Philosophers' Imprint
 UMDL Texts home  spacer  Login  
 
Add to bookbag
Search this text:   Other search options
Author: Matt Weiner
Title: The (mostly harmless) Inconsistency of Knowledge Ascriptions
Publication Info: Ann Arbor, MI: Scholarly Publishing Office, University of Michigan Library
Availability:

This text is protected by copyright and may be linked to without seeking permission. Permission must be received for subsequent distribution in print or electronically. Please contact spo-help@umich.edu for more information.
Source: The (mostly harmless) Inconsistency of Knowledge Ascriptions
Matt Weiner

vol. 9, no. 1, January 2009
Abstract: I argue for an alternative to invariantist, contextualist, and relativist semantics for 'know'. This is that our use of 'know' is inconsistent; it is governed by several mutually inconsistent inference principles. Yet this inconsistency does not prevent us from assigning an effective content to most individual knowledge ascriptions, and it leads to trouble only in exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, we have no reason to abandon our inconsistent knowledge-talk.
Keywords:
epistemology
knowledge attribution
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0009.001
PDF: Link to full PDF [719kb ]

Contents