mind, proves that is is another, and not the Mind it self; but as it per∣fectly expresses and represents the Mind, it cannot be another Nature, but one and the same Nature, though a kind of different subsistence. So the Word of God, by a distinct subsistence of its own, is distinguished from him, from whom he receives his Subsistence and Hypostasis; but inasmuch as he is all, and the same that God is, he is perfectly one and the same in Na∣ture.

This is the Doctrine of all the other Catholick Fathers, as well as of Gregory Nyssen, who resolve the Unity of the Godhead in a Trinity of Persons, into Relative Subsistencies in the same Individual Nature, which no more multiplies Natures and Divinities, to make Two or Three Gods, than the Mind, its Word, and Love, make Three Minds.

This is the true and compleat notion of the Homoousion, which (as I have already shewn) does not signify a meer Specifick Unity, but the Unity of One Individual, not Sin∣gular, Nature in Three; that Three Real, Distinct, Sub∣sisting Persons are as intimately and essentially related to each other in the same Individual Nature, as a Human Mind and its Word are; which are not, and never can be two Minds, but one Mind. Two compleat and perfect Minds can never in a proper notion be Consubstantial, or one Sub∣stance, though they have the same specifick Nature; for their Substance is not one and the same, but naturally two, and naturally separable, how closely soever they may be united; but Three Divine Persons, who are essentially rela∣ted to each other in the same Divinity, as the Mind and its Word are, are in the strictest notion Consubstantial, or One

Substance, being essentially related to each other in the same One Individual Nature and Essence.

And here I must take notice of a great mistake, which some Learned Men run into, concerning the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, singular and particular Natures, Substances, and Essences, by which they understand, what some others call Personal Substances; and conclude, That since Philoponus, and others, who asserted 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Three particular Natures and Essences, or Substances in the Godhead, were charged with Tritheism (as they deserved, if their Opi∣nions be truly represented) those who assert Three Sub∣stantial Persons, or Three distinct Personal Subsistencies or Substances, are liable also to the same Charge. This is a material Objection, and a fair Answer to it will set this whole matter in a clear light.

Now the Answer in short is this, That those who rejected the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and charged it with Tritheism, did not thereby understand particular, personal, relative, Subsisten∣cies or Substances, but compleat, absolute, particular Na∣tures and Substances; not Three Real, Substantial, Sub∣sisting Relations in One Individual Nature, as a Mind, its Internal, Essential, Word, and Spirit, as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are Three; but Three absolute particular Na∣tures, as Three Men, each of whom has a compleat, abso∣lute, personal Nature of his own, are Three. Now if this be the true Account, every one sees the difference between Three personal, relative, Substances or Subsistencies of the same Nature, and Three absolute particular Natures; the first is a real Substantial Trinity, Three Subsisting Infinite Persons in the Unity of the same Godhead. Three Persons, and One God; the other is down-right Tritheism.

And that this is all they meant by particular Individual Natures, I have many Arguments to prove.

For 1st. Had they herein condemned distinct, personal, relative Substances, they had condemned the Faith of the Catholick Church, and relapsed into Sabellianism, as abun∣dantly appears from what I have already proved at large.

2 Those very Persons, who charge Philoponus with Tri∣theism for asserting Three Individual Natures and Essences, do themselves own a Personal Substance.* 1.14 Leontius, as Ni∣c••ph rus tells us, wrote a large Book against Philoponus, and yet he tells us, That the Fathers by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Es∣sence or Substance, and Nature, understood the same thing, and so they did by Hypostasis and Person. That by Essence and Substance, they meant what the Philosophers call a Species; by Hypostasis and Person, what they call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an Individual Substance: And in this sense he tells us, They acknowledged One Divinity in Three Hypostases, or Three Personal Subsistencies. That there is One Hyposta∣sis (that is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) of the Father, One Hyposta∣sis of the Son, and One Hypostasis of the Holy Ghost; that these Three (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) in nothing differ from each other, but only in their Personal Properties, (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) that one is the Father, the other the Son, the other the Holy Ghost: So that Leontius owns Three true proper Persons, each of which is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an Indivi∣dual Substance, which he asserts to be the true Catholick Ecclesiastical Notion of a Person, and each Person as di∣stinct from each other, as he that begets is from him who is begotten; and therefore when he condemned Philoponus for his Individual Natures and Essences, he could not by that mean relative, Personal Subsistencies or Substances.

Theodorus Abucara (if he be the Au∣thor of that Tract against the Severians, Explanatio vocum,* 1.15 quibus Philosophi utun∣tur, which I have sometimes suspected to belong to Theodorus Presbyter Raithen∣sis, who promises such an Explication of

Philosophical Terms at the end of his Treatise de Incarnatione, I say, this Theo∣dorus, whoever he is) expresly charges these 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Individual Natures and Essences with Tritheism; and yet throughout that Treatise teaches, That Hypostasis is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a singular Indivi∣dual Nature; and so does Anastasius Sinaita in his Hodegos; and indeed all the Writers of that Age, who asserted against the Severians the Union of Two Natures in One Person in Christ.

3dly, But we shall soon be satisfied in this matter, if we consider the occasion of this Dispute. The Severians, as they had learnt from their Master Severus, and he from Eutyches, taught, that there was but One Nature, as well as One Person in Christ, and that for this reason, That to assert Two Natures, is consequently to assert Two Persons in Christ, which is Nestorianism; for every Nature is a Person, that it is impossible there should be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a Nature without a Personality of its own, for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Nature and Person, or Hypostasis, are the same. In opposition to this the Catholicks urged, That if Nature and Hypostasis were so the same, that One Hypostasis is One Nature, and One Nature but One Hypostasi••; then as we assert Three Hypostasis in the Trinity, we must also allow 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Three Individual Natures and Essences in the Trinity. Philoponus saw that this was an unavoidable Consequence, and therefore rather than own Two Natures in One Person in Christ, he chose to assert Three Individual Natures in the Trinity: And for this, he and his Followers were very justly charged with Tritheism.

And this shews us, what these Individual Natures were, not Three Relative Personal Subsistencies and Substances in the same One Individual Nature, which is but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, One Divinity; but Three Compleat Absolute Divinities,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Three such Divine Natures, as there are Three Individual Human Natures in Three Men: Each of which is by himself, and alone, without communication with any other in the same Individual Nature, One com∣pleat intire Humane Nature, and One Human Person: For this was the rise of the Dispute, concerning the Humanity of Christ. The Catholicks owned the Personality of the Word, but taught that Christ's Humane Nature was so uni∣ted to his Divinity, as not to be a distinct Human Person, but to subsist in the Person of the Word, which is the true Faith of the Word's being Incarnate, or made Flesh, which could not be true, if the Person of the Word were not Incar∣nate, and that could not be true, if the Human Nature in Christ, were a distinct Human Person, as other Men are. On the other hand, the Severians denied the Union of Two Natures in the One Person of Christ, because an Indi∣vidual Human Nature must be a Person, and then Christ must be two Persons, as well as two Natures: So that this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is a compleat absolute Individual Nature, such as an Individual Human Nature is, and three such Indivi∣dual Natures make three Men, or Three Gods, and to as∣sert Three such Absolute Divinities, is Tritheism; but this concerns not Personal, Relative, Subsistencies or Substances in the same Individual Nature and Essence; and therefore the Condemnation of Philoponus, or Valentinus Gentilis, and such kind of Hereticks (if they did really teach what they are charged with) cannot aff••ct those, who assert Three real, distinct, substantial, Persons, each of whom is by himself, in his own Person, the whole Divine Nature, Essence, Substance, but are essentially and inseparably rela∣ted to each other in the Unity of the same Individual Es∣sence. The very asserting three relative, personal Sub∣sistencies, or Substances, in One Individual Nature, is a direct opposition to the Doctrine of Philoponus, and the Se∣verians, that Nature and Person is the same, so the same,

that One Nature can be but One Person, and One Person but One Nature, which necessarily overthrows a Trinity of Persons in the Unity of the Divine Essence, and the Union of the Divine and Humane Nature in the One Per∣son of Christ; but Three Relative Persons and Subsistencies in One Nature, and One Nature and One Person are direct Contradictions, as One Individual Substance, and Three Individual Substances are.

