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An English Gentleman lately return'd from France, and Italy, where he had spent several years, is invited by a very considerable Merchant, and his near Kinsman, to his Country House, where discoursing of many things with great liberty, the Merchant accidentally opens a Book, call'd Plato Redivivus, which
the Traveller had brought down with him into the Country; This becomes a new subject of Discourse, and both de∣liver their opinions concerning it with great freedom, as follows.
GOod morrow, Cou∣sin, What, up and ready too so early? How do you like our Old English Coun∣try Air?
Very well Sir, and indeed the pleasantness of this situation, with those many delights which appear round about it, are sufficient to raise any Man from his Bed, especially one who hath been so long a stranger to the happinesses of a Country retirement, and who loves them so much as I do.
I rather feared that notwith∣standing our best endeavours here, your time would pass tediously away, for having seen all France and Italy (which they call the Garden of Europe) I ap∣prehended that the best part of England, would have appeared no better to you, then an uncultivated Desert.
No, nor yet shall Lumbardy, nor Capua which is the Garden of Italy, be ever preferr'd by me before our own blest, happy soil.
I am glad to find you so good an Englishman, the rather because we may now hope to keep you henceforward in a place which, it seems, you like so well.
Believe me, Tutto il mondo è pa••se. All Countries are in this alike, that they have their conveniences, and inconveniences, their particular delights, and their particular wants. And when we shall have made a just estimate of all the Kingdoms in Europe, I know none, which for pleasure and profit, ought to be preferr'd justly before our own.
Sir, I was always satisfied with my own Countrey, and the little en∣couragement you give me to exchange it for any other confirms me now so much in my Opinion, that I am re∣solv'd never to cross the Seas, except some greater Business, than I can fore∣see, should necessitate me.
I have now spent somewhat more than Eight years, (as you know Cousin) out of England. The first time
I went abroad, I only learnt my Exer∣cises, and made those Tours of France and Italy, which generally other Gen∣tlemen use to do. I could then have told you who was the best Dancing Ma∣ster of Paris, where liv'd the most fa∣shionable Taylor, the airiest Perriwig∣maker, and such like. In Italy, where the best Wines, and what Curiosities were particular to every City.
But having almost lost the bon goust, as they say, or rellish for those youthful pleasures, since I went last abroad, I have made other remarks, and grown more sullen possibly than I ought to be; can tell you now of the pride and liberti∣nage of the French Noblesse, the imper∣tinence, coquetry and debauchery of the Gentry, the misery of the Commo∣nalty, the extream poverty of most, and slavery of all. In Italy the restraint of their Wives and Women, the jea∣lousie of Husbands and their general vindicative humour: At Venice the in∣supportable insolence of their Nobili Ve∣netiani, and triumphant Vice. At Genoua the scandalous Mechanick Traffick and notorious Avarice o•• their Grandees, in∣somuch
that they starve even a Jew in his own Trade: Their frequent assassi∣nations, pride and ill manners. The dull Bigotry of Florence, and hard im∣positions upon Subjects. The formali∣ties of Rome, the lost Vertue and Cou∣rage, and natural Cowardize and Pol∣tronery of the degenerated Romans; the insolence of the Commonalty del regna, as they call it, or Kingdom of Naples, the Robberies of their Banditti, the great Titles, and small Estates of the Nobili∣ty; the hereditary risses or quarrels of the Piedmontesi, and those of Monferat, and (from their ill administration of Justice) their eternal Processes. And to conclude, add to this, the arbitrary Go∣vernment exercis'd generally all over Italy, and the heavy impositions upon their Subjects, greater than they ought to bear.
Now, Cousin, with all I have said, compare the extream happiness of the English Nation. The Riches of the Com∣monalty, insomuch that some have thought it to be the greatest part of our disease; The vast trade and prosperous condition of our Merchants; The Hospi∣tality,
Wealth and Modesty of our Gen∣try; The high quality and true worth of our Nobility, their uncorrupted Loyal∣ty to their Prince, and unaffected kind∣ness for the People.
But above all let us reflect seriously upon the most happy security and liber∣ty of our Persons and Estates, which all strangers are forc't both to admire and envy: Our freedom and exemption from all manner of Taxes and Imposi∣tions, but such as we our selves shall con∣sent to.
And not to be too tedious upon a subject which is so large, let us truly consider, and at the same time bless God Almighty for our just Laws, and impar∣tial execution of them, for the admira∣ble & equal Constitution of our Govern∣ment; where the Prince hath so great a power, and the People such ample pri∣viledges, that as our form of Govern∣ment is Monarchy, and that as perfect and free as the Sun ever saw, so it is eter∣nally secur'd from the corruption of Ty∣ranny.
Over all this, our present Age enjoys a Prince so moderate and so just, that
his mercy and goodness have been his greatest faults, and his Government over us hath been so modest, that his greatest Enemies are forc't to consess, That his present Majesty never did any Act of arbitrary Power, nor to••k from any particular Person the benefit of the Law; Plato Red. p. 18, 19.
These considerations have oblig'd all Persons of all Nations whom I have hapned to meet abroad, o•• who have heard or read any thing concerning us, to congratulate with me the incompa∣rable Constitution and easiness of the Government under which we live, and applying the happiness of Virgil's Hus∣bandman to our own People, have often repeated:
O fortunatos nimium, bona si sua norint, Anglicolas.
Now, Cousin, if you have an inclination to leave all those general blessings, besides your particular ones of a noble House, a healthful & pleasant situation, delightful Garden, plenty of water & fresh springs, and many other great conveniences be∣longing
to them, then Cousin, go abroad, and there learn to be wiser.
No, good Cousin, I intend to remain a fool and stay at home, & to speak plain∣ly, if I had as good an Opinion of the present Constitution of our own Govern∣ment, as I have an ill one of those which you have mention'd, all those foreign pleasures, which the most Frenchefi'd Traveller would make us believe were to be found amongst them, should not persuade me to leave Old England, not so much as for one single Month.
How, dear Cousin? Is it possible that there should be any thing in the Constitution of our own Government which can displease a man of your sense, and solid Judgment, and one whom hi∣therto I have ever thought very well af∣fected to it?
Truly Sir, few men love their King and Countrey better than my self. I have never forwarded any irregular address to his Majesty, nor given my Vote for any notorious Phanatick, nor am I look'd upon as such amongst them. But I must confess, when I reflect upon the differences and animosities between the
King and the House of Commons, the discontents of a great number of People, the Danger of Popery, and many other such considerations, which I have not at present in my mind, I cannot but think there is a fault somewhere, and where to lay it more modestly, and more reasona∣bly than upon the Constitution of the Go∣vernment itself, is what I cannot find out.
But we shall not want opportunity to discourse as much as you please of these matters, ere we return to London: And in the mean time, I think it a good hour to break your fast. What Drink do you choose for your Mornings draught?
Good faith Cousin, a mouth∣ful or two of good Air is to me the most acceptable Breakfast in the World.
Pray use no ceremonies. You know and believe, I hope, that our friend∣ship, as well as near relation gives, you the same freedom in my House, as you have in your own. If therefore you will eat or drink any thing, speak what you like best, and the Butler shall bring it you immediately But if you be resolv'd to stay till Dinner, I will in the mean time carry you to a very pleasant walk,
and shew you a little Arbour at the end, agreeable enough.
Most willingly. I'll only put on my Cravat and Perriwig and wait up∣on you.
And I, until you are ready, will (with your leave) examine what curious Books you have brought down from be∣yond Sea.
Very few besides such as I car∣ried over; for I find London the best Library, and England the best Universi∣ty for learned men in Europe.
I am glad you think it so. Let's see, what have we here? Hugonis Grotii de Jure Belli ac Pacis? This we have translated into English since you left us.
I heard so in Italy, but never saw the Book, I should have thought it a very difficult undertaking by reason of many expressions so particular to the Ci∣vil Law and Latin, that they are hard to be rendred into our Language.
It is very well done, and of good use, I can shew it you when ever you please. For in my vacant hours I love a little reading, especially when I meet with
an Author, who is universally allow'd to be of a solid Judgment & great Learning.
You could not have met with one in my opinion who more truly pos∣sesses those two qualifications then Gro∣tius did. Joseph Scaliger tells us, that he was prudens Politicus, optimus Groe∣cus, Juris-consultus, modestus, proestan∣tissimus in Epigrammatibus, and certain∣ly he deserv'd all or more than he hath said of him.
What have you got next? The holy Bible in English? Nay then, Cousin, we may hope, that besides your English inclinations, you have brought over with you also your English Religion. For I think the Papists seldom make use of the Bible.
Sir, I assure you, I profess the same Religion which I ever did, and hope I ever shall. I mean the true Ortho∣dox Protestant Religion of the Church of England, as it is by Law establish'd, and in my Heart do believe it, not only a safe Religion, but the most sound and the most pure in its Doctrine as well as in its discipline, that is profess'd this day in any part of the whole World.
I shall ever agree with you in the Doctrine, and not much differ from you in the Discipline. But let us proceed. What fine gilt Book is this? Plato Redi∣vivus. 'Tis a strong piece, Cousin.
As strong as Mustard, Cousin; Children are afraid of it, because it bites them by the Nose, as they fancy. But those of riper years, easily discover the fallacy, for when examin'd, it leaves no impression behind it.
Have you read it Sir?
Please to open it, and you will find whether I have or no.
I perceive indeed that your red Lead Pen hath examin'd it very strictly; every leaf looks almost as dismal as a Martyr.
Not a Martyr, I beseech you; but if you will say a Sacrifice, I will ad∣mit of the Comparison.
Why Cousin? What distinction do you make between these two?
Martyr, Sir, is generally ta∣ken in a good sense, and in a good cause, but a Sacrifice may be said to be offer'd either to God or to the Devil.
Which is as much as to say,
That you believe the Author hath un∣dertaken an ill cause.
Yes, Sir, and under any good Government besides our own, especially in that Republick, which he so much ad∣mires, both himself and his works would have been made publick Sacrifices to Justice, and to the quiet of the esta∣blish'd Government, long before now.
But is it not hard, that a Man of great Learning, should not have liber∣ty to give his Judgment in a case of so great consequence, as the Peace and Security of our Government, under which our lives and fortunes, and our all, are to be preserv'd or shipwrack'd; especially when his design is so apparent∣ly good and commendable?
First, Cousin, as to our present Author, to deal plainly with you, I cannot possibly remark, either his great Learn∣ing▪ or his good design. But supposing he had both (which I shall hardly grant you) yet I must maintain, that any pri∣vate person, who unauthoriz'd by our lawful Government, shall publish either by words or writings, any arguments or discourse, against the Constitution of
the Government by Law establish'd, is a pestilent, pragmatical Deceiver, a sedi∣tious Calumniator, and Perturbator of our Peace: His words and writings become scandalous Libels, and both deserve the extreamest punishments, which the ri∣gour of the Law or Reason in that case provides.
Hold, hold, dear Cousin, be not so angry.
Sir, I ask your pardon; for whilst you entertain me with so much kindness, it were indeed unreasonable that I should offend you in the Person of any Man, for whom you may bear the least respect.
No, no, Sir, you mistake me; for in the first place I have no ac∣quaintance with the author, supposing it, whom common fame speaks him: Besides, want of freedom in discourse, abates so much of the profit, as well as the pleasure of it, that I must conjure you to use all the liberty henceforward imaginable, and so with your good leave I intend to do my self. But I confess I wonder'd a little to see you so warm and vigorous in the Defence of a Govern∣ment,
under which we must needs agree, that even to our own knowledg, and possibly amongst our own friends, there have happen'd▪ cases very severe (not to say more) which sure must be faults, either in the Governours, or the Government.
Perhaps in neither, for though as you say, we may have remembred many particular cases, which to us have seem'd hard, yet it may be, if we had fully examin'd the circumstances of each case, we should have found, either some mismanagment in the Person, or some very unlucky contingency, which neg∣lects or misfortunes we presently throw upon the Government, that we may the easier discharge our selves.
Indeed such particular cases, how hard soever they may seem to those con∣cerned, yet ought they not to over∣bias or prejudice a Mans Reason or Ju∣stice, much less make him undermine, and endeavour to shake the very Con∣stitution of our present Government; which having subsisted so long, been constituted, approved, confirmed, by so many wise, just, and valiant Princes;
and consented to, established, and cou∣ragiously asserted by such a long Series of our grave, and learned Ancestors, re∣mains the same at this day in the sub∣stantial part, which it ever hath been in the best of times, and under the ad∣ministration of much greater Politicians than our quack Statesman, (who ever he was) seems to have been.
I know not what our former Constitution hath been. It is sufficient to mind you, that now the incertainty of grants, and Court favours hath been such, that many men have never en∣joyed, what with great pains and ex∣pence they thought they had obtained; and I still think that a fault.
I guess possibly what you mean, and I confess Machiavel above all things advises his Prince to avoid the imputa∣tion of easiness, or unsteadiness. He would not have him be, Varius, or Levis, as he calls it. But on the con∣trary, to be so firm and constant in all that he says, or resolves, as not to leave in any Man, so much as the hopes of moving or deceiving him. Ita senten∣tiam suam quam semel pronuntiavit, ratam
ac firmam haberi velit, ut ab ea nunquam deduci, aut dimoveri posse procerto te∣neant, ac talem de se opinionem sustineri ac retineri studeat, ut illorum nemo ve∣niat, ut illum aut decipi aut flecti posse cogitet. This certainly is good advice, and possibly very proper in our circum∣stances; and this exact care of a Prince in keeping his word, and not passing one grant over the head of another, might be more practicable in the little Government, under which Machiavel wrote, than in ours, which hath such numerous Offices depending upon his Majesties grace and favour. But still if this Fermete, be wanting, and hard cases do sometimes happen, yet nothing can be more ridiculous and unjust, than pre∣sently to accuse the Government: For such things have happen'd under the best forms of Government that ever have been, or ever will be, whether Monarchi∣cal or Democratical, and will ever hap∣pen, whilst we are govern'd by men, who are all more or less naturally subject to in∣evitable frailties. We must therefore di∣stinguish between the Supream Gover∣nours, and the subordinate ones, and
both from the Constitution of the Go∣vernment. The first, as I said, are sub∣ject to weaknesses and infirmities, and when they are too frequent, I mean in the subordinate Officers, they may be easily remov'd or chang'd, without destroying or altering the Government.
For as a man would be justly thought mad, or highly imprudent, who find∣ing that by the negligence of Servants, a Door-post, or Window, a Joyst, Beam or Rafter of his House had been decay'd, should immediately pull down the whole building, with a design to repair only those little breaches; so that Politician is certainly most unfit for a Prince's Cabinet, or House of Parlia∣ment, who finding, it may be, some mismanagement in State-affairs, should presently resolve to pull down the Fa∣brick it self, I mean Monarchy, and in its place build up a phantastical Commonwealth, then transform that into an Optimacy, then an Oligarchy, till having past through all the misfor∣tunes, which innovation and change have generally produc'd, we fall ne∣cessarily into confusion and Anarchy,
and in that most miserable state, be∣come either Slaves to some mechanical Tyrant, sprung up from the Lees of the people, and rais'd by the foul breath of vulgar applause, or made eternally a pittiful Province loaden with afflicti∣ons, and groaning under the heavy Taxes of a foreign Conquerour.
By this time, Cousin, I hope you under∣stand the difference between Governours and Governments; the solid Foundation, or the whole House it self, from its Ornaments, or some necessary or con∣venient parts of it, and the dangers which attend the change of the one, more than of the other. I shall en∣deavour to shew you next, if you com∣mand me, what unjust pretences our old neglected Politician has found out, to endeavour an alteration in either, and what false arguments he produces to favour his pretence.
Nothing can oblige me more; And that we may not lose the advantage of this fine morning, since you are now ready, let us be walking. I'le lead you through my Garden, which brings us into the walk I spake of, and in the
Arbour, if you please, we may dis∣course farther of these matters.
Most willingly. And to help the unfaithfulness of my memory; I'le take my constant companion Grotius in my Pocket.
And I, that I may be able now and then to make some opposition, or at least ask some pertinent Questions, will take with me our friend Plato Redi∣vivus.
Best of all: You will find, whatever is well or ill said by him al∣ready scor'd to your hand.
Come then, let us walk. You see, Cousin, that my Garden is but small, but the Soil is very proper for Fruit, and lies well enough to the South Sun, which is a great advantage to us.
Yes: And I see you have plasht your Vines upon Treilles; which sure ripens the Fruit better than when they touch the Walls. Then your Gravel walks are particular to our Country, and finer than any thing I have seen of that kind, either in France or Italy.
You may take notice also that I want not Water, for I have an excel∣lent Spring, which lies close by the Ar∣bour to which we are going, that serves all the offices of my House. Here Sir, is the walk I told you of.
It is indeed very pleasant and I suppose we see at the end of it the Ar∣bour you mean.
The same. There we shall have a very fine prospect over a great part of our Country. But what will please me much better, I hope to have there the advantage of your Discourse, upon a subject, which will be no less delight∣ful than profitable, to a man who has had neither time nor learning enough to examine those high points, which do not much belong to a man of my pro∣fession.
Sir, I am very well satisfied concerning your judgment and your learning also: For I remember you were reputed the best Scholar in Paul's School, when I was at Westminster. And if the death of your Father had not happen'd in the nick of time, you were design'd for Oxford, when I went
to Cambridg. However having lately had occasion to read somewhat more of these matters, than it may be you have done, I shall be very willing to give you my opinion, as far as my reading goes, provided you will excuse my ig∣norance, and presumption, in seeming to inform you of what possibly you are better instructed than my self.
Pray, dear Cousin, let's lose no time in complements, we are now in the Arbour, and here are seats conve∣nient enough.
Sir, I am ready to obey your commands. And that we may pro∣ceed in some method, at least as good as your Author there has taken; and because I suppose it is thought by some, that he has treated as fully and clearly upon that subject, as is necessary to satisfie a reasonable man, let us examine him from the beginning to the end.
That I fear will be too tedious for you.
No Sir, you have only to read those places, which are marked with the red lead Pen; And if you please to add any arguments of your own
(which I am confident will have more weight, than many which he has pro∣duc'd) I will endeavour to give you the most plain and satisfactory Answers I can.
Agreed; And in the first place I find, you have wounded even Plato himself in the very Title of the Book.
No Sir, it is only his Ghost or Doemon, Plato Redivivus; For to tell you the truth, I never was a friend to such troublesome spirits. But in ear∣nest, do you not think it a little arro∣gance in our Polypragmatick (not∣withstanding the gentle excuse of the Publisher) to assume the Title even of Plato himself. I am confident, could Plato look into the world again▪ he would be much asham'd to see how ill a figure his Ghost makes among all so∣ber men, and it would prove a second death more cruel than the first, to see himself so ill Travestie.
But Cousin, he that maintains Plato's opinions, may surely with∣out offence call himself Plato's Friend and Disciple, and Honoris gratia, as our Author says, take upon himself the
name of him, whom he admires and follows; that is common enough at this day among our selves.
'Tis true, but in that case he ought rather to have stiled himself Pla∣to Britannicus: That would have made distinction enough between the Master and the Scholar, agreed better with the instances which you have brought on his behalf, and have been more mo∣dest than Redivivus.
However you must consider that Plato and others living then under Common-wealths, wrote in favour of that Form of Government, under which their lives and fortunes were protected. And besides, many of them, being but the late corruptions of Mo∣narchy or Aristocracy, wanted the learn'd Philosopher's defence. But to alter, nay totally destroy the ancient establish'd Government, under which we enjoy all the blessings and liberties, which our Ancestors ever did, or we can reasonably desire, would have been so much contrary to the Wisdom and Judgment of Plato, that he would no more-have wrote in our days, for a
Democracy in London, than for Mo∣narchy at Athens.
Add to this the vast difference be∣tween the State of Greece in those days, and that of Great Britain in these: The first was divided into several dif∣ferent Governments, all aemulous of one anothers greatness, and were often∣times forc'd to make great alterations in their Polities, according to the mis∣fortunes, or success of their Neighbours, who besides were all upon the same Continent, and had no other bounds or separation between them, than a hedge or brook, or at most a little River.
But England having subsisted glo∣riously and happily, more than 1700 years, as authentick History can wit∣ness, under a Monarchical Govern∣ment, and divided from the world by a Ditch which nature has made, not easily passable, Toto divisos orbe Bri∣tannos, fears no interruption whatso∣ever, in our Tranquillity or Government, but such as may proceed from sediti∣ous men, whom false mischievous and calumniating persons (such as our Au∣thor
may, if tolerated, decoy into some Rebellion as unnatural, as to themselves destructive.
To conclude, I appeal to all wise men, whether the Government of Athens in those days, be more appli∣cable and necessary for us and ours in these, than to affirm, that the Govern∣ment of France could not possibly sub∣sist, except they introduce the Disci∣pline of Geneva, or Polity of the lit∣tle Commonwealth of Luca or Ge∣noua.
I am much pleased with this way of reasoning, and am well satis∣fi'd, that times, and places, and cir∣cumstances, may alter our reason ex∣ceedingly, and that no one Polity, or Form of Governments or laws whatso∣ever, are universally proper for all places.
Plato, I think, introduc'd in his Com∣monwealth, a commonalty or com∣mon use of Wives or Women, as well as of all other Goods and Chattels. Ly∣curgus forbad the use of Gold and Silver, divided all the Lands equally amongst all, and permitted the noble
exercise of stealing. Sure could these two learned men preach the same Do∣ctrine in our days at London, as they did then in Sparta and Athens, they would be look'd upon rather as mad∣men, than great Law-givers and Phi∣losophers.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or rapto vivere, was indeed commendable among the Aegyp∣tians, and generally all the Grecians, as well as Spartans. But it was not, ad sumptum libidini proebendum, as Gel∣lius observes, but only pro exercitio disciplináque reipublicoe factitatum. To accustom their youth to vigilance and agility, that thereby they might be initiated in some measure in military affairs, and learn the practical part of laying, as well as avoiding the snares and ambushes of their enemies.
This practice in Peace prepar'd them for War abroad, and the impossibility of gaining any thing at home, toge∣ther with the small reward of Industry, so inclin'd them to it, that they fancied, they could be no where more misera∣ble, than in their own Houses, nor e∣ver lead a more unfortunate than a
peaceable life, Ils estoient si malheu∣reux en leurs maisons (says my Author) qu' ils ne demandoient que la guerre pour en sontir, & trouver dans la fatique des armes du soulagement a leurs maux. And I am confident, whosoever shall consider impartially the Laws and Con∣stitutions of those older Democratical Governments, I mean of Rome, as well as Sparta and Athens, will find, that they were adapted, and contriv'd ra∣ther for the e••largement and con∣quest of other Countries, than the peace and security of their own, and in effect they were all three in conti∣tinual Wars; sometimes Conquerors, sometimes reduc'd to the utmost extre∣mities of Conquest, untill at last, having past through all the miseries which Change and Wars produce, they were united all, and consolidated under a Mo∣narchy, from which only true solid Form of Government, they at first pro∣ceeded.
Now how improper such Laws and Constitutions would prove for us, who are in no measure in their circumstances, and to whom all foreign acquisitions,
have been justly thought rather charge∣able, and prejudicial, than advantage∣ous, I leave to you and all sober men to determin.
As for Plato, it is true, that he per∣mitted the promiscuous use of Women, as may be seen in his 4 Repub. for which amongst other things Aristotle reprehends him in his 2 Polit. c. 5.
But that might proceed from the lit∣tle respect which he had for that Sex, and great love for the other, which made him so great a Paederastist, or to speak plainer, a Sodomite that he wish'd himself as many eyes, as there were Stars in the Heavens, the better to ad∣mire his dear Alexis, his Phedius, or his Agathon; witness (amongst other tender expressions) that celebrated Di∣stich to his beloved Agathon.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
I cannot pass by a memorable passage to this purpose of Philo, a great favour∣er of Plato, who tells us in his Book De vita Contemplatrice, that Plato's
Convivia's were all spent in the affairs of love, not of Men towards Women, or Women towards Men, which the Law of nature doth very well approve, but of Men towards one another, or youths no way differing but in their Ages, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c.
Now whether our Climate be warm enough to entertain such Philosophical and Amorous notions, will be an ex∣periment amongst his Politicks, wor∣thy the name of Plato Redivivus.
But to return to his Government, and that you may not be carried away with the fame only, or great reputation of any man, whether ancient or mo∣dern; give me leave to mind you, that Plato, as great a Philosopher as he was, had nevertheless an Antagonist, as emi∣nent in all manner of learning as himself; I mean the admirable Xenophon, who, whilst Plato instituted his Common∣wealth, defended worthily the most excel∣lent Government of Monarchy, as may be seen at large in his Cyropaidia. And so jealous were these two famous men of their name and honour, that as Plato in all his writings never named Xeno∣phon,
tho' contemporaries, so Xenophon also never made any mention of Plato.
This, Cousin, is thus far very plain and satisfactory, that is to say, that the ancient Customs, Laws, and Governments of Greece, or any other part of the World, though contriv'd and modell'd by men extreamly learn∣ed, and most proper for those times and Countries, where they were in force, are not for that single reason practicable in our days, and in our Kingdom, any farther than our case and circumstances agree with theirs.
And that the Authority of Plato, Lycurgus, or Solon, or any other, are to be admitted no farther than their laws are proper or convenient for us.
Right, for though Galen, Hy∣pocrates or Aesculapius himself, should have deliver'd as an Oracle that Phle∣botomy is good in Feavers, yet if a modern Physician shall from thence af∣firm that we may as safely bleed an ancient Phlegmatick person, languish∣ing under a malignant Feaver, as a vigorous, young, Sanguine man, who is sick of a burning Feaver, I think
in reason, we ought not to admit of his inference.
Besides, you must again remark, that as Democracy, so Monarchy had equal∣ly its learned Champions, as Homer, Callimachus, Aristotle, Seneca and o∣thers.
I apprehend you, and from thence you would insinuate, that the Repub∣liques of Holland, Venice, or Geneva, may as well follow the Maxims of Xe∣nophon, and imitate the Governments of Persia, and generally all the Eastern Monarchies upon the bare credit of that Great Man, and example of those Flourishing Empires as England, France, or Spain, the discipline of Plato, upon his sole Authority, and Fortune of his little Grecian Common-wealth. Your inference is most reasonable, and your design most just, which is to dis∣engage our judgments from the depend∣ance upon any Mans great Reputation, I have only one question or two to ask you, before we leave Greece, the rather because I would be well informed, con∣cerning a Country whose prosperity under their good Laws, and Democrati∣cal
form of Government, our Author has produced as great arguments, and rules for our imitation.
By all means Sir, for as no∣thing can oblige me more, than to use all possible freedom in asking whatso∣ever you doubt, or seems difficult to you, so you can never make this Discourse without that liberty, either pleasurable or profitable.
Pray then Sir, give me leave to mind you, that you were just now saying, that some of those Grecian Republicks, were but the corruptions of Monarchy, or Aristocracy: and that notwithstanding their excellent Laws, they were not only engaged in many most desperate Wars, but that their very Laws themselves, seem'd to induce them: If your memory can serve to make this out, or bring any few examples, I shall be extremely sa∣tisfied, especially since the true know∣ledge of the ancient state of Greece, will be a great help to me in your fol∣lowing discourse.
I shall endeavour to give you as plain and as short an answer, as the
case, and my memory will permit. And to your first Question, I must tell you, that all Greece was originally Govern'd under most absolute Monarchies. And that they descended for many ages suc∣cessively from Father to Son, as gene∣rally amongst us at this day.
I will pitch chiefly upon Athens and Sparta, which I suppose will be suffici∣ent at present: I need not begin so high as the very original of Greece it self, and tell you they were peopled by Fathers of Families. I mean Jon, Ja∣von, or Javan the Son of Japhet. Whence durum Japeti genus, and thence their name▪ 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as is ob∣serv'd by Suidas.
Of these you may read farther in Josephus and other Authors. I shall only mind you, that before Deucalion's Floud, Cecrops was said to have brought Learning, and with it Idolatry out of Aegypt into Greece, and was King in that Country, which we call Attica or Athens. Ante Deucalionis tempora Regem habuêre Cecropem. Cran••us suc∣ceeded Cecrops, to whose Daughter Athis that Country owes its name. After
him Amphiction, who dedicated the Town to Minerva, and from her name call'd it Athenae. In his days happen'd the Floud of Deucalion: After that per ordinem successionis, the Kingdom de∣scended to Erichthe••s or Erichthonius, then passing through many others, unto Theseus, and from him to Demophoon, who was an associate in the Trojan War. There you have a long Cata∣logue of the Grecian Kings, without the least mention either of an Aristo∣cracy or a Democracy amongst them. And from thence the Kingdom fell by succession to Codrus, the Son of Me∣lanthus, who was the last King of Athens. Eusebius in his Chronology gives us the names of Sixteen Kings of Athens to Codrus inclusively, which space of time makes up near Five hun∣dred years. And in his time it was, that a War broke out between the A∣thenians and the Dorians. Which last when they consulted the Oracle of Apollo, which should have the better, it was answer'd, that they should cer∣tainly overcome their enemies, except the King of the Athenians were slain:
Upon this, strict charge was given to their Army, that none should presume •••• hurt the Athenian King; but Codrus being inform'd, as well of the Answer ••f the Oracle, as the order which the Do∣rians had given, unknown to any, clad himself in a miserable habit, and get∣ing in that condition into the Enemies Camp, rais'd on purpose an imperti∣nent quarrel, and was there accord∣ing to his intent, slain by his enemies. This being soon discover'd, the Dori∣ans of themselves retreated home, and the War ended: Quis eum non miretur, ••aith Paterculus, qui iis artibus mor∣tem quoesierit, quibus ab ignavis vita quoeri solet?
Much such an action did Leonidas King of Sparta for the safety of his Country in the Persian War, at the streights of Thermopiloe. Who being admonish'd by the Oracle, that either himself must fall, or Sparta, dy'd despe∣rately fighting in the midst of the Per∣sian Army.
I believe, Cousin, you will hardly re∣mark two more generous actions of publick spirited men in any Common∣wealth,
than those of these two M••∣narchs. But to return to Athens, M••∣don Son to Codrus, was first Archon •• Athens, in whose Family that Kingdom continued, having chang'd nothing by the name of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, into Archon, un∣til the death of Alcmoeon.
After him Charops was first created Archon for Ten years only, which con∣stitution lasted Seventy years. The last of those was Erixias—Tum annu••s commissa est magistratibus Respublica. Then Monarchy lay bleeding, and their Archon became but an annual Ma∣gistrate.
The first of these was Creon, to whom Nine other Princes were chosen, ex nobilibus urbis. And under this Form it was, which we may truly call an Ari∣stocracy, That Solon was appointed to make them laws, which it seems were contrived so equal, between the Senate and the People, that he was we•••• esteem'd, and thank'd on both sides: This was the first considerable change in the Athenian Government, for wh•••• was before a Monarchy, and Govern'd absolutely according to the will of the
Monarch, became now an Optimacy, or if you will, according to Isocrates, a mix'd Democracy, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and had now, by the diligence of Solon, certain publick written Laws, which (as I said) seem'd so rea∣sonable, that both the Prince and the People obliged themselves to observe them.
Pray Cousin, by your leave, had the Athenians no Law before So∣lon? And did their Kings rule after their own Wills, which we may call, Fancies or Inclinations?
First, Sir, the Athenians had, as I said, no certain publick Laws, by which they might constantly know their Duty, and which might regulate the Princes Commands, as well as their Obedience, except a few which Draco made for them about sixty Years be∣fore Solon; which being now mostly antiquated, signify'd little. Solon there∣fore is truly said to have found Laws proper for the Government and Times, which were both much out of order and distracted. Administratio Reipubli∣coe annuis magistratibus commissa, sed
Civitati nulloe tunc leges erant, quia ••••∣bido Regu•••• pro legibus habebatur. Le∣gitur itaque Solon, vir justitia insignis, qui velut novam Civitatem legibus con∣der••t, &c.
And for their Kings, I must tell you, that anciently, not only in Greece, in which there were several Kingdoms, but generally all the World over, the People were govern'd, purely and sim∣ply, according to the good Will and Pleasure of their Prince. This you will easily believe was very inconvenient for the People. For, since there are more bad than good amongst all sor••s of Men and Professions, it happened by consequence, that there were generally in the World more evil than just and vertuous Princes.
The last therefore were ador'd as Gods. The first, from the very ill use of their right of Power, were deserved∣ly call'd Tyrants, and sometimes re∣mov'd by violence, when their Yoke grew insupportable.
I do not wonder at it; for hu∣mane Nature hath its Bounds, beyond which it cannot suffer; and both Re∣spect
and Obedience too, will break, when bent with too much Rigor and beyond their Trempe.
This hath happen'd, and may do so again, especially amongst People whose Understandings having been ne∣ver open'd by the more glorious Rays and Light of the Gospel, follow, at best, the Dictates of Nature only; a∣mongst which, that of Self-Preservati∣on is none of the least. But you will observe, that these Accidents are still no Arguments against a Monarchical Form of Government, no more than the happy Reign of a good King, and the entire Obedience of most dutiful Subjects, are certain Reasons for it, these being Contingences, and may vary often, in Prince, or People, or in both toge∣ther.
What solid Foundation then do you establish for perpetuating a Govern∣ment, and judging of its Goodness?
The same which God and Mo∣ses did, I mean, good Laws, of which we have as many, as prudently penn'd, and as proper for us, as any People up∣on Earth; not only in the point of Meum
and Tuum, but the more necessary parts of Obedience and Command, the Right of Power and Honour in the Governour, and Right of Priviledge and Protection in the Governed; that the one may be secur'd against Oppression, and the other from Violation. And in this it was, that Solon, (having probably in his Travels▪ perused Part, it not all the Law of Moses, and nicking the Circum∣stances of the troublesome Affairs in Attica) succeeded so well that, as hath been said, he had the Fortune to make such Laws, and contrive such a Form of Government, as for a time pleas'd both Parties.
Pray, How did Athens prosper under these new Laws, and this Inno∣vation in the Government?
As for the Laws, they continu∣ed in Force for many Years: but for the Form of Government, it succeeded as generally all Innovations do, especially such as are popular; for, his mingled Democracy became, even in his own Days, a perfect Monarchy, under the Reign of Pisistratus, to whom, even Solon himself was a constant Privy Councillor.
It surprises me extreamly, that so wise a Man as Solon▪ should fail so grosly in so material a Point as the Esta∣blishment of his new Government.
Sir, you will cease to wonder, when I shall tell you how the Case and his Circumstances stood. Attica was di∣vided into three principal Factions, ac∣cording to the three different Situati∣ons of the Country. The Mountaineers were all for a Popular Government; those of the plain or low Country affect∣ed an Aristocracy; the Coasters, and those who liv'd near the Sea-side, de∣sir'd rather a mix'd Government; but all the People and poorer sort were so generally indebted to the Rich, that they paid annually no less than the sixth part of all they had, to their Cre∣ditors: whence they were call'd Hecte∣mor••i; and many were so desperately engag'd that they were forc'd to sell their Children.
In these Distractions and Afflictions, the more sober part did believe, That nothing could so truly heal their Grie∣vances as returning again under the Government of a Monarch; whose
Power being despotical, might, ac∣cording as himself should think most just, end all their Differences, by easing the Poor, without exasperating the Rich.
In this Conjuncture, Solon (being a rich Merchant, and a wise Man, and living splendidly enough) grew so po∣pular, that the common People invited him to take the Government wholly upon himself. Two of the Parties were very zealous in it, and the third seem'd well enough satisfy'd that the Management of all should be in the Hands of so prudent a Man, as he was thought to be.
But Solon very unadvisedly refusing what was offer'd him, suffer'd himself to be chosen after Philombrotus their Archon; and then, to gratifie the Peo∣ple, who had been so respective to him, he abolisheth their Debts, and gave them a greater share in the Govern∣ment than in good reason and Policy they ought to have had. All their Law-givers and Politicians, after Dra∣co, (as Josephus cont. App. observes) aut Civitatem laudantes, aut Reges, that
is, affected, according to their Circum∣stances or Inclinations, a Popular or a Monarchical Government.
But this sure should rather have strengthned their popular Government, than introduced another so contrary to it.
No Sir, that's a Mistake; for when Men are unduely raised to the Helm who are born to obey, or as Agrippa observes, Qui hoereditariam obedientiam susceperunt, their new Pow∣er, like Strong Liquors, intoxicates them, their Heads grow giddy, and they become more insolent and unsup∣portable, even to their Fellows, for whose sakes they receiv'd their Ho∣nours, than the most absolute Monarchs generally have been. This makes them easily shake off the servile Yoke, and re∣turn to the Obedience of their natural Prince, or else some aspiring Man a∣mongst them usurps all. So the popu∣lar Sedition of the Gracchi, and some others of the Tribunes, confirm'd the Authority of the Consuls, and introduc'd at last (even by the Consent of the Peo∣ple) a Monarchical Government.
This Observation is most just, and common enough amongst us, no∣thing being more ridiculously proud and insolent, than a Clown in Office. But what became afterwards of Athens?
Pisistratus having govern'd very well, about thirty five Years, left the Kingdom to his Son Diocles; who being murther'd by one of his Subjects, the other Son, Hippias, was banish'd by the Rebellious Multitude, and the Government fell again into the Hands of the People. Then it became an Ari∣stocracy, and was governed wholly by the Senate, Permittente populo imperi∣um ad Senatum transfertur. Then a Tyranny under thirty Governours, each of which was more cruel than any of their former Kings had been. Then they reduc'd the thirty to ten Tyrants; then the Government came to the People again; and, in a Word, passing through all the Changes and Forms which they could invent, they had nothing certain and establish'd but continual Wars, which lasted untill they became Slaves to the Macedonian Conquerour, and at last remain'd Subjects to the Roman and
Grecian, as at present to the Turkish Emperours.
And was this the Condition of the celebrated Athenian Governments? are their Wars and Changes the admi∣rable Blessings which we are encoura∣ged to seek after?
Sir, I relate only matter of Fact, as you will find at large in Thu∣cydides, Justin, Plutarch, and several other Authors; make what use of it you think fitting.
The Use is plain; which is, To seek after Peace while I live, and, by the Grace of God, endeavour, as far as belongs to a Man of my Professi∣on, to support the present Government by Law established, that we may avoid the Plague of Innovation, and the Slavery of some Macedonian Conquerour. One Word more, dear Cousin: How came Athens to produce such excellent Wits as it seems it did, in those troublesome Days?
As our Miseries under the Tyranny of the rebellious House of Commons, and Usurpation of a Plebeian, produced several most learned Works;
or as the Persecution of the Primitive Church procur'd the excellent Volumes of many Holy Fathers and Martyrs.
Besides, you must believe ••••at Athens had some Intervals of Prosperity: but that is still little to our purpose; for, I cannot think it reasonable that we in this Age should be oblig'd •••• in••ur all the Misfortunes, which Innovation generally produces, in hopes that the next Age may be (if possible) more happy and flourishing t••••n we are at present.
