The repressor of over much blaming of the clergy.

xiiij. CHAPITER.

BUT certis more scharpeli here risen ij. obiecciouns, whiche the holders of the firste opinioun miȝten make aȝens me bi resoun thus: Mannys resoun is a thing whiche in hise doomys and iugementis ofte failith, as experience ofte schewith. Wherfore it myȝte seme that God wolde not him to be oure reule in deedis of oure seruice to God. Forwhi this, that God schulde make vs forto leene to a thing deceyuyng and failing forto performe his seruice, bisittith not his wisdom as it wolde seme. The ij^e. obiectioun is this: Holi Scrip|ture is a reuerend thing and a worthi, sythen that bi it and fro it al the Cristen Chirche of God takith her feith. Wherfore it miȝte seme that God wolde not subdewe or submitte and remytte and sende him to resoun, for to be interpretid and be expowned and dressid into trewe and dewe sense and vndirstonding; and that bothe for resoun is a reule failing in his doom, and al so for that Holi Scriptures affermyng vpon a mater is more worthi than is the doom of mannis resoun. And therfore sithen, as it semeth, God not so reulith him in hise gouernauncis, that he ȝeueth a reule which is not sufficient forto reule, or that he puttith the worthier thing vndir reule of the vnworthier thing, it miȝte seme miche of al what y haue bifore tauȝt in this present book be vntrewe.

To the firste of these ij. obiecciouns y answere thus: It is ful profitable to mankinde that he haue of seable treuthis sure knowing, and that bi siȝt of iȝen; and ȝit what othere iȝen or seing power hath God ȝouen to mankinde forto therwith se, than which at sumtyme wolen faile and erre? It is also ful profitable to mankinde that he haue sure knowing of heereable treuthis, and that bi heering of eeris; and ȝit what othere eeris or power of heering hath God ȝoue to man, than which at sumtyme schulen faile and erre in deemyng? Is it not profitable to man|kinde forto move fro oon place into an other place redili and riȝtli and sureli with leggis and feet? And ȝit what othere feet or leggis hath God ȝoue to man, than whiche schulen at sumtyme slide and at sumtyme stumble fro the riȝt going and moving? And if this be trewe, certis thouȝ it be ful profitable to mankinde forto knowe with and bi the power of resoun resonable trouthis, (that is to seie suche as mowe not be knowe bi seing or heering or eny out|ward sensitijf wit,) and also tho same treuthis whiche outward sensityue wittis knowen, it is not merveil, thouȝ God ȝeue noon other power of resoun to man forto bi it knowe these treuthis, than whiche power of resoun schal at sumtyme and ofte faile in his re|sonyng and iuging. And, namelich, herfore it is the lasse merveil. For bi cause that God hath ȝouen to vs noon othere iȝen and power of seing than whiche wolen at sumtime erre, and noon other power of heer|ing than whiche wolen at sumtime erre, and noon othere feet than whiche wolen ofte slide and stumble; therfore if we do oure diligence and bisynes forto kepe as weel as we mowen and kunnen oure power of seing that he erre not, oure power of heering that

he erre not, oure feet that thei slide not and stumble not, God wole holde us excusid, thouȝ oure power of seing erre, and thouȝ oure power of heering erre, and thouȝ oure feet stumble; and it schal be allowid to us as miche of God as if it be seen ariȝt, herd ariȝt, and walkid ariȝt. And euen so, bi cause that God hath ȝouen to vs noon other power of resonyng than which may faile and erre, he wole holde us excusid, thouȝ we folewe an erroneose doom of resoun, whilis we ben not necligent but diligent bothe in oure owne avising and bi counseil taking of othere forto haue a riȝt doom in oure resoun; and he wole allowe, rewarde, accepte, and take oure deede which we doon bi such an erroneose doom, as ferforth as it were doon bi a riȝt doom; al the while that thilk errour in oure resounys doom is had aȝens oure wil, and not bi oure consent and willing or necligence. And so, if this be trewe, (as it is proued be trewe in othere placis of my writingis,) noon inconuenience is, if God ordeyne the power of resoun for to be oure reule in his seruice doing, thouȝ thilk power of reson be such that he schal sumtime (ȝhe, and ofte tyme) erre, but if the gretter laboure be mad theraȝens bi avisingis and bi counseil taking and bi leernyng long tyme in scolis.

