Essays on the principles of morality and natural religion: In two parts.

CHAP. VIII. Of the PRIMARY LAWS of NATURE.

WE are now come to the thing princi|pally intended in this essay, which is to give a general view of the primary laws of nature. Action ought to be the end and aim of all our inquiries; without which, moral, as well as metaphysical, reasonings are but empty speculation. And, as life and man|ners are more peculiarly the object of the moral science, it was to be expected, that the weight and importance of the subject, should have brought authors to one way of think|ing. But it is lamentable to find the world divided about these primary laws, almost as much as they commonly are about the most airy and abstract points. Some au|thors acknowledge no principle in man, but what is altogether selfish; and it is curious to observe how they wrest and torture every so|cial principle, to give it the appearance of sel|fishness. Others exalt human nature much

bove its just standard, give no quarter to sel|fishness, but consider man as bound to di|rect every action to the good of the whole, and not to prefer his own interest to that of others. The celebrated lord Shaftesbury goes so far as not to admit of any thing like par|tial benevolence; holding, that if it is not entire, and directed to the whole species, it is not benevolence at all. It is not difficult to assign a cause for such difference in opini|on; tho' it may appear strange, that authors should differ so widely upon a subject, which every man ought to be acquainted with, be|cause the subject is his own constitution. There is nothing more common in philoso|phy, as well as in life and action, than to build castles in the air. Impatient of the slow and cold method of induction, we fly to systems, which every writer takes the liber|ty of framing, according to his own taste and fancy. Fond of the fabric which he him|self has erected, 'tis far from his thoughts to subject it to examination, by trying whe|ther

it will stand the test of stubborn facts. Men of narrow minds and contracted prin|ciples, naturally fall in with the selfish sys|tem. The system of universal benevolence attracts the generous and warm-hearted. In the midst of various and opposite opinions, the purpose of this essay is to search for truth by the patient method of induction; and, after what is above laid down, it will not be difficult to find it.

LET us only recapitulate, that the princi|ples of action furnish motives to action, and that the moral sense is given as an instruc|tor to regulate our actions, to enforce one motive, to restrain another, and to prefer one to another, when they are in competiti|on. Hence the laws of nature may be de|fined to be rules of our conduct and behaviour, founded on natural principles, approved of by the moral sense, and enforced by natural re|wards and punishments.

IN searching for these laws, it must be obvious, that we may safely indulge every principle of action, where the action is not disapproved of by the moral sense, and that we ought to perform every action which the moral sense informs us to be our duty. From this short proposition, may be readily deduced all the laws of nature which go|vern human actions. Tho', in the present essay, the duty which a man owes to himself, where others are not concerned, is not com|prehended.

AND, with regard to our general principles of action, self-preservation being the leading principle, it is hard to say, that any means, strictly speaking, are unlawful, to attain that end. If two men in a ship-wreck get hold at the same instant of a plank, which is not bul|ky enough to support both, it is lawful for the one to thrust off the other, in order to save his own life. This action is not con|demned by the moral sense: It is not at|tended with any feeling of wrong. In like

manner, it is lawful for a man to seize upon food wherever he can find it, to keep him|self from dying of hunger.

UPON the same principle, it is lawful for a man to save a member of his own body, at the expence of another's member, if both cannot be saved. A man will scarce have a|ny consciousness of wrong in so doing. But it will hardly be allowed in morality, to save a member at the expence of another's life. This matter, however, is not to be reduced to any accurate rule. The determination of questions of this kind, must necessarily vary according to the circumstances of the per|sons concerned, and according to the tem|per and disposition of the actor.

THE second general principle in point of rank is self-love, which, being a more pow|erful principle than benevolence, it naturally assumes the preference. And we meet with no obstruction from the moral sense, when we prefer our own interest to that of others.