Sir, I am hitherto perfectly well satisfied, and ••eg your Pardon for the Trouble which I have given you; but it will shorten our way very much in our Discourse hereafter. One word concerning the famous Spar•••••• Com∣monwealth, and then I have done.
That will not cost us much time. You must know then, that Sparta was govern'd originally by Kings, as Athens was. They reckon nine successively to Lycurgus, whose Power was also most arbitrary. But then the Kingdom falling, by Right of Succession, to Charyllus, Posthumate
Son to Polybita, Lycurgus his Uncle taking the Advantage of his Nephew's Minority, gave the People Laws, and made some Alteration in the Govern∣ment, which consisted principally in the Institution of a Senate composed of twenty eight of his own chiefest Friends. The Kingdom he deliver'd to his Ne∣phew assoon as he came of Age.
What kind of Government do you call that?
Monarchy, without doubt. It is true, their Senate had given to them a greater Right of Power than ours have, who enjoy only a Right of Coun∣sel and Consent, or a subordinate Pow∣er for the Dispensation of Justice; and the People had Liberty to choose their Senators. But the Right of making Peace and War, vvith several other Prerogatives, together vvith the Right of Succession, continued alvvays in the Prince.
I have heard much talk of the Ephori. Were not they created on pur∣pose to abate the Authority of their Kings?
Sir, they were not created, until about an Hundred and thirty years after the death of Lycurgus: And then if we may believe their Kings Agis and Cleomenes whom our Author hath men∣tion'd) their Authority was only to do justice, whilst their Kings were ab∣sent in the Wars, and were properly the Kings Ministers, they usurped in∣deed afterwards a Soveraign Authority and dar'd to depose the Kings them∣selves; for which Usurpation, Cleome∣nes, who divided again the Land a∣mong the People, slew them publickly as enemies to the ancient Government, and present prosperity and peace of Sparta.
Pray Cousin, what new Laws did Lycurgus institute with his new Go∣vernment.
Many Sir, but sure not much to our purpose, or fit for our imitation; for at first they had none, Non haben∣tibus Spartanis leges instituit, &c. Their Prince's will, being (as I have already observ'd) the only rule. But Lycurgus considering, I imagin, the greatness of the Spartan name, fram'd Laws most
proper for the encouraging War, and educating the People from their infan∣cy in a military kind of Discipline; Amongst other Laws he totally forbad the use of Gold and Silver, Auri argen∣tique usum, velut omnium scelerum ma∣teriam sustulit, he forbad traffick, but encourag'd idleness and stealing.
He commended parsimony and hard∣ship, and order'd that all the People of Sparta, should always eat together, that none should eat at his own house, except upon great occasion. That the young Women should dance, and ex∣ercise publickly without any manner of covering upon them, and many such, too long to repeat at present.
Judge then how ridiculous and un∣practicable, and unnecessary these Laws would appear in our age, and in our climate and circumstances; To conclude let me refer you to two suf∣ficient Authors, concerning the Spar∣tan Laws. The first is Aristotle, in his 7. Pol. cap. 14. who tells us, that the cheif admirers of the Spartan Com∣monwealth, have plac'd its sole excel∣lency, in having Laws adapted most
Particularly for War and Victory. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. &c. The other is Euripides in his An∣dromache. His Words are these;
Add to all, this single Consideration, That Lacedemonia was but as a small Province, in Comparison of the King∣dom of Great Britany; and Sparta, no more than a Corporation Town. And when you have done this, let their Law, or Form of Government, be what it will, I dare undertake to make it ap∣pear, that they are so far from being made an Example for our Imitation, that our own Government, as distem∣per'd as our Author would have it, even
at this time, while we are discoursing, is a more excellent Form, and the Laws more just and reasonable▪ and conducing more to the Safety and Per∣petuity of the Government, and Peace and happy Subsistence of the People, than either Sparta or Athens ever en∣joyed, or any other part of Greece, or Government in the World, except that Monarchy, which God himself was pleas'd to institute, and which, above any▪ other, ours does most particularly imitate. And this, I hope, is a suffi∣cient Answer to whatsoever our Au∣thor hath offer'd concerning Greece.
Dear Cousin, You have more than perform'd your Promise; and that my Pleasure as well as Profit may be compleat, pray let us proceed with our Author.
Assoon as you please.
What say you then to the first Day?
Very little, save only that I never knew a Day worse spent in my Life, nothing being more nauseous than to read the impertinent Complements of three Fools, extolling one anothers
great Parts and Learning; when, if we may believe the Publisher, who comes in like Sapientum octavus, the eighth wise Man, the whole Triumvirate, or if you will, Quatrumvirate are included in the politick individuum of the Eng∣lish Gentleman.
Really, I was almost deceiv'd at first, and did begin to fancy that I knew the Physician.
It was without doubt his De∣sign to deceive all Men.
To what Purpose?
That he might make the cre∣dulous Reader believe, that there were more learned Men of his Opinion be∣sides himself. But truly, I think that neither the State of Venice, nor Col∣ledge of Physicians, are much oblig'd to him, for picking out two of their Soci∣eties, to make up so ridiculous a Comedy.
Is that way of writing Anci∣ent or Modern?
Dialogue was oftentimes very properly used among the Ancients; but they seldom introduc'd more than two, if the Subject of their Discourse were grave and serious.
Why then hath our Author made choice of three?
I suppose the noble Venetian wanted Learning enough, to compre∣hend so profound a Discourse, and the Physician, we must imagine, had not anatomiz'd or studied the Body Poli∣tick, so throughly as he had done the Body Natural, and so could not see so far into a Milstone as a Venetian States∣man can, who, as our Nobleman tells us, will sometimes discover a State Marasmus breaking out, two hundred Years after the passing an indigested Law; and this without the help of any Telescope: both therefore possessing se∣parately these eminent Qualifications, became joyntly an Auditory worthy of Sir Politick Wouldbee's Doctrine. Be∣sides, you know the number Three is most perfect. But had I been advis'd withall, I could have shewn our Au∣thor this Number of Three so ingeni∣ously and politically plac'd, that our Medicopolitico-Venetian Publisher might have born a better part than he does, in his Book, without either altering the Number or spoiling the Figure.
But, to be serious, I must confess, Cousin, that I have sometimes heard two or three Fools cog••••onaring one another, as our Author calls it; and it hath been pleasant enough: But that one Coglione should presume to coglio∣nare three Kingdoms, impose upon His Majesty, despise the Wisdom of the Lords and Commons, His Majesty's Privy Council, and Learned Judges of the Land; and last of all, to give the Fool to all our Worthy Ancestors, who have liv'd within the Compass of four hundred years, according to his Ac∣count, is so ridiculous a piece of Inso∣lence, that I know not whether I should be more angry at his Arrogance, than laugh at his Impertinence. But, let us proceed, and see whether the se∣cond Day will afford us any thing bet∣ter.
Nothing, Sir, can be more ac∣ceptable to me. But, I think, the ring∣ing of that Bell tells us, that Dinner is ready. In the Evening my Coach shall carry us into a pleasant Ai•• a little farther from home; where, if I shall not too much tire you, I should be ex∣treamly
pleas'd to hear your Opinion of the Second Part.
Most willingly, Sir; and by that time I shall have rubb'd over some few of my old Notes, whereby I may be able to give you a little better Satisfa∣ction than hitherto I have done.
Dear Cousin, I shall own my self much oblig'd to you; and in the mean time, let us go drink a Health or two to our Good Friends at Lon∣don.
Sir, I wait upon you.
COme Sir, we are now in the open Air, and, I think, in a pleasant Country. And, to tell you the Truth, I am so much pleased with our Morning Discourse, that I cannot any longer forbear importuning and persecuting you, untill we shall have got through our politick Author, and examined whether we be really so sick
as he would make us believe we are; and if we be, whether he hath ghessed right at our Distemper, and our Cure.
In good faith, Cousin, I am perswaded he plays the Knave with us, as those idle People did, when they took in the Gentleman's Doublet, ma∣king him believe he was in a Dropsie, and only let it out again when they thought fit to tell him he was cur'd. But however, pray Sir proceed.
The first Remark which you have made lies, I perceive, upon the high Commendation which the Noble Venetian hath bestow'd upon our Coun∣try, in Page 16.
Pray read it.
He saith then, That since he arriv'd in England, he finds it one of the most flourishing Kingdoms in Europe, full of splendid Nobility and Gentry, the comeliest Persons alive, valiant, courte∣ous, knowing and bountiful; well stor'd with Commons, honest, industrious, fitted for Business, Merchandise, Arts, or Arms, prodigious for Learning, and succeeding to Admiration, in the Perfection of all Sciences.
Add to this, the good Chara∣cter which our Author himself gives of us, That there is not a more Loyal or Faithful People to their Prince in the whole World, than ours are: that we have as gracious and good a Prince as is any where to be found, having never yet heard that he did, or attempted to do, any the least Act of Arbitrary Power, in any publick Concern, or endeavoured to take from any particular Person, the be∣nefit of the Law: that his only Brother, and Heir to the Crown, is a most glo∣rious and honourable Prince, one who has expos'd his Life, several times, for the Safety and Glory of this Nation, who pays justly and punctually his Debts, ma∣nages his own Fortune discreetly, and yet keeps the best Court and Equipage of any Subject in Christendom: is cour∣teous and affable to all: and in fine, hath nothing in his whole Conduct to be ex∣cepted against, much less dreaded. These are our Author's own Words. Now, dear Cousin, if all these extraordinary Happinesses be the Symptoms of a di∣stemper'd Government, then the Lord keep me and my Friends out of a health∣ful one.
But yet you see, that both the Venetian and himself concur in this, That the Posture of our Affairs is tur∣bulent, the Government and the People disunited, the Gentry discontented; and to cure all this, he tells us, That the present Constitution of the Government it self lies agonizing, must be alter'd and chang'd from what it is, or all will come to Destruction.
Indeed I am apt enough to be∣lieve, that somewhat is ami••s amongst us. But to lay the fault upon the Go∣vernment rightly understood, that I think is unreasonable.
Pray Sir, please to inform me what you mean by Government right∣ly understood.
Most willingly, since it is ex∣tream necessary to avoid Equivocati∣ons, of which, our Author, and most such malicious Writers as he is, are very full.
Government then, is divided into the Material part, and the Formal part. The material part, or Subjectum mate∣riale, is the People. The Subjectum Formale, or Proprium, est persona ••na
pluresve pro cujusque gentis legibus ac moribus, is one or more Persons, accor∣ding to the Customs of different Countries, in whom the right of Power resides.
Now, by this distinction, when a Man shall tell you that our Govern∣ment is distemper'd, you will certainly ask him, whether he means in the ma∣terial or formal Part, because Govern∣ment, by use, is become an equivocal Word.
I understand you and suppose that our Author means the formal part.
Without doubt he does; but therein, I think he is mistaken. For, when the whole Crasis of a Body is decay'd, and Infection is gotten into the very Mar∣row, and Soul of Life, the Body con∣sumes all over, and in every part, and never produces such lively and beaute∣ous Marks of Health and Vigour, as those which the Noble Venetian and English Gentleman have numbered up. But on the other side, when a little Choler only, or Heat, or some sharp Humours, abound, they generally shew themselves in some little Tettars or Pimples, on the Face, without infecting
the whole Mass of Blood▪ And though I be no Physician, am yet perswaded, that they may be easily cu••'d by some slight Purge; or, if you please, breath∣ing a Vein with some proper Juleps, and keeping a little Diet for a time.
Now these Tettars and Pimples in our Body Politick, are some of those few discontented Gentlemen, whose number, our worthy Author has him∣self augmented, or some of the igno∣rant and turbulent Commonalty. But, had I been call'd into Consultation with our State-Physician, (whom, between you and I, Cousin, I believe to be only a Quack) I should never have agreed, that the whole Oeconomy and Systeme of the Body, should be so much dis∣compos'd to purge it of Humours so ea∣sily remov'd.
But what if this Choler run on untill it come to the Disease which they call Atra bilis?
It would be ill advis'd, to ne∣glect the Cure so long: but if they should, a few stronger Medicines ap∣ply'd, by a skil••ul hand, would reme∣dy all at last.
But of these matters, we shall dis∣course more fully, in a more proper place. And in the mean time, pray go on.
In Page the twentieth, you note these Words; The evil Councellors, the pen••ioner Parliament, the through∣pac'd Judges, the flattering Divines, the ••••sie and designing Papists, the French Councils, are not the cause of our Misfor∣tunes. What have you to say to this?
Little, Sir, save only, I would have you remark the Malice of the Man. But he and his Party are known s•• well, that their Tongues are become no Slanders. For first, as to evil Coun∣sellors, we must believe, that there ever hath been such, and ever will, whilst Men have different Judgments: that is to say, if we mean those, as in all Cha∣rity we ought to do, who following their Opinions, give sometimes Coun∣sel, which in truth, may be prejudici∣al rather than advantageous for us; witness▪ our Author himself, whom sup∣posing to be (as in great Charity we may) an honest Man, hath yet given Counsel, even undesir'd and unautho∣riz'd,
more pernicious to our Govern∣ment and Happiness, than the worst of our evil Counsellors could ever have in∣vented.
As to the Pensioner Parliament, I must confess, till of late days, I never knew it was a Crime for a Parliament Man to hold an Imployment from the King, nor a fault in the King, to en∣deavour to ••o••••en the Rancor of a vi∣rulent Member, any more than in an indulgent Father, to hire, by fair Words and Promises, a froward and perverse natur'd Child, to live peaceably and decently in the Family amongst the rest of his Brethren, since the Design both of the Pater Patrioe, and Pater Fami∣lias, is no other than to procure to him∣self and Family, a quiet and happy Life.
For the Judges and Divines, if their great Worth and Learning, and most exemplary Lives, did not speak plainly, and loud enough in their Behalf, they would not want better Pens than min•• to defend their Cause.
But I think their Sphere is much a∣bove the noise, much more the danger
of this barking Mongrel. When ••e nam'd the busie and designing Papist, I was in great hopes, that he would have added the Presbyterians too, and then we might have come betimes to the Cause of our Misfortunes. But, since he has thought fit to leave them out, I shall also let them alone till occasion requires. For his French Councels, I know them no more than himself does; and, in my Opinion, had our Author had any Wit in his Anger, he might have forborn in this place, to have re∣vil'd the Divines and Judges of our Land, the King's Council, and Parlia∣ment it self; that is to say, all that we hold under the King, sacred and religi∣ous amongst us: especially since he tells us immediately, that these are not the Causes of our Misfortunes; the finding which out, is, I think, one main De∣sign of his Politick Search.
Very well, Sir. The next thing is, We have plaid handy dandy with Parliaments, and especially the House of Commons, (the only Part which is now left entire of the old Constitution) by adjourning, proroguing, and dissolving
them, contrary to the true meaning of the Law.
That's enough. I have only to remark his two Parenthesises. In the first he tells us, That the House of Commons is the only part that is now left entire of the old Constitution. Pray, Cousin, Have you heard what is become of the House of Peers? or, Do you know how it comes to be less entire than ever it was? I am perswaded you cannot tell me.
I imagine his Meaning may be, that their Estates are not so great as formerly they have been; or that the House of Commons depended more upon them formerly than now they do.
For the first, it is false, there being as great Estates now in the House of Lords, as, generally, ever there were. And for the dependance of the Commons upon the Lords, that is to say, wearing their blew Coats, making up their Lords-train, waiting upon them to the House of Lords, and making a La••e for them to enter, and such like, as he tells us, pag. 135. Let him endea∣vour
to reduce the House of Commons to this old Constitution if he can, and he will soon see, how far the Com∣moners will think themselves oblig'd to him for it. If not, why does he talk of an old Constitution?
But Sir, with his good leave, and the Commoners too I take the House of Commons to be the latest Addition to that Assembly, which altogether we call a Parliament. I do not remember to have heard any News of a House of Commons, as it is now understood, untill several Years after the Norman Conquest, that is, untill the end of the Reign of Henry the Third, at soonest. But though some contend for the eigh∣teenth of Henry the First; But the House of Lords hath subsisted, and been a Court of Judicature, even before the Roman Conquest, 1700 Years ago. Witness, amongst many other Passages, the Dispute between King Cassibelaunus and Androgeus Duke of the Trinovantes. Whose Son, or Nephew, having slain the Son of the King, Cassibelaunus com∣manded the Duke to surrender him, in order to his Tryal, that he might suf∣fer
such Punishment as the Noblemen or Lords of the Kingdom should judge most ••it. Commotus Rex Androgeo mandavit, ••t nepole•• suum sibi redderet paratum ••alem sententiam subire, qualem Proceres regni judicarent. So we read of Vor∣tegern, the British King, Vortegernus excitatus perstrepentium vocibus super statu publico in medium consulit Senten∣tias Magnatum. So of the* 1.1 Saxon Ethelwulphus, Cum concilio Episcoporum ac Principum conci∣lium salubre ac remedium uniforme* 1.2 affirmavi, &c. So Edmundus Rex Anglorum ••••m concilio & consensu Optima∣tum meorum, &c. Besides many hundred of such Instances (proving the Existence of a Court of Lords from the Conquest of Will▪ the First, untill the end of Hen. the Third) are to be found in Eadme∣rus and other good Authors.
But, it being none of my business to defend, in this place, the Prerogatives of the House o•• Lords, I shall not offer any thing further concerning them. But since our Author troubles himself so much about the old Constitution of the House of Commons, and (detracting
from the House of Lords) calls the Lower House the only entire part of the old Parliaments. I shall beg leave to mind you what was the Cause and Design of their first Institution; as I find it in the best Histories of those Ages; and by that you will easily per∣ceive their Antiquity, as also, which was the eldest Constitution.
William the Conquerour,* 1.3 (called by Eadmerus, and o∣thers, William the Great,) having ma∣ster'd the Power and the Fortune of the English Nation, what he retain'd not, in Providence, as the Demesnes of the Crown, or reserv'd not, in Piety, for the Maintenance of the Church, the rest of his Kingdom he divided amongst such of his principal Lords as sailed hither with him in the Barque of▪ his Adventures, giving to some, whole Countries, to others, considerable parts of it; so as in the County of Norfolk, for instance, there were not above threescore Chief Lords or Owners, and half of them not very considerable, as appears by Doomsday.
And as the Estate, so the Council of the Kingdom was entrusted into few Hands, none being employed in the publick Councils, but only these great Lords and Peers who were Conciliarii nati, born to that priviledge, and came thither without Leave and without Summons.
And although at first this great Pow∣er and Trust in so few hands, was look'd upon as a great Obligation to those Lords, and a great Security to that King, so long as their Interests stood united in their new Conquest; yet, in the next Age, when the heat of that Action was over, their Interests divided, and the Obligation forgotten, it proved to the succeeding Kings so great a Curb and Restraint to Sove∣reignty, that nothing fell more inti∣mately into their Care, than how to retrench (as much as they durst) the Power of that Nobility which they be∣gan to suspect, and was like, in time, to mate even Monarchy it self.
Though others foresaw the mischief in time, yet none attempted the Re∣medy untill King John; who no soon∣er
began to reign (in his own Right, for, by the way, he practis'd a little in his Brother's time, and by that Expe∣rience found Mat. Paris his Words true of the Barons, viz. Quot Domini tot Ty∣ranni.) But he bethought himself to frame his Counsel of such a Constituti∣on as he might have Credit and Influ∣ence upon it.
To be short, he was the first that durst restrain the tumultuary access of the Barons to Council; he was the first that would admit of none but such as he should summon, and would summon none but such as he thought fitting: and besides, he would send out Summons to several of the Commons (or lesser Te∣nants) mixing them with the Nobles, and engaging them thereby to his In∣terest: and whereas, before, the Coun∣cil consisted of the Nobility and Clergy, he erected a third Estate, a Body of the Commons, or lesser Tenants, which might, in some measure, equal the rest, and be faithful to him. All which ap∣pears in the Clause Rolls and Patent Rolls of the sixth Year of this King; and in vain, before that time, shall any
Man seek either for Summons or Advice of the Commons in any of these great Councils.
King John having put this Cheque upon the Councils, considers next, how to ballance the unequal power of the unruly Barons; and first he tampers with the Bishops and Clergy: sain he would have drawn them into his Par∣ty, at least, to his Dependency; but that Tryal cost him dear. In the next place therefore, that he might create new Dependances and new Strength to himself, he becomes a great Patron and Founder, or at least, Benefactor to ma∣ny considerable Corporations, as New∣castle, Yarmouth, Lynn, and others; in∣somuch, that he is taken notice of by Speed, and other of our Chroniclers, and stiled particularly, the Patron of Corporations: Thus you see not only when, but for what Reason, the Insti∣tution of the House of Commons was first thought upon; and indeed, ac∣cording to their old or first Constitu∣tion, their Attendance in Parliament, or (as we say) their serving in Parliament, was look'd upon rather as an easier Ser∣vice
due to the King, than otherwise, as a Priviledge granted to the People; as may be seen, not only in the Case of the Burgesses of St. Albans in temp. Ed. 2. recited by the Worthy Dr. Bra∣dy against Petit, but also by many other good Authorities, too long for this place.
But, begging your Pardon for this long Story, I now proceed to the se∣cond Parenthesis; in which, he makes no Scruple, to accuse his present Maje∣jesty, and his late Sacred Father, of breaking the Law, in adjourning, pro∣roguing, and dissolving Parliaments.
Indeed, Cousin, I know nothing that reflects more truly upon the Constitu∣tion of our Government, than that it suffers such pestilent seditious Men, as our Author seems to be, to live under it. For nothing sure is more evident, in the whole or any part of the Law, whether Statute, common or customary, than that the Kings of England, ever since the first Parliament that ever was call'd, have had, and exercis'd the same Power, in adjourning, proroguing, and dissolving them, as his present Majesty
or his Father of Blessed Memory, ever did.
And, that you may have Plato's own Authority against himself, I must anti∣cipate so much of his Discourse, as to inform you, That in p. 105. you will find these very Words; That which is undoubtedly the King's Right, or Pre∣rogative, is, to Call and Dissolve Par∣liaments.
Nay more, so great was the Autho∣rity and Prerogative of our Kings over the House of Commons, according to their old Constitution, That they have in their Writs of Summons named and appointed the particular Persons all over England, who were to be returned to their Parliaments: sometimes have or∣der'd, that only one Knight for the Shire and one Burgess for a Corporation, should be sent to their Parliaments, and those also named to the Sheriffs, and sometimes more; as may be seen, by the very Writs of Edw. 2. and Edw. 3. fully recited by the aforesaid Dr. Brady, from p. 243. to p. 252.
Besides, Sir, what is more reasona∣ble and equitable, than that our Kings
should enjoy the Power of Adjourning, Proroguing, and Dissolving, that their Council or Parliament, when, and as often as they please, since our Kings alone, in Exclusion to all other mor∣tal Power in England whatsoever, en∣joy ••olely the Prerogative of Calling or Assembling these their Parliaments, when, and where, they alone shall think convenient.
I confess, we generally say, That it is a great Weakness in a cunning Man, to raise a Spirit which afterwards he cannot lay; and that in such case the Spirit tears him in pieces first who rais'd him. And, I think, we have had the Misfortune to see somewhat very tragical, of this kind, in the be∣ginning of our late Troubles, if it were not possibly the great Cause of his late Majesty's fatal Catastrophe. But truly, excepting that case, I never heard the King's Authority, in proroguing or dis∣solving Parliaments, question'd before.
Well, Sir, go forward to the twenty fifth Page; for all between, is nothing but quacking, and ridiculous Complements, or Matter as little worth our notice.
He tells us there, that it re∣mains undiscovered, how the first Regu∣lation of Mankind began; that Necessity made the first Government; that every Man, by the Law of Nature, had, like Beasts in a Pasture, Right to every thing. That every Individual, if he were stron∣ger, might seise whatever any other had possessed himself of before.
Hold a little, Sir, that we may not have too much Work upon our Hands at once. I think he said before, at Page 22. That he would not take upon him, so much as to conjecture how and when Government began in the World, &c.
This, Cousin, I cannot pass by, be∣cause it seems to be the only piece of Modesty, which I observe, in his whole Treatise. And I should commend him for it much, but that I have great rea∣son to suspect, that he pretends Igno∣rance, only to cover his Knavery, and thereby leave room to introduce seve∣ral other most false and pernicious Principles, which we shall endeavour to refute.
First therefore, I shall take the Li∣berty, not only to conjecture, but to tell him plainly, when and where Co∣vernment began, and how also it con∣tinued.
Government then, began with the World, and God, who had the Sove∣reign Right of Power over the whole Universe, invested Adam with so much as was necessary for the Government of this World, and that in such express Words, that there can remain no doubt, but such as is malicious and willful. And God said, be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the Earth, and subdue it, and have Dominion over the Fish of the Sea, and over the Foul of the Air, and over every living thing that moveth up∣on the Earth.
And, least those Words, every living thing, should not yet be general enough to comprehend Mankind, God gives Adam the rule over his Wife Eve, the only humane Subject that was then upon Earth, and from whom, all the Race of Mankind was to proceed.
And surely Adam had naturally a Right of Power over those whom him∣self
begot. Unto Cain God gave the rule over his Brother Abel, and after God had banish'd him from the Prote∣ction of his Father, he builds a City, and secures it by Walls. Can any body be so blind as not to see that Cain was absolutely Governour of the Place, and had an undoubted Right of Power over those Subjects which proceeded out of his own Loins?
I confess, the Affairs of that Age be∣fore the Flood, are a little obscure; and since Moses thought fit to pass them over with so great Silence, it is reasonable we should do so too. But, we may most probably conjecture, as well from that short History in the Bible, as from the Authority of Jose∣phus, and after him Grotius, That the neglect of Government, and of the exercise of Power in those days, pro∣duc'd the Deluge: for formerly Go∣vernment was but a trouble; and as the best of Men cared for no more than was necessary for the Preservation of their particular Families, so some were unnatural enough to abandon their Children to the Licentiqusness of their
own corrupt Inclinations. Whence proceeded Violence, as the Text says, The Earth was corrupt, and filled with Violence. And, as Grotius tells us, Ante Dil••vium Gigantum oetate promis∣o••a invaluit coedium Licentia. And from thence follow'd the Punishment of their Violence, by that universal Cataclis••▪
But howsoever it was before the Flood, I suppose it will be sufficient for our purpose, if we deduce the History of Government, and the Right of Pow∣er, from the Restauration of Mankind to the first Grecian Kingdoms; which, I hope, may be done so plainly, and that by the Authority of approv'd Au∣thors, that not only Europe, Asia, and Africa, but even America it self, ac∣cording to the imperfect Accounts of Solon, Plato, and Pliny, and of later Authors, Josephus Acosta, and Herrera, will appear to have been repeopled and govern'd absolutely by Fathers of Fa∣milies.
But, not to embarque into so wide an Ocean as that is, we shall keep our selves within the Streights, where Af∣fairs being more certainly known, they
will prove more pertinent to our pur∣pose. Which is, to shew, when, and how Governments, and the first Regula∣tion of Man began in the World after the Flood.
I think, there are very few who doubt the Truth of the Flood it self. Common Experience, even in our days, in several Countries attesteth it; be∣sides, most Authors, both Greek and Latine, agree to it, even as it was de∣liver'd by Moses.
I confess, the Greeks, from the Assy∣rians, talk of a Deluge happening un∣der Sythithrus, or Xi••uthrus, as also Ogyges and Deuc••lion. But we are as∣sur'd by Grotius, de verit. Rel. Christ. That they signifie the same in Greek as Noe in the Hebrew Language. Philo de proemiis & poenis tells us plainly, that whom the Chaldaeans call Noe, the Greeks call Deucalion. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And ma∣ny other good Authorities there are, it being most usual among the Greeks to contrive expressive Names. So Pla∣to observes of Solon, That he, search∣ing into the Force and Signification of
the Hebrew Words, turned them into the Greek Idiom, vim ipsam significati∣onémque nominum personatus ea ipsa no∣str•• vestivit Sermone.
This being granted, I suppose all Men must agree, that Noe had a Right of as absolute Power in him, as any Man upon Earth ever had. Not only as he inherited it from Adam and the rest of Mankind, but even from his own Father Otyartes, if we will believe Abyd••us the Assyrian, and Alexander Polyhistor, who say, that Otyartes, be∣ing dead, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, his Son Sisythrus reigned in his stead eighteen Years; in which time the Deluge hap∣pen'd. However, a Monarch he was, and I do not hear, and am confident you will not believe, that he receiv'd any Investiture or Right of Power from his Children, but that as his Authori∣ty was successive, so it was divided among his Children, according to their Generations, by whom the World was progressively re-peopled.
But, Sir, if the World was re∣peopled progressively, as you speak, that
is to say, from Father to Son, sure Fa∣thers were more humane than to suffer their Children to live together like Beasts in a Pasture, as our Author says; Men having not, certainly, debased their Natures so soon, to be equal with the Beasts which perish, and turn their young ones out a grazing, without any farther Care what became of them.
No surely, Cousin, for besides natural Instinct, which we have com∣mon with other Creatures, and by which we are desirous to preserve our Young, God has bestow'd upon us all a rational Soul, more than the rest of other Creatures have, by which we may find out the best and easiest way to obtain artificially what naturally we thus desire.
Methinks then, Sir, we should easily contrive a way to live happily together, and peaceably, Peace being, undoubtedly, more rational and natu∣ral than War. Nor can I easily believe, That naturally we should covet what another hath possess'd himself of before; but rather leave that to every Man which he had appropriated to himself
and Family. Pray, Sir, is Nature a God or a Devil?
Nature is certainly a God, or else, rather, the Opifex Dei, whom we call Natura naturata, that is, the Causa Causata, or second general Cause of all sublunary Beings whatsoever. God is the first Cause, who out of nothing hath made Matter. Whether that nothing be a Nothing, which to us is incom∣prehensible, Nullam rem è nihilo gigni divinitus unquam, or whether it be that Materia prima, which some Philoso∣phers have believ'd antecedent to the Elements themselves, and which others agreeing with the Rabbins, have call'd Hyle, Ench. phys. Rest. Can. 18. by which they seem to mean a kind of Shadow, or Darkness, incomprehensible, the fan∣cy of a thing rather than a thing in∣deed; a Matter without Form, yet most desirous and capable of all Form; without a Body, and yet the Foundati∣on of all Bodies; in short, a vast abyss of Cold and Night, which we cannot comprehend. I say, whether God cre∣ated all things out of Nothing, which we cannot conceive, or out of this ma∣teria
prima, which we can as hardly explain, I'll not determine. It is suffi∣cient, for my purpose, to declare, that God is the first Cause, and made mat∣ter, and that what I here call Nature is the second Cause. Who, working up∣on the second Matter, or materia Ele∣mentata, produceth several Effects, ac∣cording to its several Dispositions.
In the next place, Nature▪ can nei∣ther create nor yet destroy; her Power extends no farther than Generation and Preservation, or changing old Matter into new Form. The God of Nature only hath the power of Annihilation; and as he made all things out of no∣thing, so he alone can again reduce all things into nothing.
To conclude, Nature is most just and good in all her Actions. And as she hath receiv'd the Command of Preser∣vation from him who hath given her the Power of Generation, so she hath transmitted that inviolable Precept un∣to all things, which she hath made, according to their different Kinds and Species. And this is the Ground and Foundation of that universal Law of
Nature, which is so immutable, that it cannot be changed. Jus naturale adeo immutabile est, ut ne à Deo quidem mu∣tari queat, saith Grot. l. 1.
And this is sufficient for the Expla∣nation of Nature, what she is; that is to say, a Spirit, infinitely good and just, and abhorring, above all things, Vio∣lence and Destruction.
Dear Cousin, this is extreamly satisfactory, to shew what Nature is, and by consequence, what her Laws must needs be. And indeed, we see it most plainly by the Effects: for, amongst the various kinds of Beasts and Fowl, there is scarce a Creature found which is not solicitous to preserve its Young. And by this Law of preserving what we have produc'd, the World was govern'd, from Adam to Moses. And had we as exactly observ'd this Law of Nature as she hath obey'd that of the first Crea∣tor, the World sure would have need∣ed no other Law, nor known any other Government.
This, Sir, is that Law, which to our shame, continues uncorrupted amongst Birds and Beasts. An Eagle
stoops not upon an Eagle, a Lyon preys not upon a Lyon; Man only devours Man, and from being made a little be∣neath the Angels, degenerates below the worst of Beasts.
This sure proceeds from some accidental Corruption; to recompence which, God Almighty hath given us Reason, which, methinks, joyn'd with the natural Law of Preservation, should produce Government, and by conse∣quence, Peace and Happiness.
Your Observation is most just: for, the World being peopled, as well before the Flood as since, successively, Succession begets Inequality, the Father being greater than the Child. And in∣equality necessarily produces Superiori∣ty, which eternally includes a natural Right o•• Power.
By this Rule then, Noah, as well as Adam, being our first Parent, should have been an Universal Monarch; the whole right of Power being lodg'd originally in himself, pray what be∣came of this Power?
First you must observe; that Power never dyes, but descends to him
who best represents the last Possessor, and that is naturally the eldest Son: for his Title being before those who are posteriour to him, it cannot pass to them but through him. So you see Noah settles the Power only upon his eldest Son Shem. Canaan, he saith, shall be a Servant to him, and Japhet shall dwell in the Tents of Shem; which, ac∣cording to the Interpretation of the best Expositors, is, under the Government and Protection of Shem.
How came this Power then so soon divided, as we hear in the Histo∣ries of those elder times.
By the express Will of God himself, who whilst the People were building Babel, confounded their Lan∣guage, and dispersed them abroad, that the Earth might be the better repeo∣pled▪
Did then the People of different Languages choose to themselves parti∣cular Governours who were to conduct them, or did every Man go according to his own Fancy?
Neither, but were all govern'd according to their different Languages,
by the Head of the Family, that hap∣pen'd to be in that Language, whose Right of Power proceeded from their Father Noah, and from them the first Kingdoms of the World were begun and continued.
Can you name me any of those Kingdoms so begun?
I think I can. And first, Ja∣phet is said to be Father of the Europoe∣ans. Japetus Europoeorum genitor, says Grot. Gomer, his Son, of the Galatians, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Magog founded the vast Empire of the Scythians, where his Name is to this Day remembred; Ma∣dian the Medes, Javan the Greeks, as hath been already observ'd: these are the Sons of Japheth. The Sons of Ja∣van were, Elishath, Tarshish, Kittim, and Dodanim. By these, saith the Text, were the Isles of the Gentiles divided in their Lands, every one after his Tongue, after their Families in their Nations, Gen. 10. From Ham proceeded the Africans; from Cush, his Son, the Cusei or Ethiopians. From Seba, the Son of Cush, the Sabeans. From Ashur, the Son of Shem, the Assyrians. From Lud
the Lydians. The Caldoeans from Ar∣phaxad; and from his Grandson Eber, the Hebrews.
But it would be too tedious to relate in this place, all the Kingdoms, Coun∣tries, and Cities, that had their Begin∣nings and Names from the Sons of No∣ah. If therefore you be not yet satis∣fied, I shall only recommend you, be∣side the Bible, to Eusebius, Nicholaus Damascenus, Pliny, Strabo, Josephus, and of our Modern Authors, to Grotius, and the Learned Doctor Stillingfleet.
Sir, I am very in••linable to be∣lieve all that you have here observ'd, having heard and read much to this purpose. But then, Sir, People must always have liv'd under some Govern∣ment, and have been obedient to some Superiour, which will surely destroy our Authors perpetual State of War, as also his universal Right, which every one had to all things; and, in a Word, will so totally divest the People of that original Liberty, which he pretends they had, and Right of Power which they were able to bestow, and upon which Foundation he seems to build the
greatest part of his Discourse, that ac∣cording to your Principles, we shall not meet with any People who had any right of Power or Liberty, but such as was granted them and derived from their Governours.
Sir, This Liberty is no where to be found, but in the shallow Brains of such conceited Men as our Author seems to be. And I am perswaded, that he will never be able to produce one single Instance of any People what∣soever, even to this day, that were so free, or enjoy'd such an original or vir∣gin Liberty, that they could of them∣selves give a Right of Power, which never had been possess'd but by them∣selves. From whence it will follow, That all popular Governments have been Ʋsurpations, except such People alone, who having leave from their Mother City, have planted Colonies in Foreign Countries. Such were most of those Grecian Governments, which we find in Asia, and in Italy, and in some parts of Greece it self. And they all bore generally this Mark, That they followed the form of Government of
those from whom they proceeded, and ••ver paid them a dutiful Respect: which when neglected or denied, generally produc'd War; witness the long Pelo∣ponesian War, largely described by Thu∣cydides. These things consider'd, let us draw this Conclusion, to which all Politicians must agree, and even our Author himself, whether he will or no, That all Commonwealths have been founded upon Ʋsurpation or Rebellion, or the Grant or Permission of some supe∣riour and antecedent Power.
How comes it then to pass, that so many Philosophers, and all our Antimonarchical Authors, pretend, That the People were before the Prince, that they are above him, that they made him, and by consequence, may depose him. That their Liberty and Freedom was independent upon any, untill, for their own Interest and Advantage, they parted from it; and much to this pur∣pose?
From the Ignorance of some ancient Philosophers, and the impious Complaisance of some of our modern Wits.
What do you mean by the impious Complaisance of our modern Wits?
I mean, Sir, that neglecting the History of Moses; which being the most ancient, and most authentick of any extant, is penn'd besides by the Assistance of the holy and infallible Spi∣rit of God himself; neglecting, I say, what our very Faith obliges us to be∣lieve most sacred; we run foolishly af∣ter the blind Conjectures of Men, who were as much inferiour to Moses in Learning and Wisdom, as they are po∣steriour to him in Time.
What is it these Philosophers teach us contrary to Moses, and where∣in lies their Error?
It consists chiefly (as it relates to our Case) in their Ignorance of the History of the Creation, and want of a true Notion of the Deity. Hence they teach, That the World was made, or rather, made it self, by chance, and that Mankind was, at first, but the natural Production of the Earth, as Plants, and some few Animals at pre∣sent are produc'd. So the Epicurean
Lucretius tells us in his second Book.
Diodorus Siculus gives us a long ac∣count of the Creation; where, amongst other things, he tells us, That when the great Separation was made of the Waters from the Earth, the Earth re∣main'd, nevertheless, very moist, over which a Pellicule, or kind of Skin, in most places was spread. This preserv'd the Seeds of all things whatsoever, which after due Fermentation, and the nou∣rishing heat of the Sun, the Pellicule broke, and all sorts of living Creatures appear'd. Those which participated most of Heat, became Birds and Fowl. Those which were of a more gross and earthly Composition, were made Men and Beasts; and the more moist became Fish.
After this, the Moisture and Surface of the Earth being hardened, and dry'd, by the continual heat of the Sun and drying Winds, the Earth could no more produce any considerable Creatures, but that they were henceforward propaga∣ted by Generation, according to their several Kinds and Species.
Now, Sir, notwithstanding this fine Fancy, you may easily see its great Er∣ror, if you consider, that the Earth produc'd those living Creatures either by Chance or Accident, or by the po∣sitive Will of God.