Indeed those who deny Three Relative Personal Sub∣sistencies, that is, Three Real, Proper, Substantial Persons, in the Unity of the Divine Nature, go upon the same Principle with Philoponus and the Severians, that One Na∣ture is but One True and Proper Person, or Hypostasis, and therefore there cannot be Three Proper Subsisting Persons in the Unity of One Individual Substance; which, as Anastatius Sinaita, and the other Catholick Writers of that Age frequently observe, is that fundamental Error, which gave birth to Sabellianism, Arianism, Nestorianism, and Eutychanism; for as different as these Heresies are, the fundamental Principle is the same, that One Individual Na∣ture is, and can be but One Person, and One Person but One Nature: For this reason Sabellius, who acknowledged the Unity of the Divine Nature, rejected a Trinity of pro∣per Subsisting Persons; Arius, who owned a Trinity of Persons, denied their Consubstantiality, or Sameness and Identity of Nature; Nestorius, who owned Two Natures in Christ, asserted also Two Persons; and Eutyches made Christ but One Nature, as well as One Person; and in consequence of this Philoponus (if he was not mistaken) taught Three Individual Natures, as well as Three Persons in the God∣head. So that to make Nature and Person in the true and proper notion of Person commensurate and converti∣ble Terms; that a Nature is a Person, and a Person an In∣dividual Nature; that One Nature is but One Person, and One Person but One Nature; and that Individual Natures

and Persons must always be multiplied with each other, is the fundamental Principle of all the Heresies relating to the Trinity and Incarnation, and then one would think, that those Doctrines which expresly contradict this Principle, and all these Heresies which result from it, should be the true Catholick Faith: And then Three Real, Substantial, Subsisting Persons, or Three Relative Personal Subsistencies, or Substances, in the Unity of the same Individual Essence, or one Godhead, is the True Catholick Faith; and to reject it upon pretence, that this must multiply Natures with Persons, and so make Three Divinities, and Three Gods, is to return to that condemned Heretical Principle, That One Nature can be but One True and Proper Person; which, if Men understand the true Consequences of what they say, must inevitably betray them to Sabellianism, Arianism, or Tritheism. And thus much for the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which, I hope, we shall hear no more of. The Doctrine of Relations demonstrates the Individual Unity of the Divine Essence; for if Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, though each of them in his own Person be True and Perfect God, yet are not Three Absolute Divinities, but Three Eternal Subsisting Relations, in the same One Divinity, they must be One Individual Essence and Substance, for else they cannot be the Relations of the same One Essence and Substance.

2. As these Divine Relations prove the Individual Unity of Nature and Essence, so they prove the Sameness and Iden∣tity of Nature, wherein, as I have shewn at large, the Ca∣tholick Fathers place the Unity of the Godhead. That 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. One Divinity is One God. A few words will serve to explain this, after what I have already discoursed on this Argument.

The 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as I have already shewn, does not sig∣nify the Singularity, but the perfect invariable Sameness and Identity of Nature; not such a Sameness, as every single Person is the same with himself, but such a Same∣ness

as is between distinct Persons of the same Nature. Now the Doctrine of Relations necessarily infers this per∣fect Sameness and Identity, and this Relative Sameness and Identy proves a perfect Unity.

As for the first, there needs no other proof, but barely to represent it, for it is self-evident: For is it possible, that a Perfect, Living, Subsisting Word should not be perfectly the same with that Infinite Mind, whose Word it is, and from whom it proceeds? That a Perfect, Living, Subsist∣ing Image, should not be perfectly the same with its Pro∣totype, from whom it receives its Being and Nature? For if the Word be not perfectly the same with the Mind, nor the Image with its Prototype, it is not a true and perfect Word, not a perfect Image: By these Relations of Father and Son, of a Mind and its Word, a Prototype and its Image, the Catholick Fathers, as I have already shewn, prove the perfect, invariable Sameness and Identity of Nature; for the thing proves it self. The Relation indeed of Father and Son, considered in general, proves no more than a spe∣cifick Sameness of Nature, which may admit of great changes and variety within the same Species; but when God is the Father, and begets a Son of his own Substance, his Nature being absolutely and immutably perfect, he must communicate the same perfect invariable Nature to his Son; especially when this Son is his own perfect living Word, and his perfect Image. But this is not all: A perfect Sameness between Two Absolute Natures, without the least conceivable difference or variation, would not be a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a Sameness of Identity; for though they could subsist as perfectly the same, as their Idea is, yet they would be Two Absolute Natures, not One Nature: But a perfect Sameness in Essential Relations, or Relative Subsisten∣cies, proves a perfect Identity of Nature, that they are per∣fectly the same in the same One Individual Nature: As a living substantial Word must receive its substance and being,

whole of whole, from that Mind, whose Word it is; for if it be not the same Substance, it can't be the substantial Word of that Mind, whose Substance it is not; nor can a living substantial Image be any other Substance, than that of the Prototype; for if it were, it might be its likeness, but not its natural Image. And thus this Sameness and Identity of Nature proves each Person by himself to be true and perfect God, and all Three but One God; for each Person, according to this Doctrine, has, and must have, the whole perfect Divinity in himself, and all Three but one and the same Divinity.

3. These Subsisting Relations in the Unity of Nature, give us an intelligible Notion of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of the inseparable Union of the Divine Persons, and their mutual 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Inexistence, Inbeing, in each other. That all the Catholick Fathers asserted the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or insepara∣ble Union of the Divine Persons, as essential to the Unity of the Godhead, is so well known, that I need not multi∣ply Quotations to prove it, after what I have already ob∣served to that purpose. But the Question is, What they mean by this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, wherein the Essential Unity of the Godhead consists.

Now it is certain this relates to the inseparable Union of the Persons; for it is opposed to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, divided and separate Hypostases and Persons, which the Fathers charge with Tritheism. The Son is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.16 inseparable from the Essence and Substance of the Father, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is inseparably in the Father; that he is begotten of the Father without any division of Substance, within the Father, and inseparable from him; so that this does not relate immediately to the Unity of Nature, but the Union of Persons, and therefore can∣not signify the Singularity of the Divine Nature, but the Inseparable Union of real distinct Persons in the Unity of Nature. That the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, this Inseparable Union and

Inbeing of Persons, does as necessarily prove the real Di∣stinction of Persons as the Unity of Nature, as St. Hilary, and Athanasius, and the other Fathers, frequently observe, and that proves that the Unity of the Divine Nature, which is the Inseparable Union of Three proper subsisting Persons, is not the Unity of Singularity: Which shews by the way, how improperly the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is made use of to prove the Singularity of the Divine Essence, for it proves quite the contrary; it is the Unity of Three which is a Trinity in Unity; not the Unity of One, which is Singu∣larity and Solitude.

In the next place I observe, That by the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 all the Catholick Fathers understand in this Mystery the in∣separable Union of Relatives in the same Individual Nature, not the Union of compleat, absolute Natures, how close and inseparable soever it may be. There is by Nature no Inseparable Union, but in the same Individual Nature. Three compleat Individuals, though of the same Kind and Species, how closely and intimately soever they be united, are not by Nature inseparable nor essentially One, for they may be parted by that Power which united them, and when they are parted, can subsist apart; as Three com∣pleat Minds, how intimately soever they should be united by God, yet can never be essentially and inseparably One, for they are not essential to each other; they might have subsisted apart, and may be parted again, and an External Union cannot so make them One, as to be natu∣rally inseparable. Which I think is a Demonstration that a Natural Inseparability, which is an Essential Unity, can be only in One Individual Nature between such Relatives as are Essential to each other, and can neither be, nor be conceived, divided, or separated: And therefore the Catholick Fathers represented the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 by Examples of Natural Unions between things Essentially related to each other in One Individual Nature, which either cannot

be conceived, or at least cannot subsist apart. Of this last Kind are a Fountain and its Streams, a Tree and its Branches, whereby they not only represent the Homoousion, but the Inseparable Union of the Divine Persons, as every one knows; for there cannot be a Fountain but its Wa∣ters must flow out, nor Streams without a Fountain from whence they flow; and though Branches may be separated from the Tree, yet they live no longer than they are united, and are Branches of that Tree no longer: But these are very imperfect Images, and without great caution will corrupt our Ideas of the Divine Unity. Of all Cor∣poreal Unions the nearest resemblance we have of this, and which the Fathers most insist on, is the Sun, and its natural Splendor, for we cannot conceive the Sun without its Splendor, nor the Splendor without the Sun; they never were, never can be parted, and therefore, though two, are essentially one. This Representation the Scrip∣ture makes of it, which calls the Son, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Brightness of his Father's Glory, and in this Sense they teach that he is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Light of Light, as it is in the Nicene Creed, whereby they do not mean two distinct independent Lights, which either are or may be parted, though one be lighted at the other (this was the Heresy of Hiera∣chas,* 1.17 as St. Hilary tells us, who repre∣sented this Mystery by two Candles, one of which is lighted at the other, or by one and the same Lamp,* 1.18 which is divided and burns in two Sockets); but that Light and Splendor which is essential to the same Sun, and can never be divided from it, as Athanasius teaches. But the truest Images we have of this in Nature, is the Inseparable Union which is between a Mind and its own

Internal Word, which are so essentially related to each other in the same Indi∣vidual Nature, that they can never be parted, nor conceived apart; the Mind can never be without its Word, nor the Word subsist but in the Mind: It is evident, That two compleat, absolute Minds can never be thus united; for they are not Essential to each other; not naturally one, and therefore not naturally inseparable; but a Mind and its Word, though two, are essentially One, and therefore can never be parted but must subsist together; and these are the Characters the Scripture gives us of God the Father and his Son; the Father Infinite, Eternal, Self-originated Mind; the Son his Eternal Infi∣nite, Living, Subsisting Word. And if Father and Son, this Eternal Mind and Eternal Word, be as essentially One, as a mans Mind and his Word are One, this is a Demon∣stration of their Inseparable Union, and gives us a sensible Notion and Idea of it.