The same will hold with regard to our par|ticular appetites, passions and affections. But here comes a remarkable limitation, that we are not to indulge self-love at the expence of harming others, whether in their persons, goods, or reputation. The moral sense, in every case, self-preservation excepted, lays us under an absolute restraint with regard to these particulars. This restraint is felt as our indispensible duty, and the transgression of this duty never fails to be attended with re|morse, and a dread of merited punishment. And this is wisely ordered. Society could not be preserved without such a law; and e|ven, abstracting from society, the law is es|sentially necessary, to attain the ends propos|ed by the two great principles of action, self-preservation and self-love. No man could be secure of his life a moment, far less of his happiness, if men, worse than savage beasts, preyed upon one another.

THE third principle, which is that of fi|delity, is also in the strictest sense a law of

nature. We are bound to take care of our children, to perform our promises, and to stand true to our engagements. It need only be observed upon this head, that the obli|gation is indispensible, and yields to no other principle or law of nature, if it be not self-preservation alone.

GRATITUDE, the fourth principle, is like|ways to be ranked among the laws of na|ture. We feel it in the strictest sense as our duty. The transgression of this law is not only attended with self-disapprobation, but with hatred and contempt from others.

BENEVOLENCE, the last principle, may be indulged at pleasure, and without restraint, unless where it comes in competition with a strict obligation. If it is directed to advance the happiness of others; it is not to be rank|ed, strictly speaking, among our duties. Be|cause, tho' actions of this kind are highly re|warded by self-approbation, and the love of others, yet the neglect of them is not at|tended

with remorse or punishment. It is true, that a person of a sociable and gene|rous temper, will be strongly impelled to ac|tions of this kind, and will feel pain and uneasiness upon reflecting, that he has not been so useful to his friends, his country, or mankind, as he might have been. But this uneasiness does not arise to what is properly called remorse, or self-condemnation, tho' it may, in some instances, approach to it. There is undoubtedly a distinction here, tho' it be not easy to ascertain the precise limits of feelings that are so much allied to one ano|ther, any more than it is to fix the exact boundary betwixt light and darkness, or to distinguish the very last shade of any colour in tints that run into each other. To in|stance in another case, which belongs to the same head of benevolence. We are oblig|ed to provide for our children; it is strict duty, and the neglect of it causes remorse. In the case of an only brother, suppose, or some very near friend who depends entirely on our help, we feel somewhat of the same

kind of obligation, tho' in a weaker degree; and thus, thro' other connections, it dimi|nishes by successive gradations, 'till at last the motive to benevolence is lost in simple ap|probation, without any obligatory feeling. This is universally the course which nature holds. Her transitions are soft and gentle; she makes things approximate so nicely one to another, as to leave no gap or chasm. Where the object of these feelings can be clearly and fully distinguished, it may be safely asserted, that, in the general case, of procuring positive good to others, or ad|vancing happiness, it is self-approbation and not strict obligation that is felt. But where the object of benevolence is distress, there it becomes a duty, provided it is in our pow|er to afford relief without hurting ourselves. The neglect of such an action is certainly at|tended with remorse and self-condemnation; tho' possibly, not of so strong a kind, as where we betray our trust, or are the au|thors of positive mischief to others. Thus

charity is, by all mankind, considered as a duty to which we are strictly bound.

THESE are the out-lines of the laws which govern our actions, comprehending both what we may do, and what we ought to do. And now, dropping the former to be indulg|ed by every one at pleasure without restraint, we shall confine ourselves to the latter, as the more proper subject of laws, both na|tural and municipal. And no more seems to be requisite in this matter, than clearly to point out our duty, by informing us of what we ought to do, and what we ought not to do; seeing actions, which come not under the character of duty, may be safely left to our own choice. With regard then to what may be called our duty, the first and primary law is the law of restraint, by which we are prohibited to hurt others in their persons, goods, or whatever else is dear to them. The second is a positive law, that we ought to relieve those in distress. The