If the last, then we shall easily a∣gree with you, it being indifferent to us which way God was pleas'd to take for the making of Man, supposing he was made and propagated successively by Gods Order: but this the Philoso∣phers generally deny.
If the first, Then how comes it to pass, that Accident and Chance should form Male and Female, so fitting for the work of Generation, that few things do more manifestly declare the Wis∣dom of our Maker, than the Composure of those Organs, which serve for the
Nutrition of the Infant in the Womb, and whatever else belongs to our Con∣servation and Propagation.
And indeed, when we come to con∣sider seriously of what many of the An∣cients have deliver'd concerning the Creation of the World, we shall not find them so different from the Do∣ctrine of Moses as some imagine.
The Phoenicians and Egyptians, and some later Philosophers, as Aristotle, Anaxagoras, and amongst the Poets, Hesiod, Orpheus, Ovid, Virgil, and others, supposing that Mankind pro∣ceeded originally from the Earth, have ascribed the Production to some parti∣cular Cause, as the brooding of a Pigeon upon the Chaos, incubitum columbae, Anaxagoras to a Mind, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Aristotle to Nature, most of the Poets to Amor, or Love: but all as they have fetch'd these Notions from the Phoenicians, and they from Moses, so they mean the same thing which Moses did, that is to say, God; which for want of that Illumination which Moses had, they could not better ex∣press.
Now some Men, not well under∣standing what the Philosophers meant, and others refining upon Notions which the Philosophers themselves had too grosly interpreted, have deliver'd Opinions most ridiculous.
Hence Mr. Hobbs will have Men produc'd like Mushrooms, fungorum mo∣re. But sure it were most reasonable, that those Mushroom Men should be kept in some sharp and sour Pickle, untill they had disclaim'd a foolish Fancy, which is so contrary to the Word of God; which is the publick Rule of our moral Actions and Obe∣dience.
Sir, I believe most assuredly the History of the Creation, as Moses hath wrote it, and think, that in Rea∣son, as well as Conscience, we ought so to do. But, setting aside the Di∣vine Inspiration, Are there any other Reasons why we ought rather to be∣lieve Moses in that Particular, than any other of the Learned Grecian Philoso∣phers?
Yes, Sir, there are three principal Reasons, which ought to en∣gage
our Belief for Moses rather than for any other Historian whatsoever. And they are, first, The Antiquity of his History; secondly, The Reason in his History; and thirdly, the Testimo∣ny of others concerning both.
For the first, It is agreed by the Greeks themselves, That they have no History ancienter than that of Homer. Constat apud Groecos nulla invenitur con∣scriptio poëmate Homeri vetustior, saith Josephus contra Appion. And yet Homer liv'd above six hundred Years after Mo∣ses.
But, not to trouble you with what you may find elsewhere, I shall refer you to the same Josephus, and to Gro∣tius de Verit. Rel. Christ. and last of all, to the Origines Sacroe of Dr. Stilling∣fleet, or Mr. Gale's Court of the Gen∣tiles.
For the Reason of his History, es∣pecially as it relates to the Creation of Man, nothing seems more just, than that God Almighty, who is the Foun∣tain of all Wisdom and Goodness, should have rather chosen to propagate
the World at first, as he did at last af∣ter the Flood by Succession, than by such a promiscuous Production of the Earth as is before mention'd; that even there∣by he might prevent (as he did) that State of War suppos'd by our Author, and those many Mischiefs and Incon∣veniences which would attend an Equality intolerable, and never yet known upon the Earth. And notwith∣standing the ridiculous Arguments of Mr. Hobbs, and some others, they could never yet produce any good Au∣thorities or Examples, where this Equality was ever to be found, except in their own Understandings. The Learned Pompenatius, in his Treatise de immort. Animoe, tells us, That if the Inequality which is amongst Men were taken away, the Race of Mankind would be destroy'd, or at best, subsist with great Inconvenience; and that it is not the occasion of Discord, but ra∣ther of the most perfect Harmony. Hoecque inoequalitas, si toleretur, aut genus h••manum periret, aut non commo∣dè constaret. Neque inoequalitas inter
homines, commensurata tamen, debet dis∣cordiam parare, imo sicut in symphonia vocum commensurata diversitas concentum delectabilem facit, si•• commensurata diver∣sitas inter homines perfectum, pulchrum, decorum & delectabilem generat.
On the other side, by this successive Propagation God hath secur'd Man's Preservation, and that by introducing a natural form of Government and Obedience, so certain, and so reasona∣ble, that it might have continued even to this day, had not the Negligence of the Governours in the first Age per∣mitted a Confusion. And the Ambiti∣on and Avarice both of the Governours and Governed in the latter Age, so en∣tangled the Reins, that they have made it sometimes as hard to drive as to be driven.
In the next place, the compiling of the Law of Moses shews so demonstra∣bly the Wisdom and Reason of the Law-giver, that his Laws have been the Ground and Patterns for the best and most ancient both of the Attick or Greek, as well as Roman Institutions.
And lastly, for Testimony concern∣ing the Veracity of his History, we find even the very Particulars con∣firm'd by the most ancient Authors. Hesiod, Homer, and Euripides, declare, That Man was made out of Clay. Cal∣limachus calls Man 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, lu∣tum Prometheum. The History of Adam and Eve, of the Tree of Know∣ledge of Good and Evil, and the Ser∣pent, are attested by Sanchuniathon.
In the most ancient of the Grecian Ceremonies and Mysteries, they used to shew a Serpent crying out 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Eva; Hesychius, Clemens in protreptico and Chalcidius ad Timoeum tell us, that according to the account of Moses, God forbad our Fore-fathers the eating of the Fruit of certain Trees, left thereby they should come to the Knowledge of good and Evil, ex quibus notitia boni malique animis eorum obreperet.
The Story of the Gyants is attest∣ed by Pausanias, Philostratus, and Pli∣ny. Berosus, and Abydenus the Assyri∣an, with many others, give a perfect Account of the Deluge. Trogus Pom∣peius,
Polemones, Manetho, Lysimachus, and others, of the flight of the Chil∣dren of Israel out of Aegypt, under the Conduct of Moses himself. All which, and a great deal more to this purpose, abundantly confirm the Authority of Moses his History, and oblige our Ap∣probation and Belief, even without the express and indisputable Command both of God and Man.
I am perfectly satisfy'd, and shall reap this advantage from the long Trouble I have given you, that I shall henceforward apply our Authors Pro∣positions to the History of Moses; and according as they are conformable to it, approve them, or otherwise, if con∣trary, totally reject them; and for the present, am sufficiently convinc'd that the first Regulation of Mankind began from paternal Governments. For his Necessity, universal Right to all things, the regulating of Ownership and Proper∣ty, and the Mediation of some wise men, for the consenting to the establishing a Government, I shall look upon them hereafter as canting Terms, contriv'd
by some Commonwealths Men, and not at all consonant to Reason or Truth, especially since he hath not pro∣duc'd one Instance of any Government o∣riginally so begun, against twenty which you have, and I believe can produce, for the deducing many great Governments from Fathers of Families.
You will find, that the force of all his reasoning, quite through his Book depends chiefly upon such cant∣ing Propositions as you have here re∣peated. But pray proceed.
He tells us then, p. 31. That could we trace all Foundations of Polities that now are, or ever came to our Know∣ledge since the World began, we shall find none of them to have descended from Paternal Power.
Did you ever meet with a more impudent or more ignorant Au∣thor? You remember, I suppose, those Instances which I have already produc'd to demonstrate the repeopling the World by Fathers of Families, which are confirm'd to us by approv'd and ir∣reproachable Authors. Besides, what
is more notoriously known, than the History of the Edomites, or the Poste∣rity of Esau or Edom, and the Hatred which continued in his Family against the Sons of Jacob, when they deny'd the Israelites Passage through their Country. Nay so certain is it, that that great Nation descended from Edom, who was the eldest Son of Isaac, and Father of his Family, and that they spread as far as the Red Sea, that the Greeks themselves, from his Name Edom, which they interpret 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, have left the Name of Mare Erythroeum, even to this day.
Nor less known is the Genealogy of Ismael the Son of Abraham, from whence the Ismaelites or Arabians, whom Epiphanius calls the Saracens, are li∣neally descended.
And, as a constant Mark of their unquestionable Descent from Ismael, they have, to our Age, retain'd the Cu∣stom of being circumcised after the thirteenth Year, according to what we find written of their Father Ismael him∣self.
There are besides, as I told you, many more undoubted Instances in those Authors, which I have already nam'd to you. And if our Politician hath any respect for the Holy Bible and History of Moses, let me recommend him to the twenty fifth Chap. of Gene∣sis, where Moses numbring the Chil∣dren of Ismael, concludes, These are the Sons of Ismael, and these are their Names, by their Towns and by their Ca∣stles, twelve Princes according to their Nations. And they dwelt from Havila unto Shur, that is before Egypt, as thou goest towards Assyria. And whilst he hath the Book in his hand, let him turn forward to the thirty sixth Chap∣ter of Genesis, where, after a long Ca∣talogue of the Dukes and Kings which descended lineally from Esau, it is said, ver. 31. And these are the Kings that reigned in the Land of Edom before there reigned any King over the Children of Israel. And these are the Names of the Dukes that came of Esau, according to their Families, after their Places, by their Names. And Verse the last, These
be the Dukes of Edom according to their Habitations, in the Land of their Pos∣sessions, he is Esau the Father of the Edomites.
Now what can be more particular or express, than what I have here pro∣duc'd? Or what can he mean by tra∣cing the Foundation of Polities, which are, or ever came to our Knowledge since the World began, if these will not pass for such?
He cannot pretend that we should bring a long Roll of Parchment, like a Welch Pedigree, ap Shinkin, ap Mor∣gan, and so from the Son to the Fa∣ther, untill we arrive at ap Ismael, ap Esau, ap Magog, ap Javan, and so forth: that would be too childish to imagine of him; for we know very well, that all the Kingdoms upon the Earth have oftentimes chang'd their Masters and Families.
But if he means, as surely he must, if he mean any thing, that we cannot name any such Kingdom or Govern∣ment that hath been so begun, then he is grosly mistaken: for, the Assyrians,
the Medes, the Ethiopians, or Cusoei, the Lydians, the Jones, or Greeks, and very many others, are sufficiently known, and preserve to this day the very names of their first Founders; who (as is made appear) were all Fa∣thers of Families.
Cousin, I begin to be very wea∣ry of this rambling Author. Pray, therefore let us go on as fast as we can.
Read then what follows.
As for Abraham, whilst he liv'd, as also his Son Isaac, they were but or∣dinary Fathers of Families, and, no que∣stion, govern'd their Housholds as all others do. What have you to say to this Holy Patriarch and most excellent Man?
I say we are beholden to our Author, that he did not call him a Country Farmer, some such a one, it may be, as in his new Model of the Go∣vernment, is to share the Royal Autho∣rity. Indeed it is hard, that whom the declar'd Enemies to the Hebrew Peo∣ple have thought fit to call a King, we
who adore the Son of Abraham, will not allow to be better than a common Housholder?
I confess, my Reading is not great; but as far as the Bible goes I may adventure to give my Opinion: And if I mistake not, the Children of Heth own'd him to be a mighty Prince among them.
Yes▪ Sir; and the Prophet David, in the hundred and fifth Psalm, calls him the Lords Anointed. But, because I perceive the Word of God is too vulgar a Study for our Learned Statesman, I have found out a Pro∣phane Author who concurs with the History of the Bible.
And first, Justin makes no Scruple to call him in plain Words a King. Post Damascum Azillus, Mox Adores, & Abraham & Israel, Reges fuere. lib. 36. Josephus also, and Grotius, who are Men of no small Repute even a∣mongst the most Learned, have quoted Nicolaus Damascenus to vindicate the Regal Authority of Abraham.
His Words are very intelligible, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And tells us moreover, that in his Days (which was in the Reign of Augustus) the Fame of Abraham was much celebrated in that Country: and that there was yet a lit∣tle Town remaining, which was called by his Name.
I perceive, when Men grow fond of their own Imaginations they run over all, and neither Reason nor Religion have any Power to stop them.
Then he introduceth Samuel upon the Stage, chiefly I suppose, to insinuate, that the People had a Power, and did choose themselves a King: which is so notoriously false, that they never had the least share, or pretended any in the election of Saul. It is true they chose rather to be govern'd by a temporal King, who was to live a∣mongst them, and rule as other Kings did, than continue under the Govern∣ment of the King of Heaven and Earth; and so the Word chose relates wholly to the Government, but not to the Per∣son
of the Governour. For which, Samu∣el also reproves them, and accordingly they acted no farther, leaving the Ele∣ction of their new King wholly to God, and their Prophet, and God did particularly choose him from the rest of their People, and Samuel actually anointed him before the People knew any thing of the matter.
Afterwards, lest some might have accus'd Samuel of Partiality in the Choice, he order'd Lots to be cast, which in the Interpretation of all men, is, leaving the Election to God; and Saul was again taken. What Junius Brutus, another old antimonarchical se∣ditious Brother, objects concerning re∣newing the Kingdom at Gilgal, where it is said, And all the People went to Gilgal, and there they made Saul King before the Lord, will serve very little to prove any Right of Power in the People, no not so much as of Election: for confirming and renewing the King∣dom, and such like Expressions, signi∣fie no more, than the taking by us the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy,
which I think were never thought to give the King any Right to the Crown, but only a just Right to punish us for our Perjury as well as Disobedience, in Case of Rebellion. So renewing the Covenant with God, as particularly a little before the Death of Joshuah, can∣not be supposed to give a greater right of Power to God Almighty, than what he had before, but is only a stricter Obligation for the Peoples Obedience, that they might be condemned out of their own Mouths. And Joshuah said unto the People, See ye are Witnesses against your selves.
So Samuel makes the People bind themselves to God, to their King, and to their Prophet, that they would faithfully obey him whom the Lord had set over them. And behold, saith Samuel, the Lord hath set a King over you. But having spoke more to this purpose elsewhere, and the Case being most clear, as well by the History it self, as by the Authority of Grotius, and other learned Men, that Saul and the rest of the Hebrew Kings, did not
in the least depend upon their People, but received all their Right of Power wholly from God, we will proceed with our Author. Only I must note by the way, that with the learned Gentle∣man's leave neither the Sanhedrim, the Congregation of the People, nor the Princes of the Tribes, had any manner of Power, but what was sub∣ordinate, and that only to judge the People, according to the Laws and In∣stitutions of Moses. And so they con∣tinued to the Babylonish Captivity, Grotius only observing, in favour of the Sanhedrim, that they had a particular Right of judging concerning a whole Tribe, the High Priest and a Pro∣phet.
Well, Sir, we are now come to our modern despotical Power. What say you to Mahomet and Cingis Can.
Prethee, Cousin, let's not trou∣ble our selves with those Turks and Tartars, they are yet ••ar enough off, and not like to trouble us, nor does their Government much concern us; we have Laws of our own sufficient,
which as they secure us from the dan∣ger of any Despotical Power or arbi∣trary Government which can rise up amongst our selves, so they do no less protect the Person of our Supream Ma∣gistrate or King, from all manner of Violence or Jurisdiction of the People.
In the next place then we come to an Aphorism, which is, That Em∣pire is founded in Property. Upon which, he tells us, he must build the most of his subsequent Reasoning.
Ay marry, here's Work indeed. And no doubt but the Foundation being so solid, the Building will last eternally. But let us see, in page 40. he gives us this Aphorism in Latine; and then it runs thus, Imperium fundatur in Dominio: which, lest we might not understand, he tells us his meaning of Dominium, is, the Possession of Lands. And that what Kings soever in former times had no Companion in the Sovereign Power, they had no share likewise in the Possession of the Ground or Land.
Truly, Cousin, I do not remember to have met with such grave and seri∣ous
Fooling in any Author besides himself. But we will examine his Reasoning, and his Aphorism, as fully and impartially as we can. And in the first place it is most necessary that we should define the Word Imperium, which surely we cannot do more plainly, than when we say, That Imperium est jus Im∣perandi, Empire is a Right of Com∣mand. Now that this Right of Command should be fix'd or found∣ed upon what in it self is incapable of receiving any Command, or pay∣ing any Obedience, I mean Land, is so absurd a Proposition, that it makes Empire an empty Name on∣ly, and Sound: for when you thunder your Imperial Laws through your hollow Rocks, your shady Groves, and Woods, those stiff and stately Subjects of your new found Empire, will pay no other Homage or Obedience, than a Return of your Commands upon your own Royal Head, by the Repetition of a foolish Eccho, the only Subject
which can entertain you with Dis∣course.
You, in the mean time, must re∣main like Midas, amidst his Gold, without Service or Sustenance, ex∣cept being wholly transform'd into an Ass, or grazing, like Nebuchad∣nezar, amidst your fertile Pastures, you might indeed in such case be∣come a fat and lusty, though a beast∣ly, Emperour.
But, Cousin, to be serious, the great Folly of our Authors Apho∣rism will appear more demonstrable by putting a familiar Case or two, and such as may shew us plainly, upon what Empire is truly founded, and upon what it is not.
Let us suppose then, that the King should make some Nobleman or Gentleman, Duke or Prince, or (if you will) Emperour of some vast tract of Land, in the Western Part of Terra Australis incognita; which we will also imagine totally uninhabited. What kind of Empe∣rour do you think this Nobleman would be?
Truly, Sir, if he had no Subjects, I think he would appear much such another kind of Prince as Duke Trinkolo, in the Come∣dy.
You have hit upon a very proper Instance.
But pray, Cousin, why may not our Emperour have Subjects ha∣ving Land to bestow?
Undoubtedly so he may; but they must be procur'd one of these three ways: either from his own Loins, as in the old World, that is, from his Wife and Children; or from Slaves, such as may possi∣bly be bought in some other Part of the World; or from Free People, whom he may probably carry over with him.
Very well; and why may not the Land be peopled, in time, by his own Family, especially if Po∣lygamy be permitted, as formerly it was, and both himself and Sons take to themselves several Wives.
So it may, Sir, but this will not do our Business; for, his Empire, in that case, will not be founded upon the Possession of his Land, but the Persons of his Chil∣dren, who become naturally his Subjects, even when he did not pos∣sess one Acre of Land. For God and Nature have so invested a Sove∣reign Right of Command in Fathers over their Children, that no Power upon Earth can take that Right away.
'Tis true, the Civil Law, for the Good of all, has reduc'd even Fa∣thers themselves under the Civil Government, who is still Pater Pa∣trioe. But, naturally, every Father is Emperour in his own Fami∣ly.
I understand you, Sir; for, Fathers having naturally a Sovereign Right of Command over their own Children, if then he peoples a Coun∣try by his own Posterity, the Pos∣session of his Land gives him no more Power than what he had ori∣ginally,
and from a higher Title too, before. It is plain; but why may he not then stock his Land with Slaves, from Guiney, or other Parts of Africa?
O Cousin, but properly speaking there is no Empire of Slaves. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
For Aristotle, lib. 8. de Rep. and from thence Grotius assure us, That such a Government is not properly an Empire, but an over-grown Fa∣mily. Qui ergo tali tenetur imperio populus, in posterum non civitas erit, sed magna Familia. Besides, Rea∣son it self convinces us of this Truth: for no Man is a Slave wil∣lingly, and what we hold by force is not truly an Empire, which, as I said, is Jus Imperandi, but a Ty∣ranny, which always includes Inju∣stice.
But, by your leave, may not a Man justly command his Slave.
Yes Sir, as he may use his Oxe or his Horse, and they are al∣ways look'd upon as part of our Personal Estate, and pass according∣ly. But naturally, or according to the Law of Nature, which is Ju∣stice, no Man is born a Slave, Ser∣vi natura, id est, citra factum huma∣num, hominum nulli sunt, saith Gro∣tius, lib. 3. Whence the Civilians tell us, Contra naturam esse hanc ser∣vitutem▪
Lawfully indeed, which is humane Institution, Men become, and are sometimes born Slaves, but Subjects we are both by Law and Nature too.
All Politicians therefore, and Ci∣vilians, have made a Distinction between Subjects and Slaves: the last are so by Accident and Mis∣fortune, and against their Will, for the sole Benefit of their Lord and Master; the others are Subjects by Nature, and willingly continue so, not only for the Honour of their Emperour, King, or Supreme Go∣vernour,
but for the peaceable and happy Subsistence of themselves. So Tacitus distinguisheth them in these Words, Non Dominationem & ser∣vos, se•• rectorem & cives cogitatet. And Xenophon of Agesilaus, whatso∣ever Cities he reduc'd under his Government he exempted from those servile Offices which Slaves pay their Lords, and only commanded such things as were fit for Free-Men to pay their Supreme Gover∣nour. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Nor are there, or ever were there, any such Kingdoms of Slaves.
For, though the Turk and Tar∣tars at present, the Persians, and generally all other Eastern Kings, anciently govern'd despotically; yet their Subjects always had a Civil as well as a Personal Liberty, and were generally so far from being go∣vern'd against their Wills, that, as Apollonius observes, the Assyrians and Medes ad••r'd their Monarchy, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The Cappa••o∣cians
would not accept of the Liber∣ty which the Romans offer'd them, Negantes vivere se posse sine Re∣ge.
The same Philostratus tells us of the Thracians, Scythians, and those Mysians which inhabited about the Hellespont, that they had no man∣ner of Satisfaction in the Proposi∣tion of a Liberty, which they car'd not for. And the Tarks, at this day, being so taught by their Pro∣phet and their Alcoran, think it an Honour to dye by the Command of their Emperour.
This I comprehend well: but why may not those Slaves be made free?
That indeed they may. But then they come under the third Con∣sideration; which is, That our Em∣perour may People his Country with Free-Men, whom he is sup∣posed to carry over with him. But then I must ask you, Whether you imagine, That Men who are Free at home will become Subjects in a
Foreign uncultivated Country, un∣healthful it may be, and dangerous, and very remote from all their Friends and Relations, and what∣ever else they once esteemed, with∣out the Hopes of some Recom∣pence and considerable Advan∣tage?
Without doubt, they will not: But, why may not the Pro∣prietor of the Land grant such Pro∣portions of it, to these Free-men, as may encourage them to transplant themselves and Families, as they do at present, to Carolina, and other Colonies.
This is, and may be done: but then, Sir, you must observe, that, according to our Authors A∣phorism, part of his Empire must go for it; whence will arise the most ridiculous Soloecism that ever was heard of, which is, That by how much he encreaseth in Subjects, by so much he decreaseth in Empire. Which is as much as to say, That by how much he becomes powerful, and rich,
and strong, by so much he becomes less an Emperour.
Nay, and in process of time, when his Lands shall happen to be all peo∣pled, he shall be no Emperour at all.
But, Sir, Why may he not retain, suppose, half the Lands to his own use?
He may, Sir: Yet still the Empire being founded upon the Pos∣session of the Land, he is but half so great an Emperour, now his Em∣pire is half peopled, and begins to be supply'd with all Necessaries, as he was when no humane Creature besides himself, did inhabit it. Which is so absurd, that nothing can be in∣vented more unreasonable.
I know not what to say a∣gainst this; but must only ask you one Question more. Whether you pretend to make an Emperour with∣out Land?
I do not say I would, nor was there, it may be, any such Em∣perour ever known. Yet I must
tell you, that it is more rational to affirm, That a Man may be an Emperour without Land, than with∣out People. So many of the Ro∣man Generals were called Empe∣rours, when they had little to fix their Empire on, besides their Ar∣my.
But this also we shall illustrate by this following Case. Suppose then▪ That after the Death of this present Emperour of Germany, the Princes Electors should think fit to choose this present King of France in his stead. I do not know that he hath any Lands in Germany; yet, never∣theless, what kind of Emperour do you suppose he might prove?
Without doubt, as great as his Predecessor.
Truly, I believe as great, and as perfect an Emperour, to all Intents and Purposes, as ever en∣joyed that August Title, since Char∣lemaigne. Which, sure, is an Ar∣gument most demonstrable, that Empire is not founded according to
our Authors erroneous Aphorism, in the Possession of Lands.
The wise Queen Eliz. understood this Truth well enough, when she us'd to say, That she car'd not to rule in her Subjects Purses, but in their Hearts. And the truly poli∣tick Church of Rome knew most assuredly, that they should raise their temporal Empire to the ut∣most height that their Ambition could suggest, not when they inva∣ded some few Territories, belong∣ing to some of their neighbour Counts and Princes, but when they could fix their Empire in Mens Minds, perswading them that they had a Right of Power over their Souls and Bodies, the Lands fol∣lowed then of Course; and you find them presently deposing Em∣perours, and disposing of King∣doms, and other temporal Possessi∣ons, with no less Freedom than they did their spiritual Benefices.
And, to comply with our Au∣thor's Country Comparison of a
Carter and his Teem, let him com∣mand his Waggon, or his Cart, with all the Rhetorick and Artifice he can, see whether all his Endea∣vours would not prove ineffectual to obtain the least Motion; and whether himself would not look ri∣diculous. Besides, could the Cart obey, and drag the Teem after it; where could we see a more irregu∣lar and preposterous Sight?
But by governing well and com∣manding his Horses, the Cart will certainly follow with ease, and both arrive safely and happily at their Journeys end.
Whence it is easie to infer, That Empire is always founded upon Li∣ving Bodies, and not upon Lands or Things insensible.
Pray, give me leave to ask you, Whether you think this A∣phorism of our Authors false in it self, or by him ill understood?
Sir, I am not oblig'd to defend another Man's Proposition. It is sufficient for me, if I prove that
it is false, according to his own In∣terpretation.
But however, that I may give you all the Satisfaction which you can reasonably desire, I will so far comply with you, as to tell you, That Empire may be well enough said to be founded in Property, but by no means when he constrains Property to signifie the Possession of Lands.
Dear Cousin, I must entreat you, that you will give me your own Interpretation, especially since the true understanding where Em∣pire ought to be fix'd, will be a ••arther Light to me.
Sir, If you can have Pati∣ence, I shall endeavour to satisfie you, as briefly as the Subject will permit. And first, I must again re∣mind you, that the formal part of all Empire is Power, or a Sovereign Right of Government; whether re∣siding in one or more is not mate∣rial▪
Power thus fix'd in some Person, hath for his Objects, first, the Per∣sons to be govern'd; secondly, the Territory containing them.
The first is sometimes alone suffi∣cient to create an Empire; the se∣cond may be divided or chang'd, the Empire remaining still entire. Imperium, says Grotius,* 1.4 duas solet habere materias sibi subjacentes; Prima∣riam personas, quoe materia sola in∣terdum sufficit: Secundariam locum, qui territorium dicitur.
This second Matter Grotius calls Dominium, as it is distinguish'd from Imperium. Ideóque, saith he, Domi∣nium non in cives tantum, sed & in extraneos transit, manente penes quem suit imperio.
These rightly understood, it will be no difficult Matter to affirm, That Empire is founded in a Sovereign Right of Command, or Government, or Power over Persons and Men; which that we may bring under the Term of Property, we will say,
That Empire consists in holding this Government or Power, as Grotius ex∣presses it, In pleno Jure proprieta∣tis, or, In patrimonio imperantis, that is properly, or in Property, or in chief, or how else you please to render these Words in English. Which Grotius, in the same Chap∣ter, explains, by a Jus regendi, non aliunde pendens. A Right of Go∣vernment not depending upon any other humane Authority whatsoe∣ver.
But, Sir, since you have founded Empire upon a Supreme Right of Government or Power o∣ver Men, how comes it to pass that we find a Right of Power, and Priviledges, and Government too, so founded in the Possession of seve∣ral Lands, that the Possession of those Lands alone gives a Man several Rights and Prerogatives.
For example, amongst us 'tis said, That whosoever hath the Right and Possession of the Barony of Burgaveny, besides some others,
becomes thereby a Baron of England, and enjoys those Priviledges which belong to it.
In France I have heard say, That nothing is more common than for Men to receive their Titles according to their Lands, whether Count, Ba∣ron, Marquess, and so forth.
Is it not plain then, That the Right of Command or Power, which is Empire, may be founded upon Property, according to our Author's Interpretation, that is, the Possession of Lands?
I agree to what you have urg'd; that is to say, That several Priviledges, and Right of Power, are annexed to several Lordships or Ter∣res Nobles, that they have thereby haute & basse Justice; and their Ju∣risdiction extends to Life and Death. Nay more, in several parts of Italy, and particularly in Lom∣bardy, there are several Imperial Feuds, which Grotius seems to call Regna Feudalia, which have almost
as great Prerogatives as some other Kingdoms have. They make Laws, raise Taxes, and mint Money, as other greater Kingdoms do. And yet all this makes little for our Author's Apho∣rism, as by him interpreted.
The Reason, if you please.
Because all those little Lord∣ships, or Principalities, whether they were instituted at first by the Goths and Vandals, or Lombards, or grant∣ed afterwards by several later Em∣perours and Kings, or both, as is most probable, yet they did, and still do, at this day, depend upon a Superiour Power, and pay Homage and Fealty for those Priviledges which they enjoy; which is much different from Empire, or a Sove∣reign Right of Power. And yet, even in this Case, this subordinate Power is so far from being founded upon the Possession of all the Land belonging to the Feud, which is our Author's Proposition, that very
often their Liberties depend only upon the old Walls of a ruinated Ca∣stie, and a very inconsiderable Num∣ber of Acres, which represent the whole Feud, or Mannor, the rest of the Land having been sold away, and become the Property of others, some small Rent only, or Acknow∣ledgment, being reserv'd. And af∣ter this manner, the Supreme Pow∣er may as well tye Priviledges to a Post, and grant the Possessor of that Post such Royalties as the Proprietor of such a Castle or Land. Which is very far from proving, that the Possession of Lands doth thereby ori∣ginally create a Sovereign Right of Power.
Cousin, I have heard, and read too, I think, that the Sea hath formerly eaten up a considerable part of your ancient Patrimony, and from thence, it may be, you are no Friend to Lands. But, for my part, I will stand up for Land as long as I can; and must therefore ask you,
Why those Rents or Acknowledg∣ments were reserv'd, if not to testi∣fie, that they came originally from the Lord, and that thereby he still keeps up a kind of Sovereign Right to the Lands themselves; knowing well enough, that his Power, accor∣ding to our Author, is founded upon them.
This yet signifies nothing: for although the Reservation of these Rents or Services do preserve the Memory of the Benefactor, and con∣tinue the Respect due from the Te∣nant, yet this is personal only, and hath no Relation to the publick Right of Power or Government.
For, when this Rent was not re∣serv'd, yet whosoever lives within the Jurisdiction of such a Fewd or Mannor, is always subject to him, who enjoys the Lordship.
So in England, Services and Quit-Rents have been generally receiv'd and paid, untill the late King, and his present Majesty, were pleas'd to dispose of them.
But to believe that this hath les∣sened his Sovereign Right of Govern∣ment, is a Fancy that sure cannot enter into the Head of any sober Man. But let us put a plain Case.
Suppose the Kingdom of England were at any time obtain'd by abso∣lute Conquest, as I conceive it was more than once, and that such Conquest gives the Conquerour a So∣vereign Right, not only to our real and personal Estates, which we find to have been wholly in the hands of some of our Kings, but also over our Liberties and Lives, as may be fully seen in Grotius, de Jur. B. & P.
Now, Sir, supposing a People in this Condition, and having nothing of their own, submit themselves, and all they have, to the Mercy of the Conquerour, as the Carthagi∣nians did to the Romans, you will grant, I imagine, that this Conque∣rour is an Emperour to all Intents, having an absolute Right of Power over the People and their Land also.
Yes certainly, as long as he keeps himself and People in that Condition there cannot want any thing to make him an absolute Mo∣narch.
But we will farther suppose, That our Conquerour (being of a more noble, and more humane Temper, than, it may be, our Au∣thor would have been) orders dili∣gent Inquisition to be made into the Value of his conquer'd Lands. Which being done, and enter'd into a Re∣gister, such as we call Doomsday Book, the Conquerour divides most of these Lands between the Conque∣rours and the Conquered; some he returns to their former Own∣ers, upon certain Conditions or Ser∣vices; others he changeth. To his Noblemen and Favourites he grants great Titles and Priviledges, to the Gentry less, and to the vulgar or common sort, some small Possessions, which with a little Labour and Di∣ligence, will enable them to live ea∣sily
and peaceably the rest of their days.
All these become an Inheritance to themselves and their Heirs, ac∣cording to their several Tenures, (which the Conquerours have gene∣rally created) and which we call Property. These, Sir, being thus established, and the Lands of the Kingdom setled after this manner, the Conquerour or King himself reserves, it may be, a small part, which we call Crown Lands; and in Consideration of his Right of Con∣quest, and those Benefits which he hath bestowed upon his People, in granting them their Liberties, Lives, and Lands, he continueth to himself the Power of making and abolishing Laws, according as he shall think most fit, and proper for the Peace, Ho∣nour, and Safety of his Government. He creates Magistrates for the due Execution of these Laws; who, in his stead, and by his Authority, have a Power to judge between his Sub∣jects, and in some Cases between his
Subjects and himself, or his Attor∣ney.
Besides these, he retains the sole Power of making Peace and War, of disposing of the Treasury, whether it be his own particular Revenue, or such as may be granted for the De∣fence and Security of the Kingdom, and such other Prerogatives as So∣vereign Princes generally pretend to.
And after all, he obligeth all his Subjects, generally and in particu∣lar, to pay him Homage and Fealty for the Land and Priviledges which they hold or have receiv'd from him, and to bind themselves and their Heirs for ever to become true and faithful Subjects unto him their Liege Lord, his Heirs and Successors for ever; as may be seen at large in the Form of our general Oath of Al∣legiance: and this under no less Pe∣nalty than the loss of our Lives, Honour, and Estates, whatever they be.
Now, Cousin, after the Dispositi∣on of the Lands, as hath been here suppos'd, and this Establishment of the Government, according to the good Will and Pleasure of him who is Master of all, and the Consent and Confirmation of the People, who have receiv'd those Lands and Pri∣viledges, can you believe that our Conquerour is less an Emperour than he was, when he kept all the Lands in his own Hands, and undi∣stributed?
Methinks, in good Reason, in Justice, and in Gratitude, he should lose nothing of the Power which he hath reserv'd, by reason of the Graces and Priviledges which he hath granted.
No sure, Sir, he rather ac∣quires another Right, and becomes doubly their Soveraign, that is to say, both King and Father of his Country; for since Government is agreed even by our Author, to
have been instituted for the Good of Man, certainly, that Governour who doth the greatest Good, is by con∣sequence the greatest Emperour. So Josephus (in the Speech which Ju∣dah makes in the Behalf of his Bro∣ther Benjamin, to his unknown Brother Joseph, chief Minister of the Egyptian Kingdom) observes, That Power was given Men to do Good. And by how much we ex∣tend our Bounty, by so much we enlarge our Empire, Ad servandos homines potentiam datam existimare, & quô pluribus salutem dederis, hôc te ipsum illustriorem fore.
Cousin, all this is very fine, and seems indeed most reasonable and most just. But I perceive we are not yet come to a right Under∣standing of the Case.
For, if a Prince or Sovereign Mo∣narch shall, out of a Principle of Goodness, or what you please, en∣trust Part of his Power in the hands of the People, let the Conditions be
what they will, when they are once possessed of that Power, most likely they will think it reasonable, to share the Government also; or, to use our Author's Expression, p. 45. if the People have the greatest In∣terest in the Property, they will, and must, have it in the Empire. So if a Master of a Family shall think fit to arm his Servants, to the Intent only, and upon the ex∣press Condition, that they shall ne∣ver use them but in Defence of their Master and Family, and that only according to his own Commands; yet, nevertheless, if in process of Time the Servants shall believe that the Master doth not govern his Family for their mutual Advantage and Security, it is ten to one, but that having the Power in their Hands, they will pretend to govern the Family as well as the Master: nay, and if the Master prove too ob∣stinate, turn even himself out of the Government and Family too.
Very well. I did indeed expect, that at last we should come to Club Law, and that your convin∣cing Arguments would end in the invincible Force of Powder, Ball, and Musket.
Pardon me, Sir, I do not speak this of your self; for I know, that according to our Agreement, and for the Support of our Discourse, you only personate our Author, whose Words are, They will and must have it in the Empire.
Now, though will and must are not proper Terms amongst civiliz'd and reasonable Men, yet neverthe∣less, since we know that Deformity in some Countries, and when in Vogue, passeth for Beauty; and a Disease grown Epidemical assumes the Name of Health, according to that of Seneca, Recti locum tenet error, ubi fit publicus.
I shall endeavour to pull off the ugly Vizard, and unmask our igno∣rant State-Physician, and demonstrate first, That it is not reasonable, that
those who have the greatest Interest in the Property, or the Possession of the Lands, according to our Au∣thor's Interpretation, should have any Right of Power in the Govern∣ment, otherwise than what is subor∣dinate, and deriv'd from the Supream Magistrate.
Secondly, That by having this Interest in the Property, they have not thereby more Right, no nor more Power, than if they had it not.
Thirdly, That all Sovereign Prin∣ces have a Right of Power over the Lands themselves, notwithstanding the Property be divided amongst the People.
Fourthly, That most Kings who have had the Sovereign Power, have yet had many Companions and Sha∣rers in the Possession of the Land.
And lastly, I shall give an Answer to your Instance which you have produc'd concerning a Master and his Servant.
Dear Cousin, Excuse the Li∣berty I take, since you know, we at first granted it to each other. Besides, the deciding these main Points will be in a great measure ending the Trouble which I give you. And being confident that you will be able to make good what you have promis'd, I shall reap the Ad∣vantage of your Pains, and you the Honour and Satisfaction of con∣firming me, and it may be many others in an Opinion, which we were rather willing to believe than able to justifie.
Sir, not to lose Time, I shall begin with the first, That it is not reasonable, that those who have the greatest Interest in the Property, should have any Right of Power in the Government, except what is subor∣dinate and deriv'd from the supream Magistrate.
To prove this, we must make these two general Distinctions, which are, and ever were in all Governments
whatever: That is to say, between the Governour and the Governed, which must of necessity be two dif∣ferent Persons: for, as Plutarch ob∣serves in his Introduction to the Lives of Agis and Cleomenes, one Man cannot be Master and Servant, nor can he who commands be able at the same Time to obey. So Gro∣tius tells us, Quod cogens & coactum requirunt distinctas personas, neque sufficiunt distincti respectus. I never heard but that the People were al∣ways taken for the Governed. To moderate and regulate whose unruly Passions and inclinations, Govern∣ment it self has been hitherto conti∣nued in the World, and they are generally call'd the Body of the King∣dom. The Governour has been ever understood to be a single Person, or Counsel, or more, who are likewise properly call'd the Head. Both form the Body Politick. Right of Power is like the Soul, and is seat∣ed in the Head; whence dispersing itsvital Heat, through proper Arte∣ries
and Veins, it nourisheth and gives Motion to all the Body, and every part of it. The Body thereby is enabled to preserve the Head from Violence. The Head alone commands, and the Body performs. The Body cannot command, nor hath the Head any Action, nor can it possibly obey. The Head se∣parated from the Body destroys both.