This is the account Athanasius every where gives of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that the Father and Son are inseparably One; the Father being in the Son, and the Son in the Father, as the Word is in the Mind, and the Light in the Sun.* 1.19 To separate the Divine Persons, so as not to be in each other, whatever other Union we own between them, Dionysius of Alexandria charges with Tritheism; for the Divine Word must of necessity be one with God, and the Holy Spirit be and sub∣sist in him. And this Athanasius resolves into such a Sameness and Unity of Na∣ture, as must be between two Relative Subsistencies in the same Individual Na∣ture.

That the Son is in the Father, as the Word is in the Mind, and the Splendor in the Sun; that he is a genuine proper natural Son in the Father's Essence and Substance, not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not subsisting out of his Father's Substance, as other Creature Sons do.* 1.20 That the true No∣tion of the Sons being in the Father, is that the whole Being of a Son, is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Genuine Natural Birth of the Father's Substance, the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as the Splendor is of the Sun: That the very Being of the Son is the Form of Species, and Divinity of the Father. That as the Sun and its Splendor are two, but not two Lights, but one Light from the Sun enlighten∣ing all things with its Splendor and Brightness; so the Divinity of the Son is the Divinity of the Father, and there∣fore inseparable; and thus there is but one God, and none else besides him.

All this plainly refers to the Insepa∣rable Union and Inbeing of Relatives of the same Individual Substance, which are really distinct, but essentially in each other, as the Word is in the Mind, and the Mind in the Word, that Thought it self cannot part them; which is such an Union as can never be be∣tween compleat absolute Substances, which are not natu∣rally Inseparable, nor essentially One. Herein Athanasius places the adequate Notion of the Homoousion, the Same∣ness, Identity, and Unity of Nature. He tells us, That for this reason the Nicene Fathers taught the Homoousion, or

that the Son is Consubstantial, or of one Substance with the Father, to signify that the Son is not only like the Father,* 1.21 but to be so of the Father, as to be the same in likeness; not after the manner of Bodies, which are like each other, but subsist apart by themselves, as Human Sons subsist sepa∣rately from their Parents; but the Ge∣neration of the Son of the Substance of the Father is of a different Kind and Nature from Human Generations, for he is not only like, but inseparable from his Father's Substance. He and the Father are One, as he himself says: The Word is always in the Father, and the Father in the Word, as it is with Light and its Splendor, and this is what the Homoousion signifies; and in like man∣ner he resolves the Sameness, Identity, and Unity of Nature, into this Inter∣nal, Inseparable Union and Inbeing of Three, essentially related to each other in One Individual Divinity.

4thly, That Mutual Inbeing of the Divine Persons, which is their Insepa∣rable and Essential Union, that the Fa∣ther is in the Son, and the Son in the Father, which the Greeks call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and the Latins Circumincessio, can be understood only between the Rela∣tives of the same Individual Essence and Substance. The true compleat Notion of this Inbeing or Perichoresis, is not merely a Mutual Presence, or the same Vbi, that where∣ever one is, there the other is; or a kind of Immeation and Penetration of each other, which is a Corporeal No∣tion, and rejected as such by the Catholick Fathers, when

they speak of this Divine Inbeing, as St. Hilary expressly does,* 1.22 inesse autem non aliud in alio, ut corpus in corpore; that they are not in each other,* 1.23 as one Body is in another Body. And when the Arians objected against our Saviour's saying, I am in the Father, and the Father in me; How can this be in that, and that in this? Or how can the Father, who is greater, be at all in the Son, who is less? Or what wonder is it, that the Son should be in the Father, when it is written of us all, That in him we live, and move, and have our being? Athanasius answers, That this is all owing to Corporeal Conceits, as if they apprehended God to be a Body, not considering the Nature of the True Father, and true Son, the Invisible and Eternal Light, and its Invisible Splendor; an Invisible Substance, and its unbodied Character and Image.

But the true Notion of this Inbeing and Pericharesis is the Perfect Unity of the same Individual Nature in Three. That the Nature and Essence of the Father is in the Son,* 1.24 that the Son is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Character, Image, Mind, Divinity of the Father. Here, as Atha∣nasius observes, our Saviour himself lays the Reason and Foundation of this Mutual Inbeing: He first tells us, I and my Father are One; and then adds, I am in the Father, and the Father in

me, that he might shew the Sameness and Identity of the Godhead, and the Unity of Essence. For they are One, not One divided into two Parts, and nothing more than One; for they are Two▪ the Father is the Father, and not the Son; and the Son is the Son, and not the Father, but there is but One Nature; for he that is begotten, is not unlike in Nature to him that be∣gets, but is his Image, and all that the Father hath is the Sons.

There is no need to multiply Quotations to this pur∣pose, which may be met with every where. The Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father, as the Nature of the Father is, lives and subsists in the Son▪ not a Na∣ture like the Fathers, but the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Fa∣ther's own proper Nature and Essence; they are in each other, as being essentially One, not One merely as being in each other, as it is possible Three may be, and yet not be essentially One, but Three; as Three compleat absolute Minds would be Three still, though they should perfectly penetrate each other: Or as Three Candles in the same Room, are Three Lights though they are perfectly united in One. But Original Mind, its Word and Spirit are and must be in each other, as being Three in One Individual Essence; for the same undivided Essence can't be whole and entire in Three, but those Three must be in each other. If the Divinity of the Father is in the Son, the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father; the Mind is in its Word, and the Word in the Mind: The Son is in the Fa∣ther, as eternally begotten in the Substance of the Father, whole of whole, and essentially one and the same, as the Word is in the Mind, not by such an Union and Penetra∣tion as we may suppose between two Minds, but as con∣ceived in the Mind, and essentially one and the same with it.

Now according to this Representation, which all the Catholick Fathers make of this Mystery, we must of ne∣cessity acknowledge Number without Multiplication, Di∣stinction without Division or Separation, a perfect Trinity in perfect Unity; Three Persons, each of which is by him∣self True and Perfect God, but not Three Gods, but One God: A Mind and its Word are two, and a living, sub∣sisting Word is true and perfect Mind, Mind of Mind, and yet not two Minds, but one Mind; for the Mind and its Word are essentially One, as all Men must confess; the Word is in the Mind, and the Mind in the Word, and therefore identically one and the same: for which reason the Fathers acknowledge that the Father is Spirit, the Son Spirit, and the Holy Ghost Spirit, and these are Three, but not Three Spirits, as essentially related to each other in the same individual Essence, essentially the same, and essentially in each other: And thus Will of Will, Wisdom of Wisdom, Life of Life, Power of Power, though they multiply and distinguish Persons, do not multiply Wills, Wisdoms, Lives, Powers, which are essentially One, as the Mind, its Word, and Spirit, are One: They are not One Life, One Will, One Understanding, One Power, in the Sense of but One who Lives, who Wills, who Under∣stands, and has Power; but as the same, identically the same Life, and Will, &c. is in each of them, and indivisibly and inseparably in them all.

And this gives an account of the Unity of Operation, wherein the Catholick Fathers unanimously place the Uni∣ty of God, for One Almighty Agent is but One God, and One Essential Will, Wisdom, and Power, can be but One Agent; and Infinite, Original Mind, and its Eternal subsisting Word can have but One Will, and Wisdom, and Power, for the Will and Wisdom of the Mind is in its Word; the same, not merely specifically the same, or the same by consent, as it may be between Two Minds,

which Will perfectly the same thing, but the same One Individual Will; the Father Wills, and the Son Wills, and they both Will distinctly, but with one Individual Will; as it is impossible that the Word should Will with any other Will, but the Will of that Mind, whose Word it is. And therefore Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, though Three Eternal, Infinite, Living, Intelligent, Willing, Persons, which Subsist and Act distinctly, yet being that to each other in a more perfect and excellent manner, that Mind, its Word, and Spirit, are in Men, they must be as perfectly One Almighty Agent as a created Mind is, which Wills and Acts in its Word and Spirit.

The Distinction and Unity of Operation necessarily proves the Distinction and Unity of Essence; it being in our way of conceiving things a necessary effect of it; there must be some real Distinction in the same Nature and Essence, in which there are Three who Act distinct∣ly; and there must be an Individual Unity of Essence, when in Three there is but One Individual Operation; and though these things may be distinguished in Crea∣tures, where we distinguish the Suppositum and the Powers, and give a priority of Nature to the Suppositum, yet Es∣sence and Energy being the same in God, who is a pure simple Act, there can be no priority nor posteriority be∣tween them, but the Demonstration proceeds equally upon Nature or Operation; but that is the best, which is the most intelligible Representation of this Distinction and Unity.

For this reason the Fathers chose to explain the Distin∣ction and Unity of the Godhead by the Distinction and Unity of Operation, which I need not prove at large, as being universally owned, and therefore I shall only ob∣serve, how St. Gregory Nyssen represents this matter.

