Reasons as Defaults

Author:	John F. Horty
Title:	Reasons as Defaults
Publication Info:	Ann Arbor, MI: MPublishing, University of Michigan Library April 2007
Availability:	This work is protected by copyright and may be linked to without seeking permission. Permission must be received for subsequent distribution in print or electronically. Please contact mpub-help@umich.edu for more information.
Source:	Reasons as Defaults John F. Horty vol. 7, no. 3, April 2007
Abstract:	The goal of this paper is to frame a theory of reasons--what they are, how they support actions or conclusions--using the tools of default logic. After sketching the basic account of reasons as provided by defaults, I show how it can be elaborated to deal with two more complicated issues: first, situations in which the priority relation among defaults, and so reasons as well, is itself established through default reasoning; second, the treatment of undercutting defeat and exclusionary reasons. Finally, and by way of application, I show how the resulting account can shed some light on Jonathan Dancy's argument from reason holism to a form of extreme particularism in moral theory.
Keywords:	default logic moral particularism nonmonotonic logic reasoning reasons
URL:	http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0007.003
PDF:	Link to full PDF [587kb ]

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