Mark, that Right of Power, which is Empire, hath no other Object or Subject than the Body, and in its Exercise, is properly and solely founded thereupon. The Body part∣ed from the Head, is no more a Body, but a Carcass. And the Peo∣ple, without a Supreme Governour, is no more a People, but a confus'd deform'd, and unactive Multitude. Mark, that the People have no Life, nor Power, nor Motion, but what they receive from the Head. This is the constant Doctrine of the most Learned Authors who have ever treated of Government.
Sir, I have often heard this Comparison made: but, if you al∣low that a Head may be compos'd of several Members, as you seem to suppose, when you say, a Council, or more, we shall then easily agree. For all we desire is, That a Head may be chosen or made up out of the rest of the Members.
Necessity sometimes, and Violence, have compos'd such a monstrous Head, over which also they have been forc'd to raise ano∣ther Phantasm; such as the State∣holders in Holland, the Doge of Ve∣nice, or Duke of Genoua. So I have observ'd in many places, and parti∣cularly in the Prince's Gallery at Monaco, two famous Heads, which were so artificially contriv'd, that at first Sight, or at a Distance, they have represented a humane Shape. But upon a stricter Examination, we have found them patch'd together of se∣veral sorts of Fishes, Fowls, Beasts, or Insects.
Now, besides that all unnatural and monstrous Productions have been observ'd by Naturalists, to be generally of short Continuance, so they do not at all destroy my Pro∣position, which is, That there must be a perfect Distinction between the Governour and the Governed: and that howsoever the Head be com∣pos'd, whether of one Monarch, or thirty Tyrants, as in Athens, or of five Hundred, yet there the sole and total Right of Arbitrary Power, doth and must reside.
I cannot approve of Arbi∣trary Power; and I should think, that in this Case there can be no Danger of it: for, the Body having by much the greater Force and Strength, may not only refuse to obey what they do not approve of, but if the Head should impose too obstinately, by virtue of their Strength, they may resist, and easily reduce their Head to their own terms; nay, even to obey the Body.
They may so, Sir, and ever might since the Beginning of Bodies, and ever may whilst Bodies continue in the World; no matter whether they be fat or lean. But the Con∣sequence also ever was, and ever will be, Confusion, Dissolution, and the Destruction of both.
This puts me in mind of a Fable which Plutarch relates in the Life of Agis, King of Sparta; which if our Author would have impartially consider'd, it might have stop'd the furious Current of his Popular Pen. The Story is this:
The Serpent's Tail, who had been ever us'd to follow its imperi∣ous Head, grew weary, at length, of this servile Complaisance, disputes the Precedency; and having brought the Body into its pernicious Faction, the triumphant Tail begins to take the place, and marches first. But being no ways qualified for that Government which it had usurp'd, it train'd the Head through Thorns and Briars, through Waters, and
down Precipices; till having totally blinded and disabled the Head, and the Tail no ways able to support its Life, both became a Prey, and were swallow'd up by a Vultur, who had watch'd the fatal Consequence of this unnatural and irregular Mo∣tion.
You see here the Effect of Force against a Right of Power; which, since it comes in my way, it is most necessary we should distinguish: for Power, by Abuse, is become, I per∣ceive, another of our Authors equi∣vocal Words.
All Power came originally from God Almighty; for, There is no Power but of God, the Powers that be are ordained of God, Rom. 13. 1. which must be always understood a Right of Power; for God doth nei∣ther Violence nor Wrong. Namque odit ipse vim Deus. And if some∣times we have seen Violence and Force prevail against Power, which is a just Authority, it is only a mark of Permission in the Divine Provi∣dence,
as a Punishment for Sin, not of Approbation. Narratur in testi∣monium divinae Providentioe id per∣mittentis, non in facti humani appro∣bationem. These are the Words of Grotius.
The Body Politick is compos'd of Men, that is to say, Dust and Clay, without Form or Action, untill God breath'd into his Nostrils the Breath of Power, and it became a living Soul.
Power then is a Ray of the Divi∣nity it self. And notwithstanding the insolent Mockery of our Atheisti∣cal, conceited Author, where there is a Sovereign Right of Power there is Jus •…•…um.
So when God, at the Request of Moses who was unable to govern so great a People without subordi∣nate Officers, instituted the Court of the Sanhedrim. God took of the Spirit that was upon Moses, and gave it to the seventy Elders, which was this Right of Power, and they began to prophesie; a constant mark
of this Right of Power, which they deriv'd from Moses, and was subor∣dinate as generally the Constitutum is to the Constituens.
So when Saul was anointed King as a Mark of his undoubted Right of Power, he prophesied amongst the Prophets. So again, when Mo∣ses growing old, desir'd that God would set a Man over the Congrega∣tion, that they might not be as Sheep without a Shepherd, the Lord said unto Moses, Take Joshuah the Son of Nun, and lay thy Hands upon him, and thou shalt put some of thine Honour upon him, that all the Con∣gregation of the Children of Israel may be obedient.
What should all the Congregation of the Children of Israel be obedient to, but to the Commands of Joshu∣ah, who had received this Right of Command, which is Power and Go∣vernment, immediately from the Hands of Moses.
Power then is the Soul of Go∣vernment, receiv'd from God him∣self.
It is a Spirit which gives Life to the Body, but not the Body it self.
Power is like that nourishing Heat and Light of the Sun, which we are sensible of by its Effects, that is, its Influence upon all sublunary Bodies, by its Attraction, Reverbe∣ration, or Transmission through pro∣per Vehicles. Not by contact of the Body.
Nay, we are assur'd, that the Aether, which is nearer the Sun, is dark.
Power shews it self by its Effects, that is, Government, which it pro∣duces by Transmission also of its In∣fluence through proper Vehicles, which are subordinate Officers, whom it animates and inspires.
Power is invisible, incomprehensi∣ble, eternal: Power never dyes, and in its original it is Omnipotency, which is God. And when God himself had invested Moses with this Power, he was pleas'd to tell him, That he should be unto his Brother Aaron in∣stead of a God.
Sir, I am much pleas'd with this Description which you have given of Power. And indeed, since Government is one of the greatest and most necessary Bles∣sings which Mankind enjoys, that Government cannot subsist with∣out Power, and that Power is ori∣ginally in God, who is the Foun∣tain of all Power, nothing seems more reasonable, than that we should deduce all humane Authority from that inexhaustible Source, and respect it accordingly.
I have only one Argument against what you have propos'd; which, however it may seem strange, yet I must beg leave to offer it to you. And it is this, That I have heard some Learned Men, both Ancient and Modern, seem to maintain, That although God may possibly be the universal Governour of the World, or governs the Universe in general, as the Sun, Moon, and Stars, and so forth, yet that he doth not, (as being beneath so
great a Majesty) inspect or mind the little particular Governments of our small Globe of Earth.
This is, indeed, the per∣nicious Doctrine of the Epicureans; which, with its Disciples, ought to be banish'd all good Governments, Qui ex bene moratis urbibus eje∣cti sunt, as Grotius tells us, cap. de poenis. Ita & coerceri posse ar∣bitror, nomine humanae Societatis, quam sine ratione probabili vio∣lant.
Gassendus, I confess, in his Trea∣tise de Vita & Moribus Epicuri, seems too much to favour this Opi∣nion. But Grotius, whose Judg∣ment I prefer before the Philosophy of both; and St. Paul, whom we Christians ought to respect before all three, tells us, Heb. 11. v. 6. That he who cometh to God, must be∣lieve that he is, and that he is a Rewarder of those who diligently search him. Grotius also, in the same Chapter, says farther, That
that Religion which in all Ages has been accounted true, is chiefly ground∣ed upon four Principles; the third of which he says is this, That God takes Care of humane Affairs, and determines them according to his most just Decrees, à Deo curari res hu∣manas & aequissimis Judiciis dijudi∣cari. And after he hath quoted, to the same purpose, Cicero, Epi∣ctetus, Lactantius, and others, he concludes, That Revera negare De∣um esse, aut negare à Deo curari actiones humanas, si moralem effectum respicimus, tantundem valet. That to deny there is a God, or to deny that he regulates humane Affairs, is in Effect the same thing. And parti∣cularly in the same Chapter, Sect. 44. he tells us farther, that Epi∣curus, when he took away the Provi∣dence of God, in the Government of the World, he left nothing of Ju∣stice, but the empty Name. That Ju∣stice is no farther necessary than pro∣fitable, and that we ought to abstain from hurting one another, out of no
other Consideration, than the Fear that those, whom we offend, should revenge themselves. Epicurus cum Divinam providentiam sustulisset, Justitiae quoque nihil reliquit nisi no∣men inane, &c. But these, and many other of the Epicurean Princi∣ples, are rather plausible than solid, witty than judicious, and striking the Senses, are rejected by a sober Ʋn∣derstanding.
Besides, Cousin, we Christians are obliged by a truer, and much more Divine, Philosophy; to which, we have all subserib'd, and which is become a publick Law and Rule amongst us: and with good Rea∣son, for nothing is more dangerous in all Governments, than to regu∣late Publick Actions according to Pri∣vate Opinions.
Publick Actions must have Publick Rules, and publick Obedience must have Publick Laws, under which we must acquiesce, untill they be alter'd by Publick Authority; other∣wise we may eternally wander after
the false Lights of foolish Men, who from their Extravagancies would be accounted witty.
Sir, I shall not dispute any farther, either your Reasons or your Authorities; both which I allow as most authentick: pray, therefore, proceed.
Having told you then, what Power is, I come now to Force; and as the first is the spiri∣tual part of Government, so the lat∣ter is the material part. Force is the Arm and Nerve, which being animated by lawful Authority, pro∣duces Power in the general Accep∣tation, which is properly, and in a good Sense, the Ʋnion of both. Force, without this Right, is, Vis injusta, or Violence. With it, it becomes the just Defence, which Nature hath given all Creatures, as well as Man, to preserve to themselves their Lives, Liberties, and Possessions. Without it, that is, when we invade the
Possessions of another, it becomes Robbery and Rapine, and is no more excusable in Alexander than the Pyrate. Tully de Officiis 3. and Grotius, who cites him, besides ma∣ny others, tell us the same Truths in plain Words, Ʋt quisque malit sibi, quod ad vitae usum pertineat, quam alteri acquiri, concessum est, non repugnante natura. Illud natura non patitur, ut aliorum spoliis no∣stras facultates, opes, copias augea∣mus. And Grotius adds this Con∣sequence, Non est ergo contra Socie∣tatis naturam, sibi prospicere atque consulere, dum jus alienum non tol∣latur. Ac proinde, nec vis, quae jus alterius non violat, injusta est. It is Right of Power therefore, which makes Force justifiable, both accor∣ding to the Laws of Nature, and the Laws of Man.
To conclude, Power or Authori∣ty, and Force, are generally so uni∣ted, that they oftentimes are mi∣staken, and pass for one another. But they are also sometimes separa∣ted,
as a Right may be from the Possession, and by this Instance we may easily distinguish them. A law∣ful Prince hath first Power and Au∣thority, to which Force is added. A Rebel first procures a Force, or Strength, and afterwards usurps a Power.
This is plain enough; and I have nothing to reply.
Having then made these necessary Distinctions, I affirm, That the People, (which is the Force and Strength of all Kingdoms) by how much their Strength is great, (whe∣ther in Land, or Personal Estate) by so much their Power, which is Authority, or Right of Govern∣ment, ought to be the less. And this not only because it is incon∣gruous and unnatural, that the Go∣verned should become their own Go∣vernours, or that the several destru∣ctive Appetites of the Members should train after them, the Reason
which ought to regulate all; but it is also very imprudent, and against all the Rules of true Polity and Government. For it hath been e∣ver the Rule and Endeavour of wise Men, so to ballance Power and Force, that neither may offend the other, but that by the harmonious Accord of just Commands, and faith∣ful Obedience, a State may become most happy, invincible, and eter∣nal.
Hence Power never ought to as∣sume an adventitious Force, such as Mercenary Souldiers, which have generally prov'd destructive both to Prince and People; nor the Peo∣ple usurp a Power, which belongs not to them; such as the Seditious Tribunes of Rome often pretended to, which lost them both that Power and Liberty which they had. Go∣vernment consists in Command and Obedience; whence Empire is defin'd by some to be certus ordo in jubendo & parendo. Command is the Effect of Power, Obedience the Result of
both, and Peace, Happiness, and Security, the end of all. The ge∣neral Interruption proceeds from want of due Obedience; the sole Consideration of their Force makes Men dare to disobey.
What then can be more irrational and absurd, than that the Gover∣nour should, by granting a Right of Power, countenance their Violence; and by giving a pretence to Dis∣obedience, make it more difficult, if not impossible, for himself to go∣vern. It is like uncurbing, or lay∣ing the Reins upon the Necks of headstrong Horses; which is against the Reason and Practice of all good Governments upon Earth.
Were the Beasts well tempered, it were yet more practicable; but by how much their Strength is dange∣rous, by so much a stricter Hand ought to be kept over them.
What wise Pilot would ever trust the Helm into the Hands of an inso∣lent Crew of Mariners? Or, What prudent Prince would submit his
Scepter to the Will of arrogant Sub∣jects, whose Wills they themselves declare to be, to govern equally, if not superiour to the King.
If our Author had meant a sub∣ordinate Power we would easily have agreed; and I think there are few People, under Heaven, who enjoy a larger Proportion of pro∣fitable and honourable Employ∣ments, than our English Subjects do. But, an independent Right of Power is destructive to the Prince as well as People, and would only serve the turn of a few pragma∣tical, ambitious, antiquated Politi∣cians.
But, Sir, if the People have the Force, as they have by enjoy∣ing so great a share in the Land, and shall think it reasonable to have the Government also, how will you help your self? This is the main Point, which you have not yet an∣swered.
Have a little Patience, for my Clock cannot strike Twelve all at once: and this is the second point, viz. That by having this Interest in the Property, as our Author calls it, they have not thereby a greater Pow∣er, or Force, or Strength, than if they had it not.
And first, you must admit, that the Possession of Lands, giving there∣by no Right of Power, as hath been sufficiently prov'd: If then the Peo∣ple by Force only, endeavour to pro∣cure to themselves this Right, it is a formal Rebellion; and what they shall obtain thereby is absolute Ʋsur∣pation.
But in the next place, by having the Possession of these Lands sup∣pos'd, they are not more enabled to usurp this Power than if they had them not: for, the Strength of all Governments being eternally in the Persons of the Governed, whether they be rich, or whether they be
poor, it must follow, that when they please to rebell, no Gover∣nour or Governours whatever under Heaven, can of themselves possibly reduce them: for the Number is even in the most popular Govern∣ment, ten thousand of the Govern∣ed to one that governs. And this is a natural, irresistible Inequality of Strength, which even in their natural, naked Estate, without other Arms than such as Nature hath given all Creatures, according to their dif∣ferent Kinds, puts them always in a Condition to destroy the Govern∣ment when they please.
You must not urge, that a great Number may probably preserve their Obedience, and follow the Party of the Governours. For it is already suppos'd in our Case, that the greater Number, having the Pos∣session of the Lands, must and will share the Government.
Might, indeed, if put in Executi∣on, will ever be too hard for Right, and May and Ought can never stand against the Torrent of Will and Must.
This needs no farther Demon∣stration: Ten Servants in a Family will easily turn their Master out of Doors, though they have not the Propriety of one foot of Land upon the Earth.
Examples we need not. Howe∣ver, since our Author hath fur∣nish'd us with one, as he hath done many others against himself, I shall mind you of it.
The Turk, he tells us, who is absolute Proprietor of all the Lands in his vast Empire, is not yet there∣by so secure, but that the Palace and Seraglio have often become the Sham∣bles of those Princes.
But, Sir, that, he tells you, has been done by his Janizaries,
which he calls a Mercenary Army, and not his natural Subjects. But could he introduce his Timariots in∣to the places of those Janizaries, this horrid Flaw, and Inconvenience in the Government, had been wholly avoided.
But why does he entertain these Janizaries, if not to preserve him from the Violence of his dis∣contented and numerous Subjects? And why dare the Janizaries act these horrid Murders, if not because they know themselves too strong? And what Security can he give, that his Spahis would not do the same thing if their Prince should endeavour to keep them in too se∣vere Subjection. Never, sure, did any sober Author maintain Proposi∣tions so irrational; nay, insomuch that their contrary is true. What People are more happy and quiet than those, who possessing a reasona∣ble Proportion of Lands, live in Plenty, and enjoy, in Security, the
Fruit of their own Labours? In this our Nation is blessed particularly, above all others: for, setting, aside Ambition, what do we want to make us happy? And what hinders our Happiness from being secure? who can offend us and remain un∣punish'd.
Our Cattel, our Houses, our Lands, are inviolable; our Persons as free as the Air, which is it self restrain'd within certain Bounds; and we (as all Men ought to be) within the Compass of just and rea∣sonable Laws. What People, who are at ease, would of themselves di∣sturb their own Happiness? And what oftner occasions Rebellion than the Pretence of Misery and Oppres∣sion?
What made the People of Athens, according to our Author, endeavour a Change in the Government, but their great Incumbrances and Debts to the Nobility?
What made the People of Rome mutiny against the Senate, but the want of their Lands? And what oc∣casion'd the Barons Wars in King John and Henry the Third's Time, but the Severity of their Tenures, and want of their Rights and Privi∣ledges, as they pretended?
What, indeed, begins all Wars on the Peoples side, but Oppression; and what establisheth Peace, but Ease and Plenty? Our Author's divine Machiavel is wholly of our Opinion, and tells us amongst other things, That if a Prince will preserve to his Subjects their Possessions, their Pri∣viledges, and their Women, he runs no manner of Danger, but such as may proceed from the Ambition of a few, which yet he assures us we may easily, and by many ways, prevent. In odium omnium maximè adducunt bonorum direptio, & suarum raptus mulierum. Quotiescunque bonis par∣citur multitudinis & honori, praeclarè secum agi ducunt homines. Id dun∣taxat
fit reliquum oppugnandum, am∣bitio nimirum paucorum, quoe multis modis, nulloque negotio reprimi po∣test. Prin. cap. 19.
Sir, I can very hardly grant you this Point, it being one of our strongest Holds, which we must de∣fend to the last Drop of Blood. I must tell you therefore, that though the greatest Number, such as I must own is ever compos'd of the People, be always capable of usurping the Government, over the Governour, who is indeed no more than a single Man against a whole Nation in point of Strength; yet whilst the Tenures are preserv'd, such as were formerly in England, the Prince had a strict∣er Tye upon the People, than when having relinquish'd them, he hath no other Obligation upon them than his Parchment Right of Power, and, if you please, their Oaths of Allegi∣ance; both which are cancell'd in a Moment, while the Lands remain eternally in the People.
I have already told you, That publick Right of Government, or if you will, the Right of publick Government, doth not in the least depend upon Tenures: for they are only particular Services and Royal∣ties, which Princes have sometimes thought good to reserve to them∣selves, more or less, according as they alone have thought fit, and may be alter'd or relinquish'd, with∣out diminishing their Publick Right of Government over the Nation, they being such as regard rather the pri∣vate Person of the King, as Lord of a Mannor, than his Politick Capaci∣ty, as Supreme Magistrate, or Go∣vernour of the State. And indeed, many of these Services and Tenures were rather very inconvenient and burthensome to the People than be∣neficial to the Government.
Many such were anciently known in England and Scotland, as well as France. Amongst others, what was more inhumane, than that the Lord should have a Right to lye with his
Tenants Wife the first Night they married: which in France they call Droit de Jambage. Some Services were very ridiculous, and some ex∣travagant. So I have heard of a Te∣nure in France, by which the Te∣nant is oblig'd, at certain Times, to drive a Cart with twelve Oxen round the Court of the Mannor House. In which time, if any of the Oxen hap∣pen to dung in the Court, the Cart, with the twelve Oxen, was forfeited to the Lord of the Mannor: but if none of the Oxen should dung, un∣till they were driven out of the Court, then the Lord was to receive only one Egg. Now how do these and many other such Services, re∣late to a Right of Government? So many Mannors were held of the King, to accompany him in his Wars in England, or in France, or else∣where; some were obliged to carry his Spear, some his Sword, others his Helmet, and such like, which are all merely private Obligations, and which any private Man might
reserve, upon consideration of Lands given.
It is true, the King had then a stronger Tye upon particular Persons, than since he hath released them. But this, I say, hath no influence upon his Publick Right of Power; for the Supreme Magistrate is always (not∣withstanding any such Release) Ma∣ster both of our Estates and Persons, as far as they are necessary, for the Pre∣servation of the Government.
So you see Care is taken that all Lands shall pay their Quotas towards Horses and Footmen, which is in use at this day; which Forces so paid, we call the Militia. His Majesty may press Souldiers, and by the Consent of his great Council, the Parliament, charge our Estates and Persons with such Sums as shall be thought expe∣dient for the Occasion. And this brings me to the third Point, which is, That all Sovereign Princes have a Right of Power over the Lands, not∣withstanding the Property be divided amongst the People. And this pro∣ceeds
from the Dominium Superemi∣nens, which is eternally in all Supreme Magistrates or Magistrate whatsoe∣ver; whose Duty it is to look after, and by all means secure, the Preser∣vation of the Whole, in which every particular is involv'd. Nor is it a suf∣ficient Objection, to say, That Laws or Impositions may lye very heavy upon particular Men, if such an Ar∣bitrary Power should rest in any Go∣vernment: for Laws cannot be al∣ways made so easie, but that Occasi∣ons may happen, which may make them seem very hard to some, Id modò quoeritur, si majori parti, & in summo prosint.
Hence Grotius, from Thucydides, remarks an excellent Passage of Peri∣cles to this purpose: Sic existimo, saith he, etiam singulis hominibus plus eam prodesse civitatem, quoe tota rectè se habeat, quam si privatis floreat uti∣litatibus, ipsa autem universim laboret. Qui enim domesticas fortunas bene col∣locatas habet, patria tamen eversa, pe∣reat & ipse necesse est, &c. All which,
Livy thus briefly expresses; Respub∣lica incolumis, & privatas res salvas facile proestat. Publica prodendo, tua nequicquam serves. That whilst the Commonwealth is safe in general, our particular Concerns may be also easily secur'd. But by deserting the publick Interest of the Nation, we do thereby no ways preserve our own. Nothing, therefore, seems more reasonable, and indeed necessary, than that the Government should have always a Power, to compell every particular Subject, who standing upon their pri∣vate Rights and Properties, would thereby suffer the Whole to be de∣stroy'd.
For, though naturally every Man hath a Right to maintain what is his own, and by consequence might op∣pose whosoever would endeavour to take his Property from him; yet Grotius tells us, That Government, which is instituted for the publick Tranquillity of the Whole, or, Tran∣quillitas publica in qua & singulorum continetur, acquires thereby a more
Sovereign Right, even ••ver our Per∣sons as well as Possessions, than we our selves can pretend to; that is, as far as shall be necessary for obtain∣ing that great end of publick Preser∣vation. Civili societate ad tuendam Tranquillitatem instituta, statim ci∣vitati jus quoddam majus, in nos & nostra nascitur, quatenus ad finem illum id necessarium est. Whence Seneca observes, That the Power of all is ever in the Supreme Magistrate, but the Property remains, neverthe∣less, in the Hands of particular Sub∣jects. Ad Reges Potestas omnium pertinet, ad singulos Proprietas. And so, as hath been said, the King in Parliament hath a Right to dispose of our Estates and Persons as shall be thought necessary for our publick Security. And where Sovereign Princes act without Parliaments, they have in themselves the same Authority.
I have spoke already of the Pow∣er which the Government hath o∣ver
our Estates; and for our Per∣sons, Grotius hath furnish'd us with a Case, very strong to shew the great Extent of Sovereign Authority. He puts a Question, Whether an inno∣cent Citizen may be abandoned, ad Exitium, even to Destruction, for the Common Good. Without doubt, says he, such an innocent Citizen may be so abandon'd. Dubium non est quin deseri potest. And going still on, how far such a Citizen is oblig'd to deliver himself, he con∣cludes, That he may be forc'd to it, and sacrific'd too, to prevent an immi∣nent Mischief, both against his Will, and entirely innocent. Quare & in nostra controversia, verius videtur cogi posse civem; for, saith he, Though one Citizen cannot compell another to any thing more than what is strictly just according to Law, yet the Superiour hath a lawful Autho∣rity, as Superiour, to force an inno∣cent Man to suffer for the Common Good. Par parem cogere non potest, nisi ad id quod jure debetur strictè
dicto. At superior cogere potest, etiam ad illa, quae quaelibet virtus praecipit quia in jure proprio Supe∣rioris, quâ superior est, hoc est com∣prehensum.
We find, even in the Common∣wealth of Holland, so much envied and applauded by Men, who are given to change, that in the late Wars with England and France, they ta∣xed Mens Purses with such heavy Contributions, that they were almost as much dissatisfied with their Go∣vernours at home, as afraid of their Enemies abroad: and all this was done much against the Wills of al∣most every particular Subject. Nay more, I have heard say, That their Fond, or Principal, (the greatest part of their Estates, for want of Land, consisting in Money) is so involv'd in the great Bank, that they can never retrieve their Prin∣cipal again. But their Estates being wholly at the Dispose of the Govern∣ment, when that falls, they perish.
I confess, I do not know of any Christian Kingdom where a more ar∣bitrary power is exercis'd. But it is, it seems, necessary for their affairs, that it should be so. Yet neverthe∣less it is no rule for our imitation, their circumstances being extremely diffe∣rent from ours.
I perceive you will not be perswaded, to let us enjoy our pro∣perties, and our share in the govern∣ment together, notwithstanding our author assures us, that we will and must have it. But pray, Sir, setting aside your reasons, why you have ta∣ken from us our shares, (which in∣deed at present, (I know not how to confute) let me prevail with you to be rul'd, in this matter, by examples of other great Kingdoms. And you know, Plato Redivivus tells us for cer∣tain, that those Kings who had no com∣panions in the Soveraign power, had no sharers likewise in the Dominion or pos∣session of the land. But if the Senate or people, or both did share the land, they shar'd also in the Administration of the Soveraignty. And pray why should
we, (who enjoy no small possessions) be excluded?
Cousin, under-favour, your Plato redivivus is a most impudent Ghost. For provided it serves his turn, he makes no Conscience of advancing downright falshood for undeniable matter of fact, which will appear more fully hereafter. We will begin with the Scythians, who contending with the Egyptians for antiquity, have been thought the first people, which inhabited the earth after the sloud. The people were not known in History before their Kings, whose power also was arbitrary. So sure it is, that the first known Governments upon earth were Monarchical. Principio, rerum, gentium, nationumque Imperium penes Reges erat, says Justin. And imme∣diately after, Populus nullis legibus te∣nebatur, arbitria Principum pro legibus erant. And yet we find the ground so common to all, that every man was as much Proprietor as the King him∣self. Hominibus inter se nulli sines, ne{que} enim agrum exercent, nec domus illis ulla, armenta & pecora semper pascentibus, &
per incultas solitudines errare solitis. Eve∣ry man had a propriety to as much ground as was necessary for himself and his cattle, which also he chose, as he thought most convenient. Yet so far were the people from pretending any share in the Government, that no Kings were more absolute than the Scythians, nor did any enjoy their Government longer. And if we follow them into the upper Asia, which they totally conquer'd, we do not find their Kings pretending to one foot of the land.
What good then did their conquest do them, if they did not enjoy the possessions of the conquered?
They made the same use of it, as all Conquerors generally have done, that is to say, leaving the lands to their proper owners, they only ex∣acted a Tribute, which was gathered amongst themselves. Yet neverthe∣less, contrary to our Author's Propo∣sition, they always retain'd the Empire, or Government over them, and that for no less time than 1500 years. Asi∣am perdomitam vectigalem fecere, mo∣dico tributo magis in titulum imperii,
quam victoriae praemium imposito. His igitur Asia, per mille quingentos annos vectigalis fuit. Pendendi tributi finem, Ninus Rex Assyriorum imposuit. Ninus then was the first, who freed the Assy∣rians from their Tribute, and the Scy∣thian Empire. Nor do we read, that he enslaved them more under his own. But leaving them their possessions entire, yet preserving always the Supreme right of Government, required only such Contributions, as himself thought necessary.
After the Assyrian Empire, that of the Medes began. But no alteration can I find in the Property of the lands. On the contrary we read, that the Persians became only Tributary to the Medes. Sed civitates, quae Medorum tributariae fuerant, mutato imperio, con∣ditionem suam mutatam arbitrantes, à Cyro defecerunt. That Those Persian Cities, which were tributary to the Medes, under Astyages, revolted from Cyrus. But to leave no dispute in the case, Xenophon in his Cyri Inst. l. 4. tells us in plain words, that Cyrus bid the Assyri∣ans be of good heart, that their condi∣tion
should be no ways altered, but in the change of their King. That they should enjoy their houses and their lands as for∣merly they did, and have the same right over their wives and children. Cyrus victos Assyrios jubebat bono esse animo, eandem ipsorum sortem fore, quae fuerat, mutato tantum Rege. Mansuras ipsis domos, agros, jus in uxores in liberos, ut fuisset hactenus.
This, I think, shews most clearly, that the people enjoy'd the Property in their lands, not only under the Medes but the Persians also. And yet they were so far from sharing any part of the Government, that all men agree, no Princes to have been more absolute than the Medes and Persians.
Now if this be true, as sure it is, for Xenophon was a very good Judge, who wrote particularly the History of Cyrus, what an ignorant, or what an im∣pudent Author is Plato Redivivus, who boldly affirms, p. 52. that Cyrus by name, and other conquering Monarchs before him, took all for themselves.
From Asia, let us travel into Egypt, and by the way we will take notice
of the Government of Sodom and Gomorrha, and those five Kingdoms which we read in Scripture, to have been subject to Senacherib King of As∣syria for twelve years. But we do not find, that either before or after their defection, the King of Assyria had any right to their lands, but only a tribute, which they at length refus'd to pay.
With the History of the Bible Jose∣phus agrees, who tells us, chap. 10. Eo∣dem tempore, cum Imperium Asiae penes Assyrios esset, Sodomitarum res, tam opibus, quam numerosa juventute flore∣bat, ut a quinque Regibus administra∣rentur, donec victi ab Assyriis, Tribu∣tum eis solvebant.
The Egyptian Kings, notwithstand∣ing the conceit of our Author, and it may be of some other his Antimonar∣chical Accomplices, were as absolute as any Kings of the East. Egyptiorum Reges, saith Grotius, ut alios Reges Orientis summo imperio usos, non est du∣bium.
From the first Egyptian King to Chencres Pharaoh, who was over∣whelm'd
in the Red Sea (for Pharaoh like Augustus is only a title of honour) Authors have reckoned a Succession of Ten Kings, a time long enough to have establish'd a firm Government. And yet we see in the days of Joseph's Admini∣stration, his Subjects had an undoubted property in their lands, which at last they sold, with their freedom also, to purchase bread. Quibus agri fuere, saith Josephus, partem aliquam in prae∣tium alimentorum, Regi decidebant—And again, Non solum corpora sed animos gentis in servitutem redegit necessi∣tas. Which servitude we must interpret slavery, and was now distinguish'd from subjection: for there is no question, but that Subjects in those days, were free both in their persons and estates, which they enjoy'd in property, and only liable to such Impositions and Ser∣vices, as concern'd the publick happi∣ness and security of the Government.
We can by no means agree with our Author, that the Egyptian Kings held a kind of precarious Kingdom, such as the Heraclides in Sparta. But being absolute, according to Grotius,
or summa potestate praediti, were not yet so barbarous, as to appropriate to themselves, all the possessions belonging to their Territories, or otherwise en∣slave their Subjects, than according as misfortunes or necessity forc'd them to sell their Liberty. Yet even in this case we find, that Pharaoh return'd the Lands to most of them, upon pay∣ment of the Sixth part only of the usu∣frute which he retein'd, as Josephus tells us, Jure Dominii, which conditions they most gladly accepted, Laeti insperata restitutione agrorum. And to conclude, let me inform you (from good Autho∣rities) that the Egyptian Kings were so far from retaining or reserving all the lands to themselves, that after the general division of their Territories, their Lands were distributed into Three Equal parts; One part was appropri∣ated to the Kings use, and was De∣mesne or Crown-lands; the Second part was assign'd to their Priests, for their Subsistence, and the support of the ne∣cessary charges of their Sacrifices, and other Offices belonging to the Worship and Service of their Gods. And the
Third part was allotted to their Cala∣siri or Milites, which were those who professed arms for the defence of their Country.
In the next place, The Romans who held the Soveraign Empire of so great a part of the world, had it so little in their thoughts to make themselves Proprietors of all the land belonging to their Empire, that as well in their first as latter Monarchy, they seldom took away more from the Conquered, than was almost necessary for preserving their Dominion over them, by the maintaining of Garrisons, or planting such Colonies, and Praeda militaria a∣mongst them, as might, at their own expence, and charges, preserve their fidelity to the Romans, and secure the publick peace: Hence Petilius Cerealis reproaching the French (after his vi∣ctory over them) for their folly, and defection from the Roman protection, he tells them, That although the Romans had been often provoked, yet they added nothing more to what they might claim from their right of Conquest, than such conditions as might secure their pub∣lick
peace. For (saith he) there can be no peace without arms, nor can armies be maintain'd without pay, nor can pay be procured but by Tribute and Taxes. Nos quanquam toties lacessiti, Jure victoriae id solum vobis addidimus, quo pacem tueremur, nam neque quies gentium sine armis—Tac. Hist. 4. Salluste tells us, That the ancient Pious Romans took nothing from the Conquered but the liberty of doing injury or wrong: Majo∣res nostri religiosissimi mortales nihil victis eripiebant, praeter injuriae licnti∣am. And that they encreasd their Em∣pire by their goodness and mercy. Igno∣scendo auxisse Pop. Rom. magnitudinem.
Certain it is, that Romulus and some others of those first Roman Monarchs, us'd their victories with so much mo∣deration, that the Conquered were scarce sensible, or sorry they were overcome; whence Claudius (blaming, in his Speech to the Senate, the seve∣rity of the Athenians and Lacedemoni∣ans) At conditor noster Romulus, (saith he) tantum sapientia* 1.5 valuit, ut plerosque populos eodem die hostes, dein Cives habuerit:
But our Founder Romulus was so pru∣dent a Prince, that he caus'd many to be∣come Citizens of Rome, who the same day had been the Roman enemies. And Grotius takes notice particularly out of Appian, that the Romans when they subdued Italy, took but a part even of those Italian lands* 1.6 from the Conquered. Romani cum Italiam armis subegissent, victos parte agri mulctarent: and again, etiam victis hostibus, terram non omnem ad∣imebant, sed partiebantur. And this hath been done (as is already observ'd) for their support and security. And it hath been universally a Custom a∣mongst all Nations, that (howsoever the Conquerors might differ concern∣ing the Persons or Personal estate of those whom they overcame or what might fall to them nomine praedae) they generally left the Lands in the possessi∣on of their ancient Proprietors and In∣habitants of the Country (except some∣times in the case of Colonies) upon the payment only of certain Tributes or Taxes. Very many examples oc∣cur in all Histories, I shall only there∣fore
take notice of what Tacitus ob∣serves of our ancient Britains, They paid (saith he) their Tribute readily enough, and performed such other Duties as were commanded them, provided they had no affronts or injuries put upon them, for those they could not bear; being brought only to obey, but not to serve. Ipsi Britanni dilectum ac Tributa, &c. in vita Agrip.
These then were the Customs of the Romans, and Greeks too, concerning Lands between themselves and the Conquered; let us now see how they dispos'd of their Lands between them∣selves and their Natural Subjects, and we find that Romulus made the first general distribution of his Free men into Tribes, and that Those again he distinguished into Patres and Plebes, who were afterwards called Patricians and Plebeians, or Lords and Commons; the Patricians were compos'd of such as were eminent either in Birth, Cou∣rage, Wealth, or any other remarka∣ble Virtue, and to these many great Priviledges and Possessions were grant∣ed; out of these alone were chosen
their Priests, as well as Senators, and other inferiour Magistrates.
The Plebeians minded only Tillage and Husbandry, and other mechani∣cal employments, and were called Commoners, or Roman Citizens, which title became afterwards an honour of no small esteem, and was much affe∣cted by their neighbours, and pur∣chased by particular Admission or De∣nization; many such were chosen out of the Sabins, Volscians, Samnites and others: but lest this distinction between Patricians and Plebeians might beget on the one side, Insolence, and on the other, Envy, those pru∣dent Monarchs thought fit to unite them by a more endearing Relation, whence the Patricii were called Pa∣troni, or Patrons of the People, and were to protect them, not only in all Law Suits, but in what other occur∣rences might happen to them. The Plebeians also were styled Clientes or their Clients, who besides the Protecti∣on of their Patrons, received also Lands from them, under certain conditions, which remained many years invio∣lable:
for example, in case the Patron should be taken by the Enemy, the Client was to contribute towards his Ransome, as also towards the advance∣ment of their Daughters in their Mar∣riages; they were not to inform or give testimony against their Patrons; or if they did, they were accursed and condemned as Traitors, Diis inferis de∣vovebantur, & proditionis erant rei, besides many other obsequious duties and respects: so we read that Appiu•• Claudius gave Lands to his Clients even in the very Infancy of the Roman Government.
Nor was this jus tutelare, personal only, but it was also Gentilitium, that is, it extended it self into whole fami∣lies, as for instance, some of them (with their whole Generation) were Clients under the protection of the Aemilian, some under the Julian, and others under the Claudian Families. This constitution was of great use to the Common-wealth, for the credit which the Patricii had with their Clients, was sufficient oftentimes to appease their popular disturbances,
who yielding either to the Authority or Entreaties of their Patrons, were brought to acquiesce, though with some little prejudice to their own right, and this continued many Ages, until the ambition of the Tribunes inter∣rupted this good correspondence be∣tween the Princes and the People: and so honourable did the name of Client grow, that many States and Governments, who have voluntarily committed themselves to the fidelity or protection of the Romans, did not disdain that Title.
Thus we see the Lands, even with∣in the narrow compass of the first Ro∣man Monarchy, divided amongst the Princes and the People, which Lands so given to the latter, were called Clientela's; and accordingly we may observe under Servius Tullius their sixth King, a Register of their particu∣lar Estates: Regis solertia, ita est ordi∣nata respublica, ut omnia Patrimonii, dignitatis, aetatis, artium, officiorumque discrimina, in tabulas referrentur. Flor. c. 6. So we read of the Confiscation of the particular lands of Tarquinius su∣perbus;
and yet Romulus and his suc∣cessors were as absolute Monarchs, as any of the Caesars have been; and Julius Caesar himself by Will deviseth part of his own private estate to the Romans.