In his Answer to Ablabius, that there are not Three Gods,* 1.25 he tells us, That the best way to form the clearest and most perspicuous Notion of this, is to examine what this Name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Godhead, signifies. Now whereas some think this a proper Name to signify the Divine Nature and Essence, he asserts with the Scriptures (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) that the Divine Nature and Essence is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, without a Name,* 1.26 and can't be signified by words; and that every Name which is given to God, signifies something es∣sential to him, but not his Nature and Essence it self. This he shews particu∣larly in some Names given to God, and affirms,* 1.27 That thus it is in all other Di∣vine Names, that either they remove all Imperfections, or attribute all Divine Perfections to him, but do not declare his Nature: And thus he adds it is in the Name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is, God is a S••er, an Inspector, who beholds all things: Now if God signifies him, who sees and knows all things, we must inquire, whe∣ther this All-seeing Power belongs only to one of the Divine Persons of the Tri∣nity, or to all Three: For if this be the true interpretation of the Name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that it is an All-seeing Power, and that He that sees all, is God, we can∣not reasonably deny this to any Person in the Holy Trinity, since the Scrip∣ture

does equally attribute this Omniscience to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

Well! suppose this, as he adds, it does not remove but encrease the difficulty; for though God be not a Name of Nature, but of Energy and Power, if the Name God signifies a Seer and Inspector, and there be Three, who thus see all things, Three must be Three Gods, as we number Persons of the same Profession, who all do the very same things, as well as those who have the same Nature; as we say many Orators, Mathematicians, and the l••ke,* 1.28 as well as many M••n. Now this he answers by the Unity of Energy and Power, which is in each of them, but is but One indivisible inseparable Power; not as it is in Men, who each of them acts separately by him∣self; and though they do the same thing for kind, yet what each of them does, is properly his own doing, and not anothers: They act separately, and produce distinct and separate Ef∣fects, and therefore are many Agents.* 1.29 But it is quite otherwise as to the Di∣vine Nature: The Father does nothing by himself without the Son, nor the Son without the Holy Ghost; but each Divine Operation proceeds originally from the Father, is continued by the Son, and perfected in the Holy Spirit; and therefore the name of Energy is not divided into a number of Agents, because neither of them acts separately by himself.

And this he proves from the Unity of the Effect;* 1.30 that whatever good thing we receive from God, as suppose Life, is attributed to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; but though it be given by Three, that which is given, or done for us, is not Three; we do not re∣ceive three Lives, one from each Per∣son of the Trinity, but we have but one Life, which we receive from them all. Now where there is but One Undivided Effect, there can be but One Natural Agent; for separate Agents will pro∣duce separate Effects; and therefore there can be but one motion of the Di∣vine Will from the Father by the Son to the Holy Spirit, and that without di∣stance and Succession. Now it is plain, that all this does not signify a mere Uni∣ty of Consent, as may be between Three Distinct and Separate Minds, but the Unity of Principle, which acts distinctly, but uniformly and inseparably in Three; the same Divine Will, which is origi∣nally in the Father, acting in the same manner, and with one indivisible motion (as they speak) in the Son, and Holy Spirit; which Unity of Operation, though it admits of distinct Acts, and consequently a real distinction of Per∣sons, yet proves the individual Unity of Essence; for there can be no Unity of Principle or Operation, but in the same Individual Essence; where Three Persons are united in the same Individual Essence, as the Mind, its Word, and Spirit, are in Man.

And here (had there not been enough already said about it) is a proper Place to vindicate that late Representation which has been made of the Distinction and Unity of the Godhead by the self-consciousness,* 1.31 and mutual consciousness of the Divine Persons.

I have met with no body yet so hardy as to deny, that Self-consciousness is essential to the natural Unity of a Person, and that Three Persons cannot be naturally and es∣sentially One without mutual Consciousness. But the great Objection against this Notion (and which I am amazed to find some Learned Men insist on) is the order of Nature, which requires, that a Person should be One by an Unity of Nature, before it can be self-conscious; and that Three Persons must be One by the Unity of Nature, before they can be mutually conscious: For the Unity of Nature, and the Union of Persons in the same Nature, must be before all Acts of Self-consciousness, and mutual Consciousness: And that which in the order of Nature comes after such a Distinction and Union cannot be the cause of it.

But who ever thought of causes of Distinction and Unity in an Eternal Nature, which has no cause? Did the Fa∣thers philosophize thus concerning Priority and Posteriority in the Divine Nature, when they placed the Unity of the Godhead in the Unity of Energy and Operation? For does not the same Objection lie against the Unity of Energy and Operation, that does ••gainst mutual consciousness, (which is essential to this Unity of Energy) that the Divine Persons must first be One, before they can be One Energy and Power? and therefore that One Energy does not cause their Unity, because they must be One,* 1.32 be∣fore they are One Agent. And indeed such Men Gregory Nyssen intimates he had to deal with, who would not allow the Deity to be Energy and Power, but

he thought it not worth the while to dispute that Point with them; for the Divine Nature being Infinite and Incom∣prehensible, the pure and simple Nature of God is not the immediate Object of our Knowledge, can have no name and definition given it; and therefore we can know nothing of it immediately and directly, but by such Essential Attributes and Properties, as we c••n form some no∣tion of.

The not considering this, how perfectly unknown and incomprehensible the Divine Nature it self is, occasioned a late Author to tell us, That An Hypothesis in this Affair, which leaves out the very Nexus, the Natural and Eternal Vni∣on, and insists upon mutual consciousness, which at most is but the consequence thereof, wants the principal thing requisite to the salving the Vnity of the Godhead.

But this is to philosophize about the abstracted Natures and Essences of Things, even the Divine Substance and Essence, which I dare not presume to do. No doubt but God is the most real substantial Being in the World, even Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and there is as little doubt, but there is as real and substantial an Union between them: But I know nothing of the Substance of God, as distin∣guished from his Essential Attributes and Perfections, nor of such a Distinction and Unity of Substance in the Deity, as can help us to form any notion of a Trinity in Unity, and defend it from the Charge of Contradiction and Impos∣sibility, when we have done. For we must have a care of conceiving any Extension, or Parts, or Composition in God, without which we can have no notion of a Distinction and Union of Substances, considered purely under the notion of Substance. And therefore we must be contented to be ignorant of the Substance and Substantial Unions of the

Deity, as we are of all other Substantial Unions. We know not what the Substance of a Spirit is, nor what the Sub∣stance of Matter is, nor what their substantial Unity is: And therefore when we inquire into their Distinction and Unity, we never meddle with the Essential Reasons and Causes of Unity, which are concealed from us, but consi∣der as far as Sense, or Reason, or Observation will reach, wherein the Unity of any thing consists, and when a thing may be said to be One: As to instance at present only in the Unity of a Mind, and in the Union of Soul and Body.

Is there any thing else in the World which can make a Mind one with it self, and distinguish it from all other Minds, but a self-conscious Sensation, that it feels it self, and its whole self, and only it self? I suppose these Men will grant, that such a Mind is One, and but One, and distinct from all other Minds; but Self-consciousness is not the formal rea∣son of the Unity of a Mind, or of a Person, because in or∣der of Nature the Unity of a Mind or Person must go be∣fore Self-consciousness; that is, Self-consciousness is owing to the Unity of Essence, not the Unity of Essence to Self∣consciousness. Well, but what is this Essence of a Mind, and this Unity of Essence, which makes a Mind One? Truly that no body can tell; and therefore to say a Mind is one by the Unity of its Essence, is to say, it is One, be∣cause it is so; for we know no more of the matter: But Self-consciousness is a sensible Unity, which we all feel in our selves, and know our selves from other Men by it.

This Unity of Essence we know nothing of, but by Self∣consciousness; and I desire to know, whatever the Unity of Essence be, whether any but a Self-conscious Unity would make a Mind One, and distinguish it from all other Minds? which shews, that we have nothing to do with the naked Essences and Substances of Things, but with their imme∣diate and essential Properties; and when we know them,

we know all that is to be known of Nature; and therefore we can know no more of the Unity of a Mind than Self-consciousness.

The Substances of things are distinguished from each other by their Essential Properties, and therefore from them we must learn their Unity or Distinction. A Mind is a Substance, and Matter is Substance; and the essential dif∣ference between them, as far as we can understand, is, that a Mind is a thinking Substance, and Matter extended Substance; and therefore we must judge of a Mind by the properties of Thinking, and of Matter by extension: The Unity of a Thinking Substance must consist in the Unity of Thoughts and Sensations, that is, in one Consciousness; and the Unity of an Extended Substance in the continuity of its extension; and to ask farther, what is the cause or princi∣ple of Consciousness in a Mind, or of One Consciousness in One Mind, is to ask a reason of the natures of things; why a Mind is a Thinking Being, and why One Thinking Being has one Center of Thoughts: Why do they not ask also, how Extension comes to be essential to Matter, and how Matter is extended? I know no reason to be given of such matters, but the Will of God, who formed all things according to the Ideas of his own Infinite Wisdom.