Neuertheles it may be answerid to the firste obiec|cioun in other wise thus: That the power of resoun in him silf is not ordeyned of God to be oure next and best and surest reuler or reule anentis alle resonable treuthis, but the doom of reson is ordeyned to so be; and ȝit not ech doom of resoun, but thilk doom of resoun which is a formal complete argument clepid a sillogisme in resoun, whos bothe premissis ben sureli or likeli knowen for trewe, and that bi hem silf or bi sume othere bifore had lijk sillogisme or sillogismes prouyng the premisse hauyng nede to be proued, into tyme it bicome into premissis openest in suerte or openest in probabilite or likelihode. And

certis this doom of resoun (in this wise had) failith neuere, neither may in eny tyme erre. For if y be sikir aud suer in my resoun that no man is in the chirche of Seint Poul at Londoun, and that the bischop of London is a man, y mai be sekir and sure that the bischop of London is out of the chirche of Seint Poul at London, thouȝ alle aungels in heuen wolde seie the contrarie. And cause of this suerte is that the doom of resoun is had bi such a formal sillogisme as is now seid. And in lijk maner suerte of knowing is had bi ech other of the xix. maners or chaungis of sillogismes tauȝt in logik bi opene reulis. Lete ther|fore ech man abide in his resonyng in what euer mater of resonyng he hath to do, in to tyme he be sure that he hath suche seid sillogismes; and he schal neuere be deceyued. So that al the cause whi men ben deceyued in resonyng is her hastynes, that thei wole iuge bi schorte argumentis, eer tho argumentis ben reducid into formes of sillogismes; or ellis for that thei trusten and trowen the premisse be trewe, eer that thei seen the premisses sufficientli proued bi sillogizing, into tyme it be come up into premissis so open in sure trouthe or ellis so open in proba|bilite, that noon nede is that eny other premisse be take forto proue hem; or ellis for that thei knowen not bi reulis ȝouen therto whanne an argument is a formal sillogisme, and whanne he so is not. Sotheli, if a man wole reule him thus, he schal neuere be bigiled aboute maters of resoning; forwhi ther is noon con|clusioun or trouthe in the world, (except tho which ben open bi experience of sensitijf witt or at fulle pleyn in resoun, whiche ben clepid groundis and foun|damentis to alle the othere treuthis and conclusiouns in philsophie, and aboute which no man schal erre, bi cause thei ben so openli trewe), but that into proof of it mai be had a sillogisme weel reulid. And thanne if the bothe premissis be knowen at fulle for sure

trouthis, the conclusioun is to be take for sure trouthe; and if the bothe premyssis be knowun not for sure trouthis, but for suche that for the more parti thei ben trewe and seeldem fallith the contrarie that thei ben vntrewe, or if oon of the premissis be such as is now seid and the other is sure trouthe, thanne the conclusioun is knowen as probabili or likeli trewe.

And this difference here now touchid is the differ|ence bitwix a demonstratijf sillogisme and a probable sillogisme, that is to seie bitwixe a sillogisme which ȝeueth sure and vndoutable kunnyng and a sillogisme which ȝeueth probable kunnyng oonli, that is to seie kunnyng of likelihode and of opinioun but not of cer|teinte. And so no treuthe is a this side the openest fundamental treuthis, but that into proof of him mai be had a sillogisme weel reulid forto proue him sureli trewe, or forto proue him likeli to be trewe; ȝhe, and so likeli to be trewe that he is rather to be holde for trewe than for vntrewe, and that he is to be holde trewe into tyme his contrarie parti be had strenger and euydenter premissis than ben the premyssis whiche ben had into him now. And euen as a pre|misse, whos suer knowing is lokid aftir and souȝt after, is to be resolued bi arguyng of sillogismes in the maner now seid, into tyme it be come into pre|missis of openest suerte; so whanne eny premysse is such that his suer trouthe is not lokid aftir neither souȝt after, but his probabilite or likelihode of trouthe is lokid aftir and souȝt aftir, he is to be resolued upward bi sillogismes, into tyme it be come vp into premyssis of whiche euere either is openest in likeli|hode thouȝ not in suerte, or ellis into premyssis of which oon is openest in suerte of trouthe and the other is openest in suerte of likelihode or of proba|bilite

a this side suerte. So that as ther ben principlis openest in suerte to treuthis whos suer kunnying is souȝt aftir to be had, so ther ben principlis openest in probabilite or likelihode to treuthis whos likeli kun|nyng or probable kunnyng is souȝt aftir to be had, and whos suer kunnyng is not souȝt aftir to be had.