Thus was property, or the possession of Lands, divided amongst the people, during the first Roman Monarchy, thus it continued under the Roman as well as Graecian Empire, thus it remains at present in the German Empire, and thus it is established in all the most Christian Monarchies upon earth: and not to forget our own Country, I must observe out of a learned Au∣thor, that our ancient British Kings who were as absolute as any, made distribution also of their Land amongst their Subjects after this manner; one pa••t they gave to the Archflamens to pray for the Kings, and their po∣sterity, a second part to the Nobility to do them Knights service, a third to the Husbandmen to hold of them in S••••••age, and a fourth to the Mecha∣nicks to hold in B••rgage. l. MS. H••st. Brit. And yet Plato Red. dares
obtrude this proposition upon us p. 40. That in all states, if the King had no Companions in the Soveraign Power, he had no sharers likewise in the Dominion or possession of the Lands.
But for further satisfaction let us consider the Government of Gods people, or the Kingdom of the Jews. I think all will agree, that the He∣brews were proprietors of their Lands, and held them upon as good a Title, as the people of England do theirs, even at this day. We find in that History a particular account of the distribution of the Lands according to their Tribes, who were at that time under a Monarchical Government, whether we look upon God Almighty as their King, who according to Gro∣tius, Hobbs, Junius Brutus, and all good Authors, was Rex peculiaris Isra∣elitarum, or as Brutus tells us De jure Mag. p. 226. Ab initio Deus ipse ater∣nus ejus Monarcha fuit, non eo tantum nomine quod ipse rerum omnium supre∣mum dominium obtinuit, sed singulari quodam modo, nempe, &c. Or whether under their High Priest, who was
Gods vicegerent, except when he raised them up a Judge. We hear of no Tenures or services amongst them, other than such as all Subjects upon earth, are oblig'd to perform for the honour of the King and publick safety.
It is plain from the story of Ahab in the case of Naboth's vineyard, that Naboth had a clear right and property in the possession of his lands, and that their Kings had no authority, in their pri∣vate capacities, to force any Subject, so much as to sell his land upon reason∣able conditions. Yet nevertheless, neither the Kings of Persia, nor of Egypt, nor of any part of the East, were more absolute than the Kings of Israel were, and yet none had a less proportion in the possession of the lands.
Sir, I shall grant you all ex∣cept this, That the Kings of Israel were absolute, which I can hardly be∣lieve, especially since our Author tells us the contrary, and instances in the Sanhedrim, the Assembly of the Tribes, and Congregation of the Lord, who all had a share in the Government, as they had in the property.
I confess several zealous Com∣monwealths men have asserted this false doctrine, and amongst others, their old Coryphaeus, Junius Brutus. But I find no colour of pretence for this their assertion, but we will examine the case, as fully as this occasion will per∣mit, and refer you afterwards to what I have writ more at large concerning this point elsewhere.
And first, it is necessary that we should agree, what we mean by an absolute Monarch, which is indeed a point rather controverted, than clearly decided by any Author, that I have yet met withal.
Sallust thinks it consists in an exemp∣tion from all humane jurisdiction, Impune quidvis facere, hoc est Regem esse. Others, that to be absolute, a Prince ought to govern peremptorily, according to his will. So Juvenal, Sic volo, sic jubeo, stat pro ratione voluntas.
A third sort have declar'd that King truly absolute, who giving Laws to others, is subject to none himself. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.—to com∣mand without being oblig'd to give a
reason why or wherefore 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as Aeschy∣lus saith, and again, Rex est suo utens jure, nulli obnoxius. Hobbs will have it consist in the subjection of our wills to that of the Prince, Homo ille, vel concilium illud, cujus voluntati singuli suam voluntatem subjecerunt, summam potestatem sive summum imperium sive dominium habere dicitur.
Grotius, whose opinion I must al∣ways esteem very much, tells us, that the most absolute or highest power, is of that Prince, whose actions are not ac∣countable or subject, to any other mans right or authority, so as that they may be made void, according to the will or pleasure, or decrees of any other mortal man, Potestas summa illa dicitur, cujus actus alterius juri non substunt, ita ut alterius humanae voluntatis arbitrio, irriti reddi possunt. De jure B. & P. p. 47.
But with submission to so great au∣thorities, These do not reach the defi∣nition of an absolute Monarch, in a good sense as it ever ought to be taken. For though they have given their Prince exemption from all Laws, and
power enough to command, yet they have not excluded Tyranny, which in∣deed is oftentimes mistaken for abso∣lute power.
I confess it seems hard to destroy the Tyrant, and yet preserve the absolute Monarch. However I shall presume to give such a definition, as may do both, which I refer to the impartial judg∣ment of those who shall consider it.
An absolute Monarch then is he, who having receiv'd a just authority, executes the Laws of God and Nature without con∣troul. By receiving a just authority, I exclude one principal mark of a Ty∣rant, which is intrusion, or usurpation. In the next place, I oblige the absolute Monarch to execute the Laws of God and Nature, and nothing contrary to them. By this also Government is freed from Tyranny, in the use or exercise of authority.
For he who governs according to the Laws of God and Nature (I speak of a Natural Monarch, or a Monarch in the state of Nature) does no un∣just thing, and is by consequence no Tyrant.
And lastly, as I have secur'd the absolute Prince from Tyranny, so I have plac'd him above all conditional li∣mited Governments, by these words, [without controul.] For he who com∣mands or governs as far as the Laws of God and Nature permit, hath cer∣tainly as ample, and as absolute a Juris∣diction, as any mortal man can justly possess. This is so large a power, that he who acts beyond it, that is, contra∣ry to it, is deservedly esteem'd a Ty∣rant, and in such case the people are not oblig'd to obey. And the reason is, be∣cause the Prince, having never re∣ceiv'd an authority to command that which is unjust, that is to say, contrary to the Laws of God and Nature, the people are acquitted from their obedi∣ences as to that particular command.
All that we have now to do, is but to apply this definition to the Hebrew Kings, and from thence we shall be able to judge of their absolute power.
And first it is certain, that they re∣ceiv'd their right of power from God himself, and no other, which continued by Succession, especially after David, unto the Babylonish captivity.
I have not time at present to inlarge upon this point, and answer those fri∣volous objections which some men have brought against it. You will find this done more fully in another place, and confirm'd by the authority of Jose∣phus, Grotius, and the History of the Bible.
I know some have pretended that David received his authority from the people, and would prove it by a passage in 1 Chron. 11. where it is said, that the Elders anointed David King over Israel. But we must observe, that Da∣vid was Anointed first by Samuel, and that by the express command of God him∣self, and next, this second Anointing by the people signified nothing more, than to exclude by this publick act, the pretensions of Isbosheth eldest Son to Saul, Who without the special reveal'd will of God, would have succeeded his fa∣ther. And this was ever practised, where there was any interruption or dispute in the Succession. So Solomon was anointed, because of the difference be∣tween him and Adonijah, otherwise that Ceremony was not absolutely necessary,
and was many times totally neglected. Besides, in the case of David, it is plain, that he received no right of power from the people, but from God, and that by their own confession both before and after their anointing. And the Lord thy God said unto thee, thou shalt feed my people Israel, and thou shalt be ruler over my people Israel. And again, They anointed David King over Israel, according to the word of the Lord by Samuel, 1 Chron. 11. 2, 3. Hence Grotius observes, that David gave God thanks, for that God had subjected his people unto him. David Deo gratias agit, quod populum suum sibi subjece∣rit.
Taking it therefore for granted, that David received no right of power from the people, by consequence he depended upon none but God, as all the most Soveraign Princes do, and this is one great mark of an absolute Monarch.
In the next place, he executed the laws of God and nature without con∣troul. I never heard any question made of this, except in the case of
judgment concerning a Tribe, the High Priest, and a Prophet. Which judg∣ments Grotius supposed, were taken from the Hebrew Kings, Aliqua judi∣cia arbitror regibus adempta. But I rather think, under favour, that they were more properly, Principibus con∣cessa, which makes a considerable difference. For I find no mention of any time or power, who could take those judgments from the King.
On the contrary we read of several Kings, erecting Courts of Judicature, and making Judges both in Gods cause and in the Kings. And these three points being of the highest conse∣quence, the judgment of them might most probably be granted by the King, to the determination of the highest Court of Justice.
In the first of Chron. chap. 26. v. 5. We find David making Rulers over the Reubenites, the Gadites, and the half Tribe of Manasseh, for every matter per∣taining to God and the affairs of the King; but more particularly in the second of Chron. chap. 19. Jehoshaphat does the same thing, but in terms
more plain, And he set Judges in the Land through all the fenced Cities of Judah, City by City. And said to the Judges, take heed what you do, &c. More∣over in Jerusalem did Jehoshaphat set of the Levites, and of the Priests, and of the Chief of the Fathers of Israel, for the judgments of the Lord, and for controversies when they return'd to Je∣rusalem. And behold Amariel the Chief Priest is over you, in all matters of the Lord, and Zedekiah the son of Ishmael, the Ruler of the house of Judah, for all the Kings matters.
Indeed I should think that this is plain enough to prove, that their Kings had in them the Supreme right, of administring justice through their territories, and made their Subordinate officers, who wholly depended upon them; and I am the more confirm'd in this opinion, because I find both the High Priests and Prophets too judged, condemned and pardoned, even against the judgment of the Sanhedrim, by the Kings single authority.
So Solomon banished the High Priest Abiathar. Solomon Abiatharem Pon∣ti••icem
in exilium misit, says Josephus lib. 8. so Jehoiakim slew the Prophet Ʋriah. And they sent forth Ʋriah out of Aegypt, and brought him unto Je∣hoiakim the King, who slew him with the Sword, Jer. 26. 23. The same did Joash King of Judah to Zachariah the Prophet, And they Conspired against him, and stoned him with stones at the command of the King, 2 Chron. 24. 21. and several other instances there are.
On the other side, when the Sanhe∣drim intreated Zedekiah, that they might put Jeremiah to death, by his own single authority he preserv'd him against them.
Under favour, Sir, I have heard this very case of Jeremiah, urg'd against the Soveraign power of the Hebrew Kings, and produced as an in∣stance to shew the independent right of the Sanhedrim. For when they sol∣licited the King, that they might put him to death, Zedekiah answered, Lo he is in your power, the King is not he that can do any thing against you.
I confess I have read this ex∣ample in Junius Brutus, and know not which most to wonder at, his impu∣dence or his impious knavery. The words in the Vulgar Translation, which Scaliger esteems the best, run thus, Ecce in potestate vestra est, nam contra vos Rex nihil potest. In hoc ne∣gotiorum genere scilicet, saith Grotius.
But our brute Author, by an un∣parallell'd wickedness, perverts both the sence and words of the Holy Scrip∣ture, and translates it, Ipsis contradi∣cere nulla in re posse. And so would make the Sanhedrim so absolute, that the King could not contradict them in any thing, but we shall discover his imposture by the History it self, and practice of Zedekiah even in this very case.
And it is first certain, that the King meant nothing more by this answer, than that he left Jeremiah to be Tried by his Judges according to Law. And indeed as his affairs stood, he was un∣willing to displease the Princes, in a case which they thought so nearly concerned the good of the people and
safety of the King, which they be∣liev'd was indanger'd by the discou∣raging Prophecies of Jeremiah. Rex Zedechias, says Josephus, nè in Princi∣pum invidiam tali tempore incurreret, voluntati eorum resistens, permisit eis, ut de Propheta Jeremia quicquid libent facerent, lib. 10. c. 10. Yet our Villa∣nous Presbyter is so shameless an Au∣thor as to affirm from hence, that the Sanhedrim was superiour to the King-Rege superiorem, q. 3. p. 73. Nay and could judge the King himself, Illi Re∣gem judicare possunt, which I am confi∣dent was never found in the whole History of the Bible.
But to return to this case. We find first, that Zedekiah had by his own au∣thority imprison'd Jeremiah, ch. 30. v. 3. And Jeremiah the Prophet was shut up in the Court of the prison, which was in the King of Judah's house. For Zede∣kiah King of Judah, had shut him up.
Next we may observe, that the Princes applied themselves to the King, that they might have leave to put the Prophet to death, and that in terms respectful enough, Jer. 38. 4.
Therefore said the Princes unto the King; We beseech thee, let this man be put to death. Now what needed this imper∣tinent, and indeed abusive complement to the King, if the whole authority was in the Sanhedrim, or Princes them∣selves. But to take away all manner of dispute, we find not only applica∣tion made to the King, to release Je∣remiah and his own order thereupon, Ebedmelech went forth out of the Kings house, and spake unto the King, saying, My Lord the King, these men have done evil in all that they have done to Jere∣miah the Prophet, whom thou hast cast into the dungeon, &c. Then the King commanded Ebedmelech the Egyptian, saying, Take from hence thirty men with thee, and take up Jeremiah the Prophet out of the dungeon before he dies, cap. 38. I say, besides this, we read also in the same chap. That Jeremiah made his address to the King, that he might not dye, which most assuredly, being a Prophet of the Lord, he would ne∣ver have done, had it not been in the Kings power to have granted his re∣quest, or had it been an infringement of
the lawful power of the Sanhedrim. And thereupon Zedekiah, without ask∣ing leave of the Elders, promis'd him that he should not dye, and in terms which sufficiently express his Sove∣raign authority. Then Jeremiah said unto Zedekiah, If I declare it to thee, wilt thou not surely put me to death. So Zedekiah the King swore secretly to Je∣remiah, saying, As the Lord liveth that made us this soul, I will not put thee to death, neither will I give thee into the hands of these men, that seek thy life, v. 15, 16. I think these words need no ex∣planation, I shall only add this remark to shew the fourberie of our Author, which is, That in case this story could have pass'd according to his own sense of it, yet it would not have prov'd what he design'd it should have done. For Zedekiah at that time was not absolute as the former Kings of Judah had been, but was tributary to the King of Babylon. And when the year was ended, &c. King Nebuchadnezzar made Zedekiah King over Judah and Jerusalem, 2 Chron. 36. 10. Which is confirm'd by Josephus in these words.
Nebuchadnezzarus exprobat ingratitu∣dinem Zedechiae, quod cum à se accepisset regnum, accepta potestate abusus esset, in authorem beneficii. It being then most clear, that the Hebrew Kings were ab∣solute, or enjoy'd a Soveraign right of power, and yet notwithstanding this, the property was divided amongst the people, who had yet no share in the right of Government, but what was subordinate; I must conclude that Plato Redivivus is no less impudent and false, than his master Junius Brutus was; when he affirms universally, that if the people had a share in the property, they had a share in the Government, or where the King had no companions in the Sove∣raign power, he had no sharers likewise in the Dominion or possession of lands.
Sir, So many men amongst us have asserted an Independent right of power in the Sanhedrim, that I cannot yet get off from that opinion, unless you can shew me somewhat more par∣ticular, than yet you have done, con∣cerning their institution, and that they receiv'd not their power from God, but from man, which in such case will
make them subordinate and subjects.
I have already told you, that at the request of Moses, God was pleas'd to admit of such a Council or Court of Judicature, and that then they re∣ceiv'd their power, not only from the hand of Moses, but even from that power which Moses himself had, and no new power immediately from God. But if this be not plain enough, I will offer you another passage, by which we shall determine the two main points. First, whence the Court of Seventy El∣ders received their authority. And se∣condly, How large it was.
In the first of Deut. v. 13. you shall find Moses thus speaking to the people, Take ye wise men and understanding, and known amongst the Tribes, and I will make them rulers over you. So I took the chief of the Tribes, wise men, &c. and I charg'd the Judges at that time, saying, &c.
Here you see the authority proceed∣ing wholly from himself, and for its extent you read immediately after, that Moses reserves all appeals to him∣self, which is the undoubted mark of
Supreme Authority, And the cause which is too hard for you, bring it unto me, and I will hear it. And so you see, in the forementioned cases of David, Jehosaphat, Zedekiah and others, that the practice was conformable to the in∣stitution, where the Kings of Judah exercised their Soveraign power, even in those cases which belonged most particularly to the knowledge of the San∣hedrim. This Brutus confesses in ex∣press words, who contradicts himself, as such false men do, in most that he says. Propterea boni Reges, quales Da∣vid, Jehosaphat & caeteri, quia omni∣bus jus dicere ipsi non potuissent, etsi in gravioribus causis, ut è Samuele appa∣ret, supremum sibi judicium recipiebant, nil prius vel antiquius habuerunt, quam ut Judices bonos & peritos, ubique loco∣rum constituerent, q. 3. p. 89.
Of these Judges the greater Court was call'd Sanhedrim Gedola, the Su∣preme Senate, the lesser Sanhedrim Ke∣tanna, the lesser, and inferiour Court.
The lesser was again subdivided, and out of these, were Judges distri∣buted into most of the Cities, for the ease of the people.
From them appeal might be made to the Court or Sanhedrim Gedola▪ which always was at Jerusalem, and who had many priviledges above the others, possibly not much unlike our House of Lords, at this day. Now, Cousin, if I understand Latin and English, I think the case is plain, that the Hebrew Kings, (notwith∣standing the Sanhedrim) had the sole Soveraign right of power. But I refer all to your better Judgment.
I have nothing to reply against Scripture arguments, especially when they are so clear, as these seem to be. I am only afraid, that this great trou∣ble which I have given you, hath ta∣ken away the pleasure you might have had in viewing our Country, and talk∣ing of some other more diverting sub∣ject. But presuming still upon your goodness, I must desire that you would compleat the Reformation, which you have more than begun in me, and by giving me some account of the Gothick Government, which it seems hath pre∣vail'd in a great part of Europe, you may make me capable of defending the
doctrine, and the good constitution of our Government, against all hot∣brain'd and ambitious innovators.
Sir, I have no greater plea∣sure than in obeying your commands, nor have I lost thereby the advantage of this fine evening.
The Goths therefore, if we may be∣lieve Jordanes, who was himself of that race, and whom Procopius (wri∣ting only of the latter Goths) no where contradicts, broke out of the Island Scanzia, or Scandinavia, and with all their substance, men women and chil∣dren, advanc▪d south-east. And after several Skirmishes and Victories by the way, they at last sat down about the palus Moeotis.
Here they inhabited many years, and following the warmth of the Sun, spread Eastwards towards the South of Scythia, and the lower Asia. Their Government all this while, which lasted many hundred of years, was an absolute Monarchy, and the Tenth part of the lands were generally appropria∣ted to the support of their Prince, who descended from father to son, as at this
day amongst us, and in Ottofrising: you have a long catalogue of their names, and an account of their memo∣rable actions.
But in process of time, (those Nor∣thern people, propagating very much under a warmer climate than their own▪) a great detachment past over into Europe, whence came the distincti∣on of the Visigoths and Ostrogoths, which is as much as to say, the Southern, and the Western Goths.
The latter spread themselves over Germany and France, and erected se∣veral Kingdoms. Their Government was Arbitrary enough, and somewhat more than that of the Germans. Paulo jam addictius regnantur quam caeterae Germanorum gentes, saith Tacitus de moribus Germ. Yet we find the Ger∣mans themselves under a Kingly Go∣vernment, the lands divided, and yet neither their Noblemen nor people, had any other share in the Government than by way of Council, or a subor∣dinate authority for the Administra∣tion of Justice, whch is much different from a right of Power or Command.
Agri pro numero cultorum ab universis per vices occupantur, quos mox inter se secundum dignitatem partiuntur.
These were like great Farms, which they chose according as the situation pleas'd them. Colunt discreti ac diversi, ut fons, ut nemus, ut campus placuit. Their Councils were compos'd of the Commoners, and of the Nobility, but were distinct, and the Noblemen had the greatest interest. De minoribus re∣bus Principes consultant, de majoribus omnes. Ita tamen ut ea quoque quorum penes plebem arbitrium est, apud Princi∣pes pertractentur.
But in all these elder Governments we must consider their circumstances, which were confus'd, and much diffe∣rent from those, which are at this day established generally all the world over. The people were more barba∣rous than now they are, unsetled, and much addicted to wars.—Whence they appear'd more like the children of Israel in the Wilderness, than the people of God in Jerusalem. And I cannot think that their polities, (though they make little against us) ought to be propos'd
by any sober man, as examples for our imitation.
We come now to the Ostrogoths, as nearer to our time, and purpose.
A great body then of these, passing the Danube, possessed themselves of Hungary or Pannonia, and some of Thrace, where they inhabited sorty eight years. In Hungary they had their Kings, and paid them too such an awful obedience, that they esteemed it the greatest impiety, so much as to whisper any thing that detracted from their honour. Solummodo susurris la∣cerare nefas ducunt.
And if by chance any of the Noble∣men should have offended their King, though in never so small a matter, and even unjustly accus'd, yet the poorest Scullion belonging to, and sent by the King, had a power, though alone, to seize that Nobleman, encompassed and guarded by all his friends and ad∣herents: And thus without Messenger or Serjeant, both imprisoneth or other∣wise punisheth the unhappy offender, according to the Order of the Prince, whose Will passeth amongst all for an
unquestionable Law. Quod si aliquis ex comitum ordine, regem, vel in modi∣co, offenderit, quando etiam iniustè in∣famatus fuerit, quilibet infimae condi∣tionis lixa, a Rege missus, Comitem licet satelli••ibus suis stipatum, solus compre∣hendit, &c. Sola Principis voluntas apud omnes pro ratione habetur. Otto∣fris. de reb. gest. Fred. primi, lib. 1. ca. 31.
Now if Plato Redivivus will needs produce ancient customs among the Goths, and impose them, without any farther consideration upon us, I hope he will give me leave also to offer the example of these Loyal Ostro∣goths, which I am sure, if duly fol∣lowed, would prove a better cure for us, whatever our disease be, than our Doting Mountebank impudently pro∣posed.
From these Ostrogoths, and Gepidae—sprang the Lombards, whom Narses, the Roman Patrician, inviting into Italy, and shewing them the goodness of the Soyl, and warmth of the cli∣mate, by the richness of the Wines, and pleasantness of the Fruit, which
he sent them as a Present to encourage their remove, at last they undertook the journey, and finding the Countrey fully answer their expectation; from guests, as they were intended, they became masters. And having intro∣duced several of their own Laws and Customs, have left many of them re∣maining even to this day, with the name of Lombardy to one of the most fertile Provinces of Italy.
Pray what kind of Govern∣ment did they settle amongst them∣selves?
The most popular that could be contrived. For hating the Roman Emperors, from whom they had usurped those Lands, which they did possess, (as the offender is oftentimes the last reconciled) they set up a Go∣vernment as contrary to Monarchy as they could invent. For, obtaining leave to use their own form under certain conditions, and restrictions, they chose to be governed under Con∣suls, which they elected annually, for the most part, out of three orders, which they distinguished into Cap∣tains,
Vaivods, and the Commonalty. And that they might secure them∣selves from the ambition of the great ones, they made no scruple to choose into the most honourable employ∣ments, the most mercenary Trades∣men and Artificers. Inferioris condi∣tionis juvenes, vel quoslibet contempti∣bilium, etiam mechanicarum artium opi∣fices, quos caeterae gentes ab honestioribus, & liberioribus studiis tanquam pestem propellunt, ad militis cingulum, vel dig∣nitatum gradus, assumere non dedignen∣tur.
What was the effect of this their Popular Government?
The same which generally happens in all such low irregular con∣stitutions, that is to say, defection from their Soveraign, and division a∣mongst themselves; so that every Town became a different Commonwealth, and were never united or friends, but when they were to oppose the Emperor, and that they seldom fail'd to do, as often as occasion happened.
For instance, the Emperors always reserved a certain tribute, which they
called Fodrum, to be payed them as often as they should pass out of Ger∣many into Italy. The denial of this Fodrum, produced most desperate Wars, insomuch that the Emperors were generally forced to fight their passage to Rome, through their own Dominions.
At last under Frederick the first, most of those Corporation Towns were utterly destroyed.
Amongst these, Milan was the chief seat of Rebellion; then Brescia, Ber∣gamo, and several others shared in the same fate, as they had done in the same fault.
I thought there had been several Imperial feuds in Lombardy, as you lately observed, and Counties—what became of them, did they fol∣low the Government of those great Towns?
Sir, there were several Mar∣quisses and Counts, who had great priviledges and possessions. But in the absence of the Emperor they were in a manner necessitated—to acquiesce under the irresistible force of an inso∣lent
people. Vixque aliquis nobilis, vel vir magnus tam magno ambitu inveniri que∣at, qui civitatis suae non sequatur im∣perium.—But many times upon the return of the Emperor into those parts, they have been established in their Dominions, and the Rebells severely punished, as in the case of William Marquiss of Monferat, and the Bishop of Aste; to whom when the Citizens of Aste, and Quiere, (the chief Towns belonging to them) had re∣fused to do justice concerning their rights and priviledges, the Empe∣ror, Frederick the first, punished those Citizens most severely, as Revells and his declared enemies.
Now, Sir, if you have observed any thing in the Government of those Lombards, which either makes for our Authors proposition, or pleases your self, let me know it, and I shall shew you all the farther satisfaction I can.
I have nothing more to offer concerning them. I hate their Go∣vernment, which I think makes little for us. But I would gladly hear some∣what
more of the Goths and Vandals, because tis said, they lived under a Monarchy, though limited.
The later Goths, which were of the race of the Visigoths, being much weakned and harrassed by the Romans, at last, under their King Alaric, obtained permission from the Emperor Honorius, to retire into Spain. But being treacherously pursued by Stilico, whom they overcame, were so incensed against the Romans, that they immediately returned, and sack∣ing Rome again, set down in that part of France, which they call Pro∣vincia, or Gallia Narbonensis. There being again beaten, they entred into Spain, and possessed it, which hap∣pened about the year of our Lord 412. Here they setled a Monarchical Government, but not so absolute as formerly it had been, before their se∣paration, a great part, both of the power, as well as the possessions, be∣ing in the people.
Much such was the case of the Van∣dals, (who after they had run over almost all Italy, taken Rome and Na∣ples,
and had spread themselves all over Campania,) follow'd the Goths into Spain, whence (being invited by Bonifacius General to the Emperour Valentinian) they pass'd the Streights at Cadiz into Africa, which they possess'd near 100 years, according to Procopius his ac∣count, until Belisarius General to the Emperour Justinian, routed them, and restor'd the Province to the Roman Empire. This happened about the year Five hundred and thirty.
Now, Cousin, you must observe▪ that though both these Goths and Van∣dals instituted a kind of Kingly Go∣vernment, yet their Prince was rather a General than a Monarch, and their affairs were for the most part so turbu∣lent, that they were in a continual state of war. Sometimes their success was good, but generally bad. And, as the honour of Victory is given to the chief Commander, so the ill for∣tune falls heaviest upon his head, who governs. Hence those insolent people might possibly, as our Author says, beat the Kings brains out, or commit many outrages upon his person, who
was indeed in some things accountable to his people, and held a Kingdom so precarious, that Grotius thinks them not worthy of the name or title of Kings.
But no man sure that had not his hands in some measure, already dy'd with the blood of one of the best Kings, could have commended a people for beating out the brains of their Soveraign, nor imagined, that some excellent per∣son, as he says, contriv'd a Government, in which the people have ever been call'd and accounted most barbarous, by all the most civiliz'd Monarchies, and learned men in Europe, and even by Pro∣copius himself.
He tells us, that nothing remains, that may give us any great light, in what their excellencies consisted. Truly our Author seems to have grop'd in the dark for all the arguments and autho∣rities which he hath produc'd to favour his innovation. But no wonder, men avoid the light, when their deeds and principles are evil.
But what say you to the pos∣session of lands, and share in the Go∣vernment,
which are the points that chiefly concern us.
Sir, you may easily believe, that if the people were Masters of the Government, they would not fail to give themselves large proportions of the lands. But this made their Go∣vernment so irregular, and subject to so many inconveniencies, that instead of being setled according to the exact rules of the Polities, as our Author thinks, it was most insupportable, and not capable of any long subsistence. And in effect, we see both their name and government so totally extinct, that those people who possessed almost all Europe, are not now to be found in any part of it.
Such was the case of the once flou∣rishing Kingdom of the Jews; which (when the Seditious people, as Me∣nahemus, Eliazarus, and others, en∣deavoured to set up a popular Govern∣ment,) was utterly destroy'd, and of two such mighty Nations, nothing is left, but some few wandring remains or old rustick monuments, which serve only to testifie that they once have been.
I confess, had the authority of the Gothick Kings been Absolute and In∣dependent, I know no great incon∣venience, that their distribution of the lands, could have produced. Yet that too ought to be done, with discretion and good consideration, or many mis∣chiefs, and ruine in the end may en∣sue.
To this purpose, our Author, I thank him, hath put us in mind of a memorable example. For Plutarch tells us, that Cleomenes King of Sparta, endeavouring to make himself Ab∣solute, slew the Ephori. And the bet∣ter to ingratiate himself with the people, divided the lands amongst them. But being desperately attack'd by An∣tigonus King of Macedon, before he had well established his Soveraign Authori∣ty, he could not raise money, to pay either his Mercenary soldiers, or his own Citizens. Whence for want of that power, he was totally routed, La∣cedemon sack'd, and the whole King∣dome became a Province to the Ma∣cedonians.
Without doubt many Con∣tingencies may happen, in which an Absolute Power in the Prince, may prove the greatest security to a Kingdom against a Foreign Invasion. For whilst the people are consulted withal, or intreated to contribute toward the necessary expences of war, by an un∣timely frugality, and indiscreet hus∣bandry the whole may be lost.
I remember a story very apposite to this purpose, in the wars between the Greeks and Turks under Constantine the Fifteenth, and last Christian Empe∣rour of Greece. The numerous Ar∣my of the Turks, had so wasted the besieged in Constantinople, that Con∣stantine had no hopes of preserving the City, but by a supply of Mercenary Soldiers. To procure these, a conside∣rable sum of mony was requisite. But the brutal and covetous Greeks would not be prevail'd upon to part with any thing at present, though they had no other hopes, to preserve all for the fu∣ture. So the unfortunate Emperour was slain, and the City taken, and sack'd from top to bottom, with all
the insolences that might be expected from a Pagan Conquerour. Among the Greeks, the Admiral Notaras was accounted the most rich, and had been the most solicited by the Emperour to prevent, by a chearful contribution, and his good example, the fatal hour of the Grecian Empire. But cursed ava∣rice doth often blind our reason so much, that we are forc'd to yield That to our enemies, which might have once preserv'd our friends. And so it hap∣pened. For Notaras burying all his Treasure, whilest the Siege endured, at last to preserve his life, and com∣plement the New Emperour Maho∣met the second, he raised his dead mo∣ney from the grave, and presenting i•• with himself at the Emperour's feet, offer'd the one to secure the other. But the generous Turk looking sternly upon him, Thou dog, said he, I take thy Trea∣sure, not as thy gift, but as my due, by right of conquest. Which hadst thou in time given to thy poor Prince, whom thou hast perfidiously betray'd, thou mightest have preserv'd both thy Country, and thy King. Go then with a mischief, and
receive the just reward due to thy Trea∣chery. So he commanded him to be executed with no less severity, than if he had been a Traytor, even to Maho∣met himself.
But, Sir, Begging your pardon for this Digression, let us return to the Goths, of whom I think you were say∣ing, That they have left little behind them, which retains the memory that they once have been. Pray, what say you to those Tenures, which are yet extant in many parts of Europe. Were they not of the Gothick institution, and do they not sufficiently testifie, not only that they were, but that they were also a wise people, since their Govern∣ment has remain'd so long after them.
Sir, I perceive you use the word Government promiscuously, as indeed our Author himself does. Some∣times he makes it signifie the Supreme right of power, sometimes the Subor∣dinate, and sometimes neither, but only the effects of Government as in this case.
Now though these Tenures have remained in some Kingdoms, yet they
prove little of the wisdom, and no∣thing of the excellent Government of those Goths. For the last, it is either totally lost, or else so changed, that it is not any more to be known. For I do not hear or read of any such pre∣carious Kingdom as theirs was, ex∣tant at this day in Europe. Nor is it probable there should, for as hath been already observed, such a constitution is so irregular, and contrary to the nature of Government, that it can∣not continue long in that neutrality. For either the people will take all the power into their hands, whence some little Commonwealths have some∣times sprung up, or else the King will by degrees become absolute and independent, such as most of the Monarchs are at present throughout the whole world. And for their Tenures, you will easily find how they were continued, if you consider that many little Kingdoms have been built upon the ruines of the declining Roman Empire, which had been overrun by the Goths and Vandalls, Roman paula∣tim coepit minui jam gentes quae Roma∣norum
provincias non regna habitabant, R••ges creare jam ex illorum potestate sub∣duci—& in proprii arbitrii authoritate stare discunt.
These new Princes thought no∣thing more conducible to the establish∣ment of their new Governments, than to make as little innovation as they could, but rather leave the conquered, who were afterwards to become their Subjects, in the same condition as they found them. And those Tenures having no great matter of ill in them, provided their Lords had no right in the Soveraign Authority as they had not; many of them have continued, with little alteration to this day.
This, Cousin, is I think sufficient to prove, that contrary to our Author's proposition, most Kings which have been in the world, though they had an absolute and an independent right of power, yet they have permitted the Lands to be divided, and in the possessi∣on of the people. And that though in the mixt Monarchy of the barba∣rous Goths and Vandalls, some part of the power as well as possessions, were
in the Commonalty, yet that is no reason to us, why, neglecting all the other more civilized and flourishing Empires of Aegypt and Asia, as well as Europe, we must alone bring those Northern instances, in contradiction to all the Southern, and the Eastern learning, as the only true politick ex∣amples, for our present imitation. And to conclude, The instance which you have brought of a master, who entrusts the sword into the hands of his servants, with conditions, nevertheless, oaths and obligations to use it only in defence of their master, and according to his command, and no otherwise, yet you say, these servants, having the power in their hands, may when they please govern the Master himself, and turn him out of doors too, if they think it con∣venient so to do. This indeed cannot be denied, but it proves nothing still of our Authors proposition. For al∣though they have the sword in their hands, yet it being delivered upon the forementioned conditions, and under such obligations, they receive thereby no right of power, but are rather un∣der
stricter vows of obedience. And truly Cousin, when law and conscience, vows and protestations, and all that is binding upon Earth, or sacred in Heaven, prove but slender bonds and tyes too weak to keep us within the compass of a sworn Allegeance to our Lawful and Na∣tural Princes and Governours, all Go∣vernment in such case must break in pieces, and the Governours can by no other way be secur'd from the insolen∣ces and unjust force of the governed. And seriously, Sir, Plato Redivivus speaks of the Church with such malici∣ous disrespect, and in such seditious terms of the State and Government by Law established, that it is shrewdly to be suspected, he hath neither fear for God, nor honour for the King. What kind of cure then might be expected, supposing we were distemper'd, from such a loose, irreverent and Atheistical quacking Fop, I leave to your self and all sober men to determine.
Dear Cousin, I am most en∣tirely satisfied with all that you have said, from the very beginning of our first discourse. And though some of
my impertinent questions, may have made the subject more tedious to you, than otherwise it might have been, yet you have thereby totally remov'd all scruples, which might have remain'd concerning the good and reasonable constitution of our Government. Being most assur'd, that no people upon earth, can live more happy and secure under theirs, than we under our own, pro∣vided the strictness of our obedience, cor∣respond with the justness of our Laws. Besides, we have also gain'd this ad∣vantage, from the assurance of our health, that we need not trouble our selves to look after a phantastical cure for an imaginary disease, which is no where more truly to be found, than in the shallow brains of Plato Redivivus. Being therefore fully convinc'd, that the Constitution of our Government, is, thanks be to Heaven, very health∣ful and vigorous, you have in your dis∣course this evening, sufficiently an∣swer'd our Author's whole Libel, so that I shall not give you any farther trouble concerning it, b••t shall sacri∣fice the whole to the flames, or to some
other, not very respectful end or of∣fice.
I shall esteem my self very hap∣py, if I have contributed any thing to∣ward your satisfaction or divertise∣ment. However if you please, to¦morrow morning we will run over what is worth the observing, in the rest of his second and third Discourse. And I am apt to believe, that it will prove less tedious, and more pleasant, than what we have done this after∣noon.
Most gladly, Sir, For if it be not troublesome to you, nothing can be more acceptable to me. In the mean time, we will bid the Coachman drive us home, where we will remember all honest and Loyal good Subjects in a glass of the best Wine in the Cellar.
I approve very well of your motion, and if you please, we will conclude all with our hearty wishes and prayers, for the good health, safety and prosperity of his most Sacred Majesty, whose unparallel'd goodness is so great, that as none of our Virtues can ever equal it, so neither can our vices reach
it, except it be the most barbarous transcendent malice of his merciless and blood-thirsty enemies.
GOod morrow to you, Cou∣sin.
The same to you, Sir, or a bet∣ter. How have you rested after our long discourse yesterday?
I perceive by the time of the day, that I have slept long enough, but really my head has been so full of Politicks and Proclamations, that I am sure I have done more work in six hours sleep than our Plato redivivus can ever effect, all the days of his life. I have Reform'd Monarchies, Regulated Re∣publicks, Transform'd Aristocracies, pull'd down, and then set up and new modell▪d vast Empires. In a word, I have setled the whole world under such excellent forms and polities, that we shall never hear more disputes betwixt Priviledge
and Prerogative, Property and Power, People and Prince. No more Sedition nor Civil wars at home, no more In∣vasions from abroad, but having regu∣lated the Ʋniverse according to the Polity of private States, we may begin when we please to turn our Swords into Plough-shares, and our Spears into Pruning-hooks, for we are to enjoy an uninterrupted peace and security even unto the end of time, and all things.
Nothing is more common, than for the discourse of the day, (espe∣cially when it is out of the common road) to furnish matter sufficient for dreams at night. But pray what kind of Government had you set up.
'Twas a Perfect free Monarchy, which so incens'd Plato Redivivus, who methoughts was of the Compa∣ny, that in the height of our debate we had like to have fallen to Cuffs. At last I told him plainly, that I did not take him for a Conjurer. With which opprobrious word, being more offen∣ded than with all that had been said before, rather than not pass for a cun∣ning man, he was not ashamed to con∣fess,
that he had studied the Black art, dealt by the Devil, and understood Cornelius Agrippa, better than he did his Creed, and that to convince me of my mistake, he would shew me such an infallible proof both of his skill and parts, that I should be asham'd for ever after to have treated a person of his talent and qualifications with so little respect. And immediately (whilest I was expecting the event) our old Committe man, had transform'd him∣self into a little Cubb Fox. But to that small body there was fixt a pair of Asses Ears, so large and disproportionate to the Head, that this most ridiculous ob∣ject occasion'd so hearty, and so loud a laughter among the Company, that I awakened with the noise, and my Po∣liticks ended.
The Conclusion was pleasant enough, but indeed I should have thought, our Author had had no part about him, of so modest and well tem∣per'd a beast. But let us proceed in his examination, which hence for∣ward shall be done with as much brevity as the case will admit.