This I hope is sufficient to be said concerning the order of Nature, and the priority and posteriority of our Con∣ceptions; for if we do not stop in our Inquiries at imme∣diate and essential Properties, but demand an antecedent Rea∣son for them, this is to demand a Reason of Nature, Why things are what God has made them: Those who are not contented to contemplate Nature in its immediate and Essen∣tial Properties, may philosophize by themselves for me; for there is nothing more to be known without an intuitive knowledge of Nature it self, which none can have but the Author of Nature.

Thus should you inquire of me concerning the Union of Soul and Body; all that I know of it is, That they are uni∣ted in one Conscious Life; That the Soul feels all the Im∣pressions of the Body, and directs and governs it. No, will such Philosophers say, here wants the Nexus, the na∣tural Union between Soul and Body; for they must be One by a Natural Union before there can be this Conscious Life and Sympathy between them, which is not the Union, but the effect and consequent of this Union. Very true! They must be vitally united to have One Life, and to receive impressions from each other; But can they give any other notion of this Vital Union, than that the Body is animated by the Soul, and lives with it? Could these Philosophers tell you, how a Soul, which is an Immaterial Being, could be fastened to a Body, what Union of Substances there is between them, (which is the thing they want to know) would they understand a Vital Union ever the better for it? An Union of Substances seems to signify some kind of Con∣tact, which is hard to conceive between Body and Spirit; but however an Union of Contact, and an Union of Life, are two very different kinds of Union, and do not include or infer each other; and therefore the true Answer to that Question, How Soul and Body are united, is not to say, That their Substances are united or fastened together, which gives us no notion of a Vital Union; but that the Soul lives in the Body, and gives life to it; receives im∣pressions srom it, and governs its motions. But to in∣quire farther, is to inquire into the Reasons of Natural and Essential Unions, which are as great Mysteries as Na∣ture is: We may as well ask, How a Soul lives, as how it animates a Body; and God alone knows both. So that to inquire after the Natural Nexus, or Cement of this Union, is nothing at all to the purpose, and is not the Ob∣ject of Human Knowledge.

Now, though the Vital Union between Soul and Body, and the Union of mutual Consciousness, be of a very dif∣ferent Kind and Nature, yet the Dispute about the Nexus, or the Natural Union of Substances, is much the same.

Consciousness is the Unity of a Spirit; Self-conscious∣ness is the Unity of a Person, and by the same reason mu∣tual Consciousness is a Natural Union of Three distinct Self-conscious Persons in the Unity of the same Nature. And to reject this for want of a Nexus, or the Natural Union of Substances, is as if we should deny the Union of Soul and Body to be an Union of Life or Animation, because this don't explain the Natural Nexus between Soul and Body: If a Mutual Conscious Union be an Es∣sential Union of Three distinct Persons in the same Na∣ture, as a Vital Union is the Essential Union of Soul and Body, we have nothing to do in either Case with the Union of Substances which we can know nothing of, and if we could, should understand these Unions never the better for it. For whatever Union of Substance we may suppose between Soul and Body, and the Three Divine Persons in the Holy Trinity, it is the Kind and Species of Union which gives us the Notion and Idea of it. If you inquire, what Spirit, and what Matter is? It would not be thought a good Answer to these Questions, to say a Spirit is a Substance, and Matter is a Substance, without adding their Specifick Differences, that a Spirit is an intelligent thinking Substance, and Matter is an extended Substance; nor is it a better Answer to that Question, what Union there is between Soul and Body, or between the Three Divine Persons in the Trinity, To say, That their Substances are united, which gives us no distinct Notion of their Union; but a Vital Union, and a Mutual Conscious Union, con∣tain distinct Ideas; and if these be Natural and Essential Unions, though we know no more of the Union of Sub∣stances

than we do, what Substance is, yet we know that the Soul and Body must be one Natural Person, and the Three Divine Persons must be naturally and essentially One God; for a Natural Union makes One according to the Nature of that Union.

It is visible enough what has occasioned this Mistake: Men consider Mutual Consciousness between Three Com∣pleat, Absolute, Independent Minds, and rightly enough conclude, that how conscious soever they were to each other, this could not make them essentially One; for every compleat Mind is One by it self, and not natu∣rally Conscious to any One but it self, and by whatever Power they should be so united, as to be mutually Consci∣ous, this could not make them essentially One; they would be Three Mutually Conscious Minds, not essenti∣ally One Mind; for they are not by Nature One, nor mutually Conscious, and therefore may be parted again, and cease to be so. But then, in this way of stating it, the Objection equally lies against the Perichoresis, the in∣separable Union and In-being of Minds, which can never make Three Compleat Absolute Minds essentially One. But if we apply this to the Union of Living, Subsisting, Intelligent Relatives of the same Individual Essence, to Fa∣ther, Son, and Holy Ghost, Eternal, Self-originated Mind, its Eternal, Living, Subsisting, Word, and Eternal Spirit, this Mutual Consciousness gives us the most Intelligible Notion of the Essential and Inseparable Union and In-being of Three in One. I dare not say what other Men can do; but I have tried my self, and can form no Notion of an Unity in Trinity, but what either necessarily includes, or ultimately resolves it self into One Natural Essential Con∣sciousness in Three.

The Divine Nature is indivisibly and inseparably One in Three; but we must not understand this Inseparability after the manner of Bodies, whose Parts may be divided and

separated from each other; God is not Body, and has no Parts; but in the Unity of the Godhead there is Eternal Ori∣ginal Mind, an Eternal Word, and Eternal Spirit, which are inseparable from each other, that is, can never be parted: What then can parting and separating signify in a Mind, which has no Parts to be torn and divided from each other? I can understand nothing by it, but that the Mind does no longer see, and know, and feel its Word in it self, nor the Word the Mind; for this would make a perfect Separation between the Mind and its Word; that Mind has no Word which does not see and feel it in it self; and were it possible that a living subsisting Word should lose all Conscious Sensation of the Mind, whose Word it is, it would cease to be a Word, and commence a perfect separate Mind it self: So that as far as we can conceive it, the Inseparable Union between Father and Son, between Original Infinite Mind, and its Eternal Word, is an inse∣parable Conscious Life and Sensation, which is such a Natural Demonstration of their Inseparable Union, as no other Notion can give us; for all Men feel that a Mind and its Word can never be parted; a Mind can never be without its Word, nor the Word subsist but in the Mind.

Thus what other possible Notion can we form of the Perichoresis, or Mutual In-being of Father and Son, as our Saviour tells us, I am in the Father, and the Father in me, which is their Natural and Essential Unity, I and my Fa∣ther are one? We all feel how the Word is in the Mind, and the Mind in the Word; the Mind knows, and feels, and comprehends its own Word; and a perfect, living, subsisting Word knows and feels that whole Mind, whose Word it is, in it self; for the Word is nothing else but the whole Mind, living and subsisting in the Word, which is another Hypostasis, but perfectly One and the same Na∣ture; and therefore as they know themselves, so they

know and feel each other in themselves. As the Father knoweth me, saith Christ, so know I the Father, 10 John 15. And thus to see and know God by an Internal Sensation, and to be in him, are ••quivalent Expressions in Scripture, 1 John 18. No man hath seen G••d at any time; the only be∣gotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath de∣clared him: Where to see God, and to be in the Bosom of the Father, must signify the same thing; for to be in the Bosom of the Father, is put in the place of seeing God, that is, to see him within, to see him in his Bosom, as the Word sees the Mind, and this is to be in his Bosom, and thus the Son is in the Father.

The same Account we have of the Ho∣ly Spirits being in God, 1 Cor. 2.11.* 1.33 For what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of man, which is in him? even so the things of G••d knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God; that is, the Spirit of God is in God, as the Spirit of a Man is in Man, and therefore by this In-being, the Spirit of God knows all the Things of God by such an Internal Conscious Sensation, as the Spirit of Man knows what is in Man.

Thus what is the Unity of Energy and Operation, but the same Conscious Will and Power acting distinctly, but inseparably in Three? for without this Internal Consci∣ousn••ss, they must be Three separate Wills and separate Powers, and produce distinct and separate Effects; but when God, his Word and Spirit are in each other, and see, and know, and feel each other in themselves, as a Man's Mind, his Word, and Spirit, do, though in a more perfect and excellent manner, there can be but One undivided Motion of the Divine Will, as there is but One Conscious Life in Three; the Son lives, subsists, wills, understands, and acts, in and with the Father, and therefore is but One Eternal Life, One Almighty Will and Power.

Now as Novel as some Men think this Notion of the Vnity of Mutual Consciousness to be, we meet with it more than once in express words in S••. Hilary, whose Authority I hope is sufficient to vindicate it from the charge of No∣velty.

Thus with reference to what our Sa∣viour says,* 1.34 No man knoweth the Son but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father save the Son, and he to whomso∣ever the Son will reveal him, 11. Matth. 27. St. Hilary observes, (Hilar. de Trin. c. 2) Illis scientia mutua est, illis vicissim c••gnitio perfecta; That Father and Son have a mutual perfect Know∣ledge of each other. And this he asserts to be a Conscious Knowledge, connate with him, a Conscious Sensation of his Father's Nature in himself, which our S••viour himself signifies by his Unity of Nature and Operation with the Fa∣ther; as the Reader may see in the Mar∣gin.