If ensaumplis weren sett to al this doctrine, weel y woot the doctrine wolde be vndirstonde the bettir. But certeinli it were ouerlong for this book for to sette out al the ful doctrine which is now here attained of sillogizing for sure kunnyng, and of sillogizing for probable or likeli kunnyng; and forto sett therto sufficient ensaumplis were ouer it miche lenger. And therfore y must here therof abstene and forber. But ȝit thouȝ y schal not be vnderstonde sufficientli of the lay reders in this bifore going proces (namelich at the first), and not with oute studie and labour in her partie, me thinkith y muste needis seie so miche ther of as y haue now seid; for ellis thei wolden weene that a good clerk couthe not assoile the firste obiec|cioun, which y am sikir thei wolden make. And y haue leefir forto seie sumwhat of the trewe substancial answere longing therto, thouȝ y schulde not be suffi|cientli ther yn vnderstonde of hem, than forto seie not of such sufficient answere bi cause of her insufficience of vndirstonding, and therbi forto suffre vntrewe dif|fame falle to the clergie, and hem forto rise into pre|sumpcioun of trowing that thei han kunnyng more than thei han, and that thei han noon or litle nede to groundli clerkis. Wherfore who mai not or cannot vnderstonde this ij^e. answere to the firste obieccioun, take he him to the firste now bifore seid answere to the same obieccioun; for bothe ben gode ynouȝ, and bothe (thouȝ in her dyuerse maners) ben trewe, sithen the doom of resoun may not be oure next reule in doing Goddis seruice, but if resoun were the romber reule to vs into the same doing of Goddis seruice, bi

cause that the doom of resoun cometh out and fro the resoun, as the liȝt of the sunne comith fro the sunne.

Aftir that y haue schewid thus: That noon incon|uenient is, thouȝ God assigne for oure reule into his seruice the power of resoun in oon maner of reuling, as a power of deedis hath forto reule; and also aftir that y haue schewid thus: That the doom of resoun miȝte be a surer reule to us into Goddis moral ser|uice than is the power of reson,—now y schal schewe that euereither of hem is needis to be seid oure reule into the moral seruice of God to be doon. And firste thus: Of al the moral seruice of God, which is moral lawe of kinde, Holi Scripture is not the reule. Forwhi than therof Holi Scripture were the ground, which is proued bifore to be vntrewe: Also of al the now seid moral seruice of God, Holi Scripture is oonli a witnesser and a rehercer, and takith it out and fro moral lawe of kinde and out of moral philsophie, as it is bifore proued. Wherfore Holi Scripture is not neither may be reuler of thilk moral lawe and seruice to God. And thanne thus: Of thilk now seid moral lawe and seruice to God Holi Scripture muste be reuler, or sumwhat ellis bisidis Holi Scripture muste be ther of the reuler; but now and bifore it is proued that Holi Scripture may not be ther of the reuler, bi cause he is not therof the grounder, and he is ther of oonli the rehercer and witnesser, and taker of it fro an other which is grounder. And herwith it is also open that noon othir thing bisidis Scripture can be assigned forto be ther of the reule or reuler, but if it were the seid doom of resoun mad in forme of sillogisme as the next and best reule, and the power of resoun as for the romber and ferther reule; in as miche as fro the power of resoun cometh forth the now seid doom of resoun. Wherfore needis it muste be grantid, no man may it avoide, that bothe resoun which is the power of resonyng and of deemyng, and

the seid sillogistik doom of resoun ben in her bothe dyuerse maners reulis of al oure moral seruice to God, whiche is moral lawe of kinde, and of al oure lawe to God noon except, whether thei ben lawis of feith or not of feith; for noon of hem can be knowen of us withoute a sillogisme. And thus miche is ynouȝ for answere to the firste obieccioun.

Notes

• This chapter is misnumbered xiii. in the MS. (the two preceding chapters having been originally numbered xii.), and the error ex|tends throughout the remainder of the First Part. A later hand has corrected the running title in part; in this edition, it need hardly be added, the error is corrected throughout.
• The MS. has been corrected from bisittith into bisettith.
• the, MS. (first hand).
• schat, MS.
• The word into seems required before his.
• ooon, MS.