He tells us, p. 40. that for personal estate, the subjects may enjoy it in the largest proportion, without being able to invade the Empire, and that the subjects with their Money cannot invade the Crown. This is the first time, that I remember to have observed where lay the weak side of invincible Gold. Indeed till now I should have laid the odds for money against land, and I am the more confirm'd in that opinion, because I remember very well, that in an election of a Knight for the Shire, a certain money'd Merchant, not having three hundred pound per Annum lands in the world, was able nevertheless, to carry the Election a∣gainst a worthy Gentleman, of an anci∣ent Family, who had at that time, a∣bove four thousand pounds per Annum lands of inheritance. And it was thought, that the force of money, pro∣cured the advantage. Many such cases I suppose have happened in other Counties, which argument sure will hold in a Kingdom, as well as in a County, since the former is composed of the latter.
But our Author, who has the legisla∣tive power in his head, makes there, what card trump he thinks sit. And from his unerring judgment, there is no appeal.
I think Plato is mistaken. But Sir, you have slipt a remark a little before this; and it is, that Modern writers are of opinion that Aegypt, till of late, was not a Monarchy; and the only conjecture, which he produces, is, that originally all Arts and Sciences, had their rise in Aegypt, which they think very improbable to have been under a Monarchy.
O silly, truly for our Authors reputations sake, I thought to have passed by so childish a conjecture. I will not go about to prove, that re∣ally all Arts and Sciences had their rise in that Countrey, because our Au∣thor hath confessed it. Nor tell you that Aegypt, was an absolute Monar∣chy many hundred years before, be∣cause I have already given you good authorities for it. Neither will I trouble you with a long Catalogue of most excellent men, for all manner
of learning, who lived as well under the elder Monarchies, as later ones of Rome, Germany, Spain, France, England and many others. Let our Authors own profound Learning, rise up in judgment in this case against himself, since it is plain, that his vast politick knowledge, sprang up, bloom'd, brought forth fruit, withered and decay∣ed, and all under a Monarchical Go∣vernment. For whether we consider him in the days of King Charles the Ist. or under Oliver, or at Rome, or since his present Majesties happy Restora∣tion, he hath still sucked in a Monar∣chical Air. I do not hear that all was effected at Geneva, though most pro∣bably the first sowre Grapes came from thence, which have set his teeth on edge ever since.
Indeed I think so sober a politician might have spared such a little malicious remark. But to go on, he tells us, p. 45. That Rome was the best and most glorious Govern∣ment, that the Sun ever saw.
Our Statesman hath coupled best and glorious together, as Poulterers
use to do a lean and a fat Rabbit, that one may help off with the other. But his vulgar cheat must not pass. For glorious, we will admit of that Epithete, and good Authors give us the reason how it came to be so, which is not much to our purpose. But for best, we must examine that a little far∣ther.
I could cite many Authorities to prove that the Roman Commonwealth was one of the worst Governments, that ever subsisted so long. But because I would speak somewhat to our noble Venetian, who ought to have read his own Authors, concerning Govern∣ment at home, before he came to judge of another abroad, I will refer him for full satisfaction in this point, to the Discorsi politici of Paulus Paruta, a No∣bleman and Senator of Venice, and Pro∣curator of Saint Marco. Who in his first discourse, comparing several An∣tient Commonwealths, with that of Venice, when he comes to Rome, he tells us plainly, That the Sun never saw a more confused State. That it was really no regular government at all, and
that its chief default proceeded from the exorbitant power of the people. Whence Tacitus calls it, lib. 3. Corrup∣tissima Respublica.
Now, Sir, if this noble Senator, who also had been Ambassador abroad, understood any thing of Government, as I believe he did, even more than the English Gent. Young Venetian and learned Doctor, put all together, then we must conclude, that our Author is mistaken. But since it is not the first time, we will put it to account.
Well, Sir, he saith next, p. 52. That Moses, Theseus, and Romulus were founders of Democracies. What say you to that?
If I mistake not, he tells us the same thing in p. 28. 32, & 69. In some of which he calls their Demo∣cracy, in plain English, a Common∣wealth. For Moses, I have already prov'd his authority to have been Inde∣pendent, even in the highest measure, upon any but God, and that in the ex∣ercise none ever us'd it more arbitrarily, witness the severe punishments against the Idolaters, when he came down
from Mount Sinai. Where without any farther Ceremonies, or legal trial, he call'd the Sons of Levi to him, and said: Put every man his sword by his side, and go in from gate to gate through∣out the Camp, and slay every man his bro∣ther, and every man his companion, and every man his neighbour. And the chil∣dren of Levi did according to the word of Moses, and there fell of the people that day about 3000. men.
Many other instances there are of his Despotical power; besides, the Text saith in plain words, that Moses was King in Jeshurun.—For the cal∣ling together the Congregation of the Lord by sound of Trumpet, all men, who ever read the Bible know, that it was generally to tell them some mes∣sage from God, reproach them for their misdeeds, exhort them to amendment, and such like. But I am confident they never did any one act, which pro∣ceeded from a right of power while Mo∣ses liv'd. Nay, on the contrary, when the Seditious Princes, Corah, Datban and Abiram, as also Aaron and Miriam, murmured against Moses's Sove∣raign
authority, being desirous to have shar'd with him in the Government, we find that God punished their Sedition most severely, and the two last escaped the Justice of Gods sentence, only through the great intercession of Moses. Who knows not that his Praesecti Je∣throniani, were only subordinate Judges appointed by his own order, and for his own ease. All which, besides the com∣mon consent of learned men, makes it clear that Moses held the Supreme Civil power, wholly in himself, call him King, or Captain, or what you please.
Next Theseus being own'd after his long Travels, by his father Aegeus, found Attica Tributary to Minos, King of Candia, and the Kingdom divided in it self, into several little Burgs, which set up for so many particular several Governments. Theseus therefore be∣ing a discreet Prince, endeavour'd to reduce them to their former obedience by peaceable means. To that purpose he perswades them to unite under one Government, knowing that they would become thereby, (like a bundle of Ar∣rows) much the stronger.
And that the name of Tyrant might not affright them, or the loss of their fond power and freedom discourage them, he promised to abate so much, of his own Soveraign right of Government, as to consult with them, and take their opinions in weighty affairs, as he did in a common Hall or meeting place called Asty. In this method things went prosperously on until one Mneste∣us, a factious and an ambitious Prince of the house of Ericthonius, insinuating to the people, that Theseus intended at last to enslave them, he caused the Athenians to rebell. Theseus retired to the Island S••yros, where he ended his days. Mnesteus usurped the King∣dom; but having held his ill gotten honour but a little while, the sons of Theseus were remitted to the Throne of their father, and Theseus was ever after adored amongst them as a God.
Now if there be any thing in this story, which makes for our Author, much good may it do him.
And lastly, Romulus cannot sure be said to have instituted the Common∣wealth
of Rome, any more than Charles the Fifth the Republick of Holland, from whose successors those people re∣belled. Tacitus says most clearly, That Rome was governed in the begin∣ning by Kings, and that their liberty was procured by L. Brutus. Ʋrbem Romam à principio reges habuere. Li∣bertatem & consulatum L. Brutus in∣stituit. And to shew the extent of his power, he tells us, Ann. lib. 3. that Romulus governed them according to his will. Romulus ut libitum nobis im∣peraverat. Plutarch calls the Govern∣ment all along a Monarchy, and after Romulus had instituted the Se∣nate, composed of the Patricii or chief Citizens, whensoever he appointed them to meet, they were obliged, says he, to observe his orders and com∣mands, without making any reply. Constat initio civitatis Reges omnem potestatem habuisse, says Pomponius. That in the beginning of the City (of Rome) their Kings enjoyed intirely the whole Soveraign Authority.
But not to multiply Authorities, to prove such vulgar truths, I shall refer
you to our Authors chief Divine, I mean the Divine Machiavel, (as he stiles him more than once) his words are full and very intelligible, where he calls all three Princes and their Governments Kingdoms. Verum ut ad eos, qui non fortuna, sed singulari virtute in Principes sunt evecti venia∣mus, (speaking all the while of Kings) excellentiores dico fuisse Mosen, Cyrum, Romulum, Theseum, and again, which puts all out of dispute, At qui Cyrum & reliquos, qui Regna sibi pepererunt, & constituerunt, &c. And farther of Romulus, quo Romano imperio potiretur, de Principe, ca. 6. And yet Plato Red. hath the confidence to affirm p. 31. that Romulus himself was no more than the first officer of the Common∣wealth, and (chosen as the Doge of Venice is) for life.
But if Plato's Divine were not an ignorant Ass, then our Author is certainly a very impudent impostor.
Merch. Indeed, Cousin, I have great reason to believe, that Plato's autho∣rities and examples are as false, as his principles absurd. Besides, sup∣posing
these great men had instituted popular Governments, (as I am fully convinced they did not) what doth that concern us? Is there no differ∣ence between the foundation of a new Government, and the continuation of an old one? Is there no distinction be∣tween the Roman State in its infancy, which extended not for several years above fifteen Miles, beyond their Walls, and the Empire of great Bri∣tain and Ireland? We know that many priviledges may be granted to the people at first for encouragement, which afterwards may be inconsistent with the safety of the Government. And is there no regard to be had to different circumstances? but let us proceed.
In p. 62. we read, That it is not dangerous to a City, to have their people rich; but to have such a power in the Governing part of the Empire, as should make those, who manage the affairs of the Commonwealth depend upon them, which came afterwards to be that, which ruined their libertie, and which the Gracchi endeavoured to prevent, when
it was too late. What means he by this?
Sir, We will preserve his sence, but giving other names to the Country, People, and Governours, we shall see more plainly how it runs. Let us say then, that it is not dangerous for England, to have their people rich even in land (for he speaks immediate∣ly before of the Romans purchasing lands) but to have such a share in the right of Government as should make the King, who manages the affairs of the Kingdom depend upon them; methinks it is very clear, and it has ever been my judgment, that the people might have what proportion their industry could procure them in the lands, pro∣vided they did not pretend to any share in the Soveraign authority.
But this is directly contrary to his own beloved Aphorism. Sure there must be somewhat more in it, or else you will make him contradict himself.
Faith, Sir, I cannot help that, Truth will come out sometimes in spite of the Devil. Nor know I how
to mend his sense, except I should make him appear, at the same time, the most false, partial, and prejudiced scribler that ever wrote.
No matter, Sir, let us, if we can, preserve his sense, which I believe he values himself most upon, and let his honestly and honour take their chance.
Let us then see what follows, Which, says he, came afterwards to be that which ruin'd their liberty, and which the Gracchi endeavour'd to prevent. Pray Cousin, what is the antecedent to which, in these two places?
Sure, Sir, that is most plain; and according to my understanding, it is, that power in the governing part of the Empire, &c.
You are right without doubt; and I dare affirm, that Q. Ennius him∣self, could not make any other con∣struction of it. And if so, then the whole sentence runs thus. It was not dangerous to the Commonwealth of Rome to have their Subjects rich; but it was dangerous that the Subject should have such a power in the governing part of the Empire, as should make their Governours
depend upon them, which power of the people in the governing part of the Em∣pire, came afterwards to be that, which ruin'd the peoples liberty. And which power (for all the world knows, that, and, in this place is a conjunction co∣pulative) the Gracchi endeavour'd to prevent, &c.
Now, Sir, the first part of this Sen∣tence is most really sound doctrine and truth, though diametrically opposite to Plato's grand proposition, upon which undeniable Aphorism, as he says, he is to build most of his subsequent rea∣soning.
For indeed the people, though ne∣ver so rich, are by no means to be trusted with a right of power, but as I have said, rather the contrary, lest they should confound government, or set it upon its head, with its feet up∣permost. And so that power, which the Roman people pretended to, under the Seditious Gracchi and others, was the true cause which made the Com∣monwealth no longer governable un∣der that form. Haec ipsa in perniciem redibant & misera Respublica in exiti∣um
suum merces erat. Flor. l. 3. c. 13.
But lest all should come to ruine, and the conquering Romans be at last overcome by their own victorious arms, the arbitrary government of the Roman Emperours was introduc'd, as the only remedy for the truly distem∣pered State. Non aliud discordantis patriae remedium fuisse quam ut ab uno regeretur, Tacit. Ann. 1.
But how the Gracchi endeavour'd to prevent this power in the people, who stood up so violently for them, is a riddle, which can be salv'd this only way, That in truth, though they set on foot the popular pretence of Liberty and Property, yet honour and Empire was the true game, which they them∣selves hunted. Seditionum omnium cau∣s••s (saith Florus) Tribunitia potestas excitavit, quae specie quidem Plebis tuen∣dae, cujus in auxilium comparata est, re aut••m Dominationem sibi acquirens, stu∣dium populi ac favorem Agrariis, fru∣mentariis, Judiciariis legibus, aucupaba∣tur.
Sir, I am apt to believe, that our Author means by which, in the last
place, The ruin of the people's Liber∣ty, which the Gracchi endeavour'd to prevent.
Indeed the sence is somewhat mended, but the English is stark nought, however we'l consider it ac∣cording to your construction, the story then is this, Tib. Gracchus an ambitious Gentleman, and discontented with the Senate, for what reason I care not, struck in with the people, and became their Tribune.
The first great thing which he un∣dertook, (in outward appearance, for the good of the people, but truly for the advancement of his own private designs and Empire, which he affected) was, the establishment of the Agrarian law, and restitution of the lands among the people.
Pray what was the Agrarian law, and land, which the people so much desired might be restored. Had they any injustice done them, or were they forceably taken from them?
No sure, Sir, If there were any injustice in the case, it lay in the restoration; but you shall be Judge
your self. When the Romans under the Infancy of their Government had conquer'd any of their neighbours, they usually took away some of their lands, which were disposed of, partly for the support of the State, or publick revenue, and the other part was distri∣buted among the indigent Citizens and Soldiers, especially the Lame, An∣cient, and decrepit, and such as had deserved well, who were thence called Emeriti, or Veterani milites, now these Lands remained to them and their heirs, upon the payment of some small ac∣knowledgment, or performance of some certain Services which were in the Nature of Tenures. But in pro∣cess of time, when the Roman Empire, and with it, luxury encreas'd, the com∣mon people, following the example of their Governours, liv'd in great ease and plenty. To support which, many sold their lands, either to the richer Noblemen, or to their fellow Citizens, as they could find a Chapman. Ʋnde enim Pop. Romanus Agros & Cibarios flagitat, nisi per sam••m, quam, Luxus, fe∣cerat, hinc ergo Gracchana seditio, Flor. l. 3. cap. 12.
Was there no difference be∣tween the Lands given to the Citizens, and those which were thus bestowed upon the Soldiers?
Yes, those granted to the Citizens were of the more ancient In∣stitution and called Clientela's, which some good Authors believe to have been the original of all Tenures. Those given to the Soldiers were called Praeda militaria, or stipendiaria, and were such lands as had been taken from some conquered Provinces (as hath been be∣fore declared) Those which bordered upon the Skirts of the Enemies Coun∣tries, were generally granted unto some of their principal Captains and Commanders, which became an In∣heritance to themselves, and posterity upon presumption and Condition, that they should, and would defend their Prince and Country, with the greater courage and fidelity, since in effect they secured at the same time, their own Estates. Hence it is supposed, that those Inheritances which we now call Feuds had (in process of time) their first Institution, though the word
Feod••m was unknown to the ancient Romans.
And it is further conjectured, That from the differences between those Clientela's and these Praeda militaria, sprang our ancient Tenures, and their several diversities, as grand Serjeanty, Knights Service, Soccage, &c. Now these Praeda militaria were not (in their Original Institution) alienable, so as the Clientela's were, whence (as hath been said) the Citizens or Clientes, took the liberty to sell these lands▪ as their occasions required, which lands so sold, became, as in good reason they ought, the inheritance of the purcha∣sers, and so descended from father to son for several generations, till at last it came into the fancy of Tib. Gracchus to have these lands restor'd again to the people.
And that he might kill two birds with one stone, that is, impoverish the Senate, or Government, which (being an Aristocracy) he hated, and enrich the people whom he seemingly pro∣tected, he order▪d that the purchasers, or those in whose families these lands
were found, should be re-imburst out of the publick revenue.
You may guess what a disturbance this must needs make, among the Se∣nators and Noblemen whom it chiefly concern'd, and what inconveniences would inevitably happen upon a re∣distribution of those lands, which had been so long consolidated with their own.
Nothing, methinks, could be more unreasonable, and unjust.
Trav. No matter, Sir, for as I have seen two doors of a room so artificially contriv'd, that the shutting of one, hath at the same motion open'd the other; so generally wheresoever Am∣bition enters, Justice immediately avoids the place; and indeed, Haud bene conveniunt.—
Gracchus therefore, eagerly pursuing Dominion, Ʋt qui die Comitiorum prorogari sibi vellet Imperium, puts for∣ward this Agrarian Law with great vehemency. Which, when his Col∣legue, and another Tribune of the people, M. Octavius, oppos'd; (with∣out whose consent nothing could be
concluded, nor law pass'd) most contra∣ry to all Justice, and Law too, Gracchus by force and violence, (a thing before un∣heard of) turns him out of his Office.
Having thus gain'd his point, and ready to finish what he had so prospe∣rously begun, Scipio Nasica, with the most worthy of the Citizens and Nobi∣lity cuts him off; and for a mark of ignominy, flings his carkass into the river.
Now as the same Laws were pro∣moted by his brother Caius, with this difference, that he extended his inso∣lence farther, deferring the Judgment of cases, which had been ever particu∣lar to the Senate, to the people, and in∣troducing the antiquated Licinian Law, by which no Citizen was to possess a∣bove 500. acres of land, within the Domi∣cilium Imperii; so the same fate attended him, and that even with the consent of the people, for whose sake he seem'd to have pursu'd this specious design; Who perceiving at length the ambiti∣on and irregular proceedings of their great Patron, the injustice of their pre∣tensions, and the little good the restitu∣tion
of these lands would do them∣selves, they totally deserted him. In∣somuch, that Caius, when his fatal hour drew near, fell down before the Statue of Diana, praying, That the people, who had so basely abandon'd him, might never enjoy that liberty, which he endeavour'd to have obtain'd for them.
I am much satisfi'd with this story, and am apt to believe, that ma∣ny of our own worthy Patriots, who cry up so much for Liberty and Proper∣ty, and the interest of the people, in∣tend more really their own particular advancement; yet nevertheless you see our Author calls these men Illustrious, and renowned persons, their actions and undertakings Heroick.
He doth so; and undoubted∣ly he would say the same thing if he durst, not only of Brutus, but of the Dominican Friar, Ravillac, and Hugh Peters himself, (or whoever else it was) that murder'd our late Soveraign.
But you have heard the opinion of Florus, with whom Plutarch agrees, and all the ancient Authors, that I have yet met withal. And to conclude,
Tacitus, who seems to have been friend enough to a Democratical Go∣vernment, calls them disturbers of the people. Hinc Gracchi, & Saturnini tur∣batores plebis. Ann. l. 3.
Tis well; We come now to Agis and Cleomenes. Who were they?
They were Kings of Sparta, and their Designs and Fates much the same with the Gracchi. The difference was chiefly this, that the former being already Kings, they endeavoured by the same means, that is to say, by abolition of debts, or novae tabulae, di∣stribution of lands and favour of the people, to procure to themselves an ab∣solute authority against the usurped power of the Ephori. The Gracchi, being truly Subjects, followed the same course to usurp the Empire, but against the lawful Authority of the Senate. This is only to be observed of Cleome∣nes, that at the same time, when he endeavoured to possess the Soveraign power, he thought it nevertheless no Solecism in the Politicks, to give the property of the Lands among the people.
In a word, the same wheel, trouble∣some and dangerous ambition, moved equally all four; against which Plu∣tarch inveighs most severely, in his in∣troduction to the Lives of those Spar∣tan Kings.
And may all ambitious di∣sturbers of our peace, meet with the same Catastrophe. Next our Author tells us, that alteration of the pro∣perty, is the Ʋnica corruptio politica.
I grant it, Sir, if you apply property to the right of power in Go∣vernment, but not if restrained to Lands, as hath been already proved. And for the favourable opinion which he hath of confusion, or Anarchy, may himself be confounded (in this world I mean) by his own loose principles, and ungovernable unquiet Spirit.
What say you of the Laws and Government of Switzerland, and the Low Countries?
Little Sir; their Laws and Governments are as notoriously known, as their Rebellions; and several Au∣thors have writ fully of both.
Very good, we come next to the most famous Republick of Ve∣nice, where amongst other things vulgar enough, our Nobleman tells us, that the great difficulty in the admi∣nistration of that Republick, hath been to regulate their Nobility, and to bridle their Faction and ambition, which can alone breed a disease in the vital part of their Government. And this they do by most severe Laws, and a very vigorous execution of them.
Right: But because he hath not been pleased to let you know what those Laws are, give me leave to in∣form you. I shall not speak of little Mutineers, those poor Rogues are easily cut off. But come to the great and noble Villains, and concerning such their Law is this:—when any eminent man, whose relations and dependences are commonly very great, shall (using as yet no other weapon than his tongue)—defame the Govern∣ment, by calumnies and opprobrious Speeches, and thereby endeavour to draw off, first the affection, and next the obedience of the people to their law∣ful
Magistrate, and that the Govern∣ment thinks not fit to call him pub∣lickly to account, lest some disturb∣ance might happen through the inte∣rest of his friends; or least the muni∣cipal Laws of the State might not be sufficient to reach his life for any par∣ticular thing, though his complicated ills make him obnoxious, in general to the Government, and dangerous in it, or that a perjured Jury should ac∣quit him, which would make him more malicious than before, knowing full well, that when a man becomes so purged, the Devil enters into him again with nine Spirits worse than him∣self. I say under such circumstances, their method of—proceeding is this. First, information being given to some of the Consiglio di Dieci—and sufficient evidence concerning matter of fact, his process is made, which re∣quires very little time, and by majori∣ty of votes he is condemned to die; the offender being all this while ignorant of what is doing, and at liberty as at other times. This done, the business comes into the hands of the Inquis••tori
del Stato, who are three annual officers, chosen out of the Dieci—as also the Gao or Capo di Dieci—who are also three, but chosen monthly, and out of the same body. These Inquisitori are to see the Sentence executed, which is left to their discretion, and which they manage according to the circum∣stances of the offender. If there be no difficulty in taking him at home, then the way is this: the Inquisitori, or any two of them, send for a file of Muske∣teers or more, who accompanied with an Officer, Confessor, and Execu∣tioner, and in the most quiet time of the night, they force (if need be) the house of the offender; where be∣ing apprehended, he is acquainted, at the same instant, both with his offence and punishment. It is too late, and in vain to plead, or dispute; but being carried away into a Gondola prepared to receive him, they put off, accompa∣nied with another, toward the Sea, and being come to the place they de∣sign, the offender having received ab∣solution from his Confessor, they place him upon the midst of a Plank laid be∣tween
the two Gondola's, with a Stone about his neck, then putting off their Boat, the criminal falls, for ever for∣gotten, to the bottom of the Sea, nor is there a man in the whole state of Ve∣nice, who dares ever after inquire what is become of this Great Noble∣man; sometimes in such case they are strangled. But if the offender hap∣pens to be a person having a great re∣tinue (as many have of Bravos) and that the forcing of his Palace may prove troublesom, and make too great a noise from the opposition which the officer may meet withal, from the number of the Domesticks, then the Inquisitori send for some of the most daring and notorious of the Banditi, and at the same time accompany the message with a pass or safe-conduct, both for his coming to Venice, and return.
Upon his appearance before the In∣quisitori, they inform him of their business, which is, to hire him, at the price of his own pardon, and a con∣siderable reward, to shoot or stab such a Nobleman, who hath been condem∣ned
by the Consejo di Dieci—and that to be done whereever he meet him even in the midst of the place of St. Marco.
The Bandito seldom refuseth these conditions, but requires their order for his own absolution. Upon which the Inquisitori give him a billet, or piece of white paper folded up after a certain manner, and markt with their nail only, without any word or writ∣ten letter whatever. This done, the Bandito dispatcheth the Nobleman, but no man knowing that this person had ever been accused, much less condemned. The Bandito, as an assassinate, is carri∣ed immediately to prison. Who when he comes there, demands the Keeper of the Prison, or chief officer, to whom he delivers his billet, upon sight of which, the doors of the Prison are im∣mediately set open, and the Bandito re∣turns whither he thinks fitting him∣self.
After which, none even of his near Relations—dare ever make any questi∣on concerning his death. Such is the punishment, and such the manner of executing notorious and eminent Calum∣niators
of the Venetian Government. And sure it hath been one of the great∣est reasons, that hath preserv'd that State so long from a Popular or a Mo∣narchical Usurpation.
Now though this be the practice of the most renowned Republick of Venice, yet I am confident our Author would much blame such an Arbitrary way of proceeding under any Monar∣chical government, especially if him∣self (as he justly deserves) should hap∣pen to be made the first example, as he is of that kind, one of the greatest offenders.
The Tongue indeed is an un∣ruly and a dangerous member, and in my opinion, in some cases, ought to be restrain'd under no less penalties, than we do the violent actions of our hands.
Your next remark is in p. 88. where it is said, that the people, (under the Ro∣man Emperours) who had really an in∣terest to endeavour a change of Govern∣ment, were so prevented by seeing the Prince, whom they designed to supplant, removed to their hand, that they were
puzled what to do; taking in the mean time great recreation to see those wild beasts hunted down themselves, who had so often prey'd upon their lives and estates, &c.
Very fine sport indeed for an old Rebel, and I am perswaded, Plato would be highly pleas'd (as old as he is) to follow briskly some such Royal chase. But his blood-hounds are at pre∣sent a little out of tune, and I hope he will lose his impious diversion. But to return to his Historical observation, he tells us, that the people, who had an interest to change the Government, want∣ed time to destroy their Prince themselves, because it was done so to their hands. And yet the mischief on't is, that un∣der the first change of the Govern∣ment which is generally the most in∣supportable, the people had as much time as they could have wish'd. For Augustus liv'd an Emperour about for∣ty years, and dy'd in peace, beloved and lamented.
Tiberius, his Successor, had obtain'd the age of Seventy eight before he left his Empire, with the world; a time
long enough for such good Subjects and Patriots of their country as Plato Redi∣vivus, to have chang'd the Arbitrary Government to its ancient popular con∣stitution.
Claudius also reign'd long enough, and the people wanted not time nor opportunity. And for those succeed∣ing Caesars, as Nero, Galba, Otho, Vitel∣lius, they were taken off rather by the fury of the Soldiers, and private ma∣lice and ambition of particular men, than discontent of the Citizens. Nay, the people, as they chiefly defended their Emperours whilst alive, so they were the most considerable sufferers by their deaths. And notwithstanding the great irregularity in the Politick principles of those Emperours, by keeping the Soveraign power, and yet leaving the property to the people. That Empire (though latterly much divi∣ded and dismembred, chiefly by the Emperours themselves, and partly by the Ambition of the Roman Bishops) hath subsisted 1700 years, and may for ought we know, continue as many more, and yet no Government more
averse to our great Politicians rule.
But, Sir, if we must answer all the impertinencies, incongruities, and mis∣applications of this Scribbling States∣man, there will be no end of our dis∣course. Pray therefore let us make as short work as we can, and to that purpose we will reduce what is most considerable under some heads. And the first thing which occurs, is the ac∣count which he gives, p. 97. and 145. of the Government of France; In which he tells us, that France hath no Freemen below the Nobility, that is Yeo∣men. That the Gentry are very needy and numerous, because the elder brother in most parts of the Kingdom, hath no more share in the division of the paternal estate, than the Cadets, excepting the principal house, &c. which they call, Vol de Cha∣pon. And from hence he draws seve∣ral false arguments. To the first, I cannot find, upon the best examina∣tion I could make, any considerable difference between the constitution of France, and that of England, as to the Gentry and Commonalty. For al∣though I do not observe, any such
titular distinction as Yeomen in France, which is also antiquated, or almost lost and confounded amongst us. Yet there is a notorious difference between the Roturiers, or those whom he calls Villains, and the Freeholders. The latter are compos'd generally of little Merchants, Tradesmen, Shop-keepers, and such like, and they are distinguish'd by their Tenures or Services, which they call Droit de Corvie, and Droit de Censive. The first is properly Vil∣lenage, as, working for his Lord, ei∣ther with his Body, Cart, or Horses, or such like. The other, that is to say, Droit de Censive, doth not oblige the Free-holder to any manner of servile office, but only the payment of some small rent, as Cocks, Hens, or some little part of the profits. They have their Quint and Requint, which are certain Fines upon Alienations, as also their Copyholders, and lands held in Ga∣velkind; and in a word, I know no greater difference, between the French and English Subjects, as to the point of Lands and Properties, than this, That the Lands ennoble, or at least
give Titles in France, as Comte, Baron, Marquiss, which priviledges were taken away, I think, from the English, un∣der the reign of Hen. 3. and which came originally from the French, being introduc'd by William the Conqueror.
As for the needy and numerous Gen∣try, to the last, all the world knows, that France is extreme populous, as well in Commonalty as Gentry. The men being very Brisk, and the women, it seems, very Pregnant. But for their wants, I mean of the Gentry, I think it is as publickly known, that they pro∣ceed generally from a different cause, from what our Author hath assign'd. That is, from the Scruple which they make of undertaking any Mercan∣tile employment, which is the greatest support of our English families, so that there is no Cadet of a house ennobled, who had not rather trail a pike, than be an apprentice to the greatest Merchant in France.
All these Cadets, our Author hath brought to Court, and made them the chief props of the present French Go∣vernment and greatness. But he hath
forgot, That as the young French No∣bility are very numerous, so the vast number of Ecclesiastical Preferments, Monasteries and Temporal offices, de∣pending eternally and at all times upon the Crown, do entertain so many of these young Cadets, that I am confident, at least two thirds of the younger chil∣dren, are provided for after this man∣ner, without depending immediately upon the King's Purse. As to the di∣vision of the Paternal estate, amongst the Cadets, except the principal house, which he calls Vol de chapon, our Buz∣zardly Author of a French Capon, hath made a long-wing'd Hawk. For what he calls most part of the Kingdom, is particular to Paris only, as with us in London, and Kent formerly, (I sup∣pose by reason of the Traders) the Isle of France, Limousin, Xantonge, and it may be some one Province more, which possibly I have not remembred.
Thus you see, Cousin, how our Au∣thor augments, or diminisheth, changetth or disguiseth the truth of things, as they make most convenient for his purpose, and what little credit ought to be given
to him. We shall therefore take no more notice of France. For his pre∣mises being demonstrably false, his consequence whatsoever it be, cannot hold good.
Sir, I never thought all to be Gospel, that hath been preached by our divine Plato. But now we come to the Clergy, let us see what respect he hath for the Spiritual Government, since the Temporal doth so much offend him. He tells us then very sincerely and frankly, that he could wish, there never had been any Clergy amongst us, &c. For you know the Northern people did not bring Christianity into these parts, but found it here.
Most excellent. You may perceive how happy we are like to be under the New Government of our infamous Author, who rebelling against God, and Man appointed to rule over us by Gods authority, hath left nothing that I know of, to set up for, but H••ll and the Devil. But his argument is very strong, for the Northern people did not bring Christianity into these parts.
Indeed it is great pity that we have not retain'd the Gothick, or Saxon, and Northern Paganism with the Gothick Polities. But our learned Historian, should have had at least so much respect for Antiquity as to have consider'd, that the Ecclesiastical Government, or Clergy, was establish'd here according to his own confession, even before the barba∣rous Northern people came here them∣selves, and I thank God, it still con∣tinues in a great measure amongst us, even at this day, and I hope is like to do so, notwithstanding the Fanatical and pernicious doctrine of Plato and his hellish disciples. And for the institution of our Ecclesiastical government, and foundation of our Bishopricks, and many of our Monasteries, which our Author ascribes to most villanous causes, 'tis certain from the best Histories ex∣tant among us, that King Lucius, about the year 180. converted no less than thirty one of the Temples of the Hea∣thenish Flamins and Arch-flamins into so many Christian Bishopricks, whereof London, York & Caerlyon, now S. Davids, were made the Metropolitans of the Province.
But our Pagan Politician, hating Christianity it self, hates no less the esta∣blishment of the Christian Religion, which he vilifies with notorious slan∣ders and falsities. And as for Monaste∣ries, not to give a particular account of all their several beginnings, which were generally from the benevolence of most pious men and women, and too many to be numbred, we read that King Edgar the peaceable, founded no less for his own share than forty seven.
Sir, I concur with you both in your History and your hopes, and shall ever add my most hearty prayers, and wishes. But our Author proceeds, and in the next page, had he had wit enough, he would have turn'd the whole order into ridicule. But know∣ing well that his strongest arguments, and chiefest talent consists in opprobri∣ous language, the foul-mouth'd Fana∣tick is not asham'd to call our Christian Ancestors barbarous, and those good men, who at the expence of their blood and liv••s, pla••ted and prop••gated the Christian Faith amongst ••s, Vipers.
He is equally mistaken in both. For not six pages farther, that is in p. 106. he there is pleas'd to give our An∣cestors, the title of a plain-hearted and well-meaning people, who were barba∣rous before in p. 100. But to call a man a Saint or a Devil, is indifferent to him, and promiseuously us'd, ac∣cording as either serves best for his purpose.
For the Ecclesiastical Vipers, I do not think indeed that his wit has fur∣nish'd him, with a character answer∣able to the design of his malice. For a Viper is known to be an Animal, much more useful and valuable, than our Au∣thor himself is like to be. For although that God and Nature have given it a sting, or teeth if you will, to defend it self from violence, and punish such as offend it, yet we know, that of its body are compos'd the most Soveraign Cor∣dials: Such are the excellent Works of our Learned Clergy, which are found to be the most effectual Antidotes against the poysonous Blasphemies and Heresi••s of our Schismatical Dissenters. Besides, Naturalists assure us, that the
Viper hath such a care, and tender af∣fection for its young, that upon any pressing danger, she receives them a∣gain into her own body, and charged with the load and safety of what her self gave life to, suffers no injury to approach them until first it hath passed through her own body, and she de∣stroyed. But our unnatural sneaking and malicious worm, and good besides for nothing, is barbarous enough to tear out the bowels of his indulgent mother, (the Holy Church I mean) even whilst those very bowels, are yearning to see the sad condition of her desperately abandoned Son, and in the height of his wickedness, opens her tender arms to receive this child of perdition into her Sacred bosome. But the Prodigal will never return, and so let us leave him, whilst our Church of England, wanting as little my de∣fence as, apprehending his reproaches, will still remain firm upon the rock, secure, though sadly lamenting those miserable shipwracks, which storms of our own rasing have procured.
And may the providence of Heaven preserve her, until from mili∣tant she becomes triumphant. In the mean time, I perceive, we are like to have more work about the civil Go∣vernment. For in p. 103, our Au∣thor tells us, that the Soveraign power of England is in King, Lords and Com∣mons.
Right, Sir, when there is a Parliament in being, and as it is taken for one intire body, of which, the King is Principium, caput & finis. But there is no Soveraign power in the house of Commons, neither is there a Sove∣raign power in the house of Lords, either conjunctim or divisim, joyntly or separately without the King, therefore the Soveraign right of power can be no where but in the King; right of coun∣cil is in the Lords and Commons in Parliament duly assembled, but right of command is in the King. For he both calls the Parliament and dis∣solves it. One Soveraign power cannot dissolve another Soveraign power (could they be supposed together) except by force. But the Kings of
England have ever called and dissolved Parliaments, not by force, but by right of power and command, which belongs to them by inherent birthright, and lawful and undoubted Succession. A Bill which shall have regularly past both Houses, and brought even to the Royal assent, is no Act, nor hath it any manner of force, as such, without the Kings will. Le Roy le veult doth solely, and necessarily transform a Bill into a Sta∣tute, and is the essential constituent part of it. His Will doth alone give life and being to that which is no more than a dead insignificant letter without it. Nay though a Bill should pass both Houses with the unanimous consent, and approbation of every in∣dividual Member, yet the King may refuse it; and it is indisputably the right of our Kings so to do, if they shall so think sitting; which prove evidently (amongst other things) that the Soveraign Power is solely in our Kings.
But, Sir, Plato Red. insinu∣ates very strongly, p. 123. that It is a violation of right, and infringment of
the Kings Coronation Oath, to frustrate the counsels of a Parliament by his nega∣tive voice, and that in his opinion the King is bound confirmare consuetudines, or pass such laws as the people shall choose.
The Delphick Oracle did never impose Laws more peremptorily to the Greeks, than Plato Red. would arrogantly obtrude his private opini∣ons upon us; for notwithstanding all the Laws are against him, yet he alone would pretend to devest the King of this his undoubted Prerogative.
But, Sir, there is a difference be∣tween new modelling a Government, and maintaining it according to its ancient institution: If Plato designs the first, he may as well pretend it is in∣convenient that the Imperial Crown of England should be Hereditary, and Successive, and endeavour to make it Elective; for the right of a negative voice in Parliament, is as certainly the Prerogative of the Kings of England, as their right of Inheritance or Suc∣cession is.
But having no design to d•…•…te so much at this time, what ••lteration might be convenient for us, as ••o main∣tain, what the Kings Right ••••▪ and ever hath been, according to the ••••∣cient, as well as present Cons•…•…tion of the Government, I must, 〈…〉〈…〉 do averr, That the King, enjoyin•• ••••re∣ditarily, and undeniably this N•…•…tive voice in Parliament, hath himself the Supreme power of England. And this, the English Gentleman and his Doctor seem to acknowledge, p. 105.
Besides, If the Soveraign power of England were not solely in the King, then when there is no Parliament there could be no Soveraign power in England, which is ridiculous and absurd. For there is no Free and independent King∣dom, or Commonwealth upon earth, in which there is not at all times, a Soveraign power in being. If the So∣veraign power ceaseth for a moment, the power which remains becomes de∣pendent, and at the same instant a higher power must appear. But the Imperial Crown of England depends upon none but God. Omnis sub Rege, & ipse sub
nullo, nisi tantum Deo, says Bracton, an ancient and a Learned Author: and again, Rex non habet superiorem nisi Deum, The King has no Superiour but God. Or as it was express'd under H. 4. The Regality of the Crown of Eng∣land, is immediately subject to God, and to none other.
But since the King can neither make any Laws, nor levy any Taxes without the consent of both Houses, it shews sure, that at least some of the Soveraign power resides in them.
I perceive, Cousin, you have forgot your Grotius, for he tells you, that you must distinguish between the Empire, and the manner of holding the Empire, or the Jus ab usu Juris. Aliud enim est Imperium, aliud habendi modus. So that although the Kings of England do generally promise, or swear not to alter the Government, nor to make Laws, or levy impositions, but accord∣ing to the ancient Constitutions of the Kingdom; yet nevertheless this takes not from him his Soveraign right of power, for that he hath in him by Birthright and Inheritance, and accord∣ing
to the Original Institution of the Kingdom, and which is antecedent and Superiour also to any Oaths or Ob∣ligations. I'll give you Grotius his own words, as you will find them, l. 1. c. 3. s. 16. Non definit summum esse Imperium, etiamsi is qui imperaturm est, promittat aliqua subditis, etiam talia, quae ad imperandi rationem pertineant. But he confesseth indeed, that such a Constitution, is a little limitation to the Supreme power. Fatendum tamen arctius quodammodo reddi Imperium. But it doth not follow from thence, that there is any authority Superiour to his own. Non inde tamen sequitur ita pro∣mittenti Superiorem dari aliquem. And he gives you the example of the Persian Monarchs, who though they were as absolute as any Kings could be, yet when they enter'd upon the Govern∣ment, they sware to observe certain Laws, which they could not alter. Apud Persas, Rex summo cum Imperio erat, tamen & jurabat, cum regnum adi∣ret, & leges certa quadam forma latas mutare illi nefas erat. So also that the Egyptian Kings were bound to the ob∣servance
of several Customs and Consti¦tutions, Aegyptiorum Reges, quos tame•• ut alios Reges Orientis, summo imperio usos non est dubium, ad multarum rerum observationem oblig abantur.