Thus Tertullian long before describ'd this mutual Consciousness between God and his Eternal Word and Wisdom by what we feel in our selves when we silently muse alone, our Word does as it were talk with us, and return our Thoughts to us, is present with us in every Turn, and Motion, and Pulse of Thought, and internal Sensation, as conscious to all within us.

Thus he tells us, That the Son alone knows the Father, and does not his own, but his Father's Will, which he

knows, de proximo, imo de initio; that is, by an immediate Intuitive Know∣ledge, not by External Communication, but by Internal Sensation. Thus the Son does nothing of himself, but what he sees the Father do; in sensu scilicet facientem, in his own Mind and Will; Pater enim sensu agit, the Father does all things by disposing and ordering all things in his own Mind and Will; Fi∣lius vero, qui in sensu Patris est, videns perficit: The Son, who is in the Mind, and Sense, and Will of the Father, sees the Father's Will, and does it: Now let any Man tell me what else can be meant by the Sons being in sensu Patris, & videns in sensu Patris, but this Internal Conscious Sensation. St. Cyril of Alexandria calls it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.35 that the Son Wills together with the Father, and with the same Will. Dionysius the Areopagite, says,* 1.36 This Union does not only exceed all bodily Unions, but the Unions also of Souls and Minds, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And Fulgentius tells us,* 1.37 The Word was with God, sicut in mente verbum, sicut in c••rde con∣silium, as the Word is in the Mind, and Counsel in the Heart.

Marius Victorinus Afer tells us to the same purpose,* 1.38 That the Son being in the Bosom of the Father, signifies, that he is God; that he is in the Bosom and Womb of his Substance, and therefore they are Consubstantial, each of them being in each other, and knowing each other.

But not to multiply Quotations; all those Catholick Fathers and Doctors,* 1.39 who placed the Unity of the Godhead in Consent, (and none of them rejected this in a Catholick Sense) could under∣stand nothing less by it than this mutual natural Consciousness, for any other Con∣sent was down right Arianism, as St. Hilary witnesses; and y••t thus the famous Lucian, whom the Arians would have challenged as theirs, but whom the Catholick Church always owned, expresses it in his Creed; and thus per substantiam tria, per consonantiam verò unum:* 1.40 Three in Substance, but in Consent and Agreement One, is justified by St. Hilary, (Hilar. de Synod.) as ve∣ry Catholick; but then he refers this to the Holy Spirit, who is the substantial Bond and Cement of this Union and Consent. But Gregory Nyssen, who al∣lows of this Unity of Consent, more in∣telligibly represents it by the Consent and Uniformity of all the Motions be∣tween the Prototype and its Image,* 1.41 or a Man's Face in a Glass, which moves and acts with it. Thus Christ is the Image of the Invisible God▪ and is im∣mediately and instantly affected toge∣ther with his Father. Does the Father Will any thing? The Son also, who is in the Father, knows the Fathers Will, or rather is the Father's Will.

But this I think is sufficient to be said about mutual Con∣sciousness, which is so manifestly the Doctrine of the Fathers, of some in express Terms, and of all according to the true In∣terpretation of what they taught, that I cannot imagine the

meaning of this furious Zeal against it, but a Sabellian Zeal against Three Conscious Persons, for one single Self-conscious Nature: As St. Hilary observes in the Dispute between the Sa∣bellians and Arians. The Arians allowed Father and Son to be Two Distinct Persons, but denied their Consubstantiality, or Unity and Sameness of Nature: The Sabellians, who denied the distinction of Persons, but asserted the Sameness, Uni∣ty and Singularity of Nature, which they thought suffici∣ently proved One Person, as well as One Nature (as no doubt but it does) confuted the Arian Dissimilitude of Na∣ture by what our Saviour says,* 1.42 I and my Father are one; which they said could be the Language of none, but of a Nature conscious to it self of its own Identity, and Sameness, which he allows to be a good Argument against the Arians, (which he could not have done, had he not allowed this Consciousness in the Trinity) but then ob∣serves, That the Arians did as eff••ctually consute them, as to the distinction of Persons; and thus between them both the Catholick Faith,* 1.43 of a real distinction of Persons, in the Sameness and Conscious Unity of Na∣ture, was vindicated. In short, If the whole Divine Nature is conscious to it self, as every Created Mind is conscious to all that is in it self; and the Three Divine Persons subsist in the Individual Unity of the same Nature, then these Divine Persons must be intimately and mutually conscious to each other, as a Mind, its Word, and Spirit, are; and however Men please to philosophize about this, as to the prius & posterius, whether they will make the Unity of Nature the cause of this mutual Consciousness, and there∣fore in order of Nature prior to it; or make mutual Con∣sciousness not the cause of this Unity, but the Essential Uni∣on of Three Distinct Subsisting Persons in the Unity of the

same Individual Nature; I will not contend with any Man which of these speak most properly. Consciousness is the Unity of an Intelligent Nature, and the mutual Conscious∣ness of Persons in the same Nature, and the Conscious Uni∣ty of Nature in Three Distinct Persons is the same thing. We cannot conceive the Unity of a Mind without Con∣sciousness, nor any other kind of Unity of a Mind, but a Conscious Unity; nor can we conceive an Internal Essen∣tial Consciousness without an Essential Unity; and if the mutual Consciousness of Persons in the same Nature, is the Consciousness of Nature, I cannot see why we may not say, That it is at least One Notion of the Unity of Na∣ture too.

But to return where I left off, (if this may be called a a Digression) what I have now said, is sufficient to shew, how necessary this Doctrine of Relations is to give us a sen∣sible notion of a Trinity in Unity.

To assert a Real Trinity, we must assert Three Real, Di∣stinct, Subsisting, Substantial, Intelligent Persons, neither of which is each other, and each of which is by himself, in his own proper Person, True and Perfect God: But this, say Sabellians, Arians, and Socinians, is to assert Three Gods; which the Catholick Church always abhorred the thoughts of. Now how the Fathers answered this Charge, and vindicated the Divine Unity in a Trinity of Real Sub∣sisting Persons, I have already particularly shown, as by the Consubstantiality, the perfect Sameness and Identity of Nature, whole of whole, their Inseparability, and Unity of Operation; but we can form no distinct Idea of all this, but only among Personal Subsisting Relatives of the same In∣dividual Nature. Whatever is not this, is a meer Specifick Consubstantiality and Identity of Nature, and an External Union, how inseparable soever it be, which must make a number of Individuals in the Divine, as well as Human

Nature: but now it is plain to a Demonstration, That if God hath an Eternal Subsisting Word, and an Eternal Sub∣sisting Spirit, they can be but One Individual Essence, as a Man's Mind, and Word, and Spirit, are One; and there∣fore all Three but One God, as a Man, with his Mind, and Word, and Spirit, i•• but One Man; which is an Intelligi∣ble Notion of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, One Individual Essence and Godhead: For though the Word of God be a Person, which a M••n's Word is not, yet if his true Nature and Character is the Word, he is the same to the Eternal Mind, which a Man's Word is to his Created Mind, and therefore God, and his Living, Subsisting Word, must be One Individual Essence, as a Man's Mind and his Word are One; a Word must be conceived and begotten of the Mind, and can have no other Substance, if it be a Living, Substantial Word, but that of the Mind; and if it be a perfect Word, the perfect Image of the Mind, it must be whole of whole, all that the Mind is; for the whole Mind is in its perfect Word and Image, and lives and subsists in it, and the whole Word in the Mind. So that the C••eternity, the Coequality, the Consubstantiality, the Identity, the Inse∣parability, the Unity of Operation between God and his Word, is so far from being Jargon, Contradiction, Unin∣telligible Nonsense, that i•• God have an Eternal Word, it is self-evident that thus it must be: When we contemplate the Consubstantiality of Father and Son, under the notion of Substance, we can form no Idea of a whole, which is of a whole, that the Father should communicate his whole Es∣sence, and Substance, to the Son, and be the whole himself; and this is no great wonder, since we can form no Idea at all of the Divine Substance; but we can very well understand, That the Whole Mind must be in its Word, that the Eternal Mind and its Word must be Consubstantial, Coeternal, Coe∣qual, Two, but perfectly the same, inseparably in each other; for all this is included in the very Relation and Notion of a

Mind, and its Word. I'm sure, a Living, Subsisting Word, which is not Consubstantial, Coeternal, Coequal, with that Eternal Mind, whose Word it is; that a Mind should be without its Word; that an Infinite, Eternal Mind, which is perfect Life and Being, should have a vanishing, perishing Word, as Man has; not a living, subsisting Word; that a Mind and its Word should ever be parted; that the Word should not be and subsist in the Mind, and the Mind in the Word; I say, all this contradicts all the Notions we have of a Mind and its Word: We cannot immediately and directly contemplate the Divine Nature and Essence, which is so infinitely above us, and therefore we must con∣template it in such Ideas and Representations, as God him∣self makes of it; and if they are such, as we can form an intelligible notion of, we have no reason to complain of unintelligible Mysteries and Contradictions, though when we reduce it into Terms of Art, we find our Minds con∣founded and perplext, and unable to form any distinct and easy Ideas.

