Add to bookbag
Search this text:   Other search options
Author: Paul Hurley
Title: A Kantian Rationale for Desire-Based Justification
Publication Info: Ann Arbor, MI: MPublishing, University of Michigan Library
July 2001
Availability:

This work is protected by copyright and may be linked to without seeking permission. Permission must be received for subsequent distribution in print or electronically. Please contact mpub-help@umich.edu for more information.

Source: A Kantian Rationale for Desire-Based Justification
Paul Hurley


vol. 1, no. 3, July 2001
Abstract: This paper demonstrates that a rationale for a circumscribed form of desire-based justification can be developed out of a contemporary Kantian account as a natural extension of that account. It maintains that certain of Christine Korsgaard's recent arguments establish only that desires must have certain features antithetical to instrumentalism in order to justify. Other arguments purport to establish the standard (stronger) result: that because desires do not have these features, they cannot justify. Her arguments for this strong result, it contends, cannot be reconciled with central commitments in her epistemology and philosophy of mind. The consistent implementation of these commitments opens up a surprising space within what is still readily recognizable as a Kantian ethics--the space for desire-based justification.
Keywords:
Christine Korsgaard
Immanuel Kant
John McDowell
desire
ethics
reasons
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0001.003
PDF: Link to full PDF [116kb ]

Contents