Very well, Sir, but pray why may not the Soveraign power remain still in the people, especially if all be true, which our Author boldly affirms, p. 119. viz. That our Prince hath no au∣thority of his own, but what was first en∣trusted in him by the Government, of which he is head.
Here Plato plays the Villain egregiously, is a Traitor incognito, and carries Treason in a dark lanthorn, which he thinks to discover or conceal according to the success of Rebellion which he evidently promotes. But we shall unmask this Republican Faux. And first our King, whom he calls Prince, (not understanding, it may be, the difference between Regnum and Principa••us) hath no authority, saith he, but what was first intrusted by the Government. Here Government is a word of an amphibious nature, and can as well subsist under a Monarchy, as a
Commonwealth. For if Rebellion doth not prosper, then Government in this place signifies the Law of the Land; and indeed, the King's authority over us is establish'd by the Law, that is to say, the consent and acknowledgment of the People in due form, That the King hath inherently, antecedently, and by Birth-right, a Soveraign authority over all his people, and this is con∣firm'd to him, both by Statute, Com∣mon Law and Custom, according to that of 19. H. 6. 62. The Law is the inheri∣tance of the King and people, by which they are rul'd, King and people. But if the Commonwealths men gain their point, if the Association, and its brat, bloody murder, had taken its damnable effect, then Government had most plainly signified the People, and that is truly our Authors meaning; for the words which immediately follow are these, Nor is it to be imagin'd, that they would give him more power, than what was necessary to govern them. What can be the antecedent to They and Them, but the word Subjects, which precedes in the beginning of the Sen∣tence.
This is the true Presbyterian or Phanatick way of speaking their most mischievous Treasons, which like a Bizzare, with a little turn of the hand, represents ether the Pope or the Devil.
But since we are so plainly assured of his meaning, I'll take the liberty for once, to put it plainly into words, and I think it will then run thus: That our King, having neither by birthright, nor by a long undoubted Succession of above six hundred years, any Authority of his own, but only that which the people have intrusted in him, (for they would give him no more, than what was just necessary to govern them, p. 119.) the people, in whom the Soveraign power resides, may call this their minister, otherwise called King, to an account for the ad∣ministration of this his trust; and in case he should not acquit himself, ac∣cording to their expectation, the Soveraign Subject might punish this their Subject King, turn him out of his office, as all Supreme governours may their subordinate officers, nay and set
up any other form of Government whatsoever, without doing any man∣ner of injustice to their King.
This is our Authors doctrine, as appears not only by inevitable conse∣quences, drawn from this m••tuated or fide-commissary power, which he hath placed in the King, but from the whole context, and course of his Li∣bel.
Now though Hell it self could not have invented a proposition more no∣toriously false, though the whole Asso∣ciation could not have asserted a more Traiterous principle, though the Su∣preme power or Soveraign right of Government, hath been fixed to the imperial Crown of England, ever since the beginning of History or Kings amongst us, or the memorial of any time, though more than twenty Parliaments, which are the wisdom and Representatives of the whole Na∣tion, have by several explanatory Acts and Statutes, confessed, declared and affirmed, that this Soveraign Autho∣rity, or power of England is solely in the King, and his la••••ul Heirs and Suc∣cessors,
in exclusion to all other mortal power whatsoever. Rex habet potesta∣tem & jurisdictionem super omnes qui in regno suo sunt; Nay although all the Power, Priviledges, Liberties, and even the Estates of the people proceeded originally from the meer bounty of our Kings; as both ancient and modern Authors, and Histories have evidently made it appear; And after all, not∣withstanding our Author hath not produced one single authority, or one little peice of an Act, Statute or Law, to prove that the Soveraign power is in the people, or that the King held his authority only in trust from them, (as he plainly affirms) or when they entrusted him with it, or had it in themselves to grant; yet by an un∣parallelled piece of impudence and vanity, he dares to bring his own pri∣vate opinion, in competition with the wisdom, learning, practice, decrees and justice of the whole Nation, con∣demn our Ancestors, as betrayers of the peoples rights and priviledges, and by a single, ipse dixit, prove him∣self, the only true Physician, learned
Statesman, and (except some who in most Ages have been Executed for their most horrid Treasons) the only worthy Patriot of his Countrey and Defender of its rights.
Now lest some of our ignorant and infatuated multitude, like the Chil∣dren of Hamel, should dance after our Authors popular and Northern Bag∣pipe, until he precipitates them all into inevitable ruin and destruction, I am resolved not to insist at present upon his Majesties Hereditary and un∣doubted Soveraign right of power, which he now possesses, not only by prescription and a Succession of more than eight hundred years, but by all the La••s of the Land, as hath been al∣ready declared, and the universal con∣sent of all his good Subjects, con∣firmed by their Oaths of Allegeance, from which none but Rebels and per∣jured men can depart: I will not I say at present urge those arguments, which are sufficient to convince▪ opiniastrete, and wilful ignorance it self, but will attack him in his strong∣est Gothick ••orts, and the rational
part, upon which he seems most to value himself.
And first for these Goths, I cannot find in any History, when it was they came over into England, nay I am con∣fident that all Learned men will agree, that there is no probable conjecture from any Author, that they ever have been here, or crost our Seas, or came nearer us than Normandy; one argument (amongst others) is the flourishing condition of our Island a∣bove France (where the Goths and Vandalls had made some ravage) in point of Learning and Sciences, in∣somuch that Alcuinus an Englishman, and Scholar to the Venerable Bede, was sent unto Charles the Great, to whom he became Doctor or Professor in Divinity, Astronomy and Philosophy, and by his direction erected the University of Paris. But to return to our Goths, it is certain, that at first they travelled South-East, which is very different from South-West, such as i•• our situation from theirs. And yet our politick Author tells us positively, according to his usual method, that
they establish'd their government in these parts after their conquest, p. 93. And endeavouring to prove in p. 46. and 97. that according to their institution, the people had an influence upon the Go∣vernment, he tells us that the Govern∣ments of France, Spain and England by name, and other countries, where these people setled, were fram'd accordingly.
Here we see our Country conquer'd, and an excellent form of Government establish'd by the Goths, so good, and admirably just, that we in this age must quit our happy Monarchy, which hath subsisted most gloriously many Hun∣dreds of years, only to run a wool-ga∣thering after these precarious Gothick Princes, and yet no man could ever tell us when this conquest happen▪d, nor by whom, nor what became of them, nor indeed any thing more, than what the extravagant fancy of our Author hath imagin'd.
As for the Romans who conquer'd us, sure they were neither Goths, nor Northern people, and so nothing can be pretended from that Conquest, nor are the Saxons, who next invaded us,
to be called Northern people, by us at least, who lye so much North to them our selves.
But forgiving Plato all his absurdi∣ties and incongruities, the rather that we may find out the Truth, and con∣found him with it, we will suppose, that by his Goths and Northern people, he means the Saxons, for the Danes were but a very little while, I think not thirty years, masters of England, and so, what may be gather'd in favour of his popular Government from them, if any thing could, would not be much material.
We will imagine then that our Sax∣ons were of the race of the Goths, and that (retaining their customs) They introduc'd many of them amongst us, such as might be the division of the lands, into several Feuds, which they called Thane lands, (and were like our Mannors or Lordships) under certain Tenures or Services. Many also they might have found amongst the Bri∣tains, and retain'd them under their own Government: for it is certain the Britains held lands by several Tenures,
but whether they were originally of their own Institution, or the remains of the Roman Clientela's, and Praeda militaria, I will not determine.
I have already told you, that the Goths upon their first Transplantation, and after they were setled in their new possessions, were govern'd by Kings, whose power encreas'd despotically, ac∣cording as the people grew secure and civiliz'd, and so they continued above a thousand years; nor do I find that the people in all this time pretended to any other share in the government, than to meet in General Councils, when the affairs of the Kingdom oblig'd their King to assemble them. And truly I ever thought such National Assemblies, when well regulated, very conducible to the security, and happy subsistence of all Governments, and such our antient Monarchs have thought fit to make use of, and have transmitted the custom of convoking such Councils, which we not call Parliaments, even to our days. But that these Counsellors should have any right of command, is so contrary
to the design of their Institution, that as this must needs be dangerous to the Government it self, so they make their good Institution useless, by rendring themselves suspected to the King, who alone hath the right to assemble them. For what wise Magistrate, would by his own authority raise a power, which he apprehends might shock his own.
The sad effects of this, we have seen of late days among our selves, when our Commoners in Parliament, who were meer Counsellors, and no more, or Representatives with a power to consent, have arrogated to them∣selves a Soveraign authority, and un∣der that pretence, have forceably and violently subverted our antient Govern∣ment, and destroyed our Lawful and Natural Governour himself, and have besides, of late, spent so much time in unnecessary new disputes concern∣ing their own rights and prerogatives, which really do not much concern us, that they have totally neglected those main ends of their meeting, which are the Se∣curity of our Government, under our Lawful Soveraign, and the peace and
happiness of his people, and which are the only blessings and benefits, which we desire of them.
Nay, they have been so far from procuring those advantages for us, to which purposes they have been solely entrusted by us, that their disputes concerning the Succession to the Crown of England, which is indisputa∣ble; The Right which the King hath to borrow money upon good Security, which was never taken from the poorest of his Subjects; shewing mercy upon unfortunate offenders, which is his Nature, as well as undoubted Preroga∣tive, and several such other irregular Heats and Animosities, are the most apparent causes of our present horrid Conspiracies, troubles and distractions.
But to return to our Goths, I have told you, that after their division▪—those that spread toward the West and Southern parts of Europe, were in a continual state of war, and so their King was but their General, whom sometimes they did depose or continue, according as they found him capable of that great employment, upon whose
conduct, in their dangerous circum∣stances, their Lives and Fortunes did chiefly depend, and such in some re∣spects was the case of our Saxons un∣der their Heptarchy here in England. All the world knows that they in∣vaded us without any pretence of title, being only call'd in as friends by Vor∣tigern, the British King, to assist him against the Scots, and by degrees en∣croaching upon the Britains, they erected several Kingdoms, until at length the Native Inhabitants were totally over-power'd.
But this made very little alteration in their affairs; for wanting a com∣mon enemy, they were always quar∣relling amongst themselves, usurping upon one another, untill their several little Governments were united under one Soveraign Monarch, who was Eg∣bert as some write, or Alfred the eigh∣teenth King of the West-Saxons.
`Tis true, that during* 1.7 their Heptarchy, they chose one amongst themselves, who was the Supreme head of the rest, and was call'd King of Engle-lond. And it is re∣corded
that eight of the Mercian Kings, in a continued succession, kept the Im∣perial Crown of the Heptarchy. But it was rather a titular honour, than a Soveraign right of Government, and I do not find, but that every particular King in his own Province, did gene∣rally exercise those two great Regali∣ties, of making Laws, and levying Taxes, by vertue of his own authority. But whether they did or not, it is little to our purpose, since we have no reason to follow the examples of those petty Kings and Ʋsurpers, especially when we consider their circumstances. But if we must lay aside the form of Go∣vernment since the Norman conquest, from whence our Aera begins, and concerning which our Histories are more certain and Authentick, let us then rather consult the Administration of those West-Saxons, who solely and Soveraignly enjoy'd the Crown of England. And not to be too tedious, we will six upon King Edward the Con∣fessor, the last (except Harold) of our English Saxon Kings. I shall not trouble you with much neither concerning
him, because you may find at large whatever can be said of him, in our own English Histories. I shall only therefore make this remark, that we have had no Kings since William the Conqueror, nor was he himself, more absolute, than King Edward the Con∣fessor was.
I remember nothing of his imposi∣tions, but rather believe there might have been none during his reign, be∣cause I find that he remitted to his people the yearly Tribute of 40000 l. that had been gathered by the name of Danegelt. But for Laws which now are made by Act of Parliament, I ob∣serve no such Parliamentary way of proceedings in his days. It is true, that he called a Councel, or Wittena Gemote (which some call very impro∣perly a Parliament, especially as it is now understood) in the second year of his Reign, but the Commoners were so far from having any right of power, that their presence was not really ne∣cessary. Minores laici non sammoneri debent, sed si eorum praesentia necessaria fuerit, &c. Which shews plainly, that
they might be omitted. Nay although they were summoned and did not ap∣pear, nevertheless the Parliament was taken to be full without them. Which is a sufficient proof, that the Com∣mons, were not so much as an essen∣tial part of the Parliament; and it is certain that Edward the Confessor took the same course about his Laws, as the Greeks and Romans formerly had done, the first fetching their institu∣tions from the Aegyptians, and the latter from the Greeks. So King Ed∣ward having gathered together the Laws of the Mercians, West Saxons, Danes, and Northumbrians, he select∣ed the best, and compiled them into one body, which (being approved in Council••) by his own authority, he commanded they▪ should be observed, and they were the fountain of those which we call at this day the Common Law.
Canutus the Danish Ʋsurpe••, called also a Council or Parliament at Ox∣ford, in which he made several good Laws, but I do not find that the Com∣moners▪ pretended any right, in the
Supreme authority, at that time, any more than afterwards.
But however I cannot believe, that their example is any argument for us, to forsake the present constitution of our English Monarchy, to hunt after the polity of an Invader, who with his Successors enjoyed not the Crown of England, the fiftieth part so long, as the Norman Line hath done.
Now, Cousin, you see what is be∣come of those great expectations which we might have had, from the noise and bustle, which our Author makes of the Northern polities, and their exact rules of Government, but so it falls out, that in our days, moun∣tains are no less apt to bring forth mice, than formerly. And that when there is a great cry, there is not always the more wooll. For in this case, con∣trary to his undeniable Aphorism, though it may possibly be true, that the Saxons made some division of the Lands amongst the people (for our present division of Lands and Tenures also, were generally made and insti¦tuted by the Normans) yet they re¦tained
the Soveraign authority them∣selves.
Sir, I am obliged to you for remembring me, of what I had read before, but could not apply it so well to our present purpose, as you have done. But believing that you are clearly in the right, I shall not trouble you any farther concerning those Northern polities, but desire that you would proceed, and let me know what you mean by the rational part.
By the rational part, I mean this, that granting all to be true, which our Author hath affirmed, con∣cerning those Goths and Northern people, and that in the original consti∣tution of our Government, the people had a share in the Supreme Authority, and that the prerogative, which our King at present lawfully possesses, hath been by degrees gained from the people. (All which is so notoriously false, that on the contrary, the people have lately encroached upon the pre∣rogative), yet I say at this time, and as our present circumstances stand, it is more rational, that all honest and
sober men, who laying aside ambition and malice, consider impartially the just rights and liberties of the people, together with the preservation of our Government, and the general happi∣ness of the Nation, should rather en∣deavour by all lawful means, to in∣crease the power of his present Majesty, than diminish it. And supposing we were at liberty, to choose what form of Government we pleased, rather con∣tinue it a Monarchy as it is, than set up such a Democratical form, or phantastical model, as our Author, (having stoln it in a great measure, from the propositions of the Rebels sent to the late King in the Isle of Wight, and the transactions of Forty Eight) hath proposed to us.
The performance of this, Sir, will be such a full satisfaction to us all, that nothing will remain far∣ther for our consideration, but to con∣trive a means, how we may better secure our present Government, and by enacting farther good Laws, if ne∣cessary, with a strict execution of them, reduce our pestilent Republican disturb∣ers
of our peace, unto a due obedienc•• to their Natural and Lawful Prince.
One thing more I must beg of you by the way, which is, to let me know, why you suppose all along, that ou•• Author would set up a Common∣wealth, since he tells us plainly, p. 209. That he abhorrs the thoughts of wishing a Democracy, much less endeavouring any such thing, during these circumstan∣ces we are now in, that is, under Oaths of obedience to a Lawful King.
I thank you, Sir, for putting me in mind of it, but indeed I thought, you had by this time sufficiently un∣derstood, how to distinguish a Presby∣terian, or otherwise Phanatical Com∣monwealth man's publick declaration, from his more private meaning. I must therefore mind you of this ob∣servation by the way, that I never yet met with any of those Authors who was not demonstrably a wilful, malici∣ous Knave in his writings. But truly in this case, I think, our Author is frank and plain enough. I shall there∣fore mind you of some passages, which I shall leave to your own Interpreta∣tion.
He tells us, p. 182. That our present estate inclines to popularity, and I do not find, but that he inclines as much to comply with our estate as they could▪ wish, but let us come to his declaration against it, where he protests that he hates the thoughts of wish∣ing a Commonwealth, but yet insinuates, from the story of Themistocles his firing the Grecian ships, That nothing could be more advantagious and profitable for us, which surely shews his good incli∣nations plain enough. But I am fully perswaded that our Governours have taken no less care to secure us against the literal, than the metaphorical sence of his ••ine tale, and will as well pre∣serve our Navy, as our Government from his Diabolical designs.
But now, he gives us the reason, why he cannot think of a Common∣wealth, because (conscientious good man) he is loth to break his oath of obedience to a Lawful King.
But for this Lawful King himself, it is no matter if he be perjur'd to the very bottom of destruction, who having no less sworn, and that solemnly too,
to maintain the antient Monarchical Go∣vernment, as at present by Law con∣firmed and establish'd, with all the rights and prerogatives belonging to the Imperial Crown of England, may break all, betray his poor Subjects, their rights and liberties, abandon them to the mercy of unmerciful Tyrants, and be damn'd if he pleases. Nay our Au∣thor kindly advises him to it, and ra∣ther than his cursed project should fail, he perswades him, it is the best thing he can do. Whereas it is plain, That the power of the Kings of Eng∣land is restrained or limited (as we may say) in nothing more consider∣able, than this, viz. That they cannot by their own Grant sever their Preroga∣tives from the Crown, nor communicate any part thereof to any one, no not to the Princes their eldest Sons, as may be seen more at large in Sir J. Davies, upon Impositions, cap. 29. besides many other good Authors. Nay more, he tells us there, That neither the Kings Acts, nor any Act of Parliament, can give away his Prerogative; and farther, that no Act of Parliament in the Negative,
can take away the Kings Prerogative in the Affirmative. Yet notwithstanding this, (and ten times more that may be said to this purpose,) our King is advised and perswaded, nay, almost ne∣cessitated (as our Author would have it) not only to quit some One of his Prerogatives, but (to make short work) to release, and give them up all at once.
In the next place, let us consider Plato's excellent new model it self, and here (like a wise Politician) he hath made Three co-ordinate powers in being at the same time, that is to say, King, Lords, and Commons.
I confess, for the King, he says little of him, and with great reason, for in∣deed he signifies nothing more than a Cypher, which, as in Arithmetick, is only to make the Commons more valuable.
But to do our Author right, he hath yet a farther use to make, of this his otherwise useless Prince; that is to say, whilest neither his own Right, nor his Power, nor our Laws can secure him∣self; his Name nevertheless is to pre∣serve
these his Masters. With that they hope to prevent all opposition, and civil wars at home. For should they force∣ably depose him, they justly apprehend, that his Loyal Subjects in England, would endeavour to revenge such an insupportable wrong. Nor can they believe that the Kingdoms of Scotland, and Ireland, would again tamely submit their Necks to the ser∣vile yoke of a few ambitious, English Commoners; or that foreign Princes themselves, would even for their own securities sake, quietly, and unconcern'd, countenance this horrid injustice, and outrage done to the sacred dignity of Kings. But if they can perswade his Majesty willingly to depose himself, and at the same time disinherit his Heirs and Successors, they imagine that none can pretend to disapprove, much less blame, or impute to them, the volun∣ry act of a King. For as, Volenti non fit injuria, and by consequence no offence in them; so they will certainly reserve to themselves the honour of punishing in the King, as their master∣piece, and last act of justice, the Treason
which he shall have committed against himself. To facilitate all this, our Au∣thor hath taken from his Majesty, his Militia, and his Revenue, that is, men and mon••y, which are the strength and sinews of Power, and in the Com∣moners he hath plac'd the Royal au∣thority, of Calling, Proroguing and Dis∣solving themselves. And left the King, in this miserable condition, should have yet any hopes left, even of securing his own Person, he hath taken from him the power of making his own Officers, and bestowing those imployments, which have always depended upon the Regal authority. Nay, the Lords them∣selves are no more to receive their Ho∣nours from the Fountain of all Honour, but must lick the dust from the shooes, of their once obsequious vassals.
So our poor Master, having nothing now to give, must lose the hopes, even of a grateful friend, who in his extre∣mity, might at least wish him well, and speak a good word for him to his inso∣lent Governours.
But, Sir, our Author leaves most of these things in the disposition
of the Parliament, by which he tells us, that he ever understood, the King, Lords and Commons, so that neither his Militia nor Revenue, can be said to be so absolutely taken from himself, as granted to the Parliament in general, of which he is still to be the head.
Ah, Cousin, there is deadly poison in this his varnished treacherous Cup, and you will easily perceive it, when you consider, Plato cares not so much, that the Militia should be in the power of the Commons, as out of the King. For whilest the King can∣not dispose of it, without the consent of his Lower House, judge you, whe∣ther they will ever agree to the raising any force, which they shall not them∣selves command.
If then any difference arise, upon that, or any other point, (which un∣avoidably, and designedly will happen) then are the Commoners become im∣mediately masters of all. For what can the King do, though joyn'd with the House of Lords, without a right of command or force, against a multi∣tude, and that so unequal too, that (if
the House of Commons in Parliament, represent the whole Nation, as they pretend they do) then are they at least ten thousand men against one, though all the Nobility be included with the King. The necessary con∣sequence of all this must be, that if on the one hand, the King and Lords, agree with the Commons in all things, then the Commons govern more ab∣solutely, than if there were neither the one nor the other, because there is no pretence against them.
On the other hand, if they in any thing differ from the Commons, then undoubtedly the disagreeing Lords, as formerly, shall be turned out of doors, the King set aside, and the Votes made by the House of Com∣mons, Jan. 4. 1648, revived and confirmed, which being very short, but plain, I shall here repeat. First, That the people, under God, are the origi∣nal of all just power; Secondly, That the Commons of England assembled in Parliament, being chosen by, and repre∣senting the people, have the Supreme Authority of this Nation; Thirdly,
That whatever is enacted, and declared for Law by the Commons of England as∣sembled in Parliament, hath the force of a Law; Fourthly, That all the people of this Nation are included thereby, al∣though the consent and concurrence of the King and House of Peers, be not had thereunto.
What think you now, Cousin, of these four Votes, even whilst the King and Lords were yet in being. Do they not look, as if they designed a Commonwealth, or rather to estab∣lish an arbitrary Tyrannical power, in the House of Commons, and yet their propositions all along to the King, were the same, which Plato hath a∣gain offered us, that is, leaving the Militia, the publick revenue, nomina∣tion of officers, and such like to the Parliament, by which was always meant, King, Lords and Commons. This is the politick web, which our Author pretends to have spun out of his own shallow brains, and indeed it is so very wondrous thin, that if our present Statesmen could not with half an eye, see through it, I should
be apt to agree, with our Author, p. 22. that they ought in conscience to excuse themselves, from that sublime imployment, and betake themselves to callings more suitable to their capacities, as Shoomakers, Tailors, and such other mechanick professions.
Sir, the Sun at noon day is never more clear, than that he designs, at best, a Commonwealth. And in∣deed where three co-ordinate powers are in being at the same time, it is im∣possible they should continue long in that state, but some one or two must certainly in time over balance, and get the advantage of the other. I think Lucan confirmed this long ago, when he said,
Nulla fides regni sociis, omnisque potestas Impatiens consortis erit.—
And the King having neither power, strength, money nor officers, it is ten thousand to one, as you observe, on the Commons side, who are actually possessed of all. Pray therefore pro∣ceed, and let us know, why in reason
we should not comply, with our Au∣thors Popular Government, since he tells us that our present state inclines to Popularity.
Most willingly. But in the first place, in all changes of Govern∣ment we must consider, what incon∣veniences we find, under the present constitution, and what way we pro∣pose to our selves, to have them pre∣vented by an alteration, otherwise we shall never be able to assign any reason for a change at any time. I must therefore desire you to tell me frankly, what fault you find, griev∣ances, according to the cant of our Dissenters, in our Monarchy as at present Established.
Truly, Cousin, I have often∣times thought seriously with my self, what those grievances should be. And though I was once carried a little a∣way with the stream, and cried, Li∣berty, and Property, and Grievances of the Nation, with some others of the wide mouth'd pack, yet to deal plainly with you, I could never be satisfied from them, nor from my
own observation, what those griev∣ances were in particular.
I believe it indeed, but how∣ever since our Author, who is a know∣ing man, ass••res us, that our disease is so desperate, that we have no hopes but in a desperate cure. Pray let us both, though no State Physicians, lay our heads together, and think with our selves, what our sickness may be, especially since the beginning of every cure, proceeds from the true knowledge of the distemper. For my part, I do assure you, I will assist you what I can, in finding out the one, and for the other, we will leave it to our bet∣ters.
First then I should think, that as all diseases shew themselves by some Symptoms upon the natural body, so the distempers of the body politick, must be also visible, and will discover themselves, either in our liberties, properties, or our Religion. We will begin with our Liberties, and pray, Cousin, think with your self, whether you want any such civil liberty, as you could wish for, or know to be
given under any other Government upon earth.
Trouble not your self for that, for except I could have somewhat grant∣ed particularly to my own person, I am so far from wishing our Subjects more liberty in general, that I really think we have too much.
What mean you by too much?
I mean, Sir, amongst other things, that men, especially of late, have taken to themselves the liberty of reflecting upon, or calumniating the Go∣vernment, and our Governours, as also to slander one another, with so much bitterness and cunning, that we are ready to be destroy'd before we know any thing of the matter. And yet they keep so within the compass of the Law, that the Scrutiny of a Jury can never reach them. Nay, I have heard say, that some are so excellent at it, that they will talk you an hour together, within a hairs breadth of Sedition, and Treason, dance upon the low rope, with children ty'd to their feet, and naked swords in their hands, and upon the high rope, hanging only by their toes, or nape of the neck.
Right, but I have seen some of them hang, with the rope round about their necks, and indeed I never wonder'd at it.
Yes, men who are only im∣pudent bold fellows, and have not the skill to cut a feather, very often dance themselves into that noose. But to be serious, really, Cousin, methinks, that calumniating is a most pernicious liber∣ty; for in my opinion, men should ei∣ther accuse judicially or not at all.
In the first case, the accused hath, we suppose, a fair Trial, at which he may make his defence, and if he prove innocent, will be freed. But in the latter, a man is condemn'd, and exe∣cuted too, before he hears of his ac∣cusation. It is like killing a man with those invisible subtle poisons, which work their effect, even whilst you are reading the complementing Letter, which conveys them; your reputation and good name is gone, your acquaintance gaze upon you, with a different air than formerly; you find a coldness in your friends, neglect in your relations, and disre∣spect
from all. And at length the poy∣son, having crept through those with whom you might have occasion to converse, you find your self generally condemn'd, before you know of what, or by whom you were accused; and in truth Brinvillers were more tolerable in any Government, than these pesti∣lent Calumniators.
Indeed, Cousin, you have spoke a great deal of reason, and I am perswaded, that the immediate cause of our distractions, proceeds from the malicious Calumnies of a few knaves, who know they lye dispers'd amongst a great many fools, who think they speak truth.
The Publisher of the divine Machia∣vels Prince, is very just in this parti∣cular, telling us, that in all good Go∣vernments, Calumniators ought to be restrain'd, and punish'd by the strictest severity: Qui Rempublicam recte insti∣tuere velit, ferri nullo modo debent ca∣lumniae, sed puniendi sunt calumniatores. Quodsi hisce rebus in Republica non rectè prospectum sit, multa mala patrantur, unde seditiones & turbae ortum habent.
And concludes with the story of Furius—Camillus, who having gain'd a great deal of honour amongst the Romans, for the good service which he had done, in freeing them from the imminent danger of the Gauls: Manli∣us Capitolinus, envying above all, his great reputation, endeavour'd by all means to lessen his credit. But finding the Senate and Nobility firm in their good opinion concerning Camillus, he then apply'd himself to the Com∣monalty, who being ever the most susceptible of false impressions, were continually plied with the false asper∣sions of the envious Manlius, insinua∣ting amongst other things, that the vast sum of money, which was sup∣posed to have been paid the Gauls, re∣mained yet in a great measure, in the possession of Camillus, and the Sena∣tors, who appropriating to their use, what was said to have been paid their enemies, instead of Governours and Protectors, became themselves the greatest enemies the people had, by endeavouring to support their own luxury, at the expence of the peoples
misery. Whereas, if that mony were again distributed, (as in justice it ought) amongst the poor Citizens, it would make their present condition much more easie, than otherwise it was like to be in a great many years. Interest is the great wheel, that moves all the world, either to good or evil actions. The Commonalty thus in∣i••cens'd by Manlius, were now work'd up to that point which he desir'd, and ready either for rebellion, or any other insolence, which their Incendiary should suggest. In the mean time the Senate, perceiving this growing mischief, to obviate any farther distur∣bance, they create a Dictator, on pur∣pose to examine into the whole mat∣ter, and punish the offender, where∣ever he should find the offence. He appoints therefore a day to Manlius, who attended with vast multitudes of the credulous Commons, is ask'd by the Dictator, where or with whom, that vast sum of money was lodg'd. But Manlius, unprovided to answer a que∣stion, which it seems he did not expect, and hesitating much, without giving
any satisfactory account of what was demanded, he was cast into chains, and punish'd according to the hainous∣ness of the offence.
And may all the Manlii a∣mongst us be alike confounded. Next, Sir, I cannot approve of the liberty men take, of publishing their private sentiments, which are generally ground∣ed upon nothing but conjecture, and Enthusiastical follies.
Certainly, nothing would conduce more to our quiet, than that the liberty of the press should be re∣strain'd. But since it is not our busi∣ness, to look into those liberties, which we enjoy, so much as into those, which we want, let us leave the consideration of these, and many other such things, to our prudent Governours.
I shall only note this one thing by the way, that since the Act of Habeas Corpus, I think I may confidently af∣firm, that even at this time, when there is so much danger of a pretended slavery, the Subjects of England enjoy a greater liberty, than was known to any of our Ancestors before us.
Pray therefore proceed to the second consideration, which is our properties.
That is wholly unnecessary, for all the world knows, that whatso∣ever we possess, is so secured by the Laws of the Land, that the King him∣self doth not pretend in prejudice of those Laws (which indeed are his own Laws) to touch the least Chattel that belongs to us, nor can any Tax be im∣pos'd, but such as shall be granted by Act of Parliament, which is the very Government, that our Author so much approves. And in a word, Plato him∣self has clear'd this point, telling us, p. 127 That the people by the fundamen∣tal Laws, that is, by the constitution of the Government of England, have entire freedom, in their lives, properties, and their persons, neither of which, can in the least suffer, but according to the Laws.
And to prevent any oppression that might happen in the execution of these good Laws, which are our Birthright, all Trials must be by twelve men of our equals: and in the next page, lest the King's Soveraign authority, might be
urg'd as a stop, to the execution of those Laws, he tells us, That neither the King, nor any by authority from him, hath any the least power or jurisdiction, over any English man, but what the Law gives him.
And if any person shall be so wicked, as to do any injustice to the life, liberty, or estate, of any Englishman, by any private command of the Prince, the per∣son aggriev'd, or his next of kin, (if he be Assassinated) shall have the same reme∣dy against the offender, as he ought to have had, by the good Laws of the Land, if there had been no such command given. Now, dear Cousin, in the name of sense and reason, where can be the fault and distemper of our Govern∣ment, as it relates to the ease and pri∣viledge of the Subject, if this be the constitution of it, as at least our Au∣thor himself affirms?
Faith, Sir, I could never find it out, nor any man else, that ever I could meet withal. And what is still stranger, our great Platonick Physici∣an hath not vouchsafed to give us any one particular instance, in what part
our disease lyes, notwithstanding he alarms us with dismal news of being dead men, and that without such a strange turn of Government, as his pregnant Noddle hath found out, we are ruin'd for ever.
'Tis true, he tells us, that the pro∣perty being in the hand of the Commoners, the Government must necessarily be there also, and for which the Commoners are tugging and contending very justly, and very honourably, which makes every Parli∣ament seem a present state of war.
But, Sir, if it be true, that we enjoy all those benefits and blessings be∣fore mentioned, & that the Government it self secures these properties, invio∣lably to us, (which we know to be most certain, without the testimony of Plato or any man else) what then does this tugging concern us, or what relation has it to our happiness, which is already as great, as we can wish it to be? Must the enjoyment of our properties, put us into a state of war? Must our health become our disease, and our fatness only make us kick against our masters? what can this contention
for Government signifie more, than ambition? and what could their suc∣cess produce less than Tyranny? should the House of Commons become our masters, what could they bestow upon us, more than we already enjoy, ex∣cept danger and trouble? And what can our present Government take from us, except the fears of those fatal conse∣quences, which such a popular innova∣tion would induce? Let then the pro∣perty be where it will, and if we pos∣sess it securely, we are the happier for it.
Your reasons are too plain, and strong to be resisted, I shall quit there∣fore this point▪ and inform you, how our Author seems in many places to in∣sinuate, that the want of frequent and annual Parliaments, is the cause of our distemper, and that calling a Parlia∣ment every year, might prove a pretty cure, according to a certain Act in the time of Edward the first, and that then, instead of hopping upon one leg, we might go limping on upon three.
Faith, Cousin, you are now gotten out of my reach, and you must
answer this your self. I can only pro∣ceed according to my former rule, which is, that if we be as happy as we can be, a Parliament cannot make us more.
That answer is, I think, suf∣ficient to satisfie any reasonable man. However we will speak somewhat more particularly concerning this matter, as we find it recorded in History.
Our Author informs us in p. 110. That by our Constitution the Government was undeniably to be divided, between the King and his Subjects. (which (by the way) is undeniably and no∣toriously false: for according to our ancent Constitution as well under the Saxon as our Norman Kings, the Go∣vernment or the right of Power was originally and solely in our Kings) And that divers of the great men, speak∣ing with that excellent Prince King Ed∣ward the first about it, called a Parlia∣ment, and consented to a Declaration, of the Kingdoms right in that point. So there passed a Law in that Parliament, that one should be held every year, and
oftner if need be. The same he con∣firms in p. 159. and in other places.
Now, Sir, if after these fine Speech∣es by those great men, (whom un∣doubtedly our Author could have named) to this excellent Prince, it should happen at last, that there was no such Act, during the Reign of Ed∣ward the first, what would you think of our Author?
In troth, Sir, it would not alter my opinion, for I already be∣lieve him to be an impudent, magisterial Impostor.
I fear indeed he will prove so, for except he hath found in his politick search, some loose paper, that never yet came into our Statute books, we must conclude that he is grossly mistaken. For the first Act that is extant of that kind, was in the Fourth of Edward the Third, and the words of it are these: It is accorded that a Parlia∣ment shall be holden every year once, and more often if need be.
Now, Sir, you must observe, that this Act was made, whilst the King was but Nineteen years of age, and
both himself and Kingdom under the care of Twelve Governours. His Mo∣ther, Queen Isabel, and Roger Morti∣mer, very powerful, the Governours of the Pupil King divided amongst themselves, and many other pressing affairs of the Nation, oblig'd most people to propose that expedient of frequent Parliaments, as the most probable means to secure the peace, and prosperity of the Kingdom, at least until the King should come of riper years, and thereby many diffe∣rences be reconciled.
After this, in the Thirty sixth year of his Reign, he called a Parliament, and wanting money, (as generally he did,) the Parliament would grant nothing, until an Act passed for main∣tenance of former Articles and Sta∣tutes there expressed, And that for re∣dress of divers mischiefs and grievances, which daily happen, a Parliament shall be holden every year, as another time was ordained by Statute.
These are the two Statutes intended by our Author, when he tells us that the Statute of Edward the first, was
confirmed by that glorious Prince Edward the third. Whereas in truth they were both made by the same King, and both in a great measure, revoked in his own time. Having declared after the making this last Act, that he yielded to it, only to serve his own turn.
This Sir, is the matter of Fact, upon which our Author builds his great pretensions to the old constituti∣ons of Annual Parliaments. The first Act was made whilst the King was very young, the second, when he wanted money, and had Twenty six shil∣lings and eight pence granted him upon every sack of wool transported for three years. And both first, and second Acts were broken by several inter∣missions before he died.
Besides, we must make this remark, that a Parliament seldom met, with∣out giving the King some money, which might encourage those Kings to assemble them oftner, than lately they have done. But the truth is, Annual Parliaments were lookt upon as so great a grievance to the Nation,
that we find, that about the Tenth year of Richard the Second his Suc∣cessor, it was thought a great Pre∣rogative in the King, that he might call a Parliament once a year. And both Houses appointed the Duke of Glocest∣er, and Thomas Arundell Bishop of Ely, to acquaint the King, that by an old Statute, the King once a year might lawfully summon his Court of Parliament, for reformation of corruptions and enor∣mities within the Realm.
And if we consider with our selves, we shall find, that if yearly Parlia∣ments were imposed upon us, they would become grievances, equally insupportable, as to have no Parlia∣ments at all.
For if the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses be chosen out of the Coun∣trey Gentlemen and Merchants, in∣habiting those Countries, where they are elected, (as sure they ought to be) what inconvenience, if not ruin, must it bring upon their affairs, when they shall be forced to run every year, a hundred or two hundred Miles from their particular domestick affairs, to
serve in a formal Parliament, in which it may be, the greatest business will be, to make business for the next.
Indeed, for idle persons, who live about Town, and have nothing to do, but to scrible knavish politicks, to the disturbance of honest men, such a con∣stitution might do well enough, if they could get to be chosen members. But we find from experience and History, that in those days, when Ambition and Faction, were not so much in vogue as at present, men were so far from making parties, to get in∣to the Parliament, that many Com∣moners, and Lords too, have petiti∣oned and been excused their attend∣ance, The King's, Queen's, and Prin∣ce's Servants, have stood upon their priviledge of exemption. So James Barner was discharged by the King's command, Quia erat de retinentia Re∣gis, 7. R. 2▪ and the Lord de Vessey, in Edward the Fourths time, obtained Licence not to serve in Parliament du∣ring his life. Rex concessit Henrico Bromflet, Dom. de Vessey, quod ipse, durante vita, sit exoneratus de veniendo
ad Parl. Besides, the very Writ of Summons shews, that in the origi∣nal institution and design of Parlia∣ments, a frequent meeting could not be necessary. For they were only to treat, & concilium impendere de magnis & arduis negotiis. Now God help us, if every year should produce, such magna & ardua negotia, such difficult and weighty affairs, that the King, with his Judges and ••rivy Council, could not determine them, without assembling his great Council the Parliament. I con∣fess, in our Authors Chimerical mo∣del, I am perswaded our circumstan∣ces would be bad enough; but I thank God, we are not gotten there yet. Thus you see, Sir, that this grievance, in not having annual Parliaments, is become no grievance at all.