omission of this duty does not, coeteris pari|bus, affect us so strongly with the sense of wrong, as the transgression does of the for|mer law. Because the creating of positive pain has a greater effect upon the mind, than merely the forbearing to relieve others from pain; as there is a closer connection in the imagination betwixt a man and his actions, than betwixt a man and any action he forbears to do. Fidelity comes, in the third place, as a positive duty, comprehend|ing the care of our offspring, performance of promises, executing trusts, &c. Gratitude takes up the fourth place of positive duty. And that branch of benevolence having for its object the advancing the good of others, takes up the last place, which, if at all to be ranked among our duties, is then only to be ranked, when it is applied to those who are nearly connected with us, and to general objects, such as our town, our religion, our government.

THESE several laws are admirably adjust|ed to our nature and circumstances, and tend in the most perfect manner to promote the ends of society. In the first place, as man is limited with regard to power and capacity, the above laws are accommodated to his na|ture, ordering and forbidding nothing but what falls within his compass. In the second place, peace and security in society are am|ply provided for, by tying up the hands, as it were, of every man from harming others. In the third place, man is prompted to the utmost of his ability to be useful to others. 'Tis his positive duty to relieve the distressed, and perform his engagements. And he is incited to do all the good he can by the pleasure of the action, by benevolence and gratitude from the persons obliged. And lastly, in competition betwixt himself and others, tho' his principles of action directed upon himself, may be stronger than those directed upon others, the superior rewards bestowed by the constitution of our nature

upon the latter, may be deemed a suffici|ent counter-balance to give an ascendent to the social affections.

IT may seem strange, that the municipal law of all countries is so little regardful of the laws of nature, as to adopt but a very few of them. There never was a positive law in any country, to punish ingratitude, if it was not among the antient Persians. There is no positive law to enforce compassion, and to relieve those in distress, if the main|tenance of the poor be excepted, which, in some countries, is provided for by law. No notice is taken of breach of friendship, by statute, nor of the duty we owe our children, further than of supporting them while they are under age. But municipal laws, being of human invention, are of no great extent. They cannot reach the heart, nor its inten|tions, further than as exprest by outward acts. And these are to be judged of cauti|ously, and with reserve; because they form

a language, dark, and at best full of ambigu|ities. At the same time, the object of hu|man laws is man, considered singly in the quality of a citizen. When society is form|ed, and government submitted to, every pri|vate right is given up, inconsistent with so|ciety and government. But, in every other respect, individuals reserve their independen|cy and their private rights. Whether a man be virtuous, is not the concern of the socie|ty, at least not of its laws; but only whe|ther he transgress those regulations, which are necessary to the preservation of society. In this view, great attention is given by the legislature in every country, to enforce the natural law of restraint from mutual hurt and injury. The like attention is given, to enforce the natural obligation of fidelity, at least so far as relates to commerce; for, infi|delity in love and friendship are left to the natural law. Ingratitude is not punished by human laws; because it may be guard|ed against by positive engagements; nor

hard-heartedness with regard to objects of distress, because society may subsist without such a law; and mankind are scarce yet ar|rived at such refinement in manners, as to have an abhorrence of this crime, sufficient to make it an object of human punishment.

THERE is another substantial reason, which confines human laws within a much narrower compass, than the laws of nature. It is essential to human laws, that they be clear, plain, and readily applicable to parti|cular cases; without which, judges would be arbitrary, and law made a handle for oppres|sion. For this reason, none of our actions can be the object of positive law, but what are reducible to a precise rule. Ingratitude therefore cannot be the object of human laws, because the quality of the crime de|pends upon a multiplicity of circumstances, which can never be reduced to a precise rule. Duty to our children, friends and relations is, with regard to most circumstances, in the

same case. The duty of relieving the dis|tressed, in like manner, depends upon many circumstances, the nature of the distress, the connection betwixt the parties, the oppor|tunity and ability of affording relief. The abstinence from mutual harm, and the per|formance of promises are capable to be brought under a precise rule, and these only are the objects of human laws.