The Arians, to avoid the Consubstan∣tiality of the Son with the Father,* 1.44 would not allow the Term Substance to be used of God; the Catholick Fathers proved, that Substance is in Scripture used con∣cerning God, and that the Arians could not reasonably reject it, because they used it themselves; for though they would not own the Son to be of the same Substance with the Father; they taught, that he was of another Substance, which still is to own Substance in God.

But though God be in the most true and absolute sense, perfect Essence and Being, the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or according to

St. Ambrose his derivation of the Word (which shews what he meant by it, whether it shews his skill in Greek or not) that Essence and Substance is that which always is,* 1.45 and that which always is, is God, and therefore God is Essence and Substance, and a Consub∣stantial Son is a true and real Son; for which reason, as he observes, the Arians would not allow the Son to be Consub∣stantial, because they would not allow him to be a true genuine Son;* 1.46 and for this very reason the Nicene Fathers in∣serted the Homoousion in their Creed: But yet if we would rightly conceive of God, of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, of the Unity and Distinction of the Ever Blessed Trinity, we must not form our Notions by the Ideas of Substance and Consubstantiali∣ty, which we have no distinct conceptions of; but we must learn their Unity, Distinction, and Consubstantiality from those Characters the Scripture gives of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. This Rule St. Ambrose expressly gives us with reference to the Son, and the Reason is the same, as to the other Divine Persons. If we would avoid Error, says that Father,* 1.47 let us attend to those Characters the Scripture gives us, to help us to understand what, and who the Son is: He is called the Word, the Son, the Power of God, the Wisdom of God; all this we can understand; and not only St. Ambrose, but all the other Catholick Fathers, as I have already shewn, prove the Consubstantiality, Coeternity, Coequality, Unity and Distinction of Father and Son, from these Names and Characters, which they understood in a true and proper sense, for a Living, Subsisting Son,

and Word, and Power, and Wisdom; and there is no dif∣ficulty in conceiving all this, if we contemplate it in these Characters; nay it is impossible to conceive otherwise of it. As impossible as it is to form any notion at all of those Philosophical Terms, whereby this Mystery is commonly represented, when we abstract them from those sensible Characters and Ideas which the Scripture has given us, and begin our Inquiries with them. It will be of great use to represent this matter plainly, that every man may see what it is that obscures and perplexes the Doctrine of the Trinity, and confounds mens notions about it, to the great scandal of the Christian Religion, and the disturbance of the Christian Church.

The great difficulty concerns the Unity and Distinction of the Ever Blessed Trinity, that they are really and di∣stinctly Three, and essentially One: And this is represented by One Nature, Essence, and Substance, and Three Hypo∣stases; and yet Hypostasis signifies Substance, and every Divine Hypostasis is the whole Divine Essence and Sub∣stance. Now if we immediately contemplate this Mystery under the notion of Substance, it is impossible for us to conceive One Substance and Three Hypostases, that is, in some sense Three Substances, or which is all One as to the difficulty of conceiving it, though the form of Expression is more Catholick; Three, each of which is the whole Es∣sence and Substance, and neither of them is each other; we may turn over our Minds as long as we please, and change Words and Phrases, but we can find no Idea to answer these, or any other words of this nature. But now if in∣stead of Essence and Hypostasis, we put Mind and its Word, we can form a very intelligible notion of this Uni∣ty and Distinction, and prove that Unity of Substance, and Distinction of Hypostases, which we cannot immediately and directly form any notion of. For Eternal Original Mind, and its Living Subsisting Word, are certainly Two,

and neither are, nor can be each other; the Mind cannot be its own Living Word, nor the Word the Mind, whose Word it is; and yet we must all grant, that Eternal Mind is the most Real Being, Essence, Substance, and that a Li∣ving Subsisting Word is Life, Being, Substance, and the very same Life and Substance that the Mind is, and all that the Mind is; for a perfect Living Word can have no other Life and Substance but that of the Mind, and must be all the same that the Mind is.

The Eternal Generation of the Son 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of the Sub∣stance of the Father, Life of Life, Substance of Substance, Whole of Whole, is impossible to be conceived, as imme∣diately applied to the notion of Substance; but the Gene∣ration of the Word, Whole of Whole, is very conceivable, for the Mind must beget its own Word, as we feel in our selves; and a Mind which is perfect Life and Substance, if it begets its Word, must beget a Living, Subsisting, Substantial Word,* 1.48 the per∣fect Image of its own Life and Substance. And as impossible as it is to conceive, much more to express in words, this Mystery of the Eternal Generation, yet the necessary relation between a Mind, and its Word, proves that thus it is; we feel it in our selves, though we are as perfectly ignorant, how our Mind be∣gets its dying vanishing Word, as how the Eternal Mind begets an Eternal, Li∣ving, Subsisting Word: And the Generation of the Word includes in it all the Properties of the Divine Generation; that it is Eternal; for an Eternal Mind can never be with∣out its Word; that it is without any Corporeal Passions, or Esslux, or Division, begotten in the Mind, and insepa∣rable from it.

Now if we conceive after the same manner of the Eter∣nal Procession of the Holy Spirit, can any man deny this to be an Intelligible Notion of a Trinity in Unity, though we can form no distinct Idea of One Essence and Substance, and Three Hypostases? For if we can conceive Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; Eternal Original Mind, its Eternal Word, and Eternal Spirit, to be Essentially One and Three, the Catholick Faith is secured, though we do not so well un∣derstand the distinction between those Abstract Metaphy∣sical Terms of Nature, Essence, Substance, Hypostasis, especially when applied to the Unity and Distinction of the Eternal Godhead, which is above all Terms of Art. The Catholick Faith is, That the Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God; but yet there are not Three Gods, but One God; and this the Doctrine of the Divine Relations gives us a very intelligible notion of; for we cannot conceive otherwise of the Eternal Mind, its Eternal Word, and Eter∣nal Spirit, but that each of them are True and Perfect God, and yet a Mind, its Word, and Spirit, can be but One, and therefore but One God.

But One Substance, and Three Hypostases, is but a se∣condary notion of a Trinity in Unity, to secure the Catho∣lick Faith against the Sabellian and Arian Heresies: Against the Sabellians the Catholick Fathers asserted Three Hypo∣stases, against the Arians One Substance; and the Essential Relations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, necessarily prove both the One Substance, and Three Hypostases; but though One Substance and Three Hypostases be the Ca∣tholick Language, yet those Men begin at the wrong end, who think to form an intelligible notion of a Tri∣nity in Unity from these abstract Metaphysical Terms. This is not the Language of the Scripture, nor have we any Idea to answer these Terms, of One Substance in Three distinct Hypostases, when we consider them by themselves, without relation to the Divine Nature, to

which alone these Terms can belong, for there is no such thing in created Nature, and therefore we can have no Idea of it. It is abundantly sufficient in this Case, that we have a clear and distinct Notion of One Substance, and Three Hypostases in the Essential Unity and Distinction of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Three subsisting Relations in One Individual Essence and Substance, though when we abstractedly consider these Terms of One Substance and Three Hypostases, we can form no consistent Notion or Idea of it. And now let our Socinian Adversaries, who talk so loud of Absurdities, Contradictions, Nonsense, false Counting and Tritheism, try their skill to make good these Charges against the Divine subsisting Relations in the Unity of the same Individual Essence.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Imago enim est similitudo non quae∣cunique, sed ex eo, cujus imago dicitur expressa; respondent enim sibi invicem imago & exemplar. Proinde non quae∣cunque sibi mutuò sunt multum similia, ut ovum ovo, sunt ejusmodi, ut alte∣rum sit imago alterius; non enim in his omnibus, verbi gratia in ovis, al∣terum de altero expressam gerit figu∣ram, sed quod ex re objecta resultat in speculo, & similitudo sigilli cerae impressa, & alia hujusmodi propriè imagines dicuntur. Estius dist 27. S. 8. & Aquin 1. q 35. in cor∣pore.
• * 1.2

  Has proprietates designant nomina personarum, scilicet Pater, Filius, & Spiritus Sanctus; quae relativa sunt, & ad se invicem dicuntur. Quia no∣tant relationes, quae non sunt Deo ac∣cidentales, sed in ipsis Personis ab aeter∣no sunt immutabiliter, ut non modo appellationes sunt relativae, sed etiam relationes, sive notiones in rebus ipsis, scilicet in Personis sint. Lomb. l. 1. dist. 26.
• * 1.3

  Pater non dicitur nisi à Paterni∣tate, & Filius à filiatione; si igitur paternitas & filiatio non sunt in Deo realiter, sequitur, quòd Deus non sit realiter Pater aut Filius, sed secundum rationem intelligentiae tantum, quae est haeresis Sabelliana. Aqu. 1. q. 28. art. 1.
• * 1.4

  Relationes in divinis, cùm sint se∣cundum processiones in identitate na∣turae, reales quasdam in divinis esse relationes necessarium est. Ibid.
• * 1.5

  Respectus in natura rerum sunt re∣lationes reales, cùm aliquid procedit à principio ejusdem naturae, necesse est quod ambo, scilicet procedens, & id à quo procedit in eodem ordine conveni∣ant, & sic oportet quod habeant reales respectus ad invicem. Ib.
• * 1.6

  Relatio realiter in Deo existens, idem est essentiae secundum rem. Aq 1. q. 28. art. 2.

  Relationes personales nec à Personis, nec ab essentia reip••â distingui. Estius dist. 33. S. 2. l. 1.
• * 1.7

  Aquinas & Estius, Ibid.
• * 1.8

  Aqui. 1. q. 30. Ar. 2.
• * 1.9

  Lomb. l 1. d. 3.
• * 1.10

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Nyss. Orat. Cat. cap. 1.
• * 1.11

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.12

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.13

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• * 1.14

  Leontius de sectis Act. 1. B.P. Gr. L. T. 1. p. 493.
• * 1.15

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Theod. Abuc. Op. 2. B. P. Gr. L. p. 382.
• * 1.16

  Athan. Decr. Syn. Nic. T. I. p. 269.
• * 1.17

  Sed nec sicut Hierachas lucernam dixit de lucerna, vel lampadem in duas partes. Hilar. de Tr. c. 6.
• * 1.18

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. Syn. Nic. decr. p. 271.
• * 1.19

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Dionys. Alex. ap. Athan. Syn. Nicen. decr. T. I. p. 275.
• * 1.20

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. cont. Arian. Or. 4. p. 456.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid. p. 437.
• * 1.21

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. Syn. Nic. decret p. 269.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. Or. 4. c. Ar. p. 456.
• * 1.22

  Hil. C 7. de Tr.
• * 1.23

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. Or. 4. c Ar. p. 454.
• * 1.24

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid. p. 456.
• * 1.25

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Nyss. ad Abl. Vol. 2. p. 450.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
• * 1.26

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.27

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.28

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.29

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉— 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.30

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.31

  See the De¦fence of Dr. Sher∣lock's No∣tion of a Trinity in Unity.
• * 1.32

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid. p. 456.
• * 1.33

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Theo∣phyl. in locum.
• * 1.34

  Sed c••m na••ura Dei in natura Dei substi••••ss••••, id est, ex patre filius na∣tus esser, per virtutis ac naturae in se paternae conscientiam, nihil ab se, ni••i quod patrem faci••ntem vidisset, fi••••••m fac••re poss•• testatus est. Et cum unigenitus Deus pa••ern••e virtutis operationibus operaretur, tantum si••i a•• fa••iendum praesumcret, quantum in Conscientia sua esfet, inseparabil••m à se Dei Patris, quam per l••gitimam nativitatem ob••in▪ bat, posse naturam; non enim corporalibus modis via••••, sed visus ei omnis in virtute Natu∣rae est. Hil. de Trin. c. 7.

  Et demonstratio operum non igno∣rationis instructio, sed nostrae fidei, quae non silio scientiam ignoratorum, sed nobis confess••onem nativitatis in∣vexit — ut demonstratio ipsa na∣tivitatis esse substantia d••ceretur, cui per dile••••••••ne•• patris op••rum pater∣no•••••• — esset cognata cognitio. Ibid.

  Quod a••tem videt, conscia in se na••••••ae s••••nificatur aguitio, & in eo nunc. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Dei cognosce naturam. Ibid. U••••genitus igitur Deus naturae in••e 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••••nscius, &c.

  Di••eun•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 se per loquentem loqui, & per operantum operari, & per ju∣dicantem judica••e, & per visum vi∣••••r••, & per r••con••••••••tem reconci∣••••••ri, & manere se in ••o, qui in se ma••••ret, qu••ero quo alio a•• intelli∣g••nt•••• nostrae sensum Expositionis sit••e 〈…〉〈…〉 ap••rtio••i s••rmone, ut unum ••sse intellige••entur quam isio, quo p••r ••••••ivitatis verita••em, & naturae u••••tatem, qui••q••id filius ageret, & diceret, id in filio, pater & loque∣retur & ageret? Non est hoc itaque naturae à se alienae.— Sed per∣fecta nativitate in Deum perfectum genitae divinitatis, cujus haec natura∣lis conscientiae fi••ucia est, ut dicat, ego in Patre, & Pa••er in me, & omnia, quae Patres sant, mea sunt. Id. l. 8.

  Vide ci••m tacitus recum ipse con∣grederis, ratione hec ipsam agi intra te, e••cu••rente e••i tibi cum s••rmone, ad omnem cogitatûs tui motum, & om∣nem sensus tui pulsum. Tert. Cont. Prax. p 503. Paris.

  Tert. Contr. Prax. c. 13. p. 509.
• * 1.35

  Cyr. l. 4. in Joan.
• * 1.36

  Dion. de divin. nom.
• * 1.37

  Fulg. 3. ad Mon. c. 7.
• * 1.38

  Unigenitus qui est in gremio Pa∣tris, quod est esse Deum, in gremio enim & in 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 substantiae; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, uterque, & substantia & divinitate consistens, uterque in utro∣que, & cognoscit uterque utrumque. Vict. Afer. Bl. Patr. Vol. 4. p. 190.
• * 1.39

  Id enim quod ait, Ego & Pater Unum s••mus, tentant ad Unanimi∣tatis referre consensum, ut voluntatis in his unitas sit, non naturae; id est, ut non per id quod idem sunt, sed per id quod id••••m volunt, un••m sent. Hil. de Tr. l 8.
• * 1.40

  Et quia dixit Unum, intel••igant haeretici quod non dixit Unus. Unum enim neutral••ter positum, societatis concordiam, non unitat••m personae sonat. Novat. de Trin. c. 22.

  Quod autem dictum est, ut sint quidem per substantiam tria, per con∣sonantiam vero unum, non habet ca∣lummam, quia cognominato spiritu, id est, paracleto, consonantiae potius quam essentiae per similitudinem sub∣stantiae praedicare convenit unitatem. Hil. de Synod.
• * 1.41

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. Gr. N••ss. cont Eun. O••. 12. p 345.
• * 1.42

  Nou alta natura, quàm quae sui conscia est, diceret, ego & Pater Unum sumus. Hil. de Trin. c. 7.
• * 1.43

  Uterque hostis Ecclesiae res Ecclesiae agit; dum Sabellius Deum ex natura in operibus praedicat; hi verò ex sa∣cramento fidei filium confitentur. Ibid.
• * 1.44

  Quod si de nomine substantiae aut naturae Divinae voluerint dicere, fa∣cile revincuntur, quia Usiam Gracè & Latinè Substantiam frequenter Scriptura memoravit—quod si ex aliâ substantiâ filium dicunt, ipsi se revin∣cunt, & verbum substantiae quod me∣tuunt confitendo, & filium creaturis, quibus praeferre se simulant, conferen∣do. Ambr. de Fide, C. 1. Tom. 2. Bas. 1555. p. 51.
• * 1.45

  Aut quid est Ousia, aut unde dicta, nisi 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, quod semper maneat; cui enim esse est semper, Deus est, & ideo maneus semper Ousia dicitur Di∣vina. Ambr. Ibid. c. 3.
• * 1.46

  Non igitur verbum, sed vim verbi fugiunt, quia nolunt, verum esse Dei filium.— sicut Autor ipsorum Eu∣sebius Nicomediensis Epistola sua prodidit, dicens, siverum, inquit, Dei filium & increatum dicimus, Homou∣sion cum patre incipimus confiteri. Haec cùm lecta esset Epistola in Conci∣lio Nicaeno, hoc verbum in Tractatu fidei posuerunt Patres, quod id vide∣runt Adversariis esse formidini, ut tanquam evaginato ab ipsis gladio ip∣sorum nefandae caput haeresis amputa∣rent. Ibid. p. 75.
• * 1.47

  Certè ne quis posset errare, sequa∣tur ea quibus scriptura sancta ut in∣telligere possimus Filium significat. Verbum dicitur, Filius dicitur, Dei virtus dicitur, dicitur Dei sapientia. Ib. c. 1. p. 40.
• * 1.48

  De substantia autem, Imperator Auguste, quid loquar unius Filium cum Patre esse substantiae, cùm imaginem Paternae substantiae Filium legerimus, ut in nullo secundum Divinitatem à Patre intelligas discrepare? Iuxta h••nc imaginem dixit, omnia quae Pater habet, mea sunt; ergo nec substantiam in Deo possumus denegare. Ambr. de Fide. c. 3. p. 74.

  Mihi enim impossibile est generatio∣nis scire secretum. Mens deficit, vox silet, non mea tantum, sed & Ange∣lorum. Id. c. 1. p. 45.