I begin, Cousin, to lose all manner of respect, for this mistaken Mountebank. For I perceive, notwith∣standing his great words and pretences, all is but wind, emptin••ss and cheat. Having therefore fully satisfie•• me, concerning our liberties, properties, and Parliaments▪ pray forget not to say somewhat of our Religion.
Sir, I shall not presume to meddle with the Doctrinal part of any Religion, that being none of my Pro∣vince. Nor shall I say much concern∣ing the Ceremonial part or discipline of our own, that is to say, the Church of England. It is sufficient to mind you, that both the Doctrine and Disci∣pline in Church Government, have been established and confirm'd by seve∣ral Acts of Parliament, and Statutes: Which Parliaments, being the most Soveraign power, that our Author himself pretends to, set up amongst us, we ought all to acquiesce in, and be concluded by what they have done, until an equal authority shall repeal those Acts, or otherwise determine concerning us.
There is no objection can be made against this answer. But, Sir, since the difference in our Religion, seems manifestly to occasion most of our troubles, why may not the King, by his own authority, dispence with the penal part of these Laws, or grant a toleration, especially to Protestant Dis∣senters, or encourage an Act of Par∣liament
for uniting them into the Church of England, or else why might not the same Church release some part of the rigour of the Discipline and Ce∣remony, since 'tis agreed on all hands, that the observance or non-observance of them, are not points necessary, or absolutely conducing to Salvation.
Cousin, I shall answer you all these questions as plain as I can. And first, I shall never believe, that true and unfeigned Religion, especially a∣mongst men, where the Doctrine agrees, is ever the real cause of any troubles, disturbance or disobedience to lawful authority, such as is that, which pro∣duces an Act of Parliament, (even in our Authors sence) being so contrary to the Doctrine and Principles of Chri∣stian Religion, that I may confidently affirm, where one is, the other cannot be.
Such men therefore, who make use of that Sacred name, to countenance any disquiet in the Government, ought, according to the most impartial judg∣ment which we can make of mens opi∣nions by their actions, to be esteemed
as men having no Religion, rather than as true Professors of the Christian Faith, and that they put the highest abuse, and indignity, upon Christ and his Apo∣stles, when they make the profession of their most peaceable doctrine, a pre∣tence, mask or cloak to cover their Secular interest or ambition.
But, dear Cousin, we must judge charitably, and not conclude all Dissenters such knaves and villains, as either to have no Religion, or to make that which they have, a blind to some other worldly design.
Truly, Sir, for the commoner sort of people, I am inclin'd enough to think (it may be) better of them, than they deserve, knowing well how apt they are to be carried away with every wind of doctrine. But those who are their Ringleaders, are by so much the more inexcusable, by how much they take advantage of the peoples weakness. Yet this would be only per∣nicious to themselves, and punishable in the world to come. But their ungodly and malicious Preachers, and factious heads, mingling dexterously worldly
poison, with their spiritual food, at length their whole bodies, and mass of blood becomes corrupted, when grown rank, and swell'd (like the hea∣then Prophetesses,) with the deadly poyson, and power of the Devil, they ravingly dispense their Enthusiastical dreams and visions, no less injurious to the Providence of God, than to the government of man. Since then, I say, these their wicked Counsellors do certainly produce these effects, it is equally charitable to think, that they have no Religion, as to say, that they abuse that which they profess, to such damnable ends.
But they tell you no such thing. On the contrary, no men talk more of God, none inveigh more bitterly against the debaucher••es of the age we live in, none pretend greater humility, and in a word (to outward appearance at least) none seem to practise more sincerely the doctrine which they preach.
Quid opus est verbis, cum facta videam? What Poisoner, do you think, would not tell you, that the Ratsbane
which he offers you is the purest sugar? You and I, Cousin, cannot forget, how these very men, (some of which are living at this day) and their disci∣ples, behaved themselves, when in the rebellious sanctified times, they usurp'd the whole power of the land.
Can you forget how they persecuted the Church of England? how they Sequester'd our Estates? Imprison'd, Pro∣scrib'd and murder'd our Persons? forc'd many to seek out Dens and Caves in Woods and Rocks, to secure their lives, from the insolence and fury of these humble-minded, gospel-preaching, holy Wolves? Are they yet chang'd? are they not pursuing still the same point? Are their Associations and Con∣spiracies against the foundation of our antient rights, priviledges, government, and life it self of His present Sacred Ma∣jesty, evidences of their repentance for the murder of the late Blessed Martyr, for those flouds of innocent blood, which have corrupted our land ever since, and those violent extortions and impo∣sitions executed upon the Estates of their fellow Subjects, and fellow-la∣bourers
too, in that Vineyard, which both pretend to cultivate, and with whom they profess to agree in the Substantial and Doctrinal part of Reli∣gion? Are these arguments to con∣vince us of their sincere intentions to∣wards us?
This is indeed notorious mat∣ter of fact, and undeniable; but how∣ever, they now express a willingness to comply with us, and to be comprehend∣ed, all under one Church, and Church government. Only they desire that our Ceremonies might be abolish'd, which being circumstantial only, and not ab∣solutely necessary to Salvation, (which is the great end of Religion,) they pray that our Governours in considera∣tion of their weakness, would not tye them to harder meat than they can di∣gest, but (being babes, and to be fed with milk,) would have us condescend to their infirmities, and not to boast too much of our own strength, for those who are strong ought to take heed l••st they fall.
I perceive, Sir, you have been more conversant with this sort of
people, than I thought you had, for I find that you have gotten their very Cant; but you shall have, I hope, a very satisfactory answer. And first for our strength, I confess it behoves us all to take heed lest we fall: but if that great care be an argument against us, it is no less against themselves. For if it be so difficult for the strong to pass through this narrow way, and over these dangerous preoipices; what cir∣cumspection then ought the weak Travellers to use in this their Pilgri∣mage? Ought they not rather to seek to us for some support, than trust to their own imbecillity? And you can∣not deny, but that they do truly ac∣knowledge themselves to be weak, or that they abuse us, when they desire we should condescend to them, both which will equally reflect upon them. And next, Sir, for our compliance with them, rather than their conformity with us, I think it the most unreason∣able request that ever men made. Will a wise Father comply with a froward Son, or a Master with his obstinate Servant, or a Physician with the de∣prav'd
and false appetite of his sick pa∣tient? Sure it would be nothing less, than inverting the whole course and order of nature.
Sir, I am convinc'd that they may and ought to comply with our Government, but since your hand is in, pray let me have your opinion concerning the Popish Recusants, and whether you do not think that they are more to be apprehended in our Go∣vernment, than the Dissenters are, and by consequence, that a Parliament, or Parliamentary way of Government might not be very conducible to our security against them, especially as our circumstances stand, and may pro∣bably continue.
I understand you, Sir, and shall give you my sence of the thing freely as hitherto I have done. And in the first place, I answer plainly, that I do not think the Papists (I mean now and always the Secular or Temporal Papists▪ or Lai••y) so dangerous to our Government, as the Dissenters; but that according to the rule of true Polity, the former are more tolerable among us than the latter.
Have a care, Cousin, that you do not contradict the good account which you gave of your own Religion yesterday. For whosoever stands up for a Popish toleration at this time, will be shrewdly suspected to be at least Popishly inclin'd, if not a Papist.
Sir, I again confirm what I said yesterday, nor do I tell you now, that I would have the Papists tolerated, it belongs to the Government to look after these matters, but I must affirm, according to my judgment, that if the question be put, which may be the most safely tolerated, the Papists or Dissenters, I must give it for the Papists; and I think I shall produce good rea∣son, and authority for this my opinion.
Pray, Cousin, use all manner of liberty in your discourse, for I only minded you of your Profession yester∣day, not that I question your sincerity, but as being an impartial Judge, nei∣ther a Papist nor a Dissenter, I might oblige you to settle this point equally between them.
I do not pretend to be a Judge, but shall endeavour to open the case
faithfully, and leave the rest to your more prudent determination.
First then, we must state the diffe∣rence between these two parties, as they relate to us—and not to descend to particular points, I shall only say, that the Papists differ from us in the doctri∣nal part of Religion, that is to say, in points which they believe absolutely necessary to Salvation. The Dissen∣ters in the Discipline only, viz. Cere∣monies and Church Government, which they declare may be—either used or neglected, without the necessary con∣sequence of damnation.
Right, Sir, and from hence I should conclude, that the Dissenters agreeing more nearly with us than the Papists, ought rather to be tolerated than they, who differ so much, and so materially from us.
And I for that very reason hold the contrary.
Pray, Sir, proceed, and un∣riddle this Paradox.
Next then, we must agree, that the doctrinal parts of the Popish Religion in which they differ from us,
(as Transubstantiation, and some o∣thers, supposing them right and ne∣c••ssary as they believe they are) con∣sist of such high speculative points, as cannot possibly be made demonstrable by humane reason, nor otherwise be seen than by the eyes of faith, but require a supernatural revelation, or the special Grace of an invisible omnipo∣tent power, working in our hearts. Hence Grotius tells us, that Doctrina h••c penitus in animum admitti nequeat, nisi sanctis Dei auxiliis accedentibus. lib. 2. ••4. 20.
This then supposed, I must affirm, that outward force is not a proper means to convince a mans reason of speculative truths▪ For a man cannot always believe just when he says he will; but rather oftentimes, when he pretends he will not, he is then forc't to believe, (if proportionate argu∣ments be used) even whether he will or no, and these proportionate argu∣ments are such as force the reason only, and whilst they perstringe the mind, do not constrain the body, such as oblige by way of ••atiocination to consent to
certain propositions, and necessary con∣sequences, which they cannot avoid, arguments which reach the inward man, but leave the outward man un∣toucht. Now how improper a means ••orporal violence is, to obtain such a spiritual end, I leave to your judg∣ment.
If it be then necessary that a mans reason should be convinc't of a specula∣tive truth, before he can beleive it, it will follow, that those who use vio∣lence and force, to oblige a people to embrace an opinion, which they do not, or can not understand, commit either the greatest injustice towards man, or the greatest impiety toward God.
The injustice towards man lies in this, that they either force them to profess, what they do not believe, which is hypocrisie and a lie; or they punish them for not doing that, which is not in their power to do, which is the height of Tyranny. And Grotius tells us, in his Cap▪ de poenis, that it was provided in the Council of Toledo, That then••eforward no man should be forc'•• to believe, for God will have mercy,
on whom he will have mercy; and whom he pleaseth to harden, he hardeneth. Praecipit sancta Synodus nemini deinceps vim inferri, cui enim vult Deus▪ miseretur, & quem vult, indurat. And he adds, quod perinique faciunt, that they do most wickedly, who punish men amongst Christians, for not believing or erring in some speculative points, which they do not understand. St. Augustine also, Athanasius, Hilarius, and Salvi∣••nus are all of the same opinion, as may be seen there more at large in the same Cap. de poenis, where Grotius far∣ther informs us, that the French Bishops were condemned by the Church, for using violence against the Priscili••∣nist••.
In the next place, if it be not in∣justice towards man, it is impiety to∣wards God, and must suppose, that the gift of the holy Spirit▪ ••ra••e o•• Ill••∣mination, which is necessary for the understanding these Divine mysteries▪ is in the power of mortal man, which was the sin of Simon Magus▪ son to buy the holy Ghost for money, or to o••∣tain it by force, is equally injuriou••,
and dishonourable to a Deity. And we find, that although the Sadduces differed from the rest of the Jewes, in so material a point, as that of the Resurrection, which they totally denied, yet they received no manner of punish∣ment upon that account, nor was there any force used to perswade them▪ to embrace and believe so necessary a doctrine, when yet, at the same time▪ Sabbath-breakers, because it related to the discipline and Government of the Church, were punished with Death.
I thank you, Sir, and do assure you, that I was ever of this opinion. But I do not yet understand, why you do not apply the same reasons for Dissenters and other people, as well as the Papists.
I thought, Sir, the last in∣stance would have answered that question, which is, that the Dissen∣ters differ only in point of discipli•…•… and Government, which according to our constitution they agree—com∣mand nothing damnable, or impossible to be understood, or contrary to the
hopes of Salvation. And in such case, outward force is the proper means to re∣duce obstinate men to their duty, and a compliance with that Government which they ought, and which they confess they may obey. So in some Roman Catholick Countries the Prote∣stant Religion is tolerated, and its pro∣fessors secured by many Grants and Priviledges, because their difference consists in speculative points, whereas those Roman Catholicks themselves who (agreeing in the Doctrinal part) shall differ in the Discipline or Church Government, are punished with the extreamest rigour. We must distin∣guish therefore between Discipline and Doctrine, as also between faith and obedience.
And in confirmation of this, we may remember another reason, why a toleration is more allowable to Popish Rec••sants, than to the Dissenters, viz, because it is notoriously known, that the Papists have ventured both their lives and fortunes to support our pre∣sent Government, as it is by Law established, even against these very
dissenters, who rebell'd against it, and by force of arms, and open hostility, endeavour'd totally to subvert it. And having obtain'd a victory, did actu∣ally destroy both our lawful King and Governour, as well as government.
This is too true, and it were impudence to deny any part of it. But it hath been said, that the Papists in our late troubles ventur'd their lives, more out of hopes of their own establishment, than of the Govern∣ment.
That, under favour, is a ma∣licious and a frivolous objection. For what grounds of hopes had they to alter the Government, against the con∣sent of the whole Nation, when joyn'd with so considerable a part, as the Church of England, they were both overcome by the Dissenters, it was mo∣rally impossible. Besides, they had generally taken the Oath of Allegi∣ance, which for ought I can hear, they have not broken, (generally I suppose, for if there be any of them who refuse the Oath of Allegeance, I look upon them as out of the Kings Protection,
and little better, or full as dangerous as open enemies.) Nor can I imagine, what other Government, they could, or were ever suppos'd to introduce, contrary to that, which was then esta∣blish'd, and which they swore to main∣tain. I am apt enough to believe, that they might hope for some ease or exem∣ption from the rigour of the pen••l Laws, which neither you, nor I, can blame in them, if they had desir'd.
But though they have taken the Oath of Allegeance, yet you see, that they will not be prevail'd upon, to take the Oath of Supremacy. And you know, that according to our Law, the King is no less head of the Ecclesi∣astical, than of the Civil Govern∣ment.
True, Sir, But this is as much an argument against the Dissen∣ters, as the Papists. For it is not a greater crime in them, nor prejudice to the State, to tolerate men, who by the principles of their Religion, are taught to submit their Consciences to another Spiritual guide in Spiritual matters, as many Soveraign Princes
themselves do at this day; than those, who owning the King to be Supreme head of the Church by their words, disown him by their actions, that is, in not obeying his Laws, or Rebelling against him as such.
Besides▪ it is well known, that the general opinion of the Popish Recusants, (the Laity I mean) concerning the Pope's Supremacy hath no ill influence upon our Civil Government, which is that, which I chiefly intend in this discourse, but that they think them∣selves indispensably oblig'd, to defend our Lawful Kings, and their Civil Au∣thority, not only against all temporal powers whatsoever, but even against the Pope himself.
This, Sir, I have heard much controverted, and the contrary opini∣on affirm'd by some of their own Wri∣ters, that is to say, That the Pope may, and doth Excommunicate heretick Kings, as he calls them. By which act, their Subjects are no more bound to pay them their obedience, nay, and can absolve the people from their Oath of Allegeance, and impower them to de∣pose
their natural and lawful Prince, and set up some other in his stead. Now, Sir, this is such a doctrine, as makes the Papists uncapable of ever being trusted under any Protestant Govern∣ment.
I confess, Sir, I have heard that some private men have main∣tain'd some such erroneous and pernici∣ou•• Principles, and flattering the Pope, have endeavoured to raise his power to a much sublimer pitch, than ever Christ himself, or any of his Apo∣stles pretended it should arrive. But, Sir, as Temporal Princes have been ever usurping upon one another, and by most unchristian ways, sacrificed the innocent blood of many thousands of men, for the promoting their own greatness, and satisfying their ambi∣tious designs, so these Spiritual Em∣perours have follow'd too much the ill examples of Temporal Princes. And being, it may be, more solicitous to extend their power, than encrease the number of true believers, have per∣verted the good use of St. Peters Keys, and have rather opened by them the
door of dissention, and discord upon earth, than the gates of the Heavenly Paradise.
For some years, these holy Fathers exercised their arms against one ano∣ther, and how much blood and horrid troubles the dispute between the Bi∣shop of Rome, and Patriarch of Con∣stantinople concerning Primacy, hath cost Christendom, is sufficiently re∣corded in History. I may add farther, that this their contention, became at last the ruine of the Greek Empire; but hitherto the Temporal Princes en∣joy'd their rights and Prerogatives un∣disturb'd, until Hildebrand, otherwise called Gregory the seventh, arrogated to himself a Soveraign authority over all Christian Kings and Emperours, as may be seen at large in the History of Henry the fourth Emperour of Ger∣many, who was the first unfortunate example of the Papal usurpation, which is confirm'd by a learned Roman Ca∣tholick Bishop, and one who lived in the Reign of Fred. the first, his words are these: Lego & relego, saith he, Romanorum Regum & Imperatorum
gesta, & nunquam invenio quenquam eorum ante hunc à Romano Pontifice ex∣communicatum vel regno privatum, nisi forte quis pro Anathemate habendum ducat, quod Philippus ad breve tempus à Romano Episcopo inter poenitentes collo∣catus, & Theodosius à beato Ambrosio propter cruentam caedem à liminibus Ec∣clesiae sequestratus sit. Ottofrising. c. 35.
After this, several encroachments were made upon other Princes, and the Popes (making use as well of St. Paul's Sword, as St. Peter's Keys) reduc'd most of them under their obedience, and as the same Author expresses it, destroy'd them by that very power, which they had first receiv'd from the benevo∣lence of the Emperours themselves; seem∣ing to imitate therein the Prophet David, who first overcame the Philistine by the providence of God, and then cut off his head with his own Sword. Videntur cul∣pandi Sacerdotes per omnia, qui regnum suo gladio, quem ipsi à regum habent gra∣tia ferire conentur, nisi forte▪ David imitari cogitent, qui Philistinum pri••o virtute Dei stravit, postmodum pr••prio gladio jugulavit.
Now, Sir, after the Popes were in possession of these great Prerogatives, and had perswaded the people to con∣tribute as well to their own, as their Princes slavery, by granting them this universal right of power, it is no won∣der if some of their own Clergy have endeavoured by false arguments, to maintain this usurp'd authority. But, Cousin, it is well known, that this is now become no more, than an old anti∣quated title, and gives him no right over Soveraign Princes at this day.
It is true, those Princes, who sub∣mitted themselves to the constituti∣ons of the Council of Tre••t, permit the Pope to exercise some Spiritual Juris∣diction in their Kingdoms. But it is universally, and publickly declared, that the Popes have no Civil or Temporal Authority over Soveraign Princes, nor can they by their Spiritual power, or, authoritate clavium Ecclesiae, depose any King▪ or absolve any Subject▪ from their Faith, Obedience, or Oath of Al∣legean••e.
Can you give an instance of 〈…〉〈…〉 made by
any Popish Kings, and consented to by the Roman Clergy.
Yes, Sir, and that so fully, that there can remain no scruple or difficulty, and it is by the most Christi∣an King of France, and eldest son of the Roman Church, and a severe per∣secutor of the Protestant Religion. I will give you the words of the Decla∣ration it self, as far as it concerns this particular, that you may the better judge your self of the truth. It is De∣clared by the Gallick Church, Pri∣mum beato Petro ejusque successoribus, Christi Vicariis ipsique Ecclesiae rerum spiritualium, & ad aeternam salutem per∣tinentium, non autem civilium & tempo∣ralium à Deo, traditam potestatem, &c. Reges ergo & Principes in temporalibus nulli Ecclesiasticae potestati Dei ordina∣tione subjici, neque authoritate clavium Ecclesiae, directe vel indirecte deponi, aut illorum subditos eximi, à side atque obe∣dientia ac praestito fidelitatis Sacramento, solvi posse. Hancque sententiam public•• tranquillitati necessariam nec minus Ec∣clesiae quam Imperio utilem, ••t verbo Dei patrum traditioni & Sanctorum ex∣emplis
consonam—omnino retinendam.
Which is thus Englished. It is De∣clared—First, that the Power of Spiri∣tual things and such as concern eternal Salvation, but not of Civil or Tempo∣ral affairs, was delivered by God to the blessed Peter and his Successors Christ's Vicars, and to the Church it self, &c. Kings therefore and Princes in Tempo∣ral affairs are not Subjected by the ap∣pointment of God to any Ecclesiastical power; nor can they be directly or indi∣rectly depos'd by the authority of the Keys of the Church; nor can their Subjects be freed or absolv'd from their Faith and Obedience, and their Oath of Fidelity. And let this Sentence ne∣cessary to the publick tranquillity, nor less profitable for the Church than State, be irrevocable as agreeing with the Word of God, the Tradition of Fathers, and the Examples of the Saints or holy men.
This, Sir, is the first article in the Declaration of the French Clergy, which is asserted, registred, and confirmed by the whole Ʋniversity of Paris, the Sor∣••one, and Faculties des Droits Civil and Canon, as may be seen fully in the
Edit du Roy, sur la Declaration faitte par le Clergie de France de ces sentimens touchant la puissance Ecclesiastique, and published this present year 1683.
Now Sir, in my opinion, this so solemn and national declaration, to∣gether with the concurrence and con∣stant profession of all the English Ro∣man Catholicks, that I have met with, doth sure by much overbalance the writings of any private men or Jesuits whatsoever. And such Principles (al∣though they be most erroneous, and most damnable) yet when we come to examine the case impartially be∣tween the very Jesuits, and our Dis∣senters, even as it relates to these most horrid positions, we shall find these Dissenters have so far outgone the Jesuits themselves in the Doctrine of Deposing Heretick Princes (that is to say Prin∣ces who differ from the Church of Rome in Fundamentals, or Speculative Doctrines, which they believe abso∣lutely necessary to Salvation) that they have dared to maintain publickly the Doctrine of Deposing even Protestant Princes, and their own natural and
most lawful Soveraigns, and absolving their Subjects from their Oaths of Alle∣geance, and this, not for any difference in the Doctrinal part, which is abso∣lutely necessary to Salvation, but for Discipline only and Church Government, which right of Government is so inhe∣rent to the Imperial Crown of England, that it makes up, and is one of the con∣stituent parts of it. And that these are the very principles of our Dissenters, I refer you, for ample satisfaction, to their own very words where and when delivered, as they have been Collected and Published by the care and diligence of the most worthy Mr. L'Estrange, in his Dissenters Sayings. Now when our Dissenters shall think fit to make so Solemn and Publick a Declaration as the Papists have done at Paris, against the Doctrine of Deposing Kings, and absolving Subjects (as is before reci∣ted) I shall be as ready to do the Dis∣senters justice in that particular, as I have now done to the Papists.
Sir, I perceive you are a very good advocate for the Papists, and indeed I must needs confess, that
I am abundantly satisfied, with those arguments, which you have produced in their favour, and do heartily wish, they could as well comply with the Spiritual, as I am perswaded they will live peaceably and quietly under the Civil Government.
And as to the present question of Toleration between the Papists and the Dissenters, I perceive that the force of your argument consists in this, that the Dissenters, (besides their more than Jesuitical principles, most per∣nicious to Civil Government, as hath been now declared) that they (I say) agreeing with the Church of England in the Doctrine, differ chiefly concer∣ning Government, to which in consci∣ence they ought, and confess, they may submit: but the Papists disagreeing in the Doctrine and speculative points, which they believe absolutely necessary to Salvation, cannot possibly comply with us, without the apparent danger of eternal damnation. So having a more justifiable pretence, to differ from us in the Spiritual Government only, than the Dissenters in either the
Ecclesiastical or Temporal, they ought the rather of the two to be tolerated. Truly the reason of this is very obvi∣ous in the Oeconomy of our families. For if a Master should command two of his Sons or Servants, to go, for example, half a score miles upon ear∣nest business; and the one should ex∣cuse himself for this reason, that he is certainly assured, or believes positive∣ly and unfeignedly, that a company of Robbers, or a Lion is in the way, (which answers to Damnation, in the case of the Papists) and that he shall be murdered or devoured; that the other Son, or Servant, having no such fears upon him, doth neverthe∣less upon some much more slight, and frivolous pretence obstinately re∣fuse to obey the Master, desiring also that hence forward, the Master would go upon his own errands himself, (which agrees with the condescension that the Dissenters require from the Govern∣ment) I think indeed in this case, though both be guilty of disobedience, yet the former is much more excusable, and tolerable than the latter, and that
the obstinate Servant, is much more unreasonable, and dangerous in the family, than the other. I can say nothing against this, but only wish, that the one had less fear, and the other more duty and respect.
Having then, Sir, given me full satisfaction, concerning these three main points, viz? our Liberties, Pro∣perties, and Religion, under our pre∣sent Government; in which having found no faults negatively, we ought not to desire any change or innovation. Yet nevertheless be pleased to let me know affirmatively why a Common∣wealth might not be rationally pro∣moted and set up in this present trouble∣some conjuncture of our affairs.
Let us then agree, that our Author designs a Commonwealth, as I have already prov'd from his own mouth. Besides, the constitution of his mix'd Go∣vernment will inevitably bring it upon us, or return us again to a Monarchy, where we are. For though he doth not tell us plainly, that he designs totally to remove the King and Royal family, yet so many inconveniences will happen, that
as (it may be) in the beginning of the late Traiterous Association, all the Trai∣tors might not at first resolve upon the barbarous murder of his Majesty and Royal Highness; yet when they were once engag'd in the one, they found the other so necessary to be effected, that it was morally impossible to suc¦ceed in the former, until the latter was actually executed.
It being then most certain, that our Authors intention was to esta∣blish a Common wealth, I shall now give you my reasons, why we ought not upon any terms to admit of it.
And first, I shall not insist much upon those vulgar inconveniences, which are visible to all men. As for example, the inevitable consequen∣ces of most bloudy wars. For can any rational man believe, that all the Royal family, should be so insensible of their right and honour as never to push for three Kingdoms, which would so justly belong to them, or could they be supposed to leave Eng∣land, under their popular usurpation;
what reason hath Scotland to truckle under the Domination of the Eng∣lish Commonalty? What pretence hath the English Subject, (supposing they were to share in the English Go∣vernment,) over the Kingdom of Scotland? All the world knows that that Kingdom, belongs so particular∣ly to our King, that the late Rebells themselves, did not scruple to call him King of the Scots. Why should Ireland also become a Province to an English Parliament? Or should both Kingdoms be willing to shake off the Government of their Natural, Law∣ful and antient Monarchy, why should they not set up a Democracy, or an Aristocracy, or what else they pleas'd amongst themselves? Is there never a Statesman in the three Kingdoms but Plato Redivivus? Can none teach them to Rebel but he? No rules to maintain an usurpt Authority, but what we find among his extra∣vagancies? I am confident you do not believe it. Shall these people, no∣toriously known to have hated one another, whilst formerly they were
under different Governours, become the strictest friends, when they shall return unto those circumstances, under which they were the greatest enemies? Will the French King take no advan∣tage, (having so good a pretext) of our Divisions? Or should we unite against him, under our popular Go∣vernours, was it ever known that a Confederate army was able to defend themselves long, against an Army of equal strength, commanded by one sole absolute Monarch? Can we fore∣see any thing, but most desperate wars; and can wars be supported, but by most heavy taxes? Were not our Thimbles and Bodkins converted in the late times into Swords and Mor∣tar pieces, and by a prodigious trans∣mutation, never before heard of, were not our Gold and Ear-rings turn'd into a brazen Idol? These conse∣quences, Cousin, and dismal effects of a Commonwealth, besides many other, are so obvious, that I shall not spend any more time to mind you of them. Supposing then that none of those former horrid inconveniences
might happen, I must mind you by the way, that one reason why our Author and the Associators desire a Commonwealth, proceeds from the fear of a certain Arbitrary power, which they pretend the King would intro∣duce, as may be seen, pag. 161. 208▪ and in several other places.
Now, Though nothing be more extravagant, than such a groundless imagination, our Author having as∣sured us, that his Majesty never did one act of Arbitrary power, since his hap∣py restoration. And moreover, pag. 176. That our laws against Arbitrary power, are abundantly sufficient. Yet, that we may no more dispute this point, I must produce Plato's own authority against himself in these words: That the King fears his power will be so lessened by degrees, that at length it will not be able to keep the Crown upon his head, pag. 208. Nay, farther in pag. 214. he shews us, That it is impossible he should ever become an Arbitrary King. For his present power, as little as it is, is yet greater, than the condition of property can admit▪ and in a word, from his beloved Apho∣rism,
and the whole course of his Li∣bel, he endeavours to prove, that Do∣minion being founded on the property, and the property being in the people, the King can have no manner of hopes upon earth, of becoming absolute, nor introducing an Arbitrary Government, but by some Army of Angels from Heaven, who must procure him an Authority, which he cares not for.
The next, and main reason, why our Author would set up a Democra∣cy, at least as far as I can collect, from the whole scope of his discourse, is, because the State inclines to popula∣rity.
Now, Sir, for this last time, I must make use of our Author's own reasons against his own positions, and do affirm, that for this very reason, (were there no other) all sober men, and true Politi∣cians, ought to oppose with their ut∣most endeavours, a Popular Govern∣ment.
I will not recount to you the many mischiefs, desolations and destructions, which a popular power hath brought along with it, whereever it go•• ••he
better of the antient Established Govern∣ment of the place. Somewhat hath been already said to this purpose in our discourse, and much more may be read, in the Histories of most parts of the world, to which I refer you, and shall only mind you of some inevi∣table consequences, which will follow such an innovation amongst our selves. And first, if it be true, that the King hath no power to make himself absolute, then we have no cause to apprehend an Arbitrary power in him, and by con∣sequence, no reason to change.
But if the inclination of the people be such, that they will take advantage of the King's want of power, and intro∣duce their own Government, what moderation may we expect from men, towards those, who are to become their Subjects, who shaking off all sense of Justice, Law, Religion, and temper, dare usurp the Soveraign authority over their natural Governour? Where shall we ap∣peal for mercy, when having cut the throat of the most merciful King in Eu∣rope, we expose our own to our ambi∣tious and unmerciful Tyrants? Where
shall we expect compassion towards our selves, when we shall become Parri∣cides and Regicides to our father and our King? Where shall we seek after Eq••i∣ty, when the House of Lords▪ the su∣preme Court of Equity, are most unjustly turn'd out of doors? and what end of our miseries can we ever hope for, when our Tyrants by our villanous Authors consti∣tution, have not only got all the Wealth and Militia into their hands, but have perpetuated their usurpation, by annual Parliaments, never to end? Who being Judges of their own priviledges, p. 254. may regulate elections, as they shall think fit, p. 249. Sit, Adjourn, Prorogue, and Dissolve, as they alone shall judge ex∣pedient.
What more barbarous villany was ever propos'd, and publish'd, under a law∣ful and peaceable Government, besides our own, upon earth? But suppose our poor Country thus enslav'd, and our an∣tient Kingdom turn'd into a Common∣wealth, what can our new masters do for us more▪ than is already done? Can our lib••rties be greater, as to our persons and estates? It is impossible to suppose it▪
Will our properties be more secur'd? all the Laws that ever were upon earth, under any Government, cannot make them more inviolable.
Nothing then can remain, but liber∣ty in Religion, which we call, of Con∣science. Shall all Religions, as Papists, Orthodox Protestants, Presbyterians, Inde∣pendents, and other Fana••icks and Secta∣••i••••, be promiscuously tolerated? If not ••ll, then injustice must be done to those who are restrained. Who being all e∣qually freeborn Subjects, our grievances will not thereby be heal'd. If all, can any man of sense and sobriety imagine, that men of such different principles, aggravated too by strong animosities, and prejudice, will rejoice, or be satisfied, to see the tranquillity or propagation of those principles which they hate and be∣lieve most damnable? Or should they establish one Church, which should be the mother Church, under whose disci∣pline and government, the other different Congregations were to be regulated? would it be the Orthodox Church of Eng∣land? Ah, Cousin, let us consider, what our Author declares, p. 188. I will add,
says he, the little credit the Church of England hath among the people, most men being almost as angry, with that Popery, which is left amongst us, in Surplices, Copes, Altars, Cringes, Bishops, Ecclesiastical Courts, and the whole Hierarchy, besides an infinite number of idle, useless—Super∣stitious Ceremonies, and the ignorance and viciousness of the Clergy in general, as they are with those dogm••'s that are abolish'd. So that there is no hopes that Popery can be kept out, but by a company of poor people call'd Fanaticks, who are driven into cor∣ners as the first Christians were, and who only in truth, conserve the Purity of Chri∣stian Religion, as it was planted by Christ and his Apostles, and is contain'd in Scri∣pture.
Now, Sir, can we hope that an im∣pudent Fanatick, who dares publish all this, even whilst our Government is yet intire, will fa••l to introduce his Geneva discipline, and bring his poor F••naticks out of their corners, when he or his disciples, shall be once themselves at the helm in our Palaces?
Will he suffer, think you▪ the or∣thodox Religion of the Church of Eng∣land,
by Law established, or its pro∣fessors, to enjoy those just rights and priviledges, which they have done ever since the first plantation of Christia∣nity among us? Or shall we not be all crowded into those corners, from whence he shall have fetcht his poor Apostolick Fanaticks? Will the Papists have better measure than the Prote∣sta••ts, and will this be a setling the Nation▪ and redressing its Grievances? Must our gracious King, and his law∣ful Successors, who alone do and can, and are willing still to protect us, be de∣serted, and shall we run headlong into the open jawes of those weeping, wa••l∣ing, canting, praying, still dissembling, but ever devouring Crocodiles? Dear Cousin, oblige me not to speak more upon such a dismal subject, the con∣sideration of which, must either break our hearts▪ or raise our indignation be∣yond that temper, which I would wil∣lingly retain▪
Sir, assure your self, that I heartily comply with you▪ in all that you have said, and sym••athise with you no l••ss in your ••ust resentment▪ than
fears of their diabolical machination••▪ But we have a God most manifestly gracious to us, in his wonderful preserva∣tion of his Majesties person, and disco∣veries of their deep and damnable Con∣spiracies against him▪ We have a King, merciful, loving, and tender of u••, oven beyond the ordinary extent of humane nature; a Council wise, Loyal and ••••∣cumspect, and a people universally •…•…test∣ing this Traiterous Association, and all the consequences of it. And for my own particular, let that moment b•• the last of my life, when I comply with our false Authors detestable propo∣sitions.
Sir, I am most truly glad to find you so well satisfied, and will hope, that the plainness and sincerity, which I have used, in obeying your commands, will qualifie the ted••ousness, and my want of judgment. If there yet remains any thing, which you would have me explain to you, pray proceed, for we have yet a little time left before Dinner.
Merch. Sir, I find one l••••f o•• two ••urned down, let us see what they
contain, and then I have done▪ In p. 112. speaking of a certain Act of Par∣liament, which it seems he cannot pro∣duce, concerning answering all peti∣tions, before the Parliament could be dismissed, he tells us, That if there were nothing at all of this, nor any record extant concerning it, yet he must believe that it is so, by the fundamental Law of the Government, which must be lame and imperfect without it. For it is all one to have no Parliaments at all, but when the King pleases, and to allow a power in him, to dismiss them when he will, that is, when they refuse to do what he will. Here you see, Sir, he couples granting petitions, and a power in the King to dissolve Parliaments together. The one he af∣firms, the other he denies. What have you to say to this?
Nothing▪ Sir, only desire you to remark, as I suppose you have done all along, the prodigious impudence, and vanity of our Author, who dares advance his own private opinion in mat∣ter of Law, against several Statutes de∣termining absolutly the contrary, the universal consent of all Lawyers, and
continu••l practice of near six hundred years standing.
What say you next to the Title of the Duke of Mo••••outh▪
Little; our Author himself looks upon it as ridiculous, and im∣possible to be supported▪ Nor do I think, that we are much beholden to his honesty or conscience alone for this frank declaration, though indeed it is plain and agreeable to reason▪ But▪ he hates the thoughts of a single person▪ and it is no injustice to him, to believe from all that he hath said, that if Jesus Christ should come upon earth again, and pretend to govern accord∣ing to the present constitution of ••ur Government under a Monarchi••••l form he would find Plat•• Redivivus a Re∣bellious Spirit▪ and ever the Son of Am∣bitious Lucifer. For the fa••lts of that unfortun•••••• Duke, I shall only say▪ that if he ••a•• have merit enough to be lamented, he hath sence enough to thi••k himself the most unhappy of all manki••d, and must believe the pres••r∣v••tion of his life the ••everest punish∣ment.
Will you say nothing of the Duke of York? Our Author you see, speaks a great deal concerning him. Somethings look fair, but it is easie to perceive his mali•••• through the disgu••••••.
No, Sir, his Royal per••••••, and high merit, are as much above my needless defence, as our Authors little fri••olous acc••sation: we have only therefore to pray, that God would please to continue him long a blessing to these Nations, and that we may be no less protected by his Council, than de∣fended by his more than Heroick ••o••∣r••ge.
Pray give us then your opi∣nion concerning our ••ure in general.
Trav. Where there is no disease, there can be no ••ure, besides, I ever held it to be the greatest insolence and v••••ity imaginable to presume to give counsel, to the great Counnil of the Nation, undestred and unauthorised▪ And for my own part, I have no •…•…∣ner of pretence to ••o g••e•••• an 〈…〉〈…〉 Have you any thing more▪ Co••sin, i•• particular?
Sir, I have made some other few remarks, as the impertinent com∣parison, which Plato hath made of a Bayliff, Attorney, or Referr••e, as they relate to the choosing the Speaker of the House of Commons, all which is directly against himself, his magisterial defi∣nition of Prerogative, and many other arrogances and follies, all which, I hope I shall be able to answer my self without giving you any farther trouble.
Sir, I do not in the least qu••st••∣on it, however if any thing hath been omitted, in which I may be able to give you farther satisfaction, I shall ••v••r be ready to obey your Commands.
Coelum ipsum p••timus stultiti••, neque Per nost••um p••••im•••• scel•••• Iracunda, Jovem ponere, fulmina.
Malm. l. 1.
f. 22.
P. 57. 154. 211.
D•• Jure B, & P. l. 2. c. 3.
Tac. Ann. xi.
Grot. de I. B. & p. l. 3.
Vide Chron. Sir